Leveraging Literature to Refute Proslavery Science Laura Jones

Story, Statistics and Science: Leveraging Literature to Refute Proslavery Science Laura Jones

Presentation at the Faculty Research Colloquium, Montclair State University, October 2014

Good afternoon—thank you for being here. I’m honored, and anxious, to be the first presenter in the resurrected English Department colloquium, and I want to acknowledge Adam’s work in said resurrection.

What I thought I’d do today is briefly share some research that’s in its early stages, and then devote our remaining time, which should be ample to your comments and questions. I hope that much of our time today can be spend in robust conversation.

The ideas that I’ll present constitute a kind of preliminary framework that I have constructed in response to a few well-know abolitionist texts: William Wells Brown’s novel Clotel, Lydia Maria Child’s Appeal in Favor of that Class of Americans called Africans and her short story “The Quadroons,” and finally Frederick Douglass’ well-known Narrative. Much has been said and written about these texts, so I’m treading a well-worn path here. What I hope to add, and build on, is a slightly different lens through which we can consider these texts and their resonance today.

I will consider these texts through the particular lens of sanity and insanity. Questions about sanity were prominent in public discourse of the day, as evidenced in part by the1840 census, which for the first time counted the number of “insane” people in the American population. The data from the census prompted, of course, numerous explanations from physicians and aliensts—men pioneering the field that would come to be known as psychology. Their explanations tended to support white supremacist models of human difference, which dovetailed with another contemporary American preoccupation: defining a national identity (Griffin 374; Cushman 40). Questions of national identity and of sanity converged in the discourse of Black insanity, which offered a definition by opposition. It is, after all, often simpler to determine what one is not than to articulate what one is. Enslaved and free people of color, as Toni Morrison has pointed out, were imagined as the antithesis of the idea of the American self in many ways. In the discourse of sanity, they were constructed as the pathological inverse of a healthy America, the polar opposite of what Griffin described as the “cool, prudent, disciplined and deferential” self that was the model of American sanity. This vision of Black insanity fit neatly into proslavery rhetoric, and was widely deployed to that end.

Scientific racism like this was, in fact, “virtually uncontested” within the scientific mainstream, as Stepan and Gilman have noted. There was in other words, scant scientific support on the side of abolition. The question with which I began my investigation was whether reading the literary work of abolitionists might reveal the influence of statistical and scientific data. In other words, did abolitionists, who were largely excluded from the realm of scientific insiders, use their fictional, autobiographical, and polemic works to respond to the conclusions of that field?

That my interest here is in looking at literary responses to scientific discourse is not to say that scientific writing in favor of abolition was nonexistent. Frederick Douglass himself offered one example of it in a commencement address. Such work was marginalized, however, perhaps owing to his lack of scientific training. In addition to being the height of abolition debates, this was a time of the increasing professionalization of science—one result of which was to exclude non-professionals from its discourse. Stepan and Gilmer have suggested that abolitionists continued to rely on theological and moral arguments to make their case, essentially ignoring the rhetorical demands created by an emerging proslavery science. What I am asking here, however, is whether we can uncover direct responses to scientific discourse embedded in these literary works—and, moreover, how that response differs among Black and white abolitionists.

Quantitative evidence took center stage in proslavery arguments with the release of the 1840 census. Its data offered a startling picture of sanity and insanity among Black Americans: by the census’ count, only one in 1500 enslaved African Americans were “insane.” By this measure, slaves appeared to be even healthier, emotionally and intellectually speaking, than their free white counterparts. Fitting into the “positive good” argument that slavery benefitted everyone involved, this figure alone was potent evidence for the proslavery case.

Even more damning, however, to abolitionist arguments, was the number of free people of color who were counted insane—one in 144. By this count, the rate of insanity was eleven times higher among free people of color than it was among those who were enslaved (Deutsch).

These numbers, it probably goes without saying, were deeply flawed and ultimately rejected. That, however, didn’t prevent them from being widely circulated and influential.

