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Home , Canary Islands

MAY 2016

Learning from the Canaries: Lessons from the “Cayucos” Crisis

DESPERATE MIGRATION SERIES NO. 1

WALTER KEMP Cover Photo: Migrants being rescued ABOUT THE AUTHOR off the , 2006. Red Cross. WALTER KEMP is Senior Vice President at the International Peace Institute. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent those of the author Email: [email protected] and not necessarily those of the International Peace institute. IPI welcomes consideration of a wide range of perspectives in the pursuit of ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS a well-informed debate on critical policies and issues in international IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their affairs. generous support. In particular, IPI would like to thank the Government of Austria and the Casa for making this IPI Publications publication possible. Adam Lupel, Vice President Albert Trithart, Assistant Editor

Suggested Citation: Walter Kemp, “Learning from the Canaries: Lessons from the ‘Cayucos’ Crisis,” New York: International Peace Institute, May 2016.

© by International Peace Institute, 2016 All Rights Reserved www.ipinst.org CONTENTS

Executive Summary ...... 1

Introduction ...... 1

Origins of the Crisis ...... 2

PUSH, PULL, AND ENABLING FACTORS

DESPERATE MIGRANTS

Responding to the Crisis ...... 3

PROCESSING THE “IRREGULARS”

RESCUES AND INTERCEPTIONS AT

LEADERSHIP AND COOPERATION

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: THE AFRICA PLAN

Lessons Learned ...... 7

THE “EXTERNALIZATION” OF BORDER MANAGEMENT

TRANSFERABILITY OF THE CANARIES EXPERIENCE

1

Executive Summary failed states, and most of those arriving were migrants rather than refugees—a number of Ten years ago, thousands of people risked their lessons from this experience could be transferable: lives in wooden boats called cayucos to reach • Involvement of the whole government, effective ’s Canary Islands. This sudden influx of tens leadership, and coordination among all of thousands of desperate migrants and refugees stakeholders are necessary to develop an effective overwhelmed the islands and created a humani - long-term approach. tarian crisis for Spain and the . But • Pursuing a coherent regional strategy can help a decade later, very few are heading to the Canaries. address the push and pull factors at the root of What triggered the refugee crisis in the Canary the crisis and ensure the problem is not simply Islands in 2006? What was the response? Why are displaced elsewhere. almost no migrants and refugees heading to the • Saving lives should take precedence over border Canary Islands today? And what lessons can be management. learned for other parts of the world? • If migrants are to be pushed back to their point of The crisis was triggered by a combination of departure, there must be mechanisms to ensure factors pushing people from Africa and the respect for their rights. and pulling them to the Canary Islands. Pull factors included Spain’s surging economy, its Introduction decision to “regularize” many migrants the previous year, and tightened security around other Every year, thousands of people come to Spain’s routes to . Push factors included political Canary Islands 1 off the coast of northwest Africa instability, lack of economic opportunity, and for holidays in the sun. Ten years ago, thousands of overfishing. Moreover, wide availability of cayucos people made a different kind of journey—risking and poor control of the maritime border helped their lives in wooden boats called cayucos to reach enable migration. As a result, more than 30,000 this outermost region of Europe from Africa. The people arrived in the Canary Islands by cayuco in sudden influx of tens of thousands of desperate 2006; around 6,000 died in the attempt. migrants and refugees overwhelmed the islands The first challenge was to process the “irregular” and created a humanitarian crisis for Spain and the migrants. The Spanish government took a whole- European Union. A decade later, despite an of-government approach, ensuring cooperation unprecedented number of refugees and migrants between national and local authorities, as well as on the move around the world, very few are with civil society, lawyers, the UN, and other heading for the Canary Islands. European governments. The second challenge was This case raises a number of questions: What to try to save lives at sea. European governments triggered the refugee crisis in the Canary Islands in cooperated to intercept and rescue boats, and 2006? What was the response? Why are almost no efforts to curb illegal migration involved coordina - migrants and refugees heading to the Canary tion among countries of origin, transit, and Islands today? And what lessons can be learned for destination. The Spanish government also turned other parts of the world? the crisis into an opportunity to enhance relations This paper is part of the International Peace with the countries of West Africa and the Maghreb Institute’s (IPI) “Desperate Migration” project. It is through development assistance and law enforce - based on observations from a roundtable held in ment partnerships. Casa Africa in , , on May Although the cayucos crisis differs from other 28, 2015, as well as questionnaires and interviews migration crises in Europe—the Canaries are with practitioners who responded to the crisis on islands, most of the countries of origin were not the Canary Islands in 2006.

