PRELATES AND PRINCES: ARISTOCRATIC MARRIAGES, CANON LAW PROHIBITIONS, AND SHIFTS IN NORMS AND PATTERNS OF DOMINATION IN THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES*

Ivan Ermakoff University of Chicago

In this article, I explore the processes whereby, at the turn of the twelfth century, European aristocrats acknowledged clerics'prohibitions of divorce and close-kin marriages. I argue that this normative shift cannot be ad- equately accounted for by the rise of feudalism, the Gregorian reformers' moralist offensive or the development of canon law: These events do not ex- plain (I) why the Roman hierarchy thought it possible, at a certain moment in time, to impose their normative preferences on reluctant elites; or (2) why aristocrats eventually yielded to demands that undermined their autonomy of choice regarding marriage. I address both problems by -considering two analytically distinct transformative processes. One concerns the symbolic and institutional conditions that allowed Roman prelates to substantiate their normative claims: The Church hierarchy emphasized the sacramental and spiritual significance of the marital tie and implemented reforms intended to preclude collusive practices between lords and bishops. The second process highlights how canonical rules of marriage were converted into effective nor- mative constraints: In a context marked by the patrimonialization of feudal relations and an increase in competition, aristocrats relied on ecclesiastical standards for their own regulatory and strategic interests.

"I shall not come (to your marriage) until I toward the regular as the empirically valid" know if a general council has found that you (p. 321), a world of "canonized custom and your spouse are legitimately divorced which, just because it is considered as bind- and that you and her you wish to marry may ing, seems as though it could never give birth be legitimately married. " to anything new" (p. 754), how could any- -Yvo, Bishop of Chartres,from a letter thing ever change? Consider the ban issued written in 1092 to King Robert by the medieval Church on divorce and con- (quoted by Duby 1983:9) sanguineous ties. Until the end of the elev- enth century, European nobles simply disre- "A feeling of sinfulness ... is incompatible garded rules that forbade them to repudiate with the feudal lord's sense of dignity." their wives and marry their cousins. Repu- -Weber ([1922] 1978: 1179) diation and endogamy were critical strategies of political and military aggrandizement. By the end of the twelfth century, however, R eflecting on the transition from cus- ecclesiastical precepts were gaining prece- tomary law to legal norms, Weber dence over such practices. The church's doc- ([1922] 1978) pointed out the paradox of normative innovations. In a "world oriented metz for their critical comments. I also thank StathisKalyvas, Marc Lazar, James Miller, Anne * Direct all correspondence to Ivan Ermakoff, O'Neill, JamesSchulman, the participantsin the Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, Workshopin ComparativePolitics andHistorical 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637 Sociology at the Universityof Chicago,and the ([email protected]). I am grateful to ASReditors and reviewersfor theirobservations James Fearon, David Laitin, and George Stein- and suggestions.

American Sociological Review, 1997, Vol. 62 (June:405-422) 405

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trine on matrimonial unions was being ac- On cursory examination, the problem cepted. Marriage had become "Christian- seems simple: People submit to constraining ized" (Duby 1994:7). normative injunctions when they have more My purpose here is twofold. First, I high- to lose by breaching them than they gain by light the processes that brought about this obeying them. "Those having more power shift in norms and practices. Why did aristo- will be able to impose disjoint norms to gov- crats endorse normative standards that lim- ern the actions of those having less power" ited their ability to realize their political in- (Coleman 1990b:262). Normative shifts, in terests? Historians suggest that two broad other words, stem from processes of empow- structuraltransformations influenced nobles' erment. This view of the issue, however, acceptance of clerics' right to regulate their overlooks transformativeprocesses. The no- matrimonial choices: the institutionalization tion of empowerment is, to paraphrase We- of the feudal structures of property (Duby ber ([1922] 1978:53), "sociologically amor- 1983:19) and the reforms of the Church set phous" if it is not defined in reference to spe- out by the papacy in the second half of the cific "causal mechanisms" of coercion and eleventh century (Herlihy 1985:87). These enforcement (Kiser and Hechter 1991). What accounts, however, do not specify underly- needs to be explored is the nature and under- ing causal links. My second goal is theoreti- pinnings of this shift in power. In this regard, cal. I explore the transformative processes two paradigmatic explanations can be con- whereby normative prescriptions are trans- trasted. Each describes, in an ideal-typical lated into "empirically valid" (i.e., "factually fashion, a process of transformation. binding") rules of conduct (Weber [1922] The first model relates normative shifts to 1978:312, 754). I focus on the causal under- shifts in bargainingpower. Central to this ap- pinnings of "normative shifts"-shifts in the proach is the notion that "power resides in normative principles regulating a set of so- the other's dependency" (Emerson 1962:32). cial practices. Beneficiary actors gain leverage over target actors by controlling a set of events or re- sources in which the target actors have a SHIFT IN RULES OF CONDUCT: vested interest. These events or resources PERSPECTIVES THEORETICAL then may be used as sanctions (Coleman "Norms are rules of conduct that provide 1990b:262; Levi 1988:17). This model faces standards by which behavior is approved or two challenges. First, its explanatory power disapproved" (Hechter 1987:62). If compli- is questionable if relationships of domination ance is relatively cost free and violation "exist reciprocally"-if, in other words, it is brings forth sanctions, actors will in all like- not clear who "has control over whom" or lihood abide by the norms. Compliance be- "who has the most power" (Weber [1922] comes dubious in situations in which sanc- 1978:947). Second, this model gives short tioning is problematic and observance costly shrift to the issue of compliance. It conflates (Hechter 1987:62). Most work devoted to the an "asymmetry in sanctioning" with a trans- issue has attempted to highlight the emer- fer of right: Beneficiary actors enforce their gence of a spontaneous normative order normative demands when they successfully within a given group of people (Axelrod claim a right to control the actions of target 1986; Coleman 1990a; Heckathorn 1988). I actors (Coleman 1990b:50). But, as Coleman depart from this line of investigation by con- observes, the effective exercise of a right is sidering what Coleman calls "disjoint predicatedon consent.' Whether the threat of norms" (1990b:250)-prescriptive demands sanction alone can explain the permanence of that are set forth by one class of actors ("ben- this "consent" remains open to investigation. eficiary actors") and that pertain to the be- The second model imputes normative haviors of another class ("target actors"). shifts to a change in dispositions. Categories These prescriptions restrict the capacity of those who are the nominal target of their ju- I "An actor has a right to carry out an action or risdiction. The problem then is to determine to have an action carried out when all who are under what conditions such constraints come affected by exercise of that right accept the ac- to effectively regulate social practices. tion without dispute" (Coleman 1990b:50).

