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Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq

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Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis in Iraq UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME, IRAQ COUNTRY OFFICE CENTRAL ORGANIZATION FOR STATISTICS & INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, MINISTRY OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION, IRAQ FOOD SECURITY AND VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS IN IRAQ © United Nations World Food Programme Table of Contents ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS........................................................................ iii DEFINITIONS................................................................................................................. iv Foreword............................................................................................................................ v Preface............................................................................................................................... vi EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 5 1. BACKGROUND .......................................................................................................... 6 HISTORICAL: .............................................................................................................................................. 6 PDS STATUS:.............................................................................................................................................. 6 CURRENT SITUATION: ................................................................................................................................ 7 2. OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................. 8 3. FOOD SECURITY CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ............................................ 9 4. METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................... 11 5. FINDINGS.................................................................................................................. 13 5.1 CLUSTERING................................................................................................................................... 13 5.2 DEMOGRAPHICS.................................................................................................................................. 15 5.3 MAIN INDICATORS IMPACTING FOOD SECURITY AND POVERTY ......................................................... 17 5.3.1 Malnutrition Rate (stunting, underweight and wasting) ............................................................ 17 5.3.2 Income and Expenditure ............................................................................................................ 26 5.3.3 Public Distribution System......................................................................................................... 30 5.3.4 Coping Strategy Mechanisms..................................................................................................... 34 5.4 OTHER INDICATORS IMPACTING FOOD SECURITY AND POVERTY ....................................................... 37 5.4.1 Education................................................................................................................................... 37 5.4.2 Employment................................................................................................................................ 42 5.4.3 Infrastructure ............................................................................................................................. 45 5.4.4 Health......................................................................................................................................... 48 5.5 LOCAL PRODUCTION........................................................................................................................... 52 5.6 DIETARY DIVERSITY........................................................................................................................... 54 5.7 MAGNITUDE OF FOOD INSECURITY..................................................................................................... 61 ANNEXES ....................................................................................................................... 64 ANNEX 1. SAMPLING ................................................................................................................................64 ANNEX 2. HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ............................................................................................................... 66 ANNEX 3. GOVERNORATE PROFILE .......................................................................................................... 75 List of Tables Table 1: Cluster analysis results Table 2: Household size and age structure by governorate Table 3: Malnutrition rate studies conducted in Iraq from 1991 to 2005 Table 4: Malnutrition rate in Iraq by governorates Table 5: Malnutrition rate by age group at urban, rural and national levels Table 6: Malnutrition rate by age group within gender categories Table 7: Household and livestock assets Table 8: Percentage of households reported preferring PDS or cash Table 9: Food consumption coping strategies adopted by Iraqi poor Table 10: Illiteracy and education level of head of household by governorate Table 11: Education level by Clusters Table 12: Working status of children by clusters Table 13: Occupation of heads of households by cluster Table 14: Water and sanitation availability Table 15: Electricity and energy availability Table 16: Health status of head of households by cluster Table 17: Health status of household members by cluster Table 18: Diarrhoea, fever and coughing among children less than five years old Table 19: Test results of Iodised Salt by cluster Table 20: Malnutrition rate by “Dietary Diversity” groups Table 21: Magnitude of food insecurity in Cluster 1. Table 22: Magnitude of food insecurity in Cluster 2. Table 23: Magnitude of food insecurity in Cluster 3. Table 24: Magnitude of food insecurity in Cluster 4. i List of charts Chart 1: Food security conceptual framework Chart 2: Age structure by cluster Chart 3: Stunting rate by governorates compared to national average Chart 4: Wasting rate by governorates compared to national average Chart 5: Malnutrition rate by cluster Chart 6: Malnutrition rate by gender in urban and rural areas Chart 7: Percentage of population by expenditure classes Chart 8: Income and expenditure by cluster Chart 9: Land area and livestock assets per household in urban and rural areas Chart 10: PDS dependency rate by wealth classes within clusters Chart 11: Percentage of households not receiving PDS commodities from January to May, 2005 Chart 12: Relationship between the coping strategy index and percentage poor population by cluster Chart 13: Percentage of heads of households by education level in Iraq Chart 14: Illiteracy rate of households by cluster Chart 15: Household unemployment rate by cluster Chart 16: Percentage of reported diarrhoea cases Chart 17: Percentage of households using non iodized salt for cooking Chart 18: Dietary diversity in Iraq Chart 19: Dietary diversity of households living in districts within Cluster 1. Chart 20: Dietary diversity of households living in districts within Cluster 2. Chart 21: Dietary diversity of households living in districts within Cluster 3. Chart 22: Dietary diversity of households living in districts within Cluster 4. List of Maps Map 1: Geographic distribution of food insecurity and poverty in Iraq. Map 2: Geographic distribution of chronic malnutrition (Stunting) in Iraq Map 3: Geographic distribution of acute malnutrition (Wasting) in Iraq Map 4: Geographic distribution of general malnutrition (Underweight) in Iraq Map 5: Food consumption Coping Strategy Index (CSI) by district Map 6: Geographic distribution of unemployment rate among heads of households Map 7: Kcal/capita/day calculated from potential wheat availability from 2004 local production ii ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ARI Acute Respiratory Infections COSIT Central Organization for Statistics & Information Technology CSI Coping Strategies Index DDS Diet Diversity Score FIVIMS Food Insecurity Vulnerability Information Mapping Systems FAO Food and Agriculture Organization GDP Gross Domestic Product MDG Millennium Development Goals MOE Ministry of Education MOH Ministry of Health MoPDC Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation MOT Ministry of Trade NRI Nutrition Research Institute PDS Public Distribution System PCA Principal Component Analysis UN United Nations UNDG United Nation Development Group UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund USAID United States Agency for International Development VAM Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping WB World Bank WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization iii DEFINITIONS Underweight: Low weight-for-age index identifies the condition of being underweight, for a specific age. The advantage of this index is that it reflects both past (chronic) and/or present (acute) under nutrition (although it is unable to distinguish between the two). Stunting: Low height-for-age index identifies past under nutrition or chronic malnutrition. It cannot measure short term changes in malnutrition. For children below 2 years of age, the term is length-for-age; above 2 years of age, the index is referred to as height-for-age. Deficits in length- for-age or height-for-age are referred to as stunting. Wasting: Low weight-for-height helps to identify children suffering from current or acute
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