1 The Canary Islands, also referred to as the Canaries, are an located approximately 100 kilometers off the coast of . The archipelago is made up of seven main islands (, , Gran Canaria, , , , and ), as well as some small ones. The islands constitute one of Spain’s seventeen autonomous communities. 2 Walter Kemp

Origins of the Crisis Figure 1. Map of the Canary Islands and region PUSH, PULL, AND ENABLING FACTORS A number of factors contributed to the sudden increase of people on the move from West Africa and the Maghreb to the Canary Islands in 2006. These can be generally characterized as pull factors, push factors, and enabling factors. Among the pull factors was Spain’s surging economy, led by a real estate boom. This was in stark contrast to the countries of West Africa. For example, in 2005, the difference in per capita income between Spain and was 15:1, between Spain and was 25:1, and between Spain and was 30:1. The average Spaniard earned in two weeks what someone in Mali or Guinea would earn in a year. Indeed, most migrants who made it to the Canary Islands cited economic opportunities as the motivation for making the journey. 2 Another pull factor was a decision by the Spanish government in 2005 to “regularize” a large number of “irregular” migrants. This provided hope to others that, if they could somehow get into the country, they too would eventually be allowed to stay. Moreover, thanks to the spread of mobile phones and the Internet, it became easier to send news back home about a better life in Europe. This created an example that others sought to follow. institutions, and a demographic bulge that created a large pool of unemployed and disaffected youth. The shortest ways to Europe were via the Spanish Furthermore, it is estimated that in 2006, at least 1 enclaves of and in Morocco, across million people from around West Africa and the the Strait of , or west to the Canary Maghreb (particularly , Mali, Morocco, and Islands. In late 2005, Spain and Morocco tightened Senegal) had moved into looking for security around the enclaves after hundreds of better opportunities. 3 With few prospects at home, people rushed the fence, and patrols were stepped young people looked abroad. But there were few up off the southern coast of Spain. As a result, the regular ways of entering the European Union. route of least resistance became the Canary Islands, just over 100 kilometers off the coast of Mauritania. Another push factor was the high level of foreign illegal fishing. With few coast guard resources, the Push factors included political instability in some countries of West Africa and the Maghreb were not countries of West Africa and the Maghreb able to ward off foreign trawlers (mostly from the (including a coup d’état in Mauritania, a power EU and ). Due to the resulting overfishing, struggle in Guinea-, civil war in Côte local fish stocks collapsed in 2005, for example in d’Ivoire, and tensions between the Moroccan Senegal. This left a large pool of angry and government and the POLISARIO independence unemployed fishermen with a fleet of unused boats. movement in ), as well as low economic development, rampant corruption, weak These wooden canoe-shaped boats, known as