This content downloaded from 144.92.188.6 on Sun, 26 Jul 2015 00:19:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PRELATES AND PRINCES: SHIFT IN MATRIMONIAL NORMS 407 discriminating between licit-or appropri- petition among target actors can contribute to ate-and illicit behaviors undergo a major the emergence of mutual expectations of change. The question, then, becomes: How compliance. can we account for this transformativepro- cess whereby actors alter the regulative prin- ciples of their actions? Following Weber CLERICS' NORMS AND NOBLES' MARRIAGES IN THE CENTRAL ([1922] 1978:754), one may point to a pro- MIDDLE AGES cess of "habituation" structurally induced. Actors "make virtue out of necessity" Drawing on Duby's (1978, 1983) work, I con- (Bourdieu 1990). Material constraints are trast two successive patterns of relationships converted into "self-restraints"(Elias [1939] between prelates and nobles on the issue of 1994:443). This approach, however, moves marriage in Western Europe during the cen- the problem one step back. It is not enough tral middle ages.3 These two patterns can be to state that "the mere fact of the regular re- described as two states of equilibrium (i.e., currence of certain events somehow confers two relatively stable and self-sustaining sys- on them the dignity of oughtness" (Weber tems of interactions). One pattern, which [1922] 1978:326) if the crux of the matter is spanned the last centuries of the first millen- to explain how this "regular recurrence" nium, was marked by the prevalence among emerged in the first place. Arguments that the nobility and the knightly class of what grant causal precedence to the "symbolic Duby (1994:9) calls the "lay model of mar- power" (Bourdieu 1979) of claimant actors riage" centered on the perpetuation of famil- face a similar difficulty when the emphasis ial "honor." A second pattern followed in is shifted to the genesis of this power. which clerics came to be in charge of the This brief discussion brings two sets of is- moral code of marriage-canon law provided sues to the fore. One revolves around the no- the ethical standards for judging the legiti- tion of sanction. A norm exists to the extent macy of matrimonial unions. The transition that violation of its code of conduct entails between these two patterns took place during sanctions. This basic observation lies at the the few decades that spanned the year 1100. heart of an explanatory model framed in Around 996-997, King Robert (the Pious), terms of resource dependence. Hence, atten- son of Hugues Capet, marriedBertha, daugh- tion should be paid to the conditions that ter of King Conrad of Burgundy. Four years make possible, from the viewpoint of claim- earlier, Robert had repudiated his first wife, ant actors, the control of a strategically cru- Rozala, daughter of Beranger, King of Italy. cial resource. I argue that these conditions The French clergy apparently raised no ob- are ideological (relative to the symbolic sig- jection to the divorce, and it was duly con- nificance of a claim to a right of control) and cluded by an assembly of bishops (Daudet institutional (relative to monitoring and 1933:78, 1941:23). At the time of Robert's transactioncosts). The second issue has to do second marriage, Rozala was still alive. with the production of consent. This point is Hence, according to the canons of the central to arguments that ascribe normative Church, Robert could not lawfully take Ber- shifts to a change in dispositions. Following tha for a wife (Duby 1978:46).4 However, Weber's ([1922] 1978) remark that "every genuine form of domination implies a mini- 3 My geographical focus is on continental mum of voluntary compliance, that is, an in- Western Europe, especially the lands now mak- terest . . . in obedience" (p. 212), I focus on ing up Germany and France. This area extends the factors that engender what Levi calls approximately from the eastern provinces of the "quasi-voluntary compliance" (1988: 52).2 I Rhine River (Franconia and Swabia) to the papal investigate how patterns of conflict and com- states and Catalonia. Although there were re- gional variations in the chronology and magni- 2 In Levi's conception (1988:52), "quasi-vol- tude of the phenomenon described here, and sys- untary compliance" cannot be accounted for tems of rule differed from one region to another, solely by coercion or ideological persuasion. Nor the shift in norms was fairly general within the is it simply self-interested behavior. Actors com- area. ply with the rule because they expect others to 4 At the end of the first millennium, prelates do so. could rely on an already constituted doctrine of

This content downloaded from 144.92.188.6 on Sun, 26 Jul 2015 00:19:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 408 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW despite Pope Gregory V's explicit interdict The measure was repeated several times (in and threats of excommunication, Robert had 1094, 1095, and 1099), and the King yielded no difficulty summoning an assembly of a few years later to Urban II's injunctions prelates willing to bless his second marriage that he "abjure the sin of carnal and illicit (Duby 1978:47, 1983:82). In 1004, the King copulation" (Duby 1983:13, italics added). dismissed Bertha and married Constance, Both Robert the Pious and his grandson, daughter of the Count of Arles. He was now Philip I, acted in the implicit belief that they trigamous according to the canon of the naturally held the right to repudiate their Church. Duby (1978:52) suggests that no wives when they thought it judicious or nec- bishop would "have dared"to condemn King essary. Their matrimonial choices were em- Robert at the end of the tenth century. bedded in a "moral code," a "system of eth- Nearly a century later, in 1092, Robert's ics" (Duby 1983:36, 1994:9) based on two grandson, Philip I, repudiated his wife of 20 cardinal principles: the consolidation of a years and "appropriated"a woman named patrimony and the perpetuation of the Bertrade (Daudet 1941:50; Duby 1983:7). "glory" of a house through the legacy of Bertrade was at the time the lawful spouse of blood. Consequently, endogamous practices Fouque Rechin, Count of Anjou. From the were appealing because they preserved fam- viewpoint of canonical rules, Philip was ily property (Duby 1978:8) and ensured that committing bigamy (because his first wife dynastic blood would be passed on to the was still alive) and adultery (because he was next generation.6 Both the genetic economy taking the wife of another). Yet, the bishops of dynastic blood and the political economy of his domain, with the exception of Yvo, of patrimony required "the capacity to repu- bishop of Chartres, agreed to celebrate his diate existing marriages and to arrange new union with Bertrade. Chroniclers described ones in response to changes in political and the ceremony as "holy," like Philip's previ- social circumstances" (Brundage 1987:185). ous marriage(Duby 1983:7). This time, how- Clerics' insistence on monogamy, exog- ever, the Pope (Urban II) excommunicated amy, and the free consent of the marrying the King on grounds of adultery and incest.5 partners ran counter to the aristocrats' pro- pensity to end their marriages at will and es- nuptial indissolubility that found its spiritual tablish matrimonial ties with their cousins. sources in the Old Testament and the Gospels. These interdictions limited nobles' capacities The Council of Toledo in the year 369 defined the Christian ideal of marriageas a union binding to adjust their matrimonial choices to the for life. St. Augustine praised its morality and military and territorial interests of their emphasized the indissoluble characterof its bond houses. Aristocrats therefore had a lot to lose (Esmein 1891:65). Referring to the union of in endorsing a set of rules that constrained Christ with his Church, Isidore of Seville (560- their matrimonialchoices and, consequently, 636) characterized the marital state as "insepar- undermined their interests (Brundage 1987: abile sacramentum" (Gaudemet 1987:120). If 193; Goody 1983:145).7 Yet, although King marriage was indissoluble, separation could only be pronounced on specific grounds and remar- was cut off. Social intercourse with those ostra- riage allowed only within stringent constraints. cized was forbidden. Excommunication was in- The Synod of Hertfordstated, for instance, in 673 tended to have an effect similar to that of "the that "no man may leave his lawful wife except, as strictest social boycott" (Weber [1922] 1978: the gospel provides, for fornication" [on the part 1165). of the wife]. "And if a man puts away his own 6 Blood was the "vehicle of nobility" (Poly and wife who is joined to him in lawful marriage, lie Bournazel 1991:89). It was commonly believed may not take another if he wishes to be a good that women produced sperm and that, through Christian" (as quoted in Goody 1983:37, italics sexual union, they mingled their blood with that added). The prohibition was reaffirmed at the of their lord (Thomasset 1981:5). As mothers, Council of Soisson in 742. Allowance was made women therefore played a decisive role in the for a man who has repudiated his wife for adul- hereditary transmission of honor. tery (Wemple 1981:77). 7 Goody (1983) observes that the Church's 5 This meant exclusion from the community of rules about divorce, close-kin marriages, adop- believers and "deprivation of the right to partici- tion, and concubinage at the time of their emer- pate in the sacraments of the church" (Berman gence in the fourth century bore "little or no rela- 1983:71). The relationship of the sinner to God tion to the doctrines of the faith, much less to its

