K¬¹nti

in the bodhisattva path

of

˜¹ntideva

Barbara E. Nelson

March 2021 Canberra, Australia Corrected version of a thesis presented in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, August, 2003 Abstract

˜¹ntideva, an Indian Buddhist monk who flourished in the 8th century C.E., was the author of two works, the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. These texts concern the practices of the bodhisattva and have an important place in the Mah¹y¹na Buddhist tradition. The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra has been translated from Sanskrit and Tibetan many times, but detailed study of the content of the two texts is lacking. Therefore, ˜¹ntideva’s contribution to his tradition has not been clearly defined.

This thesis investigates k¬¹nti in the bodhisattva path of ˜¹ntideva and compares ˜¹ntideva’s interpretation of k¬¹nti with that found in the Mah¹y¹na tradition. Key concepts in the description of the bodhisattva path and the models of the bodhisattva path available to ˜¹ntideva are outlined. The bodhisattva path is presented in a variety of ways in Mah¹y¹na texts. K¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹ is primarily an antidote to anger, but has a number of other meanings in Mah¹y¹na literature.

The structures of ˜¹ntideva’s two works are examined and shown not to conform entirely to any previous models of the path. ˜¹ntideva’s treatment of k¬¹nti shows his focus on the preliminary stages of the bodhisattva path and on the beginner bodhisattva. ˜¹ntideva treats k¬¹nti mainly as an antidote to anger, but also as a part of developing the positive emotions of benevolence and compassion. He relies on the previous tradition, but does not draw on all aspects of k¬¹nti found in earlier literature.

iii Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all the people who have helped me during the years I have worked on this thesis. My supervisor, Dr Peter Oldmeadow, has guided the thesis to its completion. I very much appreciate his scholarship and calm direction. Dr N. Ross Reat supervised me in the initial stages of the project at the University of Queensland, and the Department of Studies in Religion there provided me with facilities to begin the project. The Australian Government awarded an Australian Postgraduate Award, which also helped me to get started. I spent two very happy months in Puªe in May and June 1998, reading the k¬¹nti chapters with Mrs Pushpa Kale. She provided insights into the cultural background of the texts, and helped with making sense of them. Having the opportunity to undertake intensive Sanskrit study in an environment where Sanskrit scholars are plentiful and valued was a joy. Royce and Tamara provided me with contacts in Puªe. Professor Saroja Bhate of the University of Puªe; and my landlord and my yoga teacher all helped to make my stay there a wonderful experience. My friend Jilli has encouraged me from the very beginning to the very end. I value her friendship immensely, and her belief that I could do it. Patrick Kearney also encouraged me at the beginning of my studies, and provided an opportunity to discuss Buddhist thought. Eloith helped me translate La Vallée Poussin’s difficult French. I thank all my friends who took an interest, the Dzogchen Community, and I thank all my teachers. My family loved and supported me. Hugh, Adrian and Diana, who all had experience of the academic enterprise, encouraged me to keep going. Margaret, Ron and Geoffrey always provided emotional and practical support. I am very sad that my father, Hugh, passed away in June 2001, and did not have the opportunity to see the thesis completed. The thesis would not have been possible without the excellent collection of the Australian National University Library. I am grateful to the past scholars of the ANU who ensured the collection existed. I am also grateful to the Library for providing me with paid employment over many years. Finally, because not least, I thank Conrad for his love, companionship, encouragement and assistance in many ways over the past four years.

iv Table of Contents

Abstract...... iii

Acknowledgements...... iv

Table of Contents ...... v

Abbreviations ...... viii

Chapter 1 Introduction ...... 1

Chapter 2 ˜¹ntideva : an introduction ...... 8

I ˜¹ntideva’s life, work and tradition ...... 8

I.1 ˜¹ntideva’s life...... 13

I.2 ˜¹ntideva’s works ...... 14

I.3 ˜¹ntideva’s tradition ...... 18

II Survey of study of ˜¹ntideva ...... 20

II.1 Early assessments ...... 21

II.2 Late nineteenth century and early twentieth century context ...... 24

II.3 Mid-twentieth century ...... 27

II.4 Later twentieth century ...... 42

Conclusion ...... 43

Chapter 3 Bodhisattva path and k¬¹nti in the Mah¹y¹na tradition...... 45

I Literature...... 46

II Path structures...... 53

II.1 Bodhisattva, bodhicitta, and the bodhisattva path ...... 53

II.2 P¹ramit¹s...... 63

II.3 BhØmis ...... 76

II.4 M¹rga ...... 113

III K¬¹nti ...... 118

v III.1 Types of k¬¹nti ...... 118

III.2 K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ ...... 124

Conclusio n ...... 134

Chapter 4 Bodhisattva path in ˜¹ntideva’s works ...... 136

I Structures ...... 137

I.1Structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra...... 137

I.2 Structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya ...... 144

I.3 Comparison of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya ...... 148

I.4 Another version of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra ...... 161

II BhØmis in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and ˜ik¬¹samuccaya ...... 164

II.1 The beginning of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya ...... 165

II.2 Other references to bhØmis in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya...... 173

II.3 BhØmis and ˜¹ntideva’s path ...... 177

Conclusio n ...... 178

Chapter 5 K¬¹nti in the works of ˜¹ntideva ...... 180

I K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹...... 181

I.1 The three types of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya...... 181

I.2 The three types of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra...... 188

I.3 Comparison of k¬¹nti in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya ...... 194

II ˜¹ntideva’s arguments ...... 202

II.1 Concepts of the main argument...... 202

II.2 Arguments to change attitude to desired/undesired ...... 220

II.3 Other arguments...... 225

III Patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti)...... 229

Conclusion ...... 230 vi Chapter 6 K¬¹nti in ˜¹ntideva in the context of the tradition ...... 232

I.1 Ak¬ayamati SØtra ...... 233

I.2 ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa...... 237

I.3 Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya ...... 238

I.4 BodhisattvabhØmi...... 239

I.5 Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra ...... 241

II Why k¬¹nti?...... 242

II.1 Protecting merit...... 242

II.2 Weariness and other faults/benefits ...... 244

III Arguments to aid the cultivation of k¬¹nti ...... 246

III.1 ˜¹ntideva’s main argument ...... 248

III.2 Arguments based on nature of suffering...... 254

III.3 Realizing others do not cause suffering ...... 258

III.4 Noble aims and creating a positive attitude...... 261

III.5 K¬¹nti and the divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra) ...... 265

III.6 Prasa¡ga arguments ...... 269

Conclusion ...... 270

Chapter 7 Conclusion...... 272

Appendix 1 Bodhicary¹vat¹ra Chapter 6 K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹...... 278

Appendix 2 ˜ik¬¹samuccaya Chapter 9 K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹...... 346

Bibliography...... 360

vii Abbreviations

Aks Ak¬ayamati SØtra. Page references to Jens Braarvig, Ak¬ayamatinirde¶asØtra, vol. 2, The tradition of imperishability in Buddhist thought (Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1993). ASPS ¸rya¶ura’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa. Verse references to ¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium of the perfections: translation and analysis of the P¹ramit¹sam¹sa, trans. Carol Jean Meadows (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1980). Bendall and ˜¹ntideva, ˜ik¬h¹ Samuccaya: a compendium of Buddhist Rouse doctrine, trans. Cecil Bendall and W. H. D.Rouse. First published 1922; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971. BB Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi. Page references to Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmiå: being the XVth section of Asa¡gap¹da's Yog¹c¹rabhØmiå, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, 2nd ed. (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1978). BCA Bodhicary¹vat¹ra by ˜¹ntideva.

BCAP Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹ by Prajñ¹karamati.

BHS Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist hybrid sanskrit grammar and dictionary, vol. 2, Dictionary (First edition: New Haven, 1953; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993). Crosby and ˜¹ntideva, The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trans. K. Crosby and A. Skilton Skilton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

LVP ˜¹ntideva, Bodhicary¹vat¹ra: together with Prajñ¹karamati’s Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin (Calcutta: Bibliotecha Indica, 1902-1914). MA Madhyamak¹vat¹ra by Candrak»rti.

MAB Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya. References to "Madhyamak¹vat¹ra: introduction au traité du milieu de l'¹c¹rya Candrak»rti avec le commentaire de l’auteur," trad. Louis de la Vallée Poussin, Le Muséon, n.s., 8 (1907): 249-317; 11 (1910): 271-358. MPPS Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹sØtra. Page references to N¹g¹rjuna, Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de N¹g¹rjuna (Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra), [trad.] Etienne Lamotte, 5 vols. (Louvain: Institut orientaliste, Bibliotheque de l'universite, 1949-1980).

viii MW Monier Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English dictionary (First edition published 1899; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990). SS, Vaidya ˜ik¬¹samuccaya of ˜¹ntideva, ed. P.L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1961). SSB ˜¹ntideva, ˜ik¬¹samuccaya: a compendium of Buddhistic teaching, ed. Cecil Bendall (St. Petersburg: Bibliotecha Buddhica, 1897-1902; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992). TTD Tibetan Tripi−aka, Sde dge bstan ågyur, Dbu ma, 17 vols. (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku, 1977-1979). TTK Tibetan Tripi−aka, Dbu ma'i skor, vol. 10 (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey, 1985). Vaidya Bodhicary¹vat¹ra with the commentary pañjik¹ of Prajñ¹karamati, ed. P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960).

ix Chapter 1

Introduction

˜¹ntideva was a Buddhist monk who lived in north India at the turn of the 8th century C.E. Buddhism had been flourishing in India for about 1300 years, and had developed into a number of schools. ˜¹ntideva belonged to the M¹dhyamika school of Mah¹y¹na Buddhism. He is known as the author of two texts, the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. These texts describe the path and practices of the bodhisattva, the highest ideal of the Mah¹y¹na tradition. They were used as a source for the bodhisattva path by the Tibetan schools and are also our main sources of knowledge of the M¹dhyamika path of spiritual discipline. This may be because his two known works, the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, and a commentary to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra by Prajñ¹karamati, the Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹, are available in Sanskrit.

Starting in 1889, ˜¹ntideva’s texts have been edited and translated into several European languages. Most scholars have focused on edition and translation of his texts, and have made brief statements about their significance. His contribution has not been clearly defined, due in part to a lack of detailed study of his texts. As well, reliable information on aspects of the path of practice according to the Mah¹y¹na is also lacking. ˜¹ntideva’s works greatly influenced the Tibetan schools. Much writing on the path either relies on Tibetan interpretations or the works of ˜¹ntideva. Therefore, distinguishing ˜¹ntideva’s contribution is not easy.

The path of practice is central to any form of Buddhism and the Buddhist literature on the bodhisattva path is extensive, yet few studies have been devoted exclusively to the subject. Western scholars have focused on the philosophical, or wisdom, aspect of Mah¹y¹na Buddhism. As Gethin points out, scholarly study of the Buddhist path and spiritual practice has been lacking, partly due to the lack of recognition that "Buddhist thought is about the

1 Buddhist path."1 Western scholars, coming from a European philosophical tradition that emphasizes reason above practice, often fail to appreciate that Buddhist philosophy consists of Buddhist thought about Buddhist practice, i.e., the path that leads to enlightenment.2 Studies of M¹dhyamika Buddhism have primarily focused on philosophical arguments found in the works of Candrak»rti and N¹g¹rjuna; the few studies of ˜¹ntideva have concluded that his philosophy accords with his tradition. The source of ˜¹ntideva’s contribution and innovation, if any, must therefore be sought in areas other than philosophy.

In order to advance our knowledge of ˜¹ntideva, detailed studies of his texts are needed. Some effort has been devoted to his treatment of prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and to other philosophical aspects of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, and one study to an aspect of the bodhisattva training in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. As the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya are mostly about the practices of a bodhisattva, this thesis chooses to examine one aspect of the bodhisattva path.

The Buddhist system of thought includes many concepts which are repeated in various contexts with subtle shifts in meaning and use. The bodhisattva path encompasses this system of thought and is too vast to be covered by this thesis in its entirety. Both ˜¹ntideva’s texts have a chapter entitled k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹3 and k¬¹nti is central to ˜¹ntideva’s understanding of the path. K¬¹nti, usually translated as “patience” or “forbearance,” is interesting for a number of reasons. Its role in Mah¹y¹na Buddhism is complex. “Patience” does not cover the full range of meanings given to k¬¹nti in the Buddhist literature. As one of the six p¹ramit¹s, it gained a place of importance in the bodhisattva path, which it did not have in the eight-fold path of the P¹li Canon. Furthermore, k¬¹nti is not only a p¹ramit¹ but is significant in the path in other ways. For these reasons, I have chosen to confine my investigation to k¬¹nti.

1 R. M. L Gethin, The Buddhist path to awakening : a study of the bodhi-pakkhiy¹ dhamm¹, Brill's Indological library, vol. 7 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), 18-19. 2 Ibid. 18. 3 ˜ik¬¹samuccaya has three chapters entitled “p¹ramit¹:” d¹nap¹ramit¹, k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ and v»ryap¹ramit¹. 2 It is telling that many Buddhist scholars writing about the bodhisattva path still use Har Dayal’s text, published in 1932, as one of their main sources.4 Some of the most useful primary material was translated more than fifty years ago, and in some cases nearly a hundred. Scholars lament that much of the basic terminology of the Nik¹yas is still in need of investigation.5 If this is the case with P¹li Buddhism, where the Canon has been available in English for many years, the study of Mah¹y¹na Buddhism encounters an even greater task. Many generalizations are made, the validity of which is hard to determine as many texts are yet to be studied. This lacuna is obvious in the case of k¬¹nti.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate in detail one aspect of ˜¹ntideva’s texts. It aims to determine whether ˜¹ntideva conformed to earlier Mah¹y¹na in his treatment of k¬¹nti in the bodhisattva path. The results of this research can be a basis for further study of ˜¹ntideva’s contribution to other aspects of the path and to the bodhisattva path as a whole, and for further study of the bodhisattva path in the Mah¹y¹na Buddhist tradition.

Chapter 2 introduces ˜¹ntideva’s life works and tradition. It surveys the scholarly study of ˜¹ntideva to date, starting with the first editions of his works in the late nineteenth century. It places the assessments made of ˜¹ntideva in the context of attitudes to Buddhism, mysticism and philosophy. It establishes that more detailed study of his texts is needed, with more attention paid to the path of practice rather than philosophy.

As ˜¹ntideva’s contribution must be assessed against his tradition, chapter 3 outlines the models of the bodhisattva path available to ˜¹ntideva, and examines the place of k¬¹nti within those models. It identifies the uses of the term k¬¹nti in the Mah¹y¹na tradition. The chapter introduces the literature of the Mah¹y¹na tradition, beginning with the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras and then turning to important works of the M¹dhyamika school, as well as Asa¡ga’s BodhisattvabhØmi, which describes the career of a bodhisattva. A discussion of models of the bodhisattva path, based on p¹ramit¹s, stages (bhØmi), and paths

4 Har Dayal, The bodhisattva doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit literature (First published 1932; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970). 5 Peter Masefield, Divine revelation in Pali Buddhism (Colombo: Sri Lanka Institute of Traditional Studies; London: George Allen and Unwin, 1986), xv. 3 (m¹rga), follows an introduction to the concepts of bodhisattva and the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta). K¬¹nti has a range of meanings in Mah¹y¹na literature and also appears in several contexts, such as the bhØmis and m¹rgas. Its place in these schemes is dealt with as part of discussions of those path models. The section of the chapter on k¬¹nti begins by outlining the range of meanings of k¬¹nti. The discussion of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, which follows, ascertains how the three types of k¬¹nti, which are said to make up k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in some Mah¹y¹na texts, are treated by a range of texts.

Chapter 4 assesses the extent to which ˜¹ntideva followed available models of the bodhisattva path. In order to determine the structures of ˜¹ntideva’s two texts, and whether they have the same structure, the chapter describes and compares the structures of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, with particular reference to the p¹ramit¹s. The chapter considers whether the bodhisattva path advocated by ˜¹ntideva consists only of p¹ramit¹s, and whether we would expect his treatment of k¬¹nti to be only as a p¹ramit¹. It places k¬¹nti in the context of the structures of the texts. The chapter also examines ˜¹ntideva’s approach to the stages (bhØmi) and what sort of bodhisattva he was addressing.

Chapter 5 investigates ˜¹ntideva’s treatment of k¬¹nti and its place within his bodhisattva path. It attempts to identify the three types of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in both texts, and compares the contexts of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the two texts. ˜¹ntideva has a principal argument for the cultivation of k¬¹nti, and a number of arguments to support this main argument. Finally, the chapter considers ˜¹ntideva’s treatment of patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti).

Chapter 6 compares ˜¹ntideva’s treatment of k¬¹nti with that found in five other Mah¹y¹na texts. The Ak¬ayamati SØtra is an early Mah¹y¹na sØtra, which ˜¹ntideva quotes from in his ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya is another text that outlines the bodhisattva path and ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa is a description of each of the six p¹ramit¹s. The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra has an extensive description of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, which includes many of the arguments also used by ˜¹ntideva. The BodhisattvabhØmi

4 also treats k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, and has several arguments that are common to a number of texts. Chapter 7 is the conclusion.

Appendices include translations from Sanskrit of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapters of the Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹6 and of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.7 A sub– thesis presented for an Honours degree at the Australian National University (1994) included a translation of the Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹, verses 1-63. The translation of these verses presented here has been completely revised. Although Crosby and Skilton’s translation of the verses of Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is very good,8 it was necessary to make new translations of the verses as words and phrases from the verses are explained in the commentary. These words must make sense both in the context of the verse and the commentary. When only a verse translation is made, the meanings of the words in the verses can be adjusted in line with the commentary. This may leave the commentary with nothing to explain. As far as possible, I have avoided additional explanatory material in square brackets. I have preferred a literal translation, while still trying to write in standard English.

I have followed Roger Jackson’s suggestion of not italicizing Sanskrit words found in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, while adding the appropriate diacritical marks.9 These words are treated as acceptable English words and mostly left untranslated. In general, I also leave k¬¹nti untranslated. Other terms not translated as a rule include bhØmi (its usual translation as ‘stage’

6 For the Sanskrit text, I have used La Vallée Poussin’s edition, ˜¹ntideva, Bodhicary¹vat¹ra: together with Prajñ¹karamati’s Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹, ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin (Calcutta: Bibliotecha Indica, 1902-1914), checking against Vaidya’s edtion, Bodhicary¹vat¹ra of ˜¹ntideva: with the commentary pañjik¹ of Prajñ¹karamati, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit texts, no. 12 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1960). A second edition, published in 1988, did not make any changes to the text, but has a different pagination and some typographical errors. Bodhicary¹vat¹ra of ˜¹ntideva: with the commentary pañjik¹ of Prajñ¹karamati, ed. P. L. Vaidya and Sridhar Tripathi, 2nd ed., Buddhist Sanskrit texts, no. 12 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1988). I have also consulted the Tibetan text for clarification, when needed. 7 For the Sanskrit text, I have used Bendall’s edition, ˜¹ntideva, ˜iksh¹samuccaya: a compendium of Buddhistic teaching, ed. Cecil Bendall, Bibliotecha Buddhica 1 (St. Petersburg: Bibliotecha Buddhica, 1897-1902; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1992), checking against Vaidya’s edition, ˜ik¬¹samuccaya of ˜¹ntideva, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit texts, no. 11 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1961). 8 ˜¹ntideva, The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trans. Kate Crosby and Andrew Skilton, The world’s classics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), xxviii.

5 fits awkwardly in most contexts), prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ (since neither prajñ¹ nor p¹ramit¹ are translated), patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti) and the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta). Dharma is spelt with a capital letter when indicating the Buddhist teaching, or doctrine, and without a capital when meaning ‘phenomena’ or ‘constituent of reality.’

I have tried to use standard, familiar and accurate translations of key Buddhist terms, and have added the Sanskrit in brackets so the technical meaning can be appreciated. There are some translations of Buddhist concepts which have been around for so long that they are acquiring the connotations relevant to their use in Buddhist discourse. To provide ease in relating ˜¹ntideva’s teaching to Buddhism as a whole, it seems advisable to retain these standard terms. For instance, translating duåkha as ‘suffering’ requires no explanation. When choosing a translation, I have tried to choose a word which fits all contexts, but this is not always possible. In that case, I limit the number of translations and to be consistent. For instance, in some contexts, ‘pleasure’ is the best translation of suåkha and, in others, ‘happiness.’ Where an explanation of the chosen translation is required, this will be provided either in the text or in a note. All translations from Sanskrit texts are my own, unless otherwise indicated.

The thesis is based on primary sources in Sanskrit and texts available in English, French or German translation. Tibetan primary sources have been used for information on the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, when necessary. New material in the thesis includes a review of scholarly study of ˜¹ntideva, a comparison of the structures of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya and the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, a comparison of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the earlier (Tun-huang) version of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra with the canonical version, a survey of ˜¹ntideva’s attitude to the bodhisattva stages (bhØmi) in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, a critical analysis of the three types of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the Mah¹y¹na tradition, a detailed outline of k¬¹nti in ˜¹ntideva’s texts, a comparison of ˜¹ntideva’s treatment of k¬¹nti with

9 Roger Jackson, "Terms of Sanskrit and P¹li origin acceptable as English words," Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 5, no. 2 (1982): 141-42. 6 other Mah¹y¹na texts and a survey of arguments for cultivating k¬¹nti in those texts. As well, an appendix includes the previously untranslated k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of Prajñ¹karamati’s Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹.

7 Chapter 2

˜¹ntideva: an introduction

This chapter introduces ˜¹ntideva and his texts, and establishes that his contribution to the Mah¹y¹na tradition has not been clearly defined. Contradictory conclusions have been drawn about ˜¹ntideva, exacerbated by the changing meanings or values given to concepts over a period of time. A consideration of how his contribution to Mah¹y¹na Buddhism has been assessed by scholars through most of the twentieth century shows a lack of detailed analysis of the content of his texts, which has led to superficial and unsupported assessments. This situation is beginning to change.

The chapter begins with a survey of the sources of information on ˜¹ntideva, a summary of what is known about his life, and an introduction to his works and tradition. A survey of the scholarly study of ˜¹ntideva follows. Most scholarly study has focused on the editing and translating of ˜¹ntideva’s two texts, particularly the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. ˜¹ntideva’s contribution to the Mah¹y¹na Buddhist tradition is briefly stated in introductions to these editions and translations. Rather than restate the sometimes repetitive assessments and descriptions of ˜¹ntideva, this survey looks at the context and background which may have led to some of these statements being made.

I ˜¹ntideva’s life, work and tradition Our knowledge of ˜¹ntideva is based on three main sources: Tibetan histories, his works, and scholarly research undertaken in the West. Other sources of knowledge about him are the monastic Indian Buddhist context in which he lived, and the tradition in which he practised. ˜¹ntideva’s works were very influential in the Tibetan schools of Buddhism and sources of information for ˜¹ntideva’s life are mainly Tibetan. Tibetan historiography’s concern is with tracing the origins of Buddhism in Tibet, therefore its aim is to record the development of Buddhism in India in order to link it with the Tibetan schools. For this reason Indian Mah¹y¹na teachers and their works are recorded in

8 detail.1 Pezzali reproduces four biographies of ˜¹ntideva in full; three are from Tibetan histories and one is from a fourteenth century Nepalese text, in Sanskrit. She documents the variations in the four biographies and provides translations of these four biographies and compares the information contained in them.2 De Jong reports a fifth biographical source, found in the Tanjur, which is very similar to the Sanskrit text.3 The material collected by Pezzali, with additions and corrections suggested by de Jong, supply the available information on ˜¹ntideva’s life.4 The broad outline of ˜¹ntideva’a story is the same in each text.5 As Pezzali and de Jong have thoroughly examined these sources, a brief survey of the sources and conclusions concerning ˜¹ntideva’s life is presented here.

The three Tibetan histories are Chos-’byung6 by Bu-ston (1290-1364),7 Rgya-gar chos ’byun by T¹ran¹tha (b.1573),8 and Dpag-bsam-ljon-bzang by Sum-pa mkhan-po Ye-¶es-dpal-'byor (1704-1788), which was completed in 1747.9 The other two sources are the text in Sanskrit, discovered by Harapras¹d

1 Sukumar Dutt, Buddhist monks and monasteries of India: their history and their contribution to Indian culture (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962), 243. 2 Amalia Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva: mystique bouddhiste des VIIe et VIIIe siècles, Testi e ricerche di Scienze religiose 3 (Florence: Vallecchi Editore, 1968), 4-20, 27-32. 3 J. W. de Jong, "La légende de ˜¹ntideva," Indo-Iranian journal 16 (1975): 164. It is in response to what de Jong considers Pezzali’s errors and omissions that de Jong wrote his article, de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 161. 4 de Jong, "˜¹ntideva," 161-182 5 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 21. 6 Bu-ston, History of Buddhism (Chos-åbyung), pt. 2, The history of Buddhism in India and Tibet, trans. E. Obermiller, Reprint series 5 (Heidelberg: In Kommission bei O. Harrassowitz, 1932; reprint, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1964). Bu-ston’s history was composed in 1322-33; it is “perhaps the earliest Tibetan history so far discovered,” S. Dutt, Buddhist monks, 242; de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 162: Pezzali’s translation follows Obermiller’s translation closely. 7 Dates from S. Dutt, Buddhist monks, 242; and Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 3. Uncorrected by de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 1975. 8 T¹ran¹tha, History of Buddhism in India, trans. Lama Chimpa, Alaka Chattopadhyaya; ed. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (Simla: Indian Institiute of Advanced Study, 1970). According to Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya T¹ran¹tha’s History was written in 1608; de Jong also says that T¹ran¹tha wrote this work in 1608, and that Pezzali incorrectly gives 1608 as T¹ran¹tha’s date of death. According to de Jong, T¹ran¹tha’s date of death is unknown, he was 34 in 1608; de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 161 n. 2. S. Dutt, Buddhist monks, 243, gives 1573 for T¹ran¹tha’s birthdate, and gives no date of death; he states that the history (rgya-gar chos ’byun) was completed in 1607. 9 Sum-pa mkhan-po Ye-¶es-dpal-'byor, Pag sam jon zang, ed. Chandra Das, Rinsen Buddhist text series 5 (Calcutta: The Presidency Jail Press, 1908; reprint, Tokyo: Rinsen, 1984), iii. De Jong gives the date of the work as 1748. He agrees with Pezzali that Sum-pa mkhan-po adds nothing new about ˜¹ntideva; de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 162. 9 ˜¹stri,10 and a Tibetan text, found in the Tanjur. This Tibetan text is found at the beginning of a commentary on the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra written by VibhØticandra (Byang chub kyi spyod pa la 'jug pa'i dgongs-pa'i 'grel pa khyad par gsal byed ces bya-ba = Bodhicary¹vat¹rat¹tparyapañjik¹ vi¶e¬adyotan» n¹ma).11 De Jong concludes that the latter two are based on an earlier text, not now extant.12 He reproduces both these texts, and translates the Tibetan text into French.13

The credence given to these works as sources of historical knowledge varies. Pezzali considers that history is “of course” mixed with legend in these short biographies.14 De Jong also refers to the legend of ˜¹ntideva rather than his life.15 He believes that this legend contains many elements which merit study in order to understand its origin and development, but that it is difficult to discover an historical nucleus which allows the determination of when and where ˜¹ntideva lived.16 Although de Jong and Pezzali consider the story of ˜¹ntideva’s life to be legend rather than history, it is evident that T¹ran¹tha is concerned with providing an accurate history. He does assess his sources, accept some and reject others.17 However, attempts to verify the facts in the biographies of ˜¹ntideva with other historical sources have met with little success.18 One problem with identifying ˜¹ntideva’s period is that the biographies mention various kings’ names, but these kings are otherwise untraceable. Chattopadhyaya notes that modern scholars of Indian history use T¹ran¹tha’s History as a source of political and cultural information, as well as a source of information about Buddhism, particularly for the period between

10 See Harapras¹d ˜¹stri, A descriptive catalogue of Sanskrit manuscripts in the government collection, under the care of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. 1, Buddhist manuscripts (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1917), 51-53. 11 Tibetan Tripi−aka, Sde dge bstan ågyur, Dbu ma (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku, 1977-1978), 11: 192b-282a. 12 de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 164. 13 Ibid., 168-172, 175-177. 14 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 1. 15 de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 161. 16 Ibid., 179. 17 T¹ran¹tha, History, trans. Lama Chimpa, Alaka Chattopadhyaya, 19: he also acknowledges that he is only interested in the history of the “True Doctrine.” 18 de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 179; Bendall, SSB iii-iv. 10 Hsüan-tsang’s visit to India and the decline of Buddhism. It contains historical data not available from other sources, as well as legendary material.19

The exact dates of ˜¹ntideva’s life are uncertain. Based on the writings of the Chinese pilgrim, I-tsing, who does not mention ˜¹ntideva and left India in 695, and the date of ˜¹ntarak¬ita’s visit to Tibet, Bhattacharya concludes that ˜¹ntideva was active sometime between 695 and 743 C.E.20 The evidence for the second date is ˜¹ntarak¬ita’s quoting an entire ¶loka from the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra in his Tattvasiddhi. Murti and Pezzali accept this argument, although Pezzali corrects the dates to 685 and 763. According to de Jong, a Japanese scholar Kanakura arrived at a similar conclusion, i.e., that ˜¹ntideva was born in the second half of the seventh century and was active about 700 C.E.21 De Jong rejects the conclusiveness of these arguments on two grounds. The attribution of the Tattvasiddhi to ˜¹ntirak¬ita may not be correct and it has yet to be proven that I-tsing and Hsüan-tsang mentioned all the Buddhist masters of some importance who were living during or before their sojourn in India. Therefore, that I-tsing does not mention ˜¹ntideva does not signify that he could not have lived before 685.22 However, de Jong acknowledges that the dates of the Tibetan translators of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and ˜ik¬¹samuccaya provide a terminus ad quem for ˜¹ntideva of about 800 C.E.23

One of the scholarly debates about ˜¹ntideva concerns whether ˜¹ntideva, the author of Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, is also the tantric adept ˜¹ntideva, described in Tibetan sources.24 According to Bu-ston and the texts translated by de Jong and ˜¹stri, ˜¹ntideva was also given the name

19 T¹ran¹tha, History, trans. Lama Chimpa, Alaka Chattopadhyaya, xi-xii. 20 Bhattacharya in Tattvasa¡graha of ˜¹ntarak¬ita: with the commentary of Kamala¶»la, ed. E. Krishnamacharya; foreword B. Bhattacharyya (First published 1926; reprint, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1984), 1:xiii-xiv. They are accepted by T. R. V. Murti, The central philosophy of Buddhism: a study of the Maadhyamika system (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1980), 100 n. 6; and Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 38. 21 de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 180 n. 42: Kanakura Enshø, Satori ye no michi, (Tøkyø, 1957), 232-33. 22 Although Crosby and Skilton note that I-tsing resided at N¹land¹ for several years during second half of 7th century. Crosby and Skilton, xxviii. 23 SSB, v; and de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 180. 24 Discussed by Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 43-44. 11 Bhusuku at N¹land¹.25 Several Indo-Tibetan biographies of the Mah¹siddhas include a monk named ˜¹ntideva, or Bhusuku.26 The legends about Bhusuku in these biographies are very similar to those about ˜¹ntideva in the Tibetan histories of Buddhism.27 On the basis of some Bengali sahaja songs attributed to Bhusuku, ˜¹stri concludes that ˜¹ntideva was from Bengal and that he was also a tantric practitioner.28 Nevertheless, the question of whether ˜¹ntideva was a tantric practitioner or if there are two ˜¹ntidevas, or Bhusukus, is not settled.29

It is generally accepted that ˜¹ntideva flourished between 685 and 763 C.E and that he was a follower of Mah¹y¹na Buddhism.30 He was a Buddhist monk at N¹land¹ monastery and composed two works, the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Bu-ston and T¹ran¹tha attribute another work, entitled SØtrasamuccaya, to ˜¹ntideva. Bendall,31 Winternitz,32 Pezzali,33 Vaidya,34 Ruegg,35 de Jong and others36 have discussed this attribution, but no work with this title by ˜¹ntideva has been found.37 A misreading of two verses of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra (BCA5:105-106) may have led to the erroneous conclusion that ˜¹ntideva was the author of a work called SØtrasamuccaya.38 Ruegg accepts

25 Bu-ston, History of Buddhism (Chos-åbyung), pt. 2, trans. Obermiller, 162; de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 176; Harapras¹d ˜¹stri, "Santideva," Indian antiquary 42 (February 1913): 50. 26 David Seyfort Ruegg, The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India, A history of Indian literature, vol. 7, fasc. 1 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 106, refers to “a (later) ˜¹ntideva known also as Bhusuku.” Neither Pezzali nor de Jong consider these biographies to be valid sources of knowledge about ˜¹ntideva. 27 For example, Abhayadatta, Masters of Mah¹mudr¹: songs and histories of the eighty-four Buddhist siddhas, trans. Keith Dowman, SUNY series in Buddhist studies (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1985), 222-228. 28 Sastri, “˜¹ntideva,” 51-52. 29 Abhayadatta, Masters of Mah¹mudr¹, trans. Dowman, 226-228. 30 Paul Williams, general introduction to Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, by ˜¹ntideva, trans. Crosby and Skilton, viii. 31 SSB, iv. 32 Maurice Winternitz, A history of Indian literature, trans. B. Srinivasa Sarma, rev. ed., vol. 2. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), 353 n. 1. 33 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 80-86. 34 SS, Vaidya, vii. 35 Ruegg, Literature, 84. 36 Pezzali summarizes the views of Finot, La Vallée Poussin, Tucci and Filliozat on this issue. Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 81-83; de Jong refers to four articles in Japanese which discuss the issue, de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 182 n. 50. 37 Ruegg, Literature, 84. 38 SSB, iv n. 2, discusses the way these verses have been interpreted. Prajñ¹karamati interprets them as saying that ˜¹ntideva composed two works, ˜ik¬¹samuccaya and SØtr¹samuccaya, and that N¹g¹rjuna also composed two works with these titles. However, they 12 that the conclusion that Bu-ston and T¹ran¹tha were mistaken is reasonable.39 An alternative reading of the relevant verse leads to the conclusion that the work mentioned is the SØtrasamuccaya by N¹g¹rjuna.40 De Jong does not rule out that such a work by ˜¹ntideva existed,41 but no Sanskrit version is extant.

I.1 ˜¹ntideva’s life The version of ˜¹ntideva’s life according to T¹ran¹tha is as follows. ˜¹ntideva was born the son of a king in Saur¹¬−ra, which is located in West India, now part of modern Gujarat. He renounced his kingdom after having a dream of the deity, Mañju¶r», who told him not to take up the throne. The female deity, T¹r¹, also recommended that he not become king. He immediately left his home, met a yogi who became his teacher, undertook meditation and attained sam¹dhi and non-conceptual awareness (nirvikalpa jñ¹na).42 These accomplishments were again assisted by the two deities, Mañju¶r» and T¹r¹. Following a period as a minister to a king, he travelled to N¹land¹, a Buddhist monastic university, the site of which is in present day Bihar. There he was ordained as a monk and given the name ˜¹ntideva. As a monk, he would have followed Mah¹y¹na precepts, studied sØtra literature, and meditated. T¹ran¹tha describes the three activities of monks at N¹land¹ as “listening (¶ravaªa), reflecting (manana) and meditating (dhy¹na).”43

At N¹land¹, ˜¹ntideva gained a reputation for being extremely lazy. Although he appeared to do nothing but eat and sleep, T¹ran¹tha says that he was actually “meditating and listening to the doctrine from Mañju¶r».”44 The other monks decided to get rid of him by exposing his lack of knowledge of the sØtras. They organized a day when monks would recite sØtras in turn, thinking

could mean that ˜¹ntideva wrote the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya and N¹g¹rjuna the SØtr¹samuccaya, and this is now generally accepted (see, for instance, Crosby and Skilton’s translation). 39 Ibid. 40 Chr. Lindtner, Nagarjuniana: studies in the writings and philosophy of N¹g¹rjuna, Buddhist traditions, vol. 2 (First published 1982; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987), 11, 175-178, accepts that the SØtrasamuccaya is a genuine work by N¹g¹rjuna, and lists the 68 sØtras from which it contains extracts. Forty of the 68 texts cited by N¹g¹rjuna in his SØtrasamuccaya are also found in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Most of the excerpts are from different parts of these texts. 41 de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 182. 42 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 12. 43 T¹ran¹tha, History, trans. Lama Chimpa, Alaka Chattopadhyaya, 217.

13 that ˜¹ntideva would not know any texts to recite, and would leave the monastery in shame. When ˜¹ntideva’s turn came, he asked the other monks if they would like to hear an existing sØtra or something new. They asked to hear something new. He then recited the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. As he discoursed on the perfection of wisdom (prajñ¹p¹ramit¹), he ascended into the sky and disappeared. He continued to recite the rest of the work while no longer visible. The verse he was reciting when he disappeared was:

When neither entity nor non-entity remains before the mind, since there is no other mode of operation, grasping no objects, it becomes tranquil.45

˜¹ntideva did not return to N¹land¹. T¹ran¹tha relates several more incidents from ˜¹ntideva’s life. These are accounts of the miracles he performed in order to convert others to the Buddhist doctrine. Throughout this biography, ˜¹ntideva is referred to as an ¹c¹rya (Tibetan: slob dpon), teacher.46

I.2 ˜¹ntideva’s works Pezzali surveys the known manuscripts and editions of ˜¹ntideva's two works, and lists all translations into languages both ancient and modern.47 This introduction gives a brief overview and brings her survey up to date.

Minayeff prepared the first edition of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, which was published in 188948 and reprinted by Harapras¹d ˜¹stri in 1894.49 La Vallée Poussin published a new edition, with Prajñ¹karamati’s commentary, from 1902- 1914 (LVP). Prajñ¹karamati’s commentary is the only commentary surviving in Sanskrit. Other published editions are by ˜¹ntibhik¬u¶¹str» (1955),

44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., 218 n. 57; translation from Crosby and Skilton, 118. De Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 163, says that one of Obermiller’s rare errors in his translation of Bu-ston, copied by Pezzali, is that he says that ˜¹ntideva reappeared, whereas de Jong translates the relevant passage as “il s’en alla” - he went away. 46 Bu-ston says that ˜¹ntideva described himself as an ordinary being, but Prajñ¹karamati calls him an ¹rya (‘phags pa) (Bu-ston, History of Buddhism (Chos-åbyung), pt. 2, trans. Obermiller, 166; Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 11). 47 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 50-65, 72-80. 48 In Zapiski no. 4 (1889) as “La doctrine du salut dans le Bouddhisme postérieur;” Bodhicary¹vat¹ra: introduction à la pratique des futurs Bouddhas: poème de ˜¹ntideva, trad. Louis de La Vallée Poussin (Paris: Librairie Bloud, 1907), v n. 1. 49 ˜¹ntideva, "Bodhicaryy¹vat¹ram," ed. Harapras¹d ˜¹stri, Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of India 2, part 1 (1894): 1-16; part 2 (1894): 17-32; Sastri, “˜¹ntideva,” 49. 14 Vidhu¶ekhara Bha−−¹c¹rya (1960)50 and Vaidya (1960).51 Vaidya’s edition, with Prajñ¹karamati’s commentary, relies largely on that of La Vallée Poussin.52

Early translations of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra were made into Tibetan (eighth and eleventh centuries),53 Chinese (tenth century)54 and Mongolian (fourteenth century).55 The Tibetan Tanjur contains ten commentaries,56 including that of Prajñ¹karamati, which is also available in Sanskrit. Pezzali provides bibliographic details of complete translations of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra into French, Hindi, Gujar¹t», Mar¹−h», Beng¹l», Mongolian, Kalmuk, and Japanese, and partial translations into English, French, Italian, German, and Mongolian.57 Since Pezzali completed her survey, several more translations have been published. These include English translations by Matics,58 Batchelor,59 Sharma,60 Crosby and Skilton, the Padmakara Translation Group,61 Wallace and Wallace,62 a German translation by Steinkellner,63 an Italian translation by Pezzali,64 a Danish translation by Lindtner65 and Hindi translations by Swami

50 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 56. 51 A second edition, published in 1988, did not make any changes, but has a different pagination. Bodhicary¹vat¹ra of ˜¹ntideva: with the commentary pañjik¹ of Prajñ¹karamati, ed. P. L. Vaidya and Sridhar Tripathi, 2nd ed., Buddhist Sanskrit texts, no. 12 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1988). 52 Prajñ¹karamati’s commentary also appears in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra of ¸rya ˜¹ntideva with the commentary Pa¡jik¹ of Shri Prajn¹karamati and Hindi translation, ed. and trans. Swami Dwarika Das Shastri, Bauddha Bharati series 21 (Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1988). 53 Ruegg, Literature, 85; Akira Saito, A study of Ak¬ayamati (=˜¹ntideva)’s Bodhisattvacary¹vat¹ra as found in the Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang (Miye: Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C), 1993), 15. 54 Hajime Nakamura, Indian Buddhism: a survey with bibliographical notes, Intercultural Research Institute monograph, no. 9 (Hirakata, Japan: KUFS Publication, 1980), 288. 55 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 57-58. 56 TTD, vol. 10-11. 57 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 63-65. 58 ˜¹ntideva, Entering the path of enlightenment: the Bodhicaryavatara of the Buddhist poet Santideva, trans. Marion L. Matics, Unesco collection of representative works. Indian series (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971). 59 ˜¹ntideva, A guide to the bodhisattva’s way of life, trans. Stephen Batchelor (Library of Tibetan Works and Archives: Dharamsala, 1979). 60 ˜¹ntideva, Bodhicary¹vat¹ra: original Sanskrit text with English translation and exposition based on Prajn¹karmati’s Panjik¹, [trans.] by Parmananda Sharma, 2 vols. (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 1990). 61 ˜¹ntideva, The way of the bodhisattva: a translation of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trans. Padmakara Translation Group (Boston: Shambhala, 1997). 62 ˜¹ntideva, A guide to the bodhisattva way of life (Bodhicary¹vat¹ra), trans. V. A. Wallace and B. A. Wallace (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1997). 63 ˜¹ntideva, Eintritt in das Leben zur Erleuchtung (Bodhicary¹vat¹ra): Lehrgedicht des Mah¹y¹na, übersetzt Ernst Steinkellner (Düsseldorf: Eugen Diederichs, 1981). 64 Il Bodhicary¹vat¹ra di ˜¹ntideva, [trans.] Amalia Pezzali (Bologna: Egidi, 1975). 15 Dwarika Das Shastri66 and Trip¹th».67 No translation of Prajñ¹karamati’s commentary has been published.

There are two editions of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Bendall’s edition (SSB) is dated 1897-1902. Vaidya bases his edition on Bendall’s, with some corrections.68 The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya was translated into Tibetan early in the ninth century69 and into Chinese in the eleventh century.70 There are only two complete modern translations of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. One is in Japanese and the other in English.71 Translations of sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya are found in various collections of Mah¹y¹na sØtras.72

Both the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya are valued for being some of the few Indian Buddhist texts which are still available in Sanskrit. Most texts originally composed in Sanskrit are now only available in Tibetan or Chinese translation. One reason that they have survived in Sanskrit is because of their importance in the Mah¹y¹na Buddhist tradition. At»¬a, who arrived in Tibet from India in 1042 C.E. to promulgate Buddhism, included both the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and ˜ik¬¹samuccaya in his "Six Basic Treatises" of the Bkha-gdams sect, which he founded.73 Both texts concern the spiritual path and training of a bodhisattva. A bodhisattva is a person proceeding on the path to Buddhahood with the aim of helping all beings, and is the highest ideal of the Mah¹y¹na tradition. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya consists mainly of excerpts from Mah¹y¹na sØtras which form the commentary to verses (k¹rik¹) composed by

65 Chr. Lindtner, To buddhistiske laeredigte: Nagarjuna: "Brev til en ven" (Suhrllekha). Santadeva: "Om en bodhisattvas livsform" (Bodhisattvacaryavatara) oversat med indledning og noter, Indiske studier 1 (Kobenhavn: I kommission hos Akademisk Forlag, 1981). 66 Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, ed. and trans. Swami Dwarika Das Shastri. 67 ˜¹ntideva, Bodhichary¹vat¹r: Bhot-version, Hindi-translation and commentary, [trans.] R¹ma ˜a‚kara Trip¹th», Bauddha Him¹laya grantham¹l¹, vol. 8 (Leh: Central Institute of Buddhist Studies, 1989). 68 SS, Vaidya. 69 Ibid., vii; TTD, vol. 16. 70 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 77; Nakamura, Indian Buddhism, 289. 71 ˜¹ntideva, ˜iksh¹ Samuccaya: a compendium of Buddhist doctrine, trans. Cecil Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse (First published 1922; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971). (Later cited as Bendall and Rouse). 72 See Peter Pfandt, Mah¹y¹na texts translated into Western languages: a bibliographical guide, rev. ed. (Köln: Brill, 1986), for details of these. 73 At»¶a, A lamp for the path and commentary of At»¶a, trans. Richard Sherburne (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 104. 16 ˜¹ntideva. In many cases, these excerpts are the only surviving Sanskrit remnants of the texts from which they are quoted.

Only eight of the ten commentaries to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra listed in the contents of the Tanjur are complete.74 One of the complete commentaries is to a shorter version of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.75 A Tibetan translation of this shorter version is found among the manuscripts discovered at Tun-huang, and now located in the British Library. Saito’s 1993 monograph discusses this version of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and compares the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ chapters in the canonical and Tun-huang versions.76 Ishida looks at differences between the Tun-huang manuscript and the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter on ¶»lap¹ramit¹.77

The only commentary surviving in the original Sanskrit is that of Prajñ¹karamati, which was originally composed in the late tenth or early eleventh century. If little is known about the life of ˜¹ntideva, then even less is known of Prajñ¹karamati. He is identified as one of the Six Door-keeper Scholars of Vikrama¶»la monastery,78 at the same time as ˜¹ntipa and N¹ropa.79 Vikrama¶»la was one of the last great monastic universities of Northeastern India. Chattopadhyaya has determined that the period when these scholars were active was early in the eleventh century.80 Ruegg suggests that Prajñ¹karamati flourished c.950-1000.81 According to T¹ran¹tha, he was a monk and "a scholar in all the branches of learning and had the direct vision of Mañju¬r»."82 Works attributed to him are Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ravÅttipiª©¹rtha, ˜i¬yalekhavÅtti and Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹.83

74 TTD, vol. 10-11; ˜¹ntideva, Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trans. Padmakara Translation Group, 193. 75 TTD, 10: 5: No. 3873, Bodhisattvacary¹vat¹ra-vivÅtti-pañjik¹, author and translator not mentioned. 76 Saito, A study of Ak¬ayamati (=˜¹ntideva)’s Bodhisattvacary¹vat¹ra. 77 Chikø Ishida, "Some new remarks on the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chap. V," Journal of Indian and Buddhist studies / Indogaku bukkyogaku kenkyu 37 (1988): 476-79. 78 See Alaka Chattopadhyaya, At»¶a and Tibet: life and works of D»pa÷kara ˜r»jñ¹na in relation to the history and religion of Tibet (Calcutta: the Author, 1967), 100-112. 79 T¹ran¹tha, History, trans. Lama Chimpa, Alaka Chattopadhyaya, 294ff.; George N. Roerich, The blue annals, pt. 1, Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal monograph series, vol. 7 (Calcutta: Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1949), 206. 80 Chattopadhyaya, At»¶a, 295. 81 Ruegg, Literature, 116. 82 T¹ran¹tha, History, trans. Lama Chimpa, Alaka Chattopadhyaya, 295. 83 Ibid. 17 Vaidya proposes that Prajñ¹karamati wrote the commentary to chapter nine of Bodhicary¹vat¹ra first of all, and composed that for the first eight chapters at a later date.84 La Vallée Poussin suggests that the authenticity of chapter ten of Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is doubtful, because Prajñ¹karamati wrote no commentary to it.85 Vaidya and Ruegg both reject this view.86 Ruegg refers to the fact that although Prajñ¹karamati wrote no commentary to chapter ten, he does mention it in BCA1:33.87

Although Prajñ¹karamati lived several centuries after ˜¹ntideva, he belonged to the same North Indian monastic tradition,88 and wrote his commentary in Sanskrit, the language of the original work. Prajñ¹karamati's commentary to Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is considered to be authoritative by the Tibetans.89 Tsong-kha-pa refers to Prajñ¹karamati's Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹ several times, as a good interpretation and as a "great commentary."90

I.3 ˜¹ntideva’s tradition ˜¹ntideva lived more than a thousand years after the time of the historical Buddha. Not surprisingly, doctrinal change had occurred during that period. Most significant was the development of the Mah¹y¹na tradition. Its development was linked to a new type of Buddhist literature, the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ (or perfection of wisdom) sØtras.91 The Mah¹y¹nists accepted these sØtras as the word of the Buddha, whereas the non-Mah¹y¹nists did not.92 The ideas contained in these sØtras were formulated in reaction to Abhidharmikas of the Sarv¹stiv¹din school, who claimed that reality consists of ultimate units of existence (dharma), which are self-existent entities. The prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras

84 Vaidya, ix. 85 Ibid., viii-ix. 86 Ibid.; Ruegg, Literature, 84. 87 Ruegg, Literature, 84. Also, the commentary to the shorter version includes chapter ten (numbered chapter nine), TTD, 10:6. 88 M. J. Sweet, ˜¹ntideva and the M¹dhyamika: the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹-pariccheda of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1984), 38. 89 Ibid. 90 Tsong-kha-pa, Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism: with Kensur Lekden's Meditations of a tantric abbot, ed. and trans. Jeffrey Hopkins (London: Rider, 1980), 155. 91 Paul M. Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism (London: Routledge, 1989), 4, 40; Murti, 83. 92 Whether these were composed later than the literature now contained in the P¹li Canon, or concurrently, is a question beyond the scope of this thesis. Williams, Mah¹y¹na

18 claimed that no entities are self-existent, everything is dependently arisen and thus empty of self-nature. These Mah¹y¹na sØtras also idealized the path of the bodhisattva, in contrast to the earlier ideal of the arhat. The Mah¹y¹nists characterized the arhat as seeking for personal enlightenment only, whereas the bodhisattva’s aim was to help all sentient beings to enlightenment.

M¹dhyamika is the philosophical systematisation of the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras.93 Wisdom (prajñ¹) is the state of consciousness that understands that all dharmas are empty; the perfection of wisdom (prajñ¹p¹ramit¹) can only occur within the context of the bodhisattva path, leading to full Buddhahood.94 N¹g¹rjuna was the originator of the M¹dhyamika school of Mah¹y¹na Buddhism.95 In the MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹, N¹g¹rjuna demonstrates the emptiness of all dharmas by showing that any argument that posits a self-nature can be defeated in terms of its own propositions.96 He tries to show that if any dharma, or thing, is analyzed it is found to be empty. Entities have no essence, or self-existence, they only exist in relation to other entities; emptiness (¶Ønyat¹) is dependent arising.

Later developments led to the school splitting into two groups that were later named, by Tibetan scholars, the Sv¹tantrika M¹dhyamika and Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamika.97 The Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamikas claim that they do not put any argument of their own, they only demolish the arguments of their opponents. In Dkon-mchog 'Jigs-med dbang-po’s Jewel garland of the dissertation on philosophical systems (Grub pa’i mtha’i rnam-bzhag rin-po-che’i phreng pa) a Pr¹sa¡gika is defined as “a person who absolutely denies the notion of an essence and who does not accept that things exist by virtue of a constitutive principle through which they are what they are, even in a nominal sense;" and

Buddhism, 29, suggests that it is possible that a Mah¹y¹na sØtra or teaching may contain elements of a tradition which goes back to the historical Buddha. 93 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 30. 94 Ibid., 43, 45. 95 Ruegg, Literature, 4; Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 55. 96 There are several English translations of MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹: N¹g¹rjuna: a translation of his MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹ with an introductory essay, trans. Kenneth K. Inada (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970); MØlamadhyamakak¹rik¹ of N¹g¹rjuna: the philosophy of the middle way, [trans.] David J. Kalupahana (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986); The fundamental wisdom of the middle way: N¹g¹rjuna’s MØlamadhyamakak¹rik¹, trans. Jay L. Garfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

19 names Buddhap¹lita, Candrak»rti and ˜¹ntideva as representatives of this school.98

Ruegg and Murti attribute to ˜¹ntideva, along with Candrak»rti, the firm establishment of the Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamika school.99 Philosophically, Candrakirti established the Pr¹sa¡gika school as the dominant form of M¹dhyamika, while ˜¹ntideva established the practices to be undertaken.100 ˜¹ntideva belonged to the last period of the M¹dhyamika tradition in India, a generation or two later than Candrak»rti.101 All that is known of ˜¹ntideva’s teacher and immediate predecessor, Jayadeva, is that he was a paª©it at N¹land¹ had two students, ˜¹ntideva and VirØpa.102

II Survey of study of ˜¹ntideva Study of ˜¹ntideva began in the late nineteenth century. The early research on ˜¹ntideva by Minaev, La Vallée Poussin, Bendall, Barnett and Finot consists of editions and translations of his two works (Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and ˜ik¬¹samuccaya), with more or less brief introductions. The introductory material to these editions and translations contains the editors’ and translators’ assessments of ˜¹ntideva. These early editors and translators admired ˜¹ntideva for being ethical, preaching a universal ideal and rejecting the tendency of his time to embrace tantrism and meditation.

Scholars have interpreted ˜¹ntideva in a variety of ways and have arrived at contradictory conclusions regarding him. These contradictions are due partly

97 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 57. 98 Herbert V. Guenther, Buddhist philosophy in theory and practice (Boulder: Shambhala, 1976), ix, 143. 99 Murti, 98; Ruegg, Literature, 85. See Tillemans on Candrak»rti and the term Pr¹sa¡gika; Tom J. F. Tillemans, Materials for the study of ¸ryadeva, Dharmap¹la and Candrak»rti: the Catuå¶ataka of ¸ryadeva, chapters XII and XIII, with the commentaries of Dharmap¹la and Candrak»rti: introduction, translation, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese texts, notes, vol. 1, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 24,1 (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 1990), 13-14. 100 Murti, 87, 95, 99. 101 Ibid., 87; Akira Saito, “˜¹ntideva in the history of M¹dhyamika philosophy," in Buddhism in India and abroad: an integrating influence in vedic and post-vedic perspective, ed. Kalpakam Sankarnarayan, Motohiro Yoritomi, and Shubhada A. Joshi (Mumbai: Somaiya Publications, 1996), 261. 102 Jürg Hedinger, Aspekte der Schulung in der Laufbahn eines Bodhisattva: dargestellt nach dem ˜ik¬¹samuccaya des ˜¹ntideva, Freiburger Beiträge zur Indologie, Bd. 17 (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1984), 8. 20 to changes in interpretation of the Buddhist and M¹dhyamika tradition and due partly to changes in the connotations and meaning of the terms used to describe him. ˜¹ntideva and his works have been described as mystic, philosophical, tantric, scholastic, poetic, personal, universal, ethical, moral, religious, following his tradition, innovative, mythical, magical and irrational.

The literature about ˜¹ntideva reveals the changing attitudes to Buddhism since its scholarly study began in the nineteenth century. It reflects the changing assumptions of scholars concerning the Buddhist tradition and M¹dhyamika philosophy. Some background to the changes in meaning and changing values given to concepts used in describing ˜¹ntideva and his school helps in understanding scholarly reactions to ˜¹ntideva. In particular, the term mystic has been used in a variety of ways and sometimes has had positive connotations and sometimes negative connotations. Linked to the interpretation of ˜¹ntideva as a mystic was the belief that M¹dhyamika philosophy embodies a doctrine of the Absolute. Before discussing some of these issues, some of the early reactions to ˜¹ntideva are introduced.

II.1 Early assessments In 1893, after the initial publication of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, Auguste Barth (1834-1916) commented that it reveals a side of seventh century Indian Buddhism that we would not otherwise have been aware of and that ˜¹ntideva expresses humble renouncement and ardent charity. He praises the work, calling it “une très belle oeuvre” and “une sorte de pendant bouddhique de l’Imitation.”103 By comparing the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra to Thomas À Kempis’s Imitation of Christ, he was identifying ˜¹ntideva as a devotional mystic rather than a philosopher.104

Between 1902-1914, La Vallée Poussin published a Sanskrit edition of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra (with Prajñ¹karamati’s commentary) (LVP), and in 1907 translated the verses into French.105 In the introduction to his translation, La

103 Quoted in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trad. La Vallée Poussin, v. (a sort of Buddhist counterpart to the Imitation) 104 Encyclopedia of religion, s.v. “Thomas À Kempis” by Howard G. Hageman. 105 Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trad. La Vallée Poussin; Donald S. Lopez, Jr. describes La Vallée Poussin as a “devout Christian” in his introduction to Curators of the Buddha: the study of 21 Vallée Poussin commends ˜¹ntideva for his “practical morality” and for his rejection of “ecstatic meditation.” He says:106

. . . si on néglige quelques raffinements scolastiques, et des traits un peu trop hindous pour ne pas choquer par leur exotisme, j’espère qu’on appréciera l’élévation et la solidité du raisonnement et du sentiment : dans le fond, étroitement associées avec des vues ascétiques et métaphysiques, avec la sagesse “à stoïcienne” du vieux Bouddhisme, les deux idées “qui renferment toute la loi et tous les prophètes” : la paternité des Bouddhas et la fraternité des créatures; une théologie qui avoisine la nôtre, avec des saints et la communion des saints, mais dans laquelle Dieu est remplacé par la loi automatique de la rétribution des actes qui, en somme, n’est qu’une manière de se représenter la Justice Incréée; . . .

He then criticizes the arhats and the pagan Hindus for supposing that passion and ignorance can be destroyed through the “puerile method” of meditation. He appreciates the practice of the bodhisattva, described by ˜¹ntideva, for being a school of humility, fervour and good sense, which is demonstrated by its favouring moral law and charitable activity over ecstatic meditation.107

Bendall made the first Sanskrit edition of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya in 1902. In his introduction to this edition, Bendall confines his assessment of ˜¹ntideva to the following:

It must suffice to say that ˜¹ntideva represents an advanced stage of Buddhism, in a somewhat scholastic aspect, but with very slight references to Tantrism and these too uncontaminated by the peculiar mystic hedonism which dragged down some of the later literature to the level of very thinly veiled K¹ma-¶¹stra.108

In a footnote he adds:

Buddhism under colonialism, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 10. 106 Ibid., x-xi; ... if we ignore some of the scholastic meticulousness, and the offensively exotic Indian features, I hope that the nobility and durability of the argument and the sentiment will not go unappreciated: essentially inseparable from the ascetic and metaphysical views of old Buddhism, with its characteristic stoic wisdom, are the two ideas which comprise all the law and all the prophets: the fatherhood of the Buddhas and the brotherhood of creatures; a theology which is similar to our own, with our concept of the saints and the communion of saints, and in which God is replaced by the automatic law of retribution for acts, which is just another way of explaining the idea of Uncreated Justice; ... 107 Ibid., xi. 108 SSB, v-vi. 22 precisely one of these few mystic passages in the book (139.4-140.12) which we should most gladly (for ˜¹ntideva’s credit) have passed over lightly, is selected by the Tibetan translators for repetition at the end of the book109

The passage which Bendall considers mystic is in the chapter of ˜ik¬¹samuccaya about preserving the person (¹tmabh¹varak¬¹). This chapter includes advice on how and what to eat, the attitudes to take when receiving gifts on the alms round, and what a monk should do if he gets sick; as well as a mantra to ensure that these actions are done with the correct intention and result.110 Later in the chapter more mantras are given to protect against threats to the physical body, such as poison or snake bites.111 In 1880, Bendall had edited a text of the Megha SØtra, which was an invocation to the N¹gas for rain. As he was dismayed with the content of the text he had chosen to edit, he decided to issue an abridged version.112 At one point he marked a hiatus by stating: “here follow several pages of gibberish and mysticism.”113 His reaction to ˜¹ntideva’s inclusion of such mantras in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya may be due to his acquaintance with such “mysticism” in this earlier publication.

The first English translation of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra published in 1909114 omits most of chapter nine, which outlines the philosophy of the Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamika school of Mah¹y¹na Buddhism.115 The translations by Tucci (into Italian, 1925) and Schmidt (into German, 1923) also do not include this chapter.116 Barnett translates prajñ¹ as “mystic insight.” He says, “The older Buddhism . . . did not give enough play for the elements of mysticism and

109 SSB, vi n. 1. 110 My interpretation. 111 Bendall and Rouse, 136-139. 112 Cecil Bendall, "The Megha-SØtra," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, n.s., 12 (1880): 286: “A perusal, however, of the work showed such a preponderance of the objectionable peculiarities of this branch of Tantric literature . . . that the project of preparing a complete edition was abandoned . . .” 113 Ibid., 300. 114 The path of light: rendered for the first time into English from the Bodhi-chary¹vat¹ra of ˜¹nti-Deva: a manual of Mah¹-y¹na Buddhism, trans. L. D. Barnett, Wisdom of the East (London: John Murray, 1909). 115 This translation was prepared for a general audience, considered to have little interest in the philosophy of Buddhism. 116 Sweet, ˜¹ntideva, 6; Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 64. According to T¹ran¹tha, History, trans. Lama Chimpa, Alaka Chattopadhyaya, 218, some Indian traditions maintain that the chapter on prajñ¹ was not in the original work. 23 emotion that have always been strong in the Hindu spirit.”117 He describes the metaphysics of Mah¹y¹na as nihilistic idealism.118 He refers to “the whole of the scholastic disputation which makes up the bulk of the ninth chapter,” and also omits from the other chapters text which he considers to be “needlessly prolix.” His aim is to enable the reader to understand and appreciate “the fervent devotion and brotherly love which make this little book, in spite of its errors, a lasting monument of true religious emotion, ‘an everlasting possession’.”119

II.2 Late nineteenth century and early twentieth century context ˜¹ntideva was a popular object of study for two reasons. The first was the availability of his works in Sanskrit,120 which also reflected his importance within the Buddhist tradition. The second was that the content of his texts seemed to be largely concerned with ethical matters with which late nineteenth century and early twentieth century European scholars were sympathetic. Earlier interpreters such as La Vallée Poussin, Bendall, and Barnett praise ˜¹ntideva’s ethical system and his devotional attitude, but are critical of the mystical and scholastic tendencies in his work. Vaidya says: “The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is a very popular work among European scholars, perhaps for its devotional character, which appealed to them most.”121 Sweet notes the lack of chapter nine in the earlier translations which stressed the devotional side.122 These translations also stressed the ethical and practical aspects of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.

When ˜¹ntideva’s texts were first edited, a distinction had been drawn between H»nay¹na123 and Mah¹y¹na with the assumption that H»nay¹na

117 Path of light, trans. Barnett, 19-20. 118 Ibid., 26, 98 n. 13: “‘Void,’ ˜Ønya, . . . is another name for infinite Being, the unqualified Transcendental.” 119 Ibid., 33. 120 Most Buddhist works in Sanskrit had been destroyed during invasions of India and extensive study of Tibetan sources developed later. 121 ˜¹ntideva, Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, ed. Vaidya, Tripathi, xi. 122 Sweet, ˜¹ntideva, 6; Sweet considers that ˜¹ntideva was popular because he was not scholastic and that his work has a devotional, quasi-Christian tone; ibid., 4. 123 H»nay¹na was a term coined by the Mah¹y¹nists to describe the non-Mah¹y¹na schools, and is considered to be pejorative. It is not easy to find a satisfactory replacement term, however. Therav¹da is a type of Buddhism that developed out of the Sthavirav¹da school and includes later developments. We do not know exactly what early Buddhism consisted of, and the 24 Buddhism, based on the P¹li Tripi−aka, was historically prior to Mah¹y¹na Buddhism and thus contained the essence of Buddhism.124 In the nineteenth century the Mah¹y¹na school was generally considered to be a corrupt form of an earlier, more ethical form of Buddhism.125 The ethical qualities of P¹li Buddhism were admired and Mah¹y¹na Buddhism was seen as a later, degenerate, and corrupt form of Buddhism.126 One interpreter saw the Mah¹y¹na as “having replaced plain practical morality with listless quietism, abstract nihilism, and fanciful degrees of contemplation and ecstatic meditation.”127

Buddhist ethics and morality were admired even by those who rejected Buddhist doctrine.128 Almond suggests that in nineteenth Britain, Buddhist morality was admired because of its analogies to the Victorian understanding of Christian morality.129 In 1890, an author admired Buddhism for being like Christianity, and the Buddha for being a “reformer who stood up alone against a dominant caste to proclaim the brotherhood and equality of man; the isolated thinker ... ; his heroic career of self-sacrifice and life laid down for his friends; ... literature pervaded by love and purity.”130 The individualism and independence of the Buddha is emphasized, as is his opposition to all former systems of philosophy and morals.131 In this can be seen both a vindication of the reforms of Protestantism132 and the European rejection of the caste system of India (and

term P¹li Buddhism has similar problems to the term Therav¹da, as the P¹li Canon includes early and later materials. 124 Philip C. Almond, The British discovery of Buddhism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 95; Richard S. Cohen, "Discontented categories: H»nay¹na and Mah¹y¹na in Indian Buddhist history," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 63, no. 1 (1995): 1-25, looks at how the categories H»nay¹na and Mah¹y¹na have been defined in Western Buddhist scholarship. 125 Gethin, Buddhist path to awakening, 19, laments the persistence of the view that early Buddhism comprised an ethical doctrine that was later complicated by ¹bhidharmika scholasticism. 126 There was an “assumption that the original was the essential,” “. . . a discourse of pure versus corrupt Buddhism was developed on the foundation of the historical priority of Pali Buddhism.” Almond, 95. 127 Eitel quoted in Almond, 96. 128 Ibid., 112. 129 Ibid., 113. 130 Quoted in Almond, 3. 131 Ibid., 3. 132 See Gregory Schopen, "Archaeology and the Protestant presuppositions of Indian Buddhism," History of religions 31 (1991): 1-32. 25 all things Indian).133 Nineteenth century scholars approved of the Buddha who, like them, had rejected the Indian system.134

This admiration was not uniquely Protestant or British. La Vallée Poussin, a Belgian Catholic, also admired ˜¹ntideva’s ethics when they seemed to be like “ours.” La Vallée Poussin and Barth admired ˜¹ntideva for qualities similar to those attributed to the Buddha. They welcomed ˜¹ntideva as an exponent of Mah¹y¹na who fitted an acceptable, ethical image of Buddhism. Although ˜¹ntideva was a Mah¹y¹na monk, they praise him for being practical and ethical, and for having a personal vision. La Vallée Poussin reverses the previous assumptions of the H»nay¹na/Mah¹y¹na debate, the ethical high ground now belongs to a Mah¹y¹na monk and the arhats of the H»nay¹na are condemned as meditators. He does not recognise that ˜¹ntideva taught meditation practices.135

In order to praise ˜¹ntideva as an inspired saint who reflected Christian values, early scholars ignored portions of his work.136 Not only does La Vallée Poussin not recognize ˜¹ntideva’s use of meditation, he also explicitly points out the sections of ˜¹ntideva’s work which he finds unacceptable. These are the traits which he regards as scholastic or as Indian. La Vallée Poussin suggests that only the ethical and devotional aspects of ˜¹ntideva are to be appreciated. He says that the good qualities of ˜¹ntideva, such as his spiritual fervour, can be appreciated if one ignores “the mythological, dialectical and ritual rubbish of Buddhism.”137 Barnett suggests ignoring ˜¹ntideva’s scholasticism and errors.138

133 “The few defenders of Buddhism – men like Albrecht Weber, Jean Baptiste Francois Obry, and Philippe Foucaux – argued that Buddhism had operated as a force for social reform, fostering notions of equality and change in socially repressive Brahmanic India.” Andrew P. Tuck, Comparative philosophy and the philosophy of scholarship: on the western interpretation of N¹g¹rjuna (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 34. 134 Whether this is a true interpretation of the Buddha’s agenda is debatable. See, for example, Masefield, Divine revelation, 146-164. 135 Almond, 22, found that the Victorians did not recognize the central place of meditation in the practice of Buddhism. 136 Almond, 140, notes that the Victorians created “a conceptual filter through which acceptable aspects of Buddhism could be endorsed, unacceptable ones rejected;” and in 1880s, Monier-Williams criticized Buddhism’s admirers for being selective in their presentation of Buddhism; ibid., 4. 137 Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trad. La Vallée Poussin, xii. 138 Path of light, trans. Barnett, 33. 26 Bendall rejects anything that he construes as “tantric” or “mystic.”139 That someone as ethical as ˜¹ntideva could also be a tantrika was considered inconceivable. However, the biographies of ˜¹ntideva show that his own tradition sees nothing wrong with their philosophers or ethicists (if, indeed, that is what ˜¹ntideva is) practising tantra.140

II.3 Mid-twentieth century At the turn of last century, those elements of ˜¹ntideva’s works which were identified as mystical were rejected, mysticism was seen as antithetical to reason and the true religious spirit. As definitions of mysticism have changed and interpretations of M¹dhyamika philosophy developed in the twentieth century, ˜¹ntideva was later considered primarily to be a mystic.141 Finot, Pezzali, Ruegg, and Steinkellner describe ˜¹ntideva as a mystic. This description was linked to ˜¹ntideva’s religious and personal vision, as well as to a view of M¹dhyamika as being essentially mystic. These two streams culminate in the work of Pezzali, who sees ˜¹ntideva as personally religious, and therefore a mystic, and M¹dhyamika as a type of mysticism. Pezzali claims that ˜¹ntideva was a mystic because he was expressing a personal vision, and yet she also interprets his whole tradition as a type of mysticism.142 Before discussing how these two strands of thought influenced the interpretation of ˜¹ntideva, some background to the philosophical interpretation of Buddhism and M¹dhyamika, and the changing definitions of mysticism is needed.

II.3.i Mysticism and the Absolute The publication of William James The varieties of religious experience143 in 1902 led to the development of mysticism as a category for the cross-cultural

139 In 1877, Rhys Davids had referred to tantric Buddhism as “loathsome and nauseous,” cited in Almond, 95. 140 See also Murti, 88 n. 6, on N¹g¹rjuna. 141 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, is subtitled: “a mystic of the 7th century.” 142 Ibid., 1. N¹g¹rjuna, the founder of the M¹dhyamika school, has also been characterized as a mystic. See Bimal Krishna Matilal, Epistemology, logic, and grammar in Indian philosophical analysis (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), 166-67; and L. Stafford Betty, "N¹g¹rjuna's masterpiece - logical, mystical, both, or neither?" Philosophy east and west 33 (1983): 123-38. 143 William James, The varieties of religious experience: a study in human nature (New York: Longmans, Green, 1902); see John E. Smith, “William James’s account of mysticism: a critical appraisal," in Mysticism and religious traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 247-279. 27 study of religion, and to a universalist view of mysticism. Mystical experience was posited as the essence of all religions; the essential core of religion was a personal experience,144 and mystical experience was considered to be “independent of concepts and beliefs.”145 By interpreting mysticism as a kind of religious experience, which is at once personal and universal, and placing this personal experience at the core of religion, the centre of power of religion was removed from the established churches. Mystical experience was personal and anti-establishment.

At present, there is no agreed definition of mysticism. William James’s definition of mystical experience as consisting of four characteristics146 is still influential but is not universally accepted. Mysticism is often left undefined.147 Some scholars, such as Hans Penner, have questioned whether it is a useful category at all.148 Penner suggests that “the term mysticism now covers a host of beliefs and experiences which have no relation to each other whatsoever.”149 The category of mysticism is still in the process of being defined and what is to be included in the category is yet to be established. Recent studies challenge the universalist view of mysticism150 and emphasize the dependence of mystical experience on its context, and on the beliefs and practices of the person having the experience.151

When study of Buddhism began in Europe in the nineteenth century, most scholars considered Buddhism to be a philosophy rather than a religion as it had no God or anything eternal.152 Although this view was challenged by the cross-

144 Robert H. Sharf, "The zen of Japanese nationalism," in Curators of the Buddha: the study of Buddhism under colonialism, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 135. 145 Wayne Proudfoot, Religious experience (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1985), 233. 146 Namely ineffability, noetic quality, passivity, and transiency, Encyclopedia of religion, s.v. “Mysticism,” by Louis Dupré. 147 Ibid.: “No definition could be both meaningful and sufficiently comprehensive to include all experiences that, at some point or other, have been describe as “mystical.” 148 Hans H. Penner, "The mystical illusion," in Mysticism and religious traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 96. 149 Ibid., 95. 150 Most strongly identified with the critique of S. Katz, see Gethin, Buddhist path to awakening, 5 n. 13. 151 Proudfoot, Religious experience, 228. 152 Almond, 94. 28 cultural study of religion,153 Buddhism continued to be studied as essentially a philosophy and was subject to what Tuck calls the “philosophical fashions in Indian studies.”154 According to Tuck, “It was not until the second decade of the twentieth century that anyone thought to argue that M¹dhyamika could be taken seriously, that it might be understood as anything besides the most extreme of irrationalist nihilisms.”155 Early in the century La Vallée Poussin had considered M¹dhyamikas to be nihilists but defended Buddhism in general on the grounds that its goal was “a passage of the immortal soul into a transcendent paradise.” M¹dhyamikas, he asserted, were heretics in the Buddhist tradition, as they believed in neither soul nor eternity.156

In the 1920s Stcherbatsky rejected La Vallée Poussin’s assessment of M¹dhyamika. Stcherbatsky did not consider that M¹dhyamika was philosophical nihilism or accept that Buddhists believed in an eternal soul.157 Stcherbatsky reassessed M¹dhyamika by identifying its philosophy with Kantian transcendental idealism.158 When philosophical interest in M¹dhyamika began, the philosophy of Kant was the criteria by which any serious philosophy was to be measured.159 Stcherbatsky interpreted Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamika thought in Kantian terms of noumena (things in themselves)/phenomena (appearances), and postulated that M¹dhyamika philosophy included the idea of the Absolute.160 Tuck says that Stcherbatsky “used the label of monism to turn N¹g¹rjuna’s apparent nihilism into an absolutist idealism” and “asserted that N¹g¹rjuna’s ‘emptiness’ was the ‘something’ that was ultimately real in the M¹dhyamika.”161 Stcherbatsky considered that the M¹dhyamika posited a reality that was unable to be known rationally or empirically.162 This Absolute could only be known through “the mystic intuition of the Saint and the

153 According to Almond, this idea was challenged by new definitions of religion in terms of ‘the Holy.’ Almond, 94. 154 Tuck, 16. 155 Ibid., 34; Barnett, considers Mah¹y¹na to be nihilistic idealism; Path of light, trans. Barnett, 26. 156 Tuck, 36. 157 Ibid., 36. 158 Ibid., 47. 159 Ibid., 17-18. 160 Ibid., 36-37. 161 Ibid., 43.

29 revelation of the new Buddhist Scriptures, in which the monistic view of the universe is the unique subject.”163

A combination of seeing an Absolute in N¹g¹rjuna’s teaching, and the discourse on mysticism led to the interpretation of M¹dhyamika teachers and texts as “mystical.” Starting with Stcherbatsky, M¹dhyamika philosophy was interpreted as a type of mysticism, and N¹g¹rjuna was characterized as a mystic.164 Scholars, including de Jong, Matilal, and Betty, interpret M¹dhyamika philosophy as a type of mysticism.165 De Jong says that, “N¹g¹rjuna n’a qu’essayé de traduire en termes philosophiques une expérience mystique, une expérience directe et individuelle d’une réalité ineffable.”166 The description of Buddhism in terms of the Western concept of the Absolute enabled Buddhist mysticism to be conceived in (pseudo-)Christian terms of achieving union with a Transcendent Reality, or Absolute. A definition of mysticism which includes experiencing union with the transcendent could then be applied to Buddhism. However, the M¹dhyamika doctrine of ¶Ønyat¹ denies any real existents, including emptiness, and therefore there is nothing, no “ontological substratum,”167 to be ineffable.

Murti’s influential book, The central philosophy of Buddhism, first published in 1955, continued the Kantian interpretation of Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamika philosophy in terms of the Absolute. Hayes and Tuck both point out the untenability of Murti’s position.168 For Hayes, one problem with Murti’s argument is that Murti uses the term Absolute so often that he ends up with a number of Absolutes which must be distinguished from each other.169 Tuck suggests that Murti tries to get around this problem by “introducing a distinction

162 Ibid., 44. 163 F. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist logic (First published 1930; reprint, New York: Dover, 1962), 1:10. 164 Matilal, Epistemology, 166-67; Betty, "N¹g¹rjuna's masterpiece," 123-38; 165 Matilal, Epistemology, 166-67; Malcolm David Eckel, "The concept of reason in Jñ¹nagarbha's Sv¹tantrika Madhyamaka," in Buddhist logic and epistemology: studies in the Buddhist analysis of inference and language, ed. Bimal Krishna Matilal and Robert D. Evans, Studies of classical India, vol. 7 (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986), 265. 166 J. W. de Jong, Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapad¹, Buddhica, première série: mémoires, tome 9 (Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1949), xii. 167 Tuck, 50. 168 Richard P. Hayes, "N¹g¹rjuna’s appeal," Journal of Indian philosophy 22 (1994): 333- 338; Tuck, 52-53.

30 between ‘epistemological’ and ‘metaphysical’ absolutisms.”170 Matilal, also, finds that the M¹dhyamika upholds “a kind of Absolutism.”171 According to Murti and Matilal, the M¹dhyamika does not have a definite position on questions of ontology.172 Nevertheless, Matilal says that ¶Ønyat¹ = the Absolute;173 and Murti that “the Absolute (˜unya) is the universal, impersonal reality of the world.”174 The acceptance of an Absolute seems to be an ontological position. Robinson suggests that, "The dominant problem for the European discussants has remained the M¹dhyamika ontology – whether this system acknowledges an absolute."175 Hayes notes that it is rare these days for scholars to assert that M¹dhyamika is concerned with an Absolute. He attributes this to criticisms by scholars such as Robinson and Ruegg, and also to Kantian philosophy going out of fashion.176 Tuck also suggests that this phase of interpretation has ended due to “changing European philosophical assumptions.”177

There are other criticisms of using the term “mystic” in describing the ultimate aim of Mah¹y¹na Buddhists. Jeffrey Hopkins examines Rudolf Otto’s concept of Mysterium Tremendum in relation to Tibetan Buddhist practice. He shows that the Tibetan Buddhists consider that the experience of the Mysterium Tremendum is only a stage on the Buddhist path, not the ultimate experience at all.178 Gimello shows that mediation/contemplation in the Buddhist context is also not a good candidate for inclusion under the term mysticism. Again, the experiences defined as mysticism are only one aspect of the practice which leads to wisdom (prajñ¹). They are parts of the path, not the ultimate goal.179

169 Ibid., 335. 170 Tuck, 50. 171 Matilal, Epistemology, 147. 172 Tuck, 51; Matilal, Epistemology, 147. 173 Matilal, Epistemology, 150. 174 Murti, 280. 175 R. H. Robinson, Early Madhyamika in India and China (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 4. 176 Hayes, 337-338. 177 Tuck, 53. 178 Jeffrey Hopkins, "A Tibetan perspective on the nature of spiritual experience," in Paths to liberation: the m¹rga and its transformations in Buddhist thought, ed. Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Robert M. Gimello, Studies in East Asian Buddhism 7 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,), 225-68. 179 Robert M. Gimello, "Mysticism in its contexts," in Mysticism and religious traditions, ed. Steven T. Katz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 61-88. 31 II.3.ii Finot, Dayal and Murti Finot’s French translation of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra in 1920 was too early to be influenced by the interpretation of M¹dhyamika as mysticism.180 In the introduction, Finot attempts to give a balanced assessment of ˜¹ntideva, taking the various aspects of his work into account. He acknowledges ˜¹ntideva’s vigour and fervour, but adds that he was also shrewd, clever and ingratiating. He quotes Barth, partly with the intention to temper Barth’s praise. According to Finot, ˜¹ntideva should not be regarded as a sort of mystical and ignorant poverello, as implied by Barth.181 He points out that ˜¹ntideva was a learned doctor of the M¹dhyamika sect and expertly expounded its doctrine.182 Nevertheless, Finot also claims that ˜¹ntideva formulates the mystical theory with admirable precision. For Finot, the mystical theory concerns eternal themes, such as terror at the thought of death, and the languages of hope and despair, of joy and sadness, that have inspired people over the centuries.183 Finot uses the term “mystic” in the sense of “religious.”

Between the 1920s and 1950s, little was published about ˜¹ntideva. Dayal’s book, The bodhisattva doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit literature (1932),184 uses the texts of ˜¹ntideva as important sources of information. Dayal emphasizes ˜¹ntideva’s devotion, which is at the expense of wisdom. He says that the spirit of early and late Mah¹y¹na are different, since the earlier Mah¹y¹nists, like N¹g¹rjuna and Vasubandhu, “follow the real Indian traditional in attaching equal importance to Wisdom and Love, and even stressing the former more than the latter; but ˜¹ntideva seems to ignore prajñ¹ (Wisdom) altogether, though he offers lip-homage to it. He moves in an entirely different atmosphere: he talks with genuine feeling of sin and service, confession and forgiveness. His ideal of perfection is different from that of the earlier Mah¹y¹nists.”185 Dayal concludes that if there is any influence from Christianity in Buddhist thought, it may be found in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra; it may show some

180 La marche a la lumière, Bodhicaryavatara: poème Sanscrit de ˜antideva, trad. Louis Finot, Les classiques der l’orient, vol. 2 (Paris: Éditions Bossard, 1920). 181 Ibid., 14. 182 Ibid. 183 Ibid., 17. 184 This work is still used as a source of information on the bodhisattva path.

32 external influence because “a new spirit is in evidence.”186 He calls ˜¹ntideva “the chief representative of this devotional type of Buddhism” and claims that ˜¹ntideva’s verses on confession of sin (p¹pade¶an¹) “introduce a new note in Buddhist literature, which was not heard before in the H»nay¹na or the Mah¹y¹na.”187

Murti counters Dayal’s assertion that ˜¹ntideva ignored wisdom (prajñ¹) and that his devotion was “a new note.” ˜¹ntideva’s devotion to the Buddhas and bodhisattvas and confession of sins was not an innovation, N¹g¹rjuna’s Catuåstava has similar ideas.188 Murti says, "Salutation to and worship of the Buddhas and their sons (the Bodhisattvas) is an integral part of the bodhicary¹," and "˜¹nti Deva is the accredited teacher of the worship-cult in the M¹dhyamika system. It would, however, be wrong to hold that he was the innovator of this. In N¹g¹rjuna’s Catuåstava we have the feature of worship in full measure."189

Although Murti interprets M¹dhyamika in terms of an Absolute, he does not call ˜¹ntideva a mystic. Murti describes ˜¹ntideva's ˜ik¬¹samuccaya and Bodhicary¹vat¹ra as "the most popular works in the entire Mah¹y¹na literature.”190 Murti feels that ˜¹ntideva’s works are pervaded by "spiritual serenity and detachment,” and that his Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is "born of deep philosophical insight.”191 They were important within the Buddhist tradition and have also been used by Buddhist scholars as a source of information on Mah¹y¹na Buddhist doctrine and practice. Indeed, Murti asserts that they have been the main sources of knowledge of the M¹dhyamika path of spiritual discipline.192

185 Dayal, 42. 186 Ibid., 42-43. 187 Ibid., 54-55. 188 Murti, 101. 189 Ibid., 266. Also, the verses on the confession of sin in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra (BCA2:27-31) are very similar to the section of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya on this topic, which are quoted from the Suvarªaprabh¹sottama SØtra (SSB161-163). 190 Ibid., 101. 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid., 101, 268 n. 2 . 33 II.3.iii Pezzali Pezzali gave a paper at the 1958 International Congress for the History of Religions, where she describes ˜¹ntideva as a mystic.193 This paper concludes that ˜¹ntideva’s teaching is intended to show how “to become united to the Absolute.”194 Her later monograph, published in Italian in 1967 and in French in 1968, is an attempt to synthesize the critical knowledge available in existing studies of ˜¹ntideva. She accepts the Absolutist interpretation of M¹dhyamika. She maintains that the M¹dhyamika systematization of Mah¹y¹na doctrine succeeded in demonstrating that true wisdom is in recognizing the ineffability of the Real (i.e., all is empty).195 Her view is that the M¹dhyamika practitioner is seeking union with an Absolute and therefore all M¹dhyamikas are mystics.

Pezzali considers that ˜¹ntideva was entirely in harmony with the basis of M¹dhyamika, and was not the author of his doctrine, but a faithful interpreter.196 Yet, “his spiritual character surpasses the limits of his tradition and religion and attains a universal expression of devotion and love.” In regard to his doctrine, she concludes that ˜¹ntideva was a philosopher and a mystic, and says:197

˜¹ntideva adds the vigour of religious warmth to philosophical criticism: the intellectual search and mental acceptance are not simply translated into a practice of a rational and ethical life, but they are enriched with the mystical exuberance and depth that transform the tasteless prosaic everyday routine into a chant of glory that reaches up to the Absolute. He develops the M¹dhyamika as a poem of spiritual life, that touches the universal and human in an essential lyricism.

In calling ˜¹ntideva a mystic, Pezzali emphasizes his religious qualities, rather than his philosophical commitment. She interprets M¹dhyamika as mystical, and yet within this tradition ˜¹ntideva is somehow especially mystical. According to Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva’s life story and work demonstrate his mysticism;

193 Amalia Pezzali, "˜¹ntideva, a mystic of Buddhism," in Proceedings. International Congress for the History of Religions (9th: 1958: Tokyo and Kyoto) (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1960), 398- 402. 194 Pezzali, "˜¹ntideva, a mystic of Buddhism," 402. 195 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 69. 196 Ibid., 68-69, 120. 197 Quotation from Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 106, translated in Cesare Rizzi, Candrak»rti (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988), 5. 34 he turned to mysticism due to his strongly religious temperament and became the genuinely great mystic of the M¹dhyamika system.198 Summing up her reasons for calling ˜¹ntideva a mystic, she says that his life was dedicated to spiritual values, shown by his renouncing his throne, his ascetic life as a monk, his discipline of silence and meditation, which he pushed to such an extent that he was considered incapable, his submission to the will of his superiors, his attention to the interior world, and his reputation as a magician.199 She continues: his life developed under the sign of spiritual progress, and he assumed the contemplative path. He was humble, generous, secluded, zealous in discipline and renouncement, meticulous in worship and in doctrinal preparation, full of compassion, dedicated to the search for and the possession of the perfection of wisdom, in sum, a giant of Indian Buddhism, who by his life and his works wished to reveal the way to nirv¹ªa.200

Apparently following Pezzali, Ruegg and Steinkellner also describe ˜¹ntideva as a mystic.201 Ruegg does not accept the Absolutist interpretation of M¹dhyamika202 and appears to interpret ˜¹ntideva’s mysticism in religious terms. In his chapter on ˜¹ntideva in The literature of the Madhyamaka school of philosophy in India (1981), Ruegg avers that ˜¹ntideva brings out the "mystical aspects" of the school and that the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is about purifying the spirit and contemplation, the sustaining power of the Buddha, and emptiness. He describes emptiness (¶Ønyat¹) as "the theory of ultimate reality free from the dichotomy of existence and non-existence.”203 In the introduction to his translation of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, Steinkellner also describes ˜¹ntideva as a Buddhist mystic of the eighth century. But he does not indicate what it is about ˜¹ntideva that warrants this appellation. Due to the problematic nature of the term “mystic,” and due to the recognition that M¹dhyamika is not concerned with a reified Absolute, it is no longer popular to describe ˜¹ntideva as a mystic.

198 Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 45. 199 Ibid., 148. 200 Ibid. 201 Ruegg, Literature, 82. 202 Hayes, 337-338. 203 Ibid., 82-83. 35 II.3.iv Personal, universal, innovative and scholastic ˜¹ntideva is admired for being personal, and thus universal, and for being innovative in relation to his tradition, but he is also said to display scholastic elements and to follow his tradition. La Vallée Poussin praises ˜¹ntideva for his ethical stance, which sets him apart from the earlier Buddhist tradition, and sees ˜¹ntideva’s ethics as expressing universal themes. Barnett, Dayal, Murti and Pezzali also consider ˜¹ntideva’s devotional fervour and ethics/morality to be universal qualities. Later, when mysticism is identified as that aspect of religion which is universal,204 Pezzali praises ˜¹ntideva for being a mystic. She finds that ˜¹ntideva both followed Mah¹y¹na doctrine and surpassed the limits of his tradition. The admiration of ˜¹ntideva’s expression of personal thoughts and feelings contrasts with the assertion that he follows his tradition.

Elements of ˜¹ntideva’s work have been described as scholastic. La Vallée Poussin suggests ignoring these scholastic elements of ˜¹ntideva in order to admire him.205 Bendall feels that ˜¹ntideva expressed “a somewhat scholastic aspect” of later Buddhism.206 Barnett describes the ninth chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra (the perfection of wisdom (prajñ¹p¹ramit¹) chapter) as “scholastic disputation” and omits text from the rest of the work which he considers “needlessly prolix,” with the aim of enabling the reader to appreciate the enduring aspects of the work.207 Much later, Saddhatissa writes of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra: “it is a poetical work inspired by personal experience and a universal ideal.”208 The message of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra “outshines all scholastic argumentation (that may have been added later, as for instance the ninth chapter).”209 Barnett and Saddhatissa find the ninth chapter to be the main expression of ˜¹ntideva’s scholastic tendencies.

204 The universalist view of mysticism is critiqued Steven T. Katz, "Ethics and mysticism in Eastern mystical traditions," Religious studies 28 (1992): 253-67. 205 Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trad. La Vallée Poussin, x. 206 SSB, v-vi. 207 Path of light, trans. Barnett, 33. 208 H. Saddhatissa, "Santideva and the Bodhisattva ideal," in Buddhist philosophy and culture, ed. David J. Kalupahana and W. G. Weeraratne (Colombo: N.A. Jayawickrema Felicitation Volume Committee, 1987): 95. 209 Ibid., 98. 36 Sweet’s introduction to his translation and commentary on the ninth chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, completed in 1984, brings into focus the difficulty of describing ˜¹ntideva as personal/innovative and also as a follower of his tradition.210 Sweet notes that earlier translations, which stressed the devotional side of ˜¹ntideva, lacked chapter nine.211 As shown earlier, the early translators also stressed the ethical and practical aspects of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. It is ˜¹ntideva’s devotion and ethics which they find express his personal vision. Sweet describes the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra as “an intensely personal religious statement” in contrast to “the endless prolixity and scholastic casuistry that characterize the great bulk of Mah¹y¹na sØtras and ¶¹stras.”212 These words are very similar to those used by Barnett to describe the content of chapter nine. Even though Barnett identifies chapter nine as scholastic, Sweet does not. Sweet characterizes ˜¹ntideva’s tradition as scholastic, and ˜¹ntideva as personal. Sweet concludes that ˜¹ntideva was “not an original philosophical thinker”213 and his arguments are no different to those of Candrak»rti.214 Yet Sweet still describes the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra as intensely personal. How ˜¹ntideva is “intensely personal” while remaining firmly in a tradition that is scholastic is a problem that Sweet does not address.

II.3.v Practice and philosophy Sweet’s focus on the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ chapter of Bodhicary¹vat¹ra reflects scholarly interest in the philosophical aspects of Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamika. Early scholars had focused on the ethical and devotional aspects of ˜¹ntideva. After Stcherbatsky suggested that the philosophy of the M¹dhyamika could be divorced from its soteriological goals,215 the study of M¹dhyamika became the study of the philosophy of M¹dhyamika.216 When interest in M¹dhyamika

210 Crosby and Skilton, 114, mistakenly claim that Sweet has translated Prajñ¹karamati’s commentary on Chapter 9. This chapter is translated by Peter R. Oldmeadow, "A study of the widom chapter (Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ pariccheda) of the Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹ of Prajñ¹karamati" (Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 1994). 211 Sweet, ˜¹ntideva, 6. 212 Ibid., 4. 213 Ibid., 15. 214 Ibid., 14. 215 Tuck, 36. 216 Ibid., 18, notes the differentiation of Indian texts by European scholars into those which are philosophical and those which are religious or poetic. 37 philosophy increased, ˜¹ntideva’s work was neglected for some time. Neglect of ˜¹ntideva may have been a consequence of scholarly enthusiasm for N¹g¹rjuna and his MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹, which seemed to contain the definitive expression of M¹dhyamika philosophy,217 and of ˜¹ntideva not being considered an original philosophical thinker.