2 Information from questionnaires from staff of UNHCR and the Spanish Red Cross. 3 Ibid. LEARNING FROM THE CANARIES 3

cayucos and often colorfully painted, were a major humanitarian assistance. For example, in 2006 the factor enabling the movement of people from West Red Cross, which was present on all the main Africa and the Maghreb to Europe. Fishermen were islands, attended to 4,238 people, most of whom able to sell them to traffickers with a return much were suffering from dehydration and hypothermia. higher than the opportunity cost of not fishing for Many also suffered from trauma. As the number of several months. Another enabling factor was the refugees and migrants increased—along with the wider availability of cheap GPS navigation, which number of dead bodies washing up on the shore— made it easier for fishermen, or smugglers, to it soon became apparent that the situation was navigate on open water. Furthermore, there was a deteriorating into a humanitarian disaster. large and poorly controlled maritime border According to a member of a local non- between northwest Africa and the Canary Islands. governmental organization (NGO) who witnessed An increase in criminal activity in the region, the crisis, “We felt overwhelmed. You have to involving the trafficking of drugs and weapons, understand that hundreds of people were arriving also made it easier for networks to smuggle people. every day. We had no idea how this started, or DESPERATE MIGRANTS when it would end. It was like a tide of humanity.” The islanders turned to help from the . As a result of these and other factors, in 2006 a growing number of people—mostly young men— Responding to the Crisis started to make their way to the Canary Islands in cayucos or smaller vessels called pateras .4 The PROCESSING THE “IRREGULARS” wooden boats, which usually carried a crew of The Spanish authorities quickly realized that the around eight, were packed to the gunnels with number of people on the move was a challenge that between sixty and eighty people. It is estimated that deserved to be treated as an affair of state. They refugees and migrants paid between 400 and 700 took a whole-of-government approach and for the crossing. The journey—usually mobilized the necessary economic resources, all in setting off from the shores of Mauritania, Morocco, coordination with the autonomous authorities of or Senegal—lasted between twenty-four and forty- the Canary Islands. The autonomous authorities eight hours. Many of the boats had neither a proper established a rescue coordination center, and captain nor sufficient drinking water. It is regular meetings were held among all relevant estimated that in 2006 around 6,000 people died stakeholders. They also reached out to interna - while attempting the crossing. tional partners like the International Organization The lucky passengers usually reached the coast of for Migration. Tenerife or Gran Canaria. First dozens, then The first challenge was to deal with the large hundreds arrived on the island’s popular ; number of new arrivals: Where were they from? by the summer of 2006, it was thousands. Indeed, Were they refugees or migrants? What should be whereas 4,718 people reached the Canary Islands done with them? irregularly in 2005, in 2006 the number jumped to 31,859 in 515 boats. 5 Almost half (16,237) came When boats were intercepted at sea, they were from Senegal, while other major countries of origin rescued by the patrol boats of the Spanish Guardia included Gambia (3,633), Morocco (3,423), Côte Civil officers. When they were intercepted on d’Ivoire (1,698), Guinea-Bissau (1,448), and shore, the “irregulars” were handed over to Mauritania (1,237). Most were young men (average national police officers, given first aid, and taken to age twenty-five) fleeing poverty and looking for a police stations to be fingerprinted. Then they were brighter future. A few were escaping war and taken to internment or reception centers (special persecution. centers were created for unaccompanied minors). 6 According to Spanish law, they had to be taken to a Local aid agencies and the Red Cross were the judge within forty-eight hours and could only be first responders. They tried to provide basic held for up to forty days, but the caseload became

4 The first patera arrived in 1995, and several hundred irregular migrants arrived in 1999. 5 Data from the Ministry of the Interior of Spain. 6 At the time, there were three internment centers in the Canaries: Barranco Seco in Las Palmas, Hoya Fría in Tenerife, and El Matorral in Fuerteventura. 4 Walter Kemp so heavy that some were detained for months. As flows of refugees and migrants. Thanks to its the centers filled up, conditions deteriorated, the intervention, international protection leaflets were authorities started using other facilities (like restau - distributed to all new arrivals, and UNHCR worked rants, parking lots, sports centers, and dock facili - closely with CEAR to make detainees more aware ties) and the military was called in to build an of their rights. It is worth noting that in Tenerife additional camp in Gran Canaria and renovate alone, 251 foreign nationals submitted applications disused military installations in Tenerife to serve as for asylum in 2007, compared with just 9 the year camps. before. Initially, there was criticism from legal aid That said, most of the foreign nationals did not providers and human rights advocates that the fulfill the legal requirements for entry and detainees were not being given sufficient protec - residence in Spain, since they were considered tion or information about their rights. There were migrants rather than refugees. Therefore, the also complaints about insufficient legal aid and Spanish authorities initiated forced return or interpretation, mistakes about country of origin, expulsion procedures. 9 Since Spain has readmission minors wrongly identified as adults, and confusion agreements with most countries of West Africa and between asylum and immigration procedures. 7 the Maghreb, irregular migrants arriving from However, thanks in large part to the those countries (including Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, of the Canary Islands, the Spanish Commission for Mauritania, and ) were sent back via air Refugee Aid (CEAR), and other civil society actors, shuttles. The Spanish authorities made a point of cooperation improved among civil society, lawyers, highly publicizing these returns in order to and the local government. Access was granted to discourage other potential migrants from coming. the detention centers, legal aid was made more The readmission agreements contained clauses readily available, and the system for establishing requiring these countries to respect the human country of origin was improved with the assistance rights of returned migrants, but it is difficult to of embassy staff from the countries of transit and judge to what extent these clauses were faithfully origin. Assistance also came from expert teams applied. It is also not clear what happened to from , , , , the nationals from third countries who were sent back, Netherlands, Norway, and the , for example, to Mauritania. Migrants who could which were sent to the Canary Islands under an not be expelled were sent to the Spanish mainland, operation coordinated by Frontex called Hera I. 8 albeit with an expulsion order that barred them from working. An advisory body, the Canaries Immigration Forum, worked with civil society, the government, An exception was made for unaccompanied and the media to strengthen the sense of solidarity minors (under the age of eighteen). In 2006 alone, and assuage fears about what the media, at the 1,062 unaccompanied minors (almost all male) 10 outset, described as an “invasion.” In particular, the were registered and allowed to stay. A further 880 forum published a “Decalogue for Inclusive and were allowed to stay in 2007, and 866 in 2008 Non-Xenophobic Communication,” which helped (roughly one-tenth of all the irregular arrivals in to promote tolerance and more responsible the Canary Islands that year). More than half of all reporting. unaccompanied minors came from Senegal, and around a third from Mali. 11 Special centers were The UN High Commissioner for Refugees created for many of these children around the (UNHCR), which did not have an office on the Canary Islands, although many were moved to the islands, also got involved because of the mixed mainland.