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Robert had been able, at the end of the tenth Synod of Douzy in 874 suggest, marriage century, to carry out his matrimonial plans regulations were constantly defied at the end without encountering major constraints, of the ninth century (Wemple 1981:87). Dur- Philip eventually submitted to the Pope's ex- ing the next decades, when the last barbarian hortations. Duby (1978:67) interprets the invasions destabilized Western Europe, the contrast between these two cases as evidence prelates' grip on aristocrats' marital behav- of the emergence of new patternsof relation- iors probably became even more ineffective ships between prelates and princes in the last (Daudet 1941:20; Strayer 1959:135). By con- decades of the eleventh century-the aristo- trast, the controversy raised by Philip's sec- cratic model of marriage was being "infil- ond marriage sheds light on a recurrent trated"by the normative concerns of clerics. source of conflict between princes and prel- To what extent is this reading of the his- ates on issues of marital indissolubility.9 The torical record acceptable? Gregory V may Roman curia had launched a vast offensive to have been a more lenient Pope than Urban II. curb behaviors judged to be morally deviant Conversely, Philip may have been more con- within and outside the Church (the cerned than was his grandfatherabout the sal- "Gregorianreforms").10 vation of his soul. Nobles' matrimonialstrat- Similar observations can be made regard- egies were not, prior to the eleventh century, ing the definition of incest and the regulation entirely free from ecclesiastical pressure and of consanguinity. Since the Council of Paris control. Prelates did not hesitate to encroach (829), the Church prohibited marriages with- on aristocrats' domains. Herlihy (1985:86) in seven degrees of consanguinity, computed notes that disputes over noble marriageswere according to the German method-"acts of frequent in ecclesiastical annals from at least generation" were calculated from "ego" to the ninth century. In the middle of the eighth the common ancestor (Champeaux 1933; century, King Pepin the Younger (751-768), fused to consecrate the new queen (Daudet for instance, was persuaded by Pope Stephen 1941:16). II to give up his projected divorce (Wemple 9 In 1069, King Henri IV of Germany at- 1981:77). And, in 862, when Lothaire, King tempted to divorce with the support of the epis- of Lorraine (855-869), divorced his queen, copate. Papal legates were sent to the court of the Theutberga, and married his mistress, Wal- King to dissuade him from carrying out his deci- rada, Pope Nicholas I annulled the marriage, sion. Their forceful threats put an end to the af- excommunicated Walrada, and deposed the fair (Fliche 1944:462; Paul 1986:302). Hilde- garde, Countess of Poitiers, went before Pope over the bishops who presided ceremony Calixtus II in 1119 to denounce her husband, Wil- (Gaudemet 1987:127). Lothaire formally liam IX of Aquitaine, who had repudiated her yielded to the Pope's request to restoreTheut- (Fliche 1944:463). William was subsequently ex- berga as his wife (Wemple 1981:86). communicated on the ground that he had replaced Nothing indicates, however, that Lothaire's his second wife with a concubine, who was her- difficulties marked the decline of the com- self married (Duby 1983:123). mon practices of divorce and close-kin mar- 1( The doctrine of the lawful marriage was key riages-princes continued to disregardeccle- to this moralist offensive. Decrees against repu- siastical regulations and prelates continued to diation were adopted at the Council of Reims in of Rome in 1069 underscored than sanction marital devi- 1049. The Council reprimandrather the sacred character of monogamy (Duby 1983: 8 expressed ance As the romnhlints at the 118). The Councils of Bourges (1031), Tours scriptures" (p. 84). He suggests that the Church (1060), and Rouen (1072) prohibited remarriage may have designed these prohibitions to maxi- while a spouse was still alive (Gaudemet 1987: mize its inheritances by substantially limiting 242). Canon X of the Council of Nimes (1096) strategies of heirship available to kin groups reasserted the ban on marriage to the wife of an- (Goody 1983:95). other (Fliche 1944:463). Compilations of canon x In 878, for instance, a few years after the im- laws and decretals reflected similar concerns. broglio created by Lothaire's divorce, Louis, son Anselm of Lucca devoted the Book X of his of Charles the Bald, dismissed his wife Amsgarde Collectio canonuin to the indissolubility of mat- so he could marry Adelaide, daughter of Count rimonial ties (Fliche 1944:466). In his Decretum, Adalard (Gaudemet 1987:125). Hincmar, arch- Yvo, bishop of Chartres, also emphasized this bishop of Reims, raised no objection to the dis- point of doctrine and "reinterpreted" previous missal of Amsgarde, while Pope Jean VIII re- regulations in a stringent way (Duby 1983:165).

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Herlihy 1985:61). This method of computa- Thus, prior to the end of the eleventh cen- tion puts stringent constraints on licit matri- tury ecclesiastical norms of marriage did not monial choices. In her study of the matrimo- constitute a "valid legal order" in Weber's nial history of the Counts of Burgundy, sense of the term. Nobles' choices of marital Vermandois, and Nevers in the tenth and partners eluded the normative grip of the eleventh centuries, Bouchard (1981) argues Church (Brundage 1987:144; Mc Namara that consanguinity "made impossible a num- and Wemple 1976; Wemple 1981:8 1). On the ber of marriages that other considerations issue of marriage, Roman prelates and made highly desirable" (p. 286). This analy- princes were engaged in a regular and pre- sis suggests that the fear of incest as defined sumably self-perpetuating pattern of rela- by canon law already motivated strategies of tionships characterized by two central fea- exogamy at the end of the tenth century. In tures. On the one hand, noble families paid short, ecclesiastical prohibitions may have only lip service to the Church's matrimonial been more pervasive than Robert's behaviors regulations, demonstrating little concern for would suggest. papal pronouncements (Fliche 1944:462). But, as Bouchard (1981) herself points out, Repudiations and remarriageswere "routine" throughout the period the clergy "fulminated among the high aristocracy (Duby 1978:37), against the wickedness of incestuous unions" and the notion of incest remained, in all like- (p. 271; also see Brundage 1987:192). Al- lihood, meaningless beyond the third degree though blatantly consanguineous marriages of kinship. On the other hand, marital devi- were rarely performed, aristocratsapparently ance, although verbally disapproved or con- thought they could legitimately marry their demned, was not effectively repressed, and cousins. Endogamy was rife among the no- threats of sanction were not enacted. bility in the Macon region on the exe of the By the end of the twelfth century, the nor- twelfth century (Duby 1976:25). King Rob- mative demands of Roman prelates no longer ert and his first wife, Rozala, were cousins went unheeded (Brundage 1987:192; Goody six times removed, that is, the union was 1983:86; Herlihy 1983:7). Aristocrats inte- within the prohibited degrees defined by ca- grated Church regulations in their horizon of nonical texts (Duby 1983:79). The clergy it- expectations, and clerics did not hesitate to self at times had a rather lenient position on sanction violations. Ecclesiastical precepts, the issue.'' Such leniency would have been in other words, were becoming effective unimaginable to the Gregorian reformers of norms of practice.'4 Brundage (1987) notes the second half of the eleventh century, when prohibitions and methods of determining in 1053 on the ground that they were related in consanguinity were strongly reaffirmed 12 the fifth degree (Paul 1986:302). Pope Gregory and sanctions were increasingly applied.'3 VII forbade several marriages deemed to be in- cestuous, including those of Countess Mathilda of I I An assembly of bishops duly celebrated King Tuscany, Count Centullus of B1arn, and King Robert's marriage with Bertha, his cousin in the Alfonso VI of Castile and Leon (Brundage 1987: third degree. A letter of Pope Leo VII evoked the 192). Philip I was accused of incest and was ex- possibility of dispensations for marriages beyond communicated (Duby 1983:6). Constance, daugh- the second degree (Daudet 1933:72). ter of Philip, was forced to separate from Count 12 The Council of Reims in 1049 punished in- Hugh of Troyes because they were related within cest with excommunication (Gaudemet 1987: four degrees (Bouchard 1981:279). 140). In 1059, Pope Nicholas II called on a grand 14 This is not to say that nobles faithfully ad- council that reiterated and specified the interdic- hered to the standards ordained by clerics. Un- tion (Goody 1983:135). Around the same period, doubtedly, adherence to the prohibitions of canon the Roman hierarchy eventually endorsed the ar- law often served instrumental purposes. The guments set forth by Peter Damian in his De point, however, is that in the twelfth century the Parentelae Gradibus (1063) regarding the Ger- heads of great families could no longer ignore manic system of computation. This position was, prelates' normative injunctions. They acknowl- for instance, defended by Pope Alexander 11 edged de facto clerics' authority on matrimonial (1061-1073) (Esmein 1891:353) and Yvo of issues. Thus, ecclesiastical norms of marriage Chartres (Bouchard 1981:271). were, to take up a dichotomy established by 13 Duke William of Normandy and his wife Elster (1989), at once "legal" and "social." They Mathilda were excommunicated by Pope Leon IX were "legal" in the sense that they were "enforced

