NO. 30 JUNE 2019 Introduction

Turkey between NATO and Russia: The Failed Balance Turkey’s S-400 Purchase and Implications for Turkish Relations with NATO Mehmet Yegin

Turkey’s purchase of a Russian S-400 air defense missile system has raised questions concerning Turkey’s alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the country’s future intentions. Nonetheless, a break with NATO is unlikely, as alliance dependence is still applicable for both Turkey and other members. Turkish government circles have cast the recent purchase as a means to gain more autonomy from and/or better bargaining power with Western allies. However, the purchase of S-400s will not bring about the desired outcomes. Instead, it will generate a dual dependency characterized by vulnerability to Russia and an increased need for assurances from NATO. Turkey also seems to have reached the limits of its bargaining power, as the is placing more weight on punitive measures. The only explanation left for the purchase is the possibility that President Tayyip Erdoğan may be seeking a domestic rally effect via a confrontation with the United States to pre- vent possible challengers to his leadership from gaining momentum.

Russia is scheduled to deliver S-400s to Tur- disagreement over the severity of risks of key in July 2019. Turkey and the United using S-400s and F-35s together and added States are engaged in a high-level debate that the US sanctions should target its concerning the ramifications of the deal on enemies rather than an ally such as Tur- the NATO alliance. Chairmen and ranking key. The Turkish minister of foreign affairs members of both the Armed Services and also reiterated that the S-400 issue is a Foreign Relations committees of the US “done deal” and may not be annulled. Senate delivered a bipartisan message via Another confrontation took place between op-ed to assert their objection to Turkey’s US Vice-President and his acquisition of both a Russian S-400 missile Turkish counterpart, Fuat Oktay. The two system and American F-35 advanced fighter accused each other of risking the alliance aircraft, as well as to state their determina- via developing an affinity with each other’s tion to activate sanctions against Ankara if adversaries, Russia and the Syrian Kurd- Russia delivers the missiles. In response, the ish YPG (People’s Protection Units), respec- Turkish minister of defense voiced Turkey’s tively.

This tension between the governments discourages regional adversaries from en- has refueled the debate on “Turkey break- gaging in a full-scale military campaign ing up with NATO.” Indeed, analysts and against Turkey. This deterrence is no less journalists in the United States have been important than having particular weapons, questioning Turkey’s ties with the alliance such as S-400s. NATO also supports inter- for a long time. alliance peace between Turkey and Greece, thereby sustaining a delicate balance to prevent the Aegean dispute from turning Alliance Dependence Prevails into a military confrontation. Turkey has a long-term policy of participating in the The question is whether these confronta- international organizations that Greece tions are a prelude to the end of Turkey’s joins in order to maintain parity. Leaving NATO membership. Alliances are sustained the most crucial one – NATO – would put not with perfect policy harmony, but in- Turkey in the difficult position of confront- stead are based on alliance dependence ing the alliance alone. Lastly, Turkey would among the parties. Unless alliance depend- not want to give up the NATO nuclear um- ence ceases, the tensions between Turkey brella, given that some of its neighbors pos- and other NATO members serve to advance sess (Russia) or are striving for the capabil- inter-alliance bargaining and do not neces- ity of developing (Iran) nuclear weapons. sarily signify alliance termination. Thus, a From NATO’s perspective, Turkey’s de- break between Turkey and NATO would be parture from the alliance and the possibil- the extreme of all possible outcomes of the ity of Ankara becoming an adversary would S-400s imbroglio. be a significant setback. A Turkey that acts Alliance endurance is determined by in unison with Russia in the Black Sea and alliance dependence, which is based on the Mediterranean would be strategically indispensable security benefits. Thus, other disadvantageous for NATO. Besides, in addi- than the termination of the need for these tion to the ethnic and religious background indispensable security benefits or the exist- of Turkey’s population, it has a broad geo- ence of a better alternative, a divergence in graphic reach that could not be replaced policy preferences among allies – even a by another NATO ally. As a country with a major divergence – may not be a sufficient Muslim-majority population, Turkey pro- reason to end an alliance. Every strongly vides political legitimacy to NATO missions worded statements in the media made by in Muslim countries, as seen in Afghanistan high-level officials or diplomatic confronta- and Libya. Turkey still contributes to the tions do not necessarily signal the end of an Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and alliance. Media and analysts tend to over- NATO’s peacekeeping operation in Kosovo. estimate the severity of crises in alliances without clear criteria for defining them. In terms of alliance dependence, Turkey S-400s for Autonomy and would not put the peace and deterrence pro- Domestic Concerns vided by NATO at risk in a volatile neigh- borhood. This approach includes Russia- In Turkey, government circles primarily cite originated threats. Despite conjunctural political reasons in justifying the purchase of cooperation between Turkey and Russia, S-400 air defense missiles from Russia when the chances for a new strategic axis cen- they could have purchased alternatives from tered on the two countries is improbable. NATO members. All the arguments share Rather, NATO is an important asset for Tur- three intersections: having closer relations key, even in developing its relations with with Russia, thereby making Turkey more Russia, as membership eases the threat of autonomous vis-à-vis NATO; using this as a domination by Moscow. As a NATO mem- bargaining chip; and/or making the pur- ber, Turkey can rely on deterrence that chase for domestic purposes.