7 Interviews in Las Palmas, May 28, 2015, and information from questionnaires. 8 The full title of Frontex, which was launched in 2004, is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. 9 Amnesty International, “Spain: The Southern Border. The State Turns Its Back on the Human Rights of Refugees and Migrants,” June 2005. 10 Data from the Ministry of the Interior of Spain. 11 Data from the Spanish Red Cross. LEARNING FROM THE CANARIES 5

RESCUES AND INTERCEPTIONS AT SEA This was followed by Operation Seahorse The second challenge was to try to save lives at sea. Atlantico—from December 2006 to December Initially, there was a debate about whether 2008—to fight smuggling of migrants off the coast improved search and rescue would act as a pull of northwest Africa. This project, funded by the factor that would encourage more boat people to and led by Spain’s Guardia risk the journey. It was decided that the highest Civil, was designed to improve coordination priority—from both a legal 12 and a moral perspec - among countries of origin, transit, and 13 tive—should be to save lives. (A similar debate took destination. It included capacity building, joint place in Italy in 2014, which led to the creation of patrols, information exchange, and development of the successful Mare Nostrum search-and-rescue a network (which eventually led to the creation of operation.) the Seahorse Network and the establishment of Seahorse Coordination Centers). A similar As a result, the Spanish Coast Guard and Guardia operation for curbing illegal migration between Civil were substantially reinforced. Their Mediterranean countries was launched in 2013. operations were facilitated by an Integrated System of External Vigilance (SIVE). Installed between LEADERSHIP AND COOPERATION 1999 and 2004, the SIVE is comprised of fixed and Although the authorities of the Canary Islands and mobile sensors. These sensors provide early the Spanish government were caught off guard by warning, predict boats’ estimated time of arrival, the large influx of migrants and refugees in 2006, and even predict the number of people on board. they adapted quickly. An ad hoc and reactive On the basis of this information, an interception or response was soon replaced by a more coordinated rescue unit can be deployed. Operations were run and proactive strategy. out of the Canary Islands Regional Coordination At the local level, the island officials held Center (with headquarters in Las Palmas). frequent roundtables to engage all relevant Spain also appealed to other EU countries for stakeholders, including humanitarian organiza - help in the spirit of shared responsibility. Support tions, maritime rescue officials, civil society, and was provided through a Frontex-coordinated lawyers. After a few preliminary glitches, the mood operation called Hera II. It involved assets from was described as constructive and cooperative. Italy (one vessel and one aircraft), Portugal (one When the scale of the problem became apparent, vessel), and Finland (one aircraft). Together with the national government became active. Prime Spanish boats and planes, they patrolled the coastal Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero took leader - areas of , Mauritania, Senegal, and the ship and pursued a whole-of-government Canary Islands between 11 and December approach that engaged all relevant ministries 15, 2006. Bilateral agreements were also reached (Labor and Social Affairs, Interior, and Foreign between Spain and Mauritania (Operation Cabo Affairs and Cooperation), along with regional and Blanco) and Spain and Senegal (Operation Gorée), local governments (particularly the administration which enabled Spanish vessels to patrol these of the Canary Islands) and civil society. It is worth countries’ territorial waters. These operations led noting that, already in 2003, the government had to increased rescue at sea, but also increased passed responsibility for refugees and migrants interceptions, since the main aim of the operation from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of was to detect vessels departing from Africa toward Labor and Social Affairs. This reflected the govern - the Canary Islands and divert them back to their ment’s view that this was more than a law enforce - point of departure. It is not clear if people on the ment issue. intercepted vessels were interviewed to determine The government showed openness to working whether they wanted to apply for asylum or to with relevant humanitarian partners, like the Red distinguish between refugees and migrants.