Eckel challenges the distinctions between philosophy and religion, and theory and practice. He argues that it is misleading to suggest that some M¹dhyamika thought is philosophical and some religious. His study of Bh¹vaviveka seeks to show that, while Bh¹vaviveka is considered to be a philosopher, this is a misleading designation, if intended to convey that he does not practice. Although sections of Bh¹vaviveka’s work are overwhelmingly analytical, rational investigation is part of a narrative of liberation.218 Eckel describes Bh¹vaviveka’s view of his own theory as “an inclusive system for the discipline of thought rather than as a piecemeal presentation of individual arguments.”219 Further, Eckel shows that Western interpreters have had difficulty recognising that Indian texts combine narrative and philosophy, and have shown a tendency to treat only the philosophical elements and ignore the narrative.220 When a text is considered to be primarily philosophical there is the temptation “to mine it for the epistemological and ontological arguments” to establish connections “with other recognizable ‘philosophers.’”221 Although Bh¹vaviveka’s works are described as philosophy, if his critique is seen in the context of his whole argument, it is clear that it is intended to support his religious vision. Eckel observes that ˜¹ntideva’s Bodhicary¹vat¹ra weaves “devotional and philosophical questions together even more intimately than do the works of Bh¹vaviveka.”222 Sweet also notes “the intimate connection

217 Robert M. Gimello, "Apophatic and kataphatic discourse in Mah¹y¹na," Philosophy east and west 26 (1976): 117. 218 Malcolm David Eckel, To see the Buddha. (San Francisco: Harper SanFrancisco, 1992; reprint, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 7. 219 Ibid., 5. 220 Ibid., 25-26. 221 Ibid., 26. 222 Ibid., 208 n. 2. 38 between the devotional and philosophical sections” of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra,223 but does not demonstrate how this is so.

Murti notes that, “No Indian philosophical system is merely speculative. Each is a dar¶ana, an insight into the real which is at once a path of perfection and cessation of pain." The practices are meant to lead to prajñ¹ and prajñ¹ is necessary for perfect virtue and freedom from pain.224 Murti recognizes the intimate relationship between philosophy and practice:225

It must not be thought that Intellectual Intuition (prajñ¹) and Freedom are two parallel but independent processes. Freedom is the practical implication of prajñ¹. Buddhist spiritual discipline had always consisted of three parts-¶»la (virtue), sam¹dhi (contemplation) and prajñ¹ (wisdom). Practice of virtue and contemplation are ancillaries to the attainment of prajñ¹. A person assailed by passions and distracted by worldliness cannot perceive the truth. And only on perceiving the truth is one completely freed of passions.

The practices that prajñ¹ is meant to support, and the soteriological goals of these practices, are often ignored when the philosophy of Buddhism is discussed. Lack of attention to the whole of Buddhism has often led to misunderstandings of Buddhism.226 This can be seen in the case of ˜¹ntideva, where conclusions drawn on his relation to his tradition seem to contradict one another, as in each case only one aspect of his teachings is considered.

Finot, Murti, Pezzali and Sweet all consider ˜¹ntideva to be a philosopher, but not an original thinker. Sweet and Pezzali describe ˜¹ntideva’s vision as personal, yet they also consider that he faithfully followed his tradition, characterized by Sweet as scholastic. Sweet considers that ˜¹ntideva is simultaneously innovative (rejecting the scholasticism of the Mah¹y¹na), and faithful to his tradition. When Sweet, Pezzali and Finot suggest that ˜¹ntideva follows his tradition, it is with reference to his exposition of M¹dhyamika philosophy. Finot found that ˜¹ntideva was an expert in the doctrine of the

223 Sweet, ˜¹ntideva, 6. 224 Murti, 30-31. Murti translates prajñ¹ as “insight.” 225 Ibid., 221. 226 Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Robert M. Gimello, introduction to Paths to liberation, ed. Buswell and Gimello, 25. 39 M¹dhyamika sect. Murti thought ˜¹ntideva had “deep philosophical insight,”227 but concludes that, "˜¹nti Deva’s preoccupation is with spiritual discipline, the cultivation of the Bodhicitta. [His] two works are our chief sources for the M¹dhyamika path of spiritual realization.”228

A monograph by Hedinger, published the same year as Sweet’s thesis, focuses on the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya; Hedinger finds ˜¹ntideva’s innovation to be associated with the path of practice.229 Before Hedinger, most of the assessments of ˜¹ntideva and his work were based on the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. ˜¹ntideva’s ˜ik¬¹samuccaya has been studied very little. Until Hedinger’s study, no work appears to have been done on the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya since the publication of Bendall and Rouse’s translation in 1922.230 In the introduction to his 1902 Sanskrit edition, Bendall provides information on the manuscripts, language and metres of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.231 Hedinger's work examines the path presented by ˜¹ntideva with reference to the chapters of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya which concern training in meditation, particularly mindfulness. Hedinger credits ˜¹ntideva with creating a path for the Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamika school from elements previously present in Buddhism, but not previously integrated.

Hedinger finds that ˜¹ntideva's philosophy is closely linked with that of Candrak»rti, who is more easily characterized as a philosopher than ˜¹ntideva.232 Unlike Candrak»rti, however, ˜¹ntideva concentrated upon translating the doctrine into religious practice. Hedinger argues that although ˜¹ntideva belonged to the Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamika school, his own school offered him little guidance for practice, and he had to draw on other traditions of the Mah¹y¹na, such as that contained in the Buddh¹vata÷saka or the RatnakØta.233

227 Murti, 101. 228 Ibid., 101. 229 Hedinger, 8-9. 230 Bendall and Rouse’s translation has many errors and deficiencies. As well as the errors in translation (some due to lack of knowledge of Buddhist doctrine at the time), and inconsistencies in translation of particular words, the quotations are not distinguished clearly from ˜¹ntideva’s own words, or the verse sections from the prose. Even with the errors, this would make it much easier to read. 231 SSB, xiii-xxx. 232 Peter Fenner, The ontology of the middle way, Studies of classical India, vol. 11 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 11, says that Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra describes both the philosophy of M¹dhyamika and details of practice. 233 Hedinger, 8. 40 This conclusion – that ˜¹ntideva's use of these texts for his sources indicates that he went outside his tradition – is open to question. Ruegg characterizes as being "Mah¹y¹nist canonical sources of the Madhyamaka school,”234 the very texts which Hedinger cites as evidence that ˜¹ntideva is relying on non-M¹dhyamika sources.

Hedinger also argues that ˜¹ntideva utilized elements of the pre- Mah¹y¹na tradition contained in the writings of the earlier schools.235 However, it is not unusual that ˜¹ntideva follows traditional Buddhist teachings in the area of practice and the M¹dhyamika school in his philosophy. Harrison, Williams and Sangharakshita have all suggested that the major differences between H»nay¹na and Mah¹y¹na are the result of differences in interpretation and attitude, rather than in the practices themselves.236

Hedinger acknowledges that ˜¹ntideva’s work is diverse and simultaneously exhibits philosophical, scholastic, religious and poetic features.237 Nevertheless, his conclusion that ˜¹ntideva is peculiar in that his work is interspersed with mythical, wonderful, cultic and magical ideas, which are otherwise unusual for a follower of M¹dhyamika, is questionable. For instance, ˜¹ntideva was not innovative in regard to the verses of worship of Buddhas and bodhisattvas.238

Murti says that ˜¹ntideva established the practices of the M¹dhyamika school, but does not say how. However, he suggests a key to the relation of philosophy and practice in the M¹dhyamika with his statement: "The supremacy

234 Ruegg, Literature, 7. 235 Hedinger, 8. 236 See Paul M. Harrison, "Buddh¹nusmÅti in the Pratyutpanna-buddha- sa÷mukh¹vasthita-sam¹dhi-sØtra," Journal of Indian philosophy 6 (1978): 55; Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 198; Sangharakshita, A survey of Buddhism, 6th ed. ( London: Tharpa Publications, 1987), 461. Other scholars, such as Kalupahana, Warder and Hayes, also seek to emphasize the conformity of N¹g¹rjuna to his tradition philosophically as well, rather than seeing his making a radical break with it. See MØlamadhyamakak¹rik¹ of N¹g¹rjuna, [trans.] Kalupahana; A. K. Warder, Indian Buddhism, 2nd rev. ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), 376- 387. 237 Hedinger, 9. 238 Murti, 266. 41 of the intellect and its absolute power to control and eradicate passions is the rock on which the M¹dhyamika spiritual discipline is built."239

II.4 Later twentieth century Crosby and Skilton’s introductory notes to their translation of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra from Sanskrit published in 1996 do not describe ˜¹ntideva as a mystic, or M¹dhyamika as a type of mysticism. In his introduction, Williams points out that in the M¹dhyamika tradition the ultimate truth is only arrived at by investigating the way things are, not by sudden mystical inspiration.240 He says that the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra integrates “the analytic into a spiritual path based on altruism and compassion” and that it is a meditation manual. 241

In the translation’s introductory notes and the introductions to each chapter, Crosby and Skilton aim to make the work intelligible to a general reader. They look at ˜¹ntideva’s monastic tradition, the structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, the Tun-huang edition, and some principle terms: bodhicitta, defilement (kle¶a), nirv¹ªa, bodhi, prajñ¹, and dharma. Their assessment of ˜¹ntideva is that he writes with great sincerity, and people who are affected by his work are responding to the sentiments he expresses.242 Although they only aim to give simple explanations, their background material avoids contradictions and repetition of familiar formulas, so at least it is not misleading.

One question that they deal with is whether ˜¹ntideva is a superior poet. The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is consistently described as a great work of literature, whether poetic, religious or spiritual. Kalupahana praises it as:

one of the most elegant and inspiring pieces of poetic literature inculcating a religious ideal, strong in appeal and born of deep philosophical maturity and insight.243

Williams calls ˜¹ntideva a great poet.244 Although La Vallée Poussin describes the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra as a work of literature, he acknowledges that it is

239 Ibid., 223. 240 Williams, general introduction to Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trans. Crosby and Skilton, xx. 241 Ibid., xxv-xxvi. 242 Ibid., xl. 243 David J. Kalupahana, "Bodhicary¹vat¹ra," in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, vol. 3, fasc. 2 ([Colombo]: Government of Ceylon, 1972), 181. 42 sometimes dry, technical and concise and sometimes full of images and long- winded.245 Steinkellner also draws attention to the varying tone of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, from sterile didactic statements to inspired verses full of the images and ornaments of Indian poetry; at times it is admonishing and lively and at times has the air of personal confession.246 Crosby and Skilton question the basis for concluding that ˜¹ntideva is a great poet.247 They discuss the poetry in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, and remark that although it is written in verse, this has a somewhat different meaning in the Sanskrit context than in the English context. They conclude that the text “is modest in its poetic aspirations.”248 ˜¹ntideva’s work would have to be assessed against the criteria of Sanskrit poetics before concluding that he was a great poet.

The most recent study concerning ˜¹ntideva is Williams’ book that focuses on philosophical analysis of some verses from chapters eight and nine of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. It includes three previously published articles and two new essays. His main concern is with the interpretation of Indian M¹dhyamika by the Tibetan tradition.249 In one of the articles which is included in the book, he draws attention to the tendency among Western scholars to accept Tibetan interpretations of the Indian Mah¹y¹na tradition.250 He therefore wishes to distinguish the Tibetan interpretations from the Indian tradition. The last essay in the book reflects his growing interest in philosophical questions.251

Conclusion The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra has been translated into English many times, from both Tibetan and Sanskrit. Crosby and Skilton’s translation from Sanskrit is particularly good, and reliable. Their introductory material has filled a gap in

244 Williams, general introduction to Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trans. Crosby and Skilton, x. 245 Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trad. La Vallée Poussin, xi. 246 ˜¹ntideva, Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, übersetzt Steinkellner, 21. 247 Crosby and Skilton, xxxviii-xl. 248 Ibid., xxxix. 249 Paul Williams, Altruism and reality: studies in the philosophy of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 1998), ix. 250 Paul M. Williams, "On prakÅtinirv¹ªa/prakÅtinirvÅta in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra: a study in the Indo-Tibetan commentarial tradition," Asiatische Studien / Etudes asiatiques 46 (1992): 550. See also Tillemans, 14-16, for some comments on using the Tibetan commentorial tradition for interpreting Indian texts. 251 Williams, Altruism, xi. 43 providing an impartial introduction to ˜¹ntideva. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya still awaits a reliable translation. Most scholarship has focused on editing and translating ˜¹ntideva’s texts, and have only made brief statements about their significance. These statements are mostly unsupported and also need to be understood in their context. ˜¹ntideva’s biography has received some attention, but lack of verifiable historical fact has limited its usefulness in providing insight into his motivations. After surveying the available information on ˜¹ntideva’s life, de Jong concludes that there are still many problems to resolve concerning his life and works and that one must hope for the discovery of new data which will aid in dispelling the obscurities which are still much thicker than is generally supposed.252 Regarding ˜¹ntideva’s works, perhaps it is not so much new data that is needed, but greater study of the texts we have. To ascertain whether ˜¹ntideva was innovative requires determining what he said and then comparing this with his tradition.

As a basis for studying the content of ˜¹ntideva’s texts, previous work is of limited value. Most attention has been paid to philosophical aspects of M¹dhyamika, where ˜¹ntideva is considered least original. ˜¹ntideva’s texts describe the bodhisattva path. The focus of scholarship on Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamika philosophy, rather than practice, has led to a lack of detailed analysis of the path of practice described by ˜¹ntideva. Of the more recent studies of ˜¹ntideva, only Hedinger’s monograph deals with aspects of the path according to ˜¹ntideva.

In order to understand ˜¹ntideva, more detailed research into the content of his texts is needed, with particular reference to the bodhisattva path. Both the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya have a chapter devoted to k¬¹nti. A study of k¬¹nti provides an opportunity to compare its treatment in ˜¹ntideva’s two texts. Before turning to k¬¹nti in the bodhisattva path according to ˜¹ntideva, the next chapter investigates the place of k¬¹nti in the bodhisattva path in the Mah¹y¹na tradition.

252 de Jong, “˜¹ntideva,” 182.

44 Chapter 3

Bodhisattva path and k¬¹nti in the Mah¹y¹na tradition

˜¹ntideva’s contribution must be assessed against his tradition. The aim of this chapter is to describe the role of k¬¹nti in the bodhisattva path before the time of ˜¹ntideva. It investigates the models of the bodhisattva path available to ˜¹ntideva, and examines the place of k¬¹nti within those models. It identifies other uses of the term k¬¹nti in the Mah¹y¹na tradition.

The first section is a survey of literature relevant to the topic. The second section is an introduction to the bodhisattva, the bodhisattva path, and the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta). In describing the bodhisattva path, the Mah¹y¹na literature uses a number of terms. These include p¹ramit¹s, stages (bhØmi), paths (m¹rga), aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma), accumulations (sambh¹ra) and courses of conduct, or practices, (cary¹). Other terms associated with the practice of a bodhisattva are training (¶ik¬¹), vinaya, pratimok¬a, vow (sa÷v¹ra), but an examination of these is beyond the scope of the present thesis. A brief note on the accumulations (sambh¹ra) and aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma) precedes a discussion of the p¹ramit¹s. K¬¹nti does not appear in the list of aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma), and the accumulations (sambh¹ra) are generally defined in terms of the p¹ramit¹s. A discussion of the p¹ramit¹s follows, as these are key in the bodhisattva path and because k¬¹nti is one of the p¹ramit¹s. The bhØmis incorporate many elements of the bodhisattva path. Texts which outline the bodhisattva path in terms of bhØmis at times relate the bhØmis to the p¹ramit¹s, paths (m¹rga), and courses of conduct (cary¹). Candrak»rti bases his path description on the bhØmis, which could be expected to have influenced ˜¹ntideva. For these reasons, the bhØmis as a description of the bodhisattva path are outlined in some detail. The section on the bhØmis in the Mah¹y¹na tradition focuses on the earlier stages of the path, and the place of k¬¹nti in the

45 bhØmis. The second section ends with an overview of k¬¹nti in the path (m¹rga) scheme.

The third section discusses k¬¹nti. K¬¹nti appears in several contexts in Mah¹y¹na literature. It has three main fields of reference. As well as being the third p¹ramit¹, it features in outlines of the bodhisattva path according to five paths (m¹rga), and appears in the expression anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. Anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti – patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas – is sometimes related to the eighth bhØmi, and is sometimes part of the third p¹ramit¹. After a note on anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, its relation to other types of k¬¹nti and possible interpretations of the term k¬¹nti, the chapter finishes with a discussion of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹.

I Literature The development of the Mah¹y¹na tradition was linked to the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ (perfection of wisdom) sØtras, which are considered to be the earliest Mah¹y¹na sØtras.1 The earliest of the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras is the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹.2 Conze applies the term Large Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ to later prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ texts, such as ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ (100,000 verses), Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ (25,000 verses) and A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ (18,000 verses).3 Establishing a chronology of Mah¹y¹na texts is difficult. Most texts originally composed in Sanskrit are no longer extant and those that are are dated much later than their original composition. Dates for texts are often based on the date of translation into Chinese.4

1 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 4, 40. 2 Edward Conze, The prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, 2nd ed., Bibliographia philologica Buddhica: serie maior 1 (Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library, 1978), 1: The earliest parts date from 100 B.C., but its composition spanned two centuries. 3 Conze, Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, 10: “They only differ in the extent to which the ‘repetitions’ are copied out.” 4 See Michael Pye, Skilful means: a concept in Mahayana Buddhism (London: Duckworth, 1978), 102. 46 Other early sØtras, which are presented as the word of the Buddha, include the ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra5 and Da¶abhØmika. The Chinese compiled some of these early non-prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras into three large collections - 1) Mah¹ratnakØ−a SØtra,6 which includes Mañju¶r»buddhak¬etraguªavyØh¹la÷k¹ra SØtra, RatnakØ−a (other title: K¹¶yapaparivarta), Ratnar¹¶i SØtra, ˜r»m¹l¹dev»si÷han¹da (other title: M¹l¹si÷han¹da), Up¹yakau¶alya SØtra, Up¹liparipÅcch¹ (other title: Vinayavini¶caya), and Tath¹gataguhya SØtra; 2) Mah¹sa÷nip¹ta,7 which includes Ak¬ayamatinirde¶a SØtra, S¹garamati[paripÅcch¹] SØtra; and 3) Avata÷saka (other title: Buddhavatamsakamahavaipulyasutra) which includes Da¶abhØmika, Gaª©avyØha, Ratnolkadh¹raª».8

The Mah¹vastu describes itself as the vinaya of the Lokottarav¹dins, which is a school of the Mah¹s¹¡ghikas. It is a pre-Mah¹y¹na work that includes elements later associated with Mah¹y¹na teaching. It outlines the career of the bodhisattva in terms of courses of conduct (cary¹) and bhØmis.

N¹g¹rjuna (fl. c. 150-250) systematized the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras, but did not outline a systematic path.9 Lindtner has surveyed the texts attributed to N¹g¹rjuna, and categorized them according to whether they are genuine, decidedly spurious, dubious but “perhaps authentic,” and dubious but possibly genuine or not. MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹ is considered to be authentic. Apart from that text, twelve others are genuine. MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹, Vigrahavy¹vartan», ˜Ønyat¹saptati, Vaidalyaprakaraªa, Vyavah¹rasiddhi and

5 ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra: the concentration of heroic progress, an early Mah¹y¹na Buddhist scripture, trans. and annotated Etienne Lamotte; English trans. Sara Boin-Webb (London: Curzon Press in association with The Buddhist Society, 1998), 41. 6 English translations of the first six are found in A treasury of Mah¹y¹na SØtras: selections from the Mah¹ratnakØ−a SØtra, ed. Garma C. C. Chang; trans. The Buddhist Association of the U. S. (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1983), 164-188, 387-414, 280-312, 363-386, 427-468, 262-279. Encyclopedia of religion, s.v. "Bodhisattva path," by Nakamura Hajime: Bodhisattvapr¹timok¬a SØtra is identical to the Vinayavini¶caya- up¹liparipÅcch¹. 7 Wayman refers to the “lost Mah¹sa÷nip¹ta collection,” Alex Wayman, Untying the knots in Buddhism: selected essays, Buddhist tradition series, vol. 28 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997), 64. 8 English translation: The flower ornament scripture: a translation of the Avatamsaka sutra, trans. Thomas Cleary, 3 vols. (Boston, Mass.: Shambhala, 1984).

47 Yukti¬a¬−ik¹ are mainly dialectical, and deal with prajñ¹p¹ramit¹. Catuåstava, Ratn¹val», Prat»tyasamutp¹dahÅdayak¹rik¹, SØtrasamuccaya, Bodhicittavivaraªa, SuhÅllekha, Bodhisambh¹ra(ka) are mainly didactic.10 Ratn¹val», SuhÅllekha, Bodhisambh¹ra(ka) concern all p¹ramit¹s, but do not present them in a systematic order.11

The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, a commentary to Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, was attributed to N¹g¹rjuna by Kum¹raj»va, who translated it into Chinese early in the fifth century C.E., but there is doubt that N¹g¹rjuna actually composed this text.12 Lindtner classes it as “decidedly spurious.”13 It "reflects the attitude of the M¹dhyamika school, which was in its tenets more akin to the Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ than any other."14

¸ryadeva (fl. early 3rd c.) was a disciple of N¹g¹rjuna.15 His chief work, Catuå¶ataka, deals with the bodhisattva and bodhisattva practice in its first half.16 The Catuå¶ataka has sixteen chapters. For the first eight, ¸ryadeva utilizes N¹g¹rjuna’s SuhÅllekha and Ratn¹val» and for the second eight N¹g¹rjuna’s logical works, MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹, Vigrahavy¹vartan», ˜Ønyat¹saptati and Yukti¬a¬−ik¹.17 Lindtner sees the Catuå¶ataka as a continuation of the work of N¹g¹rjuna, including the refutation of non-Buddhist schools which N¹g¹rjuna knew about but did not deal with in his texts.18 Warder describes the second half of the work as “a direct supplement to the

9 Warder’s claim, that “N¹g¹rjuna has nothing about the bodhisattva and the aim of Buddhahood,” seems to be contradicted by Ratn¹val». Warder, Indian Buddhism, 387; Wayman, Untying, 66: the bodhisattva path only gets one mention in MMK, at XXIV, 32. 10 Lindtner, Nagarjuniana, 11-17, 23, 268. Paul M. Williams, "Review article," Journal of Indian philosophy 12 (1984): 73-104, discusses Lindtner’s approach and some alternative conclusions. 11 Lindtner, N¹g¹rjuniana, 267, says that nearly any verse can be understood as concerned with one of the p¹ramit¹s, but they are not presented in order. It is up to the reader to make the connection. 12 Conze, Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, 93. 13 Lindtner, N¹g¹rjuniana, 11. 14 Conze, Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, 93. 15 A. G. S. Kariyawasam “¸ryadeva,” in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, vol. 2, fasc. 1 ([Colombo]: Government of Ceylon, 1966), 109. 16 Warder, Indian Buddhism, 387. 17 ¸ryadeva’s Catuå¶ataka on the bodhisattva’s cultivation of merit and knowledge, [trans.] Karen Lang, Indiske studier 7 (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986), 9. 18 Lindtner, N¹g¹rjuniana, 278-279. 48 MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹.”19 Lang outlines the Catuå¶ataka in terms of the accumulations (sambh¹ra), but the text does not support such an interpretation.20

Later M¹dhyamikas are Buddhap¹lita, Bh¹vaviveka, Candrak»rti, ˜¹ntideva and possibly ¸rya¶Øra. The only surviving work (in Tibetan) of Buddhap¹lita (c.470-540 C.E.) is his commentary to N¹g¹rjuna’s MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹, where he uses the prasa¡ga method (reductio ad absurdum) to show the undesired consequences of an opponent’s thesis without advancing a proposition of his own.21 Bh¹vaviveka (c.490-570 C.E.) also wrote a commentary to N¹g¹rjuna’s MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹, where he attempts to use independent reasoning to prove M¹dhyamika doctrines.22 Bh¹vaviveka criticized Buddhap¹lita and their disagreement led to two branches of M¹dhyamika being classified by the Tibetans as Svat¹ntrika and Pr¹sa¡gika.23

Candrak»rti (c. 600-50),24 whose works from a Pr¹sa¡gika point of view were written prior to ˜¹ntideva, bases his path description on the bhØmis. According to Murti, Candrak»rti and ˜¹ntideva represent the third stage in the development of M¹dhyamika 25 Ruegg, on the other hand, places Buddhap¹lita, Bh¹vaviveka, Candrak»rti and ˜¹ntideva in the second period.26 Candrak»rti established the philosophical view known as Pr¹sa¡gika M¹dhyamika.27 Of Candrak»rti’s main works, only the Madhyamak¹vat¹ra with its autocommentary,

19 Warder, Indian Buddhism, 387. 20 ¸ryadeva’s Catuå¶ataka, trans. Lang, 16. See section on sambh¹ra, below. 21 Encyclopedia of religion, s.v. “Buddhap¹lita,” by Mimaki Katsumi. Some scholars have questioned this common characterization of the Prasa¡gika M¹dhyamika method. See, for example, Tillemans, Materials, 72-76. 22 Encyclopedia of religion, s.v. “Bh¹vaviveka,” by Nathan Katz; Warder, Indian Buddhism, 478. 23 Mimaki Katsumi, “Buddhap¹lita.” 24 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 58. See Tillemans, Materials, 13, for other possible dates. Murti, 100, dates of Candrak»rti: Winternitz places him in the 6th century; others say 575- 625 C.E. 25 Murti, 87: ˜¹ntideva came a generation or two later than Candrak»rti. 26 Ruegg, Literature, v; Saito “˜¹ntideva in the history of M¹dhyamika philosophy," 260- 61, discusses these divisions of the M¹dhyamika. 27 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 58: Candrak»rti (c. 600-50) is “the actual founder of Pr¹sa¡gika Madhyamaka as a self-aware tradition standing in conscious opposition to the Sv¹tantrikas.” Tillemans, Materials, 13, does not credit him as the founder but merely as “one of the principal figures.” He also mentions Buddhap¹lita as responsible for the prasa¡ga method. Murti, 99, says that due to Candrak»rti, the Pr¹sangika School became the accepted form of M¹dhyamika. 49 Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya, are independent. His other main works, Prasannapad¹ MØlamadhyamakavÅtti, Yukti¬a¬−ik¹vÅtti, ˜Ønyat¹saptativÅtti, and Catuå¶atakavÅtti or °−»k¹ are commentaries on texts by N¹g¹rjuna and ¸ryadeva.28

Tibetan sources categorise N¹g¹rjuna’s MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹ as only concerned with insight (dar¶anabhaga), whereas Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra deals with insight and practice (cary¹bhaga).29 The Prasannapad¹ MØlamadhyamakavÅtti, Yukti¬a¬−ik¹vÅtti and ˜Ønyat¹saptativÅtti are concerned with the sixth p¹ramit¹, prajñ¹p¹ramit¹. The Madhyamak¹vat¹ra and Bh¹¬ya are about the path of practice and discuss all ten p¹ramit¹s.30 The Catuå¶atakavÅtti is a commentary to ¸ryadeva’s Catuå¶ataka. The Tri¶araªasaptati also gives some information on the bodhisattva path.31

¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa, which describes the six p¹ramit¹s, is found in the M¹dhyamika section of the Tanjur.32 ¸rya¶Øra’s emphasis is ethics,

28 Candrak»rti’s other independent works are Pañcaskandhaprakaraªa (Chr. Lindtner, "Candrak»rti’s Pañcaskandhaprakaraªa," Acta orientalia 40 (1979): 87, “a treatise on Abhidharma from the M¹dhyamika point of view”); Tri¶araªasaptati (Tillemans, Materials, 14 n.43, claims that the attribution of Tri¶araªasaptati to Candrak»rti is in doubt; see also Ruegg, Literature, 105 n.334) and Madhyamakaprajñ¹vat¹ra (Tillemans, Materials, 14; Lindtner, "Candrak»rti’s Pañcaskandhaprakaraªa," 88-89). Rizzi, Candrak»rti, 6, also mentions a work called Samantabhadra and does not list Tri¶araªasaptati. Only the Prasannapad¹ MØlamadhyamakavÅtti, and parts of the Catuå¶atakavÅtti (¸ryadeva, Catuå¶ataka‚ along with the Candrak»rti VÅtti and Hindi translation, ed. and trans. Bhagchandra Jain Bhaskar, Bauddha grantham¹l¹ 1 (Nagpur: Alok Prakahan, 1971)) are extant in Sanskrit, although some verses of the Madhyamak¹vat¹ra are found as citations in other Sanskrit texts. See C. W. Huntington Jr., The emptiness of emptiness: an introduction to early Indian M¹dhyamika, with Geshé Namgyal Wangchen (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 145. 29 Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, 11, 30 n.16: See, for example, Mkhas-grub-rje, Fundamentals of the Buddhist tantras (rGyud sde spyi.hi rnam par g'zag pa rgyas par brjod): with original text and annotation, trans. Ferdinand D. Lessing and Alex Wayman, Indo-Iranian monographs, vol. 8 (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), 89. 30 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 58, says that Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra and its autocommentary “integrate Madhyamaka philosophy into the Mah¹y¹na spiritual path.” Fenner says that Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra is “a significantly different text from the earlier expositions of M¹dhyamika thought,” because it describes both the philosophy of M¹dhyamika and details of practice. 31 Per K. Sorensen, in Candrak»rti, Tri¶araªasaptati: the septuagint on the three refuges, ed., trans. and annotated Per K. Sorensen, (Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Univeristät Wien, 1986), 10, the sources of Tri¶araªasaptati are N¹g¹rjuna’s MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹, Catuåstava, Ratn¹val», Vasubhandu Abhidharmako¶a (bh¹¬ya), prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, Da¶abhumika. 32 Ruegg, Literature, 119 n.388: “But not in the Madhyamaka section of the sDe dge bsTan ‘gyur.” 50 compassion, intention, and the beginner bodhisattva.33 Meadows concludes that ¸rya¶Øra lived about the time of ˜¹ntideva, and was not the same ¸rya¶Øra who was responsible for the J¹takam¹la.34 Ruegg, on the other hand, suggests that the same ¸rya¶Øra was responsible for J¹takam¹la and P¹ramit¹sam¹sa. This would place him in the third or fourth century.35

According to Conze, M¹dhyamika philosophy accords with the teaching of the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras and the M¹dhyamika school attempted merely to expound the meaning of the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ texts.36 The Yog¹c¹ra school (began 4-5 Century), on the other hand, had its source in other sØtras, such as the Sa÷dhinirmocana, and therefore interpreted the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras as having a hidden meaning, which needed analysis.37 This gave rise to such texts as the Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra, which attempts to provide a table of contents to the Large Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹.38 However, the relationship of the Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra to the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ is rather loose.39 The Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra is divided into eight sections (called abhisamaya, which means “clear understanding”) and seventy points. The eight abhisamayas only relate slightly to the contents of the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, but more correspondence is found for the seventy points and the subdivisions of the abhisamayas. Even with the seventy points, creative inference is needed.40

According to Obermiller, the Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra is an extremely abridged summary of the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹; its principal subject matter is the path and its philosophical standpoint is that of the

33 ¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium of the perfections: translation and analysis of the P¹ramit¹sam¹sa, trans. Carol Jean Meadows (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Dissertation Services, 1980), 93-94. ¸rya¶Øra introduces advanced bodhisattvas, those who have attained anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, only as inspiration for beginners (¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium, trans. Meadows, 2). 34 Ibid., 45-46. 35 Ruegg, Literature, 119. 36 Conze, Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, 93, 104. 37 Ibid., 95. 38 Ibid., 93, 104; Edward Conze, "Marginal notes to the Abhisamay¹la¡k¹ra," in Liebenthal Festschrift, ed. Kshitis Roy, Sino-Indian studies, vol. 5, pts. 3 and 4 (Santiniketan: Visvabharati, 1957), 22. 39 Conze, "Marginal notes to the Abhisamay¹la¡k¹ra," 22-25. 40 Ibid., 25. 51 M¹dhyamikas.41 Obermiller says that in the Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra, “the same subjects [are] discussed over and over again at different places and from different points of view.”42 This is hardly surprising, when the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras are similarly convoluted.

Asa¡ga (c. 310-390) was the founder of the Yog¹c¹ra school. He was responsible for the Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra and four other texts (including Mah¹y¹nasØtr¹la÷k¹ra, Madhy¹ntavibh¹ga) that he transmitted either from a divine bodhisattva, Maitreya, or from a human teacher, Maitreya or Maitreyan¹tha.43 Asa¡ga himself composed Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha and Abhidharmasamuccaya. The Yog¹c¹rabhØmi, of which BodhisattvabhØmi is a part, is also attributed to Asa¡ga. However, it is probably a compilation completed before the time of Asa¡ga.44 The BodhisattvabhØmi describes the career of a bodhisattva. Book 1 deals with the basic spiritual exercises of a bodhisattva,45 and includes chapters on each of the p¹ramit¹s. Vasubandhu (4th or 5th century C.E.), Asa¡ga’s brother, was a prolific writer who composed the Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬ya from the Sautr¹ntika point of view before his conversion to Mah¹y¹na.46 Among his Mah¹y¹na works are Vi÷¶atik¹ and Tri÷¶»ka, to which Hiuan-tsang’s Vijñaptim¹trat¹siddhi is a commentary.47

41 E. Obermiller, Analysis of the Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra, Calcutta Oriental Series, no. 27 (London: Luzac, 1933), 1:i-ii. 42 E. Obermiller, "The doctrine of prajñ¹-p¹ramit¹ as exposed in the Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra of Maitreya," Acta orientalia 11 (1933), 61. 43 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 80-81; Encyclopedia of religion, s.v. "Asa¡ga," by Hattori Masaaki; Conze, Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, 101-102. 44 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 81. 45 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmiå: being the XVth section of Asa¡gap¹da's Yog¹c¹rabhØmiå, ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, 2nd ed., Tibetan Sanskrit works series, vol. 7 (Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1978). 8. 46 On one or two Vasubandhus see Encyclopedia of religion, s.v. “Vasubandhu,” by Nagao Gadjin; Warder, Indian Buddhism, 445-449. Anacker discusses the evidence concerning Vasubandhu’s life in Stefan Anacker, Seven works of Vasubandhu: the Buddhist psychological doctor, Religions of Asia series, no. 4 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984),7-28. He arrives at the “plausible date, 316-396, for Vasubandhu” (p.10). Anacker relies mostly on Param¹rtha, who considered Asa¡ga and Vasubandhu to be brothers. Bu-ston and T¹ran¹tha considered them to be half-brothers (p.11). 47 Anacker, Seven works of Vasubandhu; Hiuan-tsang, Vijñaptim¹trat¹siddhi: la siddhi de Hiuan-tsang, trad. La Vallée Poussin, Buddhica, première série: mémoires, tome 1 (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928). 52 II Path structures

II.1 Bodhisattva, bodhicitta and the bodhisattva path

II.1.i Bodhisattva The earliest Mah¹y¹na sØtras, the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras, do not contain elaborate philosophical argument, but celebrate bodhisattvas as beings striving for complete realisation for the benefit of all beings, and criticize those seeking release purely for themselves.48 They describe the practices, deeds, wisdom and compassion of bodhisattvas in order to encourage others to emulate them.49

The prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras idealize the bodhisattva, in contrast to the earlier ideal of the arhat.50 The early Mah¹y¹nists characterized the arhat as seeking for personal enlightenment only, whereas the bodhisattva’s aim is to help all sentient beings to enlightenment. The Mah¹y¹nists proposed the bodhisattva path as an alternate religious path to that of the arhat. The bodhisattva's aim is supreme perfect enlightenment. A being who has achieved supreme perfect enlightenment is a Buddha, so the bodhisattva’s goal is Buddhahood.51 The arhat follows the vehicle of the hearers (¶r¹vakay¹na), which leads to self-liberation, whereas the bodhisattva follows the vehicle of the bodhisattvas (bodhisattvay¹na), which leads to liberation for others.52

The idea of the bodhisattva, one who desires to become a Buddha, did not originate with Mah¹y¹na teachings.53 The concept of a bodhisattva existed in early Buddhism, but was not considered to be the aspiration of the ordinary Buddhist.54 The Mah¹y¹na innovation was to assert that everyone should aspire to the bodhisattva ideal.55

In the H»nay¹na, the bodhisattva’s career was still only of retrospective and not exemplary value : it concerned only the seven Buddhas of the past . . . whose

48 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 46, 49. 49 Ibid., 51. 50 Murti, 263. 51 Nakamura Hajime, "Bodhisattva path." 52 Ibid. 53 Edward Conze, Buddhism: its essence and development (First published 1951; reprint, New York: Harper & Row, 1959), 125. 54 Sangharakshita, Survey of Buddhism, 398. 55 Conze, Buddhism, 126. 53 history it was [sic] endeavoured to explain; the coming of the Mah¹y¹na was needed before the bodhisattva’s career could be proposed as an example to the faithful.56

One who vows to become a Buddha and to work for enlightenment of others is by definition a bodhisattva,57 but the term bodhisattva is used in two main senses in the Mah¹y¹na tradition. One type of bodhisattva is the person who has taken the bodhisattva vow to become a Buddha, in order to be able to work for the liberation of all beings, and is practising the path; the other is a being who has completed the path and is now working for the benefit of all beings.

Bodhisattvas who have not yet completed the path can also be of different classes. At»¶a (982-1054), an Indian scholar-monk who travelled to Tibet to teach Buddhism, attempted to integrate the teachings of the various Mah¹y¹na schools in his work the Bodhipathaprad»pa.58 He identified five kinds of bodhisattva. There are "those who have first produced the Thought; those who are entering the Practice Path; those who will not turn back; those who have attained Patience [in seeing that] phenomena do not arise; those who have but one rebirth left."59

The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ lists four classes of bodhisattvas:60 “1. Those who are committed to the vehicle61 (prathamay¹nasamprasthita); 2. those endowed with the practices (cary¹pratipanna); 3. irreversible (avinivartan»ya) bodhisattvas; 62 and 4. bodhisattvas separated from Buddhahood by only one existence63 (ekaj¹tipratibaddha).” Lethcoe further subdivides these categories, noting that the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ "describes a variety of bodhisattvas

56 Étienne Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism: from the origins to the ˜aka era, trans. Sara Webb-Boin, (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, 1988), 626. 57 Nakamura Hajime, "Bodhisattva path." 58 At»¶a, Lamp for the path, trans. Sherburne; Encyclopedia of religion, s.v. "At»¶a," by Leslie S. Kawamura. 59 At»¶a, Lamp for the path, trans. Sherburne, 45. 60 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 43. 61 Edward Conze, Materials for a dictionary of the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1967), 281-282: those who have just begun to set out in the vehicle. 62 Ibid., 84: avaivartika incapable of turning away from full enlightenment. 63 Ibid., 139: those bound to one more birth only. 54 with different attainments," adding that "[t]heir differences are due to a difference in position along the bodhisattva carya."64 For instance, the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ laments that few bodhisattvas set out and even fewer progress on the path, and distinguishes between bodhisattvas who are irreversible and those who turn away from complete enlightenment.65

II.1.ii Bodhicitta The bodhisattva path begins with the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) and the making of a vow (praªidh¹na) to become a Buddha for the liberation of all beings.66 The vow made by the bodhisattva at the time of the arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da or cittotp¹da) is “to reach supreme and perfect enlightenment so as to devote himself to the welfare and happiness of all beings.”67

Although the arising of the thought of enlightenment (bochicittotp¹da) is often referred to as a single event, there is more than one thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta). For instance, Candrak»rti's Madhyamak¹vat¹ra refers to ten aspects of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta), one for each bhØmi.68 The first bhØmi is the first production of the thought, the last bhØmi is the tenth production of the thought.69 For this reason, some texts distinguish

64 N. R. Lethcoe, "The bodhisattva ideal in the A¬−a. and Pañca. prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ SØtras," in Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and related systems: studies in honor of Edward Conze, ed. Lewis Lancaster (Berkeley, Ca.: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series, 1977), 263. She says, 275 n.5, that "later texts divide the Bodhisattva's career into bhØmis" suggesting perhaps that the bhØmi model replaced the cary¹s. These are discussed further below in the section on bhØmis. 65 The perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines & its verse summary, trans. Edward Conze, Wheel series 1 (San Francisco: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973), 200-208, 251. 66 Nakamura Hajime, “Bodhisattva path,” says, “The uttering of this vow has profound axiological consequences for the bodhisattva: henceforth, it will be the vow that will be the ultimate controlling factor in one’s karmic destiny, inaugurating one on a path of spiritual perfection that will take aeons to complete.” 67 The teaching of Vimalak»rti (Vimalak»rtinirde¶a), trans. Etienne Lamotte; English trans. Sara Boin, Sacred books of the Buddhists, vol. 32 (London: Pali Text Society, 1976), 284. 68 MAB1:4b-5a, "Madhyamak¹vat¹ra: introduction au traité du milieu de l'¹c¹rya Candrak»rti avec le commentaire de l’auteur," trad. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Le Muséon, n.s., 8 (1907): 260. Other examples are: twenty two forms of bodhicitta in Asa¡ga’s Mah¹y¹nasØtr¹la÷k¹ra, Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra and Ak¬ayamati SØtra (Conze, Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, 102). Lamotte suggests that these are divided into four main categories, Teaching of Vimalak»rti (Vimalak»rtinirde¶a), English trans. Boin, 285. 69 MAB1:4b-5a, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 261. 55 the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) that begins the bodhisattva path as the first thought (prathamacitta).70

According to Candrak»rti, the first arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da) is compassion for all beings united with the vow of universal good (samantabhadrapraªidh¹na).71 Candrak»rti says that the vow of universal good encompasses not only the ten great vows (mah¹praªidh¹na) made by the bodhisattva with the first arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da) but also all the resolutions of a bodhisattva. This fundamental vow is expanded into ten, which in turn signifies uncountable vows.72

AtȦa noted the differences in interpretation of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) among the Indian masters.73 He found that some teachers

say that the Enlightenment Thought is the Resolve nurtured in the Mundane Paths when one is practising out of devotion. Others hold that Resolution is the Thought in so far as it depends upon an object [creatures], and is a species of Relative Truth. Others that Resolution is the Thought when it produces the basic virtues equivalent to the Equipment Path's "Aids to Liberation.” And others that Resolution, which has yet to actualise its merit, is the Thought. Still others, that simply the Resolve to take Perfect Enlightenment as one's objective is the Thought, as in [the difference between] "Desiring to go, and [actually] going.”74

Bodhisattvas have the intention to achieve supreme perfect enlightenment, but recognize that they do not yet have the capacity to do so. Developing this capacity requires training. Through this training, they aim to get rid of the obstacles of the defilements (kle¶a) and of knowledge (jñeya).75 As

70 For example, BodhisattvabhØmi, Mah¹vastu, Ak¬ayamati SØtra. 71 See La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 261 n.10: the vow of Samantabhadra, analagous to bhadracar»praªidh¹na; see SSB297. Huntington, 149, 219 n.6. 72 MAB1:4b-5a, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 261. Ten vows found in the Da¶abhØmika: Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. P. L. Vaidya (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1967), 9; Megumu Honda, "Annotated translation of the Da¶abhØmikasØtra (revised by Johannes Rahder)," in Studies in South, East and Central Asia: presented as a memorial volume to the late Prof. Raghu Vira by members of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference, ˜ata-pi−aka series, vol. 74 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1968), 129. 73 At»¶a, Lamp for the path, trans. Sherburne, 44-45. 74 Ibid., 44. 75 MAB1:16a, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 277; Asa¡ga, La somme du grand véhicule d'Asa¡ga (Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha), [trad.] Étienne Lamotte, tome 2, Publications de 56 well, they aim to cultivate skill and merit, in order that they can help all sentient beings when they become enlightened.

According to At»¶a, the differences in interpretation of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) include differences in interpretation of the kind of training required. The training involved depends on the five kinds of bodhisattva.76 He says that some teachers maintain that training only refers to what is prescribed for the first two kinds of bodhisattva, i.e., those who have produced the first thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) and those entering the path of practice. Some teachers maintain that "everything preached in the sØtras must be observed. Some that only the Training of the Equipment Path need be observed. Others that neither these Trainings nor any like them [need be observed]." And there are other suggestions.77

The path for a bodhisattva is not as clearly delineated as the path for an arhat. For the arhat, the eight-fold path is the path of practice. The eightfold path is commonly grouped under three headings — moral conduct (¶»la), concentration (sam¹dhi) and wisdom (prajñ¹). Moral conduct (¶»la) includes right speech, right action and right livelihood; concentration (sam¹dhi) includes right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration; wisdom (prajñ¹) includes right view and right thought.78

Whether certain practices are those of a bodhisattva or not is determined by whether the individual has the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta). The K¹¶yapaparivarta, quoted in the Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, says that a bodhisattva is a bodhisattva when equipped with thirty-two attributes.79 In both texts, the first attribute is intention. In the K¹¶yapaparivarta, the last attribute is that all deeds

l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 8 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université de Louvain, Institut orientaliste, 1973), 185. 76 At»¶a, Lamp for the path, trans. Sherburne, 44-45. 77 Ibid., 45. At»¶a notes, “If I set down all the systems of the great scholars of the past, my text would be far too large.” 78 Nyanatiloka, Buddhist dictionary: manual of Buddhist terms and doctrines, ed. Nyanaponika, 3rd rev. and enlarged ed. (Singapore: Buddha Educational Foundation, 1970), 92. 79 The K¹¶yapaparivarta is also known as RatnakØ−a, part of the Mah¹ratnakØ−a collection of sØtras. Asa¡ga, Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, trad. Lamotte, 143, 25*. 57 are dedicated to bodhi, and in the Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha the last attribute is that all attributes are preceded by the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta).80

II.1.iii Bodhisattva path Bodhisattva path is a translation of the Sanskrit bodhisattvay¹na “vehicle of the bodhisattvas,” or bodhisattvacary¹, “the practice of the bodhisattva.”81 The Mah¹y¹na literature offers various path descriptions. The path of practice is described by terms which include p¹ramit¹s, stages (bhØmi), aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma), accumulations (sambh¹ra), paths (m¹rga) and courses of conduct/practices (cary¹). Some texts attempt to incorporate these elements, but vary in how they combine them. The section on the bhØmis below shows that even structures with the same name may vary in content.

At»¶a attempted to summarize the teachings of the various Indian Mah¹y¹na schools into one coherent system. His difficulties were not solely due to his trying to reconcile the teachings of a variety of teachers. Even within single texts the bodhisattva path is not always outlined systematically. Early Mah¹y¹na sØtras, such as the Ak¬obhyavyØha and the ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, do not treat the bodhisattva path systematically.82

Lamotte summarizes the path in a note to the Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha. In that text, the path has the mundane practice of the p¹ramit¹s as its cause and as its fruit the p¹ramit¹s in their supramundane state. The cultivation of the supramundane virtues comprises ten progressive stages (bhØmi), which constitute the career of the bodhisattva. He says, “Les dix terres (bhØmi), dans la culture des six vertus, se règlent sur une triple observance (¶ik¬¹) : moralité, concentration et sagesse.” The bodhisattva obtains the result of these three observances on leaving the tenth stage (bhØmi). The result is cutting all the seeds of the defilements (kle¶a).83 On the other hand, the BodhisattvabhØmi has

80 Chang, Treasury, 391; Asa¡ga, Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, trad. Lamotte, 143. 81 Nakamura Hajime, "Bodhisattva path." 82 La splendeur de l'inébranlable (Ak¬obhyavyØha), trad. et annoté Jean Dantinne, Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 29 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste, 1983), 1:40 n.198: “La carrière du Bodhisattva ne fait pas l’objet d’un traitement systématique;” Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 41- 42. 83 Asa¡ga, Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, trad. Lamotte, 27*. 58 the bodhisattva completing the p¹ramit¹s before commencing the ten bhØmis.84 The ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra and Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ say that the bodhisattva completes the p¹ramit¹s on the sixth bhØmi.85

The p¹ramit¹s are closely associated with the bodhisattva path, but do not outline a complete path. Two schemes which do set out to encompass a complete path for a bodhisattva are the ten bhØmis and the five m¹rg¹s. The stages (bhØmi) represent one of the main structures for the bodhisattva path. Whereas the six p¹ramit¹s seemed to leap into existence fully formed, the bhØmi model has varied through time. Candrak»rti based his Madhyamak¹vat¹ra on the bhØmi model of the Da¶abhØmika SØtra. The scheme of five paths (m¹rga) found in early Buddhism was reinterpreted by the Mah¹y¹na texts.

II.1.iv A note on sambh¹ra and bodhipak¬yadharma Accumulations (sambh¹ra) and aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma) are used in describing the bodhisattva path, but are not major factors in any description of the path. The accumulations (sambh¹ra) began as a very general prescription for Buddhahood, and were later defined in terms of the p¹ramit¹s.

Sambh¹ra is translated variously as collection, accumulation, or equipment. There are two accumulations (sambh¹ra) - merit (puªya) and knowledge (jñ¹na). The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ mentions these accumulations, but does not define them.86 N¹g¹rjuna does not define the accumulations (sambh¹ra) in terms of the p¹ramit¹s but he says, in the Ratn¹val», that these two accumulations are the cause of Buddhahood.87

84 Nalinaksha Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, rev. ed. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 83. 85 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 140; The large sutra on perfect wisdom with the divisions of the Abhisamay¹laªk¹ra, trans. Edward Conze (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 143-162, 153. 86 Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 275. 87 Nagarjuna and Kaysang Gyatso, The precious garland and The song of the four mindfulnesses, trans. and ed. Jeffrey Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche, 49 (vv.212-213). According to Lindtner, Nagarjuniana, 266, the SuhÅllekha says that the accumulations (sambh¹ra) are completed by practising the six p¹ramit¹s. His reference is SL 8, but it doesn’t actually say that. 59 The accumulations (sambh¹ra) are often defined with reference to the p¹ramit¹s.88 Asa¡ga, Vasubandhu and Bu-ston all say that the p¹ramit¹s of giving (d¹na) and moral conduct (¶»la) are the accumulation of merit, prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ is the accumulation of knowledge (jñ¹na) and the other three are the accumulation of both, but as all p¹ramit¹s lead to the attainment of prajñ¹, the first five also represent the accumulation of knowledge (jñ¹na).89 Candrak»rti, on the other hand, says that giving (d¹na), moral conduct (¶»la) and k¬¹nti constitute the accumulation of merit (puªyasambh¹ra) (MA3:12).

According to Lang, ¸ryadeva’s Catuå¶ataka “concerns the disciplined conduct (yog¹c¹rya) of a bodhisattva” and describes “how to acquire the requisite equipment (sambh¹ra) for enlightenment. She says that its first eight chapters deal with accumulation of merit (puªyasambh¹ra) and the second eight with the accumulation of knowledge (jñ¹nasambh¹ra).90 However, there is no evidence in the text for this, and the introduction to another English translation nowhere mentions this division.91 The preface to the commentary by Rgyal- tshab says, "The first eight chapters show how to ripen the mindstream fully, while the last eight show the stages of the path dependent on ultimate truth, which destroy obstructions formed by disturbing emotions and obstructions to omniscience."92 The first four chapters show how to develop altruistic intention by overcoming four basic misconceptions.93 The fifth chapter is called Bodhisattvacary¹. It discusses the bodhisattva’s intention to work for the sake of beings, how bodhisattvas should be compassionate to students, the bodhisattva’s

88 Dayal, 169-170. 89 Asa¡ga, Mah¹y¹na-sØtr¹la÷k¹ra: exposé de la doctrine du grand véhicule, [ed. and trans.] S. Lévi, 2 vols., Rinsen Buddhist text series 4 (Paris: Librairie Honoré Champion, 1907- 1911; reprint, Kyoto: Rinsen, 1983), 1:139-140, 2:235. Bu-ston follows the Mah¹y¹nasØtr¹la÷k¹ra. Bu-ston, The jewelry of scripture, trans. E. Obermiller, 2nd ed., Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica, no. 42 (Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1987), 109-110. Based on the commentary of Mah¹y¹nasØtr¹la÷k¹ra being attributed to Vasubandhu, Dayal, 170, says “According to Vasubandhu, the first two p¹ramit¹s (d¹na and ¶»la) lead to Merit, the last p¹ramit¹ (prajñ¹) constitutes Knowledge, while the other three partake of the characteristics of both kinds of sambh¹ra.” 90 ¸ryadeva’s Catuå¶ataka, trans. Lang, 16. 91 The yogic deeds of bodhisattvas: Gyel-tsap on ¸ryadeva’s Four hundred, commentary Geshe Sonam Rinchen; trans. and ed. Ruth Sonam, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1994), 7-50. 92 ¸ryadeva, Yogic deeds of Bodhisattvas, commentary Geshe Sonam Rinchen; trans. and ed. Ruth Sonam, 63. 93 Ibid., 19. 60 indifference to worldly pain, and the greatness of the Tath¹gata.94 Chapters six and seven describe how to eliminate the defilements (kle¶a) of greed, hatred and ignorance, with particular focus on eliminating greed, or attachment, in chapter seven. Chapter eight shows that to be worthy of Buddha’s teachings on the non- self of dharmas (dharmanair¹tmaya) bodhisattvas “must eradicate the afflictions and exhaust all karma that would result in voluntary rebirth. These afflictions . . . can be eliminated because they have no real object (nirarthaka) and are due to conceptual constructions (kalpan¹).”95

Of the aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma), Nakamura Hajime notes that, “Another enumeration of bodhisattva practices is afforded by the thirty-seven so-called bodhipak¬ya dharmas, or “principles conducive to enlightenment.”96 He says that these are common to Mah¹y¹na and H»nay¹na,97 but the Mah¹y¹na adds the p¹ramit¹s and the bhØmis.98 Gethin notes that Vasubandhu, in the Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬ya, equates these thirty-seven dharmas with the path, whereas the Therav¹dins see them as the final point of the path.99 The thirty-seven principles conducive to Enlightenment include "almost all the important practices of the original teaching.”100 Eimer suggests that they cannot be considered to comprise a path, and that they can be understood as a way to bring together separate important concepts in an ordered group. In this regard, he notes the increase in the numbering of the groups from four to eight.101

The aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma) are made up of four foundations of mindfulness (smÅtyupasth¹na), four right efforts (sa÷yakprah¹ªa), four bases of concentration (Åddhip¹da), five faculties

94 ¸ryadeva’s Catuå¶ataka, trans. Lang, 17-18, 53-63. 95 Ibid., 18-19. 96 Nakamura Hajime, "Bodhisattva path." 97 Ibid.; Gethin, Buddhist path to awakening, 14. 98 Nakamura Hajime, "Bodhisattva path." 99 Gethin, Buddhist path to awakening, 23. 100 Sangharakshita, Survey of Buddhism, 461. 101 But this is not his only argument. Helmut Eimer, Skizzen des Erlösungsweges in Buddhistischen Begriffsreihen: eine Untersuchung, Arbeitsmaterialien zur Religionsgeschichte 1 (Bonn: Religionswissenschaftliches Seminar der Universität Bonn, 1976), 46, 51. 61 (indriya), five powers (bala), seven limbs of enlightenment (bodhya¡ga), and the noble eightfold path (¹ry¹¬−¹¡gikam¹rga).102

The four foundations of mindfulness (smÅtyupasth¹na) are mindfulness of the body, mindfulness of feeling, mindfulness of mind, mindfulness of dharmas. The four right efforts (sa÷yakprah¹ªa) are guarding arisen roots of good, causing to arise unarisen roots of good, abandoning arisen bad dharmas, not letting arise bad dharmas which have not arisen. The four bases of concentration (Åddhip¹da) are will, effort, mind and investigation.103 The five faculties (indriya) and the five powers (bala) consist of the same list, although the Dharmasa÷graha lists them in a different order. The faculties are faith, sam¹dhi, effort, mindfulness, and wisdom; and the powers are faith, effort, mindfulness, sam¹dhi and wisdom. The seven limbs of enlightenment (bodhya¡ga) are mindfulness, investigation of dharmas, effort, rapture (pr»ti), serenity (pra¶rabdhi), sam¹dhi and equanimity. The noble eightfold path (¹ry¹¬−¹¡gikam¹rga) is the usual formula.104

The thirty-seven aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma) do not include giving (d¹na), moral conduct (¶»la) or k¬¹nti. Dayal says: “Mah¹y¹nists really contrast their p¹ramit¹s with the thirty seven bodhi-pak¬ya-dharmas,

102 The Dharmasa÷graha lists the thirty seven principles and their constituents as follows: saptatri÷¶adbodhip¹k¬ik¹ dharm¹å || catv¹ri smÅtyupasth¹n¹ni catv¹ri sa÷yakprah¹ª¹ni catv¹ri Åddhip¹d¹å pañcendriy¹ªi pañca bal¹ni sapta bodhya¡g¹ni ¹ry¹¬−¹¡gikam¹rga¶ceti || tatra katam¹ni smÅtyupasth¹n¹ni | tadyath¹ || k¹ye k¹y¹nudar¶asmÅtyupasth¹nam vedan¹y¹m vedan¹nudar¶asmÅtyupasth¹nam citte citt¹nudar¶asmÅtyupasth¹nam dharme dharm¹nudar¶asmÅtyupasth¹nam || katam¹ni catv¹ri sa÷yakprah¹ª¹ni | tadyath¹ || utpann¹n¹m ku¶alamØl¹n¹÷ sa÷rak¬aªam | anutpann¹n¹m samutp¹daå | utpann¹n¹maku¶al¹n¹÷ dharm¹ª¹÷ prah¹ªam | anutpann¹n¹÷ punaranutp¹da¶ceti || catv¹ra Åddhip¹d¹å | tadyath¹ || chandasam¹dhiprah¹ª¹ya sa÷sk¹rasamanv¹gata Åddhip¹daå | eva÷ citta Åddhip¹daå | v»rya Åddhip¹daå | m»m¹÷s¹sam¹dhiprah¹ª¹ya sa÷sk¹rasamanv¹gata Åddhip¹daå || pañcendriy¹ªi | tadyath¹ || ¶raddh¹sam¹dhiv»ryasmÅtiprajñendriyam ceti || pañca bal¹ni || ¶raddh¹v»ryasmÅtisam¹dhiprajñ¹balam ceti || sapta bodhya¡g¹ni | tadyath¹ || smÅtisambodhya¡ga÷ dharmapravicayasambodhya¡ga÷ v»ryasambodhya¡gam pr»tisambodhya¡gam pra¶rabdhisambodhya¡ga÷ sam¹dhisambodhya¡gamupek¬¹sambodhya¡gamiti || ¹ry¹¬−¹¡gikam¹rgaå || sa÷yagdŬ−iå sa÷yaksa¡kalpaå sa÷yagv¹k sa÷yakkarm¹ntaå sa÷yag¹j»vaå sa÷yagvy¹y¹maå sa÷yaksmÅtiå sa÷yaksam¹dhi¶ceti || ete saptatri÷¶adbodhip¹k¬ik¹ dharm¹å || Sections 43-50. Dharmasa÷graha, ed. Kenjiu Kasawara, F. Max Müller and H. Wenzel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), 9-11. 103 K. Venkata Ramanan, N¹g¹rjuna’s philosophy: as presented in the Mah¹- Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹-¶¹stra (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle, 1966; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998), 291: these are “the elements that make for the growth of concentration and insight.” See also pp.371-372 n.62. 62 which are supposed to constitute the highest ideal of the so-called H»nay¹na.” But he also asserts that the Mah¹y¹nists or semi-Mah¹y¹nists “devised the numerical list of the bodhipak¬yadharma.”105 The groups which comprise the aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma) appear in the Mah¹parinibb¹na Sutta, but are first named the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma) in commentaries and in the Visuddhimagga.106

Mah¹y¹na texts do not outline a path in terms of aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma), but do include them in the lists of attributes of an enlightened being. The thirty-seven aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma) are among the items that the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ lists as being the great vehicle.107 The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ claims that the six p¹ramit¹s contain the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharmas).108

II.2 P¹ramit¹s The bodhisattva path is often identified with the practice of the six p¹ramit¹s.109 Their names are consistent in the Mah¹y¹na texts, which mostly name six p¹ramit¹s but sometimes ten. The order of the p¹ramit¹s is justified in a number of texts. The practices associated with the p¹ramit¹s are only considered to be p¹ramit¹s under certain conditions. The p¹ramit¹s do not actually become p¹ramit¹s until the bodhisattva understands emptiness (¶Ønyat¹), so although they are practised throughout the path, at the beginning they are not truly p¹ramit¹s. Some texts overcome this problem by distinguishing the p¹ramit¹s as either mundane (laukika) or supramundane (lokottara).

104 See above, p.57. 105 Dayal, 155, 170-171. 106 Eimer, Skizzen, 42, 46. 107 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 143-162. 108 Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 236. 109 For example, Murti, 262; Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin- Webb, 25; Dayal, 170. 63 II.2.i What they are Mah¹y¹na texts recommend the practice of the six p¹ramit¹s. These are giving (d¹na), morality, or moral conduct, (¶»la), patience (k¬¹nti), energy (v»rya), meditation, or contemplation (dhy¹na), and wisdom (prajñ¹). The term p¹ramit¹ was not coined by the Mah¹y¹na sØtras. Ten p¹ramit¹s, also known as p¹ram»s, in P¹li literature are giving (d¹na), moral conduct (¶»la), renunciation (nekkhamma), wisdom (paññ¹), energy (viriya), patience (khanti), truthfulness (sacca), resolution (adhi−−h¹na), benevolence (mett¹), equanimity (upekkh¹).110 It is not clear whether this list of p¹ramit¹s, or p¹ram»s, preceded the lists found in Mah¹y¹na sØtras. The p¹ramit¹s found in the P¹li literature did not have the importance that the six p¹ramit¹s acquired in Mah¹y¹na literature.

Dayal discusses the etymology and meaning of the term p¹ramit¹.111 It is usually translated into English as “perfection.”112 Candrak»rti defines the term ‘p¹ramit¹’ in the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya. In p¹ramit¹, p¹ram signifies the other shore of the ocean of existences, the quality of the Buddha which consists of the complete abandonment of the obstacles of the defilements and of knowledge (kle¶¹varaªa and jñey¹varaªa). P¹ramit¹ means ‘reached the other side.’113 When distinguished by dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹vi¶e¬¹t), the p¹ramit¹s are a means for reaching the other shore, and get the name p¹ramit¹.114 The Abhidharmako¶a gives this etymology: p¹ramit¹s are called p¹ramit¹s “because they have arrived (gaman¹t) at the other shore (p¹ram) . . . of the totality of the perfections proper to each of them.”115 Ryusho Hikata notes that this interpretation of the etymology of p¹ramit¹ accords with the use of p¹ramit¹ as conduct of the bodhisattva (bodhisattvacary¹). However, p¹ramit¹ has also been derived from parama, meaning highest, plus t¹ - creating

110 BHS341-342; Nyanatiloka, 125. 111 Dayal, 165. 112 BHS341. 113 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 278 n.2, attempts to interpret the grammatical explanation of the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya. 114 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 277. 115 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬yam, [trans.] Louis de La Vallée Poussin; English trans. Leo M. Pruden, (Berkeley, Calif.: Asian Humanities Press, 1988), 2:694; Vasubandhu, L'Abhidharmako¶a de Vasubandhu, trad. et annoté Louis de La Vallée Poussin, tome 2-6 (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1924-1931), 3:231: “Les P¹ramit¹s reçoivent le nom de p¹ramit¹ parce qu’elles sont parvenues à l’autre bord de l’ensemble des perfection (sa÷pad) propres à chacune d’elles.” 64 an abstract noun.116 The Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha describes p¹ramit¹ in both ways. It says the p¹ramit¹s comprise six excellences (paramat¹), but also derives the word from p¹ra-mita, because they arrive at the other shore.117 Lamotte asserts that the etymology p¹ram ita, “qui va à l’autre rive” or p¹ra-mita, “qui atteint autre rive” is “purement fantaisiste.” His conclusion is that p¹ramit¹ is derived from the adjective parama and merely signifies superiority.118 The BodhisattvabhØmi “derives p¹ramit¹ from the root ‘p¹rama,’ signifying the ‘highest, chief, superior’ attainment of the bodhisattva.”119 Dayal also considers this to be the correct derivation.120

In Tibetan, p¹ramit¹ is translated as “pha rol tu phyin pa.” Willis translates this as "transcendent action. The term refers to the six transcendent actions of the bodhisattva, with respect to giving, moral discipline, patience, energy, meditation, and insight."121 The distinction between a bodhisattva who has given rise to the first thought (prathamacittotp¹da) and one who has set out led to the notion of the p¹ramit¹s being bodhicitta in action, or engaging bodhicitta.122 The Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ says, “A bodhisattva, who courses in the six perfections, is called ‘one who has set out in the great vehicle.’”123

116 Suvikr¹ntavikr¹mi-paripÅcch¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹-sØtra, ed. Ryusho Hikata (Fukuoka: Kyushu University, 1958), xi. 117 Asa¡ga, Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, trad. Lamotte, 184, 186; Hiuan-tsang, Vijñaptim¹trat¹siddhi, trad. La Vallée Poussin, 628: “l’étymologie p¹ra-mita, le dernier mot signifie: ‘arriver à’ ou ‘faire’.” 118 Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse de N¹g¹rjuna (Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra), [trad.] Etienne Lamotte, Bibliothèque du Muséon, vol. 18, Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 2, 12, 24 (Louvain: Institut orientaliste, 1949-1980), 2:1058 n.2. 119 James G. Mullens, Principles and practices of Buddhist education in Asa¡ga’s BodhisattvabhØmi (Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI Dissertation Services, 1994), 131. 120 Dayal, 166, says the BodhisattvabhØmi correctly derives p¹ramit¹ from “parama” meaning highest etc. 121 Janice Dean Willis, On knowing reality: the Tattv¹rtha chapter of Asa¡ga’s BodhisattvabhØmi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 184. 122 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 204. 123 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 132. However, this does not mean that only the practice of the p¹ramit¹s is the great vehicle. The Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ lists many items as being the great vehicle, such as the twenty emptinesses, 112 concentrations, four applications of mindfulness, the thirty-seven bodhipak¬yadharma and the dh¹raª» doors. Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 143-162. 65 While most Mah¹y¹na texts recommend the practices of the six p¹ramit¹s, some mention four additional p¹ramit¹s.124 These four are skilful means (up¹yakau¶alya), vow (praªidh¹na), power (bala) and knowledge (jñ¹na).125 Dayal says that the six p¹ramit¹s are the main factors of the bodhisattva’s discipline, “the four additional p¹ramit¹s are merely supplementary in character.”126 Six are found in many passages of Buddhist Sanskrit literature, the others are in only a few. The Da¶abhØmika SØtra expanded the six p¹ramit¹s to ten p¹ramit¹s, one for each of the ten stages (bhum») of the bodhisattva's path that it describes.127 The expansion of the six p¹ramit¹s to ten p¹ramit¹s may have been necessary to correspond to these ten stages (bhum»).128 Another suggestion is that the increase in the number of p¹ramit¹s “may have been due to the rivalry with the H»nay¹nists who had devised the P¹li formula of the ten p¹ram»s.”129

Dayal suggests that the six p¹ramit¹s formula probably evolved “after a process of selection and experimentation.”130 There is little evidence for this in the texts. The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, mentions the six p¹ramit¹s on many occasions. Although it is considered the earliest Mah¹y¹na work, it discusses them as if they are an established concept, well known to the reader. Lamotte notes that “the ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra represents Mah¹y¹na in the course of formation, in revolt against the early Buddhist concepts but unable to break away from the traditional ways of thinking and formulas,” and “the

124 Dayal, 283. 125 The Dharmasa÷graha (Section 17) lists the six p¹ramit¹s as d¹nap¹ramit¹ ¶»lap¹ramit¹ k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ v»ryap¹ramit¹ dhy¹nap¹ramit¹ prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and the ten p¹ramit¹s (Section 18) as the six p¹ramit¹s and means (up¹ya), vow (praªidhi), power (bala) and knowledge (jñ¹na). 126 Dayal, 167. 127 Sangharakshita, Survey of Buddhism, 445. Another suggestion is that it was due to the influence of the decimal system, Dayal, 167. 128 Ryusho Hikata notes that “it is only with the advent of some sØtras of the Gaª©avyØha school such as the Da¶abhØmika-sØtra, etc. that these six began to grow into ten.” Suvikr¹ntavikr¹mi-paripÅcch¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹-sØtra, ed. Ryusho Hikata, xi. Sangharakshita, Survey of Buddhism, 445; Dayal, 167. Another suggestion is that it was due to the influence of the decimal system. Dayal, 167. 129 Dayal, 167; the list in P¹li always consists of ten p¹ramit¹s, BHS342. 130 Dayal, 168. 66 doctrinal point that is best established is that of the six p¹ramit¹s which are the essential of the bodhisattva career.”131

The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ explains how all the p¹ramit¹s must be developed, and how they relate to each other. It frequently distinguishes between the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and the other five p¹ramit¹s. The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ maintains that the first five p¹ramit¹s are not p¹ramit¹s without prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and that prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ directs all the other p¹ramit¹s.132 It also states that prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ includes the other five and that prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ is a synonym for the fulfilment of all six p¹ramit¹s.133 Training in prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ automatically includes all the p¹ramit¹s and all the virtuous dharmas.134 Further, although there is no distinction between the six, a bodhisattva must practice both the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and the other five p¹ramit¹s. They are all “upheld by skill in means, dedicated to prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and dedicated to all- knowledge.”135

II.2.ii When is a p¹ramit¹ not a p¹ramit¹ There are two ways in which p¹ramit¹s are not perfected. One is if certain preconditions (faith, compassion and bodhicittotp¹da) are lacking, and the other is if a certain view is lacking (if the bodhisattva perceives beings/objects to be really existing). The bodhisattva can practise the first five p¹ramit¹s as virtues and can accumulate merit from their practice but they are only p¹ramit¹s under certain conditions. The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ states repeatedly that these are prajñ¹ and skill in means. The first five p¹ramit¹s cannot be called p¹ramit¹s unless they are practised with prajñ¹; when the p¹ramit¹s are practised with prajñ¹, they have threefold perfect purity (trimaª©ala pari¶uddhi).136 Other texts emphasize the preconditions to p¹ramit¹s being considered p¹ramit¹s. They say that practices associated with p¹ramit¹s are not p¹ramit¹s when there is no thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) or no dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹). For example, Candrak»rti

131 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 42. 132 Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 237. 133 Ibid., 112. 134 Ibid., 252. 135 Ibid., 116, 119.

67 says that the p¹ramit¹s are a means for reaching the other shore only when distinguished by a dedication of merit.137

The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ does not recognise the bodhisattva’s practice as a p¹ramit¹ if there is any discrimination (vikalpa) or the perception of a basis (upalambha).138 It allows that a great deal of merit can be accumulated by practising the virtues associated with the first five p¹ramit¹s, even before they fulfil the conditions for being p¹ramit¹s. Bodhisattvas do not have to fear wasting their time on practices which are not p¹ramit¹s, as they have advantages in worldly life.139 This claim may have led later texts to distinguish between mundane (laukika) and supramundane (lokottara) practice of the p¹ramit¹s.

The Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sometimes follows the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and sometimes allows for practices which do not have threefold perfect purity (trimaª©ala pari¶uddha) to be considered the mundane (laukika) practice of a p¹ramit¹.140 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra also allows the mundane (laukika)/ supramundane (lokottara) distinction, whereas the Vajracchedika does not.141

¸rya¶Øra agrees with Candrak»rti’s position, that for a p¹ramit¹ to be considered a p¹ramit¹, either mundane (laukika) or supramundane (lokottara), requires bodhicitta and the dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹).142 A bodhisattva who is irreversible (avivartan»ya) is skilled in supramundane (lokottara) practice.143 ¸rya¶Øra indicates that supramundane (lokottara) p¹ramit¹s can only be accomplished on the eighth bhØmi, when a bodhisattva does not apprehend an object but continues in the world.144 Until bodhisattvas are

136 Ibid., 136. 137 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 278. 138Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 131-134, 136. 139 Even prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ has advantages in worldly life. See Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 103-115, 150, 243, 250. 140 ¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium, trans. Meadows, 90-92. See also Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 18, 83, 198-99, 263. 141 ¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium, trans. Meadows, 83, 91-92 n.3. 142 Ibid., 83-84. 143 ¸rya¶Øra also uses the term imperishable (ak¬aya) (¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium, trans. Meadows, 87) as a synonym for lokottara. 144 ¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium, trans. Meadows, 87-88. 68 without effort (an¹bhoga, aprayatna) their practice is mundane (laukika). At the mundane (laukika) level, the bodhisattva’s practice is pure, but not threefold pure (trimaª©ala pari¶uddha). The bodhisattva is helped by widsom (prajñ¹) but not prajñ¹p¹ramit¹.145 This is in contrast to the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹.

When p¹ramit¹s are practised with prajñ¹, they are marked by threefold perfect purity (trimaª©ala pari¶uddhi).146 Huntington explains trimaª©ala pari¶uddhi as “the recognition that the three aspects of any practice – the actor, the action, and the object or recipient of that action – are interdependent and have no independent meaning or existence (niåsvabh¹va).”147 Candrak»rti says, “That act of generosity which is empty of giver, giving, and recipient is called a supramundane perfection; and that which is attached to [concepts of] these three is taught as a mundane perfection.”148 Candrak»rti makes this distinction between mundane (laukika) p¹ramit¹s and supramundane (lokottar¹) p¹ramit¹s in the other nine stages (bhØmi) described in the Madhyamak¹vat¹ra. For example, in the second stage (bhØmi) the statement on mundane (laukika)/supramundane (lokottara) p¹ramit¹ is as follows: “When there is any [belief in an] objective support associated with these three – he who abstains, the act of abstention, and the object of that act – then such morality is called a mundane perfection; but that which is empty of attachment to the three of them is referred to as a supramundane perfection.”149

Similarly, the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ applies the giving (d¹na) formula to moral conduct (¶»la), k¬¹nti, energy (v»rya) and contemplation (dhy¹na).150 On other occasions it distinguishes different ways in which these p¹ramit¹s are perfected. For example, introducing the p¹ramit¹s in the chapter on the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta), it suggests that,

He should perfect himself in the perfection of morality, through not transgressing into either offence or nonoffence. He should perfect the perfection of patience and

145 Ibid., 89. 146 Edward Conze, Buddhist thought in India: three phases of Buddhist philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962), 215. 147 Huntington, 220 n.20. 148 MA1:16, Huntington, 150. 149 MA2:9, Huntington, 152. 150 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 135, 199. 69 remain imperturbable, he should perfect the perfection of vigour and remain indefatigable in his physical and mental vigour. He should perfect the perfection of meditation, and derive no enjoyment (from transic meditation). He should perfect the perfection of wisdom on account of the fact that he apprehends neither wisdom nor stupidity.151

II.2.iii Skill in means Later texts equate the first five p¹ramit¹s with skill in means,152 but this is not evident in the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹. The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ draws a distinction between prajñ¹ and skill in means and the five non-prajñ¹ p¹ramit¹s. It says that bodhisattvas can practice the p¹ramit¹s but lack prajñ¹ and skill in means, and gives the example of bodhisattvas who gave gifts, etc., but did not have prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and skill in means. Such bodhisattvas remain on the level of disciple or pratyekabuddha. Despite having accumulated great merit, these bodhisattvas lack the good friend, which is prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and skill in means, and therefore are not assured of the attainment of complete enlightenment.153 At one point, the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ says that prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ is the skill in means.154 The Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ also links prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and skill in means by suggesting that the absence of the thought of giver, gift and recipient is the bodhisattva’s skill in means in relation to the p¹ramit¹ of giving (d¹na), because this shows that he sees “all dharmas as empty of own-marks, sees them as not really existing, not totally real, uncreated.” He sees their ineffectiveness (asa÷sk¹ra) and that they are unconditioned (asa÷skÅta).155

The concept of skill in means is not associated with the first five p¹ramit¹s in the Saddharmapuª©ar»ka SØtra, Vimalak»rtinirde¶a SØtra, or

151 Ibid., 45 n.2: “This definition of the six perfections is so important that it is repeated at P26 and P89. Nearly the whole second volume of E. Lamotte’s translation of Mpp-s (pp.650- 1013, is devoted to its elucidation.” 152 Stated in Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 204, based on Kamala¶»la’s Bh¹van¹krama; At»¶a also equates them (At»¶a, Lamp for the path, trans. Sherburne, 131). 153 Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 195-196. 154 Ibid., 250. 155 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 533-537. 70 ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra.156 Nor in the Up¹yakau¶alya SØtra, which, like the Vimalak»rtinirde¶a SØtra, has the bodhisattva use skill in means to help others, often involving actions contrary to a monk’s precepts.157 At some time, skill in means became identified with the first five p¹ramit¹s. At»¶a quotes from Jñ¹nak»rti,158 who in turn quotes from the Gay¹¶»r¬a SØtra, the Ak¬ayamati SØtra, and the Ratnamegha SØtra, to the effect that means are the first five p¹ramit¹s, the four immeasurables (apram¹ªa), the four means of attraction, and so on.159 Lethcoe notes that in the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ bodhisattvas use skill in means for themselves, but in the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ they use it for helping others.160 The 80th section of the Ak¬ayamati SØtra is about means (up¹ya) and it defines skill in means as “that by which the bodhisattva creates and activates all the teachings of a Buddha is expedients means.” The commentary notes that these include the p¹ramit¹s, the wings of enlightenment (bodhipak¬ika) and so on.161 At»¶a, also, says that “the means are all the equipments of virtue, starting with the perfection of giving, up to, but excluding, that of insight,” which seems to imply that means are the first five perfections, but in his commentary he lists means as the p¹ramit¹s and other things such as the four immeasurables (apram¹ªa) and the six mindfulnesses.162 Ignoring these discrepancies, Sherburne states in the glossary that “means . . . is the frequent sØtra term” for the first five p¹ramit¹s.163

156 These texts are discussed in Pye, Skilful means, but he doesn’t mention skilful means and the p¹ramit¹s. 157 The skill in means (Up¹yakau¶alya) SØtra, trans. Mark Tatz (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994), 15-16. Neither Pye nor Tatz disucusses the association of skill in means with the first five p¹ramit¹s. 158 At»¶a, Lamp for the path, trans. Sherburne, 155 n.3: Instruction in the Steps of Contemplation of the Perfection Vehicle, but this does not appear in his list of primary sources, where he gives Sanskrit and Tibetan titles - one danger of translating them into English. (Ref is Peking ed. 5456, v.103:264.2) 159 Sanskrit? Not in Sherburne’s glossary. At»¶a, Lamp for the path, trans. Sherburne. 160 Lethcoe, “Bodhisattva ideal,” 267-269. Lamotte discusses the two types in Teaching of Vimalak»rti (Vimalak»rtinirde¶a), English trans. Boin, 19 n.68. 161 Jens Braarvig, Ak¬ayamatinirde¶asØtra, vol. 2, The tradition of imperishability in Buddhist thought (Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1993), 569. 162 At»¶a, Lamp for the path, trans. Sherburne, 134-135. 163 Ibid., 197. 71 II.2.iv Order Several texts explain the order of the p¹ramit¹s. The Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha says that the p¹ramit¹s are stated in their order because the preceding favours the birth of the later.164 The Vijñ¹ptim¹trat¹siddhi says that the preceding produces the following and the following establishes and purifies the preceding. The preceding is grosser than the following and the practice of the preceding is easier.165 The Mah¹y¹nasØtr¹la÷k¹ra says they are stated in that order because it is in that order that one is produced from the other, they are more and more high, and more and more subtle. It summarizes like this: having no regard for wealth, he engages in moral conduct (¶»la), once in moral conduct (¶»la), he becomes patient (k¬¹nti), once in patience (k¬¹nti), the bodhisattva undertakes energy, having undertaken energy he gives birth to contemplation, once the mind is in contemplation he has appropriate wisdom. 166

In the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya, Candrak»rti explains the reason giving (d¹na) is preached before ¶»la.167 It is because beings only see well-being (bhavasukha) as the remedy of various kinds of suffering, not as a positive quality. For them, the remedy of suffering resides in the possession of desired objects and in states not able to be produced without such possession.168 These objects which remedy suffering are lacking in those who have not accumulated the good material actions which ensue from charity. That is why the Buddha preached giving (d¹na) before moral conduct (¶»la) and the other p¹ramit¹s (MA1:11-13). In the R¹tnav¹li, N¹g¹rjuna recommends to the king that he practice giving (d¹na), moral conduct (¶»la), and k¬¹nti and that the householder, also, should focus on these p¹ramit¹s.169

Fenner says that there is a seriation of the p¹ramit¹s, the earlier are foundational to the later.170 Yet, as he later notes, it is odd that the bodhisattva

164 Asa¡ga, Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, trad. Lamotte, 185-186. 165 Hiuan-tsang, Vijñaptim¹trat¹siddhi, trad. La Vallée Poussin, 628. 166 Asa¡ga, Mah¹y¹na-sØtr¹la÷k¹ra, [ed. and trans.] Lévi, 2:180. Translated from Lévi’s French translation. 167 MAB1:10, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 273-274. 168 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 274 n.1. 169 Chr. Lindtner, Master of wisdom: writings of the Buddhist Master N¹g¹rjuna, Tibetan translation series (Oakland, Calif.: Dharma Publishing, 1986), 293-294. 170 Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, 20. 72 can practice the first five p¹ramit¹s as supramundane (lokottara) p¹ramit¹s before obtaining prajñ¹p¹ramit¹. They are not defined as supramundane (lokottara) until the bodhisattva understands emptiness (¶Ønyat¹) at the sixth stage (bhØmi).171

Although some texts explain the order of the p¹ramit¹s, others recommend that they are to be practised concurrently.172 The Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha finishes its chapter on the p¹ramit¹s by explaining that the practice of each includes the practice of all the others.173 The Da¶abhØmika SØtra “teaches that a bodhisattva practises one of the p¹ramit¹s in each of the ten bhØmis (stages) of his career.”174 But this does not imply, as Mullens suggests, “that one perfection is fully accomplished at one stage before proceeding to the next.”175 The Da¶abhØmika SØtra systematically links each bhØmi to one p¹ramit¹. One is perfected at each bhØmi, yet all the p¹ramit¹s are practised at each bhØmi, as far as the bodhisattva is able.

II.2.v P¹ramit¹s in the bodhisattva path A path suggests starting from one place to get to another. In this sense, the p¹ramit¹s are not a path leading from giving (d¹na) to prajñ¹. The path is from the beginning the practice of all the p¹ramit¹s to the perfect practice of them. Bodhisattvas train to perfect the p¹ramit¹s. The bodhisattva path is what enables the bodhisattvas to practice the p¹ramit¹s in their highest degree, to increase their ability to practice the p¹ramit¹s. The p¹ramit¹s are the supreme accomplishment of the bodhisattva, so it is hard to see how they can also be the path. Few texts about the bodhisattva path confine themselves to discussing the p¹ramit¹s.

Lamotte introduces the bodhisattva path by saying, “The bodhisattva career consists of the practice of six perfections.”176 But later he outlines the

171 Ibid., 166. 172 Mullens, 132-133 - this is the case in prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, the BodhisattvabhØmi and the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra which deals extensively with the interrelatedness of the p¹ramit¹s. 173 Asa¡ga, Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, trad. Lamotte, 195. 174 Dayal, 167. 175 Mullens, 132. 176 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 25. 73 bodhisattva path in more detail, showing it does not consist only of the practice of the p¹ramit¹s.177 The ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra states that the bodhisattva in ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhi has the p¹ramit¹s, but needs to train to get there. The training begins with intention (¹¶aya), and goes on to application (prayoga), resolute intention (adhy¹¶aya), great benevolence (mah¹maitr»), great compassion (mah¹karuª¹), four divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra) and five superknowledges (abhijñ¹).178

Lindtner also recognizes that the bodhisattva does not just consist of the p¹ramit¹s, when he says, “The gradual process of development which a bodhisattva undergoes practising the p¹ramit¹s and a large number of other moral and intellectual virtues is minutely depicted in a number of Mah¹y¹na texts. According to the scheme of Da¶abhØmika SØtra which is the authority followed by N¹g¹rjuna (and later M¹dhyamikas) in this respect, a bodhisattva must ascend through ten spiritual stages (bhØmi) before he finally achieves buddhatva.”179

The p¹ramit¹s are often listed among the good qualities of a Buddha or bodhisattva m¹hasattva. Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ describes a bodhisattva who has set out, or mounted on the great vehicle,180 as thinking, “I myself will fulfil the six perfections and also on all beings will I enjoin them.”181 But he has the same thought with regard to the unlimited (apram¹ªa), the trances (dhy¹na), the formless attainments (¹rØpyasam¹patti), the superknowledges (abhijñ¹), the ten powers (bala), the grounds of self confidence (vai¶¹radya), and the eighteen special Buddhadharmas.182 The Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ lists many items as being the great vehicle, such as the twenty emptinesses, 112 concentrations, four applications of mindfulness, the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma) and

177 Ibid., 139 n.112. 178 Ibid., 128-143; Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 140 n.112, notes that the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature introduces the brahmavih¹ras and abhijñ¹s into the bodhisattva’s career, see Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 133-135. 179 Lindtner, N¹g¹rjuniana, 267. 180 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 131. 181 Ibid., 128. 182 Ibid., 128, 124. 74 the dh¹raª» doors (dh¹raª»mukha).183 Four of the eight abhisamayas of the Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra cover the path, but only the seventh concerns the bodhisattva acquiring the six p¹ramit¹s.184 Candrak»rti says that the Mah¹y¹na does not only teach non-self of dharmas (dharmanair¹tmya), but also the bodhisattva bhØmis, p¹ramit¹s, vows (praªidh¹na), great compassion (mah¹karuª¹) etc., and also dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹), the two accumulations (sambh¹ra), and the inconceivable nature of dharma (acintyadharmat¹).185

The bodhisattva’s aim is to acquire all the dharmas which constitute a Buddha. The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ says that the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ includes all these dharmas.186 It does say that the six p¹ramit¹s are the bodhisattva’s path. It also says they are his Teacher, light, torch illumination, shelter, refuge, place of rest, final relief, island mother, father, “and lead him to cognition, to understanding, to full enlightenment.” The prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ is accomplished in the six p¹ramit¹s. “For it is in these six perfections that the perfection of wisdom is accomplished . . . The six perfections contain the thirty-seven dharmas which act as wings to enlightenment, they contain the four Brahma-dwellings, the four means of conversion (sa÷grahavastu), and any Buddha-dharma there may be.”187

Later texts do not include the whole path under the heading of the p¹ramit¹s. For instance, chapters 3-8 of the Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, which concern “the learning and the practice leading to the attainment of Buddhahood,”188 outlines the path beginning with the p¹ramit¹s, and continuing with a chapter each on the ten stages (bhØmis), and the three trainings (¶ik¬¹): adhi¶»la, adhicitta, and adhiprajñ¹. The subjects of these last three chapters are moral

183 Ibid., 143-162. Chang, Treasury, 474, explains dh¹raª» as “1. A synonym for mantra, spell, or incantation; 2. The capability of holding in mind the vast amount of the Buddha’s teachings; 3. Extraordinary memory and comprehension.” Lindtner, Master of wisdom, 384: “literally, ‘that which bears the meaning’: a formula that contains the essence of an aspect of the teachings; meant to be memorized and recited.” 184 Conze, "Marginal notes to the Abhisamay¹la¡k¹ra," 23. 185 MAB1:8d, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 271; Cecil Bendall and Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva-bhØmi: a text-book of the Yog¹c¹ra school, an English summary with notes and illustrative extracts from other Buddhistic works," Le Muséon, n.s., 6 (1905): 52. 186 Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 84. 187 Ibid., 236. 75 conduct (¶»la), meditative concentration (sam¹dhi) and non-discriminative knowledge (nirvikalpajñ¹na).189

Although the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ says that the p¹ramit¹s include all the virtuous dharmas (ku¶aladharma), it does not explain which virtuous dharmas (ku¶aladharma) belong to which p¹ramit¹. The BodhisattvabhØmi divides moral conduct (¶»la) into three parts. The second of these is collecting virtuous dharmas (ku¶aladharma), which it equates with the six p¹ramit¹s.190

The bodhisattva path begins with the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) and culminates in supreme perfect enlightenment. A being who has achieved supreme perfect enlightenment is a Buddha. The p¹ramit¹s are central to the path of practice of a bodhisattva, but the bodhisattva path is not monolithic or confined to the p¹ramit¹s. The path includes practising the virtues associated with the p¹ramit¹s to the extent the bodhisattva is able at the time and to improve their practice until they are perfected. There are several prerequisites to beginning the practice of the p¹ramit¹s and they do not encompass everything that is found in the practice of a bodhisattva. They are practices which must be fulfilled to complete the path, but not the path in its entirety. The bodhisattva path includes many practices and rules, apart from the p¹ramit¹s, which a bodhisattva should follow, and the achievements of a bodhisattva include factors other than the p¹ramit¹s. Although they are to be practised in order, each of them is practised at all stages of the path. For these reasons, the p¹ramit¹s cannot be considered to be a path of development.

II.3 BhØmis The bhØmis outline a path for the bodhisattva, which is not evident in the p¹ramit¹s. They show the development of a bodhisattva from being an ordinary person to being a Buddha. The term bhØmi literally means earth, or ground. It

188 Hattori Masaaki, "Asa¡ga." 189 Ibid. 190 Asanga’s Chapter on ethics with the commentary Tsong-Kha-Pa, The basic path to awakening, The complete bodhisattva, trans. Mark Tatz, Studies in Asian thought and religion, vol. 4 (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 16. 76 also means stage or, more specifically, stage of religious development.191 The Mah¹y¹na literature uses the bhØmis to classify bodhisattvas.192 Bodhisattvas can be placed at some point in the bhØmi scheme, according to their accomplishments and level of achievement.193

To provide a background to ˜¹ntideva, the following outline of the bhØmis focuses on the preparatory stages, the transition to practising the bhØmis and the first bodhisattva bhØmi. It also refers to the place of k¬¹nti and its related concepts in the bhØmis. As well as being relevant to the topic of this thesis, k¬¹nti serves as an example to show the difficulty of correlating the bhØmi schemes presented in the different texts. The distinctions drawn in the texts which are useful to an understanding of ˜¹ntideva’s bhØmi references are: between a follower of Mah¹y¹na and the follower of ˜r¹vakay¹na, between an ordinary person (pÅthagjana) and an ¹rya, between someone in whom bodhicitta has arisen and someone in whom it has not, between a bodhisattva who has set out on the path and one who has not, and between a bodhisattva who has attained a bhØmi and one who has not. While the texts surveyed draw these distinctions, they do not define them consistently.

Due to the differences in the bhØmi schemes, each is outlined separately. The Mah¹vastu and prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature include earlier, less systematic schemes than those found in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra, the BodhisattvabhØmi, and the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya (which follows Da¶abhØmika SØtra). The Mah¹vastu is a non-Mah¹y¹na text which describes the path of the bodhisattva. It lists four courses of conduct/practices (cary¹), and ten bhØmis of a bodhisattva. The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ lists four classes of bodhisattva, but does not mention ten bhØmis.194 Later prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras, such as the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, give a systematic description of the bhØmis. The Da¶abhØmika SØtra was probably the first Mah¹y¹na text to name the ten bhØmis that are unique to bodhisattvas. The BodhisattvabhØmi outlines two different, but related, schemes, which it attempts

191 BHS410-411. 192 The m¹rga scheme, discussed below, is also used this way. 193 Bodhisattvas are also defined with respect to cary¹. Lethcoe, “Bodhisattva ideal,” 263. 77 to correlate with the bhØmis of the Da¶abhØmika SØtra. As Candrak»rti follows the bhØmi scheme of the Da¶abhØmika SØtra closely in the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya, the Da¶abhØmika SØtra is discussed immediately before the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya, although it is an earlier text than the BodhisattvabhØmi.

II.3.i Scholarly literature on bhØmis Dayal, Dutt, La Vallée Poussin and Lamotte provide summaries and comments on several schemes of bodhisattva bhØmis. Lamotte suggests that trying to relate all these schemes to each other will only lead to confusion.195 Nevertheless, it is possible to look for correlations. As usual in Buddhist texts, the concepts proliferate, which adds to the confusion.