Before proceeding, I’d like to clarify the definition of insanity in the mid 19th century. It was an umbrella term for any “unsoundness of mind” including including mania, dementia, idiocy, monomania and melancholia (Griffin, 372; Gamwell and Tomes, 71). When I use the term “insanity, I do so in the historically situated sense, and I hope you Reproducedwill envision with permission quotation of the copyright owner.marks Further enclosing reproduction prohibited them without as permission. I do. The same is true for “idiocy,” which was at this time a clinical term for what we would now describe as cognitive or intellectual disability.

These terms were so broad and encompassing that they were eminently malleable. The definition, of course, was controlled by scientific insiders—which put abolitionists like Child, Douglass, and Brown, in a precarious rhetorical situation. Though they were excluded from offering any credible scientific argument by the fact that they were not trained in the discipline, their works were nonetheless subject to a number of rhetorical traps laid by the protean concept of insanity.

The census itself didn’t distinguish between these types of insanity, but contemporary discourse did. To borrow a formulation applied to later disability discourse from James Trent, the insane were viewed alternately as “menace” and “burden”—in neither case, of course, candidates for productive, free citizenship. I’ll consider four images of Black insanity that fall into these categories: The menacing violent rebel (a Nat Turner figure) and the morally insane depraved madman. The potentially burdensome figure of Black insanity was the pitiable but incompetent brutalized idiot. A final image of Black insanity, the tragic mulatta, was versatile, portrayed alternately as menacing and burdensome.

Perhaps the most widely circulated report of this census data was published in the Southern)Literary)Messenger) proslavery Southern Literary Messenger— Let$us$then$suppose$a$half$of$a$million$of$free$negroes$suddenly$ turned$loose$in$Virginia,$whose$propensity$it$is,$constantly$to$ most famous, perhaps, for publishing much grow$more$vicious$in$a$state$of$freedom;$Where$should$we$ﬁnd$ Peniten=aries$for$the$thousands$of$felons?$Where,$luna=c$ of Edgar Allan Poe’s work. The Messenger’s asylums$for$the$tens$of$thousands$of$maniacs?$Would$it$be$ article on the census used the data to stoke possible$to$live$in$a$country$where$maniacs$and$felons$met$the$ traveler$at$every$cross@road?$(“Reﬂec=ons”$355@56)$ fear in the free white populace. $ Accompanying the numbers is twelve pages of commentary in which the author imagines several post-emancipation scenario in his state. He invites us to,

S=lls$from$Birth)of)a)Na4on,$Dir.$D.W.$Griﬃth,$1915.$Reprinted$from$hQp://www.authen=chistory.com$/diversity/african/4@brute/$$ Let us then suppose a half of a million of free negroes suddenly turned loose in Virginia, whose propensity it is, constantly to grow more vicious in a state of freedom;

If freedom will have this effect on former slaves, the prospect of emancipation presents an imminent threat to white life and property, prompting the pragmatic question, as the author asks, Where should we find Penitentiaries for the thousands of felons? Where, lunatic asylums for the tens of thousands of maniacs?

Imagining masses of criminally insane free people of color, the author conjures a scene that anticipates Griffith’s Birth of a Nation when he asks Would it be possible to live in a country where maniacs and felons met the traveler at every cross-road? (355-56)

This scene likely brought to readers’ minds Confessions(of(Nat(Turner( figures like Nat Turner, whose revolt still Thomas'Gray' haunted the public consciousness. The editor of A'gloomy'fana0c…revolving'in'the'recesses'of'' Turners Confessions, Thomas Gray, his'own'dark,'bewildered,'and'overwrought' characterizes him as just this kind of “maniac.” mind,'schemes'of'indiscriminate'massacre'to' the'whites'(243).'' Turner was, in Gray’s words, “a gloomy ' fanatic…revolving in the recesses of his own dark, bewildered, and overwrought mind, schemes of indiscriminate massacre to the whites.” (243) This is the “maniac and felon”

Image'from'Dan'McKay,'Round(the(Balladee.('hGp://danKmcnay.blogspot.com/ 2009/12/noKmoreKgrewKsomeKpicturesKpromise.html' that the Messenger suggests will haunt every crossroads in America should slavery be abolished.