12 Under the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (1979), Spain is responsible for providing search and rescue off the coast of West Africa. Furthermore, Article 98 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea says that “every State shall require the master of a ship flying its , in so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or passengers: a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; [and] b) to proceed with all possible speed to rescue the persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him.” 13 Participants included Belgium, Cape Verde, France, Germany, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, and Spain. 6 Walter Kemp

Cross and UNHCR. As discussed above, it reached resulted in the opening of new embassies in Cape out to the European Union for assistance, Verde and Mali and the upgrading of embassies in including for increased capacity (through , Côte d’Ivoire, , Nigeria, and operations Hera and Seahorse), and it worked Senegal. Furthermore, Spanish diplomats were closely with the countries of West Africa and the posted to West African countries without Spanish Maghreb. embassies, including , Guinea, Guinea- STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: Bissau, , , and , to improve THE AFRICA PLAN information sharing on the migration issue. Indeed, the Spanish government turned the crisis Spanish officials also worked to change the into an opportunity to enhance relations with the mindset of the leaders of West Africa who felt that countries of West Africa and the Maghreb. In 2006 the migration issue was Europe’s problem, not it launched an ambitious and far-reaching Africa Africa’s. Indeed, the exodus of young, unemployed Plan. As Miguel Moratinos, then Spain’s minister youth released social pressures at home and of foreign affairs and cooperation, noted in the generated remittances. Spanish authorities introduction of the plan, “Africa, so close to our explained that many of those attempting to make hearts and our shores, has never been more present the crossing were dying, and that the proliferation in the daily lives of the Spanish people.” 14 Africa of migrant (and drug) smugglers was spreading a presented both a threat, in terms of a major cancer of crime that could destabilize West Africa. upsurge in cocaine trafficking and the smuggling of Failure to act now would lead to greater problems 16 migrants through West Africa, and an opportunity, later on. in terms of the potential for closer trade ties and A major priority was to work with the affected stronger cooperation between Spain and Africa. African countries to adequately regulate migratory The 2006–2008 Africa Plan was launched in the flows, combat human trafficking, and repatriate spring of 2006 after an active period of shuttle illegal migrants. This included building the diplomacy over several months, during which capacity of law enforcement in the countries of Moratinos and other senior officials (particularly West Africa, providing equipment to enhance Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Bernardino border management, sharing information on León) visited almost every country in West Africa smuggling and suspicious maritime activities, and several times in order to create “a genuine climate concluding readmission agreements. Agreements of trust and partnership.” 15 Among its priorities, were even made to station Spanish Guardia Civil the plan sought to double Spain’s overseas develop - personnel in coastal regions of West Africa and the ment assistance from an average of 0.23 percent in Maghreb to carry out joint patrols and gather 2004 to 0.5 percent in 2008. This was designed in information. These arrangements continue today. large part to improve the socioeconomic Furthermore, liaison officers from West Africa and conditions of sub-Saharan African countries the Maghreb are stationed at the Frontex office in vulnerable to migration (particularly to Spain). Las Palmas. Furthermore, joint development projects were Multilateral cooperation was also enhanced, for initiated under the plan. For example, a center for example with the Economic Community of West youth training was established in Morocco, while African States (ECOWAS) and the , two centers for adult training were established in on issues of migration, trafficking, and, more Mali and Senegal. Efforts were also made to enable generally, enhanced regional cooperation to fight seasonal employment, for example in the agricul - drugs and crime. The Process, launched in tural sector, and to lower barriers to other forms of July 2006 at the first -African Conference on regular employment. Migration and Development, was also an invalu - The plan also called for reinforcement of Spain’s able mechanism for promoting dialogue and institutional presence in West Africa, which cooperation to address the challenge of irregular