SWP Comment 30 June 2019

2 Government circles point at US reluc- Russia did not reverse all sanctions after the tance to supply necessary high-tech weap- apology, as a reminder of their displeasure. ons to Turkey (e.g., US Congress restrictions) Moscow, furthermore, did not reinstate and to the strict control over their use and visa-free travel for Turkish citizens and still transfer of technology. Bringing in Russia as upholds some punitive measures, such as an alternative supplier breaks the Western blocking the import of some Turkish agri- monopoly over arms sales and enables Tur- cultural goods. On this shaky ground, Tur- key to negotiate a better deal with reluctant key may not be able to maximize its inter- allies. ests through its relations with Russia. Domestic concerns related to foreign Turkey’s purchase of the S-400s is not policy are also voiced by analysts close to the right path to pursue the intended out- the government. NATO allies are regarded come of strategic autonomy. It is wrong to as unreliable due to their perceived support believe that when Turkey receives the of the July 15, 2016, coup attempt that tar- S-400s it will simultaneously receive total geted President Erdoğan, whereas Russia control over them. These weapons are not swiftly declared its support for Erdoğan. like Bolshevik rifles used in Turkey’s Inde- Thus, Russia is expected to back Erdoğan in pendence War after World War One. As a the case of another coup attempt and, more sophisticated weapon system, the producer importantly, S-400s would be a useful in- reserves the possibility to meddle with and strument in protecting Erdoğan from a hinder the use of the system. In practice, domestic attack, particularly from the air the use of this system will be open to Rus- forces. Besides, confrontation with the West sian influence and manipulation. delivers a rallying effect for President Erdo- Turkey is solely focused on US concerns ğan and provides an excuse for economic about the risk of Russian radars spying on downturn in domestic politics. Seeking F-35 aircraft. However, Russia may manipu- more autonomy in the international arena late the weapon system in a manner that is and making sovereign decisions concerning counter to Turkey’s intentions. The weapon weapon purchases unite people behind Erdo- system may stop providing security in a ğan. This is especially true during a time in time of dire need or target aircraft without which nationalism is on rise in Turkey. Ankara’s authorization. Turkey may need further assurances from NATO to avoid vul- nerabilities and limit possibly hostile Rus- Not More Autonomy but sian actions. Worse, the presence of S-400s “Dual Dependency” on Turkish soil would make NATO assis- tance costlier. The purchase that was intended to bring more autonomy to Turkey could paradoxi- cally lead to a “dual dependence” on both Limited Space for Negotiation Russia and NATO, defined by a vulnerabil- with the United States ity vis-à-vis Russia and an increasing need for assurances from NATO. This would be The Turkish administration expected the exact opposite of the intended outcome. to make a grand bargain with President Turkey–Russia relations are currently when he was elected into fragile and transactional. After a Turkish office; however, the prospects of using Air Force fighter jet shot down a Russian S-400s as a bargaining chip to bring about Su-24 aircraft violating Turkish airspace meaningful results are limited. Turkish near the Syria–Turkey border in November government circles expected that – given 2015, trust became a casualty of their bi- his business background – President lateral relations. Even after Turkey apolo- Trump would be open to negotiations con- gized, contentious and confrontational de- cerning the following disputes inherited velopments in bilateral relations continued. from the Obama administration: the YPG’s