Lydia Maria Child addresses this fear in her Child’s(Appeal( Appeal, but offers no challenge to its accuracy.

…it#is#said#that#the#blacks#are# She acknowledges that, as she says, “it is said malignant#and#revengeful.#Gran6ng#it# that the blacks are malignant and revengeful,” and to#be#true,—is+it+their+fault,+or+is+it+ owing+to+the+cruel+circumstances+in+ then concedes the point, “Granting it to be true.” which+they+are+placed?+Surely+there+are+ proofs+enough+that+they+are+naturally+a+ Although she insists that the cause of such kind+and+gentle+people.+True,#they#do# malignance is slavery itself, she again concedes, some6mes#murder#their#masters#and# overseers;+but+where+there+is+u?er+ ”True, they do sometimes murder their masters hopelessness,+can+we+wonder+at+ occasional++despera@on?((192)(( and overseers.” In these passages, Child accedes to—and arguably highlights—a powerful appeal to fear used by opponents of abolition.

But what, we might ask, was the alternative? The truth of slave revolts could not be denied. William Wells Brown offers one answer, in which he contests not the fact of revolt but rather the question of sanity. In his novel Clotel, the character of George Green implicity challenges the view of Nat Turner as a madman, and elliptically addresses the fears stoked by the Messenger’s image of violent and vengeful freedmen and women.

Where Gray described “a gloomy fanatic” and Child a “malignant and revengeful” people, Brown’s(Clotel( Brown offers instead a noble revolutionary George(Green( motivated by an understanding of contemporary Heard*his*master*and*visitors*speak* of*the*down5trodden*and*oppressed* European battles for independence. George, Poles;*he*heard*them*talk*of*going*to* Brown tells us, “hear his master and visitors Greece*to*ﬁght*for*Grecian*liberty.* speak of the down-trodden and oppressed Poles; * All*wars*and*ﬁgh@ngs*for*freedom* he heard them talk of going to Greece to fight were*just*and*right.*(211)( for Grecian liberty.” He hears the same people reading the Declaration of Independence and asserting, as Brown says, that “all wars and fightings for freedom were just and right” (211).

In George Green, then, the figure of Nat Turner is rehabilitated, made kind to the leaders of the American Revolution. He is a patriot and, more to the point, a paragon of sanity and the heir to a great European intellectual tradition—neither a madman nor an idiot. We can read George as Brown’s counterargument to projections of post- emancipation chaos like that in the Messenger. He associates violent revolt with a noble end and entirely disconnects it from either insanity or revenge.

George stands as a counterpoint to a pathology described by former surgeon general Samuel Cartwright: The now infamous mental illness he called “drapetomania,” a pathology causing slaves to run away. What Brown casts as an utterly American “love of freedom,” Cartwright characterizes as a form of insanity. Completing a psychological worldview in which anything other than contented servitude is a form of insanity for Black people, !reprinted!in!DeBow's(Review(...:(Agricultural,(Commercial,(Industrial(Progress(,(Volume(11!Ed.!William!MacCreary!Burwell.!New!Orleans!1851! Cartwright offered a second diagnosis: Dysathesia Aetheopica. That affliction could be found, he suggested in an explanation of census numbers, in nearly all free people of color. It rendered them utterly lethargic and unresponsive, almost comatose—not violent maniacs but helpless idiots.

These maladies afflicted, by definition, only people of African descent, demonstrating their innate need for strict oversight. For Cartwright, the autonomy under which healthy white people thrive is devastating to people of color. His argument rested on and bolstered the idea of polygenism, a theory of separate human origins—in other words, the claim that white and black people constituted different species.

Also used as an argument against miscegenation, Josiah'No):'Polygenism' polygenism suggested that “hybrid” offspring would Mula)o'women'are'par7cularly'delicate,'and