14 , Africa Plan 2006–2008 , p. 6. 15 Government of Spain, Africa Plan 2006–2008 , p. 72. 16 Interview with Bernardino León, April 2016. LEARNING FROM THE CANARIES 7

migration from West Africa and the Maghreb to • The need to facilitate legal immigration and Europe. create training and job opportunities—in a Civil society actors in Spain worked with their structured and predictable way—for aspiring counterparts in the countries of origin to spread migrant workers; the word on the dangers of the crossing. • The need for a regional solution to prevent Information campaigns (including sobering “solving” the problem in one country yet images) were carried out in communities suscep - displacing it to another; tible to irregular migration to highlight the risks of • The need for approaching such challenges with a the journey and manage expectations about the sense of shared responsibility, in this case limited opportunities for staying in Spain. In manifested by cooperation among the various particular, efforts were made to support and regions of Spain and between Spain and the mobilize women in Senegal who had lost sons or countries of West Africa and the Maghreb, as husbands at sea and get them to explain their well as with partner EU states; tragedy to others as a warning of the dangers of the • The need for reception centers to cope with a crossing. massive influx of refugees and migrants and for a This mobilization of women was important, process for explaining to people on the move since it appears that sending unaccompanied their rights (particularly the right to seek minors to the Canary Islands was based on family asylum); decisions and was a well-prepared process that • The need to establish a formal mechanism to involved significant mobilization of resources. Like identify persons in need of international protec - a Darwinian survival of the fittest, the boys and tion; young men encouraged to attempt the crossing were regarded as having the best chance of • The urgency of dealing with people with special succeeding, finding a job, and sending home needs, as well as unaccompanied minors remittances to cover the cost of the trip and (including by providing psychological support); support the family. Furthermore, family members • The potential effectiveness of return agreements, and smugglers seem to have been aware that but the need to ensure that such agreements unaccompanied minors would not be sent home. 17 protect the rights of returnees to avoid violating Expectations were high for these youths, which the principle of non-refoulement; often caused psychological problems when they • The merits of cooperation among countries of were subsequently unable to find work and send origin, transit, and destination on humanitarian money back home. assistance, development programs, reduction of Lessons Learned barriers to regular migration, and law enforce - ment; and A number of lessons can be drawn from the experi - • The benefits of a regional strategy (e.g., Plan ence of the Canary Islands in dealing with the Africa) to put the issue of migration and cayucos crisis, including: displacement in a broader and longer-term context. • The need for a whole-of-government approach; THE “EXTERNALIZATION” OF BORDER • The priority of saving lives (and having sufficient MANAGEMENT assets to do so); One lesson worth highlighting is that the approach • The importance of early warning and informa - used by Spain to respond to the cayucos crisis in tion exchange; the Canary Islands has sometimes been described • The need to understand the socioeconomic push as the “externalization” of border management. and pull factors that drive people to risk their This policy, which has been practiced in lives and to implement programs and projects and the European Union, uses various methods to designed to reduce vulnerability to these factors; transfer migration management beyond national

17 Information from the Directorate General for the Protection of Minors and Family, Government of the Canary Islands. 8 Walter Kemp borders—in other words, to make it someone steps to identify them. According to the court, else’s problem. But by working with the countries “Returning migrants to without examining of West Africa and the Maghreb (including on their case exposed them to a risk of ill-treatment intelligence sharing, interception and diversion of and amounted to collective expulsion.” 19 States boats, joint land patrols, and readmission therefore need to ensure that the practice of agreements), Spain—and in some cases Frontex— pushback at sea does not violate the non-refoule - not only managed to keep refugees and migrants ment principle. away from its shores (and the external borders of Furthermore, countries that want to externalize Europe) but also helped other states to enhance border management should concurrently promote their border management. This has arguably externalization of protection. As part of coopera - enhanced the of both the transit/origin tion agreements, states seeking to limit the number and the destination countries. This proved quite of refugees and migrants reaching their shores effective, as evidenced by the significant drop in should work with countries of transit and destina - refugees and migrants reaching the Canary Islands tion on effective protection measures (including since 2008. respect for human rights) upstream. Outsourcing But it is worth recalling that, pursuant to Article the problem to another country—especially one 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with less capacity—is unfair to either the country people have the right not only to asylum but also to involved or the people affected. seek asylum. Therefore, if a country tries to push TRANSFERABILITY OF THE CANARIES back those trying to reach its shores, it must not do EXPERIENCE so at the expense of those seeking, and entitled to, A number of lessons from the experience of dealing protection. Human rights cannot be sacrificed for with the cayucos crisis in the Canary Islands have the sake of security. As one critic has observed, been listed above. Are there any good practices that externalizing border management “transfers could be applied elsewhere? migration policy to other countries and it is symptomatic of the insidious process by which It is important to note that the Canaries are immigration policy and practice become invisible. islands, and therefore the situation was in some This makes the advocacy task of civil society respects more self-contained than situations organizations more difficult and it diminishes the elsewhere. That said, the challenge for maritime accountability of governments.” Moreover, he security was significant because of the long and points out, “It dramatically increases the vulnera - relatively uncontrolled coastline on the African bility of those most in need of protection, as side. refugees and migrants are compelled to seek more Another important observation is that most and more dangerous routes in order to gain entry countries of West Africa and the Maghreb (with and make their claims.” 18 the possible exception of Guinea-Bissau) were not In this regard, it is worth noting that a case was failed states. It was possible for Spain to form brought against Italy at the European Court of partnerships with them and to have readmission Human Rights in 2009 by two dozen Eritrean and agreements that would enable return of the Somali nationals who were among 200 people migrants. picked up by the Italian coastguard off the coast of It should also be born in mind that most of the , transferred to Italian military vessels, people desperately trying to get to the Canary and returned to Libya (pursuant to a bilateral Islands were migrants rather than refugees (unlike agreement between Italy and Libya). In making most people fleeing Syria). This highlights a their case to the court, the applicants alleged that, prejudice built in to the current international during the voyage, the Italian authorities did not protection regime, which tends toward protection inform them of their real destination and took no of those fleeing conflict but rejection of those trying