Dayal summarizes the schemes found in the Mah¹vastu, ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, BodhisattvabhØmi, and Da¶abhØmika SØtra.196 He does not find much in common between the schemes in the BodhisattvabhØmi and Da¶abhØmika SØtra.197 Dutt also outlines several schemes, taking the Da¶abhØmika SØtra as standard and referring also to the BodhisattvabhØmi, Madhyamak¹vat¹ra, the Mah¹vastu and the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras.198 He accepts the BodhisattvabhØmi’s claim that stages 3-12 of its vih¹ra scheme parallel stages 1-10 of the Da¶abhØmika SØtra.199

Dutt finds some traces of the description found in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra of the first three bhØmis in the Mah¹vastu.200 Rahder draws out these similarities in the introduction to his edition of the Da¶abhØmika SØtra.201 Dayal, however, disagrees with Rahder that the systems of the Mah¹vastu and

194 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 43. 195 Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Webb-Boin, 628. See S. Bagchi in the introduction to the Da¶abhØmika SØtra for further comments on the futility of such an exercise. Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 1. 196 Dayal, 273-291. 197 Ibid., 282. 198 N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 89. 199 Ibid., 87: the BodhisattvabhØmi follows the Da¶abhØmika SØtra “with minor variations.” 200 Ibid., 88. 201 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, [ed.] door Johannes Rahder (Leuven: J.-B. Istas, [1926]), iii-viii. 78 the Da¶abhØmika SØtra are closely related.202 One of the differences between the Mah¹vastu and the Da¶abhØmika SØtra is that the Mah¹vastu outlines the circumstances under which a bodhisattva may regress from one bhØmi to the previous one, whereas the Da¶abhØmika SØtra does not.203 The bodhisattva may fall back a bhØmi, or not progress to the next, by not observing certain rules of vinaya.204

By combining various bhØmi schemes into two models, La Vallée Poussin has attempted to relate several schemes.205 The first model is according to the oldest systematic doctrines and divides the bodhisattva’s career into four stages.206 These include two stages before the bodhisattva actually begins following the path: on the first bodhisattvas engage in the preparatory practice based on their innate qualities (prakÅticary¹) and on the second bodhisattvas produce the first thought (prathamacittotp¹dika). The third stage is when the bodhisattva has set out and is following the path. Terms associated with this stage are: following the bodhisattva course (bodhisattvacary¹ñ caran), practice of conformity (anulomacary¹), the bodhisattva who is going (gantÅ), and the bodhisattva who is endowed with the practices (cary¹pratipanna). The fourth stage is when the bodhisattva achieves the stage from where there is no turning back (avinivartan»y¹ bhØmi or anivartanacary¹).207

202 Dayal, 271-272. 203 Ibid., 272. 204 N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 88. 205 Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," in Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics, ed. James Hastings, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1908-1926). As well as the texts used by Dayal and Dutt, he also refers to Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra and Prasannapad¹, Saddharmapuª©ar»ka, SØtr¹la÷k¹ra, Abhidharmako¬a, A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, Lalitavistara, Mah¹vyutpatti, J¹taka, Dharmasa÷graha, and ˜¹ntideva’s Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. 206 La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," 2:744. 207 prakÅticary¹ from the Mah¹vastu; prathamacittotp¹dika from the BodhisattvabhØmi; Mah¹vastu and Ak¬ayamati SØtra (quoted in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya); anulomacary¹ from the Mah¹vastu; cary¹pratipanna from A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, and Ak¬ayamati SØtra (quoted in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya); avinivartan»y¹ bhØmi from prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, see Conze, Materials; anivartanacary¹ from the Mah¹vastu. 79 Other terms La Vallée Poussin associates with the second stage are first setting out on the journey (prathamay¹nasamprasthita),208 and the beginner desiring to set out (¹dikarmika gantuk¹ma).209 La Vallée Poussin says:

According to the texts of the Great Vehicle quoted in the ˜ik¬¹samuchchaya, 212, 12 and 313, 19; [the second stage] corresponds to the praªidh¹nachary¹ of the Mah¹vastu, and to the adhimuktichary¹bhØmi210 of BodhisattvabhØmi and SØtr¹la¡k¹ra.211

The relevant quotations from the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya are as follows:

s¹ trividh¹ ‘ry¹k¬ayamatisØtre abhihit¹ | satv¹rambaª¹ maitr» prathamacittotp¹dik¹n¹÷ bodhisatv¹n¹÷ | dharm¹rambaª¹ cary¹pratipann¹n¹÷ bodhisatv¹n¹÷ | an¹rambaª¹ maitr» anutpattikadharmak¬¹ntipratilabdh¹n¹÷ bodhisatv¹n¹miti || (SSB212.12)

In the Ak¬ayamati SØtra, benevolence (maitr») is said to be of three kinds. For bodhisattvas who have produced the first thought of enlightenment, maitr» has beings for its object; for bodhisattvas who are engaged in the path, benevolence (maitr») has dharmas for its object; for bodhisattvas who have attained anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, benevolence (maitr») has no object.

anumodan¹nu¶a÷s¹s tv ¹ryaprajñ¹p¹ramit¹y¹m ukt¹å | yaå prathamay¹nasamprasthit¹n¹÷ bodhisatv¹n¹÷ mah¹satv¹n¹÷ t¹÷¶ cittotp¹d¹n anumodate | carat¹m api bodhisatvacary¹÷ t¹÷¶ cittotp¹d¹n anumodate | avinivartan»y¹m api avinivartan»yadharmat¹m anumodate bodhisatv¹n¹÷ mah¹satv¹n¹m (SSB313.18-20)

The Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ states the benefits of delight. He delights in the arisings of bodhicitta of the bodhisattvas, mah¹sattvas who have first set out in the

208 prathamay¹nasamprasthita is the first stage in the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, where the second is cary¹pratipanna. samprasthita: MW1176: “advancing towards Buddhahood (?), Divy¹v.” La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," 2:744: “who merely steps into the vehicle.” 209 La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," 2:744; see also p.747, quotation from MA 18-20. 210 adhimukti MW21: f. propensity, confidence. Also faith, aspiration, zealous application, zealous devotion. See ShØyØ Kanaoka, “Adhimukti-cary¹-bhØmi,” in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, fasc. 2 ([Colombo]: Government of Ceylon, 1963), 202-203. He disagrees with Edgerton’s translation “stage of zealous conduct,” saying that Chinese and Tibetan commentators translate adhimukticary¹ as “stage of deed through interpretation or comprehension,” or “stage of interpretation and deed.” He prefers to translate adhimukti as “comprehension.” 211 La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," 2:744 n.‡. Dayal, 272, says that the Mah¹y¹nasØtr¹la÷k¹ra does not give details of the bhØmis. Telwatte Rahula, A critical study of the Mah¹vastu, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978), 63, says it does. 80 vehicle;212 he also delights in the arisings of bodhicitta of those who are undertaking the bodhisattva course of conduct; he also delights in the nature of irreversibility which is the irreversibility of the bodhisattvas, mah¹sattvas.213

These quotations do not specifically refer to the bhØmis, or to the texts, Mah¹vastu, BodhisattvabhØmi and SØtr¹la÷k¹ra. Both quotations only refer to three types of bodhisattva, whereas La Vallée Poussin has proposed four types. La Vallée Poussin suggests the first types mentioned correspond to his second stage. The BodhisattvabhØmi does mention the first arising of the thought (prathamacittotp¹da) on the practice of aspiration vih¹ra (adhimukticary¹vih¹ra).214 The relationship between the first arising of the thought (prathamacittotp¹da) and the making of the vow (praªidhi) is not clear- cut in the Mah¹vastu.215 The three types of bodhisattva in the second quotation, which is from a prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ text, correspond to the first three of the four classes outlined in the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹.216 La Vallée Poussin has included the first class of the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, those who have just begun to set out in the vehicle (prathamay¹nasamprasthita), in the second stage of his model. The third stage of the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ scheme, the irreversible stage, corresponds to the fourth stage in the Mah¹vastu scheme. This demonstrates the confusion which can result from trying to relate the stages according to several schemes.

In the second model, which is a description of the bhØmis according to Mah¹y¹na teachers, La Vallée Poussin divides the bhØmis into three periods.217 The first period includes the preparatory stages (parikarmabhØmi or upac¹rabhØmi) to the bodhisattva bhØmis themselves. The BodhisattvabhØmi outlines these stages but the Da¶abhØmika SØtra and the

212 Conze, Materials, 282. 213 Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 254-255: The son or daughter of good family who rejoices at the productions of thought of those Bodhisattvas who have just begun to set out in the vehicle, as well as at the productions of thought of those who progress on the course, as well as at the irreversible nature of those who are irreversible . . . 214 BHS14: stage of zealous conduct. See below, p.93. 215 See below, p.84. 216 See below, p.54. Bendall, SSB313 n.3, says that the quotation is not from the A¬−as¹hasrik¹ recension. 217 La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," 2:745 n.**. His authorities are A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, Da¶abhØmika SØtra, BodhisattvabhØmi, Madhyamak¹vat¹ra, and SØtr¹la÷k¹ra. 81 Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya do not. La Vallée Poussin suggests that the M¹dhyamikas knew these distinctions,218 but most of the bhØmi schemes in the Mah¹y¹na literature do not speak specifically of preparatory stages. The second period corresponds to the first seven stages of the bodhisattva proper, “the ‘active’ career”219 (stages 1-7 of the Da¶abhØmika SØtra and the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya), and the third period corresponds to the last three bhØmis, where the bodhisattva no longer does anything, but correct acts naturally occur.

II.3.ii Mah¹vastu The Mah¹vastu outlines the career of the bodhisattva, modelling the bodhisattva path on the lives of ˜¹kyamuni Buddha and former Buddhas.220 The Mah¹vastu lists four practices, or courses of conduct, (cary¹) of a bodhisattva. Edgerton and Lamotte define them as follows:221 1. prakÅticary¹: bodhisattva’s “original, basic endowment” (Edgerton); “preparatory practice (prakÅticary¹) aimed at developing the natural qualities of the bodhisattvas)” (Lamotte) 2. praªidhicary¹ or praªidh¹nacary¹: bodhisattva’s “vows to attain enlightenment” (Edgerton); “the practice of aspiration (praªidhi- or praªidh¹nacary¹, consisting mainly of the arousal of the thought of bodhi)” (Lamotte) 3. anulomacary¹: “course of conduct conforming (to a Bodhisattva’s vow to attain bodhi), . . . alludes to [bodhisattva’s] progressive approach to the goal” (Edgerton); “the practice of conformity (anulomacary¹) by means of which the future Buddha adjusts all his activity to the thought of bodhi” (Lamotte)

218 Ibid., 2:745 n.*. La Vallée Poussin has no doubt that the M¹dhyamikas knew these distinctions. He refers to the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, vii.8, viii.8 and Madhyamak¹vat¹ra 13.12. See below for further discussion of these texts. 219 Ibid., 2:747. cf. the BodhisattvabhØmi cary¹pratipatti. See Kizow Inazu, "Vijñapti- m¹trat¹ doctrine as a systematical explanation of bodhisattva’s life," Journal of Indian and Buddhist studies / Indogaku bukkyogaku kenkyu 16 (March 1968): 992-96, on dividing the ten bhØmis into two stages. 220 The Mah¹vastu, trans. J. J. Jones, Sacred books of the Buddhists, vol. 16, 18-19 (London: Luzac, 1949-1956), 1:xi-xiii, 2-3; G. S. P. Misra, The age of vinaya (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1972), 31; Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Webb-Boin, 628. 221 BHS33, 226; Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Webb-Boin, 627-628. Apart from avivartanacary¹, which is similar to the third class of A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ - avinivartan»ya, these are not the same as those in A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, see above, p.54. 82 4. avivartanacary¹: “the point at which it becomes impossible for [bodhisattva] to backslide” (Edgerton); “the practice of irreversibility (avivartanacary¹), or assured and irreversible conduct until bodhi” (Lamotte)

The Mah¹vastu also gives ten bhØmis, which are completely different from those found in Mah¹y¹na literature:222

1. dur¹roh¹ hard to attain

2. baddham¹n¹ binding

3. pu¬pamaª©it¹ adorned with flowers

4. rucir¹ gracious

5. cittavistar¹ extensive in thought

6. rØpavat» beautiful

7. durjay¹ hard to conquer

8. janmanide¶a demonstration of birth

9. yauvar¹jya of the crown prince

10. abhi¬eka of unction

Rahula relates the cary¹ to the bhØmis as follows:223

prakÅticary¹ first half of the first bhØmi

praªidhicary¹ second half of the first bhØmi

anulomacary¹ bhØmis 2-7

avivartanacary¹ bhØmis 8-10

According to Lamotte, all the bhØmis are part of the practice of conformity (anulomacary¹).224 The Mah¹vastu does not say that this is the case and Rahula’s suggestion fits well with the concepts outlined in the text. The

222 Mah¹vastu avad¹nam = Le mah¹vastu: texte sanscrit publié pour la première fois et accompagné d'introductions et d'un commentaire, (ed.) É. Senart, Collection d'ouvrages orientaux. Seconde série (Paris: Société Asiatique, 1882-1897; reprint, Tokyo: Meicho-FukyØ-kai, 1977), 1:76; Jones, 1: 60; English translations from Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Webb- Boin, 628. Dayal, 273-275 has some variant spellings: cittavist¹ra, janmanide¬a, yauvar¹ja. 223 Rahula, Critical study of the Mah¹vastu, 62. 224 Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Webb-Boin, 628. 83 preparatory practice (prakÅticary¹) includes the ten paths of virtuous action (da¶aku¶alakarmapatha), giving (d¹na), acquiring merit, but no arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da). The practice of aspiration (praªidhicary¹) is where the bodhisattva makes a resolve for enlightenment. A section of the text describing this process is repeated as part of the first bhØmi.225 The Mah¹vastu does not relate its bhØmis to the p¹ramit¹s.

A feature of the Mah¹vastu, consistent with it being a vinaya, is that it outlines certain rules which bodhisattvas must observe if they are not to regress (vivarta) from one bhØmi to the previous one.226 Lamotte suggests that the fourth practice of irreversibility, (avivartanacary¹) applies to all ten bhØmis, unlike in the later schemes where this is acquired only once, usually on the eighth bhØmi.227 La Vallée Poussin sees it the other way around. He sees all the Mah¹y¹na bhØmis as being “exempt from return,” and only the last three of the Mah¹vastu as falling into this category.228 Lamotte is probably referring to the possibility for the bodhisattva in the Mah¹vastu to either be progressing (avaivarta) or not (vivarta) on each bhØmi. In the later texts, the bodhisattva is assured of irreversibility from the eighth bhØmi, but in the Mah¹vastu it is possible, but not assured, for the bodhisattva to be irreversible from the first bhØmi.

The Mah¹vastu is not consistent in the way it depicts the relationship between the first arising of the thought (prathamacittotp¹da) and the making of the vow (praªidhi). At the beginning of the first bhØmi bodhisattvas can be ordinary people (pÅthagjana).229 They are perfect in renunciation (ty¹gasampanna). They have eight rules of conduct. The first two are renunciation and compassion. Hatred is one of the causes of not progressing to the second bhØmi. Both the bodhisattvas who regress, and those who do not, gain great merit from the vow to gain enlightenment (bodhaye praªidhento).230

225 Senart, 1:48 = Senart, 1:81. 226 Dayal, 272; N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 88. Jones, 1:70 n.2, discusses various uses of the term vivartanti in relation to the bhØmis. 227 Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Webb-Boin, 628. 228 La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," 2:744. 229 Senart, 1:78. 230 Ibid., 80; Jones, 1:62. 84 At this point in the text, the first arising of the thought (prathamacittotp¹da) and the vow (praªidhi) are closely linked. Once the vow is made, although still ordinary people, their purpose is not that of ordinary people.231 The first arising of the thought (prathamacittotp¹da) and the vow (praªidhi) are also closely linked when the text describes portents that appear when bodhisattvas who do not regress (avaivarta) cause the first arising of the thought (cittotp¹da).232 But later, in the fourth bhØmi, the text gives the impression that there is a gap between the arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da) and the vow (praªidhi).233 The text describes the case of a bodhisattva who has the arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da) but has not made the vow. Bodhisattvas who do not regress (avaivartika) in any of the first seven bhØmis cannot be reborn in bad destinies.234 Any bad actions done before the bodhisattva made a vow are unable to mature after the arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da). Another confusing aspect of the text is that irreversible bodhisattvas in later bhØmis are sometimes described as producing the first thought.235 For example:

By what means are those bodhisattvas who produce the first thought (prathamacittotp¹dayanti) coursing in the fourth bhØmi turned back in the fifth bhØmi.236

On the first bhØmi, the bodhisattvas who do not regress (avivartika)237 perform difficult acts such as having no regret on giving up everything, regarding with friendliness those who are tormenting them, and speaking to them gently. Among the twenty dispositions (adhy¹¶aya) of a bodhisattva on the second bhØmi is gentleness (snigdha), which means that although their bodies are torn apart, they do not get angry.238 Their disposition (adhy¹¶aya) is

231 Jones, 1:63. See Candrak»rti below, p.107. 232 Senart, 1:82: avaivartiyo bodhisatvo prathamacittotp¹dayati, see also p.97 for similar expression: bodhisatv¹ avaivartiy¹ prathamacittotp¹dayanti bodh¹ya. Also p.110: bodhisatv¹å prathamacittotp¹dayanti. Senart, 1:82-83; Jones, 1:64. 233 Senart, 1:104; Rahula, Critical study of the Mah¹vastu, 51, also has this impression from the text in general. 234 Jones, 1:80-82. 235 Senart, 1:97, 110. 236 Ibid., 110. 237 Ibid., 83. 238 Senart, 1:85; Jones, 1: 67. 85 seen to be gentle and mild (snigdhamÅdu).239 To go from the second bhØmi to the third bhØmi, bodhisattvas practice renunciation (ty¹ga).240 The main activity of bodhisattvas on the third bhØmi is self-sacrifice for teachings. Among the causes for not progressing to the third bhØmi is attachment to gain, honour and fame.241

The only section of the text under the heading fourth bhØmi which actually refers to the fourth bhØmi, and not the eighth bhØmi, or bhØmis in general, is the section on the conditions for not progressing. The fourth bhØmi begins with a list of actions that a bodhisattva does or does not practise, including not striking due to anger and practising the ten paths of virtuous action (da¶akarmapath¹÷ ku¶al¹÷).242 These bodhisattvas are completely pure in body, speech, mind, intention (adhy¹¶aya), and have d¹nap¹ramit¹. These actions apply to all ten bhØmis.243 From the beginning of the eighth bhØmi these bodhisattvas do not regress (anivarta) and only do good actions, until then their actions are mixed.244 It is only from the eighth bhØmi that bodhisattvas renounce everything. They are honoured as Buddhas and achieve five superknowledges (abhijñ¹).245 They practise and preach the ten paths of virtuous action (da¶aku¶alakarmapatha).246

To pass to the fifth bhØmi, the bodhisattva is full of despair and disgust through seeing that all existences are subject to greed, hatred and ignorance (r¹gadve¬amoha) (similarly on the first and second bhØmi). The fifth bhØmi includes a description of Buddhas to be worshipped.247 The bodhisattva should cultivate the two types of contemplation (bh¹van¹), tranquillity (¶amath¹) and

239 Senart, 1:85. 240 Ibid., 91; Jones, 1:72. Jones translates citta as ‘state of heart’. 241 Senart, 1:89: l¹bhaguruka, satk¹raguruka, k»rti¶lokapara; Jones, 1:70. 242 Senart, 1:101; Jones, 1:80. “They are not cast down by adversity nor elated by prosperity.” ¹patsu na vi¬»danti na ca modanti vÅddhi¬u, 102. 243 Dayal, 275, however, places them in the eighth bhØmi. 244 Senart, 1:102; Jones, 1:80. 245 Jones, 1:84. The five superknowledges (abhijñ¹) are ability to perform miracles (Åddhi), the divine ear, knowledge of thoughts of others, knowledge or former births, and the divine eye, Huntington, 224. 246 Senart, 1:107; Jones, 1:85. 247 Jones, 1:87. cf. the Da¶abhØmika SØtra. 86 insight (vipa¶yan¹), on the fifth bhØmi.248 Again, the bodhisattva’s lack of delight in the world leads to the sixth bhØmi.249 For the seventh bhØmi, the bodhisattva’s state of mind is self-control.250

The text asks, what are the qualities of body, speech and mind of bodhisattvas who do not lapse from first bhØmi onwards?251 They are preaching non-murder, praising, compassion (karuª¹), practising morality (¶»la), and going forth. There is a list of the bodhisattva’s difficult acts of compassion and forgiveness, and the bodhisattva’s qualities, including patience, not being cast down by adversity nor elated by prosperity,252 acquiring roots of virtue (ku¶alamØla) by avoiding greed, hatred and ignorance, undefiled in acts of body, speech and mind, loving their enemies, and mastering all sciences and expedients. Great compassion (mah¹karuª¹) is the state of mind of a bodhisattva advancing from seventh bhØmi to eighth bhØmi.

II.3.iii Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ does not mention ten bhØmis, nor any preliminary stages.253 Later prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras, such as the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, name ten bhØmis common to the ¶r¹vakas and the bodhisattvas, as well as discussing ten unnamed bodhisattva bhØmis.254

According to the ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, the ten bhØmis which apply to all three Vehicles are:255

248 Ibid., 94. 249 Ibid., 95. 250 Senart, 1:127; Jones, 1:101. ¹thmadamatha: BHS262, control of body, speech and mind. 251 Jones, 1:101. 252 Senart, 1:134, completely different expression to that at p.102. 253 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 43. 254 ˜atas¹hasrik¹-prajñ¹-p¹ramit¹: a theological and philosophical discourse of Buddha with his disciples (in a hundred-thousand stanzas), ed. Prat¹pacandra Gho¬a, Bibliotheca Indica, n.s., no. 1224 (Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1910), 1473; Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 178. The accounts in ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ are similar. See earlier, they are essentially the same text. 255 Lamotte, History of Indian Buddhism, trans. Webb-Boin, 628 n.178: “This list in fact runs through the Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature.” Names of stages from Gho¬a, ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, 1473. English translations from Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 219 n.299. 87 1. ¶uklavipa¶yan¹256 stage of insight

2. gotrabhØmi stage of spiritual lineage

3. a¬−amakabhØmi stage of the eighth-level holy one (i.e. on the lowest level)

4. dar¶anabhØmi stage of vision

5. tanubhØmi refined stage

6. vitar¹gabhØmi stage of renunciation

7. kÅt¹vibhØmi stage of the one who has ended his career

8. pratyekabuddhabhØmi stage of the pratyekabuddhas

9. bodhisattvabhØmi stage of the bodhisattvas

10. buddhabhØmi stage of the Buddhas

The ninth bhØmi, bodhisattvabhØmi, also consists of ten bhØmis, which these texts do not name, but they do describe at length.257 A later commentator, Haribhadra, assigned the bhØmis preceding the bodhisattvabhØmi to the ¶r¹vakas, and only the bhØmi named bodhisattvabhØmi to the bodhisattvas.258 However, it is clear from the original texts that all the named bhØmis apply to bodhisattvas.259 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra also acknowledges that there are two types of bhØmis: the bhØmis for the bodhisattva only, and bhØmis common to both vehicles. The bodhisattva bhØmis are the ones named in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra,260 and the common bhØmis are the ten named in the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature.261

256 Variant: ¶u¬kavidar¶an¹bhØmi, Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 218 n.299. 257 Ibid., 119 n.44. 258 Ibid., 219 n.299: Lamotte notes that Obermiller and Conze have taken up Haribhadra’s interpretation. Lamotte includes ¶r¹vakabhØmi as the eighth stage, but this is not confirmed by the ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, or Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra (as quoted by Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin- Webb, 220 n.299). 259 Gho¬a, ˜atas¹hasrik¹-prajñ¹-p¹ramit¹, 1473. 260 See below, p.97. 261 Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra quoted in Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 220 n.299. 88 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra interprets the first seven of the common bhØmis according to whether they apply to bodhisattvas or to ¶r¹vakas. It says that the bodhisattva bhØmis are both these bhØmis and the ones named in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra.262 The first bhØmi (¶uklavipa¶yan¹) for a bodhisattva begins with the first arising of the thought (prathamacittotp¹da) and continues until he obtains conforming patience (anulomik»k¬¹nti). The second bhØmi (gotrabhØmi) begins when the bodhisattva obtains conforming patience (anulomik»k¬¹nti). He also obtains contemplations (dhy¹na) and attainments (sam¹patti). The bodhisattva on the stage of spiritual lineage (gotrabhØmi) in the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra’s interpretation of the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹’s scheme is far more advanced than on a similarly named stage in the BodhisattvabhØmi scheme. The third bhØmi sees the bodhisattva obtain anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti and the certainty of being a bodhisattva (bodhisattvaniy¹ma). Candrak»rti relates the third common bhØmi, a¬−amakabhØmi, to the first bodhisattva bhØmi.263 The fourth bhØmi is the irreversible stage (avaivartikabhØmi) of a bodhisattva. The bodhisattva obtains the five superknowledges (abhijñ¹) on the sixth bhØmi and becomes a Buddha on the seventh bhØmi.

When Dayal says that the ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ does not give names to its ten bhØmis, he is referring to the ten bhØmis exclusive to bodhisattvas. He finds this bhØmi scheme repetitive with no system evident, and says that it only mentions six p¹ramit¹s.264 Conze’s translation of the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ mentions ten p¹ramit¹s,265 but the corresponding passage in the ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ says merely “all p¹ramit¹s” and in the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra says six p¹ramit¹s.266 Six p¹ramit¹s are to be fulfilled on the sixth bhØmi,267 which Dayal omits from his

262 Ibid., 220-221 n.299. 263 See below, p.106. 264 Dayal, 277. 265 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 178. 266 Gho¬a, ˜atas¹hasrik¹-prajñ¹-p¹ramit¹, 1472; Lamotte, Traité (Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra), 5:2443. 267 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 172. See Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 140 n.112, where he says of the ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra that “The 89 summary. The ˜atas¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ do not link each stage to a p¹ramit¹ as the Da¶abhØmika SØtra does.

The Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ gives details of the preparations made by the bodhisattva on each of ten bhØmis.268 The Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ says that resolute intention (adhy¹¶aya) is the first preparation on the first bhØmi.269 Before this point, the bodhisattva has already had the first arising of the thought (prathamacittotp¹da), made a vow to become a Buddha, and now begins to act on it.270 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra says that resolute intention (adhy¹¶aya), the first arising of the thought (prathamacittotp¹da) and making the vow are simultaneous for a well-developed bodhisattva.271

The first unnamed bhØmi lists the four immeasurables (apram¹ªa) as the definition of ‘same attitude of mind to all beings,’272 renunciation and giving, good friends (kaly¹ªamitra), and leaving home every life. On the second unnamed bhØmi, the text lists purity of morality, which it defines as non- attention to ¶r¹vaka and pratyekabuddha thoughts; patience (mental attitude free from ill-will and harming); joy (maturing beings); and cultivating the p¹ramit¹s in general. The third bhØmi begins with the an “insatiable desire to learn much.”273 K¬¹nti is not mentioned on the third bhØmi.

The fourth bhØmi begins with living in the forest, and mentions renunciation and moral training again. K¬¹nti is mentioned on the fourth bhØmi and also on the seventh bhØmi. The fourth point of the fourth bhØmi is that the bodhisattva’s compliance with the austerity of the ascetic practices is k¬¹nti that is skill in the deep dharmas (gambh»re¬u dharme¬u niry¹ªa k¬¹ntiriyam

˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra gives sufficient allowance to this state of affairs [i.e., one bhØmi to each of the first six stages] by assigning the completing of the six p¹ramit¹s to the sixth bhØmi.” 268 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 163-178. 269 On difference between ¹¶aya and adhy¹¶aya see Lamotte, Teaching of Vimalak»rti (Vimalak»rtinirde¶a), English trans. Boin, 284-286. 270 Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, quoted in Conze, Large sutra perfect wisdom, 165-166 n.3. 271 Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra quoted in Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 166 n.4. 272 Ibid., 166 n.5: reference to Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra: All people love their friends and hate their enemeies; the Bodhisattva , however, treats friend and foe as the same, as identical. 273 Ibid., 169. 90 bodhisattvasya mahasattvasya dhutaguªasa÷lekh¹nuvarttanat¹).274 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra interprets this as anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.275 It is from the seventh bhØmi that no reversal occurs.276 “His patient acceptance of non-production is the patient acceptance of the fact that all dharmas are not produced, stopped, or put together.”277 He rejects all defilements (kle¶a) and their residues.

The fifth bhØmi includes avoidance of jealousy, society, self-exaltation, depreciation of others, conceit (because the bodhisattva does not review (samanupa¶yati) any dharma), arrogance (because the bodhisattva does not review an entity (vastu)), wrong views, doubt, and “he avoids the toleration of greed, hatred and ignorance because he reviews no objective cause for greed, hate and delusion.”278 It is on the fifth bhØmi that the bodhisattva avoids the ten paths of unvirtuous action (da¶¹ku¶alakarmapatha). On the sixth bhØmi, the bodhisattva fulfils the six p¹ramit¹s.279

II.3.iv BodhisattvabhØmi The BodhisattvabhØmi devotes a chapter to describing a twelve stage scheme, where the term vih¹ra is used as an equivalent for bhØmi.280 In this scheme, stages 3-12 parallel stages 1-10 of the Da¶abhØmika SØtra.281 A later chapter of the BodhisattvabhØmi gives a seven stage scheme of bhØmis, which it correlates with the vih¹ra scheme, as follows:282

vih¹ra, Book 2, Chapter 4 bhØmi, Book 3, Chapter 3

274 Gho¬a, ˜atas¹hasrik¹-prajñ¹-p¹ramit¹, 1462-1463. 275 Translated by Conze: the bodhisattva “does not abandon the austere penance of the ascetic practices, that is his patient acquiescence in the deep dharmas which his meditation discloses to him.” Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 170 n.28, quotation from Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra: “the twelve ascetic practices produce purity of morality. That in its turn produces dhy¹na, and that again wisdom. The patient acceptance, in meditation, of dharmas which fail to be produced, is the reward of the ascetic practices, and the two are related like cause and effect.” Lamotte, Traité (Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra), 5:2410-2411. 276 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 175 n.47: niy¹ma comes from equilibrium between ¶amath¹ and vipa¶yan¹. 277 Ibid., 174. 278 Ibid., 172. 279 Ibid. 280 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 35-38. 281 Ibid., 227. 282 Adapted from Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 35-41. 91 1. gotra 1.gotra

2. adhimukticary¹ 2.abhimukh»

3. pramudit¹ 3.¶uddh¹¶aya

4. adhi¶»la 4.cary¹pratipatti

5. adhicitta cary¹pratipatti

6. adhiprajñ¹ (bodhipak¬yapratisa÷yukta) cary¹pratipatti

7. adhiprajñ¹ (satyapratisa÷yukta) cary¹pratipatti

8. adhiprajñ¹ (prat»tyasamutp¹dasa÷yukta) cary¹pratipatti

9. s¹bhisa÷sk¹ras¹bhoganirnimitta cary¹pratipatti

10. an¹bhoganirnimitta 5.niyat¹

11. pratisa÷vid 6.niyatacary¹

12. parama 7.ni¬−h¹gamana

In both these schemes, the first preparatory stage is spiritual lineage (gotra).283 At this stage, there is only an innate tendency to follow the Mah¹y¹na path.284 This bhØmi distinguishes between a follower of Mah¹y¹na, that is, someone destined to be a bodhisattva, and a follower of the ˜r¹vakay¹na or Pratyekabuddhay¹na. This is the stage that determines the path a person will later follow, depending on their aspiration and the type of roots of virtue (ku¶alamØla) they cultivate.285 This person is born into the spiritual lineage of bodhisattvas (gotrabhØ).286 Such a person has already accumulated a great quantity of merit (puªya).287 Bodhisattvas on preparatory stages who have sufficient roots of virtue (ku¶alamØla) to pre-destine them to become Buddhas are said to be established in the spiritual lineage (gotrastha).288 According to Dutt, the bodhisattva develops bodhicitta and completes the p¹ramit¹s on the

283 Also in La÷k¹vat¹ra, La Vallée Poussin, “Bodhisattva,” 2:745. 284 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 36. 285 N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 101-102. 286 Rahula, Critical study of the Mah¹vastu, 55; Dayal, 51-53. 287 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 36. 288 N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 93. 92 stage of spiritual lineage (gotrabhØmi). The bodhisattva then qualifies for the practice of aspiration (adhimukticary¹) and begins to follow the ten bhØmis.289

The second preparatory stage is the practice of aspiration vih¹ra (adhimukticary¹vih¹ra) or abhimukh»bhØmi.290 At this stage, the bodhisattva has the first arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da) and makes a vow (praªidh¹na)291 to become a Buddha. In the BodhisattvabhØmi, “the firm resolution (praªidh¹na) is otherwise known [as] Bodhicittotp¹da.”292 The bodhisattva sets out on the path, but is wavering.293 The BodhisattvabhØmi says that although the bodhisattva has the first arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da), at this stage the intention is not pure (a¶uddh¹dhy¹¶aya).294 The bodhisattva can only practise contemplation (bh¹van¹) in a limited way.295 This bodhisattva follows the path with difficulty, does not have a strong desire for bodhi, and loses energy for the bodhisattva practices. Such a bodhisattva must purify the intentions, before entering the next stage, where the intentions are pure (¶uddh¹dhy¹¶aya).

Mullens discusses Dayal’s contention that the practice of aspiration (adhimukticary¹) section of the BodhisattvabhØmi was added later. Dayal bases his suggestion on the omission of practice of aspiration (adhimukticary¹) as a separate chapter in Book 1. But Mullens shows that although the term adhimukti is not used, the ideas associated with adhimukti are present:296

For example, the idea that the initial enlightenment intention and activities are unstable and that bodhisattva practice begins with the first, potentially regressive generation of the aspiration, is found in all Books of the text. Thus it is stated in BBH:II for example, that “beginning with the bodhisattva’s first generation of an enlightened attitude (prathamam cittotpadamupadaya) those bodhisattva activities related to impure high resolve (a¶uddh¹¶ayasya karma) are called the station of

289 Ibid., 83. 290 adhimukticary¹vih¹ra, BHS14: stage of zealous conduct.; abhimukh» is the name of the sixth bhØmi in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra and Madhyamak¹vat¹ra: directly facing. See fn.210. 291 La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," 2:745; and Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 36. 292 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 37. 293 N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 92. 294 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 218. 295 N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 92. 296 Mullens, 311-312. Missing diacritics have been added. 93 committed” BBH:II:iv:322. This indicates that the resolve for enlightenment is present in the adhimukticary¹ station, but because it is “impure,” i.e., not motivated totally by correct intent it has the possibility of regressing. Furthermore, the adhimukticary¹ station ends when high resolve (adhy¹¶aya) has finally been purified and the subsequent joy (pramudit¹) station is reached.

The third stage in the bhØmi scheme of the BodhisattvabhØmi is purified intention (¶uddh¹¶aya), equivalent to the third stage in the vih¹ra scheme, joy (pramudit¹). This is the first bhØmi of the scheme in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra297 and Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra. The bodhisattva begins purification, and puts the resolution into practice. The bodhisattva takes the great vow, which is also called bodhicitta. Bodhicitta is what makes the bodhisattva superior to the ¶r¹vakas and pratyekabuddhas. The cause of the arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da) is the accumulation of merit “and acquisition of the proper Equipment for Enlightenment.” The bodhisattva is full of joy because he is free from anger and fears.298 This bodhisattva makes ten great aspirations and also obtains contemplations (dhy¹na), attainments (sam¹patti) and the five superknowledges (abhijñ¹).299

The BodhisattvabhØmi has the ten paths of virtuous action (da¶aku¶alakarmapatha) on the fourth vih¹ra (adhi¶»la, second bhØmi). On the fifth vih¹ra (adhicitta, third bhØmi), the bodhisattva has pure thoughts, endures pain for religious instruction,300 attains contemplations (dhy¹na), sam¹dhis, attainments (sam¹patti), and the five superknowledges (abhijñ¹), and “cannot be overcome by hosts of M¹ra.”301

On the sixth vih¹ra (bodhipak¬yapratisa÷yukta adhiprajñ¹, fourth bhØmi) the bodhisattva achieves the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma), which are also mentioned on the second and seventh bhØmi. The seventh vih¹ra (satyapratisa÷yukta adhiprajñ¹, fifth bhØmi) is associated with the four noble truths, mindfulness, knowledge of all sciences,

297 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 40. 298 Dayal, 278-279. 299 On the adhimukticary¹vih¹ra, the bodhisattva’s abhijñ¹s are unstable. Mullens, 124. 300 cf. the Mah¹vastu third bhØmi. 301 Dayal, 280. 94 bestowing wealth,302 supplying all with objects of enjoyment303 and preaching right conduct.304 A bodhisattva on the eighth vih¹ra (prat»tyasamutp¹dasa÷yukta adhiprajñ¹, sixth bhØmi) understands dependent arising (prat»tyasamutp¹da) and completes three sam¹dhis (¶Ønyat¹, ¹nimitta and apraªihita).305 This bodhisattva achieves conforming patience (anulom»kik¬¹nti) and has skill in means (up¹yakau¶alya). On the ninth vih¹ra (s¹bhoganirnimitta, seventh bhØmi) the bodhisattva fulfils ten p¹ramit¹s and is furnished with all aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma). The actions of a bodhisattva on the tenth vih¹ra (an¹bhoganirnimitta, eighth bhØmi) are perfectly pure, unlike formerly.306 The bodhisattva acquires anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, because of knowing no origination or cessation, and also acquires the ten powers (bala).

The eleventh vih¹ra is pratisa÷vid (ninth bhØmi), where the bodhisattva becomes a preacher and acquires the four special knowledges (pratisa÷vid). The bodhisattva becomes a Buddha on the final vih¹ra (parama, tenth bhØmi).

Although the BodhisattvabhØmi follows the Da¶abhØmika SØtra, it does not relate a p¹ramit¹ to each stage. The BodhisattvabhØmi only mentions the p¹ramit¹s twice in the vih¹ra chapter.307 It does not mention k¬¹nti at all on the third bhØmi.

II.3.v Da¶abhØmika SØtra The Da¶abhØmika systematically links each of its ten stages (bhØmi) to one of the ten p¹ramit¹s. One p¹ramit¹ is perfected at each bhØmi, yet all the p¹ramit¹s are practised at each bhØmi, as far as the bodhisattva is able. It does not include preparatory stages. “The Da¶abhØmika maintains that the bodhisattva enters the first bhØmi immediately upon giving rise to bodhicitta. Other schemes, however, call for variety of intervening stages.”308 In the Da¶abhØmika SØtra, the ten bhØmis of the bodhisattva path, with their corresponding p¹ramit¹s, are:

302 cf. the Mah¹vastu fourth bhØmi or eighth bhØmi. 303 cf. Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya first bhØmi. 304 cf. the Mah¹vastu eighth bhØmi. 305 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 28, 38. 306 cf. the Mah¹vastu. 307 Dayal, 282; Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 237-238. 308 Nakamura Hajime, "Bodhisattva path." 95 1. pramudit¹ Joyful d¹nap¹ramit¹

2. vimal¹ Immaculate ¶»lap¹ramit¹

3. prabh¹kar» Illuminating k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹

4. arci¬mat» Brilliant v»ryap¹ramit¹

5. sudurjay¹ Difficult to conquer dhy¹nap¹ramit¹

6. abhimukh» Facing prajñ¹p¹ramit¹

7. dØra¡gam¹ Far-going up¹yakau¶alyap¹ramit¹

8. acal¹ Immovable praªidh¹nap¹ramit¹

9. s¹dhumat» Eminent balap¹ramit¹

10. dharmamegh¹ Cloud of dharma jñ¹nap¹ramit¹

Although the Da¶abhØmika SØtra does not include any stages before pramudit¹, it does list the achievements of a bodhisattva who is able to enter the first bhØmi. Dutt has interpreted this as referring to the practices of pre-bhØmi stages.309 The assembly of bodhisattvas try to persuade Vajragarbha to describe the bodhisattva bhØmis to them. Vajragarbha lists the ten bhØmis to the assembly.310 Vimukticandra urges Vajragarbha to describe the bhØmis in detail and lists the qualifications of the bodhisattvas for hearing the description of the bhØmis.311 In general, the bodhisattvas are very pure. Amongst other qualities, these bodhisattvas have well purified intention (supari¶odhit¹dhy¹¶aya), have practised good works (sucaritacaraªa), have “well-collected the necessary preparations” (susambhÅtasambh¹ra), and are well established in intention and aspiration (suprati¬−hit¹dhy¹¶ay¹dhimukti).312

309 N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 91, 93. 310 Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 121J. 311 Ibid., 122-123. 312 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 5.2-5. The full list of ten qualities is: supari¶odhit¹dhy¹¶aya, supari¶odhitasa÷kalpa, sucaritacaraªa, suparyup¹sitabahubuddhako−isatahasra, susa÷bhÅtasa÷bh¹ra, aparimitaguªajñ¹nasamanv¹gata, apagatavimatisa÷deha, ana¡ga, suprati¬−hit¹dhy¹¶ay¹dhimukti, aparapratyaya [in these Buddha dharmas]. 96 Vajragarbha begins his description of the first bhØmi by saying that when living beings (or bodhisattvas) have ten particular qualities, the thought of enlightenment is produced (bodh¹ya cittam utp¹dyate). Some of these qualities are the same or similar to the qualities which qualify the bodhisattvas to hear about the bhØmis: they have practised good works (sucaritacaraªa) and have “well-collected the necessary preparations” (susambhÅtasambh¹ra). They have also well-collected the roots of virtue (sØpacitaku¶alamØla), have accepted the good friend (suparigÅh»takaly¹ªamitra), have well-purified intention (suvi¶uddh¹¶aya), and are disposed to pity and compassion (kÅp¹karuª¹bhimukha).313

On the first bhØmi, in order to accomplish ten particular aims, the thought which has arisen for the bodhisattvas has ten particular qualities, including being preceded by great compassion (mah¹karuª¹pØrva¡gama), seized of skill in means (up¹yakau¶alyaparigÅh»ta), and supported by intention and resolute intention (¹¶ay¹dhy¹¶ayopastabdha).314

Together with the arising of bodhicitta, ten particular accomplishments also arise for the bodhisattva. Firstly, the bodhisattva is atikr¹nta, that is, goes beyond the stage of being an ordinary person (pÅthagjana), is born into certainty of being a bodhisattva (bodhisattvaniy¹ma), is known as one of the Tath¹gata’s family, “becomes faultless with all sorts of speech” (sarvaj¹tiv¹dena vy¹vÅtto bhavati),315 goes beyond all mundane destinies, is established in supramundane (lokottara) destinies, firmly established in the true nature of a bodhisattva (bodhisattvadharmat¹), enters into sameness due to dwelling as a bodhisattva (bodhisattv¹vasth¹nena samat¹nugato), and “is fixed in the Tath¹gata’s lineage

313 Ibid., 8.13-15. The full list of ten qualities is: sØpacitaku¶alamØla, sucaritacaraªa, susa÷bhÅtasa÷bh¹ra, suparyup¹sitabuddhotp¹da, suparipiª©ita¶ukladharma, suparigÅh»takaly¹ªamitra, suvi¶uddh¹¶aya, vipul¹dhy¹¶ayopagata, ud¹r¹dhimuktisamanv¹gata, kÅp¹karuª¹bhimukha. 314 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 8.19-22. The full list of ten qualities is: mah¹karuª¹purva÷gama, prajñ¹jñ¹n¹dhipateya, up¹yakau¶alyaparigÅh»ta, ¹¶ay¹dhy¹¶ayopastabdha, tath¹gatabal¹prameya, sattvabalabuddhibalasuvicitavicaya, asa÷bhinnajñ¹n¹bhimukha, svaya÷bhØjñ¹n¹nukØla, sarvabuddhadharmaprajñ¹jñ¹n¹vav¹dasa÷pratye¬aka, dharmadh¹tuparamam¹k¹¶adh¹tusthitakamapar¹ntako−ini¬−ham; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 127. 315 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 8.24; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 128. vy¹vÅtto, Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 9.2; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 128, translates as ‘withdrawn.’ 97 devoted to the perfect enlightenment” (tath¹gatava÷¶aniyato bhavati sambodhipar¹yaªaå).316

After listing these ten accomplishments, the Da¶abhØmika SØtra completes this section with the statement:

eva÷ rØpadharmavyavasthito bhavanto jinaputr¹ bodhisatvaå pramudit¹y¹÷ bodhisatvabhØmau vyavasthito bhavatyacalanayogena

A bodhisattva established in such dharmas, O honourable sons of the Jina, is established in the bodhisattva bhØmi, Pramudit¹, on account of not moving.

Translated by Honda:317

A Bodhisattva settled in such state, o honorable sons of the Conqueror, is (said to be) settled in the Bodhisattva-stage (called) Joy because he is suitable for the immovable (state, i.e. the eighth BhØmi).

Honda interprets acalana as referring to the eighth bhØmi, immovable (acal¹). However, it may mean that the bodhisattva is unwavering, or not turning away from the path. This is one of the distinctions between the bodhisattva still on the aspiration (adhimukti) stage and one who has entered the bhØmis in the BodhisattvabhØmi. One of the final verses of chapter one of the Da¶abhØmika SØtra says:318

ekasmi citta upapadyati bhØmil¹bho bhavate acalyu girir¹jam¹¶aya¶ca |

Translated by Honda:319

Once (such) mind is born, the (first) stage is obtained, the intention becomes immovable like the king of a mountain.320

This seems to support the idea that acalana refers to the intention of the bodhisattva on the first bhØmi, and does not refer to the eighth bhØmi.

316 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 8.22-26; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 128. 317 Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 128. Quoted in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, SSB10.17: pramudit¹y¹÷ bodhisatvabhØmau suvyavasthito bhavatyacalanayogena. Bendall provides missing letters in Add. n. 318 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 70.1-2. 319 Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 141. 320 I.e., Mount Meru, the immovable centre of the world. 98 Also on the first bhØmi, the bodhisattva is free of five fears, has no self- love,321 and works hard to acquire all the roots of virtue (ku¶alamØla).322 The Da¶abhØmika SØtra lists the activities of the bodhisattva, beginning with faith (¶raddh¹), confidence (pras¹da), and purifying aspiration (adhimukti), and including pity and compassion, great benevolence (mah¹maitr») and delight in k¬¹nti (k¬¹ntisauratyam).323 The bodhisattva accumulates merit, purifies the bhØmi and makes ten great vows (mah¹praªidh¹na).

There is some artificiality in the linking of p¹ramit¹s and bhØmis in the Da¶abhØmika. K¬¹nti appears tacked on to the third bhØmi, which is mainly concerned with contemplation (dhy¹na).324 K¬¹nti has more relevance to the first bhØmi, because as a counteragent to anger, it promotes joy (mudit¹). On the first bhØmi (pramudit¹bhØmi), the bodhisattva has much gladness (pr¹modya), rapture (pr»ti), serenity (pras¹da), exaltation (utpl¹vana), and non- violence (avihi÷s¹) and non-anger (akrodha). The quotation from the Ak¬ayamati SØtra in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya lists these first four in its definition of joy (mudit¹).325 The Da¶abhØmika SØtra mentions k¬¹nti on the first bhØmi, but does not give it special attention.

The third bhØmi begins by listing ten mental applications of mental intention (citt¹¶ayamanask¹ra)326 of the bodhisattva entering the third bhØmi. The bodhisattva examines the nature of conditioned things (sa÷sk¹ra) and sees that they are impermanent, suffering (duåkha) and momentary.327 He develops disgust for all conditioned things (sa÷sk¹ra), and a strong desire to release all beings from their suffering.328 The bodhisattva can only do this if he himself

321 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 9.5-10; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 129. 322 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 9.16-17; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 129. 323 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 9.19; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 129; “mildness of acceptance.” See below for different interpretation of k¬¹ntisauratyam. 324 Dayal, 287, suggest that the original scheme may be related to the three trainings (¶ik¬¹s), ¶»la, citta, prajñ¹. 325 SSB183.4-6. 326 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 19.3-4; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 155: mental concentration of mental intention; BHS418: manask¹ra, concentration of the mind, mental application or activity. 327 Dayal, 286; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 156. 328 Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 157; found in the Mah¹vastu on first, second, and especially the fifth bhØmi. 99 understands and practises Buddhadharma.329 The bodhisattva’s desires to hear the teaching; and acquires four contemplations (dhy¹na), four non-material attainments (sam¹patti), four divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra), and five superknowledges (abhijñ¹).330 His roots of virtue (ku¶alamØla) are purified.331 And the state of mind of delight in k¬¹nti (k¬¹ntisauraty¹¶ayat¹) is particularly purified, along with ten other states of mind (¹¶ayat¹), including non-anger (akopya), non-disturbance (ak¬ubhit¹), non-acquisitiveness (alubhit¹), and non- pride (anunn¹m¹van¹ma).332 Thus, k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ is supreme among the p¹ramit¹s at this bhØmi.

Further mentions of k¬¹nti occur on the sixth bhØmi and the eighth bhØmi. On the sixth bhØmi, the bodhisattva acquires conforming patience (anulomik»k¬¹nti), which the Da¶abhØmika SØtra describes as “the third sharp and conformable preliminary knowledge” (t»k¬ª¹ c¹nulomik» tÅt»y¹ k¬¹ntir) for truly conforming to these dharmas.333 The sixth bhØmi has established the bodhisattva in prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ through understanding dependent arising (prat»tyasamutp¹da). Anuloma is the term for understanding of dependent arising (prat»tyasamutp¹da) in its forward order.334 The bodhisattva understands the ten equalities of things (dharmasamat¹), due to his anulomik»k¬¹nti, but he is not yet ready for anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.335

On the eighth bhØmi, acal¹, the bodhisattva attains anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. He understands that all dharmas neither arise nor cease.336 He no longer has to make any effort. He “has attained the ultimate essence of non-effort” (an¹bhogadharmat¹pr¹pta).337 The Buddhas say to the bodhisattva at this bhØmi that this ultimate k¬¹nti is for the purpose of following

329 Ibid. 330 Dayal, 287. 331 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 22.30; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 162. 332 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 23.4-5; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 163. 333 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 34.29-30; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 194. 334 Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 192. 335 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 31.9-12; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 186-187. 336 Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 217. 337 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 42.17; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 218. In the BodhisattvabhØmi, the eighth bhØmi is called an¹bhoganirnimitta. See also La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," 2:747. 100 the Buddhist teaching (e¬¹ param¹rthak¬¹ntir buddhadharm¹nugam¹ya).338 But the bodhisattva does not yet have the Buddha’s powers, so he must continue to make an effort.339 The bodhisattvas must not give up this entrance to k¬¹nti (etadeva k¬¹ntimukha÷ monmok¬»å).340 The bodhisattva’s acts of body, speech and mind are limitless and faultless (atyant¹vadya)341 and he is free from the practice of all defilements (sarvakle¶asamud¹c¹r¹pagata).342 Although the bodhisattva need make no effort, he must remember his vow to liberate all beings and continue his energy (v»rya).343 If the bodhisattva entered nirv¹ªa at this point, he would be abandoning beings.344 Therefore, the p¹ramit¹ of vow (praªidh¹nap¹ramit¹) is supreme on this bhØmi.345 He pervades the world with benevolence (maitr») to relieve beings of the pain of their defilements (kle¶a).346

II.3.vi P¹ramit¹s, bhØmis and k¬¹nti in Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya Candrak»rti’s main independent work on the bodhisattva path follows the bhØmis as given in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra. Like the Da¶abhØmika SØtra, the Madhyamak¹vat¹ra coordinates the ten bhØmis of the bodhisattva path with the ten p¹ramit¹s and links the practice of one p¹ramit¹ to each bhØmi.347 Despite this linking, the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya says that the p¹ramit¹s are only perfected with prajñ¹p¹ramit¹. On the other hand, the Da¶abhØmika SØtra says one p¹ramit¹ is perfected at each bhØmi, but all p¹ramit¹s are practised on each bhØmi, as far as the bodhisattva is able. Also like the Da¶abhØmika SØtra, Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra starts directly with the first bhØmi, joyful (pramudit¹). It does not list any preliminary stages, but Candrak»rti’s commentary to the Madhyamak¹vat¹ra does acknowledge them indirectly.

338 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 43.3; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 220. 339 Seems like a contradiction. 340 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 43.5-6; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 220. 341 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 46.17; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 228. 342 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 46.23; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 228. 343 Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 220. 344 Ibid., 222. 345 Ibid., 231. 346 Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 48.3; Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 231. 347 See above, p.97. My description follows Huntington, with help from Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, and Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "Madhyamak¹vat¹ra.” 101 Candrak»rti works systematically through the ten bhØmis and the ten p¹ramit¹s. As a bhØmi is the same as the arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da), the first bhØmi is equivalent to the first arising of the thought (prathamcittotp¹da). The first ten chapters end with the formula : “So ends the first [stage in the] generation of the thought of awakening called {the relevant bhØmi}.”348 The last verse of each chapter is also regularly a metaphor on the relation of the accomplishments of that bhØmi to light and the moon. The first chapter begins with some introductory remarks about the basis of the bodhisattva path, and there is an additional chapter “The qualities and fruits of the ten stages.” In this chapter, Candrak»rti summarizes the multiplying marvellous attainments of the bodhisattva (as given in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra), and describes the bodies and powers of a Buddha.349 Candrak»rti discusses some of the bhØmis very briefly.350 The fourth, fifth, seventh, ninth and tenth p¹ramit¹s and their corresponding bhØmis have less than three verses each. He devotes nine verses of the seventeen in chapter one to the first p¹ramit¹; ten verses to the second p¹ramit¹, thirteen verses to the third p¹ramit¹ and four verses to the eighth p¹ramit¹. The 226 verses allowed for the sixth p¹ramit¹, prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, reinforces the impression that this is where Candrak»rti’s main interest lies.351

Candrak»rti begins the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya by establishing that the Buddhas (kings of the Munis) are the cause of both ¶r¹vakas and pratyekabuddhas, and that the bodhisattvas (sons of the Conquerors) are the cause of the Buddhas, or Tath¹gatas.352 Therefore, bodhisattvas should be worshipped, being the cause of the Tath¹gatas, ¶r¹vakas and pratyekabuddhas.353 But what are the causes of bodhisattvas? These are a compassionate mind (karuª¹citta), a non-dualistic intellect (advayamati), and

348 Huntington, 150, 152, 154, 155, 156, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188. 349 Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, divides this into two chapters: Chapter 11: The bodhisattva’s qualities, and Chapter 12: The Buddhas’ qualities. 350 Number of verses in each of first ten chapters: 17, 10, 13, 2, 1, 226, 1, 4, 1, 1. 351 Length of chapters in Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya roughly proportional. Extra on chapter 1. 352 MA1:1; La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 252-54. 353 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 255: quotation from AryaratnakØ−a (=Ka¶yapa). 102 bodhicitta.354 Candrak»rti shows that compassion is the primary root, which leads the bodhisattva to think, “I must become a Buddha in order to remove suffering from the world completely.” This thought is bodhicitta. It is not possible to save all beings except with non-dual knowledge. Therefore, compassion is the seed of all the dharmas of a Buddha. Furthermore, after bodhicitta has been produced (as a seed), if it is not then watered continually by the water of compassion (karuª¹), lacking the accumulation of the large quantity of fruits, one gets the nirv¹ªa of ¶r¹vaka and pratyekabuddha.355

In verses MA1:3-4, Candrak»rti explains the threefold nature of compassion (karuª¹).356 When the bodhisattva believes in the “I” and the individual existence of creatures, creatures are the objects of compassion. Compassion is initially born having for its object creatures who believe in the existence of “I” and “mine” (MA1:3). When the bodhisattva realizes that individuals (¹tman, pudgala) are only the groups of aggregates (skandha), dharmas are the objects of compassion; when the bodhisattva realizes the arising of the aggregates (skandha), compassion has no object.357 The practitioner generates compassion for all sentient beings even though he knows that they are empty of intrinsic being (MA1:4a). This is the last type of compassion mentioned by Candrak»rti in the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya, that is, compassion devoid of object.358

Having explained compassion (karuª¹), Candrak»rti goes on to explain bodhicitta (MA1:4b-5a). There are ten distinct aspects of bodhicitta. Each bhØmi is one of these aspects. The knowledge without evil influences (an¹srava÷ jñ¹nam) of the bodhisattvas, subdivided according to whether it is united to compassion, etc., takes the name bhØmi because it is the support of the qualities.359 The first bhØmi, joyful (pramudit¹), is the first production of the

354 MA1:1; Louis de La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 252, 256. 355 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 257. 356 MAB1:3, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 258-259. 357 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 258 n.1. 358 Huntington, 219 n.3. 359 MAB1:4b-5a, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 260. 103 thought, the last bhØmi, cloud of dharma (dharmamegha), is the tenth production of the thought.360

Candrak»rti compares the ten bhØmis of a bodhisattva with the eight bhØmis of the ¶r¹vakas. On each of the eight bhØmis, a ¶r¹vaka is either a candidate for, or established in, one of four paths of fruition.361 The lowest of these bhØmis is when a ¶r¹vaka is a candidate for stream-enterer (srot¹panna). Just as a ¶r¹vaka who has produced a factor conducive to penetration (nirvedhabh¹g»ya) is not considered to be in the state of ‘candidate’ for the first fruit, it is similar for the future bodhisattva (bhavi¬yabodhisattva).362

A quotation from the Ratnamegha SØtra explains the bhØmi which precedes the first bhØmi:363

“This bhØmi, placed immediately before the first and consisting essentially in the excessively excessive364 practice of aspiration, is the bhØmi of the bodhisattva who has not produced bodhicitta” and further: “It is like this, o son of the family, that someone who is placed in this moment in the practice of aspiration as, for example, a sovereign monarch; that one surpasses human nature but does not attain divine nature. Likewise, the bodhisattva [who is placed in the stage of the practice of aspiration], surpasses all the bhØmis of the mundane saints, the ¶r¹vakas and pratyekabuddhas, but does not attain the bhØmi of the true bodhisattva.”

La Vallée Poussin interprets this as the practice of aspiration bhØmi (adhimukticary¹bhØmi), the period during which one aspires, because bodhicitta has not yet been produced in the necessary conditions to create a bhØmi properly speaking, and the aspirant is still only a future bodhisattva.365 But Candrak»rti does not allow for any kind of bodhicitta before the first bhØmi. The practitioner is known as a bodhisattva from the moment he has generated bodhicitta

360 Ibid., 261. 361 See discussion on m¹rga below. 362 MAB1:4b-5a; La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 262 n.4; 262 n.3 on nirvedhabh¹g»ya (see Abhidharmako¶avy¹khy¹) mundane (laukika) spiritual states, only preparatory to meditation (dhy¹na). 363 MAB1:4b-5a; translation from French of La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 262-263. 364 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 262 n.6: adhim¹tr¹dhim¹tra, the ninth of the combinations of the terms mÅdu, madhya, ¹dhim¹tra. 365 Ibid., 262 n.7. See also fn.210. 104 (MA1:5b). The commentary says that it is only after having acquired bodhicitta, which makes him superior to an ordinary person (pÅthagjana), that he may be Comment [BN1]: called a bodhisattva, because he is now an ¹rya.366

Candrak»rti quotes the S¹rdhadvis¹hasrik¹ Bh¹gavat»,367 which says that the term bodhisattva signifies a being who knows all dharmas as unborn, unproduced, false, and not as they are known by ignorant ordinary people. If there is any idea of bodhi, there is no bodhicitta.368

As well as being known as a bodhisattva, “He is born into the family of the Tath¹gatas369 and rids himself completely of the three bonds.” (MA1:6)370 According to Huntington, the three bonds, or fetters, (sa÷yojana) are attachment to views (dŬ−ipar¹mar¶a), attachment to morality and convention (¶»lavratapar¹mar¶a), and doubt (vicikits¹).371 The Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya says that as bodhisattvas see non-self of persons (pudgalanair¹tmya), they are free from the three fetters, namely, belief in a real self (satk¹yadŬ−i), doubt (vicikits¹), and attachment to practices (¶»lavratapar¹mar¶a). Seeing things as they are (tattvadar¶ana) destroys belief in a real self (satk¹yadŬ−i) and the possibility of following a bad vehicle due to doubt.372

The first bhØmi is called Joyful (pramudit¹) because the bodhisattva has entered into certainty (niy¹m¹vakr¹nti), and acquires the corresponding virtues and is free from the faults incompatible with this bhØmi, and therefore is extremely joyful.373

At the first bhØmi, the bodhisattva avoids a bad rebirth (durgati) and is equivalent to a candidate for the fruit of stream-winner (¶rot¹panna)

366 Ibid., 263. 367 A prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtra, also called Suvikr¹ntavikr¹mi-paripÅcch¹. See Conze, Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, 56-58. 368 MAB1:5b; La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 264. 369 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 265 n.2 compare BCA3:25 370 Huntington, 149. See Candrak»rti, Tri¶araªasaptati, trans. Sorensen, 57, verse 65: attaining Pramudit¹ stage and eliminating the three fetters he “secures the noble [status of a] bodhisattva.” 371 Huntington, 219-220. 372 MAB1:6; La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 265 n.4, 5. 373 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 265 n. 8: niy¹m¹vakr¹nti, entry to a niyatabhØmi, a bhØmi properly speaking, where one is certain of liberation and progress, in

105 (MA1:7).374 At this point, the bodhisattva is superior to all ¶r¹vakas and pratyekabuddhas in terms of merit, but not of prajñ¹. It is not until the seventh bhØmi, Far-going (dØra¡gam¹), that the bodhisattva surpasses the ¶r¹vakas and pratyekabuddhas in terms of intelligence (dh») (MA1:8).375 La Vallée Poussin takes this to refer to the spiritual lineage (gotra) of a bodhisattva,376 but it is the awakening of the bodhisattva’s intention that is decisive, because the spiritual lineage (gotra) stage precedes arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da). And indeed the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya says, in a quotation from Da¶abhØmika on intelligence (dh») of bodhisattva, that the bodhisattva surpasses ¶r¹vakas and pratyekabuddhas by the greatness of his intention (adhy¹¶aya).

Candrak»rti is at pains to establish that the ¶r¹vakas and pratyekabuddhas taught the non-self of dharmas (dharmanair¹tmya). If they did not, the bodhisattva would surpass them in intelligence as soon as the bodhisattva had the first arising of the thought (prathamacittotp¹da).377 As Candrak»rti acknowledges with several quotations from the Ratn¹val», N¹g¹rjuna also taught along these lines.378 However, the beginner bodhisattva (¹dikarmika), just after having produced bodhicitta, surpasses all ¶r¹vakas and pratyekabuddhas by virtue of bodhicitta and compassion.379

The difference between the ˜r¹vakay¹na and Mah¹y¹na is not the teaching of the non-self of dharmas (dharmanair¹tmya). An objector asks, “Since the ˜r¹vakas also teach nothingness of the elements (dharmanair¹tmya),

opposition to the preliminary stages like the stage of spiritual lineage (gotrabhØmi) and the adhimok¬acary¹bhØmi) 374 As Huntington, 220 n.13, says, Candrak»rti identifies this as a reference to the ¶rot¹panna, but as La Vallée Poussin points out, this is curious because the ¹rya of the eighth, or lowest, rank is actually only a candidate for becoming a ¶rot¹panna. See Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 217. The candidate for the fruit of ¶rot¹panna is also called prathamaphalapratipannaka. 375 Candrak»rti elaborates on this point at length, MAB1:8; see Bendall and La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva-bhØmi,” 49-52. 376 Bendall and La Vallée Poussin, “Bodhisattva-bhØmi,” 49. 377 MAB1:8d; La Vallée Poussin “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 268-272; Bendall and La Vallée Poussin, “Bodhisattva-bhØmi,” 50. 378 See Nagarjuna and Kaysang Gyatso, The precious garland, trans. Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche.

106 isn’t Mah¹y¹na useless?” Candrak»rti replies that the Mah¹y¹na does not only teach non-self of dharmas (dharmanair¹tmya), but also the bodhisattva bhØmis, p¹ramit¹s, vows (praªidh¹na), great compassion (mah¹karuª¹) etc., and also dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹), the two accumulations (sambh¹ra), and the inconceivable nature of dharma (acintyadharmat¹).380 Candrak»rti supports this contention with further quotations from the Ratn¹val».381 Also, non-self of dharmas (dharmanair¹tmya) was not treated thoroughly in the ˜r¹vakay¹na, only briefly and indirectly.

After this long digression, Candrak»rti returns to the main topic (MA1:9- 15). On the first bhØmi, giving (d¹na) predominates, as it is the first cause of perfect awakening (MA1:9). The Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya explains that giving (d¹na) is the first cause of bodhi and also the first cause of non-suffering of beings.382 Creatures need possessions (bhoga) for their happiness, so the bodhisattva is generous because possessions (bhoga) come from generosity (MA1:10).383 Huntington translates bhoga as “object of pleasure” and defines this as “food or material property of any kind, or anything that can be possessed and enjoyed.”384

Candrak»rti claims that the bodhisattva feels joy even at the thought of giving (MA1:14).385 The Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya asks rhetorically why does the bodhisattva not feel bodily suffering at giving up everything internal and external. Candrak»rti gives two answers. Either the bodhisattva has gone

379 Quotation from ¸ryamaitreyavimok¬a, MAB1:8, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 266-267; 266 n.6: an extract from the same sØtra on the same point SSB9.8, also in BCAP1:17, but ˜¹ntideva does not mention compassion, only bodhicitta. 380 MAB1:8d, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 271; Bendall and La Vallée Poussin, “Bodhisattva-bhØmi,” 52. 381 MAB1:8d, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 272; Bendall and La Vallée Poussin “Bodhisattva-bhØmi,” 52. RA390-393, Nagarjuna and Kaysang Gyatso, The precious garland, trans. Hopkins and Lati Rimpoche, 75-76. 382 MAB1:9b, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 273. 383 Summary of senses of Huntington and Fenner translations. Huntington, 150: bhoga: object of pleasure; Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, 213: bhoga: [material] affluence. La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 273: bhoga translated as ‘jouissance’: enjoyment, pleasure, possession. 384 Huntington, 220 n.16. 385 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 276: joy of bodhisattva in satisfying the needy by giving objects of enjoyment, cf. parable of king in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7. 107 beyond attachment386 and feels no suffering or, if he does feel suffering, this increases his compassion and efforts for beings.387

Candrak»rti shows why a bodhisattva should practise generosity and why it should be practised first. He does not give details on how the bodhisattva should practise generosity.

On the second bhØmi, immaculate (vimal¹), the bodhisattva practises perfect moral conduct (¶»la), which consists of purification of acts of body, speech and mind, also known as the ten paths of virtuous action (da¶akarmapatha). The ten paths include three acts of body, four of speech and three of mind.388 Without elaborating, Candrak»rti immediately declares that pure moral conduct (¶»la) is only pure as long as it is not seen as intrinsically existent (having svabh¹va).389 He then explains why moral conduct (¶»la) is taught after giving (d¹na). Moral conduct (¶»la) is the cause of both temporary and supreme happiness (naiå¶reyasasukha). The conduct of great beings is naturally moral (without transgression). The bhØmi is called vimal¹ “because it is made stainless through the tenfold path of virtuous conduct.”390

Unlike in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra, the third bhØmi in the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya is devoted to k¬¹nti. Candrak»rti begins the chapter on the third bhØmi by describing why it is called illuminating (prabh¹kar»). The second verse describes the k¬¹nti of a bodhisattva. If a bodhisattva’s body is being cut slowly into pieces, then he would manifest extreme patience (MA3:2). The bodhisattva is patient because he perceives the absence of a self (nair¹tmya), and therefore sees the one being cut, the one doing the cutting and the occasion of the cutting as reflections (MA3:3). As on the other bhØmis, Candrak»rti makes the distinction between mundane (laukika) p¹ramit¹ and supramundane (lokottara) p¹ramit¹.391

386 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 277 n.2: v»tar¹gasth¹? in the eighth bhØmi? 387 MAB1:14, La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 277. 388 Huntington, 221 n.1. 389 Ibid., 221 n.3: quotation from RatnakØ−asØtra from MAB2:3ab. Not in SSB. 390 Quoted in Huntington, 222 n.9. 391 See above, p.69. 108 Candrak»rti spells out the disadvantages of anger and the benefits of k¬¹nti. Bearing a grudge against an attacker does not undo the act already done, and therefore is both not useful in the present life and a disadvantage in that it creates a bad future. The suffering being endured now is the final ripening of past bad actions. By getting angry the bodhisattva creates a seed for future suffering. Thus the bodhisattva extends his suffering, when it could be at an end (MA3:5).392

MA3:6 includes the classic Buddhist statement on k¬¹nti, that is, that there is no sin greater than lack of patience:

gang phyir rgyal sras rnams la khro ba yis // sbyin dang khrims byung dge ba bskal pa brgyar // bsags pa skad cig gis ‘joms de yi phyir // mi bzod las bzhan sdig pa yod ma yin //

One moment of anger towards the victors’ children destroys the virtues that have arisen from giving and good conduct amassed over one hundred aeons. Therefore there is no more negative fault (p¹pa) than a lack of patience.393

This is usually stated as there is no sin greater than dve¬a (hatred). Anger destroys merit accumulated through giving (d¹na) and moral conduct (¶»la) practised over aeons, so without the practice of k¬¹nti, the first two p¹ramit¹s are useless.

MA3:7 goes on to give more disadvantages of lack of k¬¹nti. It makes one ugly, “leads to association with the ignoble”394 and takes away the ability to discriminate right from wrong (therefore making ¶»la hard to practise). It also leads to a bad rebirth. K¬¹nti leads to the opposite qualities. MA3:8 specifies these qualities: k¬¹nti makes one beautiful, “leads to association with noble people,”395 and the ability to discriminate right from wrong.396 It also leads to the destruction of sin and to a good rebirth, that is, as a god or as a human.

392 Sense obtained from two translations and Huntington, 223 n.4. 393 Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, 220. 394 Huntington, 153. 395 Ibid., 152. 396 Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, 220, adds “and a scholar.” 109 Knowing the faults of anger and the benefits of k¬¹nti should lead both ordinary people and bodhisattvas to give up lack of k¬¹nti and to practise k¬¹nti (MA3.9). In MA3:10, Candrak»rti again makes the distinction between mundane (laukika) p¹ramit¹ and supramundane (lokottara) p¹ramit¹. Attachment to any of the three supports leads to the practice of k¬¹nti as a mundane p¹ramit¹. In this verse, Candrak»rti does not specify what the three supports are, but he has listed them in MA3:3.

Candrak»rti now makes some general statements about the achievements of bodhisattvas at the third bhØmi. They have destroyed hatred (dve¬a) and greed (r¹ga) in themselves and are also capable of destroying the attachments of the world. They also have contemplation (dhy¹na) and superknowledge (abhijñ¹).

MA3:12 is about the first three p¹ramit¹s. The Sugatas recommend the three dharmas, giving (d¹na), moral conduct (¶»la) and k¬¹nti, to lay people. They constitute the accumulation of merit (puªyasambh¹ra) and are also the cause of the physical form of the Buddha (rØpak¹ya).397

The final verse of this chapter says that this bhØmi “brings with it a longing for total victory over the darkness of all living beings. At this bhØmi, even though he has become extremely zealous (tik¬ªa), [the bodhisattva] is never subject to anger.” (MA3:13)398

On the fourth bhØmi, the bodhisattva cultivates the thirty-seven aids to enlightenment (bodhipak¬yadharma) and the view of an independent self is completely eradicated. On the fifth bhØmi, all the forces of M¹ra cannot subdue the bodhisattva.399 The bodhisattva understands the four noble truths, and is skilled in contemplation (dhy¹na).

397 = sambhogak¹ya and nirm¹ªak¹ya Huntington, 224 n.7. “The ‘provisions’ and their relationship to the bodies of the buddha are discussed in MA 11.5-18 and by N¹g¹rjuna in RV3. See Conze, [Buddhist thought,] 172, 232ff., for further discussion of this doctrine and its classical sources.” 398 Huntington, 154 (should be t»k¬ªa). Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, 222: “they become most sharp.” 399 See SSB355.7, where the S¹garamati SØtra states that all acts of M¹ra cease after the purification of the acalitapada, i.e. the eighth stage. In the BodhisattvabhØmi, the bodhisattva cannot be overcome by the hosts of M¹ra on the third bhØmi. 110 The chapter on the sixth bhØmi, and its related p¹ramit¹, is extensive. Amongst other things, the introduction to the chapter explains the relationship of the sixth p¹ramit¹, prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, to the other p¹ramit¹s. Candrak»rti uses the analogy of a sighted person leading a group of blind men. In the same way, prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ leads the other five p¹ramit¹ to the final goal.400

MA6:4-6 describe the type of person who is worthy to hear the teaching of prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, as taught by N¹g¹rjuna (MA6:3). Such a person “lives morally, gives offerings, practices compassion, and fosters patience. He applies the merit from these [virtues] toward his awakening for the liberation of all living beings.”401

Candrak»rti’s commentary to MA6:7 says that the bodhisattva develops great patience (mah¹k¬¹nti) through understanding the ten samenesses of all things (dharmasamat¹). The bodhisattva thus enters the sixth bhØmi. This is a quotation by Candrak»rti from the Da¶abhØmika SØtra.402 The commentary goes on to say: “Therefore, the master [N¹g¹rjuna] determined in this connection that through rational instruction in the sameness of things as regards their non- origination, the other [types of] sameness would easily follow” and that is why he begins the MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹ with the verse on origination.403 The available Sanskrit version of the Da¶abhØmika SØtra does not mention mah¹k¬¹nti, or N¹g¹rjuna’s verse from the beginning of the MØlamadhyamak¹karik¹. It does mention anulomik»k¬¹nti and anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, however. The Da¶abhØmika SØtra counteracts ignorance with an analysis of dependent arising (prat»tyasamutp¹da), whereas Candrak»rti analyses N¹g¹rjuna’s verse on causation.404

400 Huntington, 226 n.4: “The same simile is used in BCA9.1 and AS, 87.3.” 401 Ibid., 157. 402 Ibid., 227 n.9; see Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra,” 186-187; Da¶abhØmikasØtra, ed. Vaidya, 31; "Madhyamak¹vat¹ra: introduction au traité du milieu de l'¹c¹rya Candrak»rti avec le commentaire de l’auteur (suite)," trad. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Le Muséon, n.s., 11 (1910): 278, translates: “Contemplant ainsi la nature propre des choses, par une ardent anulomik»k¬¹nti il obtient l’Abhimukh», sixième terre du Bodhisattva.” 403 Huntington, 227 n.9. 404 Giving the impression that Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra is a reworking of Da¶abhØmika SØtra, replacing the prat»tyasamutp¹da formula with N¹g¹rjuna’s analysis of causation. Cf. also the formulaic endings of each chapter of both works. Huntington, 19: the 111 II.3.vii K¬¹nti in the bhØmis In the bhØmi schemes surveyed, k¬¹nti is linked to the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh and eighth bhØmis. The Mah¹vastu, Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ and BodhisattvabhØmi do not relate a p¹ramit¹ to each bhØmi. The Da¶abhØmika does and although it says k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ is supreme at the third bhØmi, this bhØmi is mainly concerned with contemplation (dhy¹na). The third bhØmi in the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya is devoted to k¬¹nti. The BodhisattvabhØmi and Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ do not mention k¬¹nti on the third bhØmi.

The Mah¹vastu says that the bodhisattva practices forgiveness, is patient, and is not cast down by adversity nor elated by prosperity on the first bhØmi. On the second bhØmi, the bodhisattva does not get angry. On the second bodhisattva bhØmi of the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, the bodhisattva has patience, which is the mental attitude free from ill-will and harming and joy. The Da¶abhØmika SØtra mentions k¬¹nti on the first bhØmi, but does not give it special attention. K¬¹nti has some connection with the first bhØmi because it promotes joy (mudit¹). The Da¶abhØmika lists delight in k¬¹nti (k¬¹ntisauratya), non-anger (akopya), non-disturbance (ak¬ubhit¹), non-acquisitiveness (alubhit¹), and non-pride (anunn¹m¹van¹ma) on the third bhØmi.

In the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, the bodhisattva obtains conforming patience (anulomik»k¬¹nti) on the second common bhØmi (gotrabhØmi), anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti and the certainty of being a bodhisattva (bodhisattvaniy¹ma) on the third bhØmi and irreversibility on the fourth common bhØmi. In the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, the fourth bodhisattva bhØmi mentions k¬¹nti, which the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra interprets as anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. Anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is definitely associated with the seventh bodhisattva bhØmi, from where no reversal occurs.405 La Vallée Poussin’s second model places the certainty of being a bodhisattva (bodhisattvaniy¹ma) on the first bhØmi (as does the Da¶abhØmika),

Da¶abhØmika “was in all likelihood the locus classicus for the ten stages described in Candrak»rti’s text.” 405 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 175 n.47: niy¹ma comes from equilibrium between ¶amath¹ and vipa¶yan¹. 112 and anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti on the eighth bhØmi.406 La Vallée Poussin also notes that anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti and irreversibility are usually linked and occur on the eighth bhØmi.407

In the BodhisattvabhØmi and Da¶abhØmika, the bodhisattva achieves conforming patience (anulom»kik¬¹nti) on the sixth bhØmi, through understanding dependent arising (prat»tyasamutp¹da), and anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti on the eighth bhØmi, through understanding that no dharmas arise or cease. Like the Da¶abhØmika, Candrak»rti has the bodhisattva developing k¬¹nti on the sixth bhØmi through an understanding of the ten samenesses of all things (dharmasamat¹). Candrak»rti does not mention anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti in the Madhyamak¹vat¹ra in connection with the eighth bhØmi, but he devotes less than four verses to it.

II.4 M¹rga The Mah¹y¹na took the m¹rga system from the earlier schools and invested it with new meanings.408 Both ¶r¹vakas and bodhisattvas follow this path and their different aspirations (at the pre-¹rya stage) determine the goal they reach.409 Sherburne explains the m¹rgas as:410

The five major stages of growth through which one must pass to reach either nirv¹ªa or Buddhahood: 1) Equipment Path, 2) Practice Path, 3) Vision Path, 4) Contemplation Path, and 5) Adept Path. These stages will occur whether one is [a ¶r¹vaka, pratyekabuddha or bodhisattva].

There are five paths (m¹rga), variously translated as follows:411

406 According to La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva," 2:746a n.*, this kind of discrepancy led to different kinds of niy¹ma being specified. 407 La Vallée Poussin, “Bodhisattva,” 2:745. 408 The following outline is based on Conze, Anacker, Fenner, Obermiller and Dutt. Conze, "Marginal notes to the Abhisamay¹la¡k¹ra," and Abhisamay¹la¡k¹ra: introduction and translation from original text with Sanskrit-Tibetan index, [trans.] Edward Conze, Serie orientale Roma 6 (Roma: Is M. E. O., 1954); Anacker, Seven works of Vasubandhu; Fenner, Ontology of the middle way; Obermiller, "Doctrine of prajñ¹-p¹ramit¹;” N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism. 409 N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 101. The bhØmi models place similar emphasis on intention, see above p.85, 92, 107. 410 At»¶a, Lamp for the path, trans. Sherburne, 195. 411 Obermiller, "Doctrine of prajñ¹-p¹ramit¹,” 43, 86-87; Anacker, Seven works of Vasubandhu, 200, 206; Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 205-206, 213; Conze, Abhisamay¹la¡k¹ra; Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 668. 113 Obermiller Anacker Williams Conze sambh¹ram¹rga path of path of path of path of accumulating preparation accumulation equipment merit prayogam¹rga path of path of path of path of training (initial) preparation methodical application training dar¶anam¹rga path of path of seeing path of insight path of vision illumination bh¹van¹m¹rga path of path of path of path of concentrated cultivation cultivation development contemplation a¶aik¬am¹rga the ultimate path of the path of no- path of the path accomplished more learning adept

The path of accumulation (sambh¹ram¹rga) consists of the five factors conducive to liberation (mok¬abh¹g»ya), namely, faith (¶raddh¹), energy (v»rya), mindfulness (smÅti), sam¹dhi and prajñ¹; the path of application (prayogam¹rga) includes the factors conducive to penetration (nirvedhabh¹g»ya), namely, heat (جmagata), summit (mØrdhan), k¬¹nti, and supreme worldly dharmas (laukik¹gradharma). Each of these four is either weak, medium or strong. K¬¹nti is variously translated in this context as steadfastness (Obermiller), patience (La Vallée Poussin, Williams, Conze), forbearance (Anacker).

The term k¬¹nti appears in eight of the sixteen moments of the path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga), as follows:412

Moments Events duåkhe dharmajñ¹nak¬¹nti acceptance of the suffering of the realm of desire (k¹madh¹tu) duåkhe dharmajñ¹na knowledge of the suffering of k¹madh¹tu duåkhe anvayajñ¹nak¬¹nti acceptance of the suffering of the form and formless realms (rØpa and ¹rØpya dh¹tus)

412 According to Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 100-101 and Herbert V. Guenther, Philosophy and psychology in the Abhidharma (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, [1957]), 222-223. 114 Moments Events duåkhe anvayajñ¹na knowledge of the suffering of rØpa and ¹rØpya dh¹tus samudaye dharmajñ¹nak¬¹nti acceptance of the origination of suffering of k¹madh¹tu samudaye dharmajñ¹na knowledge of the origination of suffering of k¹madh¹tu samudaye anvayajñ¹nak¬¹nti acceptance of the origination of suffering of rØpa and ¹rØpya dh¹tus samudaye anvayajñ¹na knowledge of the origination of suffering of rØpa and ¹rØpya dh¹tus nirodhe dharmajñ¹nak¬¹nti acceptance of cessation of suffering of k¹madh¹tu nirodhe dharmajñ¹na knowledge of cessation of suffering of k¹madh¹tu nirodhe anvayajñ¹nak¬¹nti acceptance of cessation of suffering of rØpa and ¹rØpya dh¹tus nirodhe anvayajñ¹na knowledge of cessation of suffering of rØpa and ¹rØpya dh¹tus m¹rge dharmajñ¹nak¬¹nti acceptance of path to cessation of suffering of k¹madh¹tu m¹rge dharmajñ¹na knowledge of path to cessation of suffering of k¹madh¹tu m¹rge anvayajñ¹nak¬¹nti acceptance of path to cessation of suffering of rØpa and ¹rØpya dh¹tus m¹rge anvayajñ¹na knowledge of path to cessation of rØpa and ¹rØpya dh¹tus

Dutt translates duåkhe dharmajñ¹nak¬¹nti as “faith producing the knowledge that things of the k¹madh¹tu are full of suffering” and duåkhe dharmajñ¹na as “actual realisation [that things] of the k¹madh¹tu are full of suffering.” Guenther explains the terms in the first moment like this:413

it is an acceptance of reality as it is and in this acceptance we find that particular knowledge by experience (jñ¹na) which in dealing with the constituents of reality (dharma) sets us free.

In the context of the path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga), Obermiller translates k¬¹nti as perseverance, La Vallée Poussin translates it as patience, and Anacker translates it as forbearance.

The first two paths, path of accumulation (sambh¹ram¹rga) and path of application (prayogam¹rga), lead to sam¹dhi through tranquillity (¶amatha); bodhisattvas have their first insight into ¶Ønyat¹ on the path of seeing

413 Guenther, Philosophy and psychology in the Abhidharma, 221. 115 (dar¶anam¹rga).414 They attain “direct, non-conceptual, and non-dual vision of emptiness.”415 The final moment of the path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga) is the first step on the path of cultivation (bh¹van¹m¹rga).416 On the path of cultivation (bh¹van¹m¹rga), bodhisattvas develop most of the ten bhØmis and remove the defilements (kle¶a).417 The fifth path occurs at the end of the path of cultivation (bh¹van¹m¹rga), when they have the realisations of all ten bhØmis and become Buddhas. The final path (a¶aik¬am¹rga) merely marks the end of the training, nothing further is to be done.418

The Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra is a Mah¹y¹na text which focuses on the path (m¹rga). Four of its eight abhisamayas cover the path, and the seventh concerns the bodhisattva acquiring the six p¹ramit¹s.419 As Obermiller states, “the constituent parts of the Path are discussed repeatedly from different points of view.”420 For this reason, the Abhisamay¹la÷k¹ra refers to k¬¹nti several times as a factor conducive to penetration (nirvedhabh¹g»ya).421 It also mentions the formula of the sixteen moments of the path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga).422 The text does not draw a connection between k¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹ and k¬¹nti as an aspect of m¹rga.423

In his translation of the Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬ya, La Vallée Poussin notes the following about k¬¹nti as a factor conducive to penetration (nirvedhabh¹g»ya):424

This “patience” differs from patience, a virtue of the Bodhisattva, iv.111c-d; it is connected to the pure “patiences” which form part of the Path of the Seeing of the

414 Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, 86. 415 Williams, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 205-206. 416 N. Dutt, Mah¹y¹na Buddhism, 99: “the latter commencing at the last stage of the dar¶anam¹rga. 417 Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, 86; Anacker, Seven works of Vasubandhu, 200. 418 Anacker, Seven works of Vasubandhu, 213; Fenner, Ontology of the middle way, 86: “the path of completion.” 419 Conze, "Marginal notes to the Abhisamay¹la¡k¹ra," 23; Obermiller, "Doctrine of prajñ¹- p¹ramit¹,” 16: “The chief factors for the realization of the Path are” ¶amatha and vipa¶yan¹. 420 Obermiller, "Doctrine of prajñ¹-p¹ramit¹," 86. 421 Conze, Abhisamay¹la¡k¹ra, 15, 32, 51, 66-67, 80. 422 Ibid., 34, 47. 423 Ibid., 93, 103. The Abhisamay¹la¡k¹ra does suggest that the p¹ramit¹s are developed at the first moment of the path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga). 424 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬yam, [trans.] La Vallée Poussin; English trans. Pruden, 3:1051 n.116. 116 Truths (vi.25d), but it is impure, worldly, and, as a consequence, is a jñ¹na contrary to the pure patiences (vii.1).

Section vii.1 of the Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬ya deals with the distinction between k¬¹nti and jñ¹na. K¬¹nti implies doubt, and jñ¹na certainty. K¬¹nti as a factor conducive to penetration (nirvedhabh¹g»ya) is impure, and “is in fact a ‘knowledge,’ even though it is termed ‘patience.’”425 This impure k¬¹nti is sa÷vÅtijñ¹na, i.e., conventional knowledge.426

Although no explicit connection is made between k¬¹nti as a factor conducive to penetration (nirvedhabh¹g»ya) and as a p¹ramit¹, the Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬ya reveals that both are connected to suffering. The Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬ya links the final step of the path of application (prayogam¹rga) to the first of the path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga). It states that one k¬¹nti proceeds out of the supreme worldly dharmas (laukik¹gradharma), the final step on the path of application (prayogam¹rga). This k¬¹nti is duåkhe dharmajñ¹nak¬¹nti, the patience that has the dharma knowledge of suffering for its object.427 The path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga) consists of mindfulness of dharmas (dharmasmÅtyupasth¹na).428 As well, k¬¹nti as a factor conducive to penetration (nirvedhabh¹g»ya) grows only through mindfulness of dharmas (dharmasmÅtyupasth¹na), and strong k¬¹nti “has only the suffering of K¹madh¹tu for its object.”429

Texts which outline the Buddhist path in terms of m¹rga treat k¬¹nti as a factor conducive to penetration (nirvedhabh¹g»ya) on the path of application (prayogam¹rga), and as eight of the sixteen moments of the path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga). The m¹rga schemes do not link the k¬¹nti of the path of application (prayogam¹rga) and of the path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga) with k¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹.

425 Ibid., 1181 n.2. 426 Ibid., 1181 n.4. 427 Ibid., 943. 428 Ibid., 1051 n.117. 429 Ibid., 932. Anacker, Seven works of Vasubandhu, 199 says that k¬¹nti nirvedhabh¹g»ya is called this “because all aversion-causing constructions have been shattered,” but he gives no reference and the Madhy¹ntavibh¹gabh¹¬ya does not say this. 117 III K¬¹nti

III.1 Types of k¬¹nti K¬¹nti appears in several contexts in Mah¹y¹na literature. As well as being the third p¹ramit¹, a factor conducive to penetration (nirvedhabh¹g»ya)430 and eight of the sixteen moments of the path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga), it appears in the expression the patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti). The third p¹ramit¹ sometimes divides into three types – patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti), patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti), patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti) – and sometimes into two. As well, anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti sometimes divides into three or more types. Some scholars have suggested that anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is one of three types of patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti). However, there is little evidence for this. The meaning of patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) and patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) is straightforward, so the main issue is identifying what is meant by dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti and what relationship, if any, exists between dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti and anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.

The scope of k¬¹nti changes in Mah¹y¹na literature, depending on the text. Lamotte says, “The problem of k¬¹nti, sometimes ‘patience’ and sometimes ‘certainty’, is one of the most complicated ones for scholasticism.”431 K¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹ and in its manifestations in the m¹rga scheme are unrelated. And, in the main, k¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹ and as anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti are unrelated. But there are exceptions. The A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra and ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa discuss the range of meanings of k¬¹nti associated with both k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ and

430 Candrak»rti, Prasannapad¹ MadhyamakavÅtti: douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain, accompagnés d'une introduction, de notes et d'une édition critique de la version tibétaine, [trad.] Jacques May, Collection Jean Przyluski, tome 2 (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1959), 212 n.717: “it is therefore relevant to the prayogam¹rga.” 431 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 143 n.119. The situation is even more complicated than suggested in Lamotte’s lengthy footnote, where he only distinguishes the types of k¬¹nti associated with anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. 118 anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti under the heading of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. For this, and other reasons, translating k¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹ as “patience” and k¬¹nti in the expression anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti as “certainty” or an equivalent does not solve the problem.

The variety of interpretations and range of meanings of dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti, and its occasional association with anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, suggests uncertainty. It is a term which has acquired a variety of meanings. Sasaki has suggested that the concepts and phrases of earlier Buddhism were often later clothed with developed meanings.432 It appears that this is also true of concepts developed solely within the Mah¹y¹na tradition. For example, Griffiths et al. concluded in regard to Yog¹c¹ra that it “was not a monolithic system, in India or in China. Rather, like all living theoretical endeavors, it wrestled with questions and evolved different and at times conflicting answers.”433 Similarly, while some meanings associated with k¬¹nti are consistent, texts vary on the meaning they give to dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti, and in whether they treat anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti or associate it with k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹.

Anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, the patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas, is “a fundamental thesis of the Madhyamaka.”434 It is equivalent to realizing ¶Ønyat¹ and is often found without reference to other types of k¬¹nti either in the eighth bhØmi435 or associated with prajñ¹p¹ramit¹.436 Anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is sometimes divided into three, five or ten kinds.437 Sakurabe suggests that anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti was originally an independent conception, and was later combined with gho¬¹nug¹k¬¹nti and

432 Genjun H. Sasaki, "Khanti, k¹nti, k¬¹nti," Journal of Indian and Buddhist studies / Indogaku bukkyogaku kenkyu 7 (December 1958): 354. 433 The realm of awakening: a translation and study of the tenth chapter of Asa¡ga’s Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, trans. Paul J. Griffiths et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 45. 434 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 143 n.119. 435 For instance, in the A¬−as¹hasrik¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, where a bodhisattva who has achieved anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is said to be predestined to full enlightenment, Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 241. Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 145 n.119, notes the instances where it is associated with the eighth bhØmi. 436 For instance, in the ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra. 437 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 143-145 n.119, distinguishes “the k¬¹ntis clustered around anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.” 119 ¹nulomik»k¬¹nti.438 He adds that it sometimes takes the form of dharmak¬¹nti or gambh»radharmak¬¹nti.439 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, which divides k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ into two types - sattvak¬¹nti and dharmak¬¹nti, does not use these terms as equivalents to anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.440

In a note to his translation of the Vimalak»rtinirde¶a SØtra, Lamotte asserts that anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is part of dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimuktik¬¹nti.441 He does not reiterate this opinion in the later published ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra. There he implies a lack of connection between anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti and the third type of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti, by translating the first as ‘certainty of the non-arising of dharmas’ and the second as ‘patience in contemplating the Dharma.’442 La Vallée Poussin also states that the third kind of patience of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ “is divided in the books of the Great Vehicle into three stages : gho¬¹nug¹, ¹nulomik», anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.”443 La Vallée Poussin gives no references for this and does not mention the texts he refers to. None of Dayal’s references to the same point confirm this statement.444 I have not found any text which does so.