This content downloaded from 144.92.188.6 on Sun, 26 Jul 2015 00:19:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PRELATES AND PRINCES: SHIFT IN MATRIMONIAL NORMS 411 that "in view of the objections raised against the second half of the eleventh century, heads their marriage policies, it is remarkablethat of noble families reorganized inheritance the reformers succeeded as quickly as they rules and family relations around the male did in securing a fairly high degree of con- line of descent (Duby 1983:92; Poly and formity to their unpopular principles" (p. Bournazel 1991:110). In the Macon region 184). Popes were "weak" actors in the sense from 1075 onwards, for instance, inheritance that they were not in a position to carry out became a common feature (Duby 1976). Such their claims by force. They lacked armies of changes in lineage and property structures their own. Moreover, they needed the col- occurred at a time when prospects of military laboration of princes to fulfill their pastoral conquests in the East were waning and efforts. How, in these conditions, was the pa- Gregorianreformers' long-standing efforts to pacy able to enforce its normative demands? recover and secure ecclesiastical possessions What processes led great nobles, over only a restricted the access of great families to eco- few decades, to acquiesce to a normative nomic and land resources (Goody 1983:116; model of marriage that constrained their ca- Herlihy 1961:97, 1985:87). This narrowingof pacity to realize their interests? economic opportunities increased the value of patrimoniestransmitted from generation to generation and, as a result, enhanced con- THREE EXPLANATORY ARGUMENTS cerns about lineage (Herlihy 1983:124). In addressing these questions about norma- Far from resolving the issue, these few re- tive change, historians generally refer to the marks make it even more paradoxical. First, rise of feudalism, the moralist offensive of it is unclear how sociostructural shifts af- the Gregorian reforms, or the development of fected prelates' capacity to impose canon law canon law. Arguments cast in these terms do precepts on reluctant aristocratic elites. Sec- not explain: (1) why the Roman hierarchy ond, this move toward patrimony altered thought it possible, at a certain moment in aristocrats' strategies of social reproduction time, to impose its normative preferences on in a way that reinforced their need for au- reluctant elites, and (2) why aristocratseven- tonomy of decision. Strategies to consolidate tually yielded to demands that undermined lineages required not only the right to repu- their autonomy of choice regardingmarriage. diate one's wife and marry one's cousin, but As for the view that imputes the shift in also the control over the marital fate of one's norms to clerics' monopoly of jurisdiction offspring so as to minimize transfersof prop- over marriage, it simply begs the question. erty. The political and economic rationality The question is precisely how the Roman cu- of feudalism should have induced princes to ria was able to assert an exclusive right to reject prelates' injunctions. The paradox is determine the legitimacy of marital unions. that they yielded at a time when their inter- est in eluding clerics' claims at control had become stronger. Feudalism The first line of argumentsuggested by histo- Moral Reform rians establishes a parallel between the "tri- umph of monogamy" and the institutional Could this shift in attitude among the nobil- development of feudal structures of prop- ity have been prompted by the moral offen- erty'5 (Duby 1983:19; Herlihy 1985:86). In sive launched by the reforming clergy? The first crusade (1095) was marked by an in- by specialists who [did] so out of self-interest" crease in religious fervor and the growth of (Elster 1989:100). They were "social" precepts the Church's influence in all realms of social insofar as they conveyed an ideal of conduct whose blatant violation brought collective disap- tures of property" I mean here the system of in- proval. King Philip's two marriages, for instance, terpersonal relationships based on the granting of provided the material of numerous chronicles be- lands or offices to an inferior as a reward for ser- cause it was perceived as scandalous (Brundage vices (Bloch 1961:444-45; Poggi 1978:20-23). 1987:184; Fliche 1944:262). Within my framework, "feudalism" denotes the 15 The relevance of the term ("feudalism") has relationships between lords and vassals deter- been disputed (Brown 1974). By "feudal struc- mined by these institutional arrangements.

This content downloaded from 144.92.188.6 on Sun, 26 Jul 2015 00:19:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 412 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW life. In pointing out clerics' ability to exploit mous system of rules and concepts in the late the scandals created by princes' matrimonial eleventh and twelfth centuries.17 The law affairs, Brundage (1987:244) seems to sug- elaborated by canonists would play a "politi- gest that nobles were persuaded to conform cal role as a source of authority and a means to the standardsset forth by the Church.This of control" (Berman 1983:95). Subsumed in process of "disciplinization" may have been Berman's statement is the assumption that related to the emergence of new forms of this process of legal codification and ratio- penance "shifting the control on the indi- nalization was a factor of legitimization. vidual from the techniques of shame to the Canon law, it is argued, originated a legal or- techniques of guilt" (Pizzorno 1987:59).6 der endowed with its own legitimacy. Clerics Aristocrats' gradual compliance with papal had the advantage over lay rulers of holding interdictions, and their greater acceptance of a monopoly on the written word. Therefore clerics' spiritual mission would have re- they had the capacity to objectify and inter- flected a shift in sensibility and moral dispo- pret rules of conduct. From this viewpoint, sitions resulting from a successful policy of the codification of ecclesiastical rulings em- norm indoctrination. powered bishops eager to curb deviant mat- There is little ground, however, for believ- rimonial practices by providing them a firm ing that the leaders of the Church had only basis on which to ground their normative to adopt a firmer stance on marital issues to claims. ensure knights' compliance with Christian The problem with this argument is that it teachings. The truth of the matter is that the imputes to the rule of law an efficacy of its high aristocracy, as shown in the examples own. Berman (1983) seems to assume that mentioned, fiercely resisted reformers' pleas the simple act of formulating legal standards for matrimonial indissolubility and exog- gave those standards a certain degree of ef- amy-and they had good reasons to do so fectiveness. Two points are worth underscor- (Brundage 1987:137; Duby 1991:5; Goody ing. First, there is no reason to believe that 1983:145). Roman prelates' recurrent com- the process of rationalization undertakenby plaints about princes' matrimonial wrongs reforming clerics in the late eleventh and throughout the eleventh century and their re- twelfth centuries was a guarantee of norm liance on threats and measures of excommu- enforcement. The rules of law elaborated by nication clearly indicate that moral injunc- canonists "were only effective when they co- tions in the name of God were of little use incided with the general run of secular inter- when nobles opposed rulings that thwarted ests" (Southern 1970:25). Second, the codi- their matrimonial interests. Papal decretals fication of a complex system of legal stan- certainly provided considerable ideological dards could prove to be both a resource and weight to the reformers' arguments on mar- a limitation for the papacy. With the help of riage. However, the moral offensive set forth benevolent prelates, nobles could now use by the reformers did not by itself persuade the loopholes or contradictions inherent in the aristocrats to endorse ecclesiastical stan- these regulations and, in this way, sustain dards. their claims of repudiation.