SWP Comment 30 June 2019

3 role in Syria, Fethullah Gülen’s presence Turkey–Greece balance in the Mediter- in the United States, and the violation of ranean, as it suggests lifting the arms em- Iran sanctions by Turkish banker Mehmet bargo on Cyprus and deepening security Hakan Attila. S-400s could be an important cooperation with Greece. bargaining chip to reach concessions on these three major disagreements, especially considering the strong reactions of the Domestic Concerns May United States to Turkey’s previous deal Encourage Risky Moves attempt for Chinese missiles. From Trump’s inauguration to the pres- Results of recent local elections and the © Stiftung Wissenschaft ent, however, the United States has shown rerun of the Istanbul mayoral elections und Politik, 2019 itself ready to levy punitive measures in have turned attention to domestic politics All rights reserved negotiations with Turkey. In October 2017, in Turkey. Ekrem İmamoğlu, the mayor- the United States suspended the issuance elect in Istanbul, has emerged as a national This Comment reflects of visas to Turkish citizens due to a dispute political figure and is now regarded as a the author’s views. over the incarceration of US diplomatic possible alternative to President Erdoğan. The online version of personnel in Turkey. As the fragility of Additionally, intra-party opposition within this publication contains Turkey’s economy has become more appar- the ruling Justice and Development Party functioning links to other ent, the United States has relied on more (AKP) has become more apparent with the SWP texts and other relevant severe measures. emergence of other potential challengers sources. As a reaction to the incarceration of such as Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu. SWP Comments are subject American pastor Andrew Brunson in Tur- President Erdoğan may risk the detrimental to internal peer review, fact- key, the United States applied individual effects of US sanctions to create a rallying checking and copy-editing. sanctions to two Turkish cabinet members effect and thereby attempt to prevent pos- For further information on and doubled tariffs on steel and aluminum sible adversaries from gaining momentum. our quality control pro- imports from Turkey. At present, the two Unless there is a sudden change in cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- countries seem to be running toward an Turkey’s position, the negotiations seem berlin.org/en/about-swp/ even more damaging confrontation over likely to move forward on the delivery of quality-management-for- the S-400s. the S-400s in July by Russia and the imple- swp-publications/ The punitive measures that the United mentation of sanctions by the United States announced in response to Turkey’s States. The latter may create a path depend- SWP S-400 deal are unprecedented in post–Cold ency for Turkey, which may become more Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik War bilateral relations. The United States reliant on the Russian defense industry. German Institute for has not only threatened Turkey with the Having no access to NATO’s supply of cru- International and introduction of CAATSA (Countering Ameri- cial weapons, Turkey may be forced to buy Security Affairs ca’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) more Russian-produced arms. Currently, sanctions, which aim to halt Russian de- there are also debates in Turkey about buy- Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin fense sales, but also to terminate Turkey’s ing Russian Su-35s or Su-57s in case of the Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 participation in the F-35 advanced fighter cancellation of F-35 deliveries. Fax +49 30 880 07-100 aircraft program. The former brings con- US sanctions will not only affect Tur- www.swp-berlin.org siderable risks to Turkey’s already fragile key’s economy negatively but also provide [email protected] economy, whereas the latter not only a scapegoat (United States and NATO) for deprives Turkey of F-35s, it would also be the Turkish economic crisis. Such a situa- ISSN 1861-1761 doi: 10.18449/2019C30 detrimental to Turkish defense firms. Addi- tion may cause an irreparable rise in anti- tionally, the Eastern Mediterranean Security Western sentiment among the Turkish and Energy Partnership Act, a piece of bi- people. Public opposition in Turkey may partisan legislation, was introduced and bring limitations to future collaboration – advanced in the US Congress. This act would even those based on mutual interest – extensively favor the Greek side within the between Ankara and other NATO allies.

Dr Mehmet Yegin is a Visiting Fellow in the Americas Division at SWP.

SWP Comment 30 June 2019

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