Nevertheless, texts such as the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, Dhy¹nasam¹dhi SØtra and ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa do combine concepts related to k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ and anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. However, they do not assert that k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ divides into three kinds of k¬¹nti and that the third of these, patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti) further divides into three stages, gho¬¹nug¹, ¹nulomik», anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.

It is an oversimplification to say that k¬¹nti means ‘patience’ in the types of patience associated with k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ and ‘certainty’/’receptivity’ when associated with anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, and its related kinds of k¬¹nti. Many

438 Not translated by Sakurabe. Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin- Webb, 144, translates gho¬¹nug¹ as ‘following words’ and anulomik» as ‘preparatory’ or ‘conforming.’ 439 Sakurabe, 887. 440 Lamotte, Traité (Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra), 1:394-397, 2:865-926. 441 Lamotte, Teaching of Vimalak»rti (Vimalak»rtinirde¶a), English trans. Boin, 290. 442 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 143 n.199; 129 n.86. 443 La Vallée Poussin, “Bodhisattva,” 2:751.

120 translators simply translate any occurrence of k¬¹nti as ‘patience.’ Others distinguish between k¬¹nti as endurance, in the context of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, and the meanings k¬¹nti may have in the context of anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. Opinions differ regarding its exact meaning in that context.

Sakurabe recognizes that two meanings of the word k¬¹nti coexist in Buddhist Sanskrit literature. One is associated with the third p¹ramit¹ and the other with the term anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. In this latter sense, k¬¹nti has been translated as ‘intellectual receptivity,’445 ‘certainty’ or ‘certain knowledge,’446 ‘recognition,’447 ‘conviction,’448 ‘acquiescement’ (French),449 ‘acceptance.’450

Sakurabe traces two senses of khanti in the P¹li canon. There khanti can mean either ‘patience,’ with the root k¬am - ‘to endure, to bear,’ or it can mean ‘willing to, desire,’ with the root kam - ‘to like, to be inclined to.’451 Sakurabe rejects Sasaki’s proposition that the k¬¹nti associated with anutpannadharmak¬¹nti is a “wrong sanskritization” of khanti from √kam, with the meaning ‘willingness.’452 As khanti from √k¬am has two senses in P¹li, he shows that it is not necessary to trace k¬¹nti in anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti to the root kam. The second sense of khanti from √k¬am in P¹li has an “intellectual implication” and it is from this second sense that k¬¹nti in the term anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti gets its meaning. Lamotte, on the other hand, is willing to entertain the view that the second sense of k¬¹nti is derived from √kam, and is “a wrong Sanskritization of the P¹li khanti.”453

As Schopen notes, although ‘patience’ is the usual translation of k¬¹nti, it is not always the best one. In the context of anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, he

444 Dayal, 213 . 445 BHS199. 446 Lamotte, Teaching of Vimalak»rti (Vimalak»rtinirde¶a), English trans. Boin, 323. 447 Suzuki, La¡k¹vat¹ra glossary, Sakurabe, 886. 448 Lamotte, Teaching of Vimalak»rti (Vimalak»rtinirde¶a), English trans. Boin, 323; Lindtner, Nagarjuniana, 232. 449 de Jong, Cinq chapitres, 14 n.37. 450 Lindtner, Nagarjuniana, 231. 451 Sakurabe, 111; Lamotte, Teaching of Vimalak»rti (Vimalak»rtinirde¶a), English trans. Boin, 290. 452 Sasaki, 354-355. 453 Lamotte, Teaching of Vimalak»rti (Vimalak»rtinirde¶a), English trans. Boin, 290. 121 understands the term k¬¹nti to mean ‘remain unaffected by,’ rather than ‘endure,’ or ‘accept.’ K¬¹nti is therefore used in the sense of composure, rather than patience or endurance, almost always in the face of the absence of self, or non-arising of dharmas, i.e., anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.454 Schopen’s translation of k¬¹nti as composure in these cases is based on several examples from prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ literature, where the bodhisattva who hears the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ taught is not depressed, discouraged, frightened or fearful.455 On the other hand, the section of the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra on dharmak¬¹nti does not mention fear, the emphasis is on the bodhisattva not having doubt.456 This may explain Lamotte’s preferred translation of k¬¹nti in the context of anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti as ‘certainty.’ Although Schopen attempts to find a meaning for k¬¹nti in the term anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti which distinguishes it from k¬¹nti in k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, ‘composure’ is one term which fits both contexts quite well. The action of a bodhisattva with k¬¹nti is ‘k¬amate,’ from the root √k¬am, meaning ‘remain calm, or composed, or be patient.’457

The possible P¹li etymologies of the term k¬¹nti do not solve the problem of whether anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti and k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ are related or unrelated in the Mah¹y¹na context. Some Mah¹y¹na texts relate them and others do not. Also, the third type of k¬¹nti of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti, can certainly have the “intellectual implication” which Sakurabe relates to the anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.458

The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra definitely mixes k¬¹nti as patience/endurance and k¬¹nti as certainty/receptivity.459 It confounds the

454 Gregory Schopen, "The manuscript of the Vajracchedik¹ found at Gilgit," in Studies in the literature of the great vehicle: three Mah¹y¹na Buddhist texts, ed. Luis O. Gómez and Jonathan A. Silk, Michigan studies in Buddhist literature, no.1 (Ann Arbor: Collegiate Institute for the Study of Buddhist Literature and Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, The University of Michigan, 1989), 139 n. 20. 455 Schopen, "The manuscript of the Vajracchedik¹,” 134-135 n.5. 456 Interestingly, the Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬ya suggests that k¬¹nti implies doubt, whereas in the Mah¹y¹na k¬¹nti is lack of doubt. The Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬yam, 1181 n.2, says: “Patience is not free from doubt, since it has for its end the production of knowledge through the expulsion of doubt. It does not arise as certitude (ni¶caya), but as ‘consent’ (k¬amaªarØpeªa).” 457 For example, ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, k¹rik¹ 20 - k¬ameta. 458 Sakurabe, 111-113. 459 Chapters 24-25 on k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. Lamotte, Traité (Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra), 2:865-926 . 122 attempt to separate k¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹ and k¬¹nti in anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, as both senses are found under the heading k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra divides k¬¹nti into two kinds: sattvak¬¹nti and dharmak¬¹nti. Sattvak¬¹nti includes enduring the torments of others. Dharmak¬¹nti divides into two kinds, the first of which includes enduring physical discomfort, and the second includes enduring both the truth of things and the teaching (Buddhadharma). It includes very similar conceptions to those found in texts where k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ is said to be of three kinds, but also includes the meanings associated with anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.

Venkata Ramanan suggests that k¬¹nti in the expression dharmak¬¹nti in the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra means “the capacity to accept the teachings in faith, understand their import and sustain one’s comprehension of the truth of things that one thus gains, so much so that it is saturated in one’s whole being, reflected in one’s whole life.” He translates dharmak¬¹nti “endurance for dharma;” but says “it is not mere acceptance; it is to sustain the dharma and apply and reveal it in all that one does.”460

Although the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra is a commentary to a brief statement made early in the Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹: he should perfect the perfection of patience and remain imperturbable (k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ paripØrayitavy¹k¬obhaªat¹m up¹d¹ya),461 its exposition on k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ appears to be influenced by sections found later in the Large Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹.462 There, also, k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ is divided into two kinds.463 Whereas the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra does not mention anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti as equivalent to dharmak¬¹nti, the A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ explicitly says

460 Venkata Ramanan, N¹g¹rjuna’s philosophy, 369-370 n.32. 461 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 45; Lamotte, Traité (Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra), 2:vi n.1. 462 The text used by Conze to complete his Large sutra on perfect wisdom is actually that of the A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹. 463 The Gilgit manuscript of the A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹: chapters 70 to 82, corresponding to the 6th, 7th and 8th abhisamayas, ed. and trans. E. Conze, Serie Orientale Roma, vol. 46 (Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1974), 16-17, 27-29, 148-149, 158-159; Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 558-559, 567-569. 123 that anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is the second type of k¬¹nti to be developed as part of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹.464

The Dhy¹nasam¹dhi SØtra is another Mah¹y¹na text which mixes k¬¹nti as ‘endurance’ and k¬¹nti as ‘certainty.’ It lists the three types of k¬¹nti as utp¹dak¬¹nti, anulomik»dharmak¬¹nti and anutp¹dak¬¹nti. Lamotte says utp¹dak¬¹nti is the “patience in bearing insults and torments; the second is the understanding of impermanence and of the bhØtalak¬aªa devoid of any mark; the third marks an advance on the previous one. Here, the ‘patience’ k¬¹nti and the ‘certainty’ k¬¹nti are intermixed.”465

III.2 K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ Mah¹y¹na texts frequently divide k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ into three types – patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti), patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) and patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti). The meaning of duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti and par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti is clear, and the Mah¹y¹na texts are consistent in their interpretation of these two concepts. Dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti is a good example of a concept which has developed a range of meanings466 and which has “evolved different and at times conflicting”467 meanings. The situation is complicated by the fact that later commentators to early Mah¹y¹na texts try to apply the three types to these texts, the content of which does not easily fall into these three categories.468 There is also the problem of the relationship between dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti and anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.

According to the Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra, quoted by ˜¹ntideva in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, there are three kinds of patience: duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti, par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti, and dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti (SSB179). The Dharmasa÷graha lists the three aspects of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ as

464 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 559. 465 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 144 n.119. 466 Sasaki, 354. 467 Realm of awakening, trans. Griffiths et al., 45. 468 See, for example, Braarvig, Tradition of imperishability, 144-159. 124 duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti, paropak¹radhamak¬¹nti and dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti.469 The first two kinds of patience are practical: patience which is enduring suffering, and patience which is forgiving the offence of another. The third kind, provisionally translated as patience as profound reflection on dharmas,470 is more complex and its exact meaning difficult to determine.

Duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti and par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti are karmadh¹raya compounds “in which the first member describes the last.”471 As the first member in each case is a tatpuru¬a compound, it is necessary to decide on the case relationships between the terms. Duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti = duåkhasya adhiv¹san¹ k¬¹nti - patience as the endurance of suffering. Adhiv¹san¹ is from the P¹li, and means ‘endurance’ or ‘acceptance.’472 Par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti = either parasya apak¹ram mar¬aªa or parasya apak¹rasya mar¬aªa k¬¹nti - patience as forgiving the offence of another.473 As two different words are used in Sanskrit, it is preferable to distinguish mar¬ana from adhiv¹sana in the English translation.474 As forgive means “to cease to feel anger towards (a person who has offended) or at (an offending deed)”475 it seems particularly apt for mar¬ana in the compound par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti.

Dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti can be interpreted as a karmadh¹raya compound meaning patience as profound reflection on dharmas/Dharma. It has also been interpreted as a tatpuru¬a compound in several ways: dharm¹ª¹÷/dharmasya nidhy¹n¹ya k¬¹nti or dharm¹ª¹÷/dharmasya nidhy¹n¹t k¬¹nti. Either this k¬¹nti

469 Dharmasa÷graha, 63. Edgerton, BHS199, corrects paropak¹radhamak¬¹nti to paropak¹radha(r)mak¬¹nti. 470 nidhy¹na MW549: n. intuition, seeing, sight, L.; BHS296: profound reflection, (leading to) comprehension. 471 Arthur A. Macdonell, A Sanskrit grammar for students, 3rd ed. (First published 1927; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), 173. 472 BHS15; Robert Caesar Childers, A dictionary of the Pali language (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1909; reprint, Rangoon: Buddha S¹sana Council Press, 1974), 29. It is not found in this sense in MW. 473 √mŬ put up with (+acc.) mar¬aªa MW: mfn. (ifc.) enduring, forgiving; n. =mar¬a (√mŬ) patience, endurance. mar¬aª¹ BHS420: (= S. °ªa, nt.), patience, endurance: (par¹pak¹rasya) °ª¹ sarve¬¹÷ ca °ª¹ ... Bbh 189.4 f. 474 Crosby and Skilton translate both as endurance, but merely enduring offences is not enough, the bodhisattva must not develop hostility. Conze translates adhiv¹sana as toleration, Gilgit manuscript of the A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹: chapters 70 to 82, ed. and trans. Conze, 27, 158. 475 Collins paperback English dictionary. 2nd ed. (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 1990), s.v. “forgive.” 125 is necessary for the task of profound contemplation of dharmas/Dharma or it is obtained from profound contemplation of dharmas/Dharma. Dharma can mean either dharmas = ‘phenomena’ or Dharma = the Buddhist teaching.

Edgerton and Crosby and Skilton state that k¬¹nti is a result of dharmanidhy¹na, but they differ in the meaning they give to dharma. Edgerton translates dharmanidhy¹nato ‘pi k¬amate as “also thru reflection on (or, comprehension of) the states-of-being he is receptive.”476 Crosby and Skilton translate dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti as “forbearance as a result of reflection upon the teaching.”477 Crosby and Skilton take dharma to mean Buddhist teaching, whereas Edgerton takes dharma to mean ‘phenomena’ which he translates as “states-of-being.”478 Curiously, Edgerton does not give “is receptive” as a meaning for k¬amate, and it is not a meaning given by Monier-Williams.479 In this case, it appears that Edgerton has extended the meaning he gives for k¬¹nti, “intellectual receptivity” to k¬amate. The root k¬am usually means ‘to be patient or composed, suppress anger.’ Crosby and Skilton retain the translation ‘forbearance,’ which they use for the other two types of k¬¹nti.

There are, therefore, several problems. Does dharma in the expression dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti mean the Buddhist teaching or doctrine, or does it mean ‘phenomena’? Which of the two meanings of k¬¹nti is appropriate? Should dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti be interpreted as a karmadh¹raya or a tatpuru¬a, i.e., is dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti a kind of k¬¹nti (as duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti and par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) or is dharmanidhy¹na the result or cause of k¬¹nti?

The BodhisattvabhØmi is one text which elaborates on dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti, rather than just stating that it is one of three aspects of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. It takes dharma to mean ‘phenomena’ and k¬¹nti to mean ‘patience,’ rather than ‘intellectual receptivity.’ Instead of dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti, it gives the third type of k¬¹nti as patience as conviction

476 BHS296. 477 Crosby and Skilton, 45. 478 Edgerton’s term for 2 dharma, meaning 4: state of existence, condition of being, BHS276. 479 Hajime Sakurabe, "Anutp¹dajñ¹na and anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti," Journal of Indian and Buddhist studies / Indogaku bukkyogaku kenkyu 14 (March 1966): 885, gives “to recognize” as a meaning for k¬amate when used by Ya¶omitra in his Abhidharmako¶aby¹khy¹. 126 from profound contemplation of dharmas (dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimok¬ak¬¹nti or dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimuktik¬¹nti).480

The BodhisattvabhØmi divides k¬¹nti into nine types: essence (svabh¹va), totality (sarva), difficult (du¬kara), complete/facing in all directions (sarvatomukha), true person (satpuru¬a), all aspects (sarv¹k¹ra), petitioners (vigh¹t¹rthika),481 happiness in this world (ih¹mutrasukha), completely purified (vi¶uddha).482 Sarvak¬¹nti has two aspects, householder and gone forth. These two aspects are of three kinds: par¹pak¹ramar¬aª¹k¬¹nti, duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti and dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimok¬ak¬¹nti. The BodhisattvabhØmi (Dutt edition) devotes two pages each to patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) and patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aª¹k¬¹nti), barely six lines to the patience as conviction from profound contemplation of dharmas (dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimok¬ak¬¹nti) and about two pages to the remaining seven types.

About, dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimuktik¬¹nti, the BodhisattvabhØmi says:483

tatra katam¹ bodhisattvasya dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimuktik¬¹ntiå | iha bodhisattvasya sa÷yagdharmapravicayasuvic¹ritay¹ buddhy¹ a¬−avidhe adhimuktyadhi¬−h¹ne adhimuktiå susannivi¬−¹ bhavati ratnaguªe¬u tattv¹rthe buddhabodhisattv¹n¹÷ mah¹prabh¹ve hetau phale pr¹ptavye ‘rthe ¹tmanas tatpr¹ptyup¹ye jñeyagocare ca | s¹ punar adhimuktir dv¹bhy¹÷ k¹raª¹bhy¹÷ susannivi¬−¹ bhavati | d»rghak¹l¹bhy¹sata¶ ca suvi¶uddhajñ¹nasamud¹gamata¶ ca |

Then what is a bodhisattva’s dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimuktik¬¹nti? Here, in so far as there is right investigation484 and thorough discernment485 of dharmas, the

480 Lamotte, Traité (Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra), 2:865 n.1: dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimok¬ak¬¹nti = méditer le Dharma et y adhérer (meditating on the dharma and adhering to it). 481 BHS483. 482 Each of the p¹ramit¹s is divided into these same nine types, leading Dutt to consider the BodhisattvabhØmi’s treatment of them to be “of a stereotyped nature.” He therefore does not provide summaries of the chapters on the p¹ramit¹s. Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 21. Tatz, Asanga’s Chapter on ethics, 47, translates the equivalent terms in the ¶»la chapter as “essence of ethics, complete ethics, difficult ethics, universal gateway ethics, the ethics of a holy person, ethics as all modes, ethics as distress and wishing, ethics as well-being here and there, and purified ethics.” 483 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 134, my translation. 127 conviction of the intellect of the bodhisattva is well established with regard to the eight-fold basis of conviction: in the qualities of the jewels, in knowledge of reality,486 in the great power of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, in the cause, in the fruit, in the goal to be obtained, in the means of obtaining that oneself and in the field of what is to be known. Again, conviction is well established due to two causes:- from practice for a long time and from the attainment of well purified knowledge.

When the BodhisattvabhØmi explains the third k¬¹nti, it replaces adhimok¬a with adhimukti. These two have the same meaning.487 It glosses dharmanidhy¹na as sa÷yagdharmapravicayasuvic¹rit¹ buddhi: the intellect has right investigation and thorough discernment of dharmas. Adhimuktik¬¹nti means that adhimukti is well established (susannivi¬−¹). In this passage, a possible translation of dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimuktik¬¹nti is k¬¹nti which is conviction due to profound reflection on dharmas.

Although this k¬¹nti is grouped with duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti and par¹pak¹ramar¬aª¹k¬¹nti, it is of a different type. The words used show that it is associated with meditation practice, whereas duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti and par¹pak¹ramar¬aª¹k¬¹nti are associated with the bodhisattva’s personal physical states or with relationships with others. Between the sections which explain par¹pak¹ramar¬aª¹k¬¹nti and duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti, the BodhisattvabhØmi explains that k¬¹nti is when a bodhisattva does not get angry, does not retaliate and does not experience hatred.488 The section explaining dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimuktik¬¹nti does not mention any of these.

The BodhisattvabhØmi mentions dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti later, in the section describing sarv¹k¹rak¬¹nti. A number of reasons are given for being

484 pravicaya Conze, Materials, 288: investigation, discernment; BHS: discriminating comprehension. dhamma-vicaya Walshe, D»gha Nik¹ya. Thus have I heard: the long discourses of the Buddha, trans. Maurice Walshe (London: Wisdom, 1987), 594 n.690: investigation of bodily and mental phenomena. Dharmapravicaya - one of the seven bodhya¡ga, translated by Venkata Ramanan, N¹g¹rjuna’s philosophy, 291, as “analysis and understanding of all things.” 485 Conze, Materials, 352: deliberation; vic¹rayati = appreciates, Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 144 n.119. 486 Willis’s translation of tattv¹rtha, justified extensively in Willis, On knowing reality, 37-39. 487 BHS15: adhimok¬a = adhimukti zealous application. A difficult term to translate, see fn.210. 488 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 132. 128 patient, the final one being: And knowing all dharmas to be without existence (niåsattva), one who is an observer of only the inexpressible dharmas489 is patient (k¬amate), because of profound reflection on dharmas (niåsattv¹÷¶ca sarvadharm¹n viditv¹ nirabhil¹pyadharmam¹tradar¶» dharmanidhy¹nato ‘pi k¬amate). On this occasion adhimukti is not mentioned. Whereas, in the expression dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimuktik¬¹nti, k¬¹nti is conviction due to profound reflection on dharmas, here the k¬¹nti itself is a result of profound contemplation of dharmas. The use of k¬amate suggests k¬¹nti as endurance, not “intellectual receptivity,” contrary to what Edgerton suggests.490 On the other hand, the k¬¹nti which is conviction due to profound reflection on dharmas, does echo the sense of k¬¹nti as “certainty.” In both cases, dharma means ‘phenomena’ and not the Buddhist teaching.

Other texts, however, differ. Asa¡ga’s Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha lists the three kinds of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ as apak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti, duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti and dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti.491 Vasubandhu’s commentary explains that apak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti is the cause of maturing beings (sattvavip¹kapravÅttihetu), duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti is the cause of the quality of Buddha, because, without backing away, it endures the various sufferings: cold, heat, hunger, thirst. Dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti is the support (¹¶raya) of the two preceding patiences. It is the patience towards the deep (gambh»ra) and vast (vipula) Dharma.492 This text interprets dharma as the Buddhist teaching.

The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra is unusual in that it does not divide k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ into three kinds, but two. Sattvak¬¹nti encompasses par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti, but as well as enduring those who offend, the bodhisattva must have k¬¹nti in the face of those who flatter. Dharmak¬¹nti includes both k¬¹nti for dharmas as ‘phenomena’ and k¬¹nti for the Dharma as Buddhist teaching. It argues that dharmas include such things as cold, heat,

489 In contrast to someone who is practising one of the other four foundations of mindfulness: k¹ya, vedan¹ or citta. See above, p.118, on the relationship of k¬¹nti to dharmasmÅtyupasth¹na in the paths (m¹rga). 490 See above p.127. 491 Asa¡ga, Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, trad. Lamotte, 191.

129 hunger, thirst, as well as mental states, which are of two sorts. The first includes anger (krodha, vy¹p¹da), dejection (daurmanasya), and doubt (sa÷¶aya) and the second includes lust (r¹ga) and pride (abhim¹na).

Dharmak¬¹nti includes the concepts associated with both duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti and anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. Lamotte summarizes the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapters thus:493

Rien ne l’émeut, ni les gens ni les choses : il conserve une froide indifférence à l’endroit des hommes qui le flattent, des bien-faiteurs qui le couvrent de leurs dons, des femmes qui cherchent à le séduire, des ennemis qui le persécutent. Il supporte avec une égale facilité les souffrances externes provoquées par le froid ou la chaleur, le vent ou la pluie, et les douleurs internes provenant de la vieillesse, de la maladie et de la mort. Il va même jusqu’ à prendre en patience ses propres passions : s’il ne s’y livre pas sans réserve, il évite cependant de les trancher pour ne point s’enfermer comme l’Arhat dans une ataraxie égoïste; en tout état de cause, son esprit reste ouvert aux mouvements de la grande pitié et de la grande compassion. Mais c’est par la Dharmak¬¹nti qu’il atteint le sommet de la patience : il scrute inlassablement la Loi bouddhique qui lui apprend à n’adopter aucune position philosophique définie, qui lui montre le vide universel, mais lui interdit de le concevoir.

Nothing affects [the bodhisattva], neither people nor things - he maintains a cold indifference towards people who flatter him, towards benefactors who cover him with their gifts, towards women who try to seduce him, towards enemies who persecute him. He endures with an equal ease external sufferings provoked by the cold or the heat, the wind or the rain, and the internal suffering resulting from old age, sickness and death. He even goes as far as accepting his own passions with patience: if he does not engage in them without reserve, he however avoids cutting them in order not to shut himself up in an egotistical ataraxia, like the arhat. In all cases, his mind remains open to the movements of great pity and great compassion. But it is by means of dharmak¬¹nti that he reaches the summit of patience - he indefatigably investigates the Buddhadharma which is taught to

492 Ibid.; Hiuan-tsang, Vijñaptim¹trat¹siddhi, trad. La Vallée Poussin, 621 n., also refers to dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti as the support of the other two k¬¹ntis, probably based on Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha. 493 Lamotte, Traité (Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra), 2:ix-x. My translation from French. 130 him by not adopting any definite philosophical position, which shows him universal emptiness, but which forbids him from conceptualizing.

The chapter on dharmak¬¹nti includes k¬¹nti in the face of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharma), even though it does not mention the term anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. Venkata Ramanan says: “K¬¹nti as the means is the earlier phase of wisdom. The highest kind of dharmak¬¹nti is that which springs from one’s comprehension of the ultimate truth of things, the truth of the devoidness of birth and death (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti).”494 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, however, does not propose three kinds of patience. It therefore does not divide dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti into three kinds, including anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, as La Vallée Poussin and Lamotte suggest.495

The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra concludes that dharmak¬¹nti is when the bodhisattva contemplates emptiness (¶Ønyat¹) without clinging to it, and does not produce a false view.496

De ces multiples façons, le Bodhisattva passe le seuil de la sagesse (prajñ¹dv¹ra). Il considère le Vrai caractère des Dharma; sa pensée n’éprouve ni recul ni regret; il ne suit pas [aveuglément] les considérations [qu’il a faites] et n’en a pas de chagrin; il assure son bien à lui (sv¹rtha) et celui d’autrui (par¹rtha) : c’est ce qu’on nomme dharmak¬¹nti.

Cette dharmak¬¹nti est de trois sortes. Quand il la pratique sous sa forme pure, le Bodhisattva ne voit pas les propriétés de la patience, ne se voit pas lui-même, ne voit pas ceux qui l’insultent, ne joue pas avec les Dharma. C’est alors la pure dharmak¬¹nti. Pour cette raison, le sØtra dit (ci-dessus, p.865) que “le Bodhisattva qui réside dans la vertu de sagesse doit remplir la vertu de patience en ne s’agitant pas et en ne reculant pas” (bodhisattvena prajñ¹p¹ramit¹y¹÷ sthitv¹ k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ paripØrayitavy¹ ak¬obhaªat¹m up¹d¹ya). Quelle est cette non- agitation (ak¬obhaªat¹) et cette absence de recul (avivartana)? Ne pas éprouver de haine (dve¬a, pratigha), ne pas proférer des paroles méchantes; physiquement, ne pas faire de mal; mentalement, ne pas éprouver de doute. Le Bodhisattva qui connaît le Vrai caractère de la vertu de sagesse, ne voit pas les Dharma, car sa pensée est dépourvue d’opinions (abhinive¶a) à leur sujet. Lorsque un homme

494 Venkata Ramanan, N¹g¹rjuna’s philosophy, 370 n.42. 495 See above, p.121.

131 vient l’insulter, le tourmenter, l’empoisonner ou le frapper, il peut tout supporter. C’est pourquoi il est dit qu’en résidant dans la vertu de sagesse, il peut remplir la vertu de patience.

In these various ways, the bodhisattva crosses the threshold of wisdom. He contemplates the true character of dharmas, his thought experiences neither recoil nor regret; he does not follow his deliberations blindly and does not have vexation; he secures his own good and that of others : this is what one calls dharmak¬¹nti.

This dharmak¬¹nti is of three sorts. When he practises it in the pure form, the bodhisattva does not see the properties of patience, does not see himself, does not see those who are insulting him, is not involved with the dharmas. This is the pure dharmak¬¹nti. For this reason, the sØtra says that, “the bodhisattva who resides in the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ must fulfil k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ while not being agitated and not recoiling (bodhisattvena prajñ¹p¹ramit¹y¹÷ sthitv¹ k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ paripØrayitavy¹ ak¬obhaªat¹m up¹d¹ya). What is this non-agitation (ak¬obhaªat¹) and this absence of recoil (avivartana)? Not experiencing hate (dve¬a, pratigha), not uttering unpleasant words, physically not doing bad, mentally, not experiencing doubt.497 The bodhisattva who knows the true character of prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, does not see dharmas, because his thought is devoid of opinions (abhinive¶a) on the subject. When a man comes to insult him, to harass him, to torment him or to hit him, he is able to endure it all. This is why it is said that by residing in the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, he is able to fulfil k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹.

As noted above, the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra may have been influenced by A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, which also divides k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ into two types, in two separate passages within a few pages of each other. The two treatments differ, and also differ from that of the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra. The first passage says that the bodhisattva should never give occasion to a single thought associated with disturbance (bodhisattvena mahasattvena ekacittotp¹dasy¹pi k¬obhasahagatasy¹vak¹¶o na d¹tavyaå) when being physically

496 Lamotte, Traité (Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra), 2:925-926. My translation. 497 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 135, has a different interpretation of mental patience: He is patient with the body by not striking. He is patient with the voice by not uttering unpleasant speech. He is patient with the mind by not being angry and by not maintaining impure intentions. 132 attacked.498 It then says that the bodhisattva should develop two kinds of k¬¹nti – he should endure physical and verbal abuse from all beings, and he should produce anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. When being abused, the bodhisattva should reflect on (pratyavek¬itavya) who is doing the attacking, and who is being attacked. It is through this consideration that the bodhisattva develops anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. Further, anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is of two kinds – “one results from the nongenesis of the defilements, and the other from the noncutting off of cognition” (kle¶¹nutpattikat¹ ca jñ¹n¹n¹cchedyat¹ ca).499

The second passage stipulates, that the bodhisattva “fulfils the markless k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹” (alak¬aªa k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ paripØrayati).500 He fulfils it by means of two kinds of k¬¹nti – “the patience which means toleration and the patience which can look through to dharmas” (adhiv¹sanak¬¹nty¹ dharm¹vabodhak¬¹nty¹ ca).501 The first type consists of the bodhisattva never having a thought associated with disturbance or malice (vy¹p¹da) when being attacked verbally or physically. He should reflect that the beings attacking him are afflicted by the defilements (kle¶a), and that he has seized the aggregates (skandha) which are like enemies. Having reflected like this, he becomes compassionate and benevolent. The second type is that he does not perceive any beings to exist in the ultimate sense. Asking who is doing the attacking involves conceptualizing (vikalpa), and the bodhisattva will not conceptualize, but relies on the emptiness of own-being (svabh¹va¶Ønyat¹) and the emptiness of ultimate reality (param¹rtha¶Ønyat¹). When the bodhisattva has fulfilled k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in this way, he obtains anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. Anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is defined in this way – not even the tiniest dharma is produced, this is called “anutpattika,” the knowledge (jñ¹na) of that is called k¬¹nti, and with that knowledge (jñ¹na) anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is obtained.502

498 Gilgit manuscript of the A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹: chapters 70 to 82, ed. and trans. Conze, 16, 148. Conze translates as “single thought associated with rage.” 499 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 559; Gilgit manuscript of the A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹: chapters 70 to 82, ed. and trans. Conze, 16, 149. 500 Conze, Large sutra on perfect wisdom, 567; Gilgit manuscript of the A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹: chapters 70 to 82, ed. and trans. Conze, 27, 158. 501 Ibid. 502 Gilgit manuscript of the A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹: chapters 70 to 82, ed. and trans. Conze, 28. 133 ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa seems to follow this second division of k¬¹nti made in the A¬−¹da¶as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹. In general, it focuses on the benefits of practising k¬¹nti. The main delineation of k¬¹nti it makes is between ultimate (anuttara) and non-ultimate k¬¹nti. While describing what is not ultimate k¬¹nti, ¸rya¶Øra uses a number of synonyms for ultimate k¬¹nti (param¹rtha, parama, gataprakar¬a, atyantasam¹hita, prakar¬a, atiprakŬ−a, samat¹÷ sameti, dvayavarjita, etc.).503 Meadows interprets the chapter on k¬¹nti as falling into the three categories of patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti), patience as forgiving the offence of another and patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti).504 However, ¸rya¶Øra does not mention these three types. Another reason it seems unlikely that ¸rya¶Øra considers his text to be following the threefold division is that the texts which include ultimate k¬¹nti within k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ are more likely to divide k¬¹nti into two types. ¸rya¶Øra deals with bearing the verbal abuse of others and not becoming angry, elated or cowed. The cause of anger is wrong conceptualisation (mithy¹vikalpa), and through correct conceptualisation (sa÷yagvikalpa) the bodhisattva can obtain non-ultimate k¬¹nti. Ultimate k¬¹nti is only achieved when there is no conceptualizing (vikalpa).505

Conclusion The terms p¹ramit¹, bhØmi, m¹rga are associated with the practice of bodhisattvas and the bodhisattva path. K¬¹nti is one of the p¹ramit¹s, associated with the paths (m¹rga) and connected to several of the bhØmis. K¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹ is mainly associated with the third bhØmi, whereas anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is mainly associated with the eighth bhØmi. Where anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is part of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, there is an obvious discrepancy with the bhØmi schemes. The association of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ with the third bhØmi also tells against patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti) being divided into three types, including anulomik»k¬¹nti and anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, since these are associated with

503 Reminiscent of Monty Python’s “dead parrot” sketch. 504 ¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium, trans. Meadows, 139, translates as “forbearance in reflecting on (and penetrating) the dharma.”

134 the sixth and eighth bhØmi respectively. In the path (m¹rga) schemes, k¬¹nti is associated with doubt, the opposite of certainty, whereas in the expression anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti, k¬¹nti expresses the idea of certainty. K¬¹nti in the context of paths (m¹rga) has no connection with k¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹.

K¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹ is consistently associated with being imperturbable (ak¬obhya), enduring physical and mental suffering, and refraining from anger. The texts which divide k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ into three types do not associate k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ and anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. Texts which divide k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ into two types are more likely to discuss anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti and the ultimate practice of k¬¹nti. The interpretation of dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti remains a problem.

505 Ibid., 212-220, 380-385.

135 Chapter 4

Bodhisattva path in ˜¹ntideva’s works

Two main models of the bodhisattva path existed at the time of ˜¹ntideva, bhØmis and p¹ramit¹s. K¬¹nti has a variety of meanings described in the previous chapter. The main function of k¬¹nti is as a p¹ramit¹. Therefore, it may be the case that the bodhisattva path advocated by ˜¹ntideva consists only of p¹ramit¹s, and that his treatment of k¬¹nti is only as a p¹ramit¹. This chapter assesses the extent to which ˜¹ntideva’s texts describe the bodhisattva path in terms of p¹ramit¹s or bhØmis, or if he followed another of the structures discussed in the previous chapter. This will show whether it is likely that his treatment of k¬¹nti is only as a p¹ramit¹, ultimate or otherwise, or if he may have treated other aspects of k¬¹nti.

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which ˜¹ntideva followed available models of the bodhisattva path. Two approaches are used. The first is to determine the structures of ˜¹ntideva’s works, and whether they have the same structure. To this end, this chapter describes and compares the structures of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, with particular reference to the p¹ramit¹s. The second approach is to look for other elements of the path models identified in the previous chapter. As there is no evidence that ˜¹ntideva followed the m¹rga scheme, this section discusses ˜¹ntideva’s references to the bhØmis.

An analysis of the structures of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and ˜ik¬¹samuccaya shows that neither work exclusively follows the pattern of the six p¹ramit¹s. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya follows a scheme of four activities, renunciation (utsarga), guarding (rak¬¹), purification (¶uddhi) and increase (vÅddhi), applied to three areas, person (¹tmabh¹va), possessions (bhoga) and merit (puªya). The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra does not follow this scheme. The structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is not as clearly defined as that of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, but is most usefully understood with reference to bodhicitta. There is some common material in the two works and some correspondences in the order that this 136 material is presented, but their structures are not the same. Prajñ¹karamati’s commentary at times links the subject matter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra to the scheme of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. He uses sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya in his commentary to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, but they do not appear in the same order in the two works. The introductory section of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya throws some light on the topic of bodhicitta in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. A possibly earlier version of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra found at Tun-huang does not clarify the structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.

˜¹ntideva does not outline his path in terms of the bhØmis, but refers to the bhØmis, particularly in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Many of the references to the bhØmis are in ˜¹ntideva’s own words; their presence is deliberate and not the result of their being mentioned in the texts from which ˜¹ntideva is quoting. ˜¹ntideva’s main concern in regard to the bhØmis is with the transition from the preparatory bhØmis to the first bhØmi, and with the differences between them. He distinguishes between the bodhisattva who has entered the bhØmis and one who has not. ˜¹ntideva’s references to the bhØmis reveal who ˜¹ntideva considers to be a bodhisattva and what sort of bodhisattva he is addressing.

I Structures

I.1Structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra1 Until Crosby and Skilton’s translation of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, there was little analysis of its structure. Some scholars were silent on this point,2 others merely listed the chapter headings,3 or suggested the p¹ramit¹s were the basis for ˜¹ntideva’s work, without accounting for the lack of chapters devoted to the p¹ramit¹ of giving (d¹nap¹ramit¹) and of moral conduct (¶»lap¹ramit¹).4 Steinkellner and Batchelor do address this problem, but do not

1 I have used translations by Crosby and Skilton, and Wallace and Wallace, (˜¹ntideva, Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trans. Wallace and Wallace), checking where necessary with the Sanskrit verses, and commentaries by Prajñ¹karamati (BCAP) and Trip¹−h» (˜¹ntideva, Bodhichary¹vat¹r, [trans.] Trip¹th»). 2 Path of light, trans. Barnett; La marche a la lumière, trad. Finot; Murti; Saddhatissa, "Santideva and the Bodhisattva ideal," 93-99. 3 Sweet, ˜¹ntideva, 3; Pezzali, ˜¹ntideva, 47-48. 4 Ruegg, Literature, 82. 137 arrive at the same solution.5 This suggests that a structure based on the p¹ramit¹s is not entirely satisfactory. Crosby and Skilton emphasize supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹) as a means of understanding its structure. Another way to understand the structure is through the two types of bodhicitta introduced by ˜¹ntideva at BCA1:15.

The chapter headings give some guide to the structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. The work is divided into ten chapters, which are:

Chapter 1 Praise of bodhicitta (bodhicitt¹nu¶a÷sa)

Chapter 2 Confession of sin (p¹pade¶an¹)

Chapter 3 Complete acceptance of bodhicitta (bodhicittaparigraha)

Chapter 4 Vigilance regarding bodhicitta (bodhicitt¹pram¹da)

Chapter 5 Guarding awareness (samprajanyarak¬aªa)

Chapter 6 Perfection of patience (k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹)

Chapter 7 Perfection of energy (v»ryap¹ramit¹)

Chapter 8 Perfection of meditation (dhy¹nap¹ramit¹)

Chapter 9 Perfection of wisdom (prajñ¹p¹ramit¹)

Chapter 10 Dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹)

The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra begins with praise of the opportune moment (k¬aªa)6 and bodhicitta. It describes the benefits of bodhicitta. In chapter 2, the bodhisattva confesses sins and takes refuge in the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 return to the subject of bodhicitta and the opportune moment. They also concern strengthening the resolve to undertake the practices necessary in order to liberate all beings, and continuing to practise with perseverance. The p¹ramit¹ of giving (d¹nap¹ramit¹) and the p¹ramit¹ of moral conduct (¶»lap¹ramit¹) are first mentioned in chapter 5, in the context of a discourse on the importance of the mind in mastering the training of a

5 ˜¹ntideva, Eintritt in das Leben zur Erleuchtung, übersetzt Steinkellner, 15; ˜¹ntideva, Guide, trans. Batchelor, vii.

138 bodhisattva. ˜¹ntideva suggests a number of techniques for guarding the mind. Chapters 6 to 9 show how to cultivate each of the remaining p¹ramit¹s in order: k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, p¹ramit¹ of energy (v»ryap¹ramit¹), p¹ramit¹ of meditation (dhy¹nap¹ramit¹), and prajñ¹p¹ramit¹. In chapter 10, the bodhisattva dedicates the merit generated to the welfare of all beings.

Steinkellner says that ˜¹ntideva outlines the career of a bodhisattva from the taking up of bodhicitta until the gaining of wisdom (prajñ¹); this career corresponds to the six p¹ramit¹s. As taking up bodhicitta represents giving (d¹na) in its highest form, the first three chapters on bodhicitta are, in fact, on the p¹ramit¹ of giving (d¹nap¹ramit¹). Steinkellner does not say if he bases this interpretation on any source. There is no such interpretation of bodhicitta in any of the texts quoted in the article on bodhicitta in the Enyclopaedia of Buddhism.7 Steinkellner defines ¶»la as “der sorgenden Beobachtung der Lebensführung”8 and proposes that it is the subject of chapters 4 and 5. Chapters 6 to 9 correspond to each of remaining p¹ramit¹s. He does not account for chapter 10 because he considers its attribution to ˜¹ntideva doubtful.9 Batchelor also assigns the p¹ramit¹ of moral conduct (¶»lap¹ramit¹) to chapters 4 and 5.10

6 The idea that it is very rare to be born as a human being and to have the opportunity to practise Buddhadharma. 7 S. K. Nanayakkara, "Bodhicitta," in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, ed. G. P. Malalasekera, vol. 3, fasc. 2 ([Colombo]: Government of Ceylon, 1972), 184-189. 8 Trans: careful observation of the lifestyle. 9 ˜¹ntideva, Eintritt in das Leben zur Erleuchtung (Bodhicary¹vat¹ra), übersetzt Steinkellner, 15. Williams notes, in regard to N¹g¹rjuna’s works, that Mah¹y¹na works often begin with verses of praise and end with dedicatory verses. Williams, "Review article," 78-82 . 10 ˜¹ntideva, Guide, trans. Batchelor, vii.

139 These differences in interpretation show that the first four of the ten chapters of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra do not fall easily into the p¹ramit¹ framework. Based on the existence of an earlier, shorter version of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra amongst the Tun-huang manuscripts, Crosby and Skilton suggest that scholars have not found a satisfactory structure for the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra because there was later editorial interference.11 However, as they acknowledge, the main differences between the earlier version and the ‘canonical version’ are in the later chapters,12 and it is the earlier chapters that present the most difficulty as regards structure. As they suggest, if ˜¹ntideva’s intention had been to follow the p¹ramit¹s, he would surely have assigned a chapter to each p¹ramit¹, as ¸rya¶Øra does in his P¹ramit¹sam¹sa.13 Crosby and Skilton assign the first two p¹ramit¹s to chapter 5, but note that d¹na is treated in chapters 2, 3 and 10 also.14 All the p¹ramit¹s, beginning with chapter 5 constitute “the training proper.” The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra begins with the praise of bodhicitta (chapter 1), followed by generating merit and adopting bodhicitta by means of supreme worship (chapters 2-3), and strengthening the resolve prior to commencing the training (chapter 4). Chapters 5-9 constitute the training. The work finishes with the bodhisattva undertaking vows which mark the beginning of his/her active career (chapter 10).15 Crosby and Skilton do not mention in this analysis

11 Crosby and Skilton, xxxiii. 12 Saito, A study of Ak¬ayamati (=˜¹ntideva)’s Bodhisattvacary¹vat¹ra, 14. 13 Ibid., xxxiv 14 Ibid., xxxiv, 30. 15 Ibid., xxxiv. 140 of the structure that the bodhisattva has already taken vows,16 nor do they explain the difference between “the training proper” and “the active career.”

Crosby and Skilton have another suggestion regarding the structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. They identify chapters 1 to 3 as forming a liturgy, widespread in the Mah¹y¹na tradition, known as supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹).17 ˜¹ntideva uses this to generate merit and bodhicitta, while chapter 4 advises bodhisattvas to maintain their resolve, which provides the basis for undertaking the training.18 The supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹) comprises several parts, including praising (vandan¹), worship (pØjan¹), confession of sin (p¹pade¶an¹), rejoicing in merit (puªy¹numodan¹), requesting (adhye¬aª¹), entreating (y¹can¹), dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹), going for refuge to the three jewels (tri¶araªagamana) and producing bodhicitta (bodhicittotp¹da).19 Crosby and Skilton divide the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra according to these subdivisions as follows:

Chapter 1 praise (vandan¹) Chapter 2 1-25 worship (pØjan¹) 26 going for refuge (¶araªagamana) 27-45 confession of sin (p¹pade¶an¹) 46-54 going for refuge (¶araªagamana) 55-66 confession of sin (p¹pade¶an¹) Chapter 3 1-3 rejoicing in merit (puªy¹numodan¹) 4 requesting (adhye¬aª¹) 5 entreating (y¹can¹) 6-21 dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹) 22-33 producing bodhicitta (bodhicittotp¹da)

Crosby and Skilton’s identification of “supreme worship” helps in understanding the content and order of subject matter in chapters 1 to 3 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, but does not account for the complete structure of the work.

16 They do mention it later, at p.133. 17 Crosby and Skilton, 9-11. 18 Ibid., xxxiv. 19 Ibid., 10; Dharmasa÷graha, section 14; Triskhandaka quoted in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, SSB290.2. 141 A key to the structure lies in verse BCA1:15, where ˜¹ntideva identifies bodhicitta as being of two types.

tad bodhicitta÷ dvividha÷ vijñ¹tavya÷ sam¹sataå | bodhipraªidhicitta÷ ca bodhiprasth¹nam eva ca || (BCA1:15)

Briefly, that bodhicitta is to be understood as two kinds, the mind which has vowed to achieve bodhi and the one which has set out for bodhi.

He distinguishes between merely resolving to undertake the way (BC1), and actually setting out (BC2).

While Crosby and Skilton do not outline the structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra according to these two types of bodhicitta, they cover them in other contexts.20 It is clear where they consider BC1 to be located in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, but not so clear where they locate BC2. The arising of BC1 occurs in BCA3:22-24.21 In their introduction to chapter 10, Crosby and Skilton discuss the two types of bodhicitta with regard to the bodhisattva vows (praªidh¹na) and the dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹). The bodhisattva dedicates merit by means of vows in chapter 3 and again in chapter 10. They suggest that the bodhisattva uses supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹) to give rise to BC1.22 The bodhisattva cultivates BC2 by putting BC1 into practice with the bodhisattva training.23 As the supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹) precedes BC1, this gives the impression that, in a similar fashion, the training precedes BC2. On the other hand, they also suggest that the merit being dedicated in chapter 3 is merit the bodhisattva had generated from BC1.24 So BC1 precedes the dedication of merit, and is also the result of the dedication of merit. If this pattern also applies in the case of BC2, they may mean to indicate that BC2 is both the training and the result of the training. Indeed, in the introduction to chapter 10 they explain that in chapter 3 ˜¹ntideva is dedicating merit from the arising of BC1, and in chapter 10 merit generated from BC2. They translate BC2 as “the Mind proceeding towards Awakening,” and state that “the means of its

20 Crosby and Skilton, 11-12, 133-134. 21 Ibid., 11-12. 22 Ibid., 11, 134. 23 Ibid., 12, 134. 142 [BC2’s] ‘proceeding’ towards Awakening is the practice of the perfections.”25 They may mean to indicate that BC2 does begin in chapter 5 with the “training proper.” On the other hand, by stating that the bodhisattva’s “active career” begins in chapter 10, they may mean that the bodhisattva sets out (BC2) in chapter 10.

If BC1 arises at BCA3:22-23 and BC2 begins with chapter 5, when the bodhisattva sets out by beginning the training, the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra reveals a simple structure. In his commentary to BCA1:15, Prajñ¹karamati explains that the kind of mind that arises from the vow (praªidh¹na) (BC1) is deficient in the practice of giving (d¹na) etc.; the mind which has set out (BC2) engages in the accumulations (sambh¹ra), having first taken a vow of restraint (sa÷varagrahaªa).26 Using this distinction, chapters 1-3 concern the first kind of bodhicitta, and chapters 4-10 the second kind, chapter 4 being a preliminary to setting out in chapter 5.

With this in mind, here is an outline of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. In chapter 1, ˜¹ntideva describes the benefits of bodhicitta, to persuade the hearer to accept bodhicitta. Chapter 2 prepares the person to accept it by removing any obstacles to its acceptance. The bodhisattva must formally accept bodhicitta in the presence of Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and this is done in chapter 3. Having produced the first kind of bodhicitta, that is, having made a vow to achieve awakening for the sake of all beings (BCA3:22-23), the bodhisattva must produce the second kind of bodhicitta by actually setting out. Chapter 4 prepares the bodhisattva for that step, by overcoming any doubts that he/she can do it. At the end of chapter 4, the bodhisattva resolves to follow the training, which is commenced in chapter 5. The bodhisattva now sets out (BC2). The training consists of getting rid of the defilements (kle¶a), and guarding the training consists of guarding the mind. The overarching principle under which all the p¹ramit¹s are subsumed is guarding the mind. Therefore, chapter 5 begins with arguments to persuade the bodhisattva that guarding the mind is the

24 Ibid., 134. 25 Ibid.

143 correct course of action, before describing how it is to be done. All the merit that the bodhisattva has generated from worship,27 giving (d¹na) and moral conduct (¶»la) is wasted if the bodhisattva does not develop k¬¹nti (chapter 6); the bodhisattva then generates more merit with energy (v»rya) (chapter 7), and uproots the defilements (kle¶a) with meditation (dhy¹na) (chapter 8). The bodhisattva has practised all that has gone before for the sake of wisdom (prajñ¹) (chapter 9). The dedication of merit completes the resolution made by the bodhisattva, to develop bodhi for the sake of all beings (chapter 10).

In his commentary to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, Prajñ¹karamati refers to the topics of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, which raises the hope that the structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya may help in understanding that of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. There is little evidence that ˜¹ntideva has attempted to follow the structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. However, a comparison of the two texts does provides another interpretation of the structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra based on the two types of bodhicitta.

I.2 Structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya 30 The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya can be divided according to four schemes. These are 19 chapters, 27 k¹rik¹s, 6 p¹ramit¹s, and a scheme of twelve topics. The chapter titles often refer to the latter parts of the chapter, not the chapter as a whole.31 The k¹rik¹s outline the topics of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya and give a better guide to the contents of the work.32 The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya also introduces the six p¹ramit¹s in sequence but, like the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, they do not run through the entire work. The chief structure of the text is according to a scheme of four activities applied to three areas. ˜¹ntideva indicates the beginnings and endings of these topics throughout the text. At the start of each chapter, and sometimes within chapters, he indicates which topic he has just covered, and which topic he

26 Both praªidh¹na and sa÷vara may mean vow, and they are used interchangeably in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, SSB11.15, 14.14, 15.1. sa÷vara in BHS539: “restraint, control, obligation, vow,” “moral restraints;” translated by Bendall and Rouse, 12-13, as “vow of restraint.” 27 The mention of worship confirms its importance in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. 30 Apart from chapter 7 and chapter 9, I have used Bendall and Rouse’s translation, checking extensively against Bendall’s Sanskrit ed. (SSB). 31 SSB, xxxi n.1; Hedinger, 11 n.42. 32 Hedinger, 11 n.42. 144 is introducing. Within chapters, he is more likely to indicate which topic he has just completed than to introduce the next topic.

The chapters are as follows:

Chapter 1 Perfection of giving (d¹nap¹ramit¹)

Chapter 2 Adopting the true Dharma in regard to ¶»lap¹ramit¹ (¶»lap¹ramit¹y¹÷ saddharmaprigrahaå)

Chapter 3 Protection of proclaimers of the Dharma etc. (dharmabh¹ªak¹dirak¬¹)

Chapter 4 Avoiding the hindrances (anarthavarjana)

Chapter 5 Avoiding the hindrances in regard to ¶»lap¹ramit¹ (¶»lap¹ramit¹y¹m anarthavarjanam)

Chapter 6 Guarding the person (¹tmabh¹varak¬¹)

Chapter 7 Guarding possessions and merit (bhogapuªyarak¬¹)

Chapter 8 Purifying sin (p¹pa¶odhana)

Chapter 9 Perfection of patience (k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹)

Chapter 10 Perfection of effort (v»ryap¹ramit¹)

Chapter 11 Praise of the forest (araªyasa÷varªana)

Chapter 12 The preparation of the mind (cittaparikarma)

Chapter 13 Foundations of mindfulness (smÅtyupasth¹na)

Chapter 14 Complete purification of the person (¹tmabh¹vapari¶uddhi)

Chapter 15 Purification of possessions and merit (bhogapuªya¶uddhi)

Chapter 16 Performance of the Bhadracary¹33 (bhadracary¹vidhi)

Chapter 17 Praise of praising (vandan¹nu¶a÷s¹)

Chapter 18 Recollection of the three jewels (ratnatray¹nusmÅti)

Chapter 19 (untitled)

33 Benevolent conduct (bhadracary¹) refers to a ritual recitation which appears at the end of the Gaª©avyØha (part of the Avata÷saka SØtra). See Mark Tatz, "The vow of benevolent conduct," in Studies in Indo-Asian art and culture, vol. 5, Commemoration volume on the 75th birthday of Acharya Raghuvira, ˜ata-pi−aka series, vol. 238 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1977), 153-76. ˜¹ntideva’s chapter finishes with one of the final verses of this recitation, found in Tatz, “The vow of benevolent conduct,” 165, and in Cleary, Flower ornament scripture, 3:393. 145 The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya explains the p¹ramit¹s in order. After introductory material, the second part of chapter 1 concerns the p¹ramit¹ of giving (d¹nap¹ramit¹). Chapters 2-8 deal with the p¹ramit¹ of moral conduct (¶»lap¹ramit¹). Chapter 9 covers k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ and chapter 10 covers the p¹ramit¹ of energy (v»ryap¹ramit¹). Chapters 11-13 deal with the p¹ramit¹ of meditation (dhy¹nap¹ramit¹), and chapter 14 concerns prajñ¹p¹ramit¹. It is not possible to infer from the text how much of the remainder of the work concerns prajñ¹p¹ramit¹.34

Hedinger noticed that the main structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya had only been partially delineated by Bendall.35 Hedinger says:

The composition of ˜¹ntideva’s work is very complex. Besides the traditional arrangement of the career of a Bodhisattva according to the six p¹ramit¹s, ˜¹ntideva uses the following headings: personality (¹tmabh¹va), possessions (bhoga) and merit (puªya). These items are treated under four aspects: renunciation (utsarga), preserving (rak¬¹), purity (¶uddhi) and enhancement (vÅddhi).36

The main purpose of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is to explain the moral training (¶ik¬¹) of a bodhisattva. K¹rik¹ 3 explains that the bodhisattva vow (sa÷vara) is difficult to understand if it is described at length, and that by knowing the vital points the bodhisattva can be without transgression (¹pattika) (SSB17.10- 11). These vital points, which outline the structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, are introduced in k¹rik¹ 4 (SSB17.13-14), and are restated at SSB18.8-9.

¹tmabh¹vasya bhog¹n¹m tryadhvavÅtteå ¶ubhasya ca | utsargaå sarvasatvebhyas tadrak¬¹¶uddhivardhanam || (k¹rik¹ 4, SSB17.13-14)

Renunciation of person, of possessions and of merit occurring in the three times, guarding, purification, increasing of these, for the sake of all beings.

tasm¹d evam ¹tmabh¹vabhogapuªy¹n¹m aviratam utsargarak¬¹¶uddhivÅddhayo yath¹yoga÷ bh¹van»y¹å || (SSB18.8-9)

34 As noted by Hedinger, 13 n.48. This is the last chapter that Hedinger identifies as concerning prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, or any other p¹ramit¹. 35 Ibid., 11 n.42. 36 Ibid., 165. 146 Therefore, in this way the renunciation, guarding, purification and increase of the person, possessions and merit should be practised continually, in due order.

Bendall and Rouse have misread these statements:

Give freely for all creature’s sake Thy person, thy enjoyments too, Thy merit’s store throughout all time; Guard each and grow in holiness. (k¹rik¹ 4, SSB17.13-14)37

Therefore the growth of purity should be fostered in due manner by constantly preserving thus the renunciation of self, goods, and merit. (SSB18.8-9)38

Bendall only recognizes “three aspects of [the bodhisattva’s life] each regarded from three points of view.”39

These topics are dealt with in the following order:

Topic k¹rik¹

renunciation of person, possessions and merit 4 (¹tmabh¹vabhogapuªyotsarga) guarding (rak¬¹) 5-6

guarding the person (¹tmabh¹varak¬¹) 7-13

guarding possessions (bhogarak¬¹) 14

guarding merit (puªyarak¬¹) 15-16

purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi), including 17-20 purification of the mind (citta¶uddhi) purification of possessions (bhoga¶uddhi) 21ab

purification of merit (puªya¶uddhi) 21cd

increase (vÅddhi) 22

increase of the person (¹tmabh¹vavÅddhi) 23ab

increase of possessions (bhogavÅddhi) 23cd

increase of merit (puªyavÅddhi) 24-26

37 Bendall and Rouse, 19. Also translated this way in SSB, xl, except “creature’s” is correctly “creatures’.” 38 Bendall and Rouse, 20. 147 This main structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is preceded by introductory material and is followed by a conclusion. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya begins by praising the opportune moment (k¬aªa) and by stating that faith (¶raddh¹) and bodhicitta are the foundation of the bodhisattva path (k¹rik¹ 2, SSB2.13-14). The work concludes with a homage to Mañju¶r».

I.3 Comparison of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya As the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya apparently has such an unique and definite structure,40 the question arises, can the structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya throw any light on that of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra? Prajñ¹karamati seems to indicate it can, as he introduces his commentary to some of the chapters of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra by referring to the topics of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.41 Nevertheless, the complete structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya cannot be applied to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. Even verses which are common to both the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya and the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra do not occur in corresponding sections of each text. On the other hand, comparing the two works gives some insight into the structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.

Although there is no evidence in the verses of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra that ˜¹ntideva has followed a structure similar to that of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, there are some connections between the two texts. Firstly, there are some verses in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra which have almost exact correspondence with sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, and some which are nearly the same, covering similar subject matter with similar words. Secondly, Prajñ¹karamati refers to the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya topics in his commentary to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and includes the k¹rik¹s and other sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya in his commentary to certain verses.42

Nevertheless, the structures of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya do not correspond. The subject matter is not in the same order. This can be seen from comparing the location of verses in each text which are

39 SSB, ii. 40 I have not been able to find any other work which follows this scheme. 41 BCAP5:1, BCAP6:1. 42 These connections have been located using SSB; Bendall and Rouse; LVP; Vaidya; Crosby and Skilton, (who in turn used SSB and LVP); and my own reading. 148 the same or similar, and from examples such as the sections on defilements (kle¶a), confession of sin and supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹). Prajñ¹karamati’s mention of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya topics does not clarify the situation. The possibility that the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra has followed the scheme of twelve topics found in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is dismissed, but a comparison of the first chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya with the first chapters of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra provides further information for considering the structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.

I.3.i Same or similar ideas in the verses of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya These verses are also found in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, some with slight variations:

BCA verse ˜ik¬¹samuccaya Source according to ˜ik¬¹samuccaya43 1:1-4 SSB1.9-2.2 ˜¹ntideva 3:8b SSB325.7 Vimalak»rtinirde¶a 5:55 SSB127.10-11 ˜¹ntideva 5:57 SSB127.12-13 ˜¹ntideva 5:74 SSB364.11-12 Tath¹gataguhya Søtra 5:92 SSB125.11-12 Bodhisattvapr¹timok¬a 6:10a SSB180.8 ˜¹ntideva 6:14a SSB180.18 ˜¹ntideva 6:14b SSB181.8 ˜¹ntideva 6:94a SSB266.1-2 Dharmasa÷g»ti Søtra 6:95a SSB266.5 Dharmasa÷g»ti Søtra 6:115 SSB157.7-8 uncertain44 6:119 SSB155.10-11 uncertain45 6:120-134 SSB155.14-157.6 uncertain46 8:96 SSB2.10-11 k¹rik¹ 1 8:97-98 SSB358.3-6 Tath¹gataguhya Søtra 8:101a SSB359.14 Tath¹gataguhya Søtra 8:104 SSB360.5-6 Tath¹gataguhya Søtra

43 ˜¹ntideva given as source if no evidence to the contrary. 44 Crosby and Skilton, 48, attribute verses 6:119-134 to the Tath¹gataguhya SØtra, but do not say on what basis. The last text mentioned in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya before these verses are included is the Bhik¬uprak»rªika (SSB154-155), which seems to indicate that they are either from that text or ˜¹ntideva’s own words. The styles of the Bhik¬uprak»rªika and these verses are very different. 45 See previous note. 46 See previous note. 149 BCA verse ˜ik¬¹samuccaya Source according to ˜ik¬¹samuccaya43 8:107-109 SSB360.7-12 Tath¹gataguhya Søtra

Most of the verses common to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya appear in chapter 6 and chapter 8 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, and many come from the Tath¹gataguhya SØtra. There is a wider distribution of Bodhicary¹vat¹ra verses which deal with the same or similar subject matter as sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Similar ideas are expressed in the following verses and sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya:

BCA verse ˜ik¬¹- Source according to Subject samuccaya ˜ik¬¹samuccaya47 1:15 SSB8 ˜¹ntideva two types of bodhicitta 2:27-31 SSB161-163 Suvarªaprabh¹sottama SØtra confession of sin 2:27-30 SSB169-70 Up¹liparipÅcch¹ confession of sin 2:64 SSB161 Suvarªaprabh¹sottama SØtra confession of sin 2:66 SSB162-163 Suvarªaprabh¹sottama SØtra confession of sin and vow for the future 3:10 SSB17 k¹rik¹ 4 vital points 3:12-14 SSB154 ˜¹ntideva others do as they please to my body 3:19 SSB155 Tath¹gataguhya SØtra same terms: wish fulfilling jewel etc., (3:19 me for them, 1:55 they for me) 3:27-32 SSB5-6 Gaª©avyØha list of similes of bodhicitta 4:2 SSB13 ˜¹ntideva and K¬itigarbha capacity to undertake Søtra 4:5-6 SSB12 SaddharmasmÅtyupasth¹na some same words Søtra 4:15-26 SSB2 ˜¹ntideva and Gaª©avyuha opportune moment (k¬aªa) 4:28-40 SSB181 ˜¹ntideva defilements (kle¶a) 5:2-3 SSB118 ˜¹ntideva same metaphor: smÅti/elephant 5:6-8 SSB121 ˜¹ntideva mind root of all 5:33 SSB120 RatnacØ©a same metaphor: smÅti as doorkeeper 5:40 SSB118 ˜¹ntideva same metaphor: mind/elephant, same compound: cittamattadvipasya 5:42a SSB118 ˜¹ntideva same compound, behaviour in extreme circumstances48 5:42b SSB11 Ak¬ayamati Søtra some same words, d¹na more important than ¶»la See 5:84

47 ˜¹ntideva given as source if no evidence to the contrary. 48 See SSB118 n.3. 150 BCA verse ˜ik¬¹- Source according to Subject samuccaya ˜ik¬¹samuccaya47 5:84 SSB167 ˜¹ntideva rule waived if there is benefit 5:85 SSB144-145, Ratnar¹¶i Søtra giving away all except three robes49 SSB312 5:90 SSB308 Avalokana Søtra on use of spells 5:91a SSB125 Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra rules 5:91b SSB125 Bodhisattvapr¹timok¬a rules 5:93a SSB125 Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra rules 5:93b SSB125 ˜¹ntideva avoiding what is displeasing to others 5:98 SSB290 ˜¹ntideva Triskhanda/confession/worship etc.50 5:105 SSB16 ˜¹ntideva look at SS for training 6:14a SSB265 Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra nothing is difficult with practice 6:19 SSB364 Tath¹gataguhya SØtra battle with defilements (kle¶a)51 6:112-113 SSB155 Uncertain propitiating beings 6:112 SSB153 Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra field of beings is Buddhafield 6:123 SSB166 Candraprad»pa SØtra body aflame has no pleasure 7:46 SSB278-279 Vajradhvaja Søtra reference to SØtra 7:49-51 SSB278 Ak¬ayamati Søtra bodhisattva must act for benefit of others52 7:70 SSB356 ˜¹ntideva simile of jar of oil 8:89b-90a SSB357 Tath¹gataguhya SØtra equality of self and others53 9:10 SSB359 Tath¹gataguhya SØtra continuity 9:17-18 SSB235 RatnacØ©a Søtra blade cannot cut itself 9:87 SSB359 Tath¹gataguhya SØtra division of atoms 9:130b SSB359 Tath¹gataguhya SØtra simile of cloth

I.3.ii Prajñ¹karamati’s use of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra Prajñ¹karamati drew on the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya extensively in his commentary to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, particularly in chapters 1-5. As well as using many quotations from the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, Prajñ¹karamati also quotes

49 See SSB312 n.4. 50 SSB291 n.5 cf. BCA3:1-5. 51 See SSB364 n.5. 52 Bendall, SSB Add. notes, 413, says bodhisattva “must not give to others an opportunity of wrong-doing.” 53 La Vallée Poussin compares 8:89b-90a with ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, SSB357.16, LVP 327 n.2; referred to by Crosby and Skilton, 80. 151 k¹rik¹s 1-13 and 19-20. His use of the k¹rik¹s gives some indication of which sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya appear in the commentary to various verses of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra:

Commentary to BCA verse ˜ik¬¹samuccaya

3:21 k¹rik¹ 1-2 (SSB2.10-14)

4:48 k¹rik¹ 3-4 (SSB17.10-11, 13-14)

5:1 k¹rik¹ 5-6 (SSB34.11-13, 41.9-10)

5:54 k¹rik¹ 7-8 (SSB44.19, 116.12, 118.3, 119.1-3)

5:80 k¹rik¹ 10-11 (SSB124.3-4, 124.10-11)

5:85 introduction k¹rik¹ 13ab (SSB143.1)

5:85 k¹rik¹ 13cd (SSB137.9-10, 143.3)

5:93 k¹rik¹ 12 (SSB124.13-14)

5:102 introduction k¹rik¹ 6c (SSB41.9)

5:103cd introduction k¹rik¹ 6d (SSB41.10)

5:107 k¹rik¹ 19 (SSB160.2-3)

6:1 introduction k¹rik¹ 20 (SSB179.5-9)

8:1 introduction k¹rik¹ 20b-d (SSB179.7-9)

8:4 k¹rik¹ 9 (SSB119.9-10, 123.13-14)

9:1 k¹rik¹ 9ab (SSB119.9-10)

I.3.iii Lack of correspondence in the structures of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya 1) An examination of the verses which are the same or similar in both texts shows that the material is not presented in the same order. For instance, BCA6:14 is the same as sections from ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 9, but BCA6:94- 95 corresponds to sections from chapter 14, and the final verses of chapter 6 to verses from chapter 7 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.54

54 As chapter 6 is about k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, these relationships are discussed further in the next chapter. 152 2) Sections of each text which deal with the same subject matter do not appear in a corresponding order. For example, the verses at BCA4:15-26 deal with the opportune moment (k¬aªa), a subject found very early in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB2), and then BCA4:28-40 discuss the enmity of the defilements (kle¶a), a subject found in chapter 9 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.

The subject of chapter 2 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, the confession of sin (p¹pade¶ana), is the subject of chapter 8 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, where it is taught as part of purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi). In chapter 8, k¹rik¹s 17 and 18 introduce purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) and k¹rik¹ 19 says how purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) is to be achieved – by purification of sin (p¹pa¶odhana) and by purification of defilement (kle¶a¶odhana). One aspect of purification of sin (p¹pa¶odhana) is the confession of sin (p¹pade¶ana).

Chapters 2 to 5 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya describe all the actions which a bodhisattva should avoid. ˜¹ntideva gives two means of confession in chapter 4 (SSB64-66, 68-69), but they are specifically for confessing root transgressions (mØl¹patti). They are not the same form of confession as that found in chapter 2 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and chapter 8 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.

In the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, confession of sin (p¹pade¶an¹) is part of the supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹). This is the subject of chapters 1-3 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. ˜¹ntideva introduces supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹) several times in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. In chapter 1, ˜¹ntideva briefly mentions the elements of supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹),55 as a preliminary to accepting bodhicitta formally with a vow. This correlates with the confession of sin (p¹pade¶an¹) taught in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra prior to the production of bodhicitta. Chapter 16, Performance of the Bhadracary¹ (bhadracary¹vidhi) of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya also includes supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹). This chapter marks the beginning of the section of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya on increase (vÅddhi). The main topic here is increase of merit.56 After discussing the role of energy

55 SSB13.13-15: praising, ritual worship, confession of sin, rejoicing in merit, requesting the Buddhas, entreating and dedication of merit to bodhi (vandana pØjana p¹pade¶ana puªy¹numodana buddh¹dhye¬aª¹ y¹cana bodhipariªamanam). 56 ˜¹ntideva says that the increase of merit is the root of all increase (SSB276). 153 (v»rya), of increasing strength (bala), and of resolution (¹¶aya), in the increase of merit (k¹rik¹ 24), ˜¹ntideva turns to the performance of the Bhadracary¹, an example of supreme worship (chapter 16, k¹rik¹ 25a). Practising supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹) is a way to increase merit.57 Supreme worship in the Bhadracary¹ consists of praising (vandan¹), ritual worship (pØjan¹), confession (de¶an¹), rejoicing (modan¹), requesting (adhye¬aª¹), entreating (y¹can¹), dedication of merit (n¹man¹).58

After k¹rik¹ 25a, ˜¹ntideva first recommends the reciting of the Triskhandhaka, which consists of confession of sin (p¹pade¶an¹), rejoicing in merit (puªy¹numodan¹), and requesting the Buddhas (buddh¹dhye¬aª¹) (SSB290.2). ˜¹ntideva explains how these three include praising (vandan¹) and entreating (y¹cana), and accounts for the absence of pØj¹ by saying that it is known from other sØtras. He then goes on to give some examples of mental and vocal worship (pØj¹) from the Ratnamegha and Trisamayar¹ja. By including the quotation from the Trisamayar¹ja in his commentary to BCA2:25, Prajñ¹karamati confirms that ˜¹ntideva is referring to the same kind of pØj¹ here as in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 2.59 Although ˜¹ntideva does not refer to the dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹) in his explanation of the Triskhandhaka, he says it is to be found in the Bhadracary¹ (along with rejoicing (anumodana) and requesting (adhye¬aª¹)) or in the Vajradhvajapariª¹man¹.60 ˜¹ntideva says that he has already described confession (de¶an¹) and he does not provide any further details here. In BCA5:98, ˜¹ntideva suggests the Triskhandhaka as a means to purify the mind. In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, it is a means for increase of merit (puªyavÅddhi).

3) Prajñ¹karamati refers to the topics of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya in his commentary to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. He also quotes k¹rik¹s 1-13, 19-20, along with many other sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, in his commentary. Prajñ¹karamati’s references to the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya topics and his use of k¹rik¹s

57 Crosby and Skilton, 11, refer to this use of supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹) in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. 58 Ibid., 10. 59 Ibid., 10, assign pØj¹ to BCA2:1-25. 60 A long quotation from the Vajradhvajapariª¹man¹ advocating the transfer of merit is found at SSB213.3-216.5, in the section on developing maitr». 154 and other sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya does not reveal a consistent parallel between the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.

In his introduction to chapter 5, Guarding awareness (samprajanyarak¬aªa), Prajñ¹karamati says that ˜¹ntideva has so far taught renunciation and guarding of the person, possessions and merit (¹tmabh¹v¹d»n¹m utsargam rak¬¹m ca pratip¹dya),61 and that he now commences to teach the details of guarding, of purifying and of increasing. Prajñ¹karamati begins chapter 6 (k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹) by saying that purification of moral conduct (¶»la) and guarding and purification of person, possessions and merit (¹tmabh¹vabhogapuªya) have been explained, and that k¹rik¹ 20 teaches purification of merit. In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, ˜¹ntideva does not discuss purification of merit (puªya¶uddhi) until well after the chapters on k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ and the p¹ramit¹ of energy (v»ryap¹ramit¹), which are part of purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi).

Prajñ¹karamati quotes k¹rik¹s 1-2 in BCAP3:21 and k¹rik¹s 3-4 in BCAP4:48.62 In his commentary to chapter 5, Prajñ¹karamati quotes k¹rik¹s 5- 8, 10-13 and 19. K¹rik¹s 5-8, 10-11 are in order, followed by k¹rik¹ 13 and k¹rik¹ 12, then the second half of k¹rik¹ 6 again, and finally k¹rik¹ 19. K¹rik¹s 5-6 introduce guarding (rak¬¹) in general and the third pada of k¹rik¹ 6 says that one way to achieve guarding (rak¬¹) is by never renouncing the good friend (kaly¹ªamitra). This is also the subject of BCA5:102.

Curiously, Prajñ¹karamati does not use k¹rik¹ 9 in the Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹ chapter 5, Guarding awareness (samprajanyarak¬aªa). K¹rik¹ 9 introduces a section of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya devoted to mindfulness (smÅti) and awareness (samprajanya), which are two of the main topics of chapter 5 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. He does use k¹rik¹ 9 in BCAP8:4, and BCAP9:1. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya has a section where meditation (dhy¹na) is praised, between k¹rik¹ 9a and 9b, and this is the subject of Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 8 (dhy¹nap¹ramit¹). Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 9 (prajñ¹p¹ramit¹) also includes the foundations of mindfulness (smÅtyupasth¹na), which is also treated

61 ¹tmabh¹v¹di indicates person, possessions and merit. See SSB400, Add. n. 34.11-13. 62 K¹rik¹ 1 is also identical with BCA8:96. 155 again later in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 13, Foundations of mindfulness (smÅtyupasth¹na).

Prajñ¹karamati does not use k¹rik¹s 14, 15 and 16 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, which concern guarding of possessions (bhogarak¬¹) and guarding of merit (puªyarak¬¹), in his commentary to Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 5. BCA5:85 covers guarding of possessions (bhogarak¬¹), so Prajñ¹karamati could have used k¹rik¹ 14 appropriately in the commentary to that verse. K¹rik¹s 17 and 18 introduce purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) by explaining why it is necessary. As k¹rik¹ 18 explains that it is the defilements (kle¶a) which make a person impure, it would have been appropriate for Prajñ¹karamati to use this k¹rik¹ in any commentary to verses BCA4:28-40, which discuss the defilements (kle¶a).

K¹rik¹ 20 is from the purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) section of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Prajñ¹karamati uses it in his introduction to chapter 6, even though he says at the same place that purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) was already taught in chapter 5. Apparently, chapter 6 only deals with the first pada, “one should be patient, one should aspire to listen” (k¬ameta ¶rutam e¬eta), as padas 2-4 of k¹rik¹ 20 are repeated in the introduction to chapter 8, indicating that the p¹ramit¹ of meditation (dhy¹nap¹ramit¹) chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is still teaching purification of the defilements (kle¶avi¶odhana), one aspect of purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. BCA8:1 confirms this by saying that without stabilizing sam¹dhi a person is still in the grip of the defilements (kle¶a). K¹rik¹ 20 is the last k¹rik¹ that Prajñ¹karamati uses. The remaining k¹rik¹s 21- 27 deal with purification of possessions and merit (bhoga¶uddhi, puªya¶uddhi), and increase of the person, possessions and merit (¹tmabh¹vavÅddhi, bhogavÅddhi, and puªyavÅddhi).

It is not possible to reconcile the structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya through Prajñ¹karamati’s statements at beginning of chapter 5 and chapter 6, and his use of the k¹rik¹s and other sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya in the Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹. It seems that he did not intend

156 to indicate that the structures of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya were similar.

I.3.iv ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 1 and Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapters 1-5 The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya include similar introductory matter, starting with the first four verses of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra which also appear near the beginning of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB1:9-2:2). The opening sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB1-17) include being aware of the rarity of the opportunity (k¬aªa), faith (¶raddh¹) and producing bodhicitta (bodhicittotp¹da). These sections find correspondences mainly in chapters 1, 3 and 4 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.63 The training of a bodhisattva begins in chapter 1 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, but not until chapter 5 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra devotes more time to bodhicitta than the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. The focus of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is moral conduct (¶»la), which is the subject matter of at least a third of the text. The introductory part of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB1-17) can be seen as a very condensed version of chapters 1-4 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya shows very clearly the extent of the two kinds of bodhicitta and where the bodhisattva sets out.

The section on the opportune moment (k¶aªa) in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is a commentary to the fourth of the verses shared with the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. The equivalent section appears in chapter 4 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra (BCA4:15-26). There is no corresponding section in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra on faith (¶raddh¹). Before introducing the two types of bodhicitta in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, ˜¹ntideva discusses bodhicitta in general. A list of similes for bodhicitta (SSB5.20-6.4) is similar to those found at BCA3:27-32 and is also quoted by Prajñ¹karamati in BCAP1:14. The section on bodhicitta in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is only a small part of chapter 1 (SSB5.14-11.14), whereas it comprises the whole of the first chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.

After introducing the two types of bodhicitta in similar terms to those in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra (SSB8.15-16, BCA1:15), the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya describes the

63 Chapter 2 is on the confession of sin (p¹pade¶an¹), discussed above. 157 first kind of bodhicitta and the benefits it can have (SSB9:7, 9.12; BCA1:17).64 It clearly indicates the end of the discussion of the first kind of bodhicitta (SSB10.12-13), and the beginning of the second kind (SSB10.13). The second kind requires taking a vow of restraint (sa÷varagrahaªa) to undertake the practice of the bodhisattva’s moral commandments (bodhisattva¶ik¬¹pad¹bhy¹sa) (SSB11.15). The supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹) is a preliminary to formally taking this vow.65 This information suggests another way to view the structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.

In the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, the taking of the vow is the final part of supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹). The structure of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra outlined above suggests that the bodhisattva makes a vow for the first kind of bodhicitta in verses BCA3:22-23. The commentary to BCA3:23 includes two sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya which describes how the vow is to be taken (SSB11.15-12.5, 13.12-15).66 In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, these two sections refer to a vow for the second kind of bodhicitta. Verses BCA3:22-23 seem to refer to BC1 in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, but the way the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya delineates the two bodhicittas suggests that they should refer to BC2. Prajñ¹karamati’s commentary to BCA3:22 provides some help.

The two verses read:

yath¹ gÅh»ta÷ sugatair bodhicittam pur¹tanaiå | te bodhisattva¶ik¬¹y¹m ¹nupØrvy¹ yath¹ sthit¹å || tadvad utp¹day¹my e¬a bodhicitta÷ jagaddhite | tadvad eva ca t¹å ¶ik¬¹å ¶ik¬i¬y¹mi yath¹kramam || (BCA3:22-23)

Even as bodhicitta was grasped by former Sugatas Such that they were established in the bodhisattva moral training in due order, So also I will produce this bodhicitta for the good of the world And so also I will practice those precepts in due order.

Prajñ¹karamati says that in the first half of verse BCA3:22 ˜¹ntideva has taught the production of bodhicitta (bodhicittotp¹da) and that in the second half, ˜¹ntideva is teaching taking the vow for moral training (¶ik¬¹sa÷varagrahaªa).

64 SSB9.8-12, and SSB9.14-10.7 are in BCAP1:17. 65 Referred to as praªidh¹na (SSB14.14), or sa÷vara (SSB11.15, 15.1).

158 According to the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, this vow is part of the second kind of bodhicitta. Unfortunately, Prajñ¹karamati’s commentary in Sanskrit runs out at this point. But on this pattern, the first line of BCA3:23 could also refer to BC1 and the second line to BC2. Verses BCA3:22-23 concern both kinds of bodhicitta.

The vow is taken, but in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 4 the bodhisattva is still considering his/her capacity to fulfil it. This consideration appears in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya before the vow is taken. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya describes how the vow is to be taken (SSB11.15-12.5), but before it gives the formula for the formal taking of the vow (SSB13.12-15) it considers the importance of doing what is promised (SSB12-13; BCA4:2, 4:4, 4:5-6).

Prajñ¹karamati uses some sections from the next few pages in his commentary to BCA4:48 (SSB15.1-2, 15.1-2, 17.5-19), the point just before the bodhisattva begins training in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. These concern what sin (p¹pa) is and what the bodhisattva training involves. Prajñ¹karamati also uses k¹rik¹s 3 and 4, which introduce the bodhisattva vow (sa÷vara) and its vital points, in his commentary to the last verse of Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 4 (BCA4:48). He then quotes k¹rik¹s 5 and 6 in his introduction to chapter 5. In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, these k¹rik¹s introduce guarding (rak¬¹) in general. Prajñ¹karamati explains that guarding the training is the same as guarding the person, possessions and merit (¹tmabh¹vabhogapuªya). Chapter 6 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, which introduces the subject of mindfulness (smÅti) – the main device for guarding the person (¹tmabh¹varak¬¹) – has many links with chapter 5 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, whose subject is guarding the mind. BCA5:1 says that guarding the training requires guarding the mind, one aspect of the person (¹tmabh¹va).

K¹rik¹ 4, which introduces the main structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (the four activities applied to the three objects), also introduces the renunciation (utsarga) section. The first line of k¹rik¹ 4 is similar to the first line of BCA3:10, and indicates a point at which the main structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya finds a direct reference in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.

66 Based on Tibetan commentary, see SSB396: Add. n. 11.15, 13.12-15. 159 ¹tmabh¹v¹÷s tath¹ bhog¹n sarvatryadhvagata÷ ¶ubham | nirapek¬as tyaj¹my e¬a sarvasattv¹rthasiddhaye || (BCA3:10)67

I impartially give up persons, possessions and merit acquired in all three times for accomplishing the good of all beings.

¹tmabh¹vasya bhog¹n¹m tryadhvavÅtteå ¶ubhasya ca | utsargaå sarvasatvebhyas tadrak¬¹¶uddhivardhanam || (k¹rik¹ 4, SSB17.13-14)68

Renunciation of person, of possessions and of merit occurring in the three times, guarding, purification, increasing of these, for the sake of all beings.

Whereas the k¹rik¹ from the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya introduces all twelve topics, the verse from the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra only refers to renunciation of person, possessions and merit (¹tmabh¹vabhogapuªya) and the verses that immediately follow concern the dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹).

Other verses of Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 3 which relate to sections of ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 1 are BCA3:9, 3:10 and 3:21 and Prajñ¹karamati makes use of sections of ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 1 in his commentary to these verses. Crosby and Skilton assign all these verses to the part of the supreme worship (anuttarapØj¹) which deals with dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹)69 and, appropriately, the quotations used by Prajñ¹karamati are mainly from the renunciation of merit (puªyotsarga) part of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. The final paragraph of ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 1 includes the idea proposed in BCA5:10, that giving is essentially a mental act (SSB33.16-34.1). BCA3:21 is the final verse of the dedication of merit (pariª¹man¹) section, and is about renunciation in general, and Prajñ¹karamati appropriately quotes several earlier sections of chapter 1 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya to this effect (SSB2.10-14, 18.17-18, 21.1-7, 21.23-22.4, 20.18-22).

Although there is a lack of direct correspondence between the two texts, the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya does clarify what the first and second kind of bodhicitta are,

67 This is one of only three mentions of ¹tmabh¹va in the verses of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. The others are in BCA8:100 and 8:113. Tibetan reads: lus dang de bzhin longs spyod dang, dus gsum dge ba thams cad kyang, sems can kun gyi don bsgrub phyir, phangs pa med par btang bar bya. 68 Tibetan reads: bdag gi lus dang longs spyod dang, dge ba dus gsum skyes pa rnams, sems can kun la btang ba dang, de bsrung dga pa spel ba’o. 69 Crosby and Skilton, 11. 160 and what the thoughts and actions of bodhisattvas are in relation to them. The second kind of bodhicitta begins with the vow to practice, and once bodhisattvas begin the training (BCA chapter 5), they have certainly set out.

I.4 Another version of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra When Crosby and Skilton suggest that the canonical Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is not the original work of ˜¹ntideva, but the result of later editorial interference, they are indicating that at least two versions of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra exist. As the later version is longer than the earlier one, they also suggest that material from the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya may have been incorporated into the later version of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.70 Although they refer to the later version as “canonical,” there is a commentary to the earlier version in the Tibetan Tripi−aka.

The Tibetan tradition was aware of the two versions, and tried to account for them in various ways. Akiro Saito discusses the earlier, less well-known version of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, as it occurs in four Tibetan manuscripts found at Tun-huang.71 The most significant differences between the earlier (B1) and the later one (B2) are:

1) The author is called Ak¬ayamati, not ˜¹ntideva.

2) It has nine chapters (as chapters 2 and 3 are combined), not ten.

3) It has approximately 600 verses, not approximately 1000.

4) The order and content of the verses differ, especially from chapter 5 onwards.72

Bu-ston prepared a catalogue of the Tibetan Tripi−aka in 1322.73 He knew of the two versions, and said that B2, translated in the 11th century, was essentially the same as B1, any differences being due to a different translator and the combining of chapters 2 and 3.74 The oldest catalogue of the Tibetan

70 Ibid., xxxii-xxxiii. 71 Saito, A study of Ak¬ayamati (=˜¹ntideva)’s Bodhisattvacary¹vat¹ra, 13. 72 Ibid., 14, 24. On the differences between B1 chapter 4 and B2 chapter 5, see Ishida, "Some new remarks on the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chap. V." 73 Ibid., 14. This was a section of Bu-ston’s History of Buddhism. 74 Ibid., 15. 161 Tripi−aka, from 824, seems to refer to B1.75 The colophon to B2 indicates that the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra was translated into Tibetan three times (early 9th century, late 10th-early 11th century, late 11th-early 12th century), and that the first and second translations used different manuscripts from different parts of India.76 T¹ran¹tha refers to three different versions.77 The one from Kashmir (i.e., the West) consisted of more than 1000 verses; the one from the East consisted of 700 verses, and had no confession of sin (p¹pade¶an¹) chapter or prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ chapter; the one from the middle consisted of 1000 verses, but had no “words of reverence” or “resolution for writing.”78 Both Bu-ston and T¹ran¹tha recount stories of ˜¹ntideva being asked to account for the different versions and to confirm which was the correct one. According to Bu-ston, ˜¹ntideva replied that the 1000 verse version was correct, and according to T¹ran¹tha, he said that the middle one was correct. Thus, Bu-ston and T¹ran¹tha provide a basis for the acceptance of the 1000 verse version in the Tibetan tradition.79

Saito concludes that it was the shorter, earlier version that was first translated from Sanskrit to Tibetan in the early 9th century. B1 actually consists of 701.5 verses and B2 consists of 913 verses. The figures 600, 700 and 1000 are rough estimates; those said to consist of 600 or 700 verses refer to B1 and those said to consist of 1000 refer to B2.80 He also concludes that the two texts did not have a different author, Ak¬ayamati being an epithet for ˜¹ntideva.81

75 Ibid., 16. 76 Ibid., 16-17. 77 Ibid., 17-18. 78 Accounting for the difference in length between this and the Kashmir version, which did have “a reverential verse.” 79 Saito, A study of Ak¬ayamati (=˜¹ntideva)’s Bodhisattvacary¹vat¹ra, 18. 80 Ibid., 18-19. 81 Ibid., 20-22. 162 The number of verses in each chapter are as follows:82

Sanskrit version Sanskrit version Tun-huang version Tun-huang version Chapter Number of verses Chapter Number of verses 1 36 1 36

2 66

3 33 2 98

4 48 3 48

5 109 4 94

6 134 5 127

7 75 (T has extra 6 84 verse no. 64) 8 186 7 58 or 59

9 16883 8 90.5

10 58 9 66

The Tibetan Tripi−aka contains ten commentaries on the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. Saito has identified two of these as being commentaries to B1, one duplicating the last two chapters of the other.84 Although Saito accepts that B1 is earlier than B2, it is curious that the two commentaries on B1 were incorporated into the Tibetan Tripi−aka later than the commentaries on B2.85

Saito analyzes the difference in content between chapter 9 of B2 and chapter 8 of B1. As B2’s prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ chapter is longer than B1’s, one might assume that B2 merely contains verses additional to those in B1. This is not the case. There are some identical verses in B1 and B2, and some very similar verses, but B1 also has verses which are not in B2, and, of course, B2 has verses

82 Table based on one given by Saito, A study of Ak¬ayamati (=˜¹ntideva)’s Bodhisattvacary¹vat¹ra, 20. 83 Vaidya has 167, numbered to 168, he leaves out the number 21. 84 Saito, A study of Ak¬ayamati (=˜¹ntideva)’s Bodhisattvacary¹vat¹ra, 16, 23. 85 Ibid., 23. 163 which are not in B1.86 There is no evidence that the extra verses in chapter 9 of B2 come from the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.

There are seven more verses in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ (chapter 6) of B2 than in the corresponding chapter (chapter 5) of B1. This number of verses can be accounted for by 6:81-86 and 6:126 of B2 not being in B1.87 It is unlikely that the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is the source of these verses, as verses 6:81-86 are not found in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Verses 6:60-80, 6:87-114, 6:116-125, 6:127-134 are the same, with minor variations, and 6:115 is identical.88 Unless there is a great variation in the first half of chapter 6 of B1, we may conclude that, apart from these missing verses, chapter 6 of B1 and B2 are very similar.89

II BhØmis in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya ˜¹ntideva knew of the ten bhØmi scheme of the bodhisattva path, but he did not attempt to fit his description of the path to this ten bhØmi scheme. He certainly does not correlate each p¹ramit¹ with a bhØmi, as do Candrak»rti and the Da¶abhØmika SØtra. He only mentions the first bhØmi, joyful (pramudit¹), in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. According to Crosby and Skilton, the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is only meant to lead the bodhisattva to enter the first bhØmi. They base this conclusion on the bodhisattva’s making of vows at the end of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, including the wish that he reach the “stage of delight” (pramudit¹bhØmi) (BCA10:51).90 However, this is only a vow to reach the first bhØmi, not an indication that the bodhisattva has reached it. The only other mention of bhØmis in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is at BCA4:11:

86 Ibid., 25. 87 Stein 629 Ka 19-22 (18b-23a?) (BL stamp 66-69 (65b-69a)). BCA6:81-86 are missing from the beginning of the third bam-po (Stein 629 Ka 20b line 2). They are also not referred to in the commentary of the Sde dge edition of the text (Asian Classics Input Project (ACIP), Release 4, A thousand books of wisdom, file TD3873M.ACT, Bodhisattvacary¹vat¹ravivttipañjik¹). 88 BCA6:62cd, 78cd has slightly different wording 89 I only managed to get a copy of 6:60-134 of B1 from the British Library. When I tried to order the first half of the chapter, I was told the microfilm was missing! 90 Crosby and Skilton, 135. They see these vows as a parallel to the great vows of the Da¶abhØmika (ed. Vaidya, 9.30-11.2) used by ˜¹ntideva in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB291.11- 295.12). However, the vows at the end of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra are of a different character, being much briefer and more practical. Also, the bodhisattva accomplishes the great vows at the first stage of Da¶abhØmika, he does not just make them, although it seems that in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya ˜¹ntideva uses them as vows to be made for the future. 164 evam ¹pattibalato bodhicittabalena ca | dol¹yam¹naå sa÷s¹re bhØmipr¹ptau cir¹yate || (BCA4:11)

Thus, being swung about in sa÷s¹ra by the force of transgression and by the force of the thought of enlightenment, one delays in reaching a bhØmi.

In other words, a bodhisattva who is wavering will not obtain a bhØmi.

The idea that a bodhisattva in a bhØmi is not wavering is found in both the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. ˜¹ntideva makes several statements at various points in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, linking his discussion to the concept of the bhØmis. ˜¹ntideva acknowledges the existence of the bhØmis, but argues that his text is useful to any bodhisattva. If the bodhisattva has produced bodhicitta, the bodhisattva’s vow of restraint (sa÷vara) is relevant, whether or not the bodhisattva has entered the bhØmis. ˜¹ntideva’s treatment of the preparatory stages, bodhicitta and the bhØmis also shows that he does not follow Candrak»rti and the Da¶abhØmika in considering that bodhisattvas enter the first bhØmi as soon as they have the first thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta). Although he does not follow the Da¶abhØmika, he does refer to it in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya

II.1 The beginning of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya ˜¹ntideva deals with the beginning of the bodhisattva path, the preparatory stage, different kinds of bodhicitta, and the bodhisattva training at the start of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. In this context, he discusses who the bodhisattva training is suitable for in terms of whether or not they have entered a bhØmi.91

II.1.i Types of bodhisattva Like the bhØmi models, ˜¹ntideva begins with the ordinary person (pÅthagjana). Like the Mah¹vastu and the BodhisattvabhØmi, but unlike Candrak»rti and the Da¶abhØmika, bodhicitta can arise for an ordinary person (pÅthagjana). ˜¹ntideva is at pains to point out that an ordinary person

91 In the following discussion, ‘˜¹ntideva says,’ or similar words, means that these are ˜¹ntideva’s own words, not a quotation from a sØtra, which are clearly indicated as such. 165 (pÅthagjana) can be a bodhisattva.92 ˜¹ntideva quotes from several sØtras to support his contention that bodhicitta can arise even for an ordinary person (pÅthagjana) (SSB6:9-12). Bodhicitta must be able to arise for an ordinary person (pÅthagjana), otherwise how would a bodhisattva ever come into existence. He defines an ordinary person (pÅthagjana) as someone who has a belief in a really existent self (satk¹yadŬ−i) (SSB6.10-11, 14).93 ˜¹ntideva does not follow Candrak»rti, for whom an ordinary person (pÅthagjana) cannot be a bodhisattva because as soon as bodhicitta arises, the bodhisattva is an ¸rya, and is in the first bhØmi.