Canon law A THEORETICAL REFORMULATION Prior to the eleventh century, the law of the Thus, neither the development of feudal Church remained a "disorganized body of propertystructures nor the moralist offensive material" made up of heterogeneous and of- launched by Roman prelates nor the creation ten contradictorysources (Zacour 1969:150). 17 Penitentials had primarily a regional signifi- The collections put up by Burchard of Yvo cance, and canon law emerged as an autono- Worms (about 1012), Anselm of Lucca, and of Chartres(around 1090) represented the first at- tempts to systematically organize and homog- 16 In Pizzorno's conception (1987:59), "guilt" enize ecclesiastical legal writings. This process of is associated with the "idea of morality as inten- legal codification culminated in the Decretum of tion and will," while "shame" refers to "morality Gratian (1150) and the Decretals of Gregory VIII as social custom." (1234).

This content downloaded from 144.92.188.6 on Sun, 26 Jul 2015 00:19:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PRELATES AND PRINCES: SHIFT IN MATRIMONIAL NORMS 413 of a distinct body of legal precepts explains tors endowed with distinct resources and why aristocrats agreed, at the turn of the preferences. Four main parameters must be twelfth century, to adjust their matrimonial considered: (1) the extent to which aristo- behaviors to meet ecclesiastical standards. crats value endogamy and the capacity to re- Does an argument centered on clerics' mo- pudiate their wives at will, (2) the value that nopoly of jurisdictional control over matri- aristocrats grant to the blessing of their mar- monial issues solve the problem? Church- riage by the Church, (3) the enforcement and men, explains Duby (1978:67), acquired a monitoring costs to the Roman curia of a monopoly of regulation over marriageby as- policy of repression, and (4) the political and suming its jurisdiction. At the time of Hinc- moral costs to Roman prelates associated mar, in the ninth century, matrimonialissues with the option of renouncement. were a matter of civil law (Brundage Several observations emerge from a game- 1987:137; Duby 1983:33). When King Loth- theoretical analysis of this bargaining game aire sought to divorce Theutberga,the bishop between Roman prelates and aristocrats. of Reims and Pope Nicholas I agreed that the (See Appendix A for a full description of the choice between secular and ecclesiastical formal analysis.) First, the permanence of a judges should be left to the contending par- pattern of interactions in which aristocrats' ties (Daudet 1933:77). The distinction be- concerns for power and honor prevail over tween the two jurisdictions was blurred."Le- ecclesiastical prohibitions (the status quo) is gal" could mean "in conformity with Roman conditional on the enforcement costs to prel- law" or it could refer to secular practices. ates of a repressive policy. If enforcement After the eleventh century, by contrast, mat- costs are high, Roman prelates' optimal strat- rimonial issues were the business of episco- egy is a policy of leniency and this pattern of pal courts. The Church system of prohibi- interactions is self-perpetuating-an aristo- tions had become exclusive and its monopoly cratic ethos of matrimonial alliances pre- of jurisdiction was uncontested (Daudet vails. Second, a decrease in enforcement 1941:63; Gaudemet 1987:111). costs is a necessary but not sufficient condi- To say, however, that the heads of great tion for the emergence of a regime of inter- families endorsed Church prohibitions per- actions regulated by prelates' norms for mar- taining to marriage only when Roman prel- riage (state of compliance to new norms). ates gained the right to distinguish licit from Further, if aristocrats value churchmens' illicit matrimonial behaviors begs the ques- blessings less than they value their own stra- tion. At this juncture, the issue of the con- tegic independence, aristocrats and prelates frontation between popes and princes was al- may be locked in a self-perpetuating pattern ready settled-clerics had taken control of of conflict. Third, the transition from an the institution of marriage.Their veto invali- equilibrium state dominated by aristocrats' dated the bequeathal of a patrimony(because "taste" for endogamy and repudiation at will heirs could no longer be considered legiti- to a regime dominated by ecclesiastical mate) and the consolidation of political alli- norms rests on a conjunction of factors: (1) a ances (because spouses could be denied the substantial decrease in the enforcement costs social quality of spouses). In pursuing "devi- to prelates of a policy of normative regula- ant" matrimonial behaviors, aristocrats un- tion by the Roman curia, and (2) an increase dermined the very purpose of their matrimo- in value to aristocrats of the certificate of nial strategies. Expected costs of a violation matrimonial legitimacy delivered by the of canon law outweighed expected benefits. Church. For the papacy, the problem is not This investigation thus must focus on those simply to reduce the costs associated with a mechanisms which facilitated this jurisdic- policy of sanctioning. To get the upper hand tional takeover. in this confrontation, the papacy must ensure To this end, I first reexamine the question that its certificates of matrimonial legitimacy from a strategic and analytical point of view. become both an exclusive validation proce- I assume that the pattern of interactions be- dure and a currency that nobles cannot risk tween Roman prelates and aristocratsregard- disregarding without incurring great costs. ing matrimonial issues can be conceived as a The point is consistent with Coleman's bargaining game between two classes of ac- (1990b:262) observation that beneficiary ac-

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tors are in a position to enforce their norma- ecclesiastical rules were not necessarily con- tive demands vis-a'-vis target actors if they sidered "invalid."18 can control a resource that the target actors How was the Churchhierarchy able to take value. hold of the social definition of marital legiti- In the remainder of this paper, I expand macy? The sacralization of marriage was a upon these suggestions, confront them with twofold process. First, theologians empha- the historical evidence, and, through this sized the holy characterof the sacraments in critical dialogue, refine them. I consider two marriage. These doctrinal developments analytically distinct aspects of the problem. gained momentum in the few decades that (1) Symbolic and institutional factors condi- spanned the year 1100 with the writings of tioned clerics' ability to set forth their nor- Anselm of Laon and Hugues of Saint-Victor mative demands. The Church hierarchy sub- (Duby 1983:181; Gaudemet 1987:189). Sec- stantiated its claim to a right of control of ond, wedding rituals were symbolically and aristocrats' matrimonial behaviors in two ideologically redesigned in a religious sense. ways: Marriage was, from a symbolic and A new matrimonial liturgy slowly emerged ceremonial point of view, redesigned as a (Bouchard 1981:271; Toubert 1977). Duby sacramental and spiritual reality; and (1983:152) notes that liturgical procedures Gregorian reformers created a hierarchical, pertaining to marriage can be traced back in centralized, and independent government the surviving Church manuals to the late that significantly lowered the monitoring eleventh century. The role of the priest in the costs of a policy of norm enforcement. (2) marriage ceremonial gained in importance. Clerics' normative demands emerged as ef- After the second half of the eleventh century, fective claims of jurisdiction when signifi- the ceremony of the betrothalappears to have cant fractions of the nobility invoked eccle- been transferredto the Church door and per- siastical standardsto further their own regu- formed by priests (Molin and Mutembe latory and strategic interests. 1974:32-40). By about 1140, in Gratian's Decretum the procedure is conceived of as a condition of legality (Sheehan 1978:13). IDEOLOGY, ENFORCEMENT, AND The creation of a coercive apparatus. To COORDINATION fulfill its moral mission, the papacy had to rely on the services of its representatives Ideological and Institutional Conditions (archbishops and bishops) throughout West- for Norm Enforcement ern Christendom. Their compliance with pa- Symbolic appropriation. In the first millen- pal rulings as well as their willingness to en- nium, wedding rites remained mainly secu- force these rules was a necessary condition lar. The betrothal (desponsatio), which seal- of an effective ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The ed parental consent and property settlement, Roman curia, therefore, was confronted with did not require the presence of a priest, a basic principal/agent problem: To assert its whose role was confined to endorsing the monopoly of jurisdiction over marriage, the union (Duby 1983:33). As for the nuptiae- Church had to rely on agents acting as its of- the conclusion of marriage proper-its car- ficers. But at the same time it had to make nal connotations (the procession conveyed sure that these agents were pursuing policies the woman to the nuptial chamber) were usu- that met its objectives and that agents did not ally regarded with deep repugnance by cler- collude with princes. In fact, prior to the end ics. Although there was already a liturgy of of the eleventh century, collusion between marriage (Gaudemet 1987:118; Vogel 1977), clerics and aristocrats was the rule rather its significance was subsidiary. Marriage could be concluded lawfully without being lx Kern ([1939] 1968) notes, for instance, that tied to ecclesiastical rites (Wemple 1981:83). many of the greatest rulers before the eleventh "were born out of wedlock, and this in- eleventh "the sacred and century Prior to the century, difference to the ordinary law of marriage and of the profane were ultimately undivided" inheritance was, after all, only logical, since the (Tellenbach 1993:39). The sanction of eccle- claim to rule rested on the fact that the claimant siastical authorities was therefore not deem- actually possessed a ruler's blood in his veins" ed crucial, and marriages that contravened (p. 23).