18 Quoted in Roger Zetter, “The Problem of Externalising the EU’s Borders,” in Shifting Borders: Externalising Migrant Vulnerabilities and Rights , Red Cross EU Office, 2013. For a report that focuses on this issue in the specific context of Spain, see Spanish Commission for Refugee Aid (CEAR), “The Externalization of Borders: Migration Control and the Right to Asylum,” 2013. 19 See the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy , application no. 27765/09 (Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, February 23, 2012). LEARNING FROM THE CANARIES 9

to escape poverty. This is a complex and controver - also shows the need for effective regional informa - sial issue beyond the scope of this paper. 20 That tion sharing on migration and refugee flows; said, the example of the cayucos crisis shows the otherwise, the problem will simply be displaced need for reducing barriers to regular migration and somewhere else. creating viable alternatives to having people risk A cautionary note is the lesson (described above) (and sometimes lose) their lives for the sake of a that, if migrants and refugees are to be pushed back better future. to their point of departure, mechanisms must be in Operation Seahorse in the Mediterranean shows place to ensure respect for their rights. As the UN that the maritime security experience is transfer - Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants makes able, although it should be stressed that the clear, migrants, including asylum seekers, may not Frontex-coordinated operation is a border be deprived of the right to protection, including management process rather than a search-and- asylum, or to assistance. These rights must not be rescue one. As Spain’s response to the cayucos crisis compromised by state measures to combat illegal showed, the priority should be to save lives. trafficking in human beings, especially in the 22 Much more could be done to emulate Spain’s context of maritime rescue. decision to pursue a coherent regional strategy, for Perhaps the most significant lesson to be example between countries on the north and south emulated is the need for a whole-of-government shores of the Mediterranean. Like Spain’s Africa approach, effective leadership, and coordination Plan, this could include a comprehensive package among all stakeholders. This was certainly the of development, trade, capacity building, humani - approach adopted in responding to the cayucos tarian aid, and law enforcement cooperation. This crisis. Within less than a year, a small cluster of would have wide-ranging benefits well beyond the islands that was overwhelmed by a major humani - issue of migration, such as in dealing with some of tarian crisis managed to pull together, address the the push and pull factors that fuel desperate most immediate needs of people in distress, and migration, reducing inequality, creating opportu - then form effective partnerships with countries of nities at home, strengthening national institutions, the EU and West Africa and the Maghreb to put in and enhancing networks to combat violent place measures that, ten years later, continue to extremism and organized crime. 21 The cayucos case work effectively.

20 See Independent Commission on Multilateralism, “Forced Displacement, Refugees, and Migration,” Discussion Paper, November 2015, available at www.icm2016.org/new-discussion-paper-forced-displacement-refugees-and-migration . 21 See also “Forward Defence: What Other Europeans Can Learn from Spanish Efforts to Limit Illegal Migration,” The Economist , October 17, 2015. 22 UN General Assembly, Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime , November 15, 2000, Art. 16.

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