For ˜¹ntideva, lack of faith in the Mah¹y¹na is the decisive factor in distinguishing the pÅthagjana bodhisattva from the ¸rya. It is possible for a bodhisattva not to understand emptiness (¶Ønyat¹) and not to study the Mah¹y¹na teaching. He supports this by quoting the SarvadharmapravÅttinirde¶a, which describes a bodhisattva who lacked confidence (anadhimukta) in emptiness (¶Ønyat¹) and showed hatred (pratigha) towards a ¶Ønyat¹v¹din (SSB6.17-18).

A quotation from Niyat¹niyat¹vat¹ramudr¹ says that even after producing bodhicitta, the bodhisattva’s progress can be very slow (SSB7.1-11). It describes this type of bodhisattva as a “‘bodhisattva mounted on a chariot drawn by oxen’ to indicate the slowness and uncertainty of his success.”94 The bodhisattva has cultivated bodhi, but his insight is unstable (yad api yasya bodhisatvasya bodhibh¹van¹taå prajñendriya÷ prajñ¹cak¬uå tad api tasya dhanv»kriyate pratihanyate) (SSB7.10-11). This dullness of insight comes from studying the teachings of the ¶r¹vakas.95 Further, the bodhisattva who does not practise and study the Mah¹y¹na, but who studies and follows the ˜r¹vakay¹na is withdrawn

92 Also according to the BodhisattvabhØmi, see Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 13. 93 SSB6:9-15 includes quotations from Vimalak»rtinirde¶a and Ratnakaraª©a SØtra. 94 La Vallée Poussin, "Bodhisattva,” 2:745. 95 The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ also acknowledges that bodhisattvas study ¶r¹vaka teachings. Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 243. 166 and expelled from the path of supreme knowledge (anuttarajñ¹nam¹rga) (SSB7.7-10).96

˜¹ntideva goes on to say:

tad evam e¬¹ ¶Ønyat¹nadhimuktir mah¹y¹n¹nabhirati¶ c¹sampØrª¹dhimukticittacaryasy¹pi pr¹yo na sa÷dŶyate, pr¹gev¹dhim¹tr¹dhimukticaryasya bodhisatvasya (SSB7.12-13)

This lack of aspiration for emptiness and lack of delight in the Mah¹y¹na is not seen even in a bodhisattva on the incomplete course of mental aspiration, let alone in a bodhisattva proceeding on the excessive course of aspiration.

He supports this statement with a quotation from the Ratnamegha (SSB7.13- 17).97 Even a bodhisattva who has not entered the first bhØmi, who is still in the preparatory bhØmi, adhimukti, has many accomplishments.98 Such bodhisattvas have mastered innumerable sam¹dhis, meaningful formulas (dh¹raª»), liberations (vimok¬a), superknowledges (abhijñ¹) and knowledges (vidy¹).99 They have fulfilled various meditations (bh¹van¹), are experts in accomplishing the interests of others,100 and have undertaken and accomplished both the accumulation of merit and the accumulation of knowledge (puªyajñ¹nasambh¹r¹bhinih¹r¹bhinirvÅttiå) (SSB7.17).101 Bodhisattvas achieve the superknowledges (abhijñ¹) at various stages in the other schemes, most commonly on the third bhØmi or the eighth bhØmi.102

Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya also quotes from the Ratnamegha SØtra to explain the bhØmi which precedes the first bhØmi.103 This quotation

96 Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ says that on the second bhØmi, the bodhisattva’s purity of morality is in not attending to ¶r¹vaka or pratyekabuddha thought. Conze, Large sØtra on perfect wisdom, 167. 97 Bendall and Rouse’s translation is particularly bad at this point. 98 The adhimukticary¹ is the second vih¹ra of the BodhisattvabhØmi. 99 Bendall and Rouse, 7, translate this group of terms as “infinite mystical exercises.” 100 Edgerton, BHS303, notes that Bendall and Rouse’s translation is incorrect: “by dying for others’ good.” 101 abhinirvÅtti: accomplishment; no abhinih¹ra in MW or BHS, but BHS52: abhinirh¹ra: production, accomplishment, undertaking. See also U. Wogihara, "Some contributions to the study of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya from Chinese sources (Continuation)," Le Muséon, n.s., 5 (1904): 209 on SSB184.14-15. 102 See Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, English trans. Boin-Webb, 140 n.112: the ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra says “having learnt the Abhijñ¹s, he can then complete the six p¹ramit¹s.” 103 See previous chapter. 167 says that at this stage (the excessively excessive course of aspiration) the bodhisattva has not produced bodhicitta. In contrast, ˜¹ntideva has already referred to the bodhisattva as an ordinary person (pÅthagjana) producing bodhicitta, which indicates that at this stage the bodhisattva has produced bodhicitta. ˜¹ntideva accords with the BodhisattvabhØmi by suggesting that a bodhisattva can have bodhicitta but not be in the first bhØmi.104 This is not the case in either the Da¶abhØmika SØtra or Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya.

The bodhisattva can produce bodhicitta on a bhØmi earlier than on the excessive course of aspiration. ˜¹ntideva asks:

kasm¹d anye bodhicittotp¹dak¹ asy¹÷ bhØmau ne¬yante (SSB7.18)

Why are others who have produced bodhicitta not accepted on this stage?

He answers that others who have produced bodhicitta do not qualify for the excessive course of aspiration. The existence of the excessive course of aspiration (adhim¹tr¹dhimukticary¹) shows that middle (madhya) and weak (mÅdu) practices also exist.105 ˜¹ntideva implies that there are others who have produced bodhicitta and who are only on one of these earlier stages.

II.1.ii Bodhicitta and compassion Before dividing bodhicitta into two types (as in BCA1:15): the mind which has vowed to achieve bodhi ((bodhipraªidhicitta) and the one which has set out for bodhi (bodhiprasth¹nacitta), ˜¹ntideva distinguishes bodhicitta with and without compassion. ˜¹ntideva proposes that bodhicitta can arise without compassion. Because bodhicitta is not enough and compassion is needed as well, ˜¹ntideva quotes from the Tath¹gataguhya SØtra (SSB7.20-8.4) to encourage someone, who may feel satisfied with bodhicitta alone, to produce compassion. The Tath¹gataguhya SØtra defines someone for whom bodhicitta has arisen as having an undisturbed intention (adhy¹¶ayo ’vikopitaå). This is the case for someone in whom great compassion (mah¹karuª¹) has arisen. Great compassion means not abandoning all beings. Beings are not abandoned when one’s own welfare is abandoned. ˜¹ntideva says that although he is criticizing

104 Asa¡ga, BodhisattvabhØmi, ed. Dutt, 13. 105 SSB7.19-20; Bendall and Rouse, 8. 168 bodhicitta without compassion, it is better to produce this type of bodhicitta than not to produce bodhicitta at all (SSB8.6-7). In contrast, Candrak»rti says that compassion is needed in order for bodhicitta to arise and then in order to cultivate it and develop towards enlightenment.

˜¹ntideva then states that bodhicitta is of two types: the mind which has vowed to achieve bodhi and one which has set out for bodhi (bodhipraªidhicitta ca bodhiprasth¹nacitta÷ ca) (SSB8.15-16). A quotation from the Gaª©avyØha distinguishes the type of bodhisattva who has resolved his mind on supreme perfect enlightenment and the type who has set out for supreme perfect enlightenment (SSB8.16-18).106

Concerning the first kind of bodhicitta,107 ˜¹ntideva says that even without practice (cary¹) bodhicitta is a good thing (SSB9.7, 12). It can cause good rebirths because of its setting in motion happiness in endless sa÷s¹ra (SSB9.7-8). Bodhicitta can act as a root of merit (SSB10.5), again leading to good rebirths. The R¹j¹vav¹daka SØtra refers to a king who does not have time to practise the p¹ramit¹s, but generates merit from having the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) (SSB9.12-10.11). In some texts, the vow (praªidhi) is equivalent to the production of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da) and setting out on the first bhØmi. For ˜¹ntideva, the vow (praªidhi) does not imply activity.

II.1.iii Bodhisattva training ˜¹ntideva next discusses the second kind of bodhicitta, the mind which has set out for bodhi (bodhiprasth¹nacitta). He implies that setting out (prasth¹na) means undertaking the bodhisattva vow of moral restraint (sa÷vara) (SSB10.12-14) and establishes that it is appropriate for all bodhisattvas to train, whether or not they have entered a bhØmi.

˜¹ntideva asks if there is a vow of restraint for a bodhisattva (bodhisattvasa÷var¹dhik¹ra) who has not entered a bhØmi (SSB10.13-14).108

106 The A¬−as¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ similarly talks of the rarity of setting out. See Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 251-255. 107 Called praªidhibodhicitta at SSB10.12-13. 108 Or quotes from a text, PØrv¹vad¹na? See SSB10 n.2. 169 The reply is, “It is known that there is, because of hearing of a root transgression (mØl¹patti) for the sake of gain and honour (l¹bhasatk¹ra) in the ¸k¹¶agarbha SØtra.” (SSB10.14) ˜¹ntideva then refers to the Da¶abhØmika SØtra: a bodhisattva on the first bhØmi does not want honour for himself, because he is devoted to benefit all beings (SSB10.15-16).109 On the first bhØmi, a bodhisattva would not commit a sin for gain and honour, so this shows there is a vow of restraint for a bodhisattva who has not entered the first bhØmi.

˜¹ntideva quotes the Da¶abhØmika SØtra regarding the conditions under which a bodhisattva can be said to have obtained the first bhØmi:

pramudit¹y¹÷ bodhisatvabhØmau suvyavasthito bhavaty acalanayogena (SSB10.17)110

[The bodhisattva] is established in the bodhisattva bhØmi, joy, on account of not moving.

He follows this by quoting the last of the bodhisattva’s ten accomplishments which are said to arise with bodhicitta in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra. The bodhisattva “is fixed in the Tath¹gata’s lineage [and] devoted to the perfect enlightenment” (tath¹gatava÷¶aniyato bhavati sambodhipar¹yaªa iti) (SSB11.1).111

˜¹ntideva then quotes from the UgraparipÅcch¹, which says that the moral commandments (¶ik¬¹pada) are prescribed even for someone overgrown with envy (SSB11.2-3).112 But according to another text quoted by ˜¹ntideva, a bodhisattva on the first bhØmi would not experience envy (SSB11.3-4).113

˜¹ntideva says that sØtras like these give instruction on the training (¶ik¬¹prajñapti) for someone who has entered the bhØmis. The beginner bodhisattva, the bodhisattva who has not entered the bhØmis, is not obliged to

109 SSB10.15-16. 110 Bendall provides missing letters in SSB Add. n. Bendall and Rouse, 11, translation incorrect. 111 Honda, “Da¶abhØmikasØtra,” 128; see La Vallée Poussin, “Bodhisattva,” 2:739b n.† niyata ‘definitely assured of becoming a Buddha.’ 112 Bendall and Rouse, 11, translate m¹tsarya as uncharitableness. 113 SSB11.3-4; mistranslated by Bendall and Rouse, 11: “how much less love for any service.” 170 train, but it is good if he is able (SSB11.5-8). Therefore, both kinds of bodhisattvas can train.

The bodhisattva who is not prohibited from training, and is fit to train, should take a vow of restraint (sa÷varagraha, SSB11.15) in the presence of a bodhisattva who is already practising (SSB11.5-15). The next section elaborates on the point that the vow should not be undertaken lightly.114 A quotation from SaddharmasmÅtyupasth¹na SØtra is similar to BCA4.4-5, which says:

yadi caivam pratijñ¹ya s¹dhayeya÷ na karmaª¹ | et¹÷ sarv¹÷ visa÷v¹dya k¹ gatir me bhavi¬yati || (BCA4:4)

manas¹ cintayitv¹pi yo na dady¹t punar naraå | sa preto bhava»tyuktam alpam¹tre ‘pi vastuni || (BCA4:5)

Moreover, after making a promise of this kind, if I were not to fulfil it in practice and broke my word to all these beings, what would be my future birth?

It is taught that a man who has only thought about giving in his mind, but does not actually do so, becomes a hungry ghost, even if the gift were only small.115

The bodhisattva’s truth is that, after the arising of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da), he does not abandon bodhicitta even at the cost of his life and does not sin towards beings (vipratipadyate) (SSB12.9-11).116 If he does do either of these, he is an evil liar (pratikŬ−o mŬ¹v¹da).117 It is important to do as one says.118

˜¹ntideva says that there is great fruit from merely starting the training:

yaå punar etad abhy¹s¹rtha÷ vyutp¹ditam icchati, ten¹tra ¶ik¬¹samuccaye t¹vac cary¹mukham¹tra¶ik¬aª¹rtham abhiyogaå karaª»yaå ¶ik¬¹rambhasyaiva mah¹phalatv¹t | (SSB16.1-2)

And whoever wants proficiency which is the result of habitual practice should at least make constant effort in this ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, for the purpose of training in the very beginning of the course of conduct, because there is great fruit just from starting the moral training.

114 Bendall and Rouse, 13-14. 115 Crosby and Skilton, 25. 116 See BHS492 for vipratipadyate: SSB12.10 given as reference. 117 BHS361. 118 SSB13.7-11, quotation from K¬itigarbah SØtra to this effect; Bendall and Rouse, 14. 171 ˜¹ntideva seems to use the terms bodhisattvasa÷vara, ¶ik¬¹, ¶ik¬¹pada, abhy¹sa and vinaya interchangeably. He says that the sØtras (sØtr¹nta) state the bodhisattva’s moral commandments (¶ik¬¹pada) (SSB17.5)119 and ends the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya with the statement:

sam¹pta¶ c¹ya÷ bodhisatvavinayo ‘nekasØtr¹ntoddhÅtaå ¶ik¬¹samuccaya iti || (SSB366.4)

And this bodhisattva vinaya, extracted from various sØtras, called the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, is completed.

The Ratnamegha says that “the moral restraints imposed in the code called Pr¹timok¬a” (pr¹timok¬asa÷vara )120 are not enough for bodhisattvas who are restrained with the restraint of the bodhisattva’s moral commandments (bodhisattva¶ik¬¹sa÷varasa÷vÅt¹)121 to achieve supreme perfect enlightenment. The bodhisattva must train by knowing the bodhisattva’s moral commandments (¶ik¬¹pada) and behaviour (samud¹c¹ra) described by the Tath¹gata in the sØtras (SSB17.8-9).

Following on from this, k¹rik¹ 3 says:

[durvijñeyo vistaroktatv¹d] bodhisatvasya sa÷varaå | marmasth¹n¹nyato vidy¹dyen¹n¹pattiko bhavet || (k¹rik¹ 3, SSB17.10-11)122

The bodhisattva’s vow of restraint is hard to know because of its being spoken of at length, therefore he should know the vital points so that he will become without transgression.

After k¹rik¹ 4, which outlines the vital points, ˜¹ntideva says that this is the summary of the bodhisattva’s vow of restraint (e¬a bodhisatvasa÷varasa÷grahaå) (SSB17.15). ˜¹ntideva is taking the middle way between this brief statement of how the bodhisattva should avoid sin123 and the

119 BHS527. 120 SSB17.7, BHS539; BHS391: pr¹timok¬a: “name of the code of precepts in the Vinaya according to which monks are controlled and corrected.” 121 SSB17.6: savara read as sa÷vara, Bendall and Rouse, 19, translate it that way. 122 The first p¹da of k¹rik¹ 3 is missing. Bendall gives the first line as [ ... mah¹y¹n¹d] bodhisatvasya sa÷varaå, SSB xxxix. The text supplied here is from SSB17.10, but is not metrical. These same words are quoted in BCAP4:48. 123 SSB15; Bendall and Rouse, 16-17. 172 full explanation which would take an interminably long time.124 His aim is to gather together and summarize the moral commandments (¶ik¬¹pada) found in the sØtras to fulfil the suggestion made by the Ratnamegha.

II.2 Other references to bhØmis in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya

II.2.i By ˜¹ntideva There are three further references to bhØmis in ˜¹ntideva’s own words.

1) ˜¹ntideva continues to show his concern with the distinction between the bodhisattva who has attained a bhØmi, and one who has not. After he describes the benefits of honouring Buddhas and bodhisattvas, he compares the stores of merit of someone who honours the Mah¹y¹na and its followers with someone who makes great gifts. Honouring the Mah¹y¹na produces much greater merit. He goes on:

evam abhØmipravi¬−e¬v ev¹ya÷ vip¹kavistaro dra¬−avyah || (SSB89.14)

Thus is to be regarded the extent of maturation of those who have not entered the bhØmis.

2) ˜¹ntideva again implies that the rules in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya apply for both bodhisattvas who have and who have not entered a bhØmi. He says that even someone who has formerly done bad actions will achieve the adhimukticary¹ by being immovable (acala) and by having no doubt with regard to the moral commandments (¶ik¬¹pada) (SSB139.16-17).125 ˜¹ntideva says that this applies to a bodhisattva whose bodhicitta is firm, not to an ordinary person (pÅthagjana), whose mind wavers (SSB140.2-5).126 This qualification does not need to be made with reference to someone who has entered a bhØmi (bodhicittadÅ©hat¹ c¹tra pÅthagjanacalacittat¹y¹ niyam¹rthamukt¹ na tu bhØmipravi¬−am adhikÅtya, SSB140.4-5). ˜¹ntideva then qualifies a bodhisattva who has entered a bhØmi as having surpassed all bad destinies, as being extremely enthusiastic, and as having acquired immeasurable heaps of merit

124 Bendall and Rouse, 16-17. 125 Ibid., 137. Further evidence that acala merely refers to a bodhisattva in the first bhØmi, not a bodhisattva in the eighth bhØmi. See previous chapter. 126 Bendall and Rouse, 137. 173 (atikr¹ntadurgater uts¹hormibahulasya upacit¹prameyapuªyaskandhasya, SSB140.8-9).127

3) Those who are skilled in means do not fear sins of greed (r¹ga), they fear sins of hatred (dve¬a).128 After ˜¹ntideva’s explanation that sins due to greed (r¹ga) are not sins if the bodhisattva’s aim is the good of sentient beings,129 he says:

alabhdabhØme¶ ca ¬atp¹ramit¹u caritavata iya÷ cint¹ netarasyety ¹st¹÷ pr¹sa¡gikam || (SSB168.14)

And, as this is the consideration of someone practising the six p¹ramit¹s who has not obtained a bhØmi, not of anyone else, let it remain incidental.

It is not clear whether ˜¹ntideva means that only a bodhisattva who has not attained a bhØmi could commit a sin of passion, even for the good of beings, or that his text is for the bodhisattva who is practising the p¹ramit¹s but has not attained a bhØmi and therefore is not capable of such extraordinary acts.

II.2.ii Quotations from other texts Other references to bhØmis appear in quotations from various texts. They are therefore not as important as they may be incidental. These references to bhØmis mainly occur in lists of the desirable attainments for a bodhisattva.130 Some of these references are:

1) ˜¹ntideva emphasizes the necessity for a bodhisattva not to be satisfied with a ¶r¹vaka or pratyekabuddha bhØmi.131

2) The sixth root transgression (mØl¹patti) is that a beginner bodhisattva (¹dikarmik¹) claims as his own the knowledge of bodhisattvas who have

127 Ibid. 128 Quotation from Up¹liparpÅcch¹. SSB164-165, Bendall and Rouse, 161. 129 ˜¹ntideva refers (SSB167.3-13) to a story from Upakau¶alya SØtra. For full story, see Tatz, Skill in means (Up¹yakau¶alya) SØtra, 33-35. 130 SSB29.16, Bendall and Rouse, 32: may all beings traverse all the bhØmis, quotation from Vajradhvaja SØtra, also in BCAP3.9; SSB203.12, Bendall and Rouse, 197: bodhisattva must strive for p¹ramit¹s, bhØmi, bala, quotation from R¹¬−rap¹la SØtra; SSB215.5, 13-14; Bendall and Rouse, 206-207: quotation from Vajradhvajapariª¹man¹. 131 SSB18.1, Bendall and Rouse, 20: first of 5 anantarya, not to produce a thought towards the ˜r¹vaka or Pratyekabuddha bhØmi. Quotation from Bodhisatvapr¹timok¬¹, part in BCAP4:48. 174 attained a bhØmi and other spiritual accomplishments. The beginner bodhisattva has attained knowledge by study, not by practice.132

3) The Up¹yakau¶alya SØtra describes another root transgression (mØl¹patti). A bodhisattva who has trained in the code of monastic discipline (pratimok¬a), but whose mind is yoked to a ¶r¹vaka or pratyekabuddha bhØmi, has committed a heavy root transgression (mØl¹patti). Such a bodhisattva will not realize the BuddhabhØmi.133

4) ˜¹ntideva says that the chief cause of increase of merit (puªyavÅddhi) is always to practise (abhy¹sa) faith and the rest (k¹rik¹ 25b, SSB316.3-4). There are two explanations of what ‘faith and the rest’ refers to. According to Tath¹gataguhya SØtra, it refers to the four qualities, faith (¶raddh¹), reverence (gaurava), humility (nirm¹nat¹), and energy (v»rya), which lead to specific attainment (vi¶e¬ag¹mit¹) (SSB316.5-12).134 According to Ak¬ayamati SØtra, it refers to the five faculties (indriya): faith (¶raddh¹), energy (v»rya), mindfulness (smÅti), sam¹dhi and wisdom (prajñ¹). This quotation finishes by saying:

evam im¹ni pañcendriy¹ªi sahit¹ny anuprabaddh¹ni sarvabuddhadharm¹n paripØrayanti, vy¹karaªabhØmi÷ c¹py ayanti [iti] || (SSB317.12)

Thus these five [faculties] (indriya), conjoined and developed, complete all the Buddha’s qualities (dharma), and confirm that stage where he receives the prophecy that he will become a Buddha.135

Faith and the rest can also refer to the five powers (bala), which bodhisattvas must also practise.

5) The final section of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, before the summing up, is about giving the gift of the Dharma (dharmad¹na), that is, preaching. A quotation from the S¹garamati SØtra includes this statement:

acalitapadapari¶uddhy¹ vigacchanti sarvam¹rakarm¹ªi || (SSB355.7)

132 SSB62.13, Bendall and Rouse, 65. Quotation from ¸k¹¶agarbha SØtra, also quoted in BCAP5:104. See Crosby and Skilton, 164, for summary of the eight “fundamental transgressions” (mØl¹patti). 133 SSB66.11, 14; Bendall and Rouse, 70. See Tatz, Skill in means (Up¹yakau¶alya) SØtra, 30. 134 See BHS501. 135 Bendall and Rouse, 284. 175 All acts of M¹ra cease, by purifying the acalitapada.

Bendall and Rouse translate acalitapada as immovable stage and although the word bhØmi is not used, this may be the meaning.136 The acal¹bhØmi is the eighth bhØmi, which is associated with preaching in the BodhisattvabhØmi and in the Mah¹vastu, and also with the cessation of bad acts in the Mah¹vastu. However, the text indicates that this statement is part of a mantra, so perhaps too much meaning should not be given to it.137

II.2.iii Quotations from Da¶abhØmika SØtra Apart from the brief references to the Da¶abhØmika SØtra found at the beginning of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, there are four further references to the Da¶abhØmika SØtra in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Two are not relevant to this discussion.138 The other two occur in the section of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya on increase of merit (puªyavÅddhi), and include the ten great vows (mah¹praªidh¹na) of the bodhisattva on the first bhØmi.

In chapter 16, Performance of the Bhadracary¹, (bhadracary¹vidhi), the increase of merit (puªyavÅddhi) section begins with k¹rik¹ 24, which refers to the firm resolve (vyavas¹y¹¶aya dÅ©ha) made by the bodhisattva. To increase merit, the bodhisattva must make his resolve firm and keep compassion (karuª¹) to the fore.139 ˜¹ntideva discusses resolve (¹¶aya) at some length. He discusses how to make resolve firm, what is resolved, how long resolve is, why resolve should be firm and what is meant by resolve.140 Compassion (karuª¹) is the single dharma which contains all the Buddhadharmas (SSB286.7-287.5).141 ˜¹ntideva paraphrases k¹rik¹ 1 when he says that compassion (karuª¹) is produced by realizing that one’s own suffering and fear is the same in others (SSB287.11-13).142 He then quotes from the Da¶abhØmika SØtra to the effect

136 Ibid., 312. 137 The Tibetan transliterates this piece of text (as noted by Bendall, SSB355 n.1), showing that the Tibetan translators considered it to be part of a mantra, TTD, 16:191a. 138 At SSB126.9 on pleasant speech, and at SSB227.11 on dependent arising (prat»tyasamutp¹da) and purification of ignorance (moha). 139 SSB276.4-5, repeated in part at SSB286.6. 140 Bendall and Rouse, 253-261. 141 Quotation from Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra. 142 Bendall and Rouse, 262. Also BCA8:96. 176 that the bodhisattva sees beings as ignorant, suffering, without protection, lost etc. and therefore needing rescue.143

After establishing the firm resolution and compassion (karuª¹), the bodhisattva continues to increase merit (puªyavÅddhi) through praising (vandan¹) and the performance of the Bhadracary¹ (bhadracary¹vidhi). The bodhisattva should recite the Triskhandhaka which consists of confession, delight in merit (puªy¹numodana), and solicitation of Buddhas (buddh¹dhye¬aª¹khya).144 ˜¹ntideva gives the great vows (mah¹praªidh¹na) from the Da¶abhØmika SØtra as an alternative to the Triskhandhaka.145 These are the ten great vows (mah¹praªidh¹na) that are accomplished by a bodhisattva on the first bhØmi in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra.146 The fourth great vow (mah¹praªidh¹na) is for accomplishing the arising of bodhicitta (cittotp¹d¹bhinih¹ra).147 The bodhisattva is:

sarvabhØmipari¶odhana÷ s¹¡gop¹¡ganirh¹ra÷ y¹vat salak¬aªavilak¬aªasa÷vartavivartasarvabodhisatvacary¹bhØtayath¹vadbhØmi- pathopade¶ap¹ramit¹parikarm¹vav¹d¹nu¶¹sanyanuprad¹nopastambha- cittotp¹d¹bhinirh¹r¹ya | (SSB292.1-293.1)

supported by the true instruction of the path of the stages being all the Bodhisattva’s courses of conduct (cary¹) which are wide, great, immense, indistinguishable, contained in all the perfections, purifying all the stages.148

This vow indicates that the bhØmis include all courses of conduct (cary¹), which are contained in all the p¹ramit¹s.

II.3 BhØmis and ˜¹ntideva’s path Neither the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra nor the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya outlines the bodhisattva path in terms of bhØmis. ˜¹ntideva shows that he is familiar with the bhØmis, and is concerned to show how the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is relevant to

143 Two extracts from the Da¶abhØmika SØtra, the first at SSB287.14-288.10 from chapter 5, Honda, “Da¶abhØmikasØtra,” 177-178; the second extract at SSB288.11-289.10, from chapter 2, Honda, “Da¶abhØmikasØtra,” 150-151, but not exact, see SSB288 n.9. 144 Bendall and Rouse, 263-264. 145 SSB291.8-11; Bendall and Rouse, 265. 146 SSB291.11-295.11, SSB291 n.7, Honda, “Da¶abhØmikasØtra,” 130DD-133MM. 147 SSB293.2; Honda, “Da¶abhØmikasØtra,” 131GG. 148 Honda, “Da¶abhØmikasØtra,” 131. 177 both bodhisattvas who have attained a bhØmi and those who have not. He considers that when bodhicitta first arises the beginner bodhisattva has not attained a bhØmi. When bodhicitta has arisen, but wavering, there is slow progress.

In his acknowledgment and discussion of early stages, ˜¹ntideva is more akin to the BodhisattvabhØmi than to Candrak»rti or the Da¶abhØmika. For Candrak»rti, a bodhisattva on stage of aspiration (adhimukti) does not have bodhicitta. ˜¹ntideva says that a bodhisattva on the stage of aspiration (adhimukti) does have bodhicitta, is unwavering (acala) and is no longer an ordinary person (pÅthagjana), although he also quotes Da¶abhØmika to the effect that the bodhisattva is on the first bhØmi when unwavering (acala). ˜¹ntideva implies that there is an earlier stage than aspiration (adhimukti).

˜¹ntideva talks about bodhicitta with or without compassion, whereas for the Da¶abhØmika SØtra and Candrak»rti compassion precedes bodhicitta. Great compassion (mah¹karuª¹) precedes bodhicitta in the Da¶abhØmika SØtra, whereas it is the same as bodhicitta for Candrak»rti. Candrak»rti has the first arising of bodhicitta at the same time as the making of ten great vows. ˜¹ntideva introduces the ten great vows towards the end of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.

With his distinction between the mind which has vowed to achieve bodhi (bodhipraªidhicitta) and the one which has set out for bodhi (bodhiprasth¹nacitta), ˜¹ntideva shows that a bodhisattva who has set out is training (or undertaking the bodhisattvasa÷vara). But a bodhisattva who has set out by beginning the training is not necessarily in a bhØmi. The distinction between a bodhisattva who has entered the bhØmis and one who has not is based on the consistent nature of the bodhisattva’s practice, not the practices themselves.

Conclusion ˜¹ntideva did not outline a path solely in terms of the p¹ramit¹s, and did not follow the bhØmi model. The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra focuses on bodhicitta, whereas the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya has an apparently unique structure, a precedent for which has not been found. In neither text is there a clear indication of whether the bodhisattva progresses to the first bhØmi or not. In contrast to the 178 Da¶abhØmika and Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra, where the production of the thought of enlightenment (bodhicittotp¹da) is coincident with entering the first bhØmi, ˜¹ntideva allows that an ordinary person (pÅthagjana) can have bodhicitta and be a bodhisattva progressing on a stage earlier than the first bhØmi. For Candrak»rti, a person on an earlier stage than the first bhØmi does not have bodhicitta, and there cannot be bodhicitta without compassion. ˜¹ntideva allows bodhicitta either with or without compassion.

In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, ˜¹ntideva establishes that the training is suitable for both bodhisattvas who have entered a bhØmi and those who have not. He has gathered the instructions from various sØtras for both kinds of bodhisattva. He particularly addresses the beginner, but the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya can be seen as showing a path of progress that ends with the purification of defilements (kle¶a). The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra also shows a path of progress; the bodhisattva purifies the defilements (kle¶a) with the p¹ramit¹ of meditation (dhy¹na). It is also possible that the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is not meant to describe a path, but is only meant to be a collection of rules ordered in a particular way to aid their memory. A quotation from the Ratnamegha suggests that, since the pr¹timok¬a code does not provide sufficient guidance for the bodhisattva’s training, the bodhisattva needs to train by knowing the bodhisattva’s moral commandments (¶ik¬¹pada) found in the sØtras. ˜¹ntideva appears to be fulfilling this suggestion by gathering together these commandments from the sØtras.

˜¹ntideva mainly treats k¬¹nti in chapters entitled k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. In both texts, the practice of k¬¹nti is part of the training of a bodhisattva after setting out. In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, this is an aspect of purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi). As ˜¹ntideva does not have a bodhisattva complete the bhØmis, there is no suggestion that the topic of his texts will be ultimate k¬¹nti.

179 Chapter 5

K¬¹nti in the works of ˜¹ntideva

˜¹ntideva did not outline his path in terms of bhØmis, and does not completely conform to the p¹ramit¹ model in either of his works. Nevertheless, he mainly treats k¬¹nti as a p¹ramit¹ in both the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya and the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra in chapters entitled k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. As noted in an earlier chapter, k¬¹nti appears in several contexts in Mah¹y¹na literature. Apart from being the third p¹ramit¹, it is a term used in delineating the paths (m¹rga) and appears in the term anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. The third p¹ramit¹, in turn, divides into three types – patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti), patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti), patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti). As noted in an earlier chapter, the patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti) is sometimes defined in relation to k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ and sometimes as an independent concept. ˜¹ntideva does not outline the path according to the m¹rga system, so he does not treat k¬¹nti as a factor conducive to penetration (nirvedhabh¹g»ya), part of the path of application (prayogam¹rga), or as part of the path of seeing (dar¶anam¹rga). The question is whether he treats k¬¹nti according to the three types of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ and whether he treats the patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti).

The aim of this chapter is to investigate in detail ˜¹ntideva’s treatment of k¬¹nti and its place within his bodhisattva path. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya states that k¬¹nti is of three kinds, but the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra makes no statement to this effect. Nevertheless, commentators from Prajñ¹karamati onwards have attempted to divide the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra into these three categories. The present chapter starts by determining what the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya says about the three types of k¬¹nti. It then discusses how commentators and translators have divided the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ and suggests an alternate way of

180 viewing the subject matter of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter. A consideration of the different contexts of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya and in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra follows. The appearance of a substantial portion of the material of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra in an earlier chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya reinforces the untenability of dividing the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra into the categories mentioned in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. The second part of the chapter looks at the arguments ˜¹ntideva makes in support of the practice of k¬¹nti. It discusses the concepts of ˜¹ntideva’s main argument, and outlines the methods ˜¹ntideva suggests for approaching the various situations where bodhisattvas need to cultivate k¬¹nti. The third section of the chapter notes that ˜¹ntideva does not mention anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti in the context of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra or the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.

I K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ ˜¹ntideva’s treatment of k¬¹nti mainly confines itself to k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. The only place where ˜¹ntideva suggests that k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ is of three types is in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Having ascertained from the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya what ˜¹ntideva means by the three types, we can assess to what extent the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra conforms to this scheme. Both texts unequivocally treat patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti). They also treat patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti). However, ˜¹ntideva does not specify the extent of patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. In neither text does he specify what he considers to be patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti).1 He does not define it, or even mention it apart from listing it in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya as one of the three types of k¬¹nti.

I.1 The three types of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, chapter 9, K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, ˜¹ntideva’s explanation of k¬¹nti begins by quoting the Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra, to the effect that there are

1 Hedinger, 30, concludes that ˜¹ntideva only deals with two types of k¬¹nti in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. 181 three kinds of patience: duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti, par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti, and dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti (SSB179.11-12). Without any other preliminaries on k¬¹nti in general, ˜¹ntideva explains the first of these three, that is, patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti). He says:

tatra duåkh¹dhiv¹sanak¬¹ntivipak¬o ’ni¬−¹gamapr¹ptaduåkhabh»rut¹ | i¬−avigh¹tapr¹pta¶ ca sukh¹bhi¬va¡gas t¹bhy¹÷ daurmanasya÷, tato dve¬o l»nat¹ ca || (SSB179.12-14)

The opponent of patience as enduring suffering is the dread of suffering, acquired with the arrival of what is undesired, and intense attachment to pleasure acquired with the removal of what is desired. From these two come dejection (daurmanasya), thence hatred (dve¬a) and dispiritedness (l»nat¹).

The practice of this first type of k¬¹nti requires that a bodhisattva avoids dejection (daurmanasya). In support of his assertion, ˜¹ntideva quotes several sØtras: Candraprad»pa SØtra, Ratnamegha SØtra, and UgradattaparipÅcch¹.

The quotation from the Candraprad»pa SØtra states how dejection (daurmanasya) is to be avoided:

sukhe `nabhi¬va¡gaå dukhe `vaimukhyam (SSB179.15)

Lack of intense attachment to pleasure, non-aversion to suffering.

The Ratnamegha SØtra suggests the first way that this is to be achieved. The bodhisattva puts up with grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection, and irritation;2 he is patient (k¬amate) (SSB179.16-17).

The quotation from the UgradattaparipÅcch¹ is specifically addressed to the householder who is a bodhisattva. He, also, must be free from attachment and aversion. He must not become happy on obtaining wife, son, wealth or property. And he must not become depressed in the face of adversity. In order to achieve this, he must think in this way: everything constructed is made of illusion, characterized by involvement in (illusory) creation. Further, he should consider that everything originates from the ripening of actions. His family and servants do not belong to him, nor does he belong to them (SSB180.1-6).

2 See below, p.212, for discussion of this list. 182 ˜¹ntideva then argues that, in any case, dejection (daurmanasya) is no use. Whether or not there is a solution to one’s problems, dejection will not change the situation. In fact, dejection may interfere with successfully implementing a solution. If the person is angry due to dejection, his actions will be confused. If the person is dispirited due to dejection, he may not make the effort necessary, and such a person uselessly leads a short life again and again. Having established that dejection has no purpose, ˜¹ntideva says that it should be abandoned through practice (abhy¹sa)3 (SSB180.8-12).

The abandonment of dejection requires the bodhisattva to abandon a weak and delicate mind. ˜¹ntideva again quotes the UgradattaparipÅcch¹ to show what is to be avoided: the bodhisattva must not have a mind like cotton (SSB180.14). Next he quotes the Gaª©avyØha to show the kind of mind a bodhisattva should have:

duryodhana÷ citta÷ . . . utp¹dayitavya÷ sa÷kle¶anirgh¹t¹ya | apar¹jitacitta÷ sarv¹bhinive¶avinirbhed¹ya | ak¬obhyacitta÷ vi¬am¹¶ayatvas¹gar¹vartapray¹te¬u || (SSB180.15-17)

An invincible mind . . . should be produced for the destroying all defilements (kle¶a), an unconquered mind for shattering all strong attachments, an imperturbable mind when in the whirlpools of the ocean of wicked intention.

˜¹ntideva then sets out to demonstrate that nothing at all is difficult with practice (abhy¹sa). He compares the practice of the bodhisattva with that of ordinary people such as fishermen or ploughmen, who put up with pain or hardship in order to achieve their trifling goals. They are able to do this as repeated practice has toughened their minds. ˜¹ntideva invites aspiring bodhisattvas to compare these trifling goals with their own goal of ensuring the happiness of all beings. Ordinary people also attack others and, as a result, suffer pain and even death. The bodhisattva’s fight is with the enemies, the defilements (kle¶a). The result of defeating these enemies is the end of rebirth and suffering (SSB180.18-181.8).

˜¹ntideva asserts that it is from the practice of enduring small pains that the practice of enduring greater pain is accomplished. Beings perceive suffering

3 abhy¹sa has the sense of habitual or repeated action. 183 or pleasure according to practice, therefore it is possible, through practice, to perceive only pleasure when there is an occasion for suffering. The inevitable result of such a practice is a sam¹dhi called “Pervaded by pleasure in all conditions” (sarvadharmasukh¹kr¹nta) (SSB181.8-11).

A lengthy quotation from the Pit¹putrasam¹gama describing this sam¹dhi follows (SSB181.12-182.16). When a bodhisattva has obtained this sam¹dhi, he will experience only a pleasant feeling in all circumstances. The quotation from the Pit¹putrasam¹gama includes a long list of horrific tortures to which a person may be subjected as a human being. The Pit¹putrasam¹gama asks, rhetorically, how it is possible for a person to experience only pleasure in such circumstances. The answer is that the bodhisattva mah¹sattva has made a vow (praªidh¹na) while following the bodhisattva path over a long period of time. This vow was:

ye m¹m bhojayeran, te upa¶ama¶amasukhasya l¹bhino bhaveyuå | ye m¹m p¹layeyuå satkuryur gurukuryur m¹nayeyuå pØjayeyuå sarve te upa¶amasukhasya l¹bhino bhaveyuå | ye ‘pi m¹m ¹kro¶eyur vispar¶eyus t¹©ayeyuå ¶astreª¹chindyur y¹vat sarva¶o j»vit¹d vyaparopayeyuå, sarve te sambodhisukhasya l¹bhino bhaveyuå, anuttar¹m samyaksambodhim abhisambudhyerann iti | (SSB182.9-12)

May those who support me be the recipients of the pleasure of the tranquillity of cessation. May all those who protect me, respect me, venerate, honour and worship me be the recipients of the pleasure of cessation. May even all those who curse, maltreat and beat me, and cut me with a weapon, as far as even depriving me of life completely, be the recipients of the pleasure of perfect enlightenment, may they realize the supreme perfect enlightenment.

In other words, the bodhisattva has vowed to help all beings, regardless of whether they help or harm him. The bodhisattva who has made this vow and repeatedly practises in this way eventually obtains the sam¹dhi named “Pervaded by pleasure in all conditions” (sarvadharmasukh¹kr¹nta). When the bodhisattva has attained this sam¹dhi, he is imperturbable (ak¬obhya): he cannot be overcome by all the actions of M¹ra.

˜¹ntideva explains that the practice just described by the Pit¹putrasam¹gama accomplishes all the p¹ramit¹s. Therefore, the bodhisattva

184 should always be joyful (mudita). A ¶loka from the Candraprad»pa SØtra supports this assertion (SSB183.1-3).

Another lengthy quotation, from the Ak¬ayamati SØtra, explains what is meant by joy (mudit¹). Joy (mudit¹) is rapture (pr»ti), serenity (pras¹da), gladness (pr¹modya), as well as lack of dejection and anxiety. It includes lack of hostile intention towards beings, zealousness for the Dharma and aspiration for the noble qualities of the Buddha (buddhadharma). There is no envy or pride. The bodhisattva has purified his d¹na and ¶»la, delights in k¬¹nti and is respectful to others. The love which a bodhisattva usually feels towards body, relatives and possessions is directed towards bodhisattvas, Tath¹gatas, gurus, beings, teachers, and p¹ramit¹s (SSB183.4-184.4).

To end his explanation of patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti), ˜¹ntideva quotes from the Mah¹megha to the effect that bodhisattvas are completely comfortable with the thought of going to hell. In fact, they are devoted to going to hell; they are longing for hell (SSB184.5-7). ˜¹ntideva indicates that his explanation of patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) finishes here.

The next section begins by observing that k¬¹nti is also said to be of three kinds in the S¹garamati SØtra (SSB184.9). Unfortunately, ˜¹ntideva does not say what these three kinds are. Nor does it become clear from the text. Perhaps they are identical to those already listed from the Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra, so ˜¹ntideva did not need to list them again. The extract quoted from the S¹garamati SØtra appears to be an explanation of patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti).

The quotation from the S¹garamati SØtra begins by stating that a bodhisattva mah¹sattva who has produced the thought of omniscience cannot be distracted from that state by being hurt, threatened or beaten. There follows a list of activities from which such a being is not distracted. These include compassionate and heroic effort for the final deliverance of all beings, and abandoning the life of the body with the intention of renouncing all dharmas. The bodhisattva mah¹sattva is not distracted from having no concern for his own

185 welfare since his intention is to bring all beings to maturity.4 With such an intention, he endures mocking, disrespect, abuse, reviling speech, offensive words and harm from all beings. Further, in taking on the burdens of all beings, he is not wearied or dispirited. He does not cower or despair. He generates power, strength, courage and perseverance. He is not confused. He does not retaliate when abused, struck, or angered (SSB184.9-185.6).

To illustrate the extent of the bodhisattva’s dedication to this practice, the S¹garamati SØtra gives an example. The bodhisattva is to imagine that all beings are following him with a variety of swords, spears and lances. These beings have the intention to cut his body into tiny pieces, to destroy and crush him, if he gives rise to bodhicitta, or any of the p¹ramit¹s, or the virtuous root (ku¶alamØla) of hearing. The bodhisattva must not allow his mind to be disturbed in the presence of any such being, whether they are abusing him verbally, or attacking him physically (SSB186.1-8).

The S¹garamati SØtra explains the reason that a bodhisattva must not allow his mind to be disturbed. Since the very beginning of sa÷s¹ra, the bodhisattva has experienced all the possible rebirths (in the hells, as an animal, in the realm of Yama, or as a human). In all these rebirths, he has been greedy for love and food, has not heard the Dharma, has lead a dishonest life, and has lived to no purpose. The bodhisattva’s body has been cut, broken, minced into a hundred pieces and had pain of all sorts inflicted on it, but no good has resulted either for himself or for another.5 That is why the bodhisattva should never abandon omniscience, should not abandon all beings or the virtuous zeal for the Dharma. He must not abandon them even if all creatures should attack, hurt, and kill him (SSB186.8-14).

The bodhisattva is willing to endure being harmed by beings because all the pains of the body are nothing compared to the sufferings of hell.6 The bodhisattva is even willing to endure dwelling in hell, rather than abandon the Buddhas and the Dharma, and compassion for all beings (SSB186.14-187.3).

4 Cf. Asa¡ga, Mah¹y¹nasa÷graha, trad. Lamotte, 191, which says that apak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti is the cause of maturing beings. 5 Compare BCA6:74. 6 Compare BCA6:72-73. 186 Nevertheless, the one dharma which the bodhisattva must abandon is the dharma which is the cause of malice (vy¹p¹da) arising. This dharma is the love of the body, existence as the body, and clinging to the body. When the body is abandoned, malice is abandoned. It is with this in mind that the bodhisattva endures being harmed by beings (SSB187.3-5). The S¹garamati SØtra also explains the meaning of each of the p¹ramit¹s for the bodhisattva who practises enduring the harm done by others (SSB187.5-15).

The S¹garamati SØtra suggests another way that the bodhisattva should consider his situation. The form of this consideration is the bodhisattva addressing himself. He must realize that his attacker is lazy and parted from the pure Dharma (¶ukladharma). Therefore, it is up to the bodhisattva to be eager and diligent in striving after the virtuous roots (ku¶alamØla) and to attain enlightenment for the sake of beings. He then invites himself to reflect on the real nature of things (dharmat¹). He asks, “Who abuses or is abused?” Although he searches intently, he cannot find a self or other who abuses or is abused. For this reason, he is able to be patient (k¬amate) (SSB187.16-188.4). The quotation from the S¹garamati SØtra ends here.

˜¹ntideva continues with a quotation from the Bhagavat», which is also on the theme of not allowing the mind to be disturbed.7 As in the final extract from the S¹garamati SØtra, the Bhagavat» suggests how the bodhisattva should think. Again, the bodhisattva addresses himself. He considers how inappropriate it is to quarrel with others, and how difficult it will be to accomplish what he set out to do, when he retaliates to verbal abuse. Since he intends to liberate all beings, he must not even think of retaliating in the face of verbal abuse. He must remain mute, like a sheep. It is not appropriate for him to cause hatred to arise within another. He must not waver from his intention (¹¶aya) to make all beings happy, and to completely free them. How is it conceivable that he should show malice to the very beings he is trying to liberate!8 He must not show malice even towards people who are guilty of grave offences.9 Even when his

7 Similar passage in Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 247-248, where the bodhisattva confesses his fault of quarrelling with another bodhisattva. 8 Compare BCA6:80-83. 9 Dealt with in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra BCA6:64-65. 187 life is being threatened, he must not be disturbed, but must advance with courage (SSB188.5-16).

The chapter ends with a short quotation from the Bodhisattvapr¹timok¬a, showing what a bodhisattva must do in the face of angry people. The bodhisattva must comfort, calm and soothe beings who are angry. He must satisfy them by means of the Dharma (SSB188.17-18).

The beginning of chapter 10 indicates that ˜¹ntideva considers he has completed his discussion of k¬¹nti. ˜¹ntideva has not made it clear whether he has dealt with patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti) or not. All of the sections of the chapter from the S¹garamati SØtra onward deal with not allowing the mind to become disturbed in the face of the attacks of others.

˜¹ntideva has not specified what patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti) means. Although reflecting on the nature of the body and of the real nature of things (dharmat¹) is mentioned as one means by which the bodhisattva can remain calm in the face of such attacks, this does not necessarily indicate patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti).10 Analysis is included in both patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) and patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) as a means to achieve these types of k¬¹nti, not as a type of k¬¹nti in its own right. In the section on patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti), the bodhisattva frees himself from attachment and aversion by thinking that everything constructed is an illusion (SSB180.1-6). In the patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) section, the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya suggests that the bodhisattva is able to remain calm in the face of attacks of others by searching for and not finding a self who could abuse or be abused (SSB187.16-188.4).

I.2 The three types of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra Although the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra does not mention that k¬¹nti is of three kinds, several commentators attempt to divide the subject matter of the chapter

10 See earlier chapter. 188 into the three kinds of k¬¹nti quoted in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. These commentators differ on how the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter is to be divided into the three kinds of k¬¹nti, which shows that such a division is not easily made. As ˜¹ntideva does not mention three kinds of k¬¹nti in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, it is possible that it was not his intention to explain them. The verse at BCA6:11 introduces the topics that follow, in terms of what the bodhisattva wants or does not want. ˜¹ntideva structures the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra around these topics, not the three types of k¬¹nti.11

Crosby and Skilton divide the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra into the three kinds of k¬¹nti in the following way: “forbearance towards the endurance of suffering (BCA6:11-21); forbearance as a result of reflection upon the teaching (BCA6:22-32); forbearance of the endurance of injuries from others (BCA6:33-75).”12 Prajñ¹karamati also divides the chapter into these three kinds of k¬¹nti. His divisions are not the same as those suggested by Crosby and Skilton. Prajñ¹karamati divides the chapter as follows: patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) (BCA6:9-34), patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) (BCA6:35-51) and patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti) (BCA6:52). BCA6:52 is the only verse we can be sure Prajñ¹karamati means when he introduces it with these words:

tad eva÷ par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti÷ pratip¹dya adhun¹ dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹ntim upadar¶ayitum . . .

Thus having explained patience as forgiving the offence of another, now to show the patience as profound reflection on dharmas . . .

We are sure, on the other hand, that he considers that BCA6:9-34 explains patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) and BCA6:35-51 explains patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti). For these two, he both introduces the subject and concludes it.

11 Contrary to La Vallée Poussin’s assertion that “il traite le sujet avec moins d’ordre que d’éloquence.” Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trad. La Vallée Poussin, 30. 12 Crosby and Skilton, 45. Their translations of the three k¬¹ntis differ from mine. 189 La Vallée Poussin follows Prajñ¹karamati’s divisions in his edition of the Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹,13 but has different divisions in his later translation. In the translation, he assigns patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) to BCA6:9-21 and patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) to BCA6:22-51. Concerning patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti), his footnote to BCA6:52 says that the text now deals with the third patience, but that the author immediately relinquishes the topic after BCA6:53.14

Division of BCA into 3 types of k¬¹nti

Prajñ¹karamati15 La Vallée Poussin La Vallée Poussin Crosby and edition translation Skilton duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti 9-34 9-34 9-21 11-21 par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti 35-51 35-51 22-51 33-75 dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti 52 52 52-53 22-32

None of these divisions is satisfactory. Crosby and Skilton begin patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) with the verse which specifies what the bodhisattva does and does not want (BCA6:11), whereas Prajñ¹karamati begins it with the statement of what the bodhisattva intends to do in the face of unwanted experiences, which immediately follows a vow to destroy the enemy, hatred, by removing its sustenance, dejection (daurmanasya). Prajñ¹karamati is at least consistent with the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya as regards what is included under patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti). He reveals that the threefold division of k¬¹nti may not fit the content of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra when he introduces BCA6:12 with the words: “Then, in order to eliminate non-endurance of suffering, he says” (tatra duåkh¹sahi¬ªut¹÷ t¹van nir¹kartum ¹ha). He appears to be introducing patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) a second time.

13 La Vallée Poussin’s footnotes contain some discrepancies: LVP172 n.1: “On the first k¬¹nti, 6:9-34; on the third, 35-51, on the second, 52;” LVP189 n.1: duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti = 6:8-34; LVP189 n.2 par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti = 6:35-50. 14 Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trad. La Vallée Poussin, 51-52 n.3, 53 n.1, 58 n.3.

190 For Crosby and Skilton patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) finishes with verse 21, but for Prajñ¹karamati it continues until verse 34. Yet verse 22 begins to deal with physical suffering produced by others. The reason we get angry with other people is because we see them as the cause of our pain. ˜¹ntideva demonstrates with verses 22-31 that this is a mistake because there is no independent being who could be the cause of our suffering. Crosby and Skilton have translated dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti as “forbearance as a result of reflection upon the teaching,”16 and interpret BCA6:22-32 as demonstrating that all phenomena arise conditionally. But ˜¹ntideva’s main purpose here is to show that it is inappropriate to generate anger towards another being, as beings do not act independently. This has a parallel in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, which suggests that the bodhisattva remains calm when being attacked by realizing that there is no self which abuses or is abused (SSB187.16-188.4). The goal of the argument in BCA6:22-32 is not to produce patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti) but to endure suffering caused by another.

Crosby and Skilton begin patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) with verse 33, even though verse 33 is the conclusion of the argument of the preceding verses. Having demonstrated that no independent being has caused one’s suffering, BCA6:33 says, “Therefore . . . one should be happy.” This is not a freshly introduced subject.

Prajñ¹karamati treats suffering (duåkha) in patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) as physical suffering, whether caused by another or not. This explains his inclusion of verses 22-34 in patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti). His switch to patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) at verse 35 is strange. Verses 35-38 seem to illustrate verse 34 by showing how incapable beings are of producing happiness for themselves, let alone happiness for another. And the verses from BCA6:35 onwards are still about the physical

15 Trip¹−h» follows Prajñ¹karamati’s divisions in ˜¹ntideva, Bodhichary¹vat¹r, [trans.] Trip¹th». 16 Crosby and Skilton, 45. 191 suffering seemingly caused by others, and illustrate what was established by argument in verses 22-31.

La Vallée Poussin’s translation, on the other hand, recognizes that verses 22-34 do concern the offences of another, and includes them in patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti). Yet, he seems to accept Prajñ¹karamati’s assignment of verse 52 to patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti), even though it continues the discussion of suffering:

mano hantum amØrtatv¹n na ¶akya÷ kena cit kva cit | ¶ar»r¹bhinive¶¹t tu citta÷ duåkhena b¹dhyate || (BCA6:52)

It is not possible for any one at any time to strike the mind, because of it being formless, but the mind is tormented by suffering because of its attachment to the body.

It is not possible for the mind to be struck by any one at any time, because of it being formless, but because of attachment to the body, the mind is tormented by suffering.

In fact, all of verses 22-75 discuss endurance of suffering caused by another. Verses 22-51 cover k¬¹nti in the face of physical suffering caused by another, and verses 52-75, k¬¹nti in the face of mental suffering caused by another. Despite introducing verse 52 as patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti), Prajñ¹karamati acknowledges in the commentary to verse 52 that:

dvividha÷ duåkham avic¹rato b¹dhakam upaj¹yate k¹yika÷ m¹nasika÷ ceti |

The two kinds of tormenting suffering produced for one who does not discriminate are called physical and mental.

Verse 52 marks the turning of the subject matter from physical suffering, to mental suffering, i.e., vilification, insults and dishonour. While physical suffering may or may not be caused by another, these three always involve another.

The division of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra better fits the topics introduced in BCA6:11, than the division by three types of k¬¹nti.

192 After introductory material on the faults of hatred and anger, and the benefits of patience, BCA6:11 provides the outline for the remainder of the chapter:

duåkha÷ nyakk¹rap¹ru¬yam aya¶a¶ cety an»psitam | priy¹ª¹m ¹tmano v¹pi ¶atro¶ caitad viparyay¹t || (BCA6:11)

Suffering, vilification and insults, and dishonour are undesired for those one likes and also for oneself, but for an enemy it is the reverse.

The following outline results:

Physical suffering (duåkha) Endurance of physical suffering not 6:12-21 is not wanted for oneself arising from other people

Endurance of physical suffering arising 6:22-51 from other people

Mental suffering is not Introduction to mental suffering 6:52-54 wanted for oneself (=nyakk¹rap¹ru¬yam aya¶aå)

Reasons to avoid mental suffering are 6:55-63 not valid

Mental suffering is not 6:64 wanted for those one likes

Physical suffering is not 6:65-67 wanted for those one likes

Physical suffering is not Need to endure suffering, by 6:68-75 wanted for oneself understanding its origin and result

Praise and fame are not Purification of envy 6:76-86 wanted for one’s enemies

Suffering is wanted for one’s 6:87-90 enemies

Praise and fame are wanted Praise and fame do not avoid mental 6:90-98 for oneself suffering

Enemies are friends 6:99-111

Propitiate beings 6:112-132

Concluding verses 6:133-134

193 The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra starts by describing the benefits of practising k¬¹nti and the disadvantages of anger and hatred. The major part of the chapter argues that the desires at the root of the bodhisattva’s suffering are faulty. These desires are introduced in BCA6:11. The chapter finishes by showing that the bodhisattva should propitiate all beings, not feel anger towards them. The last 36 verses demonstrate that enemies are to be regarded as friends and honoured as if they are Buddhas. According to the scheme of three types of k¬¹nti, these verses would constitute an aspect of patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti). However, there is no evidence in ˜¹ntideva’s verses that he intended to follow the structure suggested by the three types of k¬¹nti, and none of the verses seem to describe patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti).

I.3 Comparison of k¬¹nti in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya The correspondence of much of the material from the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra to other parts of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya also suggests that ˜¹ntideva was not trying to fit its contents to the paradigm introduced in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.

The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra contains material that corresponds exactly, or in subject matter, to sections of chapter 7 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. As the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya only introduces the three kinds of k¬¹nti in chapter 9, it does not include this subject matter in the three types of k¬¹nti. Chapters 7 and 9 together cover most of the material relevant to k¬¹nti in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. ˜¹ntideva also discusses hatred (dve¬a) in other chapters of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, but not specifically in relation to k¬¹nti. For instance, chapter 8 suggests that hatred (dve¬a) is a worse transgression (¹patti) than attachment (r¹ga) and chapter 12 discusses benevolence (maitr») as the antidote to hatred (dve¬a).

Some of the arguments within the two k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapters are the same or similar, and relate the practice of k¬¹nti to a similar group of concepts. These concepts are discussed in detail below. Each chapter begins by outlining the benefits of k¬¹nti followed by a description of what to do and how to do it.

194 ˜¹ntideva explains why k¬¹nti should be practised, followed by how it should be practised. In the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, he presents a variety of arguments to persuade the bodhisattva to change his/her attitude to unwanted experiences. The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya mainly contains statements of what the bodhisattva who practises k¬¹nti does, rather than arguments to persuade him/her to do it. It is less systematic and more repetitive than the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.

I.3.i Context of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapters of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya supply different initial reasons for undertaking the practice of k¬¹nti. The point of departure for the explanation of k¬¹nti in each work is different, due to the different structures of the works. Each text sets k¬¹nti within a different narrative. In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, the practice of k¬¹nti is the first step in removing defilements (kle¶a), which in turn is part of purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi).17 In the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, the practice of k¬¹nti is a means to ensure that accumulated merit is not lost. BCA6:1 explains that hostility (pratigha) destroys any merit accumulated from giving (d¹na), moral conduct (¶»la) and worship. In the scheme of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, this would make k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ an aspect of guarding of merit (puªyarak¬¹), which forms part of chapter 7.

Prajñ¹karamati’s introduction to the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra refers to the thematic structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. He says that ˜¹ntideva has already taught the purification of moral conduct (¶»la) and guarding the person (¹tmabh¹varak¬¹) etc. (indicating ¹tmabh¹va, bhoga and puªya) and he suggests that in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter ˜¹ntideva begins to teach the purification of merit (¶ubhavi¶uddhi)18 by explaining k¹rik¹ 20 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. However, in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, ˜¹ntideva does not teach the purification of merit (puªya¶uddhi) until chapter 15 (k¹rik¹ 21b).19 K¹rik¹ 20 does appear at the start of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, but

17 ˜¹ntideva does not use this term in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. 18 ¶ubha is a synonym for puªya.

195 this chapter forms part of the section on the purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi), not purification of merit (puªya¶uddhi).

The benefit of k¬¹nti according to the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is that it is the beginning of the process of purifying defilements (kle¶a). The chapter begins by saying that the bodhisattva should now be devoted to the purification of defilements (kle¶a). This purification has two purposes. It prevents the arising of wickedness (dau嶻lya) and it removes obstructions due to past actions (karm¹varaªa), that is, it purifies both past and future in the present. ˜¹ntideva then introduces k¹rik¹ 20, with a brief explanation.

k¬ameta ¶rutam e¬eta sa÷¶rayeta vana÷ tataå | sam¹dh¹n¹ya yujyeta bh¹vayed a¶ubh¹dikam20 || (k¹rik¹ 20, SSB179.5-9)

One should be patient; one should seek learning; then one should go to the forest for refuge. One should apply oneself to concentrating the mind;21 one should contemplate, beginning with the offensive things.

K¹rik¹ 20 is a summary of how to purify defilements (kle¶a). His explanation of the k¹rik¹ emphasizes that the purification of defilements (kle¶a) is comprised of a number of steps, only the first of which is associated with k¬¹nti.

Although k¹rik¹ 20 is quoted in full at the beginning of chapter 9, the rest of the chapter is an elucidation of the first word of the k¹rik¹ only, that is, k¬ameta (from the root √k¬am, meaning ‘remain calm, or composed, or be patient’).22 As k¹rik¹ 20 is found at the beginning of chapter 9, it may appear that the whole of k¹rik¹ 20 is about k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. This is a common misinterpretation, but is not the case. The commentary on k¹rik¹ 20 occupies the next six chapters. The subject of k¹rik¹ 20 is purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi), and k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ is only a part of purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi). The introductory section of chapter 9 does not

19 K¹rik¹ 21b says puªya¶odhana is from behaviour that has its source in emptiness (¶Ønyat¹) and compassion (karuª¹). 20 SSB xlv. This k¹rik¹ does not appear as a unit in the text. 21 Or ‘generating sam¹dhi.’ 22 Crosby and Skilton, 49, discuss the relation of k¶am¹ and k¬¹nti. 196 introduce only k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹, but the entire purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) section (chapters 9-14).

˜¹ntideva explains k¹rik¹ 20 at the beginning of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter. The first requirement for the purification of defilements (kle¶a) is that the bodhisattva is patient, that is, remains calm or composed (k¬ameta). K¬¹nti is a prerequisite to hearing the teachings, as an impatient person (ak¶ama) becomes weary and lacks the energy (v»rya) necessary for hearing. If the bodhisattva has not heard the teachings, he will not know the means for purifying defilements (kle¶a) or for generating sam¹dhi. Energy (v»rya) and sam¹dhi are both required for purifying defilements (kle¶a). Indeed, ˜¹ntideva asserts that the only purpose of sam¹dhi is to purify defilements (kle¶a). The bodhisattva must go to the forest for refuge, as sam¹dhi is difficult even for a knowledgeable person who is wandering about confusedly. Even in the forest, the bodhisattva will find sam¹dhi difficult to achieve if he is not applied to calming his confusion. As the only fruit to be obtained from sam¹dhi is the purification of defilements (kle¶a), while in the forest the bodhisattva should practise contemplation, starting with the contemplation of the offensive things (a¶ubha).23

Comment [BN2]: After these brief statements concerning the purification of defilements (kle¶a) ˜¹ntideva begins his discussion of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. He has located it within the topic of the purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) and of the defilements (kle¶a). ˜¹ntideva has explained why k¬¹nti should be practised, that is, because it is a necessary part of purifying the defilements (kle¶a). He then explains how it should be practised, beginning with the quotation from the Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra to the effect that there are three kinds of k¬¹nti.

The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra begins by outlining the benefits of practising k¬¹nti, the disadvantages of anger and hatred, which arise when k¬¹nti is not practised, and the intention to practise. It begins with a statement about hatred (pratigha) and immediately establishes that k¬¹nti is to

23 An aspect of the first smÅti: mindfulness of the body (kayasmÅti), it may also be called contemplation of impurity. 197 be practised as an antidote to hatred (pratigha or dve¬a).24 The practice of k¬¹nti requires combating anger, hatred and dejection (daurmanasya). The first verse of the chapter warns of the devastating consequences of anger: it destroys all the good accomplished previously on the bodhisattva path. For this reason, anger is the greatest sin and k¬¹nti is the greatest austerity. Anger also disturbs a person’s sense of happiness and contentment. The bodhisattva must consider that anger is an enemy. Dejection (daurmanasya), produced by getting what is undesired and not getting what is desired, is the cause of hatred. Dejection (daurmanasya) must be destroyed, as it feeds hatred, and hatred’s only aim is to destroy the bodhisattva (BCA6:1-8).

As already noted, the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya begins the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter with a general statement on the purification of defilement (kle¶a) before the explanation of k¬¹nti starts with a bald statement that k¬¹nti is of three kinds. Since hatred (dve¬a) is one of the defilements (kle¶a), purification of the defilements (kle¶a) necessarily includes the purification of hatred (dve¬a). ˜¹ntideva does not introduce the topic of anger and hatred specifically in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya has already discussed anger in chapter 7, in similar terms to the discussion at the beginning of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. Prajñ¹karamati uses two quotations from ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7 in his commentary to BCA6:1.25 The closing verses of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra are also found in the guarding of merit (puªyarak¬¹) section of chapter 7 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.26

The guarding of merit (puªyarak¬¹) section of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya suggests several methods for guarding merit, only one of which is avoiding anger. It focuses more on avoiding pride, which is also discussed in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 6. However, the discussion on avoiding anger and pride in chapter 7 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya has quite a different tone to the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapters of the two works. The dangers are not as intense, or the

24 I have generally translated pratigha as hostility, to distinguish it from dve¬a. 25 Apart from these two quotations, Prajñ¹karamati draws all his other quotations for the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹ from the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. 198 remedies as extreme. Nevertheless, benevolence (maitr») and propitiating beings are remedies for both pride and anger.

I.3.ii Guarding merit in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7 ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7 includes two k¹rik¹s on the subject of guarding merit (puªyarak¬¹). The second of these (k¹rik¹ 16) suggests four ways that bodhisattvas can guard merit. They should fear gain and honour, always avoid pride, have faith in the Dharma and abandon doubt. All of these play a part in developing k¬¹nti, but ˜¹ntideva does not draw a connection between them and k¬¹nti in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7. The only mention of k¬¹nti is in a quotation from the Ratnamegha illustrating lack of arrogance. Amongst other ways of avoiding arrogance, the bodhisattva thinks, “I will live with a lot of k¬¹nti in the midst of angry, malicious-minded (vy¹pannacitta) beings” (SSB151.1-2).

A quotation from the RatnakØ−a clarifies that guarding merit means not destroying good dharmas already produced and not destroying the production of future good dharmas. It lists four ways to do this. Bodhisattvas should avoid pride, gain and honour, hatred and calumny of a bodhisattva (bodhisattvavidve¬¹bhy¹khy¹na),27 and rejecting scriptures. Comparing these four with the four points in k¹rik¹ 16 shows that faith in the Dharma corresponds with lack of hatred for a bodhisattva. This is confirmed later in the chapter. Amongst the ten acts of M¹ra quoted from the Lokottaraparivarta, which are mostly linked to pride and which demonstrate the connection between hatred and pride, is the following:

j¹n¹ti ca aya÷ dharmo ‘ya÷ vinayo bhØtam idam buddhavacanam iti | pudgalavidve¬eªa dharmavidve¬a÷ karoti saddharmam pratik¬ipati any¹÷¶ca vigr¹hayati (SSB152.4-6)

And he knows, “This is the Dharma, this is the vinaya, this is the word of the Buddha.” By hating people, he hates the Dharma, he rejects the True Dharma and alienates others.

Also at BCA6:109-111, ˜¹ntideva says that the enemy is not only to be honoured, but to be worshipped as the True Dharma.

26 BCA6:115, 6:119-134 = SSB157-8, 155.10-11, 155.14-157.6. 199 The first quotations used by ˜¹ntideva to expand on these four points are the ones quoted by Prajñ¹karamati in BCA6:1. These explain why a bodhisattva should avoid hatred and calumny of a bodhisattva. The first is attributed to the texts of the Sarv¹stiv¹dins. It explains that producing a defiled mind (du¬−acittam utp¹dayati SSB149.1-2) towards a fellow student is the most efficient way to destroy virtuous roots (ku¶alamØla). The quotation from Mañju¬r»vikr»©ita Sutra explains that the very origin of the word for hatred (pratigha) is connected with its ability to destroy virtuous roots (ku¶alamØla).

sarvam etat sucarita÷ d¹na÷ sugatapØjanam | kÅta÷ kalpasahasrair yat pratighaå pratihanti tat || (BCA6:1)

All this good conduct, giving and worship of Buddhas, done for thousands of kalpas, hostility destroys that.

The very things that are meant to produce virtuous roots (ku¶alamØla), summarized as good conduct, giving and worship of the Buddhas, are destroyed by hatred.

The RatnakØ−a specifies hatred of a bodhisattva as destroying virtuous roots (ku¶alamØla), but BCA6:1 and the quotation from the Lokottaraparivarta are not so specific. The Sarv¹stiv¹din text indicates that hatred is not appropriate towards any conscious being, even though virtuous roots (ku¶alamØla) are destroyed most efficiently by hatred of a fellow student.

The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya dealt with this topic in chapter 4, as part of guarding the person (¹tmabh¹varak¬¹). Hindrance to a bodhisattva is something harmful (anartha)28 to be avoided, and includes angry speaking, and feeling hatred and contempt (SSB84). This section describes how honouring a bodhisattva is a means to honour the Buddhas, but ˜¹ntideva concludes that the same principle can be applied to an ordinary person (pÅthagjana). However, the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya immediately goes on to say that immeasurably greater merit is

27 Bendall and Rouse, 93: bodhisattva must not have contempt for another bodhisattva. 28 Sometimes translated as “evil,” but that is too strong a term. Hedinger, 19, suggests that anartha is what hinders on the path or retards development, and is also the violation of general principles such as keeping the spiritual friend and not being discouraged. 200 accrued by honouring Buddhas and bodhisattvas than is accrued from honouring ordinary beings.29

Still speaking of hindrances due to action (karm¹varaªa),30 a quotation from Sarvadharm¹pravÅttinirde¶a says that the bodhisattva must not feel contempt (paribhavacitta) for another bodhisattva, as virtuous roots (ku¶alamØla) are most easily cut when associating with another bodhisattva. ˜¹ntideva again qualifies this. He says that not only is contempt for a being who has produced bodhicitta forbidden, but for any being capable of producing bodhicitta (SSB91). Prajñ¹karamati quotes from this section of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB85.13-14) in his commentary to BCA1:34, which says:

iti sattrapatau jinasya putre kalu¬a÷ sve hÅdaye karoti ya¶ca | kalu¬odayas¹mkhyay¹ sa kalp¹n narake¬v ¹vasat»ti n¹tha ¹ha || (BCA1:34)

Thus the Lord said that he who feels wrath in his own heart towards a son of the Conqueror, a master of generosity, will dwell in the hells for as many kalpas as the duration of that wrath.

Later sections of ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7 and Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 6 explain that bodhisattvas must have goodwill towards all beings, in order to fulfil their vows and please the Buddhas. In ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7, ˜¹ntideva presents benevolence (maitr») as the antidote to both pride and hatred. He deals with benevolence (maitr») extensively in chapter 12 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, as the antidote to hatred (dve¬a) (SSB212-219). The same verses about the bodhisattva’s need to propitiate beings appear at BCA6:119-134 and in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7 (SSB155.10-11,14-157.6). In addition, BCA6:112 is a paraphrase of a quotation from the Dharmasa÷g»ti at SSB153.7- 10 and BCA6:115 is identical to SSB157.7-8.

29 The quotation from Niyat¹niyat¹vat¹ramudr¹ SØtra is included by Prajñ¹karamati in his commentary to BCA1:35. 30 ¹varaªa = anartha, attachment (r¹ga), hatred (dve¬a), and confusion (moha) are ¹varaªa (also the six p¹ramit¹s), SSB90. 201 II ˜¹ntideva’s arguments

II.1 Concepts of the main argument The elements of the main argument regarding k¬¹nti are anger and hatred, dejection (daurmanasya), a strong mind, practice, joy (mudit¹) and those things that are desired or undesired. The main argument, found in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapters of both the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, is as follows: k¬¹nti is the avoidance of anger and hatred; anger and hatred are a response to dejection (daurmanasya), which is caused by not getting what one wants, or getting what one does not want (duåkha). One way to avoid dejection is to have a strong mind, which is developed by practice. Through practice, the attitude of joy (mudit¹) can be maintained. Having a strong mind is emphasized in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, on the other hand, emphasizes avoiding dejection by maintaining joy through having the correct attitude to the experiences which bodhisattvas, indeed all people, do or do not want. It shows how to counter natural reactions to unwanted experiences with analytical thinking.

II.1.i Anger and hatred ˜¹ntideva uses several different words for anger and hatred. In BCA6:1, the word used is pratigha. Crosby and Skilton translate pratigha as hatred.31 Pratigha is not ˜¹ntideva’s preferred term for anger and hatred, however. He does not use it again. In BCA6:2, he substitutes dve¬a for pratigha. Dve¬a is one of the three unvirtuous roots (aku¶alamØla): attachment, hatred and confusion (r¹gadve¬amoha).32 These three are also transgressions (¹patti) and defilements (kle¶a).33 According to Edgerton, the dvandva compound anunaya-pratigha “may replace r¹ga and dve¬a as feelings to be avoided.”34 As pratigha and dve¬a are synonyms, hatred is appropriate as a translation of both. ˜¹ntideva also uses

31 It is sometimes translated as anger, a meaning which Edgerton finds unlikely. The possible meanings he gives are aversion, repugnance, loathing, hostility, BHS362. 32 BHS2: given as lobha, moha, dve¬a. ˜¹ntideva mostly uses the term r¹ga, a synonym for lobha. 33 Although it is misleading to suggest, as Crosby and Skilton, xxxvii, do that the number of defilements (kle¶a) is three. They also come in lists of six, ten, or more. See MW324, BHS198. 34 BHS28: anunaya, love or attachment, is often contrasted with pratigha. 202 the term malice (vy¹p¹da) as a synonym for hatred (dve¬a) in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapters 7 and 9 (vy¹pannacitta SSB151.2; vy¹p¹da SSB187.3).

˜¹ntideva may have chosen the term pratigha for hatred in the BCA6:1 to emphasize its function as a destroyer: “anger strikes down, or destroys” (pratigha pratihanti,35 BCA6:1d). Pratigha and pratihanti have the same root, √han, meaning to strike, to kill. ˜¹ntideva uses the following quotation from the Mañju¬r»vikr»©ita Sutra in chapter 7 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, regarding the fault of hatred (vidve¬a) of a bodhisattva:

pratighaå pratigha iti kalpa¶atopacita÷ ku¶alamØlam pratihanti tenocyate pratighaå (SSB149.5-6)

Hostility (pratigha) is called hostility (pratigha) as it destroys (pratihanti) the virtuous root accumulated for hundreds of kalpas, for this reason it is called hostility (pratigha).

Prajñ¹karamati also uses this quotation in his commentary to BCA6:1.36

The words that ˜¹ntideva uses for ‘anger’ and ‘be angry’ are krodha and kopa (for anger), and various conjugations of the roots √kup (swell with rage, be angry) and √krudh (become angry).37 According to Prajñ¹karamati, the terms krodha and dve¬a are not interchangeable but have different implications. In BCA6:3-5, ˜¹ntideva explains the disadvantages in everyday life for someone who is prone to hatred. In BCA6:3-4, ˜¹ntideva uses the term dve¬a, but in BCA6:5 replaces it with krodha. In his commentary to BCA6:3-5, Prajñ¹karamati distinguishes them as follows:

cittasya karka¶¹vasth¹ dve¬aå | tasyodbhØtavÅttis tu krodhaå, yadva¶¹t daª©¹digrahaªam kriyate | iti anayor bhede ‘pi dvayor api pariharta÷ vyatay¹ abhedenaiva nirde¶aå ||

Hatred (dve¬a) is a harsh state of mind. However, anger (krodha) is the action born of it, on account of which the seizing of sticks and the like is done. Thus the

35 Misprint in BCAP, ed. Vaidya, Tripathi, 85: pradihanti. 36 The only variations are the omission of the word “root” (mØla), and addition of “O Mañju¶r».” 37 √krudh is used only once, BCA6:60. Crosby and Skilton are not entirely consistent in how they translate these words. Dve¬a is always translated as ‘hatred’ and kopa as ‘anger’, but krodha mostly as ‘anger’, but sometimes as ‘hatred’ or ‘wrath.’ 203 explanation is that even though these two are distinguished, they are both equally to be avoided.

Dve¬a and krodha are not merely synonyms.

The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya introduces hatred (dve¬a) at the beginning of the explanation of enduring suffering. Hatred (dve¬a) arises from dejection (daurmanasya) (SSB179.14). ˜¹ntideva does not use the term dve¬a again in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter. ˜¹ntideva’s quotation from the UgradattaparipÅcch¹ says that the bodhisattva must be free from pratigha. In this case pratigha is part of the expression “anunaya-pratigha.”38 ˜¹ntideva also suggests that anger (krodha) leads a despondent person to act ineffectively. Later in the chapter, the S¹garamati SØtra lists the various ways in which a bodhisattva must not retaliate towards other beings. The bodhisattva must not retaliate with anger to anger (kruddh¹ya na pratikrudhyati) (SSB185.6). The only other mention of anger in the chapter is in the quotation from the Bodhisattvapr¹timok¬a, which concludes chapter 9 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya:

ye kruddh¹å sattv¹s t¹n ¹¶v¹sayati k¬am¹payati anulomayati dharmeªa to¬ayati (SSB188.17-18)

He calms those beings who are angry, he makes them patient (k¬am¹payati), he soothes them, he satisfies them by means of the dharma.

In contrast, the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra places a heavy emphasis on avoiding anger. Thirty seven of the 134 verses mention hatred or anger, and many of these ask, “Why are you angry?” Apart from these 37, several others ask, “Why are you not happy?”

Anger or hatred is a defilement (kle¶a). Both the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya personify the defilements (kle¶a) as enemies. The description of these enemies, the necessity for them to be fought, and the way the bodhisattva is encouraged to fight them are treated similarly in both texts. Verses from chapter 4 of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra (BCA4:28-40) use similar wording to that found in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. In the

38 See n.34. 204 ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, the description is in prose, and is one of the few sections where ˜¹ntideva uses his own words rather than quoting from an earlier text. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya describes defilements (kle¶a) as enemies “whose intense hostility binds for unlimited kalpas” (SSB181.6). Similarly, the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra describes hatred as an enemy who has no purpose other than the destruction of the bodhisattva (BCA6:6, 6:8). In both cases, the enemy must be destroyed. Both texts assert that the bodhisattva must endure the suffering encountered in the battle with the defilements (kle¶a) (SSB181.6-7, BCA6:19).

II.1.i.a Other references to anger/hatred in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya Apart from the quotation from the Mañju¬r»vikr»©ita Sutra defining pratigha, ˜¹ntideva refers to angry (kruddha), malicious-minded (vy¹pannacitta) beings (SSB151.1-2) and hatred and calumny (vidve¬¹bhy¹khy¹na) of a bodhisattva in chapter 7 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. ˜¹ntideva discusses hatred (dve¬a) in other chapters also, principally in chapter 8, where he describes hatred (dve¬a) as a worse transgression (¹patti) than attachment (r¹ga), and chapter 12, where he discusses benevolence (maitr») as the antidote to hatred (dve¬a). Hatred is also mentioned with reference to k¬¹nti in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 4, where malice (vyap¹da) is described as one of the ten paths of unvirtuous action (aku¶alakarmapath¹), which are harmful (anartha) and a bodhisattva must avoid.39

After ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7 has introduced and defined hatred (dve¬a),40 chapter 8, Purification of sin (p¹pa¶odhana), explains why hatred (dve¬a) is a worse root transgression (mØl¹patti) than attachment (r¹ga). A quotation from the Caturdharmaka SØtra41 introduces the four dharmas for purification of sin (p¹pa¶odhana). These are the practice of self-reproach, or remorse, (vidجaª¹samud¹c¹ra), which includes confession;42 the practice of applying the antidote (pratipak¬asamud¹c¹ra), i.e., doing a virtuous action

39 SSB90, Bendall and Rouse, 92; ten aku¶alapatha SSB74, Bendall and Rouse, 79. 40 See above, p.201. 41 SSB160.4-11. BCAP5:98. Bendall says that the whole sØtra is at SSB160.4-11, except the conventional opening and closing statements. Translated from the Tibetan in Léon Feer, "Fragments: extraits du Kandjour traduits du Tibétain," Annales du Musée Guimet 5 (1883): 197- 198. 42 This includes p¹pade¶ana, the subject of BCA Chapter 2. 205 ( ku¶ala) after doing a non-virtuous (aku¶ala) action; the power of amendment (praty¹pattibala) by resolving to abstain; and the power of refuge (¹¶rayabala), namely refuge in Buddha, Dharma and sa¡gha, and not abandoning bodhicitta.43

In his explanation of the practice of self-reproach (vidجaª¹samud¹c¹ra), ˜¹ntideva introduces hatred (dve¬a) as a heavy root transgression (gurv» mØl¹patti)44 (SSB164.9) and explains that attachment (r¹ga) is not as bad as hatred (dve¬a).45 The Up¹liparipÅcch¹ (SSB164.8-165.1)46 argues that hatred (dve¬a) is a heavier offence than attachment (r¹ga) for a bodhisattva, because hatred (dve¬a) leads to the abandonment of beings, and attachment (r¹ga) to their attraction (sa÷graha). A bodhisattva with compassion (kÅp¹) does not fear attachment (r¹ga). A bodhisattva who lacks skill in means (anup¹yakau¶ala) fears attachment (r¹ga), but one who is skilled in means (up¹yakau¶ala) fears hatred (dve¬a). Hatred (dve¬a) is always reprehensible because it diminishes compassion. Attachment (r¹ga) is excusable when the bodhisattva has skill in means, i.e., is compassionate and is thinking of the overall benefit to beings. A compassionate person is defined as one who is skilled in means (up¹yakau¶ala). ˜¹ntideva quotes from the Up¹yakau¶alya SØtra (SSB167.3-20)47 to show that “even what is proscribed is permitted for a compassionate person who sees it will be of benefit.”48 A bodhisattva who has skill in means (up¹yakau¶alya) can indulge the senses (i.e., r¹ga), but attain freedom whenever he wants.49 ˜¹ntideva says (in his own words) that this is not true of hatred (dve¬a), because hatred (dve¬a) is very objectionable50 by nature and if there is no compassion

43 See BCAP2:53. 44 See chapter 4 for 5 mul¹patti, 8 mul¹patti etc. SSB167 n. 2: Five were mentioned above pp. 59-60. Tatz, Skill in means (Up¹yakau¶alya) SØtra, 93 n.25: “each . . . requires expulsion from the monastic community: uncelibacy, murder, theft, and false claim to spiritual attainments.” 45 ˜¹ntideva has already discussed root sins (mØl¹patti) at length in chapter 4. There they are numbered as five, eight and are also summarized in twelve k¹rik¹s (SSB66-67). Number 8 and 12 mention patience, and no.11, wrath and violence. 46 In BCAP5:98. See also BCAP5:84. 47 See Tatz, Skill in means (Up¹yakau¶alya) SØtra, 34-35, 33, 29. 48 Referred to in BCAP5:84, to demonstrate that “Even what is proscribed is permitted for a compassionate person who sees it will be of benefit,” Crosby and Skilton, 41. 49 A quotation from Up¹yakau¶alya SØtra, SSB165.5-9. 50 mah¹s¹vadya SSB165.10. (MW: liable to blame or censure, objectionable). The quotation from Up¹liparipÅcch¹ (SSB168.15-171.6) begins by saying that hatred (dve¬a) is an 206 (kÅp¹), there is no skill in means (up¹ya). A bodhisattva with attachment (r¹ga) can obtain a good birth, but not with anger (krodha) (SSB168.3).51 ˜¹ntideva emphasizes that no opportunity (avak¹¶a) for hatred (dve¬a) should be given (SSB168.15).

The main point is that what would otherwise be an offence due to attachment (r¹ga) is not considered to be an offence if the bodhisattva is compassionate, that is, he has skill in means (up¹yakau¶ala). Such a bodhisattva knows the overall benefit, and is not thinking of his/her own advantage. This consideration does not apply to hatred (dve¬a) which is always unskilful. The bodhisattva restrains anger (kopa) because accomplishing the welfare of others is more important than one’s own welfare.52 The fault of anger (krodha) is that it diminishes compassion (kÅp¹) and the cutting of compassion (kÅp¹) is the fault of cutting at the root. Anger for another’s good is not allowed because it deprives future great good for beings (SSB165). However, bodhisattvas who see the suffering of others as their own lack both faults (SSB166.4-5). A quotation from Candraprad»pa SØtra (SSB166.6-14) says that a burning man is not interested in sense-pleasures.53 Assessing greater advantage with the intention of benefiting beings avoids fault (SSB166).54

Later, in the section on power of amendment (praty¹pattibala), ˜¹ntideva quotes from the Candraprad»pa SØtra (SSB177.4-8) to the effect that all sin (p¹pa) is destroyed (sarvap¹pak¬aya) by desisting from malice (vy¹p¹da). The bodhisattva endures (sahi¬y¹mi) situations where such malice may arise. These are false speaking (paribh¹¬aª¹), reviling (¹kro¬ana), and threatening (tarjan¹), all examples of verbal abuse.

˜¹ntideva returns to attachment, hatred and confusion (r¹gadve¬amoha) in chapter 12. He is still explaining the second half of k¹rik¹ 20: how to purify

extremely objectionable (mah¹s¹vadya) offence (¹patti). See Chang, Treasury, 265-268: ‘The definitive vinaya.’ 51 More from Up¹yakau¶alya SØtra about attachment (r¹ga) not being a transgression (¹patti), when it is a means for the good of beings (SSB168.5-10). See Tatz, Skill in means (Up¹yakau¶alya) SØtra, 44-45. 52 Not a quotation. 53 A similar point is made in BCA6:123. 54 See BCA5:84. Also at SSB167.2: a bodhisattva is allowed to ignore a rule (¶ik¬¹) if he sees a greater benefit for beings. 207 defilements (kle¶a) by generating sam¹dhi (chapter 12) and the contemplation of impurity (a¶ubhabh¹van¹), which is mindfulness of the body (k¹yasmÅtyupasth¹na) (chapter 13). Here, he identifies attachment, hatred and confusion (r¹gadve¬amoha) as defilements (kle¶a). ˜¹ntideva says that attachment, hatred and confusion are chiefly the defilements (kle¶a), each of which must have the antidote (pratipak¬a) applied at the start and the cause (nid¹na) avoided (SSB209.3-4). The antidote (pratipak¬a) to attachment (r¹ga) is the contemplation of impurity (a¶ubhabh¹van¹). This is the beginning of the commentary to the last section of k¹rik¹ 20: bh¹vayeda¶ubh¹dikam. The contemplation of impurity (a¶ubhabh¹van¹) consists of breaking the body down into its constituent parts and realizing that they are disgusting and a completely inappropriate object for attachment (r¹ga).55 The antidote to confusion (moha) is contemplating dependent arising (prat»tyasamutp¹da).56

˜¹ntideva says that the antidote (pratipak¬a) for hatred (dve¬a) is benevolence (maitr») and not seeing beings as unlovable (apriyasatv¹dar¶ana)57 (SSB212.9-219.8).

tena v¹ saha bhojan¹dyek¹rthatay¹pr»tyutp¹dana÷ tatra parasukhasy¹¶a÷s¹ pr¹rthan¹ tŬª¹ ‘bhinandana÷ maitr» | k¹mar¹gapratyupak¹rahetubhy¹m akli¬−aå sneha ity arthaå || (SSB212.10-11)

. . . or by encouraging the pleasure that comes from association in such matters as meals. There benevolence is a desire for another’s welfare, prayer a desire for another’s sake. Affection is unsullied by the two causes, the passion of lust or gratitude. That is the meaning.58

The Ak¬ayamati SØtra (SSB212.12-14) proposes benevolence (maitr») as the antidote to hatred (dve¬a). It notes that the third type of benevolence (maitr»), which has no object, is associated with bodhisattvas who have attained patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti).

55 Prajñ¹karamati uses the section of the quotation which lists the constituent parts of the body (SSB209.7-11) in his commentary to BCA9:60, which mentions k¹yasmÅti. SSB209 n.1: this is a stock-list. 56 A quotation from the ˜¹listamba SØtra says that “when ignorance is present, passion, hatred and delusion (r¹gadve¬amoha) exist as regards objects of sense.” Bendall and Rouse, 211. 57 MW: disagreeable. 58 Bendall and Rouse, 204. 208 Other passages in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya which link k¬¹nti and anger/hatred are SSB90.7-13, SSB151.2, SSB243.7, SSB272.3-8, SSB274.7, SSB337.3-6 and SSB349.18.

1) The Karm¹varaªavi¶uddhi SØtra says that all of the p¹ramit¹s are possible hindrances (¹varaªa) to the bodhisattva. K¬¹nti can be a hindrance when bodhisattvas have pride in their practice and exalt themselves, thinking, “We are k¬¹ntiv¹din, they are malicious (vy¹pannacitt¹å, literally, evil-minded) (SSB90.7-13). Malice (vy¹p¹da) is one of the ten paths of unvirtuous action (aku¶alakarmapatha).59 It appears in the expression vyap¹dakhilakrodhacitta – malice, harshness and anger – at SSB86.8.60

2) The Ratnamegha contrasts the bodhisattva with k¬¹nti to beings who are angry (kruddha) and malicious (vy¹pannacitta) (SSB151.2).

3) The Candraprad»pa SØtra (SSB243.7-10) says that the bodhisattva who has arisen to be the most excellent of men by the power of k¬¹nti is not angry when struck with sticks and clods, nor disturbed when torn limb from limb.61

4) The Gaganagañja SØtra (SSB272.3-8) describes the purification of each p¹ramit¹ in order. The purification of k¬¹nti (k¬¹ntipari¶uddhi) is no hostile thought (apratighacitta) for all beings and being even-minded towards all beings (samacitta), just as in a forest of trees, if one tree is cut down the others do not think that one is cut down and we are not cut down, they have neither attachment nor hostility (na te¬¹m anunayo na pratighaå). The k¬¹nti of a bodhisattva62 is like the supreme k¬¹nti of the sky (gagana).

5) The quotation from the Tath¹gataguhya SØtra at SSB274.3-11 describes how a bodhisattva increases strength (bala) by means of ten dharmas. One of these is that the bodhisattva is patient (k¬amate)63 towards beings of weak strength and does not show hostility (na pratigha÷ karoti) (SSB274.6-7).

59 Following which is said to be the fifth root sin (mØl¹patti) in the list of five root sins, SSB60, 74. 60 The expression khrodakhila is also found at SSB337.4. 61 SSB243.7; Bendall and Rouse, 225: k¬¹nti translated as tranquillity. 62 Bendall and Rouse, 249, translate bodhisattva here as “thought of enlightenment.” 63 Translated by Bendall and Rouse, 251, as “is compassionate.” 209 6) The Ratnolk¹dh¹raªi describes the bodhisattva who emits the ray of k¬¹nti as having abandoned anger (krodha), harshness (khila)64 and pride (adhim¹na) (SSB337.3-6).

7) At SSB349.18, a quotation from a prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtra says that the p¹ramit¹s of giving (d¹na), moral conduct (¶»la) and k¬¹nti are fulfilled by giving one’s means for life as a gift when it is taken by others. The bodhisattva must abandon his body willingly. He must not feel hatred (dve¬a) or anger (krodha), or offend with body, voice or mind.

II.1.ii Dejection (daurmanasya) The direct cause of hatred and anger is dejection (daurmanasya). This in turn is caused by getting what one does not want and not getting what one does want. ˜¹ntideva describes dejection (daurmanasya) as the food of hatred (BCA6:7). In Buddhist teachings, when a cause is characterised as a food, the word most commonly used is ¹h¹ra, but here ˜¹ntideva uses the term a¶ana. Dejection (daurmanasya) sustains, or nourishes, hatred (dve¬a). By destroying dejection (daurmanasya), bodhisattvas can prevent the arising of hatred (dve¬a). Just as bodhisattvas can avoid anger/hatred by knowing its cause and avoiding that, so also they can avoid dejection (daurmanasya).