This content downloaded from 144.92.188.6 on Sun, 26 Jul 2015 00:19:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PRELATES AND PRINCES: SHIFT IN MATRIMONIAL NORMS 415 than the exception, and the Roman curia had (Berman 1983:107). They were often "in- few institutional means to supervise its debted to the secular overlords from which agents or to enforce its sanctions.19 they had fiefs and tithes" (Spruyt 1994:48). Two main factors explain this situation. It comes, then, as no surprise that clerics One was the absence of strong boundaries were "more under the authority of emperors, separating the Church from society. Before Kings and leading feudal lords than of the reign of Gregory VII (1073-1085), lay popes" (Berman 1983:88). As Southern and religious societies tended to merge with (1970) points out, "The only weapon under one another (Tellenbach 1993:38). The the popes' direct control were interdicts and Church did not constitute a "visible, corpo- excommunication" (p. 125). But for excom- rate, legal structurestanding opposite the po- munications to be effective, they had to be litical authority" (Berman 1983:91). This enforced by bishops, and as the examples lack of differentiation was part ideological cited illustrate, great princes and kings could and statutory: Kingship was considered a induce the churchmen of their realm to re- "sacred office" (Tierney 1964:25) that had verse papal decisions. "an undisputedly ecclesiastical function and At this point, a disclaimer is in order. One dignity" (Tellenbach 1993:23). The bound- could object that matrimonial deviance was aries between the clergy and the nobility sanctioned infrequently before the first half were blurred socially and economically as of the eleventh century simply because cler- well. Bishops and archbishops were sons and ics were not interested in its regulation. The cousins of great families (Moore 1980:66; Roman curia may not have sought to extend Tellenbach 1993:59). No clear distinction its hold over aristocrats' matrimonial prac- was drawn between aristocratic and clerical tices during this period. Throughout the first possessions (Goody 1983:107). Great fami- millennium, indeed, churchmen viewed mar- lies patronized local churches and held he- riage with ambivalence (Toubert 1977:269). reditary interests in their properties. Barons As something carnal, marital relations could did not hesitate to seize episcopal estates be viewed as a source of "spiritualpollution" (Tierney 1964:25). (Brundage 1987:163). Some prelates among A second factor explaining the Church's Queen Constance's entourage in the first half difficulties with its agents is that lay powers of the eleventh century went so far as to ar- controlled clerics' investiture. Great princes gue that, to avoid dealing with debasing participated in Church councils, appointed practices, the Church ought not to interfere bishops, and determined canon law (Morris at all with marital issues (Duby 1978:72). 1989:23). In the absence of a corporate iden- However, the thesis that doctrinal distrust, tity, imperial bishops could not help but link not lack of power, explains the weakness of their rights with the ruler ratherthan with the the ecclesiastical grip on aristocratic mar- Pope. In addition, local prelates had few riages before the eleventh century would un- links to central ecclesiastical authorities derestimate the importance granted by theo- logians and prelates to issues of matrimonial morality (Gaudemet 1987). The Roman cu- 19 of such collu- There are numerous examples ria was not indifferent to violations of canon sion. Tellenbach (1993:73) indicates that Count- ess Irmingard of Hammerstein's appeal to Pope laws (Bouchard 1981:271; Payer 1980:370). Benedict VIII (1012-1024) against the verdict of Conceptions that viewed marriage as un- the emperor invalidating her marriage led to a Christianwere actually condemned as heretic conflict between the papacy and a substantial part (Brundage 1987:140). Roman prelates "tol- of the German episcopate. The investiture strife erated" aristocrats' matrimonial deviance, is another example. Pope Gregory VII several not because they believed marriage was un- times was declared "usurperand no true pontiff" worthy of religious concern, but because they by councils of German and Lombard bishops act- did not control the Church hierarchy.Signifi- Henri IV (Tierney ing under the auspices of cant in this regard is the ease with which 1964:55). In 1074, Gregory VII himself had to consecrate Landricus as bishop of Macon: King King Robert was able to summon, despite the Philip opposed the election of Landricus, and the Pope's interdicts, an assembly of clerics Archbishop Humbert of Lyon would not perform ready to endorse his second marriage. Rome the consecration (Tellenbach 1993:180). could not pretend to rule over aristocrats'

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marriages as long as it did not have a hold tions is quite another. Why did the nobles over the clergy. In such circumstances, mea- yield to the Pope's injunctions? sures of excommunication were likely to be overruled by assemblies of bishops subservi- ent to princes. In pursuing a policy of canon Norm Establishment: Competition and law enforcement, popes risked revealing the Coordination frailty of their authority. I contend that the normative shift observed The primary goal of the reformers, there- among the Western nobility at the turn of the fore, was to put an end to the collusive prac- twelfth century cannot be simply analyzed as tices between princes and clerics. How was the direct consequence of an increase in the this goal pursued? The reforms improved the Roman curia's sanctioning capacity. There is popes' sanctioning and monitoring capacity no question that aristocrats paid respect to in several ways. First, the statutory distinc- ecclesiastical prohibitions because the costs tiveness of the clergy was emphasized of noncompliance had become greater than (Moore 1980:69). Clerical marriage, for in- the benefits. But this view remains tautologi- stance, was fiercely opposed. Second, the cal as long as it does not explain how this Roman curia acquired its institutional and transition process came about. I argue that judicial independence vis-A-vis lay rulers the ecclesiastical hierarchy acquired the (Paul 1986:309). Until the Election Decree power to invalidate marriages deemed ille- of 1059, popes were nominated by the em- gitimate because aristocratsrelied on clerics' peror. The reform of the election process matrimonialstandards for strategic and regu- transferredthis power of nominationto a col- latory purposes. In a context marked by the lege of cardinals that also acted as a perma- patrimonialization of feudal ties and an in- nent body of advisors (Zacour 1969:192). crease in competition, the Church's rules of Third, mechanisms of direct supervision and marriage became a convenient strategic tool hierarchical control were created (Berman among aristocratsfor contesting the power of 1983:209), and after the middle of the elev- competitors and a salient coordinating prin- enth century, papal legates were regarded as ciple for regulating potentially conflictual re- the agents of a centralized system of Church lationships. government (Brooke 1931; Robinson 1990). Consider the case of Philip I at the end of These representatives were placed under the the eleventh century. Philip had been con- direct authority of the Pope (Fliche 1944:89- demned for incest and bigamy by the Roman 94; Ullmann 1970:292). The chances that curia in 1094. A few years later, the same they might be bribed by princes decreased. Philip invoked the church's prohibitions on The success of a policy of norm enforce- consanguineous ties to call into question the ment was conditioned by the creation of this marriage between his daughter, Constance, hierarchical, centralized, and independentin- and Henry, Count of Troyes. This union, he strument of government within the Church. argued, was incestuous and must be dis- Weber ([1922] 1978) emphasizes that there solved. The high clergy backed his demands, is no law without "the presence of a staff en- and the marriagewas annulled in 1104 (Duby gaged in enforcement" (pp. 34, 312), a "co- 1978:28). Lords used ecclesiastical rules to ercive apparatus able to lay effective and control the marriage of their vassals' daugh- comprehensive claims to obedience" (p. ters and the remarriageof their vassals' wid- 906). The Gregorian reforms explain why, in ows (Zacour 1969:95). In the twelfth century, the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, Ro- nobles did not hesitate to invoke papal inter- man prelates could reasonably conceive of a dicts to contest the legality of their competi- policy of sanctions as a viable alternative to tors' marriages. Raymond VI of Toulouse, leniency. These reforms do not account, how- Peter II of Aragon, and the Count of Melgueil ever, for aristocrats' eventual compliance refused to recognize the marriage of their with ecclesiastical requirements. That the neighbor, Guillem VIII, lord of Montpellier, Gregorian reformers thought it possible, in with Agnes of Castille on the ground that the the last decades of the eleventh century, to marriage was bigamous (Lewis 1971:163- flex their theocratic muscles is one thing. 65): The children of Agnes were deprived of That aristocrats conformed to these regula- their inheritance, and the lands and rights of

This content downloaded from 144.92.188.6 on Sun, 26 Jul 2015 00:19:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions PRELATES AND PRINCES: SHIFT IN MATRIMONIAL NORMS 417 the Guillems became Aragonese shortly after ness of rule and were often at war with one Guillem VIII's death (1204). another"(Poggi 1978:27). The spread of feu- Nobles also used the Church's standardsto dalism gave way to the emergence of "small dissolve their own marriages, taking advan- rival dynasties rooted in their estates" (Duby tage of the contradiction between the re- 1983:94). Most of these rivalries were related quirement of exogamy and the rule of indis- to boundary disputes. At the end of the elev- solubility. In 1152, when Louis VII sought enth century, "small feuds, disputes and ten- to divorce Eleanor of Aquitaine, he conve- sions were endemic" (Tellenbach 1993:136) niently "discovered" that he and his wife with knights carrying on private battles with were related within four degrees (Bouchard their peers (Poly and Bournazel 1991:67). 1981:268). Duby (1983) cites several ex- The patrimonialization of feudal tenures amples of princes who, after several years of went along with increased competition marriage, "suddenly" realized that they and (Goody 1983:116). their wives were cousins. Philip II "Aug- The tension inherent in the development of ustus," for instance, decided to repudiate his these two divergent trends (the institutional- wife Ingeborg of Denmark the day after they ization of feudal ties and the development of had been lawfully married (August 14, competitive relationships) could be described 1193). An assembly of barons and bishops in terms similar to the notion of a "coordina- convened at Compiegne and under the aus- tion game" as defined by Schelling (1960: pices of the archbishop of Reims duly con- 83). Conflict provided the "dramatic ele- cluded that the two spouses were cousins in ment" of this system of interactions, while the fourth degree (Duby 1983:204). mutual dependence was part of its "overall The point is not simply that the Church's structure." Because heads of aristocratic matrimonial standardsbecame effective nor- families could rely less on war conquests or mative constraints as nobles used them to ex- pillaging the Church to consolidate their ploit strategic opportunities. The phenom- wealth, they were in competition for deplet- enon must be reinterpretedin broader terms ing territorialand economic opportunities.At by reference to the changing economic and the same time, these families were entangled political conditions of the time. In the elev- in a tight network of matrimonial alliances. enth century, aristocrats were engaged in in- In an environment characterized by growing teractions characterized by two divergent competition and increasingly tight family trends. On the one hand, feudal estates tend- ties, the drive toward patrimony promoted ed to become inherited. On the other hand, the development within the nobility of what internal competition increased. This increase Heckathorn (1988:541) calls "regulatory in- in rivalries reflected the crystallization of terests": Aristocrats were better off if they small feudal dynasties faced with fewer op- could defuse conflicts and check their com- portunities for plundering. In a context petitors' strategies of expansion. Both com- marked by the development of competitive petition and patrimonialization called for relationships and the institutionalization of some form of coordination or "mutual ac- feudal ties, aristocrats had a growing interest commodation" (Schelling 1960:83). in regulating one another's behavior to mini- Marriage was already instrumental in this mize the cost of conflicts and consolidate respect. It entailed property rights, provided their own positions. legitimacy to territorialclaims, and operated Originally, the fief (beneficium) was a tem- as a "substitute for political maneuvering" porary grant of land made by a lord to his (Poly and Bournazel 1991:92). As feudal followers as a reward for temporary services structures of property became more heredi- (Zacour 1969:92). In the course of the elev- tary in the last decades of the eleventh cen- enth century, fiefs were converted into inher- tury, the political stakes attached to matrimo- itable property,and the ties between lord and nial alliances gained importance as well. But vassal became more and more impersonal. rules of marriage were not the only prin- Large systems of rules tended to be frag- ciples of conduct available for coordinating mented into "many smaller, and increasingly increasingly competitive relationships. The autonomous, systems of rules that differed establishment of vassalic ties served this pur- widely in the way they carried out the busi- pose too. Why, then, did ecclesiastical stan-

This content downloaded from 144.92.188.6 on Sun, 26 Jul 2015 00:19:38 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 418 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW dards of marriage emerge as "focal points" CONCLUSION (Schelling 1960) for solving "coordination problems" among the nobility (Ullmann- My purpose has been to investigate why aris- Margalit 1977)? Two factors seem to have tocrats agreed, at the end of the eleventh cen- played a crucial role in this process. tury, to endorse the matrimonial standards First, standardsof canon law had an advan- imposed by canon law. I have suggested that tage over feudal law; they were written down three processes underlie this conversion of and thus clearly defined. Formal rules of the Church's precepts into effective norma- matrimonial legitimacy provided a firm tive constraints. First, Roman prelates "made ground to organize aristocrats' interdepen- their case" regarding the normative control dent expectations regarding their matrimo- of marriage by emphasizing its sacramental nial conduct. Because of its "vagueness and and spiritual reality. They symbolically rede- imprecision,"feudal law embodied in unwrit- fined marriage to justify their right to regu- ten customs "led to much litigation, defiance, late it. Second, a policy of enforcement of appeals and warfare" (Zacour 1969:143). canon law emerged as a viable option when Lords who married off their daughters and Rome secured its political independence vis- sisters, for instance, had an obvious interest a-vis lay rulers and created the institutional in the "unambiguous fixation of the law" means to preclude the collusion between (Weber [1922] 1978:849) because it offered great lords and bishops. Third, the Church them some protection against arbitraryrepu- hierarchy ultimately was able to impose its diation. The personal character of vassalic normative demands because aristocrats took ties was a source of instability. Partly in re- up these prohibitions to advance their own sponse to this uncertainty, in the eleventh strategic goals and to regulate competitive century, the practice of accompanying verbal interactions. oaths with a written document spread (Duby In investigating those conditions which 1991:70; Zacour 1969:97). undergirdclaims to "possess" a right of con- Second, prelates became more and more trol over a set of events and those which lead involved in the arbitrationof disputes (Duby actors to endorse these claims, I have shifted 1977:27; Zacour 1969:192). Around 1059, the focus from patterns of interaction be- Berenger, Vicount of Narbonne, brought his tween beneficiary actors and target actors to conflict with archbishop Guifred before the the dynamics of relationships within each Pope after having failed to convince the group. The valence of beneficiary actors' bishops present at the Council of Arles that (prelates) normative demands was condi- his grievances were well-grounded tioned by their capacity to symbolically con- (Magnou-Nortier 1974:463-73). Engaged in struct their claims and to resolve agency incessant feuding with his vassal Hugh, problems related to the enforcement of sanc- Lord of Lustignan, William, Count of tions. Target actors' (aristocrats) "quasi-vol- Aquitaine, turned to Fulbert, bishop of untary"compliance reflected the emergence Chartres, for legal advice in the mid-elev- of interdependentexpectations regarding the enth century. According to Duby (1991:78), effectiveness of the rules as a strategic tool this move was motivated not only by the and a principle of coordination in a competi- fact that the vassalic bond was grounded in tive environment. an oath like any other oath, was sacred, that, Ivan Ermakoff is a Ph.D. candidate in the De- but also in the fact that the law of the partment of Sociology at the University of Chi- Church was written. At this time, bishops cago. His dissertation examines,from a compara- had already been playing a crucial role in tive point of view, the determinants of abdication the development of calls for truces and the versus resistance to an authoritarian challenger regulation of conflicts (the "Peace of God in democratic breakdowns. His primary cases of movement") (Bloch 1961:418; Zacour 1969: interest in this research are: the passing of 108). It was at the bishops' initiative that Hitler's Enabling Bill by the Reichstag in March 1933 and the transfer of constitutional powers to "peace assemblies" were convened in which Marshall Pe'tain by the French National Assem- local nobles, among others, would swear a bly in July 1940. During the 1997-1998 academic collective oath to renounce prohibited forms year, he will be Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield of violence (Duby 1971:167). College (Oxford University).