In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, the dejection (daurmanasya) which comes from “dread of suffering acquired with the arrival of what is undesired and intense attachment to pleasure acquired with the removal of what is desired” is the enemy of the first kind of patience (patience as the endurance of suffering) (SSB179.12-14). The causal sequence is the same as that in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. Getting what one does not want and not getting what one does want leads to dejection (daurmanasya) and then hatred (dve¬a). The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya adds dispiritedness (l»nat¹).

In both texts, ˜¹ntideva establishes that dejection (daurmanasya) is of no use. One line is found in both the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya:

yady asty eva prat»k¹ro daurmanasyena tatra ki÷ (BCA6:10ab, SSB180.8)

If there is a remedy, what is the use of dejection in that case?

64 BHS205. 210 The second line of BCA6:10 does not appear in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya; it is possibly to be understood, or has been omitted by mistake.65 This says:

atha n¹sti prat»k¹ro daurmansyena tatra ki÷ (BCA6:10cd)

If there is not a remedy, what is the use of dejection in that case?

The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya adds a further reason that dejection (daurmanasya) is no use. A despondent person may become either angry or bewildered. Either way, they are unable to effectively apply any possible remedy to the cause of their dejection (daurmanasya).

Dejection (daurmanasya) is also found in a list common in Buddhist sØtras: jar¹maraªa¶okaparidevaduåkhadaurmanasyop¹y¹sa. This compound is the twelfth (and last) step in the formula of dependent arising (prat»tyasamutp¹da).66 The Ratnamegha SØtra in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, chapter 9, uses part of this list – grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection (daurmanasya), and irritation (¶okaparidevaduåkhadaurmanasyop¹y¹sa)67 – as examples of the kinds of experiences which the bodhisattva must endure. Definitions of these terms are found in the ˜¹listamba SØtra,68 as follows:

The internal burning of the deluded, attached, dying (person) is grief. Giving vent to grief is lamentation. The experience of unpleasantness associated with the five consciousness bodies69 is suffering. Mental suffering associated with the mind is depression [daurmanasya]. And whatever other subtle defilements there are of this sort are anxiety [up¹y¹sa].70

Dejection (daurmanasya) is specifically mental suffering, associated with the mind, in contrast to physical suffering (duåkha), associated with the other

65 SSB180 n.3, says: “In the margin of our MS. has been written the line next following (BCA6:10b): atha n¹sti prat»k¹ro daurmanasyena tatra kim?” Bendall and Rouse, 176 n. 3, “restore” the second line of BCA6:10 in their translation. 66 BHS374. 67 BHS146: up¹y¹sa, “irritation, mental disturbance or perturbation.” The compound ¶okaparidevaduåkhadaurmanasyop¹y¹sa is most commonly found as part of the compound beginning jar¹maraªa, which is the twelfth (and last) step in the prat»tyasamutp¹da list (see BHS374). The elements of this compound are sometimes listed separately and ¶okaparidevaduåkhadaurmanasyop¹y¹sa compound alone is also found. 68 This section of the ˜¹listamba SØtra is quoted by ˜¹ntideva later in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB222). 69 “comprised of organ, object and appropriate consciousness” The ˜¹listamba SØtra, trans. N. Ross Reat (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 47. 70 Reat, ˜¹listamba SØtra, 50. 211 five senses. In chapter 14 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, the Pit¹putrasam¹gama says that each of the six senses can be divided according to whether they are experiencing pleasure, displeasure or indifference (saumanasyadaurmanasyopek¬¹), to make a total of eighteen thought processes. For example, hatred (dve¬a) arises in the mind that reacts with repulsion (pratihatam carati) when the organ of sight sees forms as disagreeable (pratikØla) (SSB251.18-252.1).71 Dejection (daurmanasya) is mental suffering that results from an unwanted experience.

II.1.iii Strong mind A strong, or imperturbable, mind is necessary to avoid dejection, or endure the suffering which results from unwanted experience. The terms used to describe this type of mind are dÅ©hi (firm) or ak¬obhya (imperturbable). Mind is the usual translation for two different Sanskrit terms: manas and citta. In BCA6:12, it is the cetas which must be firm (dÅ©hi). Throughout chapter 6, ˜¹ntideva appears to use manas, citta, and cetas as synonyms. The ability to endure suffering is due to the firmness, or bravery, (dÅ©hatva) or timidity, or cowardice, (k¹taratva) of the mind (BCA6:18). When suffering the bodhisattva should not allow the serenity of his mind to be disturbed (k¬obhayet, from the root √k¬ubh, meaning shake, tremble, be agitated or disturbed) (BCA6:19).

In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, ˜¹ntideva makes a link between dejection (daurmanasya) and the strong mind, a link which he does not make clearly in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. He says that giving up dejection (daurmanasya) is practised through giving up a weak (laghu) and delicate (sukum¹ra) mind (SSB180.13). The kind of mind to be developed by the bodhisattva is invincible (duryodhana), unconquered (apar¹jita) and imperturbable (ak¬obhya) (SSB180.15-16). As in BCA6:18-19, this invincible and imperturbable mind is necessary for winning the battle with the defilements (kle¶a).

In both texts, ˜¹ntideva introduces the concept of the strong mind as part of the explanation of how to endure physical suffering. However, a strong mind is necessary for the practice of both types of k¬¹nti discussed in the

71 Bendall and Rouse, 233. 212 k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. With his quotation from the S¹garamati SØtra, ˜¹ntideva explains patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti). In essence, in the S¹garamati SØtra k¬¹nti equals non-disturbance of mind (SSB184.9-188.4).72 The bodhisattva does not allow his mind to become disturbed (k¬obhya) in the face of attacks from other beings (SSB186.7-8). The quotation from the Bhagavat» used to illustrate patience as forgiving the offence of another also warns against becoming disturbed (k¬obhya) when being attacked, either physically or verbally, by other beings (SSB188.5-15).

Other passages in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya which link the strong mind to k¬¹nti are SSB31.16-17, SSB243.7, SSB328.3 and SSB337.3-6. At SSB31.16-17, each of the first five p¹ramit¹s is wished upon beings.73 The bodhisattva prays that all beings be perfumed with k¬¹nti,74 possessed of imperturbable will (sarvasatv¹å k¬¹ntiv¹sit¹ bhavantu ak¬obhyacetan¹pratilabdh¹å). The Candraprad»pa SØtra (SSB243.7-10) says that the bodhisattva who has become the most excellent of men by the power of k¬¹nti is not disturbed when torn limb from limb.75 ˜¹ntideva introduces a quotation from the Ratnolk¹dh¹raªi by saying that the virtues of a bodhisattva described in the Ratnolk¹dh¹raªi must be cultivated (SSB327.5). The Ratnolk¹dh¹raªi says that the bodhisattva instructs beings by means of d¹na, ¶»la, k¬¹nti, v»rya, dhy¹na and prajñ¹. K¬¹nti is “by means of imperturbable, indestructible k¬¹nti” (ak¬ayak¬¹nti ak¬obhyamukhena) (SSB328.3). This same text goes on to list the rays (ra¶mi) which a bodhisattva emits. Part of the description of the ray of k¬¹nti says that the undisturbed mind is the cause of bodhi (SSB337.5).

72 Also strongly linked in Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, where the two k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapters are a commentary on this line from a prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtra: k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ is to be fulfilled by means of imperturbability (k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ paripØrayitavy¹ ak¬obhaªat¹m up¹d¹ya). 73 Quotation from VajradhvajasØtra (SSB22.5-33.10), also called Vajradhvaja- pariª¹man¹. SSB371. See also SSB Add. Notes. SSB398. 74 Translated by Bendall and Rouse, 34, as ‘compassion.’ Statement on energy (v»rya) wrongly translated by Bendall and Rouse, 34: “May all beings be fragrant with courage, armed with patience (mah¹v»rya) for the Path.” 75 SSB243.7; Bendall and Rouse, 225: k¬¹nti translated as tranquillity. 213 II.1.iv Practice (abhy¹sa) The bodhisattva develops a strong mind through practice. ˜¹ntideva makes this point clearly in both the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB180.18, BCA6:14). The wording in each of the texts is very similar:

na ki÷ cid asti tad vastu yad abhy¹sasya du¬karam | (BCA6:14ab)

There is no thing whatsoever which is difficult with practice

na c¹bhy¹sasya du¬kara÷ n¹ma ki÷ cid asti | (SSB180.18)

And certainly nothing whatsoever is difficult with practice.

The principle behind this assertion is that by practising enduring mild pain, a person can endure greater and greater pain or hardship (BCA6:14cd, SSB181.8). ˜¹ntideva unfavourably compares the bodhisattva who is reluctant to endure suffering with types of people who endure suffering for goals which are far inferior to those of the bodhisattva. In the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, ˜¹ntideva uses the example of the devotees of Durg¹ enduring burns and cuts (BCA6:13). The example in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya shows how ordinary people, in the course of earning a living, put up with great hardship (SSB180.18-181.1). In both cases, ˜¹ntideva reminds the bodhisattva that his goal is far superior to the goals of these people. The bodhisattva must always keep in mind that his goal is liberation for himself and all beings.

Although the statement about the efficacy of practice is similar in both texts, there is a difference in the extent of the explanation. Both texts assert that great pain can be endured by practising enduring mild pain. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya adds that it is through practice that a person perceives either suffering or pleasure. Therefore, through practice it is possible to only experience pleasure. Through the practice of manifesting the perception of pleasure whenever there is the occasion for suffering, the bodhisattva experiences only a pleasurable feeling. The bodhisattva is able to perceive even intense physical suffering as pleasurable. The feeling is not suffering, not neutral, but actually pleasure.76 When this is accomplished, the bodhisattva

76 The three possible feelings (vedan¹). See BHS508: SSB232.11 ff. correlates attachment (r¹ga) with pleasure (suåkha), hatred (dve¬a) with suffering (duåkha) and confusion (moha) with aduåkh¹suåkha. 214 achieves the sam¹dhi named “Pervaded by pleasure in all conditions” (sarvadharmasukh¹kr¹nta). The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra does not mention this practice or this sam¹dhi, but Prajñ¹karamati quotes the section of the Pit¹putrasam¹gama that describes this sam¹dhi (SSB181.8-182.6, abbreviated) in his commentary to BCA6:14.

In ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 13, ˜¹ntideva discusses mindfulness of feeling (vedan¹smÅti) in terms of attachment, hatred and confusion (r¹gadve¬amoha). The quotation from the RatnacØ©a SØtra confirms that pleasant feeling (sukhavedan¹) is connected with attachment (r¹ga), unpleasant feeling (duåkhavedan¹) is connected with hatred (dve¬a) and neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling (asukh¹duåkhavedan¹) is connected with ignorance (moha). The bodhisattva realizes that “what is pleasant is impermanent, what is painful is as pleasant, what is indifferent is insubstantial” (an¹tman) (SSB232-233).77 Since hatred is a response to suffering, by only experiencing pleasure the bodhisattva can avoid hatred.

The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya also says that accomplishment of the sam¹dhi “Pervaded by pleasure in all conditions” (sarvadharmasukh¹kr¹nta) is due to a vow taken by the bodhisattva. The bodhisattva who has achieved this sam¹dhi is imperturbable, that is, has a strong mind. As such a practice also accomplishes all the p¹ramit¹s, the bodhisattva should always be joyful (mudita) (SSB182.18). The long explanation of mudit¹ follows (SSB183.4-184.4).78

Another reference to the efficacy of practice occurs at the conclusion of purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) section (chapter 14). ˜¹ntideva reiterates that the bodhisattva must abandon overestimation of self (¹tmabahum¹na) and contempt for others (par¹vajñ¹), the root of both these being the view of self and beings (¹tmasatvadŬ−i). This view is easily abandoned through practice (s¹ caitad abhy¹s¹t sukaram prah»yate) (SSB265.2- 4).79

77 Bendall and Rouse, 219. 78 See section on mudit¹ above, p.217. A portion of the quotation from Ak¬ayamati SØtra is quoted by Prajñ¹karamati in his commentary to BCA6:9. 79 Bendall and Rouse, 243, puts this in quotation marks because of iti, but perhaps in this case iti indicates “since, in this way.” 215 II.1.v Joy (mudit¹) In the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, bodhisattvas maintain joy by having the correct attitude to undesired experiences (BCA6:9). In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, bodhisattvas maintain joy because through practice they only experience pleasure. Joy (mudit¹) only gets a brief mention in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya defines joy (mudit¹) at length with a quotation from the Ak¬ayamati SØtra (SSB183.4-184.4). The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra introduces joy (mudit¹) as the antidote to dejection (daurmanasya) immediately after having established that dejection (daurmanasya) must be avoided. In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, ˜¹ntideva does not mention joy (mudit¹) until he has demonstrated that a strong mind can be developed through practice.80 The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra says that to destroy dejection (daurmanasya) requires that the bodhisattva maintain the feeling of joy (mudit¹). This, in turn, requires a strong, unperturbed mind, which is developed with practice. The sequence is slightly different in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Dejection (daurmanasya) must be renounced through practice. Abandoning dejection (daurmanasya) requires abandoning a weak mind, that is, developing a strong mind. With a strong mind, the bodhisattva can maintain his feeling of joy (mudit¹).

Crosby and Skilton translate mudit¹ as ‘sympathetic joy’. This translation does not fit the range of meanings found in the Ak¬ayamati SØtra. It is, however, the common translation for mudit¹ when mudit¹ is listed as one of the four divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra).81 Its meaning is far less restricted in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. Mudit¹ seems to be a general term for any type of pleasurable experience, including pr»ti, pras¹da and pr¹modya. ‘Joy’ is the term I have chosen to translate mudit¹; Crosby and Skilton, on the other hand, translate pr»ti as joy. Edgerton indicates that pr»ti, pras¹da, pr¹modya and sukha are synonyms.82 They are all able to be translated by ‘joy,’ but in the Buddhist

80 See also Vajradhvajapariª¹man¹ (SSB213.3-216.5): relation of joy and benevolence (maitr»). 81 These are benevolence (maitr», also known as loving-kindness), compassion (karuª¹), sympathetic joy (mudit¹) and equanimity (upek¬a). 82 BHS393. 216 discourse they are distinguished.83 Pr»ti has the sense of ‘joyful interest,’ while pras¹da has connotations of tranquillity or serenity.84

According to the Ak¬ayamati SØtra, joy (mudit¹) includes rapture, serenity and gladness (pr»tipras¹dapr¹modya), and other types of pleasure, moderate and extreme, in dharmas. It also includes kindness to beings of bad character, not reacting to abuse, freedom from envy and pride, praising others and reflecting on one’s own faults, and love of the Dharma and its teachers.

Joy (mudit¹) encompasses most of the states of mind which are associated with k¬¹nti. Without distinguishing them as aspects of joy (mudit¹), ˜¹ntideva deals with many of these topics in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. The quotation from the Ak¬ayamati SØtra ends with the statement:

iti hi y¹ sarvendriye¬v anaval»nendriyat¹ iyam ucyate mudit¹ (SSB184.4)

For thus what is non-dejectedness (anaval»na) of the senses in all the senses is called joy (mudit¹).

II.1.vi What is desired/undesired Anger or hatred are caused by dejection (daurmanasya), which, in turn, results from getting what one does not want and not getting what one does want. ˜¹ntideva gives many examples of the kinds of things the bodhisattva wants or does not want. In the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, what is undesired is physical suffering and verbal attack. In the list of tortures from the Pit¹putrasam¹gama, the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya dwells on the kinds of physical suffering possible in the human rebirth at great length. Otherwise, the types of suffering appear in lists of circumstances under which the bodhisattva is not to be distracted from fulfilling his vow. The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra treats the types of experiences which a person does not want more systematically. Verse 6:11 introduces them:

83 My translations of these terms follow Nyanatiloka, Buddhist dictionary, 142. He suggests that it is incorrect to consider pr»ti, pr¹modya and sukha to be synonyms. His translations for these terms are rapture, gladness and happiness. 84 BHS388. 217 duåkha÷ nyakk¹rap¹ru¬yam aya¶a¶ cety an»psitam | priy¹ª¹m ¹tmano v¹pi ¶atro¶ caitad viparyay¹t || (BCA6:11)

Suffering, vilification and insults, and dishonour are undesired for those one likes and also for oneself, but for an enemy it is the reverse.

They fall into two categories: physical suffering, indicated by duåkha, and mental suffering, indicated by nyakk¹ra, p¹ru¬ya, and aya¶as. Physical suffering can be caused by inanimate things, or by animate beings. Mental suffering is caused by the actions of animate beings.

A large portion of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra contains arguments to persuade the bodhisattva to change his attitude to the experiences which he does not want. The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra suggests the ways in which each type of suffering, whether physical or mental, is to be endured, often involving a logical consideration of the basis on which anger arises. In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, the general principle to be followed is not to be attached to pleasure and not to be averse to suffering, which is possible by developing a strong mind. Although the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya describes many unpleasant circumstances, it recommends few specific remedies. The texts quoted admonish the bodhisattva to remain patient, or undisturbed, in these circumstances. The bodhisattva must remember his vow, and not be distracted from fulfilling it.

The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra shows the types of experience ˜¹ntideva considers to be physical and mental suffering. ˜¹ntideva lists types of mild physical suffering to be endured: the irritation of insects, hunger and thirst, cold, heat, rain, wind, journeys, sickness, imprisonment and beatings. ˜¹ntideva often simply uses the word vyath¹ (pain) for physical suffering (BCA6:14, 16, 18-19, 42, 44, 64, 66, 73, 122-123, 131). He also uses vedan¹, in its sense of ‘pain’ (BCA6:15, 48), ¶Øla - ‘sharp pain’85 (BCA6:23) and b¹dhante - ‘they hurt themselves’ (BCA6:35). Pain results from the battle with the defilements (kle¶a) (BCA 6:19). It can be self-inflicted – with sharp objects, by not eating, by throwing oneself off a cliff, by hanging, by poisoning, or even by killing oneself (BCA6:35-37). Another form of suffering is disease, which is caused by an imbalance of humours – bile (pitta), phlegm (kapha) and wind

218 (v¹yu) (BCA6:22). The weapons wielded by others and one’s own body are also sources of suffering (BCA6:43-44). Intense suffering is associated with the hells (BCA6:46, 48, 72-74, 89, 120, 130-131). There is also suffering associated with death (BCA6:56), punishment (BCA6:72) and fire (BCA6:123).

Mental suffering is caused by vilification and insults, and the desire for gain and honour. As the mind cannot be physically attacked, it is only because of its attachment to the body that it feels suffering (BCA6:52). The causes of mental suffering introduced in BCA6:11 are reintroduced in BCA6:53:

nyakk¹raå paru¬a÷ v¹kyam aya¶a¶ cety aya÷ gaªaå | k¹ya÷ na b¹dhate tena cetaå kasm¹t prakupyasi || (BCA6:53)

This class, namely vilification, insults and dishonour, does not hurt the body, then, O mind, why do you become angry?

The attitude of others which results in mental suffering is also expressed as disfavour (apras¹da) (BCA6:54, 63). The attacking other is known as a defamer (avarªav¹din) or a disparager (aya¶askara) (BCA6:62-63). BCA6:76-86 describes envy, the mental suffering that results from others being praised and getting gain and honour. Mental suffering also results from thinking that someone has obstructed merit (BCA6:102-103). Other causes of mental suffering are seeing sacred images and stØpas being attacked, hearing someone denigrate the Dharma (BCA6:64), seeing someone hurt one’s gurus, friends and family (BCA6:65).

BCA6:90 refers to the positive correlates of the causes of mental suffering, vilification, insults, dishonour (nyakk¹rap¹ru¬yam aya¶as), as praise, fame and honour (stuti, ya¶as, satk¹ra). These are the things which the bodhisattva desires or takes pleasure in. Apart from gain and honour (BCA6:55, 100), praise and fame (BCA6:79, 92-94, 97-99), other causes of mental pleasure are the suffering of enemies (BCA6:87-88) and the pleasure someone else has in praising me (BCA6:94-95). ˜¹ntideva also suggests intoxication and gambling as sources of mental pleasure (BCA6:91).

85 MW: any sharp or acute pain (esp. that of colic or gout). 219 ˜¹ntideva makes it clear that some desires are worthwhile and some are not. BCA6:90-91 describes merit, long life, strength, good health or bodily pleasure, as the goals of a wise person (dh»mata). BCA6:133-134 also lists positive desires in this life: good fortune, fame, good circumstances, self- composure, health, joy, long life, abundance and happiness of an emperor. Other ordinary goals are tranquillity (¶ama), sleep (nidr¹), contentment (dhÅti) (BCA6:3), and comfort (susthitha) (BCA6:5).

The bodhisattva’s higher aims are gaining merit (BCA6:1, 9, 69, 90), benevolence (BCA6:69, 115), removing the suffering of the world (BCA6:75, 127), happiness of all beings (BCA6:80, 123), happiness of Buddhas (BCA6:122), Buddhahood for the sake of beings (BCA6:81, 132), bodhi for beings (BCA6:83), freedom from bondage (BCA6:100), and supreme fulfilment (sampatp¹ra) (BCA6:112). Other appropriate goals for a bodhisattva are delight in praising others (BCA6:76-79), virtue (guªa) and pleasing others (par¹varjana) (BCA6:77).

In general terms, like all beings, bodhisattvas want happiness (sukha or pr»tisukha) and do not want suffering (BCA6:34). Happiness is obtained with difficulty and suffering is easily obtained (BCA6:12), since pain (vyath¹) is inevitable for embodied beings (BCA6:66). Also the bodhisattva is fighting the defilements (kle¶a) and pain is easily obtained in battle (BCA6:19).

II.2 Arguments to change attitude to desired/undesired A large part of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is devoted to providing arguments to persuade the bodhisattva to change her/his attitude to those experiences which she/he wants or does not want. Some of these arguments are found in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya and some in other chapters of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. In arguing for the bodhisattva to practice patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti), the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya encourages the bodhisattva to seek out suffering, even to the extent of longing for the pain of hell (SSB184). In contrast, the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra uses the bodhisattva’s desire to avoid suffering and achieve happiness on the mundane level to persuade him/her to practice k¬¹nti.

220 In persuading the bodhisattva to practice k¬¹nti and endure suffering, ˜¹ntideva appeals to the ordinary desire of the bodhisattva for happiness, and also to his/her desire to achieve a higher purpose. He shows how the bodhisattva’s desire for praise, fame and honour does not bring ordinary happiness or worldly pleasure. ˜¹ntideva extols the benefits of suffering, because it causes future happiness of both kinds. ˜¹ntideva also uses the tension between the bodhisattva’s higher and lower aims and shows how the bodhisattva’s desire for worldly pleasure is incompatible with his/her higher purpose. ˜¹ntideva explains what has led to the current undesired situation, and what actions will lead to a future desired situation. He encourages the bodhisattva to analyze what has caused the present situation, and what actions now will create a future desired situation.

II.2.i What does not lead to happiness, what has lead to present suffering Principally, anger/hatred is incompatible with happiness. Anger/hatred causes worldly suffering and prevents happiness (BCA6:3-6). Therefore, happiness comes from destroying hatred (BCA6:6). Dejection (daurmanasya) does not lead to the bodhisattva achieving any of his/her goals, either good or bad (BCA6:9-10, SSB180). The result of rage is suffering and produces no good for oneself or others (BCA6:74). The bodhisattva should realise that his/her own previous actions have caused his/her present suffering (BCA6:42, 45-46, 68).

Another cause of suffering is not taking pleasure in another being praised, which leads to present and future suffering (BCA6:78). The bodhisattva should not consider the suffering of an enemy to be a cause of happiness, because any temporary advantage is outweighed by the bad that will result, that is, rebirth in hell (BCA6:87-89). Calamity results from creating suffering for others (BCA6:88). Causing suffering to beings results in the pain of hell (BCA6:131).

II.2.i.a Praise, fame, gain and honour ˜¹ntideva pays particular attention to praise, fame, gain and honour. He tries to persuade bodhisattvas to give up their desire for praise, fame and honour by showing that their actions will not lead to happiness. The worldly desires of bodhisattvas – praise, fame and honour – do not lead to long life, strength, good 221 health or bodily pleasure (BCA6:90). The desire for praise and fame is childish (BCA6:93, 97). Praise leads to jealousy and anger, it does not lead to happiness (BCA6:98). Fame and praise lack effect; they are unable to create pleasure for anyone but the praiser (BCA6:92, 94-96).

The conclusion of purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) section of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya includes similar arguments on the lack of effectiveness of praise and honour. Verses at SSB266.1-2, 5 are the same as those at BCA6:94- 95ab. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya goes on to suggest that there is no physical pleasure from another being satisfied with me, and that no long life, health or strength results from praising (vandan¹). Therefore praise, blame, and honour (k»rti, nind¹, satk¹ra) are fruitless (ni¬phala) (SSB266.5-9). Since gain and loss are not affected by being glad (hŬ−a) or sad (vi¬aªa) (up or down), the bodhisattva must avoid what is fruitless (ni¬phala) and cultivate a mind like a rock (¶ailam¹nas) (SSB266.11-12). For speedy purification of the mind (citta¶uddhi), the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya recommends that all familiarity (sa÷stava) is abandoned, because it leads to hostility and attachment (pratigh¹nunaya), from which comes calumny, jealousy, envy, desire for gain etc., pride (SSB266.13-267.1). Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 6 does not take this extreme view.

The lack of favour (apras¹da) shown by others towards the bodhisattva does not lead to lack of gain either in the present or future life (BCA6:54). Gain now has no lasting worldly effect, but has a lasting bad effect. Gain is not forever, but sin is (BCA6:55). Whether the bodhisattva gains or not, death comes (BCA6:56-59). Fame, also, has no physical result, death still comes (BCA6:92). Envy does not lead to gain (BCA6:84).

While the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 6 provides arguments to counter the bodhisattva’s desire for gain, ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7 simply advises the bodhisattva to avoid gain. It gives a general warning against pursuing gain, honour and praise. These result in pride, which destroys virtuous roots (ku¶alamØla). K¹rik¹ 16 in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7 says that in order to guard merit the bodhisattva should recoil from gain (l¹bha) and honour (satk¹ra), and always avoid pride (unnati). The acts of M¹ra include not showing respect, not wanting another to get praise, and not hearing the Dharma because of pride

222 (SSB151.13-152.19). ˜¹ntideva quotes the S¹garamati SØtra, which says that receiving a lot is an obstacle to the Mah¹y¹na (mah¹y¹n¹ntar¹ya) (SSB145.8).

II.2.ii What does lead to happiness K¬¹nti is what principally leads to happiness in this life. The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra summarizes happiness in this life as good fortune, fame, good circumstances, self-composure, health, joy, long life, abundance and happiness of an emperor (BCA6:133-134). Praising others, enemies, and lack of praise, gain and honour cause happiness.

The bodhisattva should want to praise others, because praising causes happiness (pr»tisukha) (BCA6:76-79, 94-96).86 The bodhisattva should want enemies, because they protect the bodhisattva by liberating him/her from attachment to gain and honour (BCA6:99-111). The bodhisattva’s desire for praise, gain and honour because she/he thinks they will bring happiness is mistaken. Lack of praise, gain and honour actually leads to protection from suffering (BCA6:99-101). The very thing the bodhisattva is trying to avoid – suffering – is the cause of happiness.

II.2.ii.a Benefits of suffering The bodhisattva can change his/her attitude to suffering by realizing that the benefit of suffering is that it leads to a future desired result, either worldly, namely, less suffering, or higher, namely, liberation. It is only through suffering that the bodhisattva can get release from sa÷s¹ra (BCA6:12).87 Enduring mild pain leads to being able to endure great pain (i.e., results in feeling less pain) (BCA6:14), whereas lack of endurance leads to increased pain (BCA6:16). A weak mind leads to more suffering, whereas a strong mind leads to less suffering (BCA6:18). Present suffering leads to avoiding future great suffering in hell (BCA6:72-73). Other virtues of suffering are that it leads to compassion for beings, a dread of sin and delight in the Buddhas (BCA6:21). Suffering leads to the great result of removing suffering of the world (BCA6:75).

86 pr»tisukha also used in BCA6:3. 87 Similar argument at SSB180.18-181.11. See section on practice (abhy¹sa), above. 223 II.2.iii Pursuing noble aims ˜¹ntideva contrasts the bodhisattva’s base desires with his/her more noble desires. The basis of the bodhisattva path is the resolve of the bodhisattva to generate bodhicitta for the benefit of all beings. ˜¹ntideva reminds the bodhisattva that any apparent short term gain is far outweighed by the long term dire consequences (BCA6:55-61, 88-91). An antidote to feeling anger in the case of having the fulfilment of desires prevented, is to realize that the bodhisattva’s goal is greater than any of the short term goals represented by these desires.

The principle reason for avoiding anger and practising k¬¹nti is that anger destroys merit (BCA6:1, 9, 90). The bodhisattva must avoid any behaviour that leads to a decrease in merit. Because it leads to anger (BCA6:7), dejection (daurmanasya) leads to loss of merit (BCA6:9). In order to gain liberation, the bodhisattva must accumulate merit. Gain does not lead to merit. Anger for the sake of gain leads to destruction of merit and sin (BCA6:60-61). Gain and honour are bonds that are incompatible with liberation (BCA6:100). Because praise and honour do not lead to merit or any mundane benefits, the bodhisattva should realize that they are not worth pursuing (BCA 6:90-92).88

The bodhisattva has resolved to gain liberation for the benefit of all beings, and therefore should be pleased if they are happy (BCA6:80-81). The bodhisattva wants all beings to be happy. If beings find some happiness for themselves, a bodhisattva should be happy (BCA6:82-83). If someone gives a gift to another, there is no reason for anger. On the contrary, the bodhisattva should rejoice at such an act of merit (BCA6:84-86).

Enduring the offence of another leads to sin decreasing (BCA6:48). If a bodhisattva retaliates to an offence, the offender will not be saved, and because the bodhisattva abandons practice by retaliating, the offender has no hope in the future (BCA6:51). The bodhisattva can protect merit by removing the fuel of the fire of hatred (BCA6:70-71). K¬¹nti towards an enemy leads to merit (BCA6:102-103), without an enemy there is no opportunity for k¬¹nti, therefore an enemy is a cause of merit (BCA6:104-111). The bodhisattva must realize that the very beings whose actions he dislikes, are the basis on which he can realize

224 his long term goals (BCA6:48-49, 99-107,112). Propitiating beings accomplishes the bodhisattva’s purpose, namely, removing suffering of the world (BCA6:127).

In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, the bodhisattva’s noble aim is one of the principle methods for enduring suffering. It is due to bodhisattva’s vow (praªidh¹na) that he/she is able to experience pleasure in all circumstances (SSB182). The bodhisattva endures physical and verbal harm, and shows no concern for his/her own welfare due to the intention to bring all beings to maturity (SSB184-185). The bodhisattva realizes the illogicality of abusing or having malice towards the beings who he desires to liberate (SSB188). ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7, on guarding of possessions (bhogarak¬¹), also emphasizes that the bodhisattva should think only of others. A quotation from the UgraparipÅcch¹ says: “Giving up your own aims brings about the aims of others,” and from the Dharmasa÷g»ti that a bodhisattva “desires bodhi first for all beings, not for himself.” Although the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya says bodhisattvas should not think of their own happiness (SSB146.4-5), the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra uses the desire for personal happiness to persuade bodhisattvas to give up anger.

II.3 Other arguments Most of the arguments in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra chapter 6 are concerned with changing the bodhisattva’s attitude to unwanted experiences. Apart from these, there are arguments to persuade the bodhisattva not to become angry with other beings. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, in the main, simply admonishes the bodhisattva not to be angry. In the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, ˜¹ntideva analyzes the cause of feeling anger towards other people. He shows that another person cannot cause the bodhisattva’s suffering because there is no “other” who acts and because the bodhisattva’s actions cause his/her own suffering. Therefore, the bodhisattva’s own actions lead to future happiness. The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra shows that being angry with beings leads to suffering and the hells, while having benevolence (maitr») towards beings leads to both worldly happiness and the bodhisattva’s higher goals. It finishes with an extensive argument to aid the bodhisattva in creating a positive attitude, which is also found in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7.

88 Similar argument found in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, chapter 7 and SSB266. 225 II.3.i Identifying the cause In describing the methods by which a bodhisattva should avoid becoming angry with other beings, ˜¹ntideva considers the cause of the suffering which the bodhisattva is attributing to those other beings. ˜¹ntideva sets out to show that being angry with another being is contrary to logic. In order to be justifiably angry with someone, that person must be the cause of the suffering being experienced. That person must intend to cause the suffering and be the only cause of the suffering. ˜¹ntideva shows that no being intends to cause anything, and no being is the sole, or ultimate, cause of suffering. ˜¹ntideva demonstrates the lack of intention of beings to cause harm in two ways: he proves that there is no self which can form an intention, as all beings arise conditionally, and he argues that the actions of beings show their inability to fulfil any intention that they might have.

˜¹ntideva argues that there is no logical place for anger to be directed. It is as illogical to get angry with animate beings as it is to get angry with inanimate causes of suffering, as neither intends to cause the suffering they produce. Both are dependent on causes and conditions (BCA6:22-24). Anticipating a possible objection that people do cause suffering intentionally, he explains that people do not become angry of their own free will, but from the accumulation of conditions. The accumulation of conditions, also, does not intentionally produce a result. He argues that everything exists by force of its conditions, not independently (BCA6:25-26). He also refutes, by logical analysis, the existence of the independent entities, such as Primal Substance and the eternal Self, accepted by the S¹÷khyas and the Naiy¹yikas, non-Buddhist schools of Indian philosophy (BCA6:27-30). Having established that nothing occurs independently, and that it is not possible to find an ultimate cause, ˜¹ntideva suggests that it is not logical to be angry with any particular being (BCA6:31). The quotation from the S¹garamati SØtra in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 9 refers to this argument very briefly, when it suggests that the bodhisattva ask, “Who in this case abuses or is abused?” The bodhisattva is able to be patient (k¬amate) because of being free of the view (dŬ−i) of perceiving or not perceiving a self or other who abuses or is abused (SSB188.2-4).

226 ˜¹ntideva analyses the situation in another way. He creates a dichotomy: either it is the essential nature of foolish people to harm others, or it is not. In the first case, it is not proper to be angry with them, as they have no choice. If they do have a choice, the logical consequence (prasa¡ga) would be that they abandon their essential nature. In the second case, it is not proper to be angry with people who are pleasant by nature. They are not at fault (BCA6:39-40). Prajñ¹karamati concludes that anger is proper only towards faults, not towards beings (BCAP6:40).

Having utilized logical arguments to establish theoretically that no being acts of its own volition, ˜¹ntideva then provides further evidence that beings are not deliberately malicious. People’s behaviour shows that they are subject to conditions. The suffering of beings demonstrates their inability to fulfil their intentions. If their intentions were fulfilled they would not be suffering, as no one wants suffering (BCA 6:34). As people have a disregard for their own welfare, the bodhisattva cannot expect them to care any better for other people (BCA6:35-37). ˜¹ntideva attributes their self-destructive behaviour to the effects of the defilements (kle¶a). The bodhisattva should pity such people, rather than hate them (BCA6:38). The bodhisattva can remain happy by realizing that anyone doing something wrong is acting according to their conditions (BCA6:33, 65).

As it is only logical to get angry with the cause of suffering, the bodhisattva must consider all the causes and conditions at work in any particular circumstance. ˜¹ntideva investigates whether any other being is the sole, or ultimate, cause of suffering. When being beaten, the immediate cause of pain appears to be the stick. However, it is the impeller of the stick who attracts the anger. ˜¹ntideva suggests that it is not logical to cease the search for the cause with the impeller of the stick. If we go one step further, we find that the impeller is, in turn, impelled by hatred. Therefore, hatred (dve¬a) would be better directed at hatred (dve¬a) (BCA6:41).

Another cause of physical suffering is the bodhisattva’s previous actions. The bodhisattva should consider how his own actions have caused his present suffering. If he had not caused similar pain to others in the past, he would not be experiencing pain now (BCA6:42). Again, ˜¹ntideva searches for the 227 ultimate cause of suffering: is it the wielder of the stick or the person with the body? It is illogical to be angry with one but not the other (BCA6:43-46). Further, it is the bodhisattva’s own actions that lead to beings offending, which results in them going to hell (BCA6:47). On the other hand, by enduring their offence, the bodhisattva has less sin (BCA6:48). In this way the bodhisattva is the offender and the offender is a benefactor to the bodhisattva (BCA6:49). BCA6:67 asks who is the offender, when both the initial offence and the angry response are due to confusion.

II.3.ii Creating a positive attitude The final section of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is devoted to developing a positive attitude. Most of the section of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra on propitiating beings is also found in chapter 7 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. The verses in common are BCA6:115, 119-134.89 The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya quotes these verses to counteract pride. It says that absence of pride towards all beings results when they are honoured, (SSB153) and benevolence (maitr») towards beings avoids pride (SSB157).

Not being angry with other beings is only the first step in practising k¬¹nti. K¬¹nti is, finally, propitiating beings and causing them happiness. The arguments which ˜¹ntideva uses to persuade the bodhisattva to have a positive attitude to all beings have a new element. ˜¹ntideva again uses a cause and effect analysis, taking into account the bodhisattva’s goal (BCA6:127). In addition, he bases his argument on the bodhisattva’s acceptance that the Buddhas are the means for liberation, and therefore to be worshipped. As propitiating beings also leads to liberation, ˜¹ntideva argues that it is not logical to respect Buddhas and not to respect other beings (BCA6:113,127).

˜¹ntideva also argues that because the Buddhas are willing to do anything at all for the happiness of beings, the bodhisattva who wishes to repay the kindness of the Buddhas should propitiate beings (BCA6:119-121). Causing happiness to beings causes happiness to the Buddhas, causing misery to beings causes misery to the Buddhas (BCA6:122-125). Causing happiness for beings

89 SSB157.7-8 = BCA6:115, SSB155.10-11 = BCA6:119, SSB155.14-157.6 = BCA6:120-134. 228 also leads to Buddhahood, whereas causing them to suffer leads to hell (BCA 6:131-132).

In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, it is the bodhisattva’s vow that enables him/her to both endure suffering and to forgive the attacks of others. Bodhisattvas are able to develop the sam¹dhi which enables them to experience pleasure in everything due to their resolution (praªidh¹na) that all beings should realize supreme perfect enlightenment (SSB182). The strong intention (adhy¹saya) and great compassion of bodhisattvas allows them to endure the pain, mental and physical, caused by others, as they only wish for the welfare of those others (SSB184, SSB187).

III Patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti) The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya do not mention patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti) in connection with k¬¹nti or k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. The term is not used in the verses of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. It is mentioned twice in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, in quotations. The quotation from Ak¬ayamati SØtra (SSB212.12-14) has been discussed in an earlier chapter. The other quotation is from the Ratnolkadh¹raª» in chapter 18 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (B335.3-6). In verse, this quotation consists of one of a long list of “rays” (ra¶mi) which a bodhisattva emits.

ra¶mi pramuñci rati÷kara n¹m¹ t¹ya prabh¹saya bodhita90 satv¹ | buddharat»rata dharmarat»rata sa¡gharat»rata te sada bhonti || tritayarat»rata te sada bhØtv¹ buddhasam¹gamadharmagaª¹rye | labdhanutpattikak¬¹nti91 labhanti codita sm¹rita ye bahu satv¹ || buddha anusmÅtidharmagaª¹rye bodhi ya cittaguª¹nvivaritv¹ | tena rati÷kara ra¶mi nivÅtt¹ || (SSB335.3-6)

They emit the Ray, Causing Joy.92 Inspired by its brightness, beings are always delighted by the Buddha, Dharma and sa¡gha; being always delighted by those three, devoted to the assembly of Buddhas and the collection of dharmas these

90 SSB335 n.3: “So MS., the Tib. read codita as before.” 91 Surely should be labdh¹nutpattikak¬¹nti. 92 BHS450. 229 many beings, inspired and reminded, obtain possession of the k¬¹nti of non- arising; manifesting the virtues of the mind, their awakening is devoted to remembrance of the Buddha and the collection of dharmas. Thus the Ray, Causing Joy, is completed.

The term used is anutpattikak¬¹nti, rather than anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti. Both these instances are in passing. ˜¹ntideva does not explain patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti) in either the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra or the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya.

Conclusion Starting with the general principle of k¬¹nti, the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra moves from the bodhisattva’s most personal experience of suffering to suffering involving others, and then demonstrates that the desires at the root of the bodhisattva’s suffering are faulty. ˜¹ntideva transforms the beings that the bodhisattva is most unable to feel compassion towards, namely enemies, into benefactors, before showing that all beings should be served and honoured. ˜¹ntideva begins by focusing on happiness in the present life and expands to a consideration of the welfare of all sentient beings. K¬¹nti proceeds from suppressing anger, bearing insults and not being envious, to the positive principles of joy (mudit¹) and benevolence (maitr»). Commentators have divided the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra into the three kinds commonly listed in Mah¹y¹na literature, but there is no evidence that ˜¹ntideva divided the chapter in this way.

The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapters of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya approach the topic of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ differently. They do, however, have some elements in common, particularly the principle argument on how to practise k¬¹nti and avoid anger. The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya is more prescriptive and the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is more persuasive. The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra contains extensive arguments on how to avoid anger, not all of which are found in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. The different structures of the two works account, to some extent, for the differences. In the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, ˜¹ntideva has gathered together all material relevant to the practice of k¬¹nti. Some of this material occurs in sections of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya

230 other than the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter. The lack of direct correspondence between the two k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapters is another reason that it is not likely that ˜¹ntideva was applying the three types of k¬¹nti introduced in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra.

Two of the three types of k¬¹nti are easily discernible in both the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, namely, patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) and patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti). ˜¹ntideva does not define patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti), or even mention it apart from listing it in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya as one of the three types of k¬¹nti. He also does not treat patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti).

˜¹ntideva uses a variety of arguments both to help and to persuade the bodhisattva to practice k¬¹nti. He encourages the bodhisattva to analyze any occasion for anger in a variety of ways. These analyses draw on the bodhisattva’s desire for worldly happiness, Buddhist beliefs, highest aims, and logic. This chapter attempted to categorize these arguments to some extent, but because of their interconnection, they tend to flow into each other. The next chapter looks at ˜¹ntideva’s treatment of k¬¹nti in the light of some other Mah¹y¹na texts which have treated the subject in more than a brief fashion.

231 Chapter 6

K¬¹nti in ˜¹ntideva in the context of the tradition

This chapter aims to identify what distinguishes ˜¹ntideva’s approach to k¬¹nti by comparing his treatment of k¬¹nti with some earlier Mah¹y¹na texts. An earlier chapter introduced Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya, BodhisattvabhØmi, Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra and ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa particularly in regard to their treatment of the three kinds of k¬¹nti. This chapter compares the arguments that ˜¹ntideva uses to cultivate k¬¹nti with those found in these texts, and also looks at the Ak¬ayamati SØtra. A brief introduction to each text, showing what each considers k¬¹nti to be, is followed by a discussion of the reasons given by each text for practising k¬¹nti. ˜¹ntideva’s main argument is not found in any of these texts. A discussion of arguments for practising k¬¹nti that are found in these texts is grouped into three themes: the nature of suffering, realizing others are not the cause of suffering, and the bodhisattva’s noble aims. The relationship of the divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra) to arguments for practising k¬¹nti in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra refers to some non-Mah¹y¹na literature. The final section looks at ˜¹ntideva’s style of argument.

Saito points out ˜¹ntideva’s special interest in the Ak¬ayamati SØtra (part of Mah¹sa÷nip¹ta) in contrast to Candrak»rti’s use of Da¶abhØmika (part of Avata÷saka).1 ˜¹ntideva does not quote Ak¬ayamati SØtra on k¬¹nti, but on joy (mudit¹). The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra also ends with a strong emphasis on benevolence (maitr»). The Ak¬ayamati SØtra and ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa are similar in that they both state the attributes of k¬¹nti, listing topics briefly rather than providing developed arguments, and they both discuss ultimate k¬¹nti. The language of ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa is very different to that of ˜¹ntideva. Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya is quite brief, but is

1 Saito, “˜¹ntideva in the history of M¹dhyamika philosophy," 258. 232 closest to the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra in the primary reason it gives for practising patience. The BodhisattvabhØmi and Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra give more extensive arguments on how to practise k¬¹nti, which are more easily compared to those of ˜¹ntideva.

˜¹ntideva’s use of the first person points to the use of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra as a text for recitation2 or a meditation manual.3 The practitioner would use the text to induce and cultivate the desired states of mind. All the texts use the first person when suggesting a way of thinking which will lead to practising k¬¹nti. This is only in two verses of ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa (ASPS3:25-26), not at all in Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra and only once in the commentary (Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya). The first person is only used in the third section of the Ak¬ayamati SØtra, when describing the ways of thinking which are not ultimate k¬¹nti. It is used regularly in the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra and the BodhisattvabhØmi, which both give extensive arguments to aid the cultivation of k¬¹nti.

I.1 Ak¬ayamati SØtra Apart from some Sanskrit fragments, the Ak¬ayamati SØtra is only available in Tibetan. Braarvig’s translation is from Tibetan, but he has included “reconstructions of the supposed Sanskrit original.”4 Braarvig has used the commentary, the Ak¬ayamatinirde¶a−ik¹ (also only available in Tibetan), “for dividing the sØtra into paragraphs and chapters”5 and has included material from the commentary throughout the translation in square brackets.6 This commentary interprets the SØtra from a Yog¹c¹ra point of view, and its chief authority is the Yog¹c¹rabhØmi.7 Braarvig notes that the commentary attempts to arrange the Ak¬ayamati SØtra according to “its preconceived schemes,” with particular emphasis on a gradual development through the bhØmis and the paths

2 Ibid., 258. 3 Williams, general introduction to Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, trans. Crosby and Skilton, xxv- xxvi. 4 Braarvig, Tradition of imperishability, cxxxi: Braarvig’s aim was to translate “the hypothetical Sanskrit text as it existed for the first Tibetan translator(s).” 5 Ibid., cxvii. 6 Ibid., cxxxi. 7 Ibid., cxvii, cxxi. 233 (m¹rga), although these concepts are hardly mentioned in the SØtra.8 Although the Ak¬ayamati SØtra discusses k¬¹nti in a sequence that indicates that it is one of the p¹ramit¹s, i.e., after giving (d¹na) and moral conduct (¶»la) and before energy (v»rya), meditation (dhy¹na) and prajñ¹, it does not use the term p¹ramit¹ in its discussion of k¬¹nti or divide k¬¹nti into the three types: patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti), patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) and patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti). The commentary, however, does divide it into these three types.9

The section on k¬¹nti is divided into four sections: 1) lists thirty-two manifestations of k¬¹nti, 2) lists twenty-one types of purified k¬¹nti, 3) describes non-ultimate k¬¹nti and 4) describes ultimate k¬¹nti. The commentary classifies section 1) as patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti). K¬¹nti manifests “as giving up of bad dispositions (anu¶aya); in the absence of inflicting injury, of anguish, of malice, of enmity, of rage, of quarrelling, of dispute; in not being injured by the outside world; in guarding oneself and others; as in accordance with the thought of awakening (bodhicitta); in thorough spiritual penetration; in disgust for worldly things and absence of cupidity; in confidence in the fact that actions mature; in the ornamenting of the body; in purity of speech and thought; in firm intention; in syllables are void; in the absence of thought-constructions; in introspection into one’s own thoughts; in protecting the thoughts of others; in going the way to the world of Brahm¹; in experiencing the good qualities of gods and men; in perfecting the characteristics of a great man and the marks of beauty; in attaining speech with a voice like that of Brahm¹; in having done away with all sins; in having done away with malice, harshness and aversion; in rejecting anger; in rejecting all roots of bad;

8 Ibid., cxxv. 9 Translated by Braarvig, Tradition of imperishability, 144, 148, 151, as tolerance enduring pain (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) tolerance enduring harm [from others] (apak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) and tolerance applied to reflection on the moments of existence (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti). 234 in the crushing of one’s enemies; in aloofness from the harm done by others; as attaining all the qualities of a Buddha.”10

The section on purified k¬¹nti (vi¶uddhak¬¹nti) lists the ways a person behaves, each with a reason for that behaviour. The commentary classifies this section as patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti). Whereas the previous section merely listed the ways k¬¹nti manifests, this section gives brief reasons that these behaviours are possible. The first three are:

One does not respond to insults with more insults through understanding that speech is . . . like an echo . . . ; one does not respond to beatings with more beatings through understanding that the body is . . . like a reflection . . . ; one does not respond to abuse with more abuse through understanding that thoughts are . . . like an illusion.11

The other behaviours, some listed here with their reasons, are: “not responding to anger with anger; not feeling aversion at not being praised; not being flattered by praise; no joy at gain; no aversion at loss; not being perplexed by fame; no despondency at the absence of fame; not being depressed by blame; not being exalted by praise because of not being unstable; not being fatigued by suffering through regard for living beings; not getting excited by pleasure because of the impermanence of conditioned pleasure; not getting sullied by the ways of the world (lokadharma) since one is dependent on nothing; tolerating violence against oneself; accepting cutting off of limbs and extremities; tolerating the destruction of one’s own body through desiring the body of a Buddha; tolerating every misdeed; enduring pain and suffering through having the courage to defeat all other ascetics; undertaking every kind of asceticism.”12

The next two sections of the Ak¬ayamati SØtra describe what is not absolute k¬¹nti (atyantak¬¹nti) and what is absolute k¬¹nti (atyantak¬¹nti). The commentary assigns these to patience as conviction from profound

10 Ibid., 145-148. I have used Braarvig’s translations, omitting repetitions, Sanskrit and commentary. 11 Ibid., 149. I have omitted the commentary in square brackets, and the Sanskrit. 12 Ibid., 149-150. I have omitted the Sanskrit, and some of the reasons given for each behaviour. 235 contemplation of dharmas (dharmanidhy¹n¹dhimok¬ak¬¹nti).13 This section begins by saying that k¬¹nti is “invulnerable . . . because it is beyond apprehension.”14 It then lists what is not absolute k¬¹nti (atyantak¬¹nti). These thirteen points note that how the bodhisattva thinks shows whether he/she is practising absolute tolerance or not. The first two of these say:

Tolerance thinking “He abuses Me,” is tolerance apprehending duality, it is not absolute tolerance . . . ; tolerance thinking “Who [in the sense of an permanent ego] abuses here?” is tolerance calculating and constructing moments of existence . . . , it is not absolute tolerance.15

The Ak¬ayamati SØtra goes on to describe absolute k¬¹nti (atyantak¬¹nti). K¬¹nti that each of the following is empty is absolute tolerance (atyantak¬¹nti): doctrinal views, the form of distinguishing marks, longing, the conditioned, defilements (kle¶a), the unvirtuous (aku¶ala), the worldly (laukika), the blamable (s¹vadya), evil influences (¹srava), the impure (sa÷kle¶a), existence. Before each of these, the SØtra explains in a formulaic way what the bodhisattva understands in that case. For instance, to have k¬¹nti that defilements (kle¶a) are empty, the bodhisattva understands the cessation of defilements (kle¶a), but does not suppress defilements (kle¶a) nor impute concepts of defilements (kle¶a).16 Finally, the bodhisattva understands that things do not arise, lack existence, and do not cease. This k¬¹nti of non-arising (anutp¹dak¬¹nti) is absolute tolerance (atyantak¬¹nti). Understanding this, the bodhisattva achieves the k¬¹nti of prediction (vy¹karak¬¹nti) and this is how the bodhisattva’s k¬¹nti becomes imperishable.17 The chapter finishes by describing a miracle performed by the bodhisattva Ak¬ayamati and says that as a result twenty thousand bodhisattvas attained patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti).18

13 Ibid., 151, translates as tolerance applied to reflection on the moments of existence. 14 Ibid., 151. 15 Ibid., 151. 16 Ibid., 153-155. 17 Ibid., 155. 18 Ibid., 156-159. The final paragraph of a later section of the Ak¬ayamati SØtra, which describes benevolence (maitr»), also mentions acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti). 236 The section on k¬¹nti does not include a statement of why k¬¹nti is to be practised and does not develop any arguments on how to practise k¬¹nti, although it does give brief reasons for aspects of purified k¬¹nti and brief statements of the ways of thinking that are either absolute or not absolute k¬¹nti.

I.2 ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa The influence of the Ak¬ayamati SØtra is evident in ¸rya¶Øra’s treatment of k¬¹nti.19 Like the Ak¬ayamati SØtra, ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa does not develop extensive arguments for practising k¬¹nti and distinguishes between ultimate, or absolute, and non-ultimate k¬¹nti (ASPS3:21-34). Most of the verses mention k¬¹nti, or one of its synonyms, and describes a distinct aspect of k¬¹nti, stating what k¬¹nti is and its benefit. The language is metaphorical and flowery.20 The first verse explains that k¬¹nti is worth practising as it is a means to liberation and welfare.21 The second verse explains that k¬¹nti is the steadfastness (vyavasthiti) which enables the offences of others to be ignored and is founded in compassion and acts for the benefit of the world, which is obstructed by wrath (ro¬a).22 The virtues of k¬¹nti are described rather than what is to be endured, which is specified mainly as the offences of others, particularly verbal abuse (ASPS3:5, 6, 26). The text emphasizes that the practice of k¬¹nti benefits others; the welfare of the world is mentioned in twelve verses of the forty verses (ASPS3:2-4, 10-11, 15, 17, 26, 30, 35, 38-39).

Four of the first five verses of ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa come directly from the story of K¬¹ntiv¹din in ¸rya¶Øra’s J¹takam¹l¹, which is a retelling of a birth story (j¹taka) about one of the Buddha’s previous lives, when he was a

19 Kusumita Priscilla Pedersen, The Dhy¹na chapter of the Bodhisattvapi−aka-sØtra (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1980), 13, 74, 77-78, found sections of the meditation (dhy¹na) chapter of ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa to resemble parts of the Bodhisattvapi−aka, and that Wayman and Takasaki Jikidø found similiarities between the Bodhisattvapi−aka and Ak¬ayamati SØtra. 20 Khoroche notes, of ¸rya¶Øra’s J¹takam¹l¹, that “Its vocabulary is rich: besides the words with a specialized Buddhist sense, there are many others rarely attested elsewhere, previously recorded only in dictionaries, or not recorded at all.” ¸rya¶Øra, Once the Buddha was a monkey: ¸rya ˜Øra’s J¹takam¹l¹, trans. Peter Khoroche (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), xvii. 21 J¹takam¹l¹ 28.29; ¸rya¶Øra, J¹takam¹l¹, trans. Khoroche, 197.

237 hermit named K¬¹ntiv¹din.23 In this story, K¬¹ntiv¹din has already developed k¬¹nti, and demonstrates his great accomplishment by remaining calm in the face of the anger of an angry king. The king becomes so angry that he orders the hermit to be hacked to pieces, and the hermit remains calm and reasonable the whole time, trying to persuade the king of the error of his actions. When k¬¹nti is discussed in Buddhist texts, there is often a reference to this story when k¬¹nti is spoken of in terms of not retaliating when being cut to pieces. Although ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa (ASPS3:4=JM28.27) describes k¬¹nti as “a torrent of rain on the raging fire of malice,” it does not seem to have that effect on the malice of others. The king gets angrier and angrier in the face of the patience of K¬¹ntiv¹din. According to ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa, k¬¹nti also counteracts wrath (ro¬a), malice (vy¹p¹da) (ASPS3:3-4), anger (krodha) (ASPS3:7) and animosity (vaira) (ASPS3:9).

Non-ultimate k¬¹nti involves correct conceptualization (sa÷yagvikalpa) (ASPS3:21-30), and ultimate k¬¹nti is only achieved when there is no conceptualization (ASPS3:31-34). The cause of anger is wrong conceptualization (mithy¹vikalpa) (ASPS3:18-20). The verses on non-ultimate k¬¹nti show briefly how non-ultimate k¬¹nti is to be practised. These methods of cultivating k¬¹nti include considering sense bases (ayatan¹) (ASPS3:21, Aks151- 152), reflecting on impermanence (ASPS3:22, Aks152), not perceiving a doer or an object of the action (ASPS3:23, Aks152); seeing sound as transitory, like an echo (ASPS3:26, Aks152); bearing teachings of impermanence, suffering, impurity, lack of own being (ASPS3:29, Aks152-153). Like the Ak¬ayamati SØtra, ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa finishes with a consideration of the non- arising of dharmas (ASPS3:32-34), but does not use the term patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti).

I.3 Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya The contents of Candrak»rti’s chapter on k¬¹nti in the Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya were discussed at length in an earlier chapter. For

22 ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa, 3:2-3, ¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium, trans. Meadows, 212, 380; ¸rya¶Øra, J¹takam¹l¹, trans. Khoroche, 197. 23 ¸rya¶Øra, J¹takam¹l¹, trans. Khoroche, 193-204. This story is also found in the P¹li j¹takas. 238 Candrak»rti, k¬¹nti means not being subject to anger (MA3:13). Candrak»rti’s introduction to k¬¹nti appears to refer to the j¹taka story about K¬¹ntiv¹din, as it describes k¬¹nti as manifesting when the bodhisattva’s body is being cut slowly into pieces (MA3:2). The commentary explains that the bodhisattva is naturally exempt of all disturbance of the body, of the voice or of the thought (MAB3:2).

In verse MA3:10, Candrak»rti introduces different types of k¬¹nti, namely mundane (laukika) and supramundane (lokottara) k¬¹nti. ¸rya¶Øra does not use the word lokottara as one of his synonyms for ultimate k¬¹nti. Attachment to any of the three supports, specified in MA3:3, leads to the practice of k¬¹nti as a mundane (laukika) p¹ramit¹. The Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya says that even applied to the acquisition of the excellence of Buddha, when it rests on the three supports – k¬¹nti, the one who endures and the beings who are endured, k¬¹nti is designated a mundane (laukika) p¹ramit¹ (MAB3:10ab).24 When k¬¹nti has no support, the Buddha teaches that it is a supramundane (lokottara) p¹ramit¹ (MA3:10cd).

On the third bhØmi, where k¬¹nti is perfected, the bodhisattva is not irritated (MA3:13) and destroys covetousness and hatred (MA3:11). What is to be endured is briefly stated as the attacks of others, suffering caused by others. There is very little mention of mental suffering or compassion.

I.4 BodhisattvabhØmi The BodhisattvabhØmi was introduced in an earlier chapter, with particular reference to patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti). It was noted that the BodhisattvabhØmi divides k¬¹nti into nine types: essence (svabh¹va), totality (sarva) (includes patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti), patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) and patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti)), difficult (du¬kara), complete/facing in all directions (sarvatomukha), true person (satpuru¬a), all

24 La Vallée Poussin, "Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 300. 239 aspects (sarv¹k¹ra), petitioners (vigh¹t¹rthika),25 happiness in this world (ih¹mutrasukha), and purified (vi¶uddha).26

The BodhisattvabhØmi describes the essence of k¬¹nti as follows:

tatra katam¹ bodhisattvasya svabh¹vak¬¹ntiå | y¹ pratisa¡khy¹nabalasanni¶rayeªa v¹ prakÅty¹ v¹ par¹pak¹rasya mar¬aª¹ sarve¬¹ñca mar¬aª¹ sarvasya ca mar¬aª¹ nir¹mi¬eªa ca cittena kevalay¹ karuªay¹ (BB130)

Therein, what is the bodhisattva’s essence (svabh¹va) of k¬¹nti. It is forgiving the offence of another either by nature or with the support of careful consideration, and endurance of all things, and endurance of everything by being free from covetousness27 and by a mind which is compassion alone.

What forgiving (mar¬aª¹) another’s offence consists of is outlined at the end of the section on patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) and also in the concluding section on purified (vi¶uddha) k¬¹nti. K¬¹nti means not retaliating, not being angry, not experiencing hatred or having hostile intention (BB132, 136). Purified (vi¶uddha) k¬¹nti also means having compassion and being devoid of lust for desires (k¹mav»tar¹ga) (BB136). The bodhisattva manifests k¬¹nti with the body by not striking, with the voice by not uttering unpleasant speech and with the mind by not being angry and by not maintaining impure intentions (BB135, sarv¹k¹rak¬¹nti). The sections on patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) and patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) outline the fundamental thinking (yoni¶o manasik¹ra) which the bodhisattva uses to cultivate k¬¹nti.

The BodhisattvabhØmi gives a variety of arguments for cultivating k¬¹nti. Acting for others is the main motivation for patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) and not becoming weary for patience as the

25 BHS483. 26 Tatz, Asanga’s Chapter on ethics, 47, translates the equivalent terms in the ¶»la chapter as “essence of ethics, complete ethics, difficult ethics, universal gateway ethics, the ethics of a holy person, ethics as all modes, ethics as distress and wishing, ethics as well-being here and there, and purified ethics.” 27 nir¹mi¬a MW free from covetousness/sensual desires; BHS: worldliness; ¹mi¬a BHS100: worldly things, possessions, enjoyments. 240 endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti). It refers to the compassion of bodhisattvas, but has nothing on merit or ultimate k¬¹nti.28

I.5 Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra was introduced in an earlier chapter. The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, being a commentary on Pañcavi÷¶atis¹hasrik¹ Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹, clearly follows its line that k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ means remaining imperturbable (ak¬obhya). Being imperturbable (ak¬obhaªat¹) means not experiencing hatred (dve¬a, pratigha), not uttering unpleasant words, physically not doing bad, mentally not experiencing doubt, and enduring insult, torment and physical attack of others (MPPS926).

This text covers all aspects of k¬¹nti and presents extensive arguments to aid the bodhisattva to cultivate k¬¹nti. Although Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra divides k¬¹nti into patience towards beings (sattvak¬¹nti) and patience towards dharmas (dharmak¬¹nti), beings are actually one type of dharma, as dharmas form two groups, beings and things (dharma). Patience towards beings (sattvak¬¹nti) includes both those who attack and those who flatter, and results in immeasurable merit (puªya), and patience towards dharmas (dharmak¬¹nti) results in immeasurable wisdom (prajñ¹) (MPPS865). The practice of patience towards beings (sattvak¬¹nti) involves not only avoiding anger towards tormentors, but also not developing attachment to flatterers. The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra explains that this is because there are two sorts of fetters (sa÷yojana): depending on attachment (anunaya) and depending on aversion (pratigha) (MPPS867). Patience towards dharmas (dharmak¬¹nti) includes endurance of suffering as well as those aspects that ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa and Ak¬ayamati SØtra describe as ultimate, or absolute, k¬¹nti.

28 One of the thirteen types of all aspects (sarv¹k¹ra) k¬¹nti is: And knowing all dharmas to be without existence (niåsattva), one who observes the inexpressible dharma elements is patient, because of profound contemplation of dharmas (dharmanidhy¹na). 241 II Why k¬¹nti?

II.1 Protecting merit For ˜¹ntideva, k¬¹nti is the avoidance of anger and hatred, enduring suffering and propitiating beings. In the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, the primary reason given for practising k¬¹nti is that anger destroys merit; in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, it is to maintain energy and not experience weariness while hearing the teaching (SSB179), as a first step in removing defilements (kle¶a). Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra is the only other text to describe k¬¹nti as protecting merit, although the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra does allude to the idea. Neither the BodhisattvabhØmi nor the Ak¬ayamati SØtra give a primary reason for practising k¬¹nti. For ¸rya¶Øra, k¬¹nti should be practised because it is a means to liberation and welfare (ASPS3:1=JM28.29), while the welfare of others is the main motivation for patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) in the BodhisattvabhØmi. All of the texts describe the faults of anger, or lack of k¬¹nti, and the benefits of k¬¹nti as reasons for practising k¬¹nti.

˜¹ntideva’s argument – that a moment of anger destroys merit and k¬¹nti protects merit, since it is an antidote to anger, and is therefore the greatest austerity (BCA6:1-2) – is put very similarly by Candrak»rti (MA3:6). Whereas ˜¹ntideva says there is neither sin equal to hatred nor austerity equal to k¬¹nti (BCA6:2), Candrak»rti says there is no sin greater than non-k¬¹nti. Candrak»rti also specifies a moment of anger towards a bodhisattva, which ˜¹ntideva specifies in chapter 7 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB149), but not in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. Candrak»rti uses the quotation from Mañju¶r»vikr»©ita SØtra in his commentary (MAB3:6), which is also used by ˜¹ntideva in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7 (SSB149.5-6) and by Prajñ¹karamati in his commentary to BCA6:1.

The statement that k¬¹nti is the highest austerity (tapas) (BCA6:2) is similar to a statement found in non-Mah¹y¹na texts such as D»gha Nik¹ya,

242 Dhammapada, and the Visuddhimagga.29 The Mah¹pad¹na Sutta in the D»gha Nik¹ya says:30

khant» parama÷ tapo titikkh¹ nibb¹na÷ parama÷ vadanti Buddh¹

The Buddhas says that k¬¹nti is the highest austerity, forbearance is the highest nirv¹ªa.

N¹g¹rjuna’s two verses on k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the SuhÅllekha are :

There is no austerity like patience – So do not give way to anger. By overcoming anger, the Buddha acknowledged, One attains the Stage of Non-Returning.

“This person insulted me, this one struck or Overwhelmed me, that one stole my wealth.” Such resentment generates conflict; he Who abandons resentment sleeps easily.31

The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra (BCA6:3) also follows its description of k¬¹nti being the highest austerity with the statement that an angry mind does not enjoy sleep, indicating a possible debt to these verses, or a common source.32

The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra’s primary reason for practising k¬¹nti is that it produces immeasurable merit (puªya) and immeasurable prajñ¹ (MPPS865). Apart from immeasurable merit resulting from patience towards beings (sattvak¬¹nti) (MPPS865), the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra includes arguments to avoid anger that allude to the destruction of merit: the single occurrence of experiencing annoyance because of external suffering such as cold and heat is disastrous for the bodhisattva’s career (MPPS904); anger with beings

29 T. W. Rhys Davids and William Stede, eds., Pali-English Dictionary (First published 1921-1925; reprint, London: Pali Text Society, 1979), 232; Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga. The path of purification, trans. Bhikkhu ѹnnamoli, 3rd ed. (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1975), 321: "No higher rule, the Buddhas say, than patience, and no nibbana higher than forbearance." 30 D»gha Nik¹ya, trans. Walshe, 219. Walshe translates tapas as sacrifice. 31 N¹g¹rjuna’s letter: N¹g¹rjuna’s "Letter to a friend," commentary by Venerable Rendawa, Zhön-nu Lo-drö; trans. Lobsang Tharchin and Artemus B. Engle (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979), 49-50. 32 In the P¹li canon, the eleven advantages of benevolence (maitr») include sleeping well and being dear to others. For example, A¡guttara Nik¹ya. The book of the gradual sayings, or

243 of the Buddha’s family is anger with the Buddha, if the bodhisattva is angry with the Buddha all is finished (MPPS891); anger destroys the bodhisattva’s gains (probably referring to merit accumulated) and also destroys compassion (karuª¹) (MPPS893). The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra also considers anger to be the worst defilement (kle¶a) and the sin that attracts the greatest punishment (MPPS891); the sin of anger is so serious that one arrives at no longer accepting the word of the Buddha (MPPS898); hatred (dve¬a) is the most serious of the three poisons, being the most difficult of the ills of the mind to cure (MPPS894).

The only implication of merit in the Ak¬ayamati SØtra is the statement that k¬¹nti manifests in having done away with all sins, attaining Buddha qualities and rejecting all roots of non-virtue (aku¶alamØla) (Aks148). In keeping with its emphasis on aiding others, ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa states that endurance (titik¬¹) is the principal religious observance (d»k¬¹) of those devoted to the aims of others, because the fault of wrath (ro¬a) obstructs what is best for others (ASPS3:3). Merit may be implied in ASPS3:8, as the practice of k¬¹nti results in the form of a Buddha, which is the result of accumulated merit.33

The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 8 describes at length how hatred (dve¬a) is the worst defilement (kle¶a), and since k¬¹nti counteracts hatred, it follows that lack of k¬¹nti is the worst sin. Chapter 8 also advises the bodhisattva to restrain anger because accomplishing the welfare of others is more important than one’s own welfare, the fault of anger is that it diminishes compassion (SSB165). The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya has k¬¹nti as the first step in removing defilements (SSB179). However, it is ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 7 which describes anger as destroying merit.

II.2 Weariness and other faults/benefits For the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, maintaining energy (v»rya) through combating weariness is the primary reason for practising k¬¹nti (SSB179), but this aspect is not found in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, in the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, or in the

more-numbered suttas, trans. F. L. Woodward, Pali Text Society translation series, no. 22 (First published 1932; reprint, London: Published for the Society by Luzac & Company, 1960), 5:219. 33 ¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium, trans. Meadows, 296. 244 Ak¬ayamati SØtra. Reference to weariness as an aspect of k¬¹nti, or a beneficial outcome of k¬¹nti, is found in ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa (ASPS3:8, 16) and in the BodhisattvabhØmi. The BodhisattvabhØmi places most emphasis on this aspect of k¬¹nti. It indicates that not becoming weary is the main motivation for patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti). It also lists suffering the weariness of exertion among the eight forms of suffering which must be endured and says that the bodhisattva enduring suffering does not become weary or lose exertion in the face of all the types of suffering (BB132- 133, duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti). Another reference to weariness is found among the nine kinds of ih¹mutrasukh¹ (happiness in this world) k¬¹nti: having become fatigued, the bodhisattva is patient in the face of irritation and weariness of the mind and body (BB136).

Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya and the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra are similar in the faults of anger, or lack of k¬¹nti that they detail. Lack of k¬¹nti leads to immense suffering, bad destinies (MA3:5, MPPS894, 899, BB130) and lack of judgement (MA3:7, MPPS894). The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya also suggests that anger (krodha) leads a despondent person to act ineffectively (SSB180.09). As well, the Madhyamak¹vat¹ra says anger is futile (MA3:4), leads to ugliness and keeping bad company (MA3:7). Other faults of hatred (dve¬a) in the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra are that the hateful person forgets good words (subh¹¬ita), neglects his reputation and ignores the pains of others (MPPS894). ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa agrees with the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB179) that lack of k¬¹nti leads to weariness (ASPS3:16, SSB179) and wrath obstructs what is beneficial to others (ASPS3:3, SSB165).

Candrak»rti specifies the benefits of k¬¹nti as the opposite to the faults he has named: good destiny (also MPPS899, BB135, ASPS3:37), destruction of sin, good company, beauty (also Aks146, 148) and discrimination (MA3:8). The other texts consider that the practice of k¬¹nti leads to good results or immense rewards, virtues, supreme perfect enlightenment, and the qualities of a Buddha, or Buddhahood (ASPS3:2, 4, 6-11, 17, 35, 40; MPPS898, 909; Aks148; BB137).

245 In ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa, the main motivation for practising k¬¹nti is the benefit of others, the world or beings, rather than personal happiness.34 The emphasis is the benefits of k¬¹nti rather than the faults of anger (ASPS3:1-17, 35-40). The BodhisattvabhØmi and Ak¬ayamati SØtra also do not place much emphasis on explaining the faults of anger. The BodhisattvabhØmi briefly describes the benefits as non-enmity, absence of difference (abheda), happiness and high spiritedness, dying without regret and having a good destiny (BB135). All of the first section of the Ak¬ayamati SØtra lists the positive manifestations of k¬¹nti (Aks145-148).

˜¹ntideva frames the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra with the faults of anger and the benefits of k¬¹nti. It starts with the faults of anger: it destroys merit and a hateful person is uncomfortable and disliked (BCA6:1-6). The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra also describes the hateful person as being difficult to support, like a tiger or a wolf, and easily aggravated, like an ulcer, and as comparable to a venomous serpent, who people see without pleasure (MPPS895- 896). The last two verses of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra describe the benefits of propitiating beings, which is the outcome of k¬¹nti. Causing beings to be happy leads to Buddhahood (BCA6:132-133). Again, a similarity with Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, which says that by cultivating patience, one easily obtains benevolence (maitr») and compassion (karuª¹) and owing to them one reaches Buddhahood (MPPS898), is evident. ˜¹ntideva suggests that a forgiving person (k¬am») also obtains happiness in this life (BCA6:133-134). Compared to the other texts, the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is much more focused on the bodhisattva’s personal goals (sv¹rtha).

III Arguments to aid the cultivation of k¬¹nti ˜¹ntideva and the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra give a general argument for cultivating k¬¹nti. The other texts do not, although considering the benefits of

34 ¸rya-˜Øra’s Compendium, trans. Meadows, 30-31, suggests that, in comparison to his J¹takam¹l¹, ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa has balance between one’s own aim (sv¹rtha) and that of others (par¹rtha), but the P¹ramit¹sam¹sa is far more focussed on the aim of others than the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. 246 k¬¹nti and the faults of anger, supplied as reasons for practising k¬¹nti, is also one of the ways to cultivate k¬¹nti.

At the beginning of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter, the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra provides a general argument for cultivating k¬¹nti, before providing a variety of arguments for cultivating patience towards beings (sattvak¬¹nti) and patience towards dharmas (dharmak¬¹nti).

Le Bodhisattva qui rencontre la médisance ou l’injure, qui est frappé par l’épée ou le bâton, sait, à la réflexion, que la cause en est à ses actes [antérieurs], que les Dharma, tant à l’intérieur (adhy¹tmam) qu’à l’extérieur (b¹hyam), sont absolument vides (atyant¹¶Ønya), privés de Moi substantiel (an¹tman), non- possédés par un Moi (an¹tmya). Le triple sceau de la Loi (dharmamudr¹) est imprimé sur tous les Dharma, et, bien qu’ils aient le pouvoir d’entraîner une rétribution douloureuse, le Bodhisattva les supporte sans éprouver d’irritation (du¬−acitta), ni prononcer d’injure. (MPPS865-866)

A bodhisattva faced with scandalmongering or abuse, or being hit with a stick, knows through consideration that its cause is his prior acts and that dharmas, whether interior or exterior, are completely empty, devoid of self, nor possessed by a self. The triple mark of the Dharma is imprinted on all dharmas and, though they have the power to cause a painful retribution,35 the bodhisattva endures them without experiencing irritation, or speaking abuse.

The BodhisattvabhØmi does not provide a general argument. Forgiving the offence of another can be achieved either by nature or with the support of careful consideration (pratisa÷khy¹nabalasanni¶raya); forgiving (mar¬aª¹) everything by being free from covetousness (nir¹mi¬a) and by a mind which is compassion alone (BB130, svabh¹vak¬¹nti). It goes on to supply some considerations for the bodhisattva to use for cultivating patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) and patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti), as well as the other kinds of k¬¹nti.

Candrak»rti does not provide extensive arguments to help the bodhisattva cultivate k¬¹nti, but states that knowing the faults of anger, or lack of k¬¹nti, and the benefits of k¬¹nti should lead both ordinary people and bodhisattvas to give

247 up lack of k¬¹nti and to practise k¬¹nti (MA3.9). To endure extreme physical torment caused by another, Candrak»rti says that the bodhisattva is patient because he perceives the absence of a self (nair¹tmya), and therefore sees the one being cut, the one doing the cutting and the occasion of the cutting as reflections (MA3:3).

The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra also introduces the faults of anger and the benefits of k¬¹nti in its arguments for practising both patience towards beings (sattvak¬¹nti) and patience towards dharmas (dharmak¬¹nti). Under patience towards dharmas (dharmak¬¹nti), the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra says that the bodhisattva endures internal mental sufferings by the force of wisdom (prajñ¹), knowing that anger has all kinds of faults and patience has all kinds of qualities (MPPS909). In ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa, among the verses which briefly show how non-ultimate k¬¹nti is to be practised (ASPS3:21-30), ASPS3:28 says that a person can endure things from considering suffering the consequences of actions, therefore k¬¹nti can be cultivated by seeing the advantage.

III.1 ˜¹ntideva’s main argument ˜¹ntideva’s main argument, that k¬¹nti is the avoidance of anger and hatred, anger and hatred are a response to dejection (daurmanasya), which is caused by not getting what one wants, or getting what one does not want (duåkha), is not found in other texts. For all the texts, k¬¹nti includes the avoidance of anger and hatred, but they do not follow ˜¹ntideva’s line of argument further. The other elements of this argument outlined in the previous chapter, strong mind, practice, joy (mudit¹), find very little place in these texts.

The BodhisattvabhØmi and Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra do not give a specific cause for anger.36 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra deals with much more than the avoidance of anger, and BodhisattvabhØmi’s focus is forgiving offences, rather than avoiding anger, although forgiving offences includes avoiding anger.

35 MPPS, 915, says, when considering non-self of dharmas, that although the dharmas may be non-self (an¹tman), one does not escape from sin or merit. 36 MPPS920 does say that attachment, hatred and confusion (r¹gadve¬amoha) are caused by the view of existence (bh¹vadŬ−i). SSB242 quotes from the Tath¹gataguhya sØtra, to the effect that all defilements (kle¶a) are extinguished with the cessation of the view of a real personality (satk¹yadŬ−i) 248 According to ¸rya¶Øra, wrong conceptualization (mithy¹vikalpa) is the cause of anger of those weak in firmness, and correct conceptualization (sa÷yagvikalpa) establishes peace of mind, which it calls a type of k¬¹nti (ASPS3:18). Candrak»rti’s commentary to Madhyamak¹vat¹ra argues that anger comes from attributing one’s suffering to offences done by another, whereas the suffering is caused by a person’s own previous actions. By enduring the suffering and not retaliating the person pays for his/her own previous sins, whereas anger is a seed for further suffering (MAB3:5).

III.1.i Dejection ˜¹ntideva is the only one to propose that dejection (daurmanasya) leads to anger. Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya and the BodhisattvabhØmi do not refer to dejection or elation.37 In the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, dejection is listed as one of the mental dharmas which a bodhisattva must endure (MPPS904). The other texts say that k¬¹nti includes not being elated or depressed. The Ak¬ayamati SØtra describes purified patience (vi¶uddhak¬¹nti) as not feeling flattered, joy, exalted, excited by such things as praise, gain, fame, pleasure, or not feeling perplexed, despondency, depressed, by such things as loss, absence of fame, blame, suffering (Aks146).38 ¸rya¶Øra says that a patient person does not feel elated by happiness or cowed by disgrace (ASPS3:12-13). The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra speaks of two sorts of fetters (sa÷yojana): depending on attachment (anunaya) and depending on aversion (pratigha) (MPPS867).39 These are warned against in the quotation from the UgradattaparipÅcch¹ in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB180). The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, chapter 7, also connects not being elated by gifts, fame or praise with avoiding pride (SS150-151).

37 The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya and Bodhicary¹vat¹ra claim that dejection (daurmanasya) is useless as it provides no remedy to an unwanted situation, Candrak»rti describes anger in similar terms (MA3:4). 38 These are the eight worldly conditions (lokadharma). See below. 39 Conze, Buddhist thought, 90, describes link between anunaya/pratigha and equanimity (upek¬¹). 249 III.1.ii Strong mind Only ˜¹ntideva and the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra place emphasis on a strong mind. For ˜¹ntideva, a strong, or imperturbable, mind is necessary to avoid dejection, or endure the suffering which results from unwanted experience. It is not surprising that ˜ik¬¹samuccaya places some emphasis on the strong mind, as the prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ sØtras define k¬¹nti as imperturbability (ak¬obhya), and ˜ik¬¹samuccaya quotes from early Mah¹y¹na sØtras, such as ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra,40 Gaª©avyØha and UgradattaparipÅcch¹ (SSB180.14- 17, 184.9-188.4). However, the Ak¬ayamati SØtra is also an early Mah¹y¹na text and it does not mention imperturbability (ak¬obhya), the only slight reference being that the bodhisattva is not exalted by praise (pra¶a÷s¹) due to immovability (acalanat¹) (Aks149).

This idea is not central in other texts. ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa describes forbearance (k¬am¹) as steadfastness (vyavasthiti) (ASPS3:2=JM28.26); k¬¹nti as a calm manner (dh»raprak¹ra) (ASPS3:6); the minds of the illustrious as not agitated (vikriya) by abuses or the offences of others (ASPS3:14, 17); wrong conceptualization (mithy¹vikalpa) as the cause of anger for those weak in firmness (dhÅtidurbala) (ASPS3:18); k¬¹nti as immovable (acalat¹) when there is correct conceptualization (sa÷yagvikalpa) (ASPS3:19) and someone who has attained ultimate k¬¹nti as always well- composed (sam¹hita) (ASPS3:35). Candrak»rti mentions disturbance in the commentary to MA3:2: the k¬¹nti of a bodhisattva being attacked is extreme and the bodhisattva is naturally exempt of all disturbance of the body, of the voice or of the thought (MAB3:2). The only allusion in the BodhisattvabhØmi is that a patient person has steady conduct (¹yatti) (BB135).

III.1.iii Practice ˜¹ntideva is the only one to suggest that the bodhisattva can develop a strong mind through practice. The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra suggests that the bodhisattva needs to be able to endure small sufferings in order to be able to endure large sufferings (MPPS906), and the BodhisattvabhØmi that conviction

40 In the S¹garamati SØtra, k¬¹nti equals non-disturbance of mind (SSB184.9-188.4). 250 (adhimukti) is established due to practice for a long time (BB134). The BodhisattvabhØmi also suggests that the bodhisattva should endure small suffering, as enduring great suffering is appropriate for the goal of bringing happiness to beings (BB132).

III.1.iv Joy Although the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya suggests that the bodhisattva practise k¬¹nti by maintaining joy, and defines joy (mudit¹) with a long quotation from the Ak¬ayamati SØtra (SSB183.4-184.3), joy is not mentioned in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ section of the Ak¬ayamati SØtra; nor is it mentioned in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa, in Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya or in the BodhisattvabhØmi. The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra only mentions it in arguing that the bodhisattva should endure attacks of others as beings get joy from attacking (MPPS892).

III.1.v What is desired/undesired Apart from the two main things which a bodhisattva must endure – the offences of others and suffering – the texts vary in the extent to which they specify what the bodhisattva wants or does not want. As they do not use the same principle argument for avoiding anger as ˜¹ntideva, they do not dwell on the types of suffering which a bodhisattva must endure. All texts refer to the higher aims and states which a bodhisattva wants, such as Buddhahood, liberation, and the good of beings. ˜¹ntideva also allows bodhisattvas to have happiness, and allows for worthwhile worldly desires.41 All the texts show that k¬¹nti involves not being disturbed by unwanted experiences, but the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra’s focus is changing one’s attitude to these experiences through analysis. Other texts apply this analysis to suffering in general, not specific types.

The Buddha’s first sermon preached the four noble truths, the first of which consisted of describing occasions of physical and mental suffering, and

41 Only bodily pleasure is allowed, not mental (BCA6:90-91). Also, mental suffering only occurs because of the mind’s attachment to the body (BCA6:52). 251 then categorizing and defining them.42 The definition begins with birth (j¹ti) and includes dejection (daurmanasya), physical pain which causes mental suffering, and ordinary suffering which includes mental suffering caused by “association with persons and things which are not dear, dissociation from persons and things which are dear, not getting what one desires.”43 In the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, ˜¹ntideva focuses on the type of suffering which arises from not getting what one desires.

The ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, Candrak»rti and ¸rya¶Øra focus on physical and verbal attacks of others. Apart from the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra and BodhisattvabhØmi pay the most attention to the types of experience a bodhisattva has to endure. The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra is similar to the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya in advising the bodhisattva to simply endure these things, but the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra works at changing the bodhisattva’s attitude to suffering. Whereas the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra spoon-feeds the training bodhisattva with gentle arguments to deal with dejection, the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya’s attitude is, “Just don’t be dejected.”

For ˜¹ntideva, the two categories of experience which a bodhisattva does not want are physical suffering, caused by inanimate things, or by animate beings, and mental suffering, caused by vilification, insults, and desire for gain and honour (BCA6:11, 52). In the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, extra-mental things are classified as either internal, such as hunger, thirst, old age, sickness, or external, such as cold, heat, wind, rain. Mental things are also divided into two classes: 1) anger (krodha, vy¹p¹da), dejection (daurmanasya), doubt (sa÷¶aya), etc. 2) attachment (r¹ga), pride (abhim¹na), etc. The bodhisattva endures both mental and extra-mental things without complaint (MPPS903- 904). Only Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, BodhisattvabhØmi and ˜¹ntideva specify types of physical suffering, such as cold, heat, hunger, thirst, sickness and death.

The BodhisattvabhØmi refers several times to what is desired or undesired: the reason forgiving the offence of another is necessary is because it is undesired

42 S. K. Nanayakkara, “Dukkha,” in Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, ed. W. G. Weeraratne, vol. 4, fasc. 4 ([Colombo]: Government of Sri Lanka, 1989), 697-698. 43 Ibid. 252 (BB130); one of the thirteen kinds of all aspects (sarv¹k¹ra) k¬¹nti is that the bodhisattva, having known the non-patience which is the ripening of what is undesired, is patient because of fear (BB135). Under patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti), the BodhisattvabhØmi specifies that following desires has caused suffering and the essence of desire is suffering and classifies the different types of suffering a bodhisattva may have to endure: 1) the supports of a monk’s life (because they may be lacking or be of poor quality) 2) the nine worldly dharmas (loss, absence of fame, blame, suffering, the destruction of the dharma of destruction, the diminishment of the dharma of diminishment, the old age of the dharma of old age, the disease of the dharma of disease, the death of the dharma of death)44 3) four bodily postures (because they lead to fatigue) 4) seven kinds of adopting the dharma (including pØj¹, teaching, investigation, cultivating calm and insight) 5) seven aspects of the mendicant’s mode of life (including looking strange due to shaved head and faded clothes) 6) weariness of exertion 7) the eleven aspects of action for the sake of beings45 and 8) householder or monastic obligations (BB132-133).

Candrak»rti, BodhisattvabhØmi and Ak¬ayamati SØtra say that a bodhisattva’s practice of k¬¹nti leads to no covetousness (MA3:11, BB136)46 and k¬¹nti manifests “in disgust for worldly things and absence of cupidity” (Aks149). Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya explains that, by saying the bodhisattva is free of anger and lust, the verse means to indicate that all defilements (kle¶a) diminish. Although the verse says that on the third bhØmi, the bodhisattva obtains complete destruction of attachment and hatred (MA3:11), the commentary indicates that these decrease, not that they disappear completely (MAB3:11). It also emphasizes the decrease of attachment (r¹ga), even to the point of helping other beings to be free of desire.47 The

44 Slightly different to the eight worldly dharmas (lokadharma), translated by Edgerton as “conditions of the world,” BHS464: 8 conditions of the world - gain loss, happiness suffering, fame not fame, praise blame. 45 BodhisattvabhØmi says that these have already been described. They are part of the chapter on ¶»la, a translation of which is found in Tatz, Asanga’s Chapter on ethics, 53-59. 46 BB136: the final of the ten purified (vi¶uddha) k¬¹nti is that the bodhisattva is devoid of lust for desires. 47 La Vallée Poussin, “Madhyamak¹vat¹ra,” 303. The commentary includes a quotation from Da¶abhØmika, the bodhisattva “is skilled . . . in suppressing the lust of beings” and “removing beings from the mud of desire.” Honda, "Da¶abhØmikasØtra," 163P. 253 Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra allows that desires exist in the bodhisattva subtly, but do not manifest (MPPS908).48

III.1.v.a Eight lokadharma The types of experience which ˜¹ntideva goes to great length to deal with include the eight worldly dharmas (lokadharma): gain/loss, happiness/suffering, fame/not fame,49 praise/blame. As noted above, the bodhisattva practising k¬¹nti is not disturbed by any of these states, either elated by those which are desired or depressed by those which are undesired (Aks146, ASPS3:13, SS180). The eight worldly dharmas, like suffering, cannot be avoided since they “arise in connection with worldly life.”50 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra advises the bodhisattva to say to himself, “If the eight worldly dharmas (lokadharma) are not able to be avoided by the ¹ryas, how then will I be able to avoid them?” (MPPS905)51 As well, for cultivating k¬¹nti towards flatterers, the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra argues that gain and honour are a deep wound, illustrating the point with the story of Devadatta. For the bodhisattva, k¬¹nti consists of not attaching oneself to those who pay respect and homage to him (satk¹ra, pØj¹) (MPPS868-878). For ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa, consideration that the worldly dharmas (lokadharma) arise dependently is non-ultimate k¬¹nti (ASPS3:24).

III.2 Arguments based on nature of suffering All the texts consider the nature of suffering among their arguments to cultivate k¬¹nti. The nature of human existence is suffering, so suffering is inevitable, not enduring suffering leads to more suffering, observing the suffering of beings should lead to compassion; the cause of suffering is one’s own actions; it is futile to try to avoid suffering and suffering can have benefits.

48 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra includes k¬¹nti towards defilements (kle¶a) as part of patience towards dharmas (dharmak¬¹nti), as the bodhisattva controls the defilements (kle¶a) but does not cut them (MPPS908-909). On the other hand, it does describe crushing the interior army of M¹ra, which consists of the fetters and the defilements (kle¶a) (MPPS906), and also describes the fetters as enemies, which are locked up but not killed (MPPS909). ˜¹ntideva quotes from the Tath¹gataguhya sØtra, which describes defilements (kle¶a) being destroyed like a tree being cut at the root (SSB242). 49 Nyanatiloka, 91: honour and dishonour. 50 Ibid. 51 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra classifies the worldly conditions (lokadharma) as internal suffering (like hunger). 254 Suffering can either be useless, when endured for ordinary goals, or useful, when accompanied by the bodhisattva’s vow to help beings.

III.2.1 Cause of suffering is own acts The cause of suffering is one’s own acts. ˜¹ntideva uses this argument at BCA6:42, 45-48, 68. This argument is used for enduring all kinds of suffering caused and not caused by another and has prominence in the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra and BodhisattvabhØmi. It is used in the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra’s general argument for cultivating k¬¹nti (MPPS865),52 in its first argument for cultivating k¬¹nti towards persecutors (part of patience towards beings (sattvak¬¹nti)) (MPPS889)53 and in its first argument for cultivating patience towards dharmas (dharmak¬¹nti) (MPPS904).54 Candrak»rti also suggests that one’s suffering is caused by one’s own actions, not by another, and that by enduring it less suffering will be encountered in the future (MAB3:5).

The BodhisattvabhØmi’s first consideration to aid patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) is realizing that suffering is the result of one’s own actions and others are not the cause of suffering, that the sole cause of what is undesired is one’s own actions (BB130). This is also the consideration the bodhisattva uses for cultivating patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti): “Having carefully considered, surely I have followed the courses of desire, seeking desires, on account of desires whose essence is suffering by being the cause of suffering, strong sufferings have arisen, have arrived, have been endured, have been experienced” (BB132).

The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, BodhisattvabhØmi, Candrak»rti and ˜¹ntideva all point out that lack of k¬¹nti, not enduring suffering, retaliating or responding with anger, in the future will become a cause of suffering (MPPS899-

52 The bodhisattva knows that any abuse or offence is caused by prior acts (MPPS865). 53 For enduring external suffering, such as cold and heat , the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra says that the bodhisattva reflects that the cause of his suffering is his own previous transgressions (pØrv¹patti): “that which I have done myself, I must endure it myself.” (MPPS904) 54 For bearing the suffering caused by others, the bodhisattva reflects that, “The torment which I undergo today has its cause in my previous conduct. If I have done nothing wrong in this life, I atone for the injury caused in my previous lives. I am in the process of paying; bear this torment with gentleness, what’s the use of rebelling.” (MPPS889) 255 900, BB130, MA3:5, BCA6:6, 73-74, 131). ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa and the Ak¬ayamati SØtra refer to this argument briefly: one way to practise non- ultimate k¬¹nti is from considering suffering the consequences of actions (ASPS3:28); k¬¹nti manifests “in confidence in the fact that actions mature” (Aks146).

III.2.2 Not able to avoid suffering The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra’s principle argument for cultivating k¬¹nti suggest that the bodhisattva considers the triple mark of the Dharma (dharmamØdra), which is later specified as all conditions are impermanent (anity¹å sarvasa÷sk¹r¹å),55 all dharmas are non-self (an¹tm¹naå sarvadharm¹å) and nirv¹ª¹ is truth (satya÷ nirv¹ªam) (MPPS865, 912). The triple mark is usually specified as all conditions are suffering (duåkha), all conditions are impermanent and all dharmas are non-self. Moreover, the first noble truth is suffering. This Buddhist doctrine is resorted to by Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, BodhisattvabhØmi and ˜¹ntideva to aid the bodhisattva in cultivating k¬¹nti.

In the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, the bodhisattva considers that it is not possible to avoid suffering, either because of being human or due to the battle with the defilements (kle¶a) (BCA6:12, 19, 66). The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra introduces this argument in both patience towards beings (sattvak¬¹nti) and patience towards dharmas (dharmak¬¹nti). To endure internal suffering, the bodhisattva considers that although the human body is prey to old age, sickness and death, it is only in a human body that the bodhisattva can earn merit and act for the good of beings; the bodhisattva reflects that suffering is unavoidable in the human body, everyone suffers and “the entire universe is suffering, therefore how do I wish to look for happiness?” (MPPS905-906) To endure the offences of others, the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra and BodhisattvabhØmi add that

55 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra uses impermanence in arguments for patience towards beings and dharmas (MPPS880, 905, 908). The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra does not use the thought of impermanence as an argument for k¬¹nti, but it is found in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya (SSB150, 180). The perception of impermanence is one of the five perceptions suggested by the BodhisattvabhØmi for cultivating patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) (BB131). Both the Ak¬ayamati SØtra and ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa also have arguments based on impermanence (ASPS3:12, 22, 26; Aks149, 152). 256 knowing that beings inevitably suffer should lead to compassion on the part of the bodhisattva.56

III.2.3 Benefits of suffering Among the faults of lack of k¬¹nti, described above, is that it leads to more suffering, often specifically the hells (MPPS899-900, MAB3:3, BB130). On the other hand, suffering can either be useful, leading to less suffering and welfare for beings, or useless, leading to more suffering. ˜¹ntideva shows that present suffering leads to a decrease in future suffering and not enduring it leads to an increase in suffering (BCA6:14, 16, 72-73). ˜¹ntideva, Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra and BodhisattvabhØmi all argue that, in contrast to the suffering experienced in the course of an ordinary life, which only causes more suffering, a bodhisattva’s suffering has benefits and leads to the welfare of beings. The bodhisattva is asked to compare the suffering undertaken for goals that only lead to more suffering with suffering for a worthwhile purpose.

Arguments for cultivating patience towards dharmas (dharmak¬¹nti) in the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra include: monks, in spite of undergoing present suffering, will find happiness and earn the path in the future; laity, in spite of undergoing present happiness, will find suffering in the future (MPPS905); the bodhisattva says to himself, “During innumerable kalpa I have undergone all sorts of suffering without cease, without getting any advantage, today in the interest of beings I seek Buddhahood, I will have a great advantage from undergoing this suffering.” (MPPS906)

The fundamental thinking (yoni¶o manasik¹ra) used by a bodhisattva cultivating patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) in the BodhisattvabhØmi is realizing that following desires by engaging in such activities as ploughing, trading and being a king’s minister has been a cause of

56 To endure persecutors, the bodhisattva cultivates compassion (karuª¹), recognizing that all beings are ceaselessly prey to all sufferings and asking, why would the ascetic add still more to the suffering of beings? (MPPS890); The bodhisattva realizes that, “By nature, the mental dispositions of myself and others are all these mental conditions (sarvasa÷sk¹ra) whose nature is suffering” and as the bodhisattva knows better, it is not proper to bring more suffering for those who are afflicted by nature (BB130). The bodhisattva is patient due to having sympathy for beings who are suffering old age, sickness and death from being in sa÷s¹ra (BB136, ih¹mutrasukh¹ k¬¹nti). ˜¹ntideva suggests that a virtue of suffering is that it leads to compassion for beings in sa÷s¹ra (BCA6:21). 257 suffering, but as the bodhisattva is now engaged in doing good by causing happiness to beings, he should be able to endure great suffering (BB132). The BodhisattvabhØmi refers to the bodhisattva’s previous existences, whereas the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya suggests that the bodhisattva observe that even ordinary people can get used to suffering and that the bodhisattva should be able to endure far greater suffering than them, by considering the immense rewards at stake, such as the happiness of sa÷s¹ra (SS180-181).

The BodhisattvabhØmi refers to the fruitlessness of suffering when considering patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti). The suffering which a bodhisattva attributes to another and is actually due to the bodhisattva’s own actions does not have any benefit (BB130). The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra also suggests that suffering endured as a result of anger is of no benefit, but that suffering endured to protect merit is of a different kind and leads to a great result (BCA6:68-75). Another advantage of suffering for ˜¹ntideva, is that it leads to compassion (BCA6:21).

Because lack of k¬¹nti leads to further suffering, the BodhisattvabhØmi suggests that it is not proper even for ¶r¹vakas who act only for their own sake, so it is even less appropriate for bodhisattvas who act for the sake of others (BB130). Although ˜¹ntideva is speaking to bodhisattvas, he does hold out the possibility of achieving happiness in this life.

III.3 Realizing others do not cause suffering All the texts deal with enduring offences of others and not retaliating. In general, it is a mistake to attribute one’s suffering to others. There are a variety of arguments: realizing that the other is not the cause because something else is, changing one’s attitude to the other (and therefore no longer seeing it as “other”) and realizing that there is no self and other.

III.3.1 The other is not the cause, because something else is As noted in the previous section, the argument that one causes one’s own suffering, therefore the other does not cause suffering, is given prominence in the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra and in the BodhisattvabhØmi, and is also used by ˜¹ntideva and Candrak»rti. Anger comes from ignorantly imagining the other is the cause (MAB3:5 introduction), whereas the only cause of what is undesired is 258 oneself (BB130). By realizing that suffering is the result of one’s own actions, or previous conduct, one realizes that the other is not the cause of suffering. The BodhisattvabhØmi calls this the truth of the cause of suffering (BB 130).

III.3.2 Changing one’s attitude The BodhisattvabhØmi suggests five perceptions, which involve fundamental thinking (yoni¶o manasik¹ra), to endure patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti). These are the perception of a friend in a previous life, perception of investigating dharma elements (dharmam¹tr¹nus¹riª»), perception of impermanence, perception of suffering, and perception of family (parigraha). To cultivate the perception of a friend towards beings who are offenders, the bodhisattva realizes that in previous births a particular being has been mother, father etc. In this way, the perception of an enemy towards offending beings disappears and the perception of a friend is established (BB131).57 The bodhisattva changes the perception of “other” to perception of family (parigraha) by remembering all beings have been adopted as family due to the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) (BB132).

The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa and ˜¹ntideva all suggest that the enemy should be perceived as a friend, because of providing an opportunity to practise k¬¹nti (MPPS891, ASPS3:27, BCA6:48-49, 99-111).58

III.3.3 The other is not the cause, because there is no other The argument for non-self of persons (pudgalanair¹tmya) is sometimes referred to briefly as “Who abuses, or is abused.” ˜¹ntideva spends many verses in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra establishing that no independent entities exist, and therefore there is no logical place to direct anger (BCA6:22-31). In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, by asking, “Who in this case abuses or is abused?” the bodhisattva is able to be patient (k¬amate) because of being free of the view

57 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra also suggests that the bodhisattva consider that all beings have at some time been one’s mother, father, son, daughter etc. and with reasoning of this sort, the bodhisattva is not able to feel bad feelings or engage in anger (MPPS891). 58 When the bodhisattva sees beings coming to torment him, he must say: “This is my friend, this is my teacher, let us treat him with additional affection and respect. Why? Because if he did not inflict me with torments, I would not have the opportunity to be patient.” (MPPS891) 259 (dŬ−i) of perceiving or not perceiving a self or other who abuses or is abused (SSB188).

The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra also puts this argument less briefly in the following consideration for cultivating patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti): “The bodhisattva knows the remote origin of beings, it is from a complex of causes and conditions which one gives, by designation (prajñapti), the name person (pudgala), but there is not really a person (pudgala). Against who can I then be angry? In this person (pudgala), there is only a pile of bone, blood, skin and flesh, comparable to piled up bricks, coming and going in the fashion of a mechanical doll. Knowing that is the case, there are no grounds for being angry with him. If I get angry I am a fool and I will undergo punishment myself. That is why I must practice k¬¹nti.” (MPPS900)

The perception of investigating the dharma alone (dharmam¹tr¹nus¹riª») with reference to beings who are offenders is one of the five perceptions to cultivate patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) in the BodhisattvabhØmi. The bodhisattva realizes that this being is subject to conditions, is only mental conditions (sa÷sk¹ra), is only dharmas. Here, there is not self or being or soul or creature who could abuse, could hurt, could beat, could deride, or could vilify, or who could be abused, or could be hurt, or could be beaten or could be derided or could be vilified. Doing this fundamental mental thinking (yoni¶o manasikurvata) the perception of a being disappears and the perception of dharma elements is established. Fixed upon, established in, that perception of dharma elements, the bodhisattva forgives (maŬayati), endures (k¬amate), all offences (BB131).

¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa says that the bodhisattva is not agitated by another’s offence due to having no view of self, whereas ordinary people (pÅthagjana) are overpowered by abuse, because they believe in self and others (ASPS3:16-17). ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa and Ak¬ayamati SØtra also describe this type of argument in the process of demonstrating what is not ultimate k¬¹nti. K¬¹nti considering “there is not any doer of an offence, nor is there anyone who is the object of action” is not ultimate k¬¹nti (ASPS3:23). “Tolerance thinking “He abuses Me,” is tolerance apprehending duality, it is not 260 absolute tolerance . . . ; tolerance thinking “Who [in the sense of a permanent ego] abuses here?” is tolerance calculating and constructing moments of existence . . . , it is not absolute tolerance.”59

The first means of practising k¬¹nti introduced by Candrak»rti is that the bodhisattva sees the absence of a self (nair¹tmya) in the three aspects of the act of violence: the perpetrator, the object and the occasion. They are seen as reflections by the bodhisattva who is free from the notion of ‘my’ and ‘mine’ (MAB3:3).60

The concluding verse of ˜¹ntideva’s demonstration that no independent entities exist is that there is no-one to be angry with, since all beings lack volition like a magical creation (BCA6:31). ˜¹ntideva is not content to prove this only with logic, but also directs our attention to the behaviour of beings to demonstrate the truth of the conclusion that they lack volition (BCA6:34-38), a step not taken in the other texts.

˜¹ntideva sets out to demonstrate non-self of persons (pudgalanair¹tmya), whereas the texts that include ultimate, or absolute, k¬¹nti also base k¬¹nti on non-self of dharmas (dharmanair¹tmya). The second of the general methods to cultivate k¬¹nti in Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra is that the bodhisattva knows that dharmas, whether interior or exterior are completely empty, devoid of Self, nor possessed by a self (MPPS865). The Ak¬ayamati SØtra and ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa finish with a consideration of the non-arising of dharmas (ASPS3:32-34).

III.4 Noble aims and creating a positive attitude From the very first verses, the emphasis of ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa is benefiting others. The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of ˜¹ntideva’s Bodhicary¹vat¹ra starts from the bodhisattva’s desire for personal happiness, although with a reminder that the aim is liberation (BCA6:13). The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya places more emphasis on the bodhisattva’s compassion and intention to achieve welfare for others. All the texts refer to the bodhisattva’s

59 Braarvig, Tradition of imperishability, 151. 60 Huntington, 153, 223 n.3. 261 intention to help beings and to make them happy, and to the bodhisattva’s compassion. Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya places the least emphasis on these aspects of practising k¬¹nti. In order to cultivate k¬¹nti, the texts remind the bodhisattva what it means to be a bodhisattva, what the bodhisattva vow is and that the bodhisattva helps beings and has compassion.

III.4.1 Remember the qualities of a bodhisattva In the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra and the BodhisattvabhØmi these arguments come into play to aid patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti). They suggest considering that beings already suffer and it would be wrong to add to that suffering. The BodhisattvabhØmi says it is not proper to cause suffering to those already afflicted because bodhisattvas act for the sake of others (BB130) and that bodhisattvas should be striving to remove the suffering of beings who are always followed by suffering, not to bring them suffering (BB132). The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra says that the bodhisattva should cultivate compassion and, seeing that beings suffer, not add to that suffering (MPPS890); seeing that beings are tormented, the bodhisattva has benevolence (maitr») and compassion (karuª¹) and should not want to add to the suffering (MPPS893). Candrak»rti suggests the bodhisattva cultivates k¬¹nti towards a tormentor by thinking of the sufferings of hell which will result for the tormentor (MAB3:2).61

As well, the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, BodhisattvabhØmi and ˜¹ntideva all ask the bodhisattva to consider what it means to be a bodhisattva. The bodhisattva says to himself, “In my position as bodhisattva, I wish to do good for beings, if I am not able to bear them patiently, I am no longer called ‘bodhisattva,’ I am called ‘wicked man’” (MPPS899); a bodhisattva must not be like others, but must experience great compassion (mah¹karuª¹) for beings (MPPS890); Buddhas and bodhisattvas hold great compassion (mah¹karuª¹) to be fundamental, therefore they think, “If I destroy karuª¹ with anger, how can I be called a bodhisattva?” (MPPS893); the bodhisattva wishes to do good to beings, wishes happiness for beings (MPPS890, 893, 900, BCA6:80, 83). The

61 ˜¹ntideva suggests not adding to the suffering of an enemy, but the consideration is one’s own resulting suffering (BCA6:87-88). 262 final argument that the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra puts for the bodhisattva to practise patience towards beings (sattvak¬¹nti) is that the bodhisattva says to himself, “In the past, innumerable Buddhas have practised patience towards beings, and later patience towards dharmas. Today, I am practising the path of the Buddhas, I must imitate the qualities of the Buddha and not experience aversion, as it is the characteristic of M¹ra.” (MPPS900-901) For enduring internal mental suffering, the bodhisattva considers that, “If I do not endure these sufferings, I do not differ at all from an ordinary person (pÅthagjana), I am not a bodhisattva.” (MPPS906)62

III.4.2 Remember the bodhisattva vow In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, the bodhisattva’s noble aim is one of the principle methods for enduring suffering. It is due to bodhisattva’s vow (praªidh¹na) that he/she is able to experience pleasure in all circumstances (SSB182). The bodhisattvas of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya mainly rely on intention and compassion to be able to endure the pain caused by others also, as they only wish for the welfare of others (SSB184, SSB187). In the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra, the bodhisattva remembers the vow made at the time of the first arising of the thought of enlightenment (prathamacittotp¹da): “I have vowed, in the interest of beings, to cure all their ills of the mind. Today, this man has the ill of anger, I wish to cure him. Will he be able to be soothed if I add my ill to his?” (MPPS899); “I have vowed, in the interest of beings, to resist without impatience torments resulting from inanimate beings: stones, trees, wind, cold, heat, rain; today it is such an animate being who attacks me, I must bear it; why am I angry?” (MPPS899)

In the BodhisattvabhØmi also, the bodhisattva remembers having produced the thought of enlightenment and having decided to act for the good of beings, therefore should forgive offences (BB132); one with a strong desire for supreme perfect enlightenment, a desire to accomplish k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ because of fundamental cause (k¹raªahetu) is patient (BB135, sarv¹k¹rak¬¹nti).

62 A similar argument is found under patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) at BB132. 263 ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa and the Ak¬ayamati SØtra attribute the ability to have k¬¹nti to the desire for Buddhahood (ASPS3:14, Aks150).

III.4.3 Benevelonce (maitr») and compassion The final section of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra asserts that k¬¹nti is propitiating beings and causing them happiness, which ultimately leads to Buddhahood and worldly happiness (BCA6:119-134). The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra also suggests that by cultivating k¬¹nti, the bodhisattva easily obtains benevolence (maitr») and compassion (karuª¹) and owing to them reaches Buddhahood (MPPS898); the bodhisattva’s goal is Buddhahood, and a person with k¬¹nti reaches Buddhahood (MPPS899); the bodhisattva treats beings with benevolence (maitr»), cares for all beings and loves them like a father loves his children (MPPS893, 899) and endures torments caused by others due to cultivating benevolence (maitr»citta) (MPPS889).63 The Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra also argues for enduring suffering by considering the desire to benefit beings (MPPS905, 906). Although the bodhisattva knows how to cut the fetters, in the interest of beings he prefers to remain in the world a long time (MPPS909). Although the BodhisattvabhØmi mentions compassion and acts of compassion, it does not mention benevolence (maitr»).64 Compassion is among the initial reasons for being able to endure suffering (BB130).

Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹rabh¹¬ya does not mention benevolence (maitr») and only mentions compassion in the commentary to the final verse (MA3:13). As well, the commentary to MA3:11, which says that in the third bhØmi bodhisattvas obtain the meditative concentrations (dhy¹na) and the miraculous powers (abhijñ¹s), explains that the term “dhy¹nas” also implies the attainments (sam¹patti) and the four immeasurables (apram¹ªas), namely benevolence (maitr»), compassion (karuª¹), joy (mudit¹) and equanimity

63 In illustration, the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra gives the story of K¬¹ntir¬i, which is similar to the j¹taka story of K¬¹ntiv¹din (MPPS889-890). 64 Not wanting to add to suffering of beings (BB132); patience of not having malicious feeling depending on great compassion (BB135, vigh¹t¹rthikak¬¹nti); sympathy for beings; causing happiness to beings and acting for future happiness of others (BB136, ih¹mutrasukh¹ k¬¹nti); strong intention of compassion (BB136, vi¶uddhak¬¹nti); one with a mind of pity, a mind

264 (upek¬a) (MAB3:11). The k¬¹nti section of the Ak¬ayamati SØtra does not emphasize helping others, but does mention the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) and not being fatigued by suffering due to regard for living beings (Aks146, 149).

As well as having a compassionate and benevolent attitude towards beings, the bodhisattva also acts for their benefit. ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa does not mention benevolence (maitr»), but acting for the sake of the world is very important as a reason for, and benefit of, k¬¹nti: viewing beings with affection because of compassion counteracts the faults of sa÷s¹ra and acting for sake of the world leads to a good result (ASPS 3:11); non-ultimate k¬¹nti means that without effort the bodhisattva serves others (ASPS3:30); the bodhisattva is able to accomplish the welfare of others, assisting good people about to fall in distress (ASPS3:38). ˜¹ntideva says that if the bodhisattva retaliates, the course of conduct (cary¹) is abandoned and the distressed are lost (BCA6:51).

˜¹ntideva and the BodhisattvabhØmi extend k¬¹nti to causing k¬¹nti in others. The k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya ends with a quotation from the Bodhisattvapr¹timok¬a:

He calms those beings who are angry, he makes them patient (k¬am¹payati), he soothes them, he satisfies them by means of the Dharma. (SSB188)

˜¹ntideva vows to create friendly thoughts in everyone (BCA6:69). The bodhisattva of the BodhisattvabhØmi causes another to be established in k¬¹nti, praises patience (k¬am¹), and is happy to see another person who is patient (BB135, satpuru¬ak¬¹nti).

III.5 K¬¹nti and the divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra) In the P¹li Canon, k¬¹nti is recommended as an antidote to anger, one of the three roots of non-virtue (aku¶alamØl¹ni), and is associated with the four divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra), benevolence (maitr»), compassion (karuª¹), joy

of compassion, because of love is patient; (BB135, sarv¹k¹rak¬¹nti); practising k¬¹nti removes suffering of distressed beings (BB136, vigh¹t¹rthikak¬¹nti). 265 (mudit¹) and equanimity (upek¬¹),65 which are also known as the immeasurables (apram¹ªa).66 They are of pre-Buddhist origin and their practice is recommended in both Mah¹y¹na and non-Mah¹y¹na texts.67 Buddhaghosa’s Visuddhimagga suggests methods for overcoming anger because it is a barrier to developing the divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra),68 which are among the forty subjects of meditation recommended in the P¹li canon.69 They are also part of the practice of the bodhisattva;70 benevolence (maitr») meditation is used in the perfection of meditation (dhy¹nap¹ramit¹).71 The meditator induces these states, mainly to achieve a calm state of mind (¶amatha meditation).72

Benevolence (maitr») is unlimited goodwill, the desire for the welfare of others; compassion (karuª¹) is empathy for beings who are suffering; joy (mudit¹) is sympathetic joy in another’s happiness, success and welfare, and therefore lack of envy; equanimity (upek¬¹) is either remaining unaffected by the vicissitudes of life, or an impartial attitude to beings, showing no attachment or aversion (anunaya/pratigha) and is achieved by seeing all beings as equal and realizing that everyone causes their own suffering.73 In the Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬ya, benevolence (maitr») is the absence of hatred, opposes ill-will (vy¹pad¹); compassion (karuª¹) opposes harm (vihi‚s¹); joy (mudit¹) is satisfaction (saumanasya), opposes dissatisfaction (arati); equanimity (upek¬¹) is absence of ill-will (vy¹pad¹) and desire.74

65 Pali-English Dictionary, 332; A¡guttara Nik¹ya, trans. Woodward, 1:201. References to the divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra) are found in the D»gha, Majjhima, Samyutta and A¡guttara Nik¹yas. 66 Dayal, 153-154, 178-181, 225-229; Vasubandhu, Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬yam, [trans.] La Vallée Poussin; English trans. Pruden, 4:1264-1271. 67 Lamotte, Teaching of Vimalak»rti (Vimalak»rtinirde¶a), English trans. Sara Boin, 18 n.66. 68 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, trans. ѹnnamoli, 321. 69 Walpola Rahula, What the Buddha taught, rev. ed. (London: Gordon Fraser, 1978), 75. 70 Lamotte, ˜Øra÷gamasam¹dhisØtra, 44. 71 Dayal, 225; Crosby and Skilton, 75. 72 H. Wolfgang Schumann, Buddhism: an outline of its teachings and schools, trans. Georg Feuerstein (London: Rider, 1973), 74-75. 73 Rahula, What the Buddha taught, 75; Dayal, 228; Conze, Buddhist thought, 90. Conze, Buddhist thought, 89-90, also discusses the meaning of upek¬¹ in other contexts. 74 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬yam, [trans.] La Vallée Poussin; English trans. Pruden, 4:1264-1265. 266 The divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra), particularly benevolence (maitr») and joy (mudit¹), are relevant to the types of k¬¹nti that ˜¹ntideva describes in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. The joy (mudit¹) described by Ak¬ayamati SØtra, quoted in the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, although in the sequence of four divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra) in the Ak¬ayamati SØtra (Aks342-376), encompasses much more than is usually associated with joy as a divine abode (brahmavih¹ra), but it does include lack of envy. ˜¹ntideva devotes many verses of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra to arguments to counteract envy, or not being happy that others are happy. As joy is satisfaction (saumanasya), it is fitting that the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra recommends joy (mudit¹) as an antidote to the dejection (daurmanasya) that causes anger, and that many verses of the chapter on k¬¹nti should be devoted to developing joy (mudit¹) (BCA6:76-98). Compassion (karuª¹), not wanting beings to suffer, is emphasized more in the BodhisattvabhØmi and the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra. ˜¹ntideva is the only one who looks extensively at envy.

Chapters of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya other than the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter recommend benevolence (maitr») as an antidote to anger, hatred, pride and dejection (daurmanasya). Chapter 7 suggests benevolence (maitr») as an antidote to anger and pride. In chapter 12, the bodhisattva is said to avoid dejection by the practice of benevolence (maitr») (SSB213, Vajradhvajapariª¹man¹). In that chapter, ˜¹ntideva describes the standard benevolence (maitr») meditation with beings as its object, as an antidote to hatred (dve¬a) (SSB212-213) and as preparation for mindfulness meditation (smÅtyupasth¹na).75 This involves firstly directing benevolence (maitr») towards a loved person, then an acquaintance, a stranger and gradually expanding the feeling outwards to encompass neighbouring regions, then all regions and the whole world.

In the Visuddhimagga, the monk considers the advantages of patience to aid the cultivation of the divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra), whereas in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra the cultivation of benevolence (maitr») is one aspect of k¬¹nti.

75 For other descriptions of this meditation see Vasubandhu, Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬yam, [trans.] La Vallée Poussin; English trans. Pruden, 4:1269; Nyanatiloka, 37. 267 Buddhaghosa suggests considering the advantages of patience and the danger of hatred, before beginning meditation on benevolence (maitr»).76 He then describes a suitable person to focus on for the development of benevolence. Having started with oneself, one goes on to other classes of person: a very dearly loved friend, a neutral person and, lastly, a hostile person. As generating benevolence towards a hostile person may be difficult, means for getting rid of resentment are described.77 The Visuddhimagga recommends using the same means for getting rid of resentment when developing joy (mudit¹) and compassion (karuª¹) as were used in the case of benevolence.78

A significant part of k¬¹nti in all the texts is enduring offences perceived to come from the other, so arguments on how to overcome hostility and resentment to a hostile person are relevant. One way to overcome resentment to a hostile person, suggested in the Visuddhimagga, is to consider various arguments against anger, some of which are similar to those in the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra. For instance, it must be realised that anger eats away at the roots of virtue. The meditator admonishes himself with verses such as:

Since states last but a moment's time Those aggregates, by which was done The odious act, have ceased, so now What is it you are angry with?

Whom shall he hurt, who seeks to hurt Another, in the other's abscence? Your presence is the cause of hurt Why are you angry, then, with him?79

As in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra, an appeal is made to the fact that anger arises due to conditions. The first verse reflects the doctrine of the momentariness of all dharmas. The conditions that produced the objectionable act have arisen and then ceased; there is no longer any object of anger available. ˜¹ntideva points out that beings are not suitable as objects of anger, as they cannot have any

76 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, trans. ѹnnamoli, 321. 77 Ibid., 321-332. 78 Ibid., 341-343. 79 Ibid., 327. 268 intention to harm, since they are not independent actors, being dependent on conditions. The arguments are similar, but vary in emphasis based on the difference in view between the Mah¹y¹na and Therav¹da schools. The second verse calls to mind the argument in Bodhicary¹vat¹ra 6:43-45, which points out that a person's suffering is as dependent on their own body as on the attack of another. Buddhaghosa also suggests overcoming resentment by considering ownership of karma, that one’s own anger will lead to one’s own harm, and others’ bad acts will also lead to their suffering.80 This argument is found in all the texts. In BCA6:42, the emphasis is placed on considering that one's previous actions had led to the present situation of the other causing one to suffer. There is clearly a continuity in the practices found in the Mah¹y¹na and the non-Mah¹y¹na.

III.6 Prasa¡ga arguments ˜¹ntideva applies the prasa¡ga method of argument to the cultivation of k¬¹nti. This method is explained by Sprung:

The procedure is to dichotomize the possible views on any matter into a formal, and final, either/or: the one in motion is either identical with or entirely other than motion itself; ... an agent subject must either be identical with his activities or wholly other than them; and so on.81

After setting up this dichotomy the M¹dhyamikas show how neither possibility is tenable.82 By negating the opponent’s position, they do not establish their own theory, but merely wish to convince the opponent of the untenability of their position by drawing a logical consequence (prasa¡ga) which is self- contradictory, contrary to experience, or Buddhist truths.83

For example, to show that a bodhisattva should not get angry with someone who appears to be doing harm, ˜¹ntideva creates this dichotomy: either it is the essential nature of foolish people to harm others, or it is not. In the first case, it is not proper to be angry with them, as they have no choice. If

80 Ibid. 81 Candrak»rti, Lucid exposition of the middle way: the essential chapters from the Prasannapad¹ of Candrak»rti, trans. Mervyn Sprung (Boulder, Col.: Prajna Press, 1979), 6. 82 Ibid., 6. 83 Ibid., 6, 8. 269 they do have a choice, the logical consequence (prasa¡ga) would be that their essential nature would be abandoned. In the second case, it is not proper to be angry with people who are pleasant by nature. They are not at fault. One should only be angry with the faults, not the people (Bodhicary¹vat¹ra 6:39-40).

This type of argument is not evident in the other texts. For instance, the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra argues that it is not necessary to hate someone who torments, as all beings have some good. The bodhisattva must think that although this being, at the moment commits a fault, he possesses good qualities in part of him. Because of those qualities, it is not necessary to hate him (MPPS893). It does not use an either/or dichotomy, a being can be part good and part bad.

˜¹ntideva addresses not an external opponent, but suggests arguments for bodhisattvas to use to counteract their own faulty thinking. Another example is BCA6:108-111.84 ˜¹ntideva proposes that an enemy should be honoured for being the first cause of k¬¹nti for the bodhisattva. The objection is that the enemy should not be rewarded, because he did not intend to cause k¬¹nti. The first counterargument is that if honour depended on intention, the True Dharma would not be honoured, as it has no intention. The other counterargument is that it is the enemy’s intention to harm that makes him an enemy. If he did not intend to harm, he would not be an enemy and k¬¹nti would be unnecessary. The other texts which argue that an enemy should be perceived as a friend, because of providing an opportunity to practise k¬¹nti, the Mah¹prajñ¹p¹ramit¹¶¹stra and ¸rya¶Øra’s P¹ramit¹sam¹sa (MPPS891, ASPS3:27), do not raise and dismiss any objections to this proposition.

Conclusion Many of the arguments used by ˜¹ntideva for cultivating k¬¹nti are common to both Mah¹y¹na and non-Mah¹y¹na texts. The non-Mah¹y¹na texts use these arguments for cultivating the divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra), particularly benevolence (maitr»), which is, like k¬¹nti, an antidote to hatred.

84 This argument follows a form which Walser identifies in N¹g¹rjuna’s Akutobhay¹: “the direct syllogisms are used to introduce new topics, while the reductio ad absurdum syllogisms are

270 The Bodhicary¹vat¹ra differs from the other texts examined in the main argument it uses and the emphasis it places on providing detailed arguments for dealing with the unfulfilled desires which, according to the main argument, lead to dejection and then to anger. These arguments assist the bodhisattva to develop the states of mind that are known as the divine abodes (brahmavih¹ra). The specific arguments for persuading the bodhisattva not to desire gain, honour and praise are not found in the other texts. A notable feature of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra is that it uses the bodhisattva’s desire for his/her own happiness to motivate the practise of k¬¹nti. Also notable, in both the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra and the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, is the absence of any discussion of ultimate, absolute, or supramundane (lokottara) k¬¹nti, which is consistent with the conclusion of the previous chapter that ˜¹ntideva does not elaborate on patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti). Although ˜¹ntideva’s doctrines are not original, he has been creative in the range of topics he has chosen to cover, in the way he has presented them and, quite possibly, in some of his arguments for addressing the doubts raised by arguments based on Buddhist doctrine. These doubts are the ones likely to come to the mind of a bodhisattva engaged in the practice of cultivating k¬¹nti and wrestling with his/her tendencies to feel anger in particular situations.

reserved for addressing doubts left by the initial syllogism.” Joseph Walser, "On the formal arguments of the Akutobhay¹," Journal of Indian philosophy 26 (1998), 209.

271 Chapter 7

Conclusion

This thesis investigates k¬¹nti in the bodhisattva path of ˜¹ntideva and compares ˜¹ntideva’s interpretation of k¬¹nti with that found in the Mah¹y¹na tradition. The first chapter established that although ˜¹ntideva’s texts have been translated, study of their content has lacked detail, often leading to unsupported conclusions about his place in the tradition. An introduction to k¬¹nti in the bodhisattva path in the Mah¹y¹na tradition established the models of the path available to ˜¹ntideva and the role of k¬¹nti in those models.

The bodhisattva path begins with bodhicitta and culminates in supreme perfect enlightenment. A being who has achieved supreme perfect enlightenment is a Buddha. Although the p¹ramit¹s are neither the complete path nor the complete accomplishment of a Buddha, the path includes practising six or ten p¹ramit¹s until they become perfections. There are several prerequisites for beginning the practice of the p¹ramit¹s, such as faith, compassion, bodhicitta and accumulating merit; it is as the bodhisattva begins to perfect the p¹ramit¹s that they are completed in order.

The structure of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya appears unique; there is no evidence of a similar structures amongst currently available Mah¹y¹na texts. Candrak»rti, who preceded ˜¹ntideva and is recognized as one of the main teachers belonging to ˜¹ntideva’s school, describes the path according to ten stages (bhØmi). ˜¹ntideva does not follow Candrak»rti’s scheme; a survey of the other bhØmi schemes revealed that ˜¹ntideva did not follow these either. Investigation of the path models showed that different texts address different levels of bodhisattva and demonstrate varying interpretations of the bodhisattva path. For instance, Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra deals with the later stages of the bodhisattva’s career.

The interpretation of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ is complicated by the association of k¬¹nti with the bhØmis and paths (m¹rga), and its use in the expression “patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas” (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti). The 272 synthesizing tendencies of Buddhist thought have attempted to draw anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti into k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. The bhØmi schemes developed over time, and the association of a bhØmi with each p¹ramit¹ appears somewhat forced, especially if anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti is treated as part of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. The chapter on the bodhisattva path and k¬¹nti determines, as far as possible, the meaning of the three types of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the Mah¹y¹na tradition.

As k¬¹nti has a variety of meanings and roles in the different path structures, the next chapter focused on which models of the path ˜¹ntideva followed. This involved comparing his two texts and identifying their structures and the place of k¬¹nti within those structures. Although his two works advocate a path that includes the p¹ramit¹s, his path is not equivalent to the p¹ramit¹s. In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, ˜¹ntideva reveals his concern for the bodhisattva at the very beginning of the training. He makes concessions not found in Candrak»rti’s Madhyamak¹vat¹ra. For ˜¹ntideva, bodhicitta can arise for an ordinary person and does not even depend on compassion! Bodhicitta is beneficial even without compassion; training is useful for any bodhisattva. The issue of whether the bodhisattva has or has not attained a bhØmi is irrelevant in ˜¹ntideva’s texts. The bodhisattva can practise the p¹ramit¹s, whether a bhØmi has been attained or not. These concessions encourage everyone to embark on the bodhisattva path. Other texts only address the advanced bodhisattva.

˜¹ntideva’s emphasis on the beginner bodhisattva influences the range of topics associated with k¬¹nti that he treats. He deals with only two of the three aspects of k¬¹nti normally associated with k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹. Although he only clearly indicates what patience as the endurance of suffering (duåkh¹dhiv¹san¹k¬¹nti) is in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, it is easy to identify patience as forgiving the offence of another (par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti) in both his texts. To what extent he presents patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti) is harder to ascertain; clear definition of this third type of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ is lacking in either his or other Mah¹y¹na texts. Commentators and scholars disagree on which verses of the k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ chapter of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra treat patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti). References to k¬¹nti in other sections of ˜¹ntideva’s texts do not illustrate this third type of patience. ˜¹ntideva also does 273 not associate k¬¹nti with the bhØmis or the paths (m¹rga), or elaborate on anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti.

The arguments which ˜¹ntideva uses to enable the bodhisattva to cultivate k¬¹nti find parallels in some earlier Mah¹y¹na texts. ˜¹ntideva’s arguments are addressed to the beginner. His contention that a bodhisattva can be an ordinary person leads to his addressing some very basic and ordinary concerns, and also to an emphasis on the advantages that k¬¹nti can have in worldly life. His emphasis on developing the positive emotions of benevolence (maitr») and joy (mudit¹) may be linked to his idea that since a bodhisattva can have bodhicitta without compassion, these emotions need developing in the beginner. ˜¹ntideva’s bodhisattva does not need to be concerned with ultimate k¬¹nti; ˜¹ntideva’s explanation of the practice of k¬¹nti focuses on the more pragmatic aspects. On the mundane level, k¬¹nti is an antidote to anger and hatred. ˜¹ntideva gives specific techniques to be used in particular situations which the bodhisattva may encounter. He was ingenious in analyzing any tendency to anger and in finding that the perceived cause of anger is always empty of any causal efficacy. At times, he uses the logical consequence (prasa¡ga) method of argument in these analyses. None of the other texts examined used this method of argument.

Regarding some of the assessments made of ˜¹ntideva, it can be concluded that the personal tone of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra probably results from it being addressed to the beginner and from its intended use as a meditation manual. This use leads to many of the verses being in the first person. His tone is often personal, but he is not an individualist. In the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, ˜¹ntideva gathered together moral commandments for bodhisattvas found throughout the sØtras and put them in order. The originality of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra may also be merely in the selection of the material; ˜¹ntideva certainly did not go outside his tradition in either text. If elements of the pre-Mah¹y¹na tradition are found in ˜¹ntideva’s works, this is not an innovation on ˜¹ntideva’s part. These elements are common to the whole Buddhist tradition, both Mah¹y¹na and non-Mah¹y¹na. ˜¹ntideva may have followed Candrak»rti’s philosophical viewpoint, but did not adhere to Candrak»rti’s description of the bodhisattva path in terms of the bhØmis. The bodhisattva has 274 the intention to achieve supreme perfect enlightenment, but recognises that she/he does not have the capacity to do so. To develop this capacity requires training. ˜¹ntideva takes an ordinary person with a good idea and gives them the tools and advice to put that good idea into practice.

The bodhisattva path is not easily described. Apart from beginning with bodhicitta and ending in supreme perfect enlightenment, it has many permutations in the literature. Many elements are arranged differently in different texts, and a discussion of any one of the elements often refers to and includes many others. Whether certain practices are those of a bodhisattva or not is determined by whether the individual has bodhicitta. Each of the p¹ramit¹s can be practised from a mundane level to the highest realization, which is at variance with a path of progression beginning with giving (d¹na) and ending in prajñ¹. The way a path is described in a particular text is linked with the type of bodhisattva being addressed, and the attitude the text takes to the bodhisattva’s development. The bodhisattva path cannot be said to consist only of the p¹ramit¹s. The template of the three types of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ cannot be applied to all descriptions of k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the Mah¹y¹na tradition, and the third of these types does not always include patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti). K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ does have a core of meanings which are common to the texts, but some aspects are not treated consistently, giving the impression that these areas were still being grappled with in the tradition. A closer study of texts in the Mah¹y¹na tradition is a desiderata. It would lead to finer distinctions being made, fewer inadequate generalizations, and a clearer picture of the development of Mah¹y¹na Buddhism.

The sheer quantity and wide range of Mah¹y¹na Buddhist literature – very little of it translated into English – rules out definite conclusions concerning ˜¹ntideva’s place in the Mah¹y¹na tradition. It is possible that ˜¹ntideva is entirely unoriginal. The lack of an established chronology of texts also makes it difficult to outline developments in the tradition. For the study of ˜¹ntideva, the most immediate needs are a good translation of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, and of the commentary to the earlier version of the Bodhicary¹vat¹ra found in the Tibetan Tripi−aka. Study of this commentary may throw more light on ˜¹ntideva’s

275 treatment of k¬¹nti. Finally, a number of other possible projects arising from this thesis are worth noting. These include comparison of the treatment of other p¹ramit¹s in ˜¹ntideva’s texts and the wider tradition, and a study of those texts which ˜¹ntideva used to construct his ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. The areas of k¬¹nti which ˜¹ntideva does not deal with, patience as profound reflection on dharmas (dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti) and patient acceptance of the non-arising of dharmas (anutpattikadharmak¬¹nti), would also be interesting topics for further research since their treatment varies between Mah¹y¹na texts.

276 Appendices

Appendix 1

Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹ Chapter 6 K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹

[167]1 Thus, having taught in many ways the purification of moral conduct, having taught the purification and2 guarding of the body etc.;3 in order to teach complete purification of merit this is said:

One should be patient; one should seek learning; then one should go to the forest for refuge. One should apply oneself to concentrating the mind;4 one should contemplate, beginning with the offensive things.5

And this is what he begins to explain, starting with the word "all."

1 All this good conduct, giving and worship of Buddhas, done for thousands of kalpas, hostility destroys that.

All this, born from taking on the vow of moral conduct. Good conduct, good action. Giving is of three kinds.6 In the same way, worship of Buddhas is also of three kinds.7 Done, accumulated, for many thousands of kalpas. Hostility, hatred of beings, destroys, destroys completely like a spark of fire a heap of grass, that, all.

1 Page references are to LVP. 2 ca is omitted in Vaidya. 3 ¹tmabh¹va is a word used for the body, according to BHS92, and confirmed by Tibetan, TTK f.220, which reads lus. I have translated it by person, as it means more than the physical body. For example, in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya purification of the person (¹tmabh¹va¶uddhi) includes purification of the mind (citta¶uddhi). "etc." indicates possessions (bhoga) and merit (puªya), the guarding of which was the subject matter of the preceding chapter of BCA. 4 Or ‘generating sam¹dhi.’ 5 K¹rik¹ 20 of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, SSB179.5-9. 6 In the Dharmasa÷graha, ed. Kenjiu Kasawara, F. Max Müller and H. Wenzel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), 27, the three kinds of giving are: "dharmad¹nam ¹mi¬ad¹na÷ maitr»d¹na÷" (the giving of teachings, the giving of worldly goods, the giving of benevolence). However, these are not necessarily the three referred to here. 7 Possibly with body, with speech and with mind. 278 [168] And in the ¸rya Mañju¬r»vikr»©ita SØtra he says:8

Hostility is called hostility, O Mañju¬r», as it destroys the virtue (ku¶ala) accumulated for hundreds of kalpas, for this reason it is called hostility.9

By the ¸rya Sarv¹stiv¹din it is taught:10

‘O monks! See11 that monk whose mind has become calm after prostrating with his whole body to a hair and nail stØpa.’ ‘Yes, Sir.’ ‘O monks! As many thousands of kingdoms of a universal monarch are to be enjoyed by that monk as there are grains of sand under the earth12 covered by that monk to the depth of eighty four thousand yojanas13 as far as14 the golden varja maª©ala.’15 . . .16 Then venerable17 Up¹li, after making an a¡jali, said this18 to the Bhagavan: ‘As the Bhagavan has said, this monk has such great roots of virtue. In which case, O Bhagavan, will these virtues19 be diminished, be destroyed and be completely exhausted?’20 ‘O Up¹li, I have not seen such destruction and damage21 as when a student creates a malevolent thought (du¬−acitta) with reference to his fellow student. In that case,22 O Up¹li, these great roots of virtue are diminished, destroyed and completely exhausted. [169] Therefore, O Up¹li, one should train

8 This quotation in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya SSB149.5-6. SSB omits O Mañju¶r», and has ku¶ala instead of ku¶alamØla. 9 The import of this statement is that the word pratigha, anger, is formed from the root √han, “to strike,” as is pratihanti, “strikes down, destroys.” 10 This quotation in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, SSB148.13-149.4. Variations are noted. Also found in Divy¹vad¹na, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit texts, no. 20 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1959), 122. It is longer in the Divy¹vad¹na, and otherwise varies from the version here. 11 BCAP has imperative: pa¶yadhvam, SSB indicative: pa¶yatha. 12 Read bhØmi, as SSB148.14; LVP168.6 has bhØbhi. 13 MW: a measure of distance, one estimation is about 20 kilometres. SSB has 80,000 yojanas. 14 BCAP: y¹vantyo; SSB: y¹vanty¹ 15 k¹ñcanavajramaª©ala; SSB and Divy¹vad¹na read k¹ñcanacakram. Divy¹vad¹na, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, no. 20 (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1959), 535: “(in cosmology) centre of earth." 16 Y¹vat indicates that a part of the quoted passage is missing, BHS447. Marked by ellipsis. 17 BCAP: yusm¹n; SSB: yu¬m¹n 18 BCAP: etad; SSB: idam 19 BCAP: ku¶al¹ni; SSB: ku¶alamØl¹ni 20 pary¹d¹na BHS335: “exhaustion, giving out, especially common in combination parik¬aya÷ °d¹na÷ plus a form of gacchati, give out and be completely exhausted.” 21 BCAP: k¬atimupahati÷ ca; SSB: k¬atim copahati÷ ca 22 BCAP: tatra; SSB: atra 279 thus: “I will not become angry23 even towards a burnt tree stump, let alone towards a conscious body.’

For this very reason, he says:

2 There is neither sin equal to hatred nor austerity equal to patience.24 Therefore, one should cultivate patience by various methods with persevering effort.

There is neither sin, offence, the cause of overcoming merit, equal to hatred, nor austerity, a good act25 because of its being accomplished with great pains, equal to, equivalent to, patience, endurance. Because it is so, therefore one should cultivate, one should practise, patience, forbearance, thoroughly, by various methods, with the many means about to be described.

Showing with three verses the faults of hatred just in the visible world, he says:

3 The mind neither gains peace nor attains the happiness of pleasure, nor finds sleep or satisfaction, when the arrow of hatred is lodged in the heart.

4 Even those whom he honours with wealth and respect and who depend on him wish to kill that master who is contorted with hatred.

5 Even friends are afraid of him, he gives but is not served. In brief, there is nothing whereby an angry person is comfortable.

[170] He neither gains, rests in, peace, tranquillity. He does not attain, acquire the happiness of pleasure, the happiness of mental pleasure, because he is always completely agitated due to the burning of the fire of hatred, because of being completely overcome by it. Nor does he obtain sleep or satisfaction,

23 Vaidya has changed prado¬ayi¬y¹maå to pradجayi¬y¹maå, in line with SSB. Both are possible. MW: pradجayati (with cittam) to be angry. 24 Referred to in BCA6:102.

280 peace of mind, when the arrow of hatred, which is the cause of burning heat in the body and mind, is dwelling in his heart. Even those whom he honours, venerates, with gain and honour, and who are his dependants, wish to harm such a hate filled master. Why? Someone contorted with hatred is disagreeable, this states the reason. Even friends, companions, are afraid, are frightened, of him, of someone filled with hatred. Even though he is eager to give, he is not served, he is not approached, by those belonging to the class of servants. Why say more? In brief, this must now be kept in mind: there is nothing, no cause for his peace, whereby a wrathful person can obtain happiness.

Hatred (dve¬a) is a harsh state of mind. However, anger (krodha) is the action born of it, on account of which the seizing of sticks and the like is done. Thus the explanation is that even though these two are distinguished, they are both equally to be avoided.

Having understood the faults of hatred to be thus even here in the visible world, one should make an effort for giving it up, so he says:

6 He who destroys anger with perseverance, by perceiving it as an enemy with the thought, "it causes such sufferings and others of the same kind," is happy here and hereafter.

Since it produces such, in the way just stated, sufferings, [171] therefore someone who is a virtuous person with perseverance, with extremely strong determination, the meaning is he who has acquired heroic energy (¹rabhdav»rya), is happy here in this world and in the next world.

In order to destroy hatred now, making a decision to destroy the cause of it, he says:

7 Mad hatred destroys me, having obtained the food, dejection, which is born from impeding what is desired and from causing what is undesired.

8ab Therefore I will withhold the food of that enemy.

25 sukÅta can also mean merit. 281 What is desired and what is undesired are born from the notion of me and mine. What is desired is the means of attaining happiness for me and mine, what is undesired is the opposite of that, so this is only the result of a conceptual construction. But, in the absolute sense, nothing that is desired or undesired occurs. Therefore, on account of the latent tendencies (v¹sana) of mistaken strong attachment, dejection, mental suffering, is produced from causing what is undesired, and from destroying what is desired. Therefore, hatred arises towards what cause or towards what obstruction? So since I am convinced that hatred, having acquired power after obtaining26 the powerful sustenance that is dejection, destroys me, I will kill the cause of its thriving forthwith. When that is destroyed, happiness itself will result from its destruction and from the impossibility of what is utterly destroyed rising again.

Why do you have a strong determination (abhinive¶a) to achieve this? He says:

8cd Because this enemy has no purpose other than my destruction.

[172] Because, apart from my destruction, by day and night this enemy, hatred, does not have any function.

Having ascertained the faults of hatred to be thus, by every means one should produce patience, which acts as its opponent. In this regard, in the Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra three kinds of k¬¹nti are set forth.27 Namely, patience as endurance of suffering, patience as profound reflection on dharmas, and patience as forgiving the offence of another. Of those, first referring to the patience of enduring suffering, he says:

9 Even with the arrival of what is extremely undesired, I should not allow joy to be disturbed. Even when there is dejection, there is not what is desired. However, virtue is abandoned.

The enemy of patience as enduring suffering is the dread of suffering, acquired with the arrival of what is undesired, and intense attachment to

26 labdhv¹ is omitted in Vaidya.

282 pleasure, acquired with the removal of what is desired. From these two comes dejection, thence hatred (dve¬a) or a despondent state of mind.28 For this very reason, it says in the Candraprad»pa SØtra:29 "Lack of intense attachment to pleasure, non-aversion to suffering." In Ratnamegha SØtra30 also it is said: "He is patient (k¬amate), he endures31 the grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection and irritation,32 which relate to the self.”

[173] Hence, even if my head is cut off, nevertheless I should not allow joy to be disturbed, to be agitated. For joy is the antidote of dejection; even with the arrival of suffering, for one whose mind is joyful there is no opportunity for dejection. So joy is to be guarded strenuously in order to drive off dejection. Why? Even when dejection is created, when there is the impediment of what is desired, there is not what is desired, the wish is not be achieved. However, the difference would be this: virtue, on the other hand, is destroyed.

And joy is described in the ¸rya Ak¬ayamati SØtra:33

What, then, is joy (mudit¹)? It is rapture (pr»ti), serenity (pras¹da), gladness (pr¹modya), the mind not being dispirited,34 not being crushed,35 not being anxious,36 from remembering the qualities of the Buddha;37 the basis of delight in all dharmas from the removal38 of delight in all objects of desire,39 gladness (pr¹modya) of the mind, pleasurable excitement of the body, causing joy40 for the

27 Same quotation introduces k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ in the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, SSB179.11-12. 28 Same wording as SSB179.12-14, except SSB179.14 reads l»nat¹ ca for l»nacittat¹ v¹. 29 Candraprad»pa SØtra quotation also in SSB179.15, text identical. 30 Ratnamegha SØtra quotation also in SSB179.16-17, text identical. 31 adhiv¹sayati BHS15. 32 ¶okaparidevaduåkhadaurmanasyop¹y¹sa, BHS 374. 33 Part of quotation from ˜ik¬¹samuccaya SSB183.4-184.4. BCAP has lines SSB183.4-7 only. 34 anaval»nat¹. BHS 22: state of being not downcast. 35 anavamÅdyat¹ BHS 21: state of being uncrushable. 36 aparitar¬aª¹ BHS 45: discussion of derivation, may just mean non-craving. 37 SSB183.4 reads y¹vad dharm¹nusmaraª¹t, which LVP173.8 amends to y¹ buddhadharm¹nusmaraª¹t based on the Tibetan. 38 apakar¬aª¹ BHS 42. 39 SSB183.5 reads sarvak¹marat»n¹mapakar¬aª¹, LVP173.9-10 reads sarvak¹marat»n¹mapakar¬aª¹t. 40 sa÷prahar¬aªa BHS579: causing joy, or a thing that causes joy. 283 intellect,41 elation42 of the mind, praise of and delight in the body of the Tath¹gata. And so on.

Moreover, this dejection arises for one not investigating, so he says:

10 If there is a remedy, what is the use of dejection in that case?43 If there is not a remedy, what is the use of dejection in that case?

If there is a remedy, another means, either for preventing (nivartana) the impediment to what is desired,44 or for warding off (prati¬edha) the occurrence (upanip¹ta) of what is not desired, then what is the use of dejection in that case? [174] Only that need be applied. If there is not, then also what is the use of dejection in that case? It has no purpose at all. It is gone because of an absence of means in every case. Investigating like this and preventing dejection is best.

He sets out to establish that suffering is no longer a torment through practice:

11 Suffering, vilification and insults, and dishonour are undesired for those one likes and also for oneself, but for an enemy it is the reverse.

Suffering is of two kinds: physical and mental. Of those, physical is born of striking with sticks and the like. Mental is caused by vilification and the like. Of those, vilification is contempt. Insults are words which cut to the quick. And dishonour is disgrace, publicizing lack of virtue. All these are undesired. But surely these are good if they happen to others? For that reason he says, “for those one likes.” In so far as they belong to oneself, they are accepted as one’s own, are an object of love. For them and for oneself. However, for someone who causes suffering and the like, for an enemy, it is the reverse. For him, suffering and the like is indeed desired.

41 buddheå Tibetan reads sangs rgyas la "in the Buddha," TTK, f.224. 42 utplava BHS 126: joy, reference to SSB183.6 “in a list of synonyms for joy and gladness.” 43 This line found in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, SSB180.8.

284 Then, in order to eliminate non-endurance45 of suffering, he says:

12 Happiness is obtained with difficulty, suffering remains without effort, but only by suffering is there going forth. Therefore, O mind, be strong!

[175] Having practised the side of virtue (ku¶alapak¬a) with great persevering effort, at times,46 sometimes, contaminated (s¹srava) happiness, which is very difficult to attain in sa÷s¹ra, is obtained. However, suffering is easily attainable at all times, because it is accomplished without effort. So the practice of that is not difficult, because it is always familiar. Furthermore, even the means of going forth from sa÷s¹ra is suffering itself. And thus, embracing it is indeed proper because it consists of provisions for the journey. Because it is like that, therefore, O mind, be strong for experiencing suffering, do not succumb to cowardice.

Moreover, it is appropriate to endure this suffering because it accomplishes the great purpose. Since one should reflect in this way, he says:

13 The sons of Durg¹ and the inhabitants of Karª¹−a endure the pain of burning, cutting and the like in vain. But why am I cowardly for the sake of liberation?

The sons of Durg¹ are the children of Cand».47 At the time of the Durg¹ pØj¹,48 and on other occasions, for three nights or for one day, having fasted, they experience unpleasant feeling,49 by burning, cutting and breaking the limbs, completely fruitlessly. Similarly, those born in Karª¹−a and such

44 LVP173.16 reads i¬−anigh¹ta but Vaidya corrects to i¬−avigh¹ta, in line with other occurrences of this expression. 45 Misprint in Vaidya: duåkhasahi¬ªut¹m for LVP: duåkh¹sahi¬ªut¹m. Tibetan confirms reading: "lack of forbearance," TTK, f.225. 46 Verse reads kathamcit, with difficulty, rarely, commentary reads kad¹cit, once, sometimes. The commentary seems to interpret katha÷cit as both with difficulty and rarely. 47 Durg¹ is the name of a wrathful female deity, Cand» is another name for Durg¹. MW383. 48 mah¹navam», the 9th day of the waxing moon, and also the last day of the Durg¹ pØj¹, a period of nine days when Durg¹ is worshipped. MW796 49 vedan¹ translated in the verse as pain; vedan¹ can mean merely sensation, feeling (one of the four foundations of mindfulness, where it is classified as pleasant, unpleasant, neither pleasant nor unpleasant), as well as pain. The commentary emphasizes that it is unpleasant feeling that is experienced in this case. 285 countries, the inhabitants of the south, competing with one another through pride by merely scratching their names on the upper part of their bodies, [176] experience suffering due to many tortures, even to the point of giving up life. But I, who am striving to accomplish Buddhahood, exceedingly difficult to attain, for myself and others, why, for what reason, do I become cowardly in regard to sufferings?

That may be so. Very mild suffering is able to be endured somehow. But how is suffering from cutting of hands, feet, head and the like, or suffering of the hells, to be endured for the sake of liberation? In regard to this he says:

14 There is no thing whatsoever which is difficult with practice.50 Therefore, through the practice of enduring mild pain, great pain can also be endured.

No thing, such as expertise in the various arts or recitation of the ¶¹stras, or such as experiencing mild, moderate or extreme suffering, whatsoever exists, which is not within the realm of practice. The meaning is: absolutely everything can be mastered through practice. Because of this therefore, even great pain, such as of hell, can51 be endured through practice beginning with very much milder pain.

As it is said:52 therein, preceded by the practice of a little suffering the practice of the worse than the worst is accomplished. And just as beings have the perception (sa÷jñ¹) of pleasure in suffering through the power of practice, likewise through the practice of establishing the perception of pleasure in all cases of the arising of suffering, one establishes only the perception of pleasure. And in this way,53 one obtains the inevitable result,54 the sam¹dhi named Sarvadharmasukh¹kr¹nta.55

50 Similar wording to SSB180.18: na c¹bh¹sasya du¬kara÷ n¹ma ki÷cid asti. BCA6:14: na ki÷ cid asti tad vastu yad abhy¹sasya du¬karam. Similarly, at SSB265.8: an¹dikalpan¹bhy¹s¹t kim abhy¹sasya du¬karam. 51 ¶akyate supplied by Vaidya, not in LVP. 52 This passage, LVP176.14-18, also in SSB181.8-11, also introducing the quotation from Pit¹putrasam¹gama. 53 SSB181.10: etanni¬yandaphalam, LVP176.17: evam ni¬yandaphalam, which agrees with the Tibetan: de ltar na, TTD, 10:114a. 286 [177] Indeed, it is said in the Pit¹putrasam¹gama:56

There is, O Bhagavan, a sam¹dhi named Sarvadharmasukh¹kr¹nta; through the attainment of this sam¹dhi the bodhisattva experiences only a pleasant feeling,57 not an unpleasant [feeling]58 or a neutral [feeling], in all objects of attention.59 Only the perception of pleasure is established for the person who is undergoing even hellish torture.60 Only the perception of pleasure is established for someone being subjected to even human torture, even when hands, feet, ears or noses are being cut off. The perception of pleasure61 arises even though being beaten with canes, even though being beaten with clubs or whips. Only the perception of pleasure arises even for someone flung into prison, or for one being fried in oil,62 or being crushed like sugar cane is crushed, 63 or being squeezed like a reed is squeezed,64 or being set ablaze like an oil lamp,65 . . . being cut up into small pieces the size of a coin,66 or being cooked in a baking pan,67 or being trampled by elephants. And so on.68

This will only be like that if the practice of mild pain is done first of all. Regarding the time until that occurs, he says: [178]

54 ni¬yanda MW 564: necessary consequence or result. This meaning in Buddhist literature only, otherwise flowing down etc. BHS309: issue, outcome, natural result. 55 “Pervaded by pleasure in all conditions.” BHS584: sarvadharmasukh¹kranta, name of a sam¹dhi. SSB181.10, 12 are the only examples. 56 Part of a quotation from Pit¹putrasam¹gama found in ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, SSB181.12- 182.2, 182.5-182.6. 57 vedan¹ See BHS508: SSB232.11 ff. correlates attachment (r¹ga) with suåkha, hatred (dve¬a) with duåkha and confusion (moha) with aduåkh¹suåkha. 58 The words na duåkh¹m are found in BCAP6:14, but are missing from SSB. 59 ¹rambaªa BHS103. 60 SSB reads k¹raª¹, whereas BCAP reads vedan¹. k¹raª¹, BHS178: torture, torment 61 eva added in SSB182.1, missing from BCAP. 62 taila-p¹cikam BHS257: adv. “might mean ‘(or of one being made to be) boiled in oil,’” see also further note in BHS about Chinese ed., referring to SSB182 n.1; SSB182.1 only example. 63 ik¬u-ku−−itavad See SSB182 n.1 and SSB, Add. notes, 409, which notes that BCAP has °ku−−itika÷ v¹°, and that this is the probable reading of the MS. BHS113: adv. SSB182.1 only example. “with ku−−yam¹nasya, by (the torture of) being crushed like sugar-cane.” 64 na©a-cippitika BHS289: adv., by being crushed like a reed. SSB182.2 only example. 65 taila-pradyotikam BHS257: adv., °ka÷ v¹ d»pyam¹nasya ‘(of one being set on fire) with oil lamps (?like an oil lamp?);’ SSB182.2 only example. 66 k¹r¬¹paªachedikam BHS179: “adv. (or acc. sg. of °ka or °k¹?), in °ka÷ v¹ chidyam¹nasya SSB182.5 (only example), ‘or being cut up into small pieces the size of a coin’ = k¹r¬¹paªa-m¹÷sika, see kah¹paªa BHS174-75. Bendall and Rouse, 178, "chopped up in penny- bits." BCAP reads k¹r¬¹paªachedik¹m, SSB reads k¹r¬¹paªachedikam. 67 pi¬−a-p¹canika BHS346: “acc. adv. °kam, in (by the use of) a baking pan (for meal); *ka÷ v¹ p¹cyam¹nasya SSB182.5 only example, but Edgerton does not venture a meaning in this context. BCAP reads pi¬−ap¹canik¹m, SSB reads pi¬−ap¹canikam.

287 15 Why do you not see the pain of things like gnats, stinging flies, mosquitoes, hunger, thirst, and suffering such as violent itching as useless?

Why do you not see the suffering caused by things like gnats as useless? The sense is: this accomplishment without effort is only on account of the practice of mild pain.

Again, to make one's own mind strong in another way, he says:

16 One should not be weak through cold, heat, rain, wind, journeys, sickness, imprisonment and beating, otherwise pain increases.

For suffering becomes extremely tormenting for someone with a weaker mind; even when suffering, the opposite is the case for someone with a strong mind.

Surely suffering is unbearable for the mind, even when it is made strong? To this he says:

17 Some show exceptional valour after seeing their own blood; some become faint after seeing even the blood of others.

18 This is achieved through strength or timidity of mind. Therefore, one should not be conquered by suffering; one should overcome pain.

Certainly, nothing at all is impossible for someone with a strong mind. For instance, some heroic people on the field of battle, seeing even their own blood, display more extreme heroism. However, others having a cowardly disposition experience suffering near to death, even from seeing the blood of others. [179] And thinking, "Both of these are from mutually opposite practices of the mind," one should not be conquered, should not be overtaken, by suffering, because of not being agitated even by sufferings. Therefore, one should overcome pain, but one should not be overcome by it.

68 vistara BHS504: “m. special application of Sanskrit; ... the full text ... , an indication of 288 And thus one should overcome pain, so he says:

19 Even when suffering, the wise person should not disturb the serenity of the mind at all, because there is a battle with the defilements, and in war pain is easily obtained.

Serenity69 was described previously. The sagacious person should not become dispirited. Why? Because this battle with the enemies, the defilements, has begun. And it is very unlikely that pain in battle would not occur; pain is indeed easily obtained.70

Yet surely this is seen to be extremely difficult. To this he says:

20 Whoever conquers enemies while seeking the enemies' blows on the chest are the victorious heroes, but the rest are killers of the dead.

Whoever conquers the adversaries in battle, attacking the enemy head on seeking his blows with the chest, are the valiant people who are praised; they have obtained victory here from the victory of the hostile adversaries. However, those others [180] who attack the enemy with feigned blows etc. are killers of the dead, since they are not doing anything, and they should be completely despised by heroes.

And hence, suffering is to be endured through seeing its virtue, so he says:

21 And a further virtue of suffering is that from agitation comes loss of pride and compassion for beings in sa÷s¹ra, dread of sin, delight in the Victorious One.71

This further virtue, cause of merit favourable to the path of perfect enlightenment, of this suffering is that when suffering enters the mind agitation is produced. And from that, the loss, decay, of pride resulting from

abbreviation.” 69 Serenity (pras¹da) previously mentioned in the commentary to BCAP6:9, as one definition of joy (mudit¹). 70 Vaidya adds tu, which seems unnecessary. 71 Jina, an epithet of the Buddha. Later untranslated. 289 youth, wealth, and so on, occurs, and the thought of compassion for beings in sa÷s¹ra, for those afflicted by suffering in sa÷s¹ra. And fear, the thought of abstaining, of sin, thinking, "This is the fruit of evil," And delight, devotion, faith and serenity of mind, in the Buddha, in the Lord. Thinking, "Because only the Lord has taught the path leading to the cessation of suffering."

Deliberating in order to endure suffering arising from the conditions of another, he says:

22 I have no anger towards bile and the rest, even though they cause great suffering. Why have anger towards conscious beings? They also are made angry due to conditions.

The body indeed consists of the three humours, bile and the rest.72 And they are the causes of all suffering, producing diseases when they arrive at a state of disturbance due to the deficiency of particular food and behaviour. [181] Nevertheless I have no anger towards them, because they are without consciousness. Nor do they cause suffering intentionally. How then? They have attained disorder by the force of the complex of their own causes. If this is so, why have anger towards conscious beings? If it is asked, “Why should there not be?” They also cause suffering being agitated by the complex of their own causes, because of the offence of an earlier action. So my anger is not proper towards them also, like bile and the rest.

And showing that the dependence on causes is the same in both cases, he says:

23 Just as this pain73 arises even though it is undesired, similarly, anger arises forcibly though it is undesired.

Just as pain, even though unintended, inevitably arises from bile and the rest, whose efficacy is produced from its own conditions, similarly anger arises from dejection etc., whose power is acquired from the transformation of its own

72 The three humours are bile (pitta); phlegm (kapha) and wind (v¹yu). 73 ¶Øla, MW1086: any sharp or acute pain (esp. that of colic or gout). 290 causes.74 So common to both these is their dependence on causes and conditions.

Now, it may be said here: conscious beings cause what is undesired of this kind intentionally, but the others however are not like that. So he says:

24 People are not angry intentionally of their own volition, thinking, "I will be angry," and anger does not arise intending, "I will arise."

People do not become angry in the absence of the complex of conditions for it [anger], intentionally, of their own accord, thinking in this way, with a previous thought, "I will be angry." Anger also does not just arise independently having in view, "I will arise.”

[182] Therefore, since this alone is established according to valid means of knowledge75 here, he says:

25 Whatever the faults and76 sins of various sorts, everything results from the force of its conditions; however nothing independent is found.

Everything that is has a nature present only through the principle of dependent arising. However, nothing at all is found that has come forth of its own volition.

26 And the complex of conditions does not have consciousness which thinks, "I will produce." And also what is produced does not have consciousness which thinks, "I am produced."

Also, the complex of conditions, producing its own effect, does not produce intentionally. Because it produces such an effect by means of proximity

74 Vaidya reads svahetumapariª¹m¹dhigata¶aktibhyoå for LVP svahetupariª¹m¹dhigata¶aktibhyoå, which is also supported by Tibetan which reads rang gi rgyu yongs su 'gyur ba la brten pa'i nus pa. TTK, ff.229-230. 75 pram¹ªa 76 LVP182 n.1. MS has °apar¹dha¶ ca, Minaev has °apar¹dhas tu, and LVP has followed Minaev. I have followed Vaidya, who prefers °apar¹dh¹¶ ca, which also agrees with the reference to this verse in the commentary to BCA6:65. See note to BCA6:65. 291 and transformations of its own cause, but not intentionally. And also what is produced, the effect too, does not have consciousness, have a mental act, which thinks: "I am produced by this complex." Therefore, in so far as all dharmas are without purposeful function, when this exists, this occurs, this arises from the arising of this.77 So this world exists only through the principle of dependent arising. Nothing independent is possible here because all dharmas are dependent on causes and conditions.

That may be so, but independent [entities] do indeed exist, such as the primal substance78 and the self of the S¹÷khyas, [183] space and other principles of the Naiy¹yikas.79 Then, why is it said that nothing independent is found here? Supposing this, he says:

27 Because the so-called primal substance which is accepted, that which is imagined as a “self” is certainly not born intentionally, thinking, "I will become."80

It is accepted by you that the primal substance is prakÅti, a state of equilibrium of sattva, rajas and tamas.81 By saying so-called, he displays disgust since this is inconsistent with valid means of knowledge. Also, that something or other which is imagined, conjectured, as a “self” is completely inconsistent with valid means of knowledge. He says: “Because it certainly is not born by itself alone, without another cause for it, having the aim, ‘I will become, I will arise.’"

Why? Because:

28ab Because that which has not arisen does not exist, then what could desire to exist?

77 asmin sati idam bhavati asyotp¹d¹d idam utpadyate Classic formula of dependent arising, found in ˜¹listamba SØtra. See also Vasubandhu, Abhidharmako¶abh¹¬yam, [trans.] La Vallée Poussin; English trans. Pruden, 2:414-415, 516 n.206. 78 pradh¹na MW = prakÅti. ˜¹ntideva, Bodhicary¹vat¹r, trans. Trip¹th», 164: arth¹t sattv, rajas aur tamas k» s¹my¹vasth¹ prakÅti. 79 LVP: naiy¹yik¹d»n¹m - of the Naiy¹yikas and others like them, e.g., the Vai¶e¬ikas; Vaidya: naiy¹yik¹n¹m - of the Naiy¹yikas. 80 Misprint BCAP, Vaidya, Tripathi: bhav¹b»ti for bhav¹m»ti 81 The three guªas (qualities): purity, passion and darkness. 292 That, primal substance and so on, were formerly non-existent. And how could what does not exist, like the son of a barren woman etc., have a wish to be, to arise? But82 something which is non-existent does not arise; there is only a mere transformation from the unmanifest state into the manifest state. If this is the case, how does even a transformation or the manifest state, being non- existent, arise? If the transformation and manifest state have an essential nature, there is the absurd consequence of its arising. If the opposite is supposed, there is an absence of [logical] connection.83 And if one accepts the [logical] connection, there is infinite regression. Later, the primal substance will be refuted at length.84

That may be so, but there is not this fault at all in regard to the self. For we do not [184] accept the arising of that. That is certainly always unarisen, in so far as its essential nature is eternal. Granted that it is indeed like that. Nevertheless, that is entirely like the horn of a donkey, because of the absence of arising. Consequently, even here this is not denied:

Because that which has not arisen does not exist, then what could desire to exist?

Or even if it exists, it has no power in itself. Because it only enjoys the object brought near by prakÅti. And in that case, before the enjoyment of the object it did not have the state of being its enjoyer and its essential nature was indeed born later. Otherwise, there is no possibility of the state of being its enjoyer. And when that85 arises, there is also the arising of that,86 so how could the arising of the self not be accepted. So then this:

Because that which has not arisen does not exist, then what could desire to exist?

is arrived at again.

82 An objection. 83 Any cause and effect relationship (Tibetan, TTK, f.230, TTD, 10:115b: tha dad pa yin na 'brel pa med pa) 84 BCA9:127-138 85 The object. 86 The enjoyer of the object. 293 And here he states another objection:

28cd And because of its being engaged with an object, it cannot attempt87 to stop either.

Even if it is accepted that it becomes active for enjoyment of an object depending upon primal substance (pradh¹na), then the later activity of something which was inactive before is not logical. But should it somehow become active, nevertheless there could not be cessation of what is engaged with an object. This is exactly what he says: it cannot attempt to stop either. It is also not able to cease from enjoyment of an object in that case, because of it having that essential nature and because of its not ceasing due to being eternal. Or if there is cessation, there is the absurd consequence of its not being eternal; the Naiy¹kas and the rest represent the self as being eternal.

Also, he states a qualification of that: [185]

29ab Because it is clear that an eternal and unconsciousness self is without activity like the sky.

Here, the difference from the S¹÷khyas is unconsciousness. Otherwise there is similarity. In that case, eternal means one essential nature at both prior and subsequent times, and unconsciousness, an essential nature lacking thinking. Insentient is the meaning. It becomes conscious by union with consciousness which is other from it. Like the sky, all-pervading. For this very reason, it is clear, evident, that it is without activity. As it is said:

Others, however, here assume a self, the substratum of desire and other feelings, unconscious in itself, eternal and all-pervading, the agent of good and bad actions, and the enjoyer of their fruit, conscious through union with what is conscious, not by its own nature.88

87 »hate, to have in mind, to endeavour to obtain, attempt, desire. MW171. La Vallée Poussin makes a question: "how will the activity bring itself to an end" (comment cette activite prendra-t-elle fin?). Steinkellner appears not to translate »hate, merely saying: "it cannot cease to be" (..., kann es nicht aufhoren zu sein). 88 Tattvasa¡graha, 171-72. The text is consistent with the one found in ˜¹ntarak¬ita, Tattvasa¡graha, ed. Krishnamacharya, 1:79-80. 294 And so, it is actually not doing anything, because of its inefficacy in any action whatsoever. But, in the presence of other cooperating conditions, it is accepted89 that even the inactive has its activity. As it is said:

The union of knowledge and effort etc. is said to be its agency.90

Here he says:

29cd Even when there is contact with other conditions, what is the activity of the changeless?

Even when there is the conjunction of other conditions such as knowledge and effort, what is the activity of the changeless, due to its being eternal, of the self not deviating from its previous essential nature? Activity is not at all possible. [186]

30 What is the result of activity by that, which at the time of activity is as it was before? If the connection is stated, “it has activity,” which of the two is the cause of the other?

What is the result of activity by that, by something devoid of the essential nature of an agent, which even at the time of activity is the same as it was earlier at the time of inactivity, due to which its activity would be established when in contact with other conditions. Moreover, because of the absence of mutual connection, if the connection stated is "it, the self, has this activity,” which of the two is the cause of the other. There is not anything91 at all.

And because the self92 and God93 will be refuted in detail, an independent entity is also not possible. So having proved lack of independence in every case, summing up he says:

89 Following Vaidya: kriy¹[ bhyu ]pagamyate for LVP kry¹pagamyte. 90 Tattvasa¡graha, 173ab. 91 I.e., any relationship. 92 BCA9:58-60 93 BCA9:119-126 295 31 Thus everything is dependent on another, and he on whom all depends is also not independent. When beings are such that they lack volition like a magical creation, with whom does one get angry?

Thus, in the manner explained, everything, the sum total of things internal and external, is dependent on another, subject to another. Then if it is said that the one on whom all depends will not be dependent on another, the reply is, “No.” And he on whom all depends is also not independent, is dependent on another which is his own cause. So since even that cause is from its own cause, [187] the one dependent on itself does not exist anywhere in the series of beginningless sa÷s¹ra. Hence all dharmas are without purposeful function, so who harms whom in the ultimate sense (param¹rthataå), whereby, there being offending, hatred of someone who has offended is fitting. This is exactly what he says: when beings are such that they lack volition, when all dharmas are without aspiration, like a magical creation because of devoid of all concept of function,94 with whom would one be angry? The meaning is that anger is never fitting for those who are circumspect.

That may be so, but from proving one in this way, the second is undermined. Supposing this, he says:

32ab Thus restraining also is not logical, if it is asked, "Who restrains what?"

As just established by argument, when beings lack volition like a magical creation,95 restraining also, preventing also, is not logical. If you agree that nothing whatever independent is seen, everything arises dependent on the complex (s¹magr») of conditions, then restraining also is not logical. Or if you do not agree, even then how is it not logical if it is asked, "Who restrains?" – "Which independent agent restrains what preventable independent activity?" This is the intent: “Because when there is a general rule applicable in some case, then its contradiction elsewhere is not logical. When it

94 Confirmed by Tibetan, TTK, f.233, TTD, 10:117a: byed pa’i rtog pa thams cad dang bral ba

296 is contradicted in one case, in absolutely every case its contradiction is logical, not just in a certain case, because of the generality of the rule. Therefore this is logical: restraining is not logical.”

If you think this is so, he says here in reply:

32cd It is logical, because there is dependence. The cessation of suffering is accepted.

[188] Restraining is logical. Why? Dependence. Because there is dependent arising, "this arises dependent on that,"96 even though existents are without purposeful function. Hence restraining is logical. There is no inconsistency from that. This is said: although all dharmas are without purposeful function, nevertheless dependence on another due to dependent arising is shown by the statement beginning "thus everything is dependent on another."97 Therefore, the further continuous flow of effects consisting of conditional formations and so on98 proceeds by force of the conditions beginning with ignorance;99 it ceases when each preceding one ceases. And this will be established in detail below.100 Therefore, the cessation, the stopping, of suffering, of sa÷s¹ra, is accepted. Hence, restraining the arising of the sin of hatred etc. is consistent. Dependent on that, the kind of result arises which has the nature of temporal happiness and ultimate good.101

Now, carrying on with the original topic, he says:

33 Therefore, even having seen an enemy or a friend doing an injustice, one should be happy after thinking like this, "He has such conditions."

95 LVP reads nirv¹ªavad, Vaidya corrects to nirm¹ªavad to agree with BCA6:31. 96 LVP188.1: idam pray»tyedam utpadyate. 97 BCA6:31. 98 That is, the rest of the twelve parts of the formula of dependent arising (prat»tyasamutp¹da) beginning with conditional formations (sa÷sk¹ra), which shows how suffering arises. See n.77. sa÷sk¹ra, one of the five aggregates which constitute an individual being. 99 Ignorance is the first step of the twelve step causal chain. "etc." refers to the other 11 steps. See BHS374. 100 BCA9:75 101 abhyudayaniå¶reyasvabh¹va. See A. K. Warder, Outline of Indian philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), 108. 297 Because everything is the result of conditions, therefore, having perceived an enemy or a friend102 who is an offender, only happiness should be relied on. How? After resolving like this, "He, the enemy or a friend, has such causes which dispose him towards doing an offence," one should be happy, one should not become dejected.

Moreover, there is no cessation of suffering even when the mind is agitated by the occurrence of suffering. Showing this he says: [189]

34 But if all embodied creatures have accomplishment according to their own wish, no one would have suffering; no one wishes for suffering.

Because it is not the case that the disagreeable is prevented merely by one's own wish, and that the agreeable comes about without a cause. If that were so, no one, no being, would have suffering. Why? No one wishes for suffering for themselves. Because all beings wish only for their own happiness.

After explaining patience as the endurance of suffering, now he explains patience as forgiving the offence of another:

35 They hurt themselves with thorns etc. from carelessness, by the deprivation of food and the like from anger, by longing for unattainable women etc.

36 And some kill themselves by hanging, by jumping, by eating poison or unwholesome food etc., and by unmeritorious conduct.

37 When they kill even their own beloved selves in this way because they are under the control of the defilements,103 then how would they spare the bodies of others.

102 amitretara - literally, an enemy and the other, meaning other than the enemy, i.e., friend. Vaidya adds "[amitramitara÷ ca]" possibly to explain what was just said (and an enemy or the other). LVP188 n.6, notes that this occurs in the Tibetan as “mi mdza da¡ cig ¶os = amitram itara‚ ca.” 103 Vaidya has probably misread LVP kle¶ava¶yatv¹d as kle¶ava¶yav¹d, or it may be a misprint. 298 Carelessness is the state of acting without consideration.104 They themselves hurt their own bodies with thorns, stumps,105 gravel,106 stones, pebbles etc., or they engage in actions on difficult to follow paths107 by lying on beds of thorns etc., as well as by giving up food and drink etc. [190] Why? Because of anger, or with the desire to obtain the prohibited wife of another and wealth and so on.

Hanging, hanging by the head; jumping, falling from a mountain etc.; by entering water or fire etc.; by eating poison or unwholesome food etc., by excessive eating or drinking etc.; some, deluded people, kill, cause to die, themselves, their own body. And by unmeritorious conduct such as killing others. And those with the intention of killing others by non-virtuous (aku¶ala) action in battles etc.

When, in this way, in the way declared, these beings kill, harm, even their own beloved, dearly loved, selves, because they are under the control of the defilements, because they are subject to the defilements, then how would they abstain from offence towards the bodies of others, other bodies.

And thus they are only worthy of pity, not an occasion for hatred, so he says:

38 When they are bent upon killing themselves, made mad by the defilements, not only is there not sympathy, how does anger arise?

When they, the doers of the offences, are, in the manner explained or through another offence, bent upon killing themselves as if possessed by demons, not only, not merely, is there not pity – even indifference towards them by the virtuous is not fitting – how does hatred arise? Since for those who are objects of pity, this is a great mistake.

[191] And one should restrain one's own mind in this way, so he says:

104 Vaidya has corrected LVP asam»k¬itakarit¹ to asam»k¬itak¹rit¹. 105 kh¹ªu not found in MW, BHS gives this meaning. 106 Vaidya ka−halla (MW: gravel), LVP ka©halla. ka©halla not found in MW or BHS, which gives variants ka−hala, ka−halya, ka−halla and ka©halya, meaning ‘gravel.’ Following this pattern, ka©halla would appear to be another variant. 299 39 If the essential nature of the foolish is causing misery to others, my anger towards them is not proper, as towards fire for having the nature of burning.

For accordingly, here there are two alternatives. Even if the essential nature of the foolish, of ordinary people, is only of this kind, causing misery to others, then the essential natures are surely not deserving the question: why are they offending others? Having considered this, my hatred towards them is not proper, just as towards fire which has the essential nature of burning because it causes burning. Otherwise, in the absence of that, there would be the absurd consequence of its relinquishing its essential nature.

Regarding the second alternative, he says:

40 Or else this fault is adventitious, beings are gentle by nature. And thus, anger towards them is not proper, as towards the atmosphere with acrid smoke.

Or else this fault is adventitious, completely other, it is not their essential nature. However, beings, in so far as the mental continuum is clear by nature, are gentle, have true108 essential natures. Because the faults are the ones with the wicked essential natures, the beings are not the ones having that essential nature. And thus, anger is not proper towards those beings having gentle essential natures. Like what? As, like, towards the atmosphere with acrid smoke. Because surely the acridity is not the essential nature of the clear sky, but rather of the smoke. And hence, hatred109 is only possible towards the smoke with that fault, not towards the sky which is pure by nature. Therefore anger is proper only towards the faults, not the beings.

[192] Moreover, anger would be proper only towards the principal cause of suffering, not towards the subordinate, so he says:

107 Religious paths which require adherents to subject the body to severe austerities. 108 aku−ila, literally, not crooked. 109 LVP reads dve¬a, but notes that the MS reads do¬a, which is the reading Vaidya uses. Dve¬a is easier to translate. 300 41 If one disregards the principal, sticks and the like and gets angry with the mover, he also is moved by hatred. It may be better that my hatred is with the hatred.

Because suffering arises for the uncultivated mind from the blow of a stick on the body. Therefore, since the stick itself is the principal cause of suffering, anger is proper only towards it. But what is the fault of the stick, which is moved by another? Therefore, only the mover should be hated. Then since he also, the mover of the stick, is moved by hatred, my hatred towards the hatred is proper, not towards the mover.

Moreover, after considering that nothing given unjustly is experienced, whether happiness nor suffering,110 even when there is the offence of another one should not become angry (cittam pradجayet) in that case, so he says:

42 I too caused the very same kind of pain for beings previously. Therefore, this is quite proper for me, who causes misery to beings.

Because I too caused harm of just such a kind for beings previously, in a former life, this is totally appropriate for me, who causes offence to another, by the principle of discharging the debt. The meaning is: because of the ripening of the fruit of that action.

After deliberating that if there is a cause of this, this arises from that, not from something else, one should excuse (mar¬ayed) the offence of another. Showing this, he says: [193]

43 His weapon and my body, both are the cause of suffering. The weapon is grasped by him, the body by me. With whom does one get angry?

Because the cause of all effects is the entire complex (s¹magr») of causes, so it has been authoritatively ascertained. And this [complex] of such a sort occurs in this case. For so it is, that offender has the weapon, swords and the

110 LVP reads sukha÷ dukha÷ v¹, Vaidya sukha÷ v¹ dukha÷ v¹. The meaning is the same. 301 like; and I have the body. Both of them, comprising a complex, are the cause of suffering. So when there is the existence of an efficient cause as well, how would the effect not arise. Otherwise, that would not really be the cause of it. Although other than that, arising would be possible from that.111 Therefore, if one gets angry towards what brings about a cause, then anger is proper towards yourself also; since you yourself also bear and bring about your own cause of suffering. The meaning is: when there is not anger towards yourself, anger towards another also is not proper.

Elucidating in another way the matter just stated, he says:

44 This bodily form which is an abscess, unable to bear being touched, is grasped by me, blind with craving. When there is pain, with whom does one get angry?

This ripe abscess in the shape of a body is grasped by me. Bearing every injury because it is the cause of all suffering, because it is not to be broken, even by beating, striking etc. Blind, the eye of wisdom being covered, with that which is craving, the desire to avoid suffering and to obtain happiness. When there is pain, with whom does one get angry? Because anger is not proper for the wise, when an abscess has some suffering born of contact between bodies and the like.

[194] Moreover, someone who does not want an effect should avoid the cause of it. Showing the consideration that I am contrary-minded, he says:

45 I do not desire suffering. Being foolish, I do desire the cause of suffering. When suffering comes from one's own offence, why get angry with someone else?

I do not desire suffering, born of the striking of sticks and the like. However, being foolish, having the characteristic of a fool, delusion, I do desire the cause of it, the body and retaliation.112 For that reason, the suffering which

111 LVP193 n.1, suggests “= tats¹magr»to, nyad api k¹raªa÷ sy¹t, tata ...?” Although there would be a cause other than the accumulation, [arising would be possible from that.] 112 Based on LVP pratyapak¹raªam, rather than Vaidya pratyapak¹riªam. 302 is in one's own body only comes from one's own offence, so why get angry with someone else, with someone who is only its accompanying agent?

As I am the one who has fashioned the weapon for self-destruction, my anger is not proper with someone else, so he says:

46 As the forest with leaves of swords, as the birds of hell, are only born of my actions, so is this. With whom does one get angry?

The forest with leaves of swords arises as a hell. With the understanding that its leaves are actually swords. Taking the word sword as primary.113 And another weapon or implement may cause the suffering of hell. As the birds, those inhabitants in the forest such as the vulture, the owl, the crow, are causes of suffering only born of my actions. There is no other cause of suffering in this case. So is this also, the cause of suffering, such as the weapon of another, only born of my actions. So with whom does one get angry?

[195] And thus to show that this is indeed a delusion, he says:

47 Living beings are offending me only when provoked by my action. By that they will go to the hells. Surely, they are destroyed by me alone?

Living beings, beings, who are offending me, who has committed offences previously, only when provoked, impelled, by that, by my action, will go to the hells. Therefore, surely, they, the offenders, are destroyed by me alone. One instructs one's own mind (svacittam sa÷bodhayati): 'I am not destroyed by those." This is the intent: “If I had not done such an action, then they, for their part, would not be offenders.” They become offenders due to my action alone.

Showing with these two verses that my mind is an offender, through ignorance, towards these very benefactors, he says:

113 Indicating a karmadh¹raya compound. 303 48 Depending on them, my sin decreases as I am enduring greatly, but depending on me, they will go to the hells of extended pain.

49 I alone am their offender and they are my benefactors. Having construed the opposite, base mind, why do you become angry?

Depending on them, the offenders, making them a cause, my sin, born of offences done to others in previous lives, decreases, diminishes as a consequence of experiencing that suffering. Enduring, relying on patience. Greatly, done on more than one occasion. [196] Depending on me, provoked by my actions, and so having done an offence, they, however, go to the hells of intense pain, of experiences of unbearable suffering. Hence, in the way described, the words beginning, "I alone am their offender," are easily understood.

Surely, if you are an offender, then going to the hells is proper only for you, but not for them? So he says:

50 If I have a good quality of intention, I will not go to the hells. What is the outcome for them in this case, if I protect myself?

I have that greatness of intention, devotion to ceasing from retaliation, which is the cause of ceasing from going to the hells. I will not go to the hells by force of that greatness of my own intention. This is the meaning: “but my not falling towards the hells is not however due to their bad intention.” This is exactly what he says starting with the words "for them."114 This then is the meaning of the whole: if I, even though being an offender, by some skilfulness in means, do not go to the hells, then what is attained for them, for the benefactors?115 What is diminished? The meaning is: what is the loss? Others may not be protected by me on my own, and I should protect myself. And by that there would not be loss in virtue or increase in fault for them.

114 The second line of 6:50 begins with e¬¹m, translated as “for them.” 115 Vaidya has [m?], on the basis of LVP’’s footnote, 196 n.4: Possibly apak¹riª¹m. 304 [197] Surely if it is that way, even so protecting yourself is not proper in so far as you are grateful to the benefactors. Doubting this, he says:

51 But should I retaliate, nevertheless they are not protected, and also my course of conduct (cary¹) is abandoned, therefore the distressed are lost.

If should I retaliate towards those who strike with sticks and the like, nevertheless they are not protected.116 No remedy whatsoever would be achieved for them in regard to going to the hells etc. On the contrary, I must not strike back even when struck. Thus, I should not disturb117 my benevolent mind (maitracitta) towards all beings. Finally, a hostile thought (pratighacitta) should not be produced even towards a burnt tree stump.118 From such beginnings, there would be the very abandonment of my bodhisattva course of conduct. Therefore now, because of the absence of means for a remedy, the distressed, the wretched, because it is impossible for them to be saved, are lost, have indeed fallen into a bad destiny. So now they are really neglected. Later, having attained the means for it, I will apply it so that they will not have even the slightest suffering.

Thus having explained patience as forgiving the offence of another, now to show the patience as profound reflection on dharmas, he says:

52 It is not possible for any one at any time to strike the mind, because of it being formless, but the mind is tormented by suffering because of its attachment to the body.119

[198] The two kinds of tormenting suffering produced for one who does not discriminate are called physical and mental. In regard to those, no one is able to put sticks and the like to the mind, because of the mind being formless, so ultimately (param¹rthataå) suffering produced from it is not possible; but

116 LVP: na rak¬it¹ bhavanti, Vaidya: rak¬it¹ na bhavanti. 117 LVP notes that the MS reads ni¶citavyam, but has corrected it to nik¬eptavyam based on the Tibetan. Vaidya has ni¬ci[k¬epta?]tavyam. 118 See BCAP6:1. 119 Based on Vaidya, who has preferred the reading citta÷ duåkhena (94 n.2), to LVP’’s k¹yaduåkhena. Minaev reads citta÷ duåkhena, but the Tibetan suggests k¹ya. LVP197 n.7: “Ex. conj.” The meaning is not altered substantially. 305 there is dejection and so on, created by imagination. This is what he shows, beginning with the word "body."120 The mind is distressed by suffering of the body on account of the latent tendencies (v¹sana) due to the repetition of the false notion, "This is my body."

In that regard also, he says that the cause of suffering is quite definite:

53 This class, namely vilification, insults and dishonour, does not hurt the body, then, O mind, why do you become angry?

This class, the collection, of vilification etc., is not a cause of suffering for the body. Since it certainly does not do any injury to the body, then, O mind, why, for what reason, do you become angry?

It may be this way also. Even if vilification etc. do not torment the body, nevertheless, having heard them, people's attitude towards me will be unfavourable (aprasanna), and I do not desire this. Supposing this, he says:

54 Will the lack of favour (apras¹da), which others have towards me, devour me121 either here or in a future life, so that it is undesired by me?

Granted it may be so, nevertheless it should certainly be investigated. Will this lack of favour, which people have towards me because of hearing vilification etc., devour me in this world [199] or in the next world, so that it, the lack of favour of the world, is not liked by me? Having investigated thus, one should not have attachment to this.

Or is it perhaps that the cause of attachment to this is the prevention of gain? So he says:

55 If it is undesired by me because of causing an obstacle to gain: my gain will be lost right here, but the sin will remain permanently.

For so it is, if you say that, “Through hearing vilification etc. people have disfavour and therefore aversion to bestowing gain. Therefore it, the class of

120 The second line of BCA6:52 begins with ¶ar»ra, body.

306 vilification etc.,122 is undesired by me,” that is not proper. It will be lost, in so far as it has the property of being perishable, it will disappear. Right here, my gain is only for a certain number of days, but it will not continue into the next world. Only the sin occasioned by that will remain later, will continue into the next world, for the one being angry with the doers of vilification etc. Permanently means because it is not destroyed as long as its fruit is not enjoyed.

And this also should be reflected upon here:

56 My dying this very day is better than living wrongly123 for a long time, because even after staying for a long time, I will have that same suffering of death.

This indeed is better, best, that my death may occur on this very day from an absence of gain, rather than living wrongly for a long time, for a long period of time, from receiving gain through offending against others. Why? Because, even having lived for a very long time, [200] it is inevitable that I will have that same suffering of death, since life certainly ends in death. That will be the same for me dying now as later, when a century has passed, so there is no difference for those with long lives.

And that there is indeed no difference here, he shows with two verses:

57 One awakens after having enjoyed happiness for a hundred years in a dream, and another awakens after having been happy for a moment.

121 Vaidya: sa m¹÷ ki÷ bhak¬ayi¬yati, LVP: sa kim m¹÷ bhak¬ayi¬yati. 122 Vaidya: nyakk¹r¹diguªo; LVP: nyakk¹r¹dirguªo appears to be a misprint. 123 LVP199 n.1: “Mithy¹-¹j»va is well-known, see SSB267.11.” 307 58 When awakened, surely the happiness of both of them ceases (nivartate)?124 This is the very simile applicable at the time of death to one living a long time and one living a short time.

For instance, someone awakens after having enjoyed happiness experienced in a dream for a hundred years, but another only for a moment. He considers himself to be happy for that time. When both of them who enjoyed happiness experienced in a dream wake up, the lost happiness experienced there does not return (nivartate).125 It does not continue in the state of wakefulness, because what is left is only a memory. This is the very simile applicable, like two people whose happiness is obtained in a dream, to one living a long time and to one living a short time, at the time of death, at the time of dying. Surely happiness ceases.126 So enough of this living wrongly.

And because of this there is no difference whatsoever between gain and lack of gain. Explaining this he says: [201]

59 Even having gained many gains, even having enjoyed pleasures for a long time, I will go both empty-handed and naked, as if robbed.