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Appendix A: A Formal Analysis of the bargaining game between Roman Prelates and Aristocrats

Aristocratscould pursuetheir matrimonial strategies Renouncinga policy of enforcementof canon law and ignore canonicalnorms (autonomous rule of de- was also costly to the Romanhierarchy insofar as it cision) or choose to abide by canon law (heterono- meantreneging on the moral mission of the Church. mous rule of decision). In defining strict limitations I designate by r the moralcosts to prelates associat- to divorce, repudiation,and endogamy, ecclesiasti- ed with a strategyof renouncement. cal precepts restricted the range of licit marital Figure A-1 depicts the bargaininggame between choices, thereforeimposing a "natural"hindrance to aristocrats and prelates. Sequentially, aristocrats aristocrats' strategies for lineage maintenanceand first decide whether to conform to the normative consolidation. An autonomousrule of decision, on standardsfor marriagedefined by the papacy.If they the other hand, served aristocrats'interests insofar comply with these standards,they lose the value of as it allowed them to maximize endogamy and take an autonomousrule of decision (-v) but gain the val- advantageof strategicopportunities. ue of the certificate of legitimacy inherent in the In the analysis, v represents the value aristocrats Church's blessing (L). Their payoff is therefore place on endogamy and their capacity to repudiate (L - v). If, on the contrary, aristocrats disregard their wives. In disregardingecclesiastical precepts, these imposed normativestandards, Roman prelates however, aristocratsrisked not having their matri- must then decide whetherto ignore these violations monial alliances blessed by the Churchand risked (policy of nonenforcement)or whether to sanction excommunication.L representsthe value vested by them. In the case of nonenforcement,aristocrats re- aristocratsin the certificate of legitimacy or of sal- ceive an optimal outcome (L + v) whereas the papa- vation providedby the Church. cy relinquishesits right to control matrimonialbe- Roman prelates could either enforce ecclesiastic haviors (-r). When the prelates sanction matrimo- regulationson marriageand sanctiondeviance or re- nial deviance (a policy of enforcement),aristocrats nounce their normativeclaims. I attribute,for sim- must either yield to papal injunctions and lose the plicity, a value of 0 to the externality on prelates benefit of unrestrainedmatrimonial strategies (-v) imposed by aristocrats'disregard for ecclesiastical or refuse to comply and retain the benefit of their precepts. The benefit to prelates entailed by aristo- autonomy minus the cost entailed by ecclesiastical crats' compliance with the Church's matrimonial sanctions (v - L). norms is given a value of 1. Aristocrats'optimal strategiesdepend on the rel- A policy of normativeenforcement was costly to ative values, not only of L and v, but also of L - v Roman prelates in two respects. By restricting and -v (that is, L and 2v). Similarly, prelates' opti- princes' marital choices, the Roman curia risked mal choices vary accordingto the relative values of alienatingpolitical support.Such a policy supposed, c and r, and the relative values of c and r + 1. The moreover, that any collusion between prelates and equilibriumpaths resultingfrom these strategiesare their lords must be prevented. It entailed, conse- indicatedin Figure A-2. quently, close supervisionof the clergy. I formally This formulationof the bargaininggame between summarizeboth costs (loss of political supportand Romanprelates and aristocratsis interestingin sev- close supervisionof clergy) by c. eral respects. First, it is consonantwith the hypothe-

Aristocrats

Abideby canon law Do not abidew Roman Prelates (L -v, 1) by canonlaw

Do not enforce Enforce ' Aristocrats canon law canon law (L + v, -rX

Complywith Do not comply canon law withcanon law (-v, 1 -c) (v-L,-c)

Figure A-1. Bargaining Game between Aristocrats and Roman Prelates on the Issue of Compliance with Canonical Norms of Marriage

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Values for Values for Prelates Aristocrats c < r r < c < r+1 c> r+1

| Aristocratsabide by Aristocratsabide by, ArslMMtdoP.t0 2v< L canonlaw,. .canon law ""abide yanoril law // Pr6eateOm rioenforcei

Aristocratsabide by.'. Ms.toeras.i6notA7Atotort dg.,not.. Iv < L < 2v | cano)r' '; law O.b.ide. 'byho IatX7. ....abi ~d~e,.by cann law i6 no e Pre do'it oforc 2~~~~~Pr-ae ~ ~ 'nforte ates > cAristoratsdo no an;c A'A~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A o ' no abidecanot by? n law t;; 'J ab~ideycnpnI t >t faide byeatio law /

v> L Prelate enfrc ," /PrJts~o~ ef'rc + Praesi6 ntefr? A-sortd not comply ;/ ,f;' a// v;;,/iZ' ,',

3 = Conflict X = New norm = Statusquo

Figure A-2. Equilibrium Paths and Resulting Normative Regimes Variables:v = value to aristocratsof divorce and endogamousmarriage; L = valueto aristocratsof legiti- macy and salvation offered by the Church;c = costs to Roman prelates of loss of political supportfrom aristocratsand of increased supervision of the clergy; r = moral costs to Roman prelates for failure to enforce canon law. Assumptions: 0 < v < 1; 0 < L < 2; 0 < r < 1; 0 < c < 2.

sis that prelates' enforcementcosts (c) play a criti- both classes of actorsmay be locked in a self-perpet- cal role. The persistenceof the statusquo (nonestab- uating patternof conflict. Aristocratswill not abide lishment of the norm) and, consequently,the possi- by the normative standards.Canonical rulings are bility of its breakdown appear conditioned by the likely to be transposedinto effective rules of behav- relative value of c. If this cost is high (c > r + 1), ior once the value vested in the certificate of legiti- Roman prelates' optimal strategy is a policy of le- macy offered by the Church becomes greater than niency, and the statusquo is a Nash equilibrium,that the benefit aristocratsattach to an "autonomousrule is, in this situation,neither prelates nor princeshave of decision"regarding marriage (maximization of the an interest in deviating from this equilibriumpath. resourcesprovided by endogamyand strategicrepu- Thus, a decrease in prelates' enforcementcosts is a diations) (v < L). When the value of matrimonialle- necessary condition for the successful emergenceof gitimacy to aristocratsis substantiallygreater than a policy of matrimonialregulation by the papacy. the value vested in an autonomousrule of decision Second, low enforcementcosts do not necessarily (2v < L), the papacyhas an incentive to sanctionde- entail the establishment of ecclesiastical norms of viance even thoughits enforcementcosts exceed the marriage.If nobles value churchmens'blessing less moral costs of leniency (r < c < r + 1). In other words, than they value their strategicindependence (v > L), the norm may exist even if c > r.

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