Even having gained, having acquired, plentiful gains, even having enjoyed pleasures for a long time, nevertheless, having met death, I am both empty-handed, with hands that are empty. Not even a little from that gain is taken as provisions for the journey. Also, nothing remaining from that happiness is left. And naked, since not even as much as a girdle is remaining, I will go from this world to the other world as if robbed by thieves.

124 nivartate can mean stop, cease; or turn back, recur. Either the two different meanings are used, or the verse should read: na tannivartate, as in Minayef (LVP200 n.2). When awakened, the happiness of both does not return to them. 125 See previous note. 126 Grammatical note untranslated: sukham has the same meaning as saukhyam. 308 That may be so, but gain does have this distinction: there can be life for a longer time on the basis of the conditions for long life from lack of obstacle127 to robes etc. And consequently I can destroy previously done sin by the practice of self-reproach etc.128 and increase the aspect of virtue by guarding the vow of training (¶ik¬¹sa÷vara) and by the cultivation of bodhicitta etc.

As it is said:

As long as a person who follows the dharma lives, For that time he produces a stream of good.129

Hence, aversion (pradve¬a) is indeed proper towards someone causing an obstacle to gain. Supposing this, he says:

60ab If you say that living from gain I will create both merit and the destruction of sin.

You think like this: " Living, continuing to live, from gain, in the way declared, I will create both merit and the destruction of sin." Surely this is said through not seeing the excessive fault from this? So he says: [202]

60cd Surely there is both sin and the decrease of merit for one who is angry for the sake of gain?

For the sake of gain, on account of gain, only the decrease of virtue is produced for one who expresses hatred towards someone causing an obstacle to it. As it was said, starting with the words, "All this good conduct."130 But this is the distinction: the quantity of sin produced from impatience goes on increasing.131

It may be this way also: somehow or other life may be extended for so long a time through gain, only to that extent do we have a purpose. He says:

127 Vaidya reads anupagh¹t¹d for LVP avigh¹t¹d, which fits the context better. 128 vidجaª¹samud¹c¹ra The first of four dharmas for purifying sin. The others are: practice of doing a good action, after a bad action (pratipak¬asamud¹c¹ra), the power of amendment (praty¹pattibala) and the power of refuge (¹¶rayabala). See ˜ik¬¹samuccaya chapter 8. 129 LVP201 n.2 does not know the reference. 130 BCA6:1. 131 LVP has ca, which I have not translated. 309 61 If the only purpose for which I live is lost, what is the use of living doing only what is unmeritorious?

Bodhisattvas certainly do not desire living with no purpose at all like other beings, but for the sake of decreasing sin and for the sake of developing the accumulations.132 Then if it should be the very cause of the decrease of merit (sukÅta), then what is the use of that sort of living, which has the character of doing only unmeritorious acts. The sense is: that is completely condemned.

That may be the case, but a hostile thought does not arise towards my defamer due to it creating an obstacle to gain, but because it is a cause of suffering due to the act of concealing virtue etc. To this he says:

62 If there is hatred towards a defamer, thinking that he destroys you,133 why does your anger not arise in the same way also towards someone who dishonours others?

If, if, this hatred (vidve¬a) of yours is towards someone expressing dishonour, thinking, having thought, “That defamer [203] destroys you through revealing fault and concealing virtue,” that is its cause.134 Alternatively, he destroys beings, people. He dominates by criticizing me. The meaning is that his unfavourable mind makes their mind unfavourable also. If, thinking like this, there is hatred towards a defamer. He replies, then why does your anger not arise also in the case when someone proclaims dishonour of others, of other beings? And he also is a defamer who destroys beings. Then anger towards him too is indeed appropriate.

Here supposing a rejoinder, he says:

63ab Your forbearance (k¬am¹) towards those who show disfavour is because of the disfavour being dependent on others.

132 sa÷bh¹ra, which are required by bodhisattvas, consists of two things: merit (puªya) and knowledge (prajñ¹). BHS580. 133 The commentary suggests two readings, sa tv¹÷ and sattv¹n. Either, "he destroys you" or "he destroys beings." Although with iti, one would expect sa m¹m - “he destroys me” - rather than sa tv¹m.

310 His disfavour is dependent on, directed to, others, other beings, means that it is arisen having made other beings its object. Because of that,135 your forbearance, patience, arises towards those who show disfavour, towards those defamers with unfavourable minds, because of the disfavour being directed to others. He is asking his own mind. In this case, he says:

63cd There is no forbearance towards a defamer who is dependent on the arising of the defilements.

If you have forbearance towards someone whose disfavour is dependent on others, then why is there no forbearance towards one defaming oneself? What is his nature? He is dependent on the arising of defilements, subject to the arising of defilements. The meaning is: the cause of forbearance is the disfavour being dependent on others equally in both cases.

[204] One should not produce a hostile thought even on account of faith, towards those who destroy sacred images etc., so he says:

64 My hatred is not proper towards destroyers of sacred images and stØpas, and towards abusers of the True Dharma, because the Buddhas and the like do not feel pain.

Destroyers, creators of havoc, abusers, those who express contrariness due to faulty intellect. My hatred towards them is not proper. Why? Because Buddhas and the like, bodhisattvas, arhats and pratyekabuddhas, do not have pain, dejection which is characterized by mental affliction, because of their lack of intense attachment from cessation of the notion of a self born of attachment to falsehood. Such is the sense. Hence, one should not produce a hateful thought towards those who completely destroy sacred images etc. Thus, on the other hand, for virtuous people only compassion is proper towards those acting contrary to the dharma. Otherwise, due to lack of distinction in that case, only sin itself will be produced. If, however, it is possible to restrain them according to the dharma, then there is no fault.

134 LVP: sa tannimittakaå, Vaidya omits the sa, which agrees with the Tibetan, TTK, f.242, TTD, 10:121b : de’i rgyu mtshan gyis

311 And whatever hateful thought arises, due to love of the dharma, towards those who destroy guru, parents etc. it also should immediately be restrained, so he says:

65 One should prevent anger towards those who harm gurus, relatives etc. and loved ones, having seen conditional arising, as before.

Gurus are instructors on the path of dharma, those who prevent the aspect of non-virtue. [205] Relatives are those born from the same womb, and others such as near relations, family, and more distant relations. Towards those who harm them. The connection is this: and likewise one should prevent anger towards those who harm loved ones, objects of love. How? Having seen conditional arising, as before. As described with the statement beginning, “and whatever the faults.”136 Hence, all those people too experience only the result which is generated by their previous actions. There is no reason for retaliation in this matter. By that is meant that even though at another time it is not considered a fault for one committing a sin for the sake of gods, gurus, brahmans, parents etc., it is not so accepted in this case. So it is explained.

Moreover, one should not become angry towards beings by also keeping in mind the way things are. So he says:

66 Pain is inevitable for embodied beings, whether caused by something conscious or unconscious. That pain is seen in what is conscious, hence endure that pain.

A cause is characterized by the complex of conditions known by its being a producer through positive and negative concomitance of an entire effect. And that complex has some essential nature of being effective for something, due to the properties of things. In regard to those, caused by something conscious

135 Commentary indicates that tva is used in the ablative case and refers to the abstract state of affairs stated in the preceding iti clause. 136 BCA6:25, LVP and Vaidya both refer incorrectly to BCA6:15. LVP follows Minaev in putting “ye ke cidapar¹dh¹stu,” although he notes that the ms. has ye ke cidapar¹dh¹¶ca, and this reference [205.04] also has ye ke cidapar¹dh¹¶ca. NOTE TO 6:25: LVP182 n.1. MS has °apar¹dha¶ ca, Minaev has °apar¹dhas tu, and LVP has followed Minaev. I have followed Vaidya,

312 means by striking with things like hands and feet; by something unconscious means by things like sticks, weapons and disease. And in those, there is indeed the function which is like consciousness. However, the distinction is whether it is done directly or through an intermediary. Pain is inevitable, invariably occurs, for embodied beings, for those with bodies, whether caused by blows with a clod or masonry and the like, or completely on its own accidentally. There is no other cause of pain than this. And that, born of the complex of two types of causes in this way, is seen, ascertained by a valid means of knowledge, in what is conscious, a conscious body. Hence, this only is the place where it arises, not another, [206] because feeling is not possible for something unconscious. Therefore, whatever is the place where something arises, that is exactly where it is, not another place, like a lotus is in mud, not on dry ground. Hence, from this rule, endure, bear, that pain, of the two kinds just described.

Then to describe that anger is not appropriate to anyone whatsoever, due to the same defect of both, he says:

67 Some offend because of confusion, and137 others confused get angry. Will we say who among these is without fault, or will we say who is the offender?

Due to the mistake of attachment to the notion of I and mine, some, some people, offend with sticks and the like. Or make themselves objectionable by speaking extremely abusively etc. Others, on the other hand, get angry, become enraged, due to their offence. Those who are confused, who, because of confusion, do not consider the connection between the fruit and their own actions, due to the obscuration of ignorance begin striking back, abusing and so on, in return. Thus, will we say who among these, among those subject to possession by the demons the defilements, is without fault, or will we say who is the offender, possessed of a fault? Because there is the same fault in both of them.

who prefers °apar¹dh¹¶ ca, which also agrees with the reference to this verse in the commentary to BCA6:65.

313 And a hostile thought should be restrained by one thinking to oneself this also, so he says:

68 For what reason did you act thus previously, due to which you are hurt by others in this way. All are dependent on action, who am I to make it otherwise in this case.

[207] For what reason, from what cause? Why is it thus, what act became the cause of this result? “Due to which” (yena) is a colloquial expression. The meaning of it is “so that” (yat): so that in this way. Or else, “due to which” (yena) means by the account of which capacity of action, reason. You are hurt, afflicted, by abusing, imprisoning, beating etc. by others (para), by others (anya). Beginning with the word “all,” he answers the objection that if it is indeed thus, retaliation is fitting. All, the causes of suffering, are manifestations generated by the condition of action. Since this is so, who am I to make it otherwise, to prevent its result? Nobody. Because no-one is able to prevent the actions of that which is about to give results.

But this is fitting in this case, he says:

69 But realizing this, I will make an effort towards acts of merit accordingly, so that everyone will have friendly thoughts for each other.

Realizing, understanding, this, that these beings, whose actions are dependent on the defilements, are not able to stop doing unvirtuous actions to each other, however, I will make an effort towards acts of merit, towards virtuous actions, accordingly – in that way, I will start exerting effort – so that, after obtaining capacity in this manner, all beings caused to start on the true path will have friendly thoughts, will be devoted to the creation of welfare and happiness, for each other, one to the other.

137 LVP reads anye ‘pi mohit¹å; based on the commentary, Vaidya reads anye vimohitaå. The sense is not changed substantially. 314 After completely restraining malicious thought, one must prevent hatred towards someone who attacks a beloved object. Illustrating this with a worldly example in two ¶lokas, he says: [208]

70 Just as when a house is burning and the fire goes towards a nearby house where it may contact grass and such, then it is dragged away and removed.

71 Similarly, when the mind burns with the fire of hatred due to contact with something, it must be given up instantly, from fear of the body of merit burning up.

As one house is burning with fire and the fire goes from that house to another house, goes towards a nearby house, where it contacts, touches, grass, wood and such, then with the fear that the other thing inside it [the house] may burn, it is dragged away and removed, separated and kept apart. Thus applying this usual practice also to the present context, he says: similarly, by way of the given example, when the mind (citta), the mind (manas), burns, blazes, with the fire of hatred (dve¬avahni), with the fire of hostility (pratigh¹nala), due to contact, attached, with some thing; then that thing, the place of contact, must be given up instantly, with no intervening time. Attachment to it must be abandoned. For what reason? Body (¹tman), body (¶ar»ra), of merit, that is to say, collection of merit. In the manner stated, lest there be burning, destruction, of it. Otherwise, the fire of aversion may burn it also, like the thing in the nearby house.

Moreover, the only gain obtained is the sufferings of humans, on account of which the karma resulting in hell matures. Demonstrating this, he says:

72 If one to be killed is freed after having his hand cut off, is that not fortunate? If by human sufferings one is freed from hell, is that not fortunate?

[209] For if he who deserves killing is freed having only his hand cut off, then he has lost nothing. On the contrary, he considers himself to have gained an advantage, since this suffering of cutting of the hand is very much less than

315 the suffering of death. Similarly, anybody who is freed from the suffering of hell after experiencing human suffering caused by beating, imprisonment, abuse etc. has also lost nothing at all. This pain is nothing compared to the pain of hell. It is, in fact, pleasure. Consequently, if he were wise, then only a happy state of mind is possible for him in this case.

And this may be the case: I am not able to be patient even when there is a very small amount of suffering. In this case, he says:

73 If this amount of suffering cannot be endured now, then why is anger not avoided, which is the cause of the pain of hell?

Even a small amount of suffering, done by striking with the fist or the palm of the hand, clod of earth etc. cannot, is unable to, be endured. In this case, then, I ask of you, “If it is indeed thus, then why, for what reason, is this anger, wrath, which will produce the suffering of hell, not avoided?” For this itself, above all, is the giver of suffering in the hells, so for those very ones afraid of suffering, it would be fitting to prevent anger.

Moreover, even though it cannot be endured, nevertheless you will experience suffering, although you do not desire it, due to the occurrence of the karma which causes it. And no reward will be produced. [210] However, through endurance of it one will gain a great benefit. To teach this by means of two verses, he says:

74 In the same way, for the sake of anger I was tormented138 thousands of times in the hells and I have created no benefit for myself or benefit for another.

75 This suffering is not of that kind and will create a great result. Only joy in suffering that removes the suffering of the world is proper here.

On account of anger, in the same way, just fruitlessly, I was tormented, tortured by means of cutting, breaking, cleaving etc. in the hells, like Sañj»va

138 k¹rita used in this sense mainly in Buddhist works. Examples are also found in the k¬¹nti chapter of ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. See BHS178. 316 etc., thousands of times, repeatedly. Thus I, although experiencing pain in this way, have created, achieved, no benefit, means of achieving a reward either seen or unseen, at all for myself, none at all, or benefit, characterized by producing pleasure, for another (parasya), for another (anyasya). So the humiliation of thousands of sufferings in hell was completely pointless.

Therefore he says that, similarly, even now intolerance (asahi¬ªut¹) is not proper for me. This suffering is not of that kind, like that arising from hell. As well, it will achieve a great result: Buddhahood, which accomplishes the welfare and happiness of all beings. Hence, in suffering that removes the suffering of the world, that allays all suffering of all beings throughout the three worlds, only joy is proper here, not aversion – such is the sense.

For cleansing the stain of envy on hearing of the virtues others, he says: [211]

76 If others obtain the happiness of joy after praising the excellence of virtues, why, O Mind, after praising it, do you not also become delighted in this way?

If some obtain the happiness of joy after praising the abundance of virtues, then, why, O Mind, do you not also experience the same happiness of delight by extolling those virtues? Why, indeed, do you unnecessarily make your stream of consciousness fuel to burn in the flames of the fire of envy of it?

But surely no happiness at all is allowed to be enjoyed, because of the nature of attachment. So because I turn away from all happiness, I will not accept this either. Because he is going to say:

From whatever the mind confused with happiness takes delight in, suffering develops in a thousand ways, and remains. (BCA8:18)

So he says:

317 77 And this happiness of delight of yours is an unobjectionable source of happiness, and not forbidden by those who are virtuous as it is most attractive139 to others.

For not all happiness of delight is rejected. But only that which is objectionable, being the cause of non-virtue (aku¶alahetu). And this happiness of delight depending on others’ virtues (guªa) is not objectionable for you. Nor is it the cause of non-virtue. Hence, with the understanding that it is a source of happiness, there is the arising of happiness from it, therefore it is not forbidden by those who are virtuous, by those who know the precepts140 of the Bhagavan’s teaching.141 [212] This has another virtue (guªa): it is most attractive to others, because of joy in the virtues (guªa) of others. Other beings also will become attracted to you thinking that this lack of envy is among the virtues (guªa). Hence, to accept happiness of delight in this case is certainly proper.

That may be so, but it is not that I have no forbearance for the virtues (guªa) of others. However, since this happiness is entirely his alone, I am unable to endure it. In this case, he says:

78 If you do not take pleasure in this thinking that only he has happiness, the seen and the unseen would be destroyed through the cessation of giving wages and the like.

If you do not take pleasure in this, have happiness produced from the praise of others qualities, thinking that only he, the praiser, has happiness, with this opinion, then you have fallen into extreme peril. How? From the cessation of giving wages and the like. And even that which is cause for your own happiness, giving wages, giving payment for service, to your own servants etc., likewise returning benefit to a benefactor, would not be done by one who hates the happiness of others, through the cessation of, turning away from, these and the like. Since his happiness is accomplished by that as well, then both the seen, in this world, and the unseen, in the next world, reward would

139 ¹varjana, BHS107. 140 vidhi, BHS :way.

318 be destroyed by one who cannot tolerate the accomplishment of happiness by others.

Moreover, to explain that this response of yours is false, he says:

79 And when your virtue (guªa) is being praised, you want even another to be happy. When the virtue of another is being praised, you do not even want yourself to be happy.

[213] If somebody proclaims your virtue, then you want that other to be happy, even though it is not wanted. But when someone extols the virtue of another, then, however, you do not even want yourself to be happy, your mind being pierced by the arrow of envy. The word “even” (api) means “let alone the happiness of another.” Therefore your envy is actually towards the accomplishment of happiness by others, it is not that you are intolerant of the happiness of the praiser.

As it was said:

If you do not take pleasure in this thinking that only he has happiness. (BCA6:78)

In that connection, he states the fault particularly:

80 After having generated bodhicitta from the desire for the happiness of all beings, why do you now get angry towards beings who have gained happiness for themselves?

Particularly for someone in whom bodhicitta has been produced, this is extremely censurable, namely, that there is lack of tolerance (asahi¬ªut¹) towards the acquisition of happiness by another. Since bodhicitta has been generated with the thought that after reaching Buddhahood I should make all beings, those moving within the three realms, satisfied by the acquisition of complete happiness. Having produced that, why is there anger towards beings now, today, towards beings who are an opportunity for favour, towards those

141 bhagavacch¹sanavidhi Tibetan f.126a: bcom ldan 'das kyis bstan pa'i chos. 319 who have attained happiness for themselves, by themselves alone, after making their own mind favourable? Thus the meaning is that a bodhisattva’s mind must not be turned away from this happiness of others.

Furthermore, with the aim of rebuking someone whose heart is polluted with envy, who, even with bodhicitta generated, [213] still burns with grief when thinking of another’s acquisition of gain and honour, he says:

81 You supposedly desire Buddhahood, worthy of reverence in the three worlds, for beings. Why do you burn up when you see them gain a slight honour?

Alternatively it may be like this. It is not really that I do not endure his happiness, but that gain and honour is presented to them by those whose minds are delighted on hearing of the existence of another’s virtue (guªa). In this case he says the verse beginning with the words, “The three worlds.”142 The worlds are three, characterized as the realms of desire, form and formless,143 or generally accepted as the nature of heaven etc. Or the three worlds are the group of those. Since it deserves reverence, worthy of reverence, it should be honoured. By this it is explained as surpassing everything. You supposedly desire Buddhahood of this kind for beings. By using the word “supposedly,” he displays disgust, having seen the reverse. Honour also means gain, by implication. The rest is easily understood.

Having gain in view, he says:

82 The one who supports someone who ought to be supported by you is actually giving to you. Having obtained one who supports your family, you do not rejoice, you become angry!

[215] The one who supports your loved ones, sons and so on, who ought to be supported by you, is actually giving to you. He has actually achieved a gain for you. Hence, having obtained, having acquired, one who supports your family, such a person who nourishes your family, “Why on

142 The Sanskrit verse begins with trailokya, the three worlds.

320 earth144 are you not delighted?” he asks. The meaning is: you become angry and you do not become delighted. Likewise, in the present context, only happiness with their happiness is proper for someone who has accepted all beings as his own.

It may be like this: you have promised them Buddhahood only, but not however other types of happiness. Supposing this, he says:

83ab What would someone not wish for beings, who desires enlightenment for them?

Surely, this145 is not correct, because [you] promised:

I invite the world today to the state of the Sugatas and to happiness in the meantime. (BCA3:33)

Let that be so. Nevertheless, what other mundane and supramundane wealth would someone who has developed bodhicitta and who desires enlightenment, Buddhahood, for beings not wish for them?

But should he not wish it so, then he has abandoned bodhicitta also, so he says:

83cd Where is the bodhicitta of someone who becomes angry at the acquisition of others?

Where is the bodhicitta of someone who has promised bodhicitta? It is indeed false. Of whom? Someone who becomes angry at the acquisition others, at others’ prosperity produced from gain and honour. [216] This is totally destructive146 for a bodhisattva, the cause of cessation of all virtuous acts.

Moreover, even if the other does not acquire gain and honour, still there is no possibility of it becoming yours. Why, then, without cause attempt to destroy yourself through hatred of him? Explaining this, he says:

143 k¹marØp¹rØpyadh¹tu. 144 k¹kk¹/k¹kv¹ for k¹ku - showing distressed/angry tone of voice, or for emphasis. 145 that only Buddhahood can be promised. 146 marmacodan¹ mortally wounding. 321 84 If he does not receive it, then it remains in the donor’s house. In any case, it is not yours, so what difference does it make to you whether it is given or not given?

If, indeed, he, a being who is the object of your impatience, does not receive it, the thing being given, nevertheless, it remains in the donor’s house. What, then, is the result for you from that? In any case, whether obtained by him or remaining in the house, that thing is not yours. So what difference does it make to you whether it is given or not given? It is of no use to you. Hence, in that case, only equanimity is proper for a wise man.

Moreover, this must be reflected upon further, so he says:

85 Must he obstruct147 merits, kind people, his own virtues and obtaining [something] not keep [it]? Say what does not make you angry!

He, that one who is honoured with gain and honours, given by extremely kind donors and givers, must he obstruct merits done in a previous birth which are about to ripen, [217] on account of which he has gain and honours? Or must he obstruct kind people, donors and givers? As well, must he obstruct his own virtues, depending on which their kindness is born, with the thought, “May you all not show your kindness.” Or else, even though obtaining [something] from them, he must not accept [it]. Tell me how, by what means, you would not be dissatisfied in this case? Because of the impossibility of obstructing merit and so on in that case and even if what was obtained is not kept, because of the statement of contradiction in the verse beginning “in any case, it is not yours,”148 nothing will be a cause of satisfaction.

It may be this way also. Only the other has the acquisition of gain and honour, not me. So my basis for contentment is this thought: if it is not mine, then let not another have it either. Supposing this, he says:

86 Not only are you not sorry for the sin you have done yourself, you want to compete with others who have created merit.

322 This is easily understood. All suffering whatsoever is caused by sin. The obstruction of desire is also suffering. And not obtaining what one desires is also suffering. Following this statement, he will say:

And obstructions of desire are produced for sinners. (BCA7:41)

Since all happiness whatsoever comes from merit, one who desires happiness should make an effort to do what is good (¶ubha). As he will say, beginning with these words, “However, the desire for happiness of those who create merit.”149 Thus, how is it proper to compete with those who have created merit? [218] The meaning is that for those desiring happiness it is proper to compete only by doing good actions.

Moreover, you should be asked this also:

87ab If something unwanted is produced for an enemy, what would be achieved due to your satisfaction?

For your enemy, for the object of your hatred, if, if, something unwanted, undesired, is produced, occurred, merely by your desire, what would be achieved by you due to that? As long as he gets what he does not want. Whatever else happens or does not happen for another is neither here nor there. Merely by that it is some use to me, you say. Supposing the other’s intent, he says:

87cd And a thing will not come into existence without a cause, merely by your wish.

Your wish, desire, namely, [your] craving.150 And merely by that a thing without a cause, a causeless thing, meaning it does not have a cause, will not come into existence.

Even assuming it may indeed be so for the one you do not like:

147 v¹rayatu, or Would you have him obstruct? 148 BCA6:84cd. 149 BCA7:43 reads p¹pak¹risukhecch¹: “the desire for happiness of those who sin.” Here, the reading is puªyak¹risukhecch¹. 150 Tibetan: mngon par 'dod pa. 323 88ab What pleasure do you get when he has suffering, even if it were accomplished due to your wish?

But if something unwanted were accomplished for your enemy due to your wish, even so what pleasure do you get when suffering arises for him. None at all. To that extent this is desired without purpose.

Surely, this is the only purpose – my satisfaction when he has suffering. So he says: [219]

88cd And if there should be an advantage such as this, what misfortune is there greater than this?

And if there should be an advantage, purpose, such as this, satisfaction in the suffering of another, then what misfortune is there greater than this? Nu is used to show excess.151 The meaning is that this very misfortune is great.

But how is this a misfortune, he says:

89 Because this is the horrible fishhook offered by the fishermen the defilements, whence the guardians of hell will buy you and cook you in pots.

Because this, this very kind of thought of misfortune for another, is a horrible, extremely frightening, fishhook. Of what kind? Offered by the fishermen, the defilements. The defilements are the fishermen, since they work with hooks, by means of which they offer and receive. Whence, from the fishermen the defilements, like fish from the fishermen, the guardians of hell, the servants of Yama, will buy you and cook you, will cook you. Another reading somewhere is: “lead you and.”152 In pots, peculiar to hell. The sense is: therefore, do not cultivate the desire for this.

Showing that whatever suffering arises when praise etc. are obstructed also only occurs for one who lacks discrimination, he says:

151 BCA86d: ko nvataå paraå. 152 n»tv¹, presumably for “kr»tv¹.’ La Vallée Poussin, 219 n.3, has changed the verse from k¬iptv¹ to kr»tv¹, saying that kr»tv¹ is supported by the Tibetan. 324 90 Praise, fame and honour do not lead to my merit, long life, strength, good health or bodily pleasure. [220]

91ab And this much would be the personal goal of a wise person who knows his own good.

Wise people accept only five kinds of goal as the purpose of human existence. Namely: merit, increase of life, increase of strength, having good health, and bodily pleasure. And praise etc. are in no case useful for these. Surely only so much would be the personal goal of you who possesses knowledge, of you who knows your own good. However, for someone else it may be otherwise also, so he considers himself. Even though they must know their personal goal, nevertheless because one who knows his own good may be without means, it is stated separately. It is also stated by the words beginning “of a wise person,” in so far as that is independent of [the one who knows his own good].153

Surely, there is also mental pleasure. For this reason, restriction154 is not appropriate. To this he says:

91cd Drink, gambling and so on may be enjoyed by someone wanting mental pleasure.

Mental pleasure is a happy state of mind.155 Drink, gambling, prostitutes, another man’s wife may be enjoyed by someone wanting that. However, that mental pleasure from hearing the True Dharma is covered by the word, “merit,” so it is without fault. Therefore, even though they are a cause of mental pleasure for you,156 praise etc., which are causes of happiness for childish people, are not acceptable.

In this way too, praise etc. are the causes of flattery for childish people, so he says:

153 tad = tasya i.e. of one who knows his own good. 154 avadh¹raªa - restriction of pleasure to bodily, in verse 6:90. MW - limitation ( of the sense of words), restriction to a certain instance or instances with exclusion of any other. 155 saumanasya, the opposite of dejection (daurmanasya). 156 “for you,” not in Tibetan. 325 92ab They deprive themselves for the sake of fame, they also get themselves killed for its sake.

Some confused people being praised as having the virtues (guªa) of ˜akra etc., by bards and others, although being very far from such virtue themselves, with dilated eyes and happy faces, in pursuit of fame, give away wealth such as elephants and horses, as if blades of grass. Thus, considered to possess these very virtues (guªa), due to the misconception, “My fame, produced from victory over enemies like that of ˜akra, will spread throughout the world,” they get killed by entering into an unwinnable battle.

And ultimately there is no use in this. It is nothing other than a false conception. Showing this, he says:

92cd Are words fit for food?157 And who has that pleasure when they are dead?

Words, descriptions, expressing praise etc. – are they fit for food, edible? And who has that pleasure when they die for the sake of fame, produced from hearing praise?

Therefore, showing that this is like the play of a child, he says:

93ab Just as a child cries a scream of distress when a sandcastle is broken,

Just as some child playing with extreme satisfaction with a castle made of sand is seized by great suffering when this castle is broken by someone, and howls as if in extreme anguish in a pitiable voice, “My castle is broken.” This being the very simile applicable here as well, he says:

93cd so my own mind appears to me when it is deprived of praise and fame.

My own mind attaining suffering when it is deprived of, obstructed from, praise and fame, appears exactly so, to me when I investigate. So it

157 bhak¬y¹ MW: to be eaten, eatable, fit for food. 326 should be considered that here also my disappointment is due to nothing substantial.

Again, by investigation in a different manner, considering158 in four ¶lokas that this indeed is the attribute of a child, he says:

94ab Certainly, because a word is without consciousness, it is an impossibility that it praises me.159

A word, composed of letters, in so far as it is an external object,160 is without mind, is not animate. The abstraction of that. Because of that it is an impossibility, it is not possible that it, a word, praises me, speaks161 my praise.

Then how does a happy mind arise, he says:

94cd Supposedly, this is the cause of pleasure: “Another is pleased with me.”

Another, a person possessing animate consciousness. The word “supposedly” demonstrates disgust since this too is nonsensical. This statement is the cause of pleasure: “[Another is] pleased, extremely happy,162 with me.” So the connection163 stated:

Thus even in that case, because there is no connection,164 it is only the behaviour of a child. (BCA6:97cd)

Now supposing that there is no connection,165 he says:

158 LVP222: para mŶayan, corrected by Vaidya to par¹mŶayan. See LVP220 l.6: par¹mŶati. 159 6:94a also found at SSB266.1-2, quotation from Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra. SSB266.2: ity ayam me matibhramaå. 160 b¹hy¹rtha MW: b¹hy artha a meaning external to (i.e. not resulting from) the sounds or letters forming a word; b¹hy¹rtha an external meaning; external objects or matter or reality. 161 causative of ud√»r can mean speak, utter; or to cause to appear. 162 abhiprasanna: MW abhipra√sad, but not abhiprasanna or abhipras¹da. Both at BHS54: “favorably disposed.” 163 Tibetan: sbyor ro: attach, fix. 164 asambandha, Tibetan uses mi ’thad pa: illogical. 165 Tibetan: ‘brel pa: connection. 327 95 But what is the use for me of the pleasure belonging to others, whether in me or in another.166 Only he has the happiness of that pleasure, not even the tiniest part from it is mine.

[223] Therefore, whether the pleasure is in me or another being, what is the result for me from what occurs in another’s stream of consciousness? Nothing. Why? Only he, only the one who is pleased, the praiser, has the happiness of that pleasure from it. It is not another’s. Hence, not even the tiniest part, not even the least bit, from it, from the happiness of pleasure occurring in another’s consciousness, is mine.

That may be so, but the state of happiness of bodhisattvas is only due to the happiness of others. Then why is there no part from that? To this he says:

96 If there is a state of happiness due to the happiness of another, then I should have it in every single case. Why am I not happy when they are happy due to favour towards another?

If there is a state of happiness due to the happiness of another, then even when someone is happy due to favour towards another, I should have a state of happiness from that. Why, when another is pleased due to being favourably disposed towards me,167 is there pleasure,168 but I am not happy when they are happy due to favour towards another?

Therefore, this is only an unsupported assertion. To show this is not the highest reality (param¹rtha), he says:

166 6:95a also found at SSB266.5, quotation from Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra. 167 abhipras¹da: MW: abhipra√sad, but not abhiprasanna or abhipras¹da. Both at BHS54: the making well-disposed. 168 LVP223 n.4, says Tibetan = kim ¹tmany abhiprasanne parasmin parasmin punaå pr»tiå. Why, however, pleasure in another, when another is favourably disposed towards me? 328 97 Therefore, pleasure arises in me when I think, “I am praised.” Thus even in that case, because there is no connection, it is only the behaviour of a child.169

[224] [Objector] Because of the absence of another cause for it, pleasure arises in me because of a thought, “I am praised,” but not because of being happy due to the happiness of another. [Reply] Even in that case – not only when one is happy due to the favour of another – thus, in the way described, even in oneself, because there is no connection, because of lack of immediate proximity, it is only the play of a child.

Moreover, showing that praise and the like actually bestow a loss on me, he says:

98 And this praise and the like destroy my well-being170 and agitation, and they make me both jealous of those possessing virtue (guªa) and angry at wealth.

This praise and the like destroy, kill, my well-being, good fortune, also well-being protects the side of virtue (ku¶alapak¬a), and also my agitation, disgust with the suffering of sa÷s¹ra. And not only that. Further, they make me both jealous of those possessing virtue, because of concealing the virtues of others by considering my own virtues to be superior, or by not being able to endure171 the virtues of others, and angry at the wealth which has the nature of gain, honour and so on, and hey make me impatient with them. I think, “I alone am of superior virtue, it is proper that only I have all the success, not others.”

Because these faults have their origin in praise and the like:

169 This line also at 222.11 (commentary to BCA6:94). Tibetan has mi ‘thad pa for asambandha, but asambhanda agrees with the commentary. LVP223 n.7: Tibetan: de yang de ltar mi ‘thad pas = tad apy evam anupapatteå. 170 k¬ema BHS201: adj. causing peace and comfort, or n. comfort. 171 asahana, MW: not able to endure; jealous, envious. 329 99 Therefore those who are involved in the destruction of praise and so on are surely engaged in the goal of guarding me from the fall to evil states.172

[225] Therefore, for that reason. Those beings, who are involved in, intent on, the destruction, the prevention, of praise and so on, are surely engaged in, industrious in, the goal of guarding, the goal of protecting, the cause of guarding, me from that, the fall to evil states, falling into hell etc. Hence they are good friends (kaly¹ªamitra), not harmers.

My hostile thought (pratighacitta) towards those who obstruct gain etc. is not proper at all. To show this he says:

100 And the bond of gain and honour is not proper for me whose goal is liberation. How can I have hatred towards those who liberate me from that bondage?

Gain and honour are like a bond for one longing for liberation. Because of its being an object of attachment. A bond is not proper, not suitable, for a person striving for final liberation. Those considered to be enemies who perform the function of a good friend, liberate me, free me from the bond which has the characteristic of the suffering of sa÷s¹ra, or has the nature of gain, etc. How can I have hatred towards those most excellent benefactors, those occasions for joy? The intent is that it is not proper.

He states how it is not proper:

101 How can I have hatred towards those who act like a barrier, as if by the blessing of the Buddhas, for one who wishes to enter suffering.

For someone whose desire is escape from the sufferings of sa÷s¹ra, because of the inclination for intense attachment to gain and honour, they, especially good people, act like a barrier, like a closed door. Why? As if from

172 ap¹ya, BHS46 = durgati; Tibetan: ngan song, lower state of existence, including the hells. 330 the blessing (adhi¬−h¹na), power, of the Buddhas. How can I have hatred towards them?

[226] Regarding restraining hatred even in the case of one who causes a hindrance to virtue, he says:

102 Anger is not fitting in this case, where you think someone is obstructing merit. There is no austerity equal to patience, surely this is what is present.

You think this, “he has obstructed virtue (ku¶ala),” keeping this in mind, hatred is not fitting in this case, towards one who causes an obstruction to merit. Why? Because there is no austerity, good act,173 equal to, equivalent to, patience, forbearance, because of it being the cause of all good actions (¶ubhakarma). And because of the saying:

There is no austerity equal to patience.174

Surely, this is the very thing which, without any effort at all, is present, brought near. Because of the presence of a cause for merit in the guise of someone obstructing merit.

But when there is aversion, I myself would be obstructing merit, so he says:

103 And if I do not show forbearance here through my own fault, I alone am obstructing in this case, when a cause for merit is present.

And if, if, I do not show forbearance (k¬am¹), patience (k¬¹nti), here, towards an obstructer, through fault, having the character of intolerance (asahi¬ªut¹), which is mine alone, then it is not someone else, but I alone, who is obstructing in this case of merit. Why? By being an obstructer of merit, when it is accepted that a cause for merit is present, being near at hand, or “in

173 sukÅta, or merit. 174 See BCA6:2. 331 this case (atra)” is connected with “cause for merit,” meaning “when there is this cause for merit.”175

If someone is an obstructer of merit, how is he a cause for merit, while he is actually an obstruction? To this he says: [227]

104 For that without which it does not exist and when it is there it does exist, is indeed the cause of it. How can it be called an obstruction?

It, an existent (bh¹va), accepted as an effect, does not exist without that, accepted as a cause – it does not exist when that is excluded – that through which it exists, not another, is indeed the cause, producer, of it, of what is accepted as an effect, because of the principle according to positive and negative concomitance. Thus, in the present case also, how can it, the actual producer, of it, what is produced, be called an obstruction, be designated a cause of obstruction? Even in such a case, there is no contradiction for one applying conventional usage this way.

Clarifying with an illustration the matter just stated, he says:

105 For an obstruction to giving is not created by a supplicant who has arrived at the time. And when a renunciant has arrived, it is not called an obstruction to renunciation.

It is not said that a supplicant, beggar, who arrives just at the time some generous giver wants to give, is an obstruction to giving. Since he is the very cause of giving. And, likewise, the meeting of someone desiring to go forth as a renunciant with a renunciant176 is not called an obstruction to that renunciation, the nature of which is taking vows etc. Rather, that is actually the cause of it, because without that [the meeting], it [the renunciation] is impossible. The present case should be looked at in the same way.

175 If atra is taken as asmin and is connected with puªyahetu in locative case, a locative absolute results. 176 Tibetan 131b: rab tu ‘byin par byed pa one who can give renunciation, i.e., ordination. 332 [228] Moreover, since the cause for patience is very hard to get, when it is encountered only joy is fitting. Showing this he says:

106 Beggars are easy to find in the world, however, offenders are hard to find.

Beggars are available plentifully in the world, everywhere, because of everyone’s lack of aversion for taking what is being given. However, on the contrary, this is not the case for offenders. Hence, they are hard to find, among a hundred thousand people there may perhaps somehow be someone, or maybe not.

But why is this so? He says:

106 Because no-one will commit an offence against me, a non-offender.

Because no-one, not a single person, will commit an offence, will do wrong, without reason against me, a non-offender, who has stopped doing wrong to others. Here the genitive is used in the sense of an object.177

Because of being very difficult to find in this way, and because of being the highest benefactor, an offender should indeed be welcomed. So he says:

107 Therefore, I should wish for an enemy, because he is a help on the bodhisattva path. He is acquired without effort, like a treasure appearing in the house.

Because offenders are obtained rarely, therefore I should actually desire an enemy obtained with no effort at all, like a treasure found to be in the house. And because of his giving assistance on the bodhisattva path (bodhicary¹), in acquiring the equipment for Buddhahood.

Since I am enjoying assistance of this kind for the highest purpose of human existence (puru¬¹rtha), due to my gratitude a reciprocal gesture would be proper for me. Showing this, he says:

177 karmaªi ¬a¬−hi A reference to the grammatical structure. 333 108 Therefore, this reward of patience is received both by him and by me. It should be given to him first, since he preceded the patience.

Because he, giving assistance in that, is actually a cause not an obstruction, therefore it is indeed acquired by both of us – by me who is practising patience and by him who is doing an offence. “This” – for the means of attaining which assistance is enjoyed. The reward of patience has the mark of realization of the Dharma. It must be resolved that I should give it to him, to the helper in the Dharma, first, in the first place. As the bodhisattva, Maitr»bala, resolved towards the group of five.178 Then he states the reason. Because he preceded the patience. It [the patience] is described thus, since he alone is the prior cause of it. For without the offender, there is no other cause for patience.

This is indeed logical, if this occurs due to his intention. He has only the intention to offend. Supposing this, he says:

109 He does not have the intention to accomplish patience. If, because of that, the enemy should not be honoured, why is the True Dharma honoured? It too is an unconscious cause of accomplishment.

He, the one about to offend, does not have the intention, “Let the forbearance (k¬am¹) of this bodhisattva arise.” If, because of that, for this reason, the enemy should not be honoured even though the cause of virtue (ku¶ala), [230] then why is the True Dharma, characterized by teaching, honoured? It too is the cause of the arising of virtue (ku¶ala) without intention. This is the sense: it also ought not to be honoured because of it being empty of an intention for it.

But, because of the True Dharma’s absence of intention, there is also no intention to harm. But the reverse of this is seen for him [the enemy], so he says:

178 A reference to the j¹taka story of Maitr»bala, who offered his body to five ogres. See ¸rya¶Øra, J¹takam¹l¹, trans. Khoroche,47-57. 334 110 If the enemy is not honoured since he has an intention to harm, how otherwise do I have patience, when someone like a doctor179 is intent on my welfare?

Since the enemy’s intention is to harm, in connection to this, if the enemy is not honoured, is not treated well with gifts and honours, he says “how otherwise” – when I am not restraining hateful thought towards an offender, do I have patience? The sense is: it [patience] is completely illogical for someone retaliating or not enduring his harm. In other cases as well, how is there patience? When someone like a doctor is intent on my welfare, not even a trace of a reason for hatred occurs, there is always only love and respect in the case where a good physician is bringing about welfare and happiness.

And it is called patience because of preventing hateful thought. Therefore, one preventing hostile thought only in the case of an offender has patience. So to make this very point, he says:

111 Hence, from his bad intention alone forbearance is dependently arisen. Hence, he is indeed to be honoured by me as the cause of forbearance, like the True Dharma.

Since patience is not logical when someone like a doctor is intent on my welfare, hence, for that reason, forbearance is produced dependent on, on account of, his bad intention alone. [231] But not someone’s good intention. Hence, because, forbearance is dependently arisen from his intention, he is indeed the cause of forbearance, but not, on the other hand, he who, like the physician, has no bad intention. So he is to be honoured by me like the True Dharma, even though he has no intention to accomplish forbearance.

This is said: what is the use of this investigation of intention for me? Only to that extent that it is used in establishing what is desired to be established, should it be accepted by me or not. But only he who has that unvirtuous intention gets the fruit of the unvirtuous intention, but for me this is

179 bhisaj not in MW or Apte, only bhi¬aj (m.). 335 only the cause of creation of merit (¶ubha). Thus how possibly should he not be honoured? Therefore, when there is a cause which is useful in collecting the accumulations (sambh¹ra), what is the use of investigating its nature?

Establishing from scripture (¹gama) that he is indeed the cause of collecting the accumulations (sambh¹ra), he says:

112 For this reason, the Muni declared that the field of beings is the field of Jinas,180 since, after pleasing (¹r¹dhya) them, many have gone to perfection (sampatp¹ra).

Beings are a field because of being the reason for the activity of generation of accumulations; Buddhas, Bhagavans, are likewise a field. Thus the Bhagavan praised them in many ways for this reason, because of their being the reason for the cause of Buddhahood. Why? Since, because, after pleasing them, beings and Jinas, by doing them favours, many, after achieving Buddhahood, have obtained the complete limit of all mundane and supramundane accomplishments.

That may be so. Even if beings also are the causes of all accomplishment, nevertheless it is not proper to equate them with the Tath¹gatas. To this he says: [232]

113 When attainment of Buddha qualities is equal from beings and from Jinas, what is the behaviour that does not show the sort of respect to beings that is shown to Jinas?

When attainment, acquisition, of Buddha qualities, of strength and skill etc., is equal, is without difference, from both of them. The sense is that there is no difference between them as far as their being a cause in regards to that. Hence, when they are equal in being a cause, what behaviour, manner, of the learned is it that does not to show the sort of respect to beings that is shown to Jinas? The meaning is: it is indeed not logical.

180 See SSB153.7 for a similar statement, quoted from the Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra. On k¬etra see also BCA5:81. 336 Surely, even if beings are acting as a cause, because of their mean intention due to the taint of greed etc.,181 how is equality with the Bhagavan possible? Supposing this, he says:

114 And the greatness182 of the intention is not through itself, but rather from the effect. And the greatness due to that is the same for beings, therefore they are the same.

Although the greatness of the Bhagavan is here supreme produced by immeasurable knowledge and merit, nevertheless the greatness is said to be the same because of the equality in being a cause in so far as it serves some use. Therefore, for this reason, they, beings, are said to be the same, equal to Jinas. No distinction is made in this case.

But to show where there is a distinction unique in each particular case, he says: [233]

115 It is the greatness of beings that one with benevolent183 intention is honourable. It is the greatness of Buddhas that there is merit from faith184 in the Buddhas.185

However, one dwelling with benevolent thoughts towards beings is honoured by people. Only that one with the intention of benevolence has greatness individually,186 not another. Also, that merit which arises for one making one’s own mind faithful relying on187 the greatness of the Tath¹gata is the uncommon greatness of the Bhagavan alone, because another does not have virtue of that sort.

181 r¹g¹di, i.e., attachment, hatred and confusion (r¹gadve¬amoha). 182 Tibetan has yon tan, virtue (guªa), for m¹h¹tmya, greatness. 183 SSB157.7; BCA6:115 has maitr» for maitr¹; BHS439 notes that both are used in Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit, with the same meaning. 184 pras¹da can mean serenity/happiness, grace, favour, faith. See also BHS388. 185 This verse also at SSB157.7-8. 186 praty¹tmagata, not MW or BHS; BHS376: “praty¹tma- in comp., and °mam, adv. rare in Sanskrit.” 187 ¹lambya, has the sense of taking the Buddha’s greatness as an object (¹lambana) of meditation (Tibetan: dmigs nas). 337 Thus having set forth the uncommon virtue, returning to the topic, he says:

116 Therefore, due to their part in the attainment of Buddha qualities, beings are equal to the Jinas. But nobody is equal to the Buddhas who are oceans of virtues, whose part is unlimited.

The sense is: this is the seed in accepting equality here. But in the ultimate sense, nobody, no beings, are equal to the Buddhas, to the Bhagavans. If they were of the same kind, then they also would in fact be Buddhas. Of what kind? Oceans of virtues. They are oceans188 of virtues, rich sources189 of virtues, because of being unfathomable and boundless. Yet again, he says their specific character is indeed without rival. Those oceans of virtues whose part, although part of a whole, is unlimited, without end, are [described] thus.

[234] Making clear the matter just stated, he says:

117 If a virtue (guªa) which was even an atom of those who are a singular heap of the quintessence of virtues was seen somewhere, even the three worlds would not be adequate for the purpose of honouring it.

If a virtue which was even an atom, that its to say, even to the measure of the tiniest atom, even a particle of virtue, of those Bhagavans who are a singular heap of the foremost among virtues, was seen, was perceived, somewhere, in a particular being, even the three worlds would not be adequate as a cause of honour of the one who possesses that virtue. That is to say, the jewels etc. produced in the three worlds are not sufficient.

If this is the case, then how can the propitiation of beings be talked about? He says:

188 arªava 189 ratn¹kara, jewel mine, or ocean. 338 118 But the chief part of the arising of Buddha qualities occurs among beings. The honouring of beings should be done in accordance with that part.

This has already been explained.

And hence, the propitiation of beings is proper. He says:

119 Moreover, what other recompense could there be apart from propitiation of beings, for those immeasurable benefactors who are friends without disguise.190

For friends without disguise, for friends who are not false, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, who are limitless benefactors. Recompense, return for the offence done by them. That is to say, discharging the debt.191 What other could there be except propitiation of beings. The sense is: this indeed is the best kind of return.

The propitiation of beings is to be accepted after realizing that it accomplishes the aspirations of a servant, that is, one who behaves in accordance with the mind of the Lord (prabhu). Explaining this, he says:

120 An act should be done for the sake of them192 for whose sake they break the body, they enter Av»c».193 Therefore, one should practise only everything that is good towards them even though they are great offenders.194

Hands, feet, head, eyes and flesh, having been cut piece by piece, are given to them for conferring welfare and happiness. As well, they are pained by the suffering of others, for whose sake, they enter even Av»c» to rescue them. From the context, they are the Buddhas and bodhisattvas.195 An act should be done for the sake of them, of those beings. But otherwise, even though it is an

190 This verse also at SSB155.10-11. 191 pari¶odhana, literally, purification. 192 tatra used for te¬¹m is unusual. 193 The name of a hell. 194 This verse also at SSB155.14-15.

339 act, it would not be a good act. This word “act” is used here, from reference to the context, to mean a good action (s¹dhukarªa). Because it is so, therefore, one should not allow the mind to become hostile even towards extreme offenders. Rather one should cause only everything, of many kinds,196 whether by body, speech or mind, that is good, only welfare and happiness, for them.

Establishing what was just stated, he says: [236]

121 Now, how can I show pride and not behave like a servant, towards those masters, for the sake of whom my masters themselves are indifferent to even themselves?197

“Now” in the sense of deliberation. My masters, the Buddhas etc. themselves, of themselves, for the sake of whom, on account of them, are indifferent, without attachment to even themselves, towards even their own body and life, [so that] they abandon [objects of attachment] as if they were grass, in the ways described. Then again, I am their servant. How can I show pride towards them, towards beings, towards children of the Lords (prabhu), who are extremely dear? How at all knowingly, can I oppose them and not behave like a servant, not, on the other hand, propitiate them having become their servant?

And from this also, since having abandoned offending beings then only their propitiation should be done, he says:

122 The Lords of Sages (mun»ndra) become happy when they have happiness, they become distressed when they have pain. All Lords of Sages are satisfied because of their satisfaction, when they198 are offended, the Sages are offended.199

The Lords of Sages, Buddhas, Bhagavans, like fathers of beloved children, become happy, joyful (har¬a) when they, beings, have happiness

195 See BCA6:116. 196 sarvam is glossed by anekaprak¹ram, indicating that sarvam may be being read as an adverb in the verse: “one should practise in many ways only what is good.” 197 This verse also at SSB155.16-17. 198 tatra for te¬¹m, see n.192 above. 199 This verse also at SSB156.1-2. 340 born from body or mind. And they become distressed, they become unsatisfied, when they have suffering. And this is described in this way because of it [anger] being unacceptable in the case of the Bhagavans.200 Even for the ¶r¹vakas hostiltity and attachment (pratigh¹nunaya) is impossible. The other [part of the verse] is clear.

But how can it be that when they are offended, the Munis are offended? To this, he says:

123 Just as there is no pleasure even due to all desires for someone whose body is on fire completely, also, in the very same way, there is no means for joy for those made of pity (day¹), when beings have pain.201

Just as there is no pleasure due to the five sense pleasures for someone whose body is burning completely, with fire consuming the whole body. And he has no bodily pleasure because it is being overwhelmed by suffering due to the burning. In the very same way, similarly, when beings have pain, the feeling of suffering, there is no means, no cause, for joy, for pleasure, for those whose nature is compassion (kÅp¹), the Bhagavans.

Therefore, giving up now whatever non-virtue (aku¶ala) has accrued by offensive action to beings, either due to lack of knowledge or due to the force of entering into the grasp of the defilements (kle¶a), by way of conclusion he says: [237]

200 The statement “na tu v¹ªocandanakaly¹ª¹ttat” not translated. LVP237 n.1: “It is difficult to make out the meaning of this clause. The Tib. so far as I see, gives no help.” 201 This verse also at SSB156.3-4. Bendall 156 n.1: “BCA has d¹yamay¹n¹m for mah¹kÅp¹ª¹m in 6:123, and sarva-mah¹kÅp¹ª¹m for sarva-mah¹day¹n¹m in 6:124.” La Vallée Poussin’s edition of BCAP in fact has day¹may¹n¹m for mah¹kÅp¹ª¹m.

341 124 Therefore, I have caused suffering to all those of great compassion by my giving suffering to202 those people. May those distressed Sages203 pardon that sin, which I today confess.204

Since, in this way, when there is offence to beings, the Munis will be offended, therefore today, now, I confess the sin. In the presence of those very ones of great compassion, I proclaim with great emotion, I make this vow (sa÷vara) for the future, “Being fully aware, I will not do so again.” If something wrong is done, then let them be patient with me due to their compassion.

Having asked for pardon, he now shows his own devotion to them, beginning with the words, “for the propitiation:”

125 For the propitiation of the Tath¹gatas, I now accept servitude to the world with my whole being. Let floods of people put a foot on my head or let them destroy me, let the Lord of the World (lokan¹tha) be satisfied.205

I accept the state of servitude with my whole being, with body, speech and mind, to the world, the sphere of the world, in order to bring about the intentions of the Tath¹gatas. As well let them be favourably disposed206 to me, let them put a foot on my head. With joyful mind, I bear the foot on my head. By this, may the Lord of the World, the Bhagavan, disregarding former faults, be completely satisfied with me.

And those who honour the Bhagavans should not show lack of respect towards beings. Establishing this he says:

202 Bendall, SSB156 n.2, says BCA has duhkhadena for du¬khanena. BHS265 says these two have the same meaning, “hurting, causing pain to.” 203 SSB156 n.3, BCA reads tanmun°. 204 This verse also at SSB156.5-6; SSB156.5 has mah¹day¹n¹m for BCA6:124b mah¹kÅp¹ª¹m; SSB156.6 has te munayaå for BCA6:124d tanmunayaå. 205 This verse also at SSB156.7-8; SSB156.8 has janaugh¹å nighnantu for BCA6:125cd janaugh¹ vighnantu, Bendall and La Vallée Poussin do not note this variant so it may be a typographical error in SSB. 206 Read with Vaidya pras¹dam, not La Vallée Poussin’s suggested amendment apras¹dam (LVP239.1). 342 126 For there is absolutely no doubt, that those who are made of compassion have made this whole world their own. The Lords themselves are surely seen207 in the forms of these beings, how can there be disrespect in this case.208

Because of realizing the all-pervading dharmad¹tu or by such things as exchanging self for others or attaining the equality of all beings this whole world, not just some, is made their own, accepted as their own by those, by Buddhas, by Bhagavans, whose mental continuum is full of compassion. This is indeed completely certain, because of the impossibility of Buddhahood otherwise. Therefore, these beings are seen to be actually Buddhas, Bhagavans, in the form of beings. So how can there be disrespect by those whose minds are deluded in this case. The sense is that it is not at all possible.

Because of the many benefits of propitiating beings, one should strive for only that, so he says: [240]

127 This alone is propitiating the Tath¹gatas, this alone is the achievement of my aim, this alone is removing the suffering of the world; therefore let this alone be my vow.209

Of my aim, of the very characteristic of the equipment for Buddhahood. Removing the suffering of the world, because of being the cause for that. ‘This alone’ is to be construed as ‘propitiating beings in every case.’

And from perceiving a future danger also, one must practise this very turning away from offending others. Illustrating this with an example, he says:

128 Just as one officer of the king terrorizes the general populace, the general populace, being farsighted, are not able to change it at all,210

207 SSB156 n.4: BCA reads “dri¶yantu etena tu.” Vaidya and LVP read dŶyanta ete nanu, like the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya. LVP239 n.2, “Minaev has: dri¶yantu etena tu.” 208 This verse also at SSB156.9-10; SSB156.9 reads atra for BCA6:126b asti, Bendall does not note this variant but La Vallée Poussin does. 209 This verse also at SSB156.11-12. 210 This verse also at SSB156.13-14; SSB156.14 reads vikaroti na ¶aknoti for BCA6:128c vikartum naiva ¶aknoti. 343 This officer is of that king in whose territory people live. He terrorizes, lays waste, the general populace, the residents of cities, towns, villages, hamlets etc. And, there being a perception of danger of future punishment by the king, this general populace are powerless to undertake change, even by mere words. Although beaten by him, they have completely controlled behaviour. Why?

129 because he is not, in fact, alone, his power is the power of the king.211

[241] He, the officer of the king, is not, in fact, to be seen as without help. To the question, “But how is he not without help?” He says, ‘his.’ His power is actually the power of the king, because of being on his side.

129 Similarly, one should not treat any weak person, who has offended, with disrespect,212

Therefore, one should not harm someone who has done an offence, even though he is of weak strength, because he also is not alone.

130 because both the guardians of hell and those having compassion are his power. Therefore, one should propitiate beings like a servant would a wrathful king.213

Therefore, one should propitiate beings. Why? Because the power siding with him is both the guardians of hell, like retaliators imitating his offence, and those having compassion, Jinas and others. In what way should one propitiate? In the way that those whose entire livelihood depends on obeying a merciless king.

Moreover, this is said here in this way because it is well known. However, the similarity between the result of displeasing beings and the result of offending a king is not total. So he says:

211 This line also at SSB156.15. 212 This line also at SSB156.16. 213 This verse also at SSB156.17-18. 344 131SS What could an angry king do, which would lead to the pain of hell, which is experienced by causing unhappiness to beings?214

[242] “What?” he asks.215 Would a king be able to produce that kind of suffering for him? Not at all, is the meaning. What kind? The kind of suffering by which the pain of hell is experienced.

132 What could a satisfied king give that is equivalent to Buddhahood, which is experienced by causing happiness to beings?216

133 Leaving aside future Buddhahood, which is caused by propitiating beings, why do you not see good fortune, fame, good circumstances in this very life?217

134 Self-composure, health, joy, long life, abundance and happiness of an emperor, are obtained in this very world by a patient person while living in this world.218

Here ends the sixth chapter on k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ of the Bodhicary¹vat¹rapañjik¹ composed by Prajñ¹karamati.

214 This verse also at SSB156.19-20. 215 k¹kva, see fn.144. 216 This verse also at SSB157.1-2. 217 This verse also at SSB157.3-4. 218 This verse also at SSB157.5-6.

345 Appendix 2

˜ik¬¹samuccaya Chapter 9 K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹

[SSB179] Then one should strive for purification of defilements, guarding against the arising of wickedness uninterruptedly proceeding full of suffering,1 and likewise removing the obstacle2 of hindrances due to past actions.3

In that case, from the very beginning:

One should be patient. [K¹rik¹ 20a]

Because the energy for learning etc. of an impatient person is exhausted because of not being able to endure weariness. And a person who does not possess learning neither knows the means for concentration (sam¹dhi)4 nor the means for purification of defilements. Therefore, unwearied:

One should seek learning. [K¹rik¹ 20a]

Since concentrating the mind5 is difficult even for a knowledgeable person who wanders about confusedly:

Then one should go to the forest for refuge. [K¹rik¹ 20b]

Since even there the mind of a person not engaged in calming confusion is not concentrated:

One should apply oneself to concentrating the mind. [K¹rik¹ 20c]

And since for a person who has concentrated the mind, there is no fruit except for purification of the defilements:

1 SSB179 n.1: MS reads bahusukh¹÷ but Tib. has sdug bsngal mang po, as if bahuduåkh¹÷. Bendall and Rouse, 179, therefore translate as full of pain. 2 vibandha BHS494. 3 karm¹varaªa BHS107: ¹varaªa, “hindrance, obstruction ... Two kinds, kle¶¹v° (moral faults) and jñey¹v° (intellectual faults);” karm¹varaªa, “obstruction due to past actions.” 4 sam¹dhi left untranslated hereafter. 5 sam¹dh¹na BHS568. 346 One should contemplate, beginning with the offensive things.6 [K¹rik¹ 20d]

These are the brief words of explanation concerning the purification of defilements.

Now the exposition is recounted. In this regard, in the Dharmasa÷g»ti SØtra three kinds of k¬¹nti are set forth: “patience as the endurance of suffering,7 patience as profound reflection on dharmas,8 and patience as forgiving the offence of another.”9

The opponent of patience as enduring suffering is the dread of suffering, acquired with the arrival of what is undesired, and the intense attachment to pleasure acquired with the removal of what is desired. From these two come dejection (daurmanasya), thence hatred (dve¬a) and dispiritedness (l»nat¹).10

For this very reason, it says in the Candraprad»pa SØtra:11

Lack of intense attachment to pleasure, non-aversion to suffering.

It is said in the Ratnamegha SØtra also:12

He is patient (k¬amate), he endures the grief, lamentation, suffering, dejection and irritation which relate to the self.

[SSB180] It is said in the ¸rya UgradattaparipÅcch¹ also:13

Furthermore, O Householder, a householder who is a bodhisattva should be free from attachment and hostility,14 should not be contaminated with the eight

6 a¶ubha-bh¹van¹ BHS80: “a¶ubha-bh¹van¹ ... or a¶ubha-sa÷jñ¹, ... (= P¹li asubha- bh¹van¹ or -saññ¹). ‘contemplation of offensive things,’ specifically of human corpses in various states of disintegration.” Edgerton lists nine kinds and compares the lists in SS with those in the Visuddhimagga, Mah¹vyutpatti etc. There are only four in SS, at SSB211.1. 7 duåkh¹dhiv¹sanak¬¹nti BHS15: adhiv¹sana. 8 dharmanidhy¹nak¬¹nti BHS296: nidhy¹na, “profound reflection, (leading to) comprehension.” 9 par¹pak¹ramar¬aªak¬¹nti 10 Same wording as LVP172.10-12, except LVP172.12 reads l»nacittat¹ v¹ for l»nat¹ ca. l»nat¹ BHS462: SSB179.14, and SSB180.10 (l»natva), are the only examples of these words. Abstract nouns from l»na “dispirited, fainthearted.” 11 Candraprad»pa SØtra quotation in LVP172.13-14, text identical. 12 Ratnamegha SØtra quotation at BCAP172.15-16, text identical. See Appendix 1 for further notes to the translation of these lines. 13 UgradattaparipÅcch¹ not used in BCAP. 14 anunaya-pratigha-prah¹ª¹ MW34: abandoning obstacles to conciliatory behaviour. MW seems to be incorrect in the light of BHS28: anunaya = love, attachment, often contrasted 347 worldly dharmas.15 He should not be thrilled or be elated16 by obtaining possessions, or by obtaining wife and son, or by obtaining wealth and property. And he should not be depressed17 in all adversities nor should he be dejected. And he should analyze in this way: “Everything constructed is the work of illusion, characterized by involvement in illusory creation.18 For these, namely, mother, father, sons, wife, male and female slaves, servants, labourers, friends, family, relatives and kinsmen are the result of the ripening of actions; they do not belong to me, nor do I belong to them.”

Moreover:

If there is a remedy, what is the use of dejection in that case?19 Even when there is a remedy, a dejected person stupefied by anger would be bewildered, or because of being dispirited (l»natva), he loses his enthusiasm and is seized by worse misfortune. Brooding on that he uselessly leads a short life again and again. Therefore, through practice he should give up this useless thing which has no purpose.

And how does one practice giving up dejection? Through giving up a weak and delicate mind.

As it is said in the UgradattaparipÅcch¹:

The similarity of the mind to cotton wool has disappeared.20

It is said in the ¸rya Gaª©avyuha also:

with pratigha. anunaya-pratigha “may replace r¹ga and dve¬a as feelings to be avoided” and are found as this dvandva compound. BHS362: pratigha = aversion, repugnance, loathing, hostility. Edgerton finds the meaning anger unlikely. MW665: pratigha = hindrance, anger. 15 These are l¹bho ‘lobhaå sukha÷ duåkha÷ ya¶o ‘ya¶o nind¹ pra¶a÷s¹, gain, loss, pleasure, suffering, fame, ill-fame, praise, blame. 16 unnamitavya See BHS132: unn¹ma, “elation, pride;” connection to gain (l¹bha). Reference to SSB105.5, SSB150.6. 17 avanamitavya See BHS72: avan¹ma, “depression (of spirits), opposite of unn¹ma.” 18 vi−hapanapratyupasth¹nalak¬aªa BHS486. 19 SSB180 n.3: “This line occurs at BCA6:10a. In the margin of our MS. has been written the line next following (BCA6:10b): atha n¹sti prat»k¹ro daurmanasyena tatra kim?” “If there is not a remedy, what is the use of dejection in that case?” Bendall and Rouse, 176, add this line in their translation. 20 Not standard Sanskrit; tØlapicu MW: cotton; BHS256: cotton. SSB180 n.4: cotton- wool. 348 O daughter! You should produce an invincible mind for destroying all defilements, an unconquered mind for shattering21 all strong attachments, an imperturbable mind when in the whirlpools of the ocean of wicked intention.22

And certainly nothing whatsoever is difficult with practice. For instance, the mind of even very stupid people, such as bearers,23 [SSB181] fishermen and ploughmen, being marked with healed scars, is not overcome by exhaustion, even when the object is a very small reward, because of their being habituated to suffering. How much more when the action has the reward of achieving the supreme object of all the happiness of sa÷s¹ra and all the happiness of the bodhisattvas? Similarly, even ordinary people experiencing the pain of deep wounds keep on fighting24 in order to hurt those who have offended them very slightly and who will themselves die tormented by their own bad action. How much more would there not be enthusiasm or endurance of suffering to destroy the enemies the defilements, who are offenders for the longest time, who are thieves of the small piece of treasure25 of virtue (ku¶ala) earned with difficulty, who are certainly killers of those to be killed in the hells,26 guardians of the prison27 of existence, destroyers of the way to the door of release;28 and even when people are well-disposed to them they cause more intense torment; they are unharmed enemies, whose intense hostility binds for unlimited kalpas. Especially for one ready29 for victory in the three states, fighting30 to free the prisoners of the world seized by the army of M¹ra.

21 vinirbheda BHS490: “shattering, destruction;” SSB180.16 only example. 22 vi¬am¹¶aya, literally ‘uneven intention.’ A bodhisattva’s intention should be pure and unwavering; see ¹¶aya BHS109. 23 bh¹rah¹raka, BHS619: h¹raka, porter, carrier; reference to this occurrence, SSB180.18: bh¹rah¹raka “(load-)carrier.” 24 sa÷gr¹mayati SSB181 n.2: “This denom. hitherto in gramm. only.” BHS548: “fights,” references to SSB181.4, SSB181.8 and SSB254.1. 25 dhana BHS275. 26 narake¬u n¹vadhyagh¹take¬u presents a problem. Bendall and Rouse, 177 n.1, translate the Tibetan as “in the place of slaughter which is hell,” and suggest reading the Sanskrit as “narakasth¹navadhy°.” BHS469: vadhya-gh¹taka, “executioner of criminals,” no reference to SS. Perhaps, na + a intensive positive. See MW: na. 27 c¹rakap¹laka, also at SSB231.5. 28 niåsaraªa BHS310: “‘escape (from the world), salvation; in this sense only lex. in Skt., where the word is however standardly used as (means of) ‘riddance’ from anything. It has this meaning also in BHS; esp. getting rid of evil or misfortune.” Several references to SS. 29 badhaparikara, literally, “with the girdle girded on.” 30 sa÷gr¹mayata See n. 24. 349 Therein, preceded by the practice of a little31 suffering the practice of the worse than the worst is accomplished. And just as beings have the perception (sa÷jñ¹) of pleasure in suffering through the power of practice, likewise through the practice of establishing the perception of pleasure in all cases of the arising of suffering, one establishes only the perception of pleasure. And the inevitable result32 from this33 is that one obtains the sam¹dhi named Sarvadharmasukh¹kr¹nta.34

For it is said in the Pit¹putrasam¹gama:35

There is, O Bhagavan, a sam¹dhi named Sarvadharmasukh¹kr¹nta, through the attainment of this sam¹dhi the bodhisattva experiences only a pleasant feeling,36 not a neutral [feeling], in all objects of attention.37 Only the perception of pleasure is established for the person who is undergoing even hellish torture. Only the perception of pleasure is established for someone being subjected to even human torture, even when hands, feet, ears or noses are being cut off. Only the perception of pleasure arises even though being beaten with canes, even though being beaten with clubs or whips. [SSB182] Only the perception of pleasure arises even for someone flung into prison, . . . ;38 for one being fried in oil, being crushed like sugar cane is crushed, or being squeezed like a reed is squeezed, or being set on fire like an oil lamp, or being set on fire like a butter lamp,39 or like a resin lamp.40 Only the perception of pleasure arises even for one being driven into the

31 SSB181.8; Bendall, SSB, Add. notes, 409, corrects his reading of the MS from atma to alpa. 32 ni¬yanda MW564: necessary consequence or result. This meaning in Buddhist literature only, otherwise flowing down etc. BHS309: issue, outcome, natural result. 33 SSB181.10: etanni¬yandaphalam, LVP176.17: evam ni¬yandaphalam. 34 Pervaded by pleasure in all conditions; BHS584: sarvadharmasukh¹kranta, name of a sam¹dhi. SSB181.10, 12 are the only examples. This passage, SSB181.8-11 also in BCAP, LVP176.14-18, also introducing the quotation from Pit¹putrasam¹gama. 35 Part of this quotation, SSB181.12-182.2, SSB182.5-182.6, in BCAP6:14. See Appendix 1 for further notes to the translation of these lines. 36 vedan¹ See BHS508: SSB232.11 ff. correlates r¹ga with suåkha, dve¬a with duåkha and moha with aduåkh¹suåkha. 37 ¹rambaªa BHS103. 38 pe = pey¹lam BHS354: “‘et cetera,’ indicating abbreviation, usually but not always of a passage previously cited in the text, and often but not always with implication that the full text is supposed to be recited.” Not translated, but replaced by an ellipsis. 39 sarpiå-pradyotika BHS adv. ‘with lamps of butter;’ SSB182.2-3 only example. 40 dadhi-pradyotika BHS261-62: adv. dadhi usu. means curds; lex. only, “turpentine or resin,” “perhaps the latter,” as “some inflammable material must be meant;” SSB182.3 only example. 350 mouth of a furnace,41 or being driven into the mouth of a lion,42 or being twisted like a dry wick,43 . . . ; or being cut up into small pieces the size of a coin, or being cooked in a baking pan, or being trampled by elephants. Only the perception of pleasure arises, not the perception of suffering, not a neutral perception, when the eye is being plucked out, even when being impaled alive,44 or having been carried off to the place of execution, or when being thrown down on one’s head.

What is the reason for that? Because this was the resolution (praªidh¹na)45 of the bodhisattva mah¹sattva following a course of conduct (c¹rya) for a long time: “May those who support me be the recipients of the pleasure of the tranquillity of cessation. May all those who protect me, respect me,46 venerate, honour and worship me be the recipients of the pleasure of cessation (upa¶amasukha). May even all those who curse me, maltreat47 me and beat me, and cut me with a weapon, as far as even depriving me of life completely, be the recipients of the pleasure of perfect enlightenment, may they realize48 the supreme49 perfect enlightenment.”

He is endowed with these mental activities due to this act, and being endowed with these resolutions (praªidhi), he repeatedly50 practises, cultivates, devotes himself to the perception of pleasure towards all beings. By the maturing of this act, he obtains the sam¹dhi named Sarvadharmasukh¹kr¹nta. At the time the bodhisattva achieves the sam¹dhi named Sarvadharmasukh¹kr¹nta, he is imperturbable, not to be overcome by all the acts of M¹ra. And so on.

41 ulk¹mukha BHS148: “”(1) nt. ... a smelting-pot or furnace;” gives SSB182.4 example, but does not venture a meaning in this context. 42 si÷hamukha BHS595: “nt. lit. lion’s mouth ... (2) an instrument of torture.” 43 ¶u¬ka-vartik¹ BHS532: “perhaps ‘dry wick’, a form of torture.” SSB182.4 only example. Edgerton also finds the Tibetan obscure. 44 j»va¶Ølika BHS244: “f. lit. ‘provided with (= impaled on) a stake alive: SSB182.6 °likam (read °lakam?) api kriyam¹ªasya, ‘of him even being impaled alive.’” 45 The bodhisattva’s career begins with such a resolution. 46 Read satkuryur, as in SS, Vaidya, 101.31. 47 vispar¶eyuå BHS504: “mishandles, maltreats;” SSB182.11 only example. 48 abhisa÷budhyeran BHS58-59: “often with ‘cognate’ acc., regularly anuttar¹÷ samyaksa÷bodhim, unto supreme perfect enlightenment;” which is the case here. 49 anuttara BHS27: “epithet of samyaksa÷bodhi,” See BHS582. 50 bahul»karoti Finite verb form in neither MW or BHS. Both have bahul»kÅta. MW726: ... increased; ... much practised etc. BHS399: repeatedly ... practised. BHS gives examples of occurrences with ¹sevita bh¹vita. 351 Indeed, this practice (prayoga) is the fulfilment of all sacrifices. It is the means of accomplishing all courses of conduct and courses of austerities,51 the strengthening of all kinds of k¬¹nti, the non-sinking52 of all kinds of heroic energy (v»rya), the equipment (sa÷bh¹ra) for all the limbs of meditation (dhy¹na) and wisdom (prajñ¹).53 Therefore he should always be joyful.

[SSB183] As it said in the Candraprad»pa SØtra:

He should always be joyous-minded54 with dignity, He should always maintain a gentle attitude.

And it is said in the Ak¬ayamati SØtra:55

What, then, is joy (mudit¹)? It56 is rapture (pr»ti), serenity (pras¹da) and gladness (pr¹modya) from remembering the Dharma;57 the mind not being dispirited, not being crushed, not being anxious; the removal of delight in all objects of desire,58 the basis of delight in all dharmas; gladness of the mind, pleasurable excitement of the body, causing joy for the intellect, elation of the mind; praise of and delight in the Tath¹gata’s body; skill in examining the splendour of the primary and secondary marks. Not being weary in hearing the virtuous Dharma (ku¶aladharma), rapture, serenity and gladness (pr»tipras¹dapr¹modya) from gaining confidence in the True Dharma; a joyful person has extreme joy in the dharma. There is a constant lack of hostile (apratihata) intention towards beings,

51 du¬karacary¹ BHS226: = du¬karacari BHS225: refers to historical Buddha’s experiment with severe austerities. 52 sarvav»ry¹sa÷s¹danaå SSB182 n.3: “The MS. reading is perhaps sa÷s»dana.” sa÷s»dana is the present participle of sa÷√sad; sa÷s¹dana is the present participle of the causative of sa÷√sad; MW1119: sa÷√sad to sit down; to sink down, collapse, be discouraged or distressed; sa÷s¹dana putting together, arranging; sa÷s»dana sinking. BHS542: sa÷s»dana, example with a-sa÷s»dana, which could also apply here. Bendall and Rouse, 178, translate as ‘confirms.’ Otherwise, perhaps it should be sa÷s¹dhana? 53 Bendall and Rouse, 178, translate as “gathers all the elements of wisdom in ecstatic meditation,” missing the point that ˜¹ntideva is referring to the six p¹ramit¹s. 54 pr»timanas MW: joyous-minded, pleased in mind, content; kind. 55 SSB183.4-7 quoted in BCAP6:9. See Appendix 1 for further notes to the translation of these lines. See Braarvig, Tradition of imperishability, 362-370, for a translation from the Tibetan. Mudit¹ is the 13th imperishable. 56 Based on the Tibetan, Jens Braarvig, Ak¬ayamatinirde¶asØtra, vol. 1 (Oslo: Solum Forlag, 1993), 166, reads y¹ for y¹vat. 57 dharm¹nusmaraªa Not BHS, see dharm¹nusmÅti BHS36: one of the four mindfulnesses. 58 SSB183.5 reads sarvak¹marat»n¹mapakar¬aª¹, BCAP reads sarvak¹marat»n¹mapakar¬aª¹t. 352 strong zealousness59 in seeking for the teaching of the Buddha (buddhadharma) and persistence60 of that zealousness for the Dharma. There is aspiration for the noble qualities of the Buddha. There is freedom which is the production of the thought turned away from the limited vehicles. There is the production of the thought not restricted by envy. There is the desire to give to someone who asks, and after giving,61 the giver has delight (pramodya) in the giving which is purified in the three spheres. Always favour towards people of good character (¶»lavat), joy in kindness towards people of bad character (du嶻la).

Confidence in overcoming the danger of all bad destinies (gati)62 by purifying one’s own conduct (¶»la); the development of the conduct of a Tath¹gata; firmness; not having a hostile (apratihata) thought in the face of harsh and offensive63 remarks64 made by others; patience and gentleness (k¬¹ntisauratyam);65 absence of pride; regard66 shown by bowing with respect to gurus; always having a smiling face, complete absence of frowning; speaking67 first, non-deception,68 non-extraction of gifts by means of threats,69 having the intention purified (¶uddh¹¶aya), absence of a harsh mind, absence of deviation; seeing something to praise in every case, reflecting on one’s own faults, not discussing transgressions (¹patti), conforming to pleasing dharmas.70 There is

59 chandat¹ Not MW or BHS. chanda BHS234: zeal, a characteristic of a bodhisattva or a Buddha; often associated with energy (v»rya). 60 anutsÅjanat¹ B183 n.5: “Sic. MS.; an¹cchindanat¹ (126.15 supra) is somewhat analogous.” 61 SS, Vaidya, 102.16: datv¹, SSB183.11: dattv¹; according to Macdonell, 217, dattv¹ is the correct form. 62 SSB183.12 has sarvadurgandham; BHS266 suggests text is corrupt if Bendall and Rouse translation is correct. Bendall and Rouse, 179 n.3, refer to Tibetan for their translation. Braarvig, Ak¬ayamatinirde¶asØtra, 1:166-167, corrects the text to sarvadurgatibhayam, based on the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya in Tibetan and the Ak¬ayamati SØtra . 63 dur¹gata BHS266. 64 vacanapatha BHS467: “way of speaking; virtually = vacana, speech, utterance, words.” BHS gives references to SSB185.2, SSB188.9. It does not give this occurrence, SSB183.12. 65 sauratya BHS607, often associated with k¬¹nti. 66 citr»k¹ra BHS230: “(1) respect, reverence ... Often associated with gaurava, sometimes with pr»ti, pras¹da, and the like.” 67 abhil¹pit¹ Not MW or BHS. abhil¹pa MW68: m. expression, word; declaration (as of the object of a vow). 68 akuhanat¹ Not MW or BHS. kuhana BHS189: one of 5 mithy¹j»va (BHS432: wrong way of getting a living). 69 ane¬yai¬ikat¹ SSB183 n.8 says reading is doubtful. Bendall and Rouse, 179, reads ane¬pai¬ikat¹. BHS189 & 313 reads anai¬pe¬ikat¹. nai¬pe¬ikat¹ not MW; BHS313: extraction of gifts by means of threats. Braarvig, Ak¬ayamatinirde¶asØtra, 1:166, reads ’nai¬pe¬ikat¹. 70 sa÷rañjan»ya BHS539 translates SSB183.17 as “conforming to sociable (companionable, pleasing, friendly) principles (of conduct).” 353 love of the teacher towards bodhisattvas, love of the self towards dharmas, love of life [SSB184] towards Tath¹gatas, love of parents towards gurus, love of sons towards beings, love of Buddha towards teachers and preceptors, love of the highest member, the head, towards the course of good conduct (pratipatti), love of hands and feet towards the p¹ramit¹s, love of all jewels towards reciters of the dharma (dharmabh¹ªaka), love of all pleasures and amusements towards instructions,71 love of health towards complete satisfaction, love of medicine towards examining the Dharma, love of the physician towards those who exhort72 and remind. For thus what is non-dejectedness (anaval»na) of the senses in all the senses is called joy (mudit¹). And so on.

And here is the statement which adorns trained bodhisattvas. As it is said in the ¸rya Mah¹megha:

They are always practising the contemplation of the thought of going to hell, and they are devoted to going to hell, and they are traders in the town on the way to hell. And they are longing for hell, they are addicted to and greedy for hell and skilled73 in the thought of the fires of hell.

K¬¹nti as the acceptance of suffering has been explained.

But three kinds of k¬¹nti are also explained in the S¹garamati SØtra:

Here, O S¹garamati, the bodhisattva mah¹sattva, when the jewel of the thought of omniscience74 has arisen, is not separated from it, even while being hurt, being agitated, being disturbed, being threatened, being beaten by beings who are wicked and of bad character, or by M¹ra or by the gods who are in M¹ra’s entourage,75 or by those ruled by M¹ra or by M¹ra’s messengers. [The bodhisattva] who has produced the thought of strong intention76 is not separated from the exertion of heroic energy (v»rya) with great compassion for the final deliverance of all beings; he is not separated from the courage for not cutting off77 the lineage of the three jewels; he is not separated from the practice of virtue

71 anu¶¹san» BHS35: “instruction, admonition,” reference to this occurrence. 72 codaka BHS234. 73 praguªa See SSB184 n.1 and BHS356: Edgerton refers to this instance only, and reads praguªª¹å “skilled, familiar, versed.” 74 sarvajñat¹cittotp¹daratna, see also SSB187.11. 75 m¹rak¹yika BHS430: “belonging to the entourage of M¹ra, regularly with ... devat¹.” 76 adhy¹¶ayacittotp¹da BHS17: adhy¹¶aya, “m. =P¹li ajjh¹saya (1) mental disposition etc.” 77 anupaccheda BHS28. 354 (ku¶alaprayoga) for the accomplishment of all dharmas; he is not separated from achieving the perfection (parini¬patti) of the marks and secondary marks due to the accumulation of the accumulation of merit (puªyasa÷bh¹ra); he is not separated from the zeal (autsukya) which accomplishes the effect78 of the purification of the Buddha fields; he is not separated from renouncing (utsarga) body and life, as he is intent on the relinquishing (aparigraha) of all dharmas. He is not separated from lack of exertion for his own comfort, as he is intent on bringing all beings to maturity.

Immediately upon being possessed of a strong intention (adhy¹¶aya) such as this, [SSB185] he endures mocking79 in the presence of all beings, he endures contempt,80 invective; he endures the reviling speech, the harsh and offensive remarks81 of all beings. He endures the pain caused by all beings. And he endures or removes the burdens of all beings and he is neither wearied (khidyate), nor is he dispirited (l»yate), nor does he cower,82 nor does he despair. He exhibits power (bala). He generates strength. He exerts heroic energy (v»rya). He shows courage. He produces enthusiasm. He controls his confused83 mind. Abused, he does not abuse in return. Struck, he does not strike in return. Hurt, he does not hurt in return. He does not respond with anger to someone who is angry. Thus he girds on the armour of mental consideration (cittagaªan¹).84

[SSB186] Further, if85 as many beings as exist extending in the ten directions should all chase me with a range of swords, spears and lances [intending]: “If any person standing, or sitting, or wandering about, or sleeping, on any place of the earth produces the thought of enlightenment (bodhicitta) or produces the thought of giving (d¹na) and so on up to the thought of prajñ¹, or the thought of the roots of virtue (ku¶alamØla) of learning, on that place we will cut the body into a

78 abhinirh¹ra Bendall and Rouse, 180: aspiration. SSB184 n.3 suggests that abhinirh¹ra corresponds to a P¹li word meaning “aspiration.” BHS52 says that this usage is not found in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, where it means “production, accomplishment,” etc. 79 uccaghan¹ SSB185.1; SS, Vaidya, 103.6 amends to uccagghan¹. BHS118: “uccagghana, nt., and °n¹ ( ... sometimes written with gh for ggh), mocking, laughing at.” 80 unmanan¹ BHS132: “disrespect, contemptuous treatment.” SSB185.1 is the only example. 81 durukta-dur¹gata-vacanapatha See notes 63 and 64. 82 sa÷l»yate MW1113: cower. Not BHS. 83 unmØ©ha, BHS133: SSB185.4 only example. 84 SSB185.6, SSB185 n.2: Based on Tibetan version of SS and Chinese version of S¹garamati SØtra, Bendall suggests a lacuna at this point. He gives the Tibetan text, with English translation, and an English translation of Chinese text of the same passage. 85 sacet BHS549-50. 355 hundred pieces to the size of the leaves of a jujube tree, we will destroy it, we will annihilate it.”

If all those beings should cause me to be abused, should vilify me, should insult me, should disparage86 me, should address me87 with false words, with severe words, intent on evil acts, should cut88 my body into a hundred pieces to the size of the leaves of a jujube tree, should break, destroy, annihilate me, even then I should not cause a disturbed thought to arise in the presence of any being.

What is the reason for this? From the very beginning89 of sa÷s¹ra, which is immeasurable,90 I, who have been in hell and have been born as an animal and have been in the domain of Yama and have been human, while craving for91 love and food, not hearing the dharma, acquiring a dishonest livelihood, living to no purpose, have had this body (atmabh¹va) and all its limbs cut, broken, minced into a hundred pieces, and have been subjected to various kinds of tortures, and from that cause92 no good was done by me for me, or for another. Further, if all these creatures should cut me, break me, destroy me, annihilate me up to the end of time,93 even then I would never abandon omniscience; I would never abandon all beings; I would never abandon the virtuous (ku¶ala) zeal94 for the Dharma.

What is the reason for this? Because all this pain (p»d¹) of the body, change of the body, [SSB187] does not come near even a hundredth part of the suffering of hell, to the extent that even comparison95 is not possible (k¬amate). I will endure even

86 pa÷sayeyur BHS314: speaks ill of, disparages, reviles. 87 samuccareyur SSB186 n.2: For the more usual samud¹car ‘address’. 88 chindhyur SSB186.7=chindhyur; SS, Vaidya, 103.17 correctly emends to chindyur. SSB186.12= chindyur. 89 pØrvako−i BHS351: “’the first end’ (in time), the very beginning ... In P¹li used of sa÷s¹ra.” 90 apram¹ªi Not MW, not BHS. pram¹ªi Not BHS, MW686: in compound for °ªa; pram¹ªikÅta meted out for, or apportioned to (gen.). 91 paliguddha SSB186 n.3: “cf. 105.12 supra.” BHS337: attached (to), greedy (for) (=parigÅddha). 92 nid¹na BHS296 discusses the use of tatonid¹na, editors vary in printing them as one word or two. 93 apar¹ntako−i BHS44: “the future end, the utmost limit (of existence, sa÷s¹ra).” SSB186.12 sacet punar mamaite sarvasatv¹ apar¹ntako−i÷ chindyur ..., BHS translation: “but if all these creatures should split me, up to the end of time (adv.; Bendall’s note on 14.8 and Transl. misunderstand the word).” 94 dharmachandaå SSB186.14: dharmachandaå,, SS, Vaidya,103.23: dharmacchandaå, also SS, Vaidya, 102.15=SSB183.9: dharmacchandaå. See n. 59. 95 upani¬ad BHS138: (2) likeness, comparison. In a cliché, [references include SSB187.1; SSB312.12, 21]; usually a long formula, ending kal¹m api gaªan¹m apy upam¹m apy upani¬adam api na k¬amate; sometimes abbreviated by y¹vad.” SSB187 n.1: “Rendered by the Tibetan (116a.5) rgyu ‘cause’.” Edgerton says this makes no sense. 356 dwelling in hell, but I should not abandon the Buddhas and the Dharma (buddhadharma), nor the great compassion that has all beings as its object96 . . .

However, we will renounce (prah¹sy¹maå) that dharma by reason of which malice (vy¹p¹da) may arise. And which dharma is that? Namely,97 love of the body, existence as the body, clinging to98 the body. And the body abandoned is malice abandoned. Thus intent on consideration of this dharma, S¹garamati, the bodhisattva endures the pain caused by all beings . . .

His d¹nap¹ramit¹ is this renouncing (utsarga) the body, abandoning (parity¹ga) the body, lack of attention to the body. His ¶»lap¹ramit¹ is that he extends benevolence99 to all beings when his body is being cut, and he is not distracted by pains. His k¬¹ntip¹ramit¹ is that when his body is being cut he is patient (k¬amate) for the sake of the final deliverance of the very ones who are cutting his body, and his mind is not injured, and he exhibits the power of k¬¹nti (k¬antibala). His v»ryap¹ramit¹ is the energy (v»rya) by which he does not renounce (utsÅjati) his zeal100 for omniscience, and he takes hold of generating101 strength of mind, and he is bound to sa÷s¹ra itself, and he only exerts effort for the roots of virtue (ku¶alamØla). His dhy¹nap¹ramit¹ is that when his body is being torn apart, he is not bewildered to make the jewel of the production of the thought of omniscience,102 he perceives (upek¬ate) only bodhi, he reflects on tranquillity (¶¹nta) and composure (pra¶¹nta) only. His prajñ¹p¹ramit¹ is that when his body is being cut he reflects on the similarity of the body to a blade of grass, or a piece of wood, or a wall, or an illusory image,103 and comprehends104 the real nature (dharmat¹) of the body is illusion (m¹y¹); and thinks105 that the body is truly impermanent and truly suffering and truly non-self and truly tranquil. And so on . . .

96 ¹rambaªa See n. 59. 97 yaduta BHS443-44. 98 adhyav¹sana BHS16-17. 99 maitry¹ BHS440: = maitr¹, = Sanskrit maitr». 100 chanda See n. 59. 101 SSB187.9: cittabal¹dh»na÷; I have followed SS, Vaidya, 103.32: cittabal¹dh¹na÷, which agrees with the Tibetan: sems kyi stobs bskyed pa. 102 sarvajñat¹cittotp¹daratna, also at SSB184.10. 103 pratibh¹sa BHS366-67. 104 avatarati BHS71. 105 upanidhy¹yati SSB187 n.3: “Compound new in Sanskrit; Pali upanijjh¹yati.” BHS137: “reflects upon, thinks,” agrees with Bendall’s note. 357 Moreover, the following occurs to him: “This being, who abuses me, who vilifies me, is lazy, is parted from the pure Dharma (¶ukladharma). Come on! We will exert heroic energy (v»rya),106 we will be eager, intent on (abhiyukta) striving for the roots of virtue (ku¶alamØla). I should seat this very being first, before me, on the seat of enlightenment.107 Later, I must realize supreme perfect enlightenment.” [SSB188] . . . “We should gird on the armour for the sake of such uncontrolled, unprotected, untranquil beings.” . . . “Come on! We will return to the real nature (dharmat¹). Investigating108 “Who in this case abuses or is abused?” he does not perceive a dharma which abuses or is abused. Free of the view (dŬ−i) of perceiving or not perceiving a self or other, he is patient (k¬amate).”

It is said in the Bhagavat» also:109

He generates a thought such as this: “I am the one who should expel the quarrel of all beings, yet I myself quarrel. My gains are hard to obtain, because when spoken to I answer back. I should be the means of crossing for all beings, yet I say, ‘You’ to the other, or give a severe (paru¬am) reply. I should certainly not say this. In all fights and quarrels, I should remain as if inanimate, mute like a sheep. I should not harden my heart110 while hearing harsh, offensive, derogatory remarks being spoken by others. In the presence of others it is neither right nor proper that I should produce111 another fault112 for another. It is not even proper for me that I think that another fault is to be heard by others.

What is the reason for this? I should not disturb my intention (¹¶aya). In so far as all beings should be made happy by me as a basis for all their happiness,113 and all should be brought to nirv¹ªa by me after having attained the supreme perfect

106 ¹rabdhav»rya BHS506: v»ry¹rabdhi acquisition of heroic energy. 107 bodhimaª©a BHS402. 108 parigave¬am¹naå BHS321: parigave¬ate, reference to SSB233.15. 109 See SSB188 n.1: “a recension of the Prajñ¹p¹ramit¹.” A similar passage is found in Conze, Perfection of wisdom in eight thousand lines, 247-248. 110 ¹gh¹tayati See BHS89, reference to this occurrence. 111 Bendall and Rouse translate this as if it is sam√jñ¹, when it is sam√jan. 112 do¬¹ntara; antara MW43. BHS38. do¬a BHS272: “’hatred, malice, aversion,’ for Sanskrit. dve¬a.” Can also mean ‘fault’, as in Sanskrit. do¬¹ntara not BHS. state/property of hatred/fault? another hatred/fault? opportunity for hatred/fault? The meaning of this sentence and the next sentences is not very clear. The translation has been made with the help of the Tibetan (TTD, 16:106) which reads: bdag gis gzhan dag la gang gzhan gyis nyes pa gzhan skyes na de ni bdag la legs pa ma yin pa dag gi cha ma yin no || gang bdag gis gzhan dag gi nyes pa gzhan mnyam par bsams pa de ni bdag gi cha ma yin no || If, because of me, among others another fault arises because of another that is not right for me it is not proper for me. That, because of me, others hear of a another fault is not proper.

358 enlightenment, would I then I show malice?114 And I should not show malice even when others are committing grave offences. Then I am certainly going to delusion (moha), to disturbance. However, I should do this: I should show firm courageousness. And I should not be disturbed even when my life is being threatened. And I should not allow a frown to appear on my face.115

It is said in the Bodhisattvapr¹timoksha also:

He calms those beings who are angry, he makes them patient (k¬am¹payati), he soothes them, he satisfies them by means of the dharma.

Thus ends the ninth chapter of the ˜ik¬¹samuccaya, K¬¹ntip¹ramit¹.

113 upadh¹na BHS135: “basis, what causes or is needful for ..., usually in comp. with sukha.” 114 vy¹padye BHS518: vy¹padyate, “is cross, malicious, shows ill will.” Edgerton translates SSB188.13 as “’under these circumstance, forsooth, I am cross’ ( as I ought not to be; Transl. wrong);” and SSB188.14 as “and I must not be cross at others even when they are guilty of grave offenses.” 115 SSB188.16, read mukha for sukha, as does SS, Vaidya, 104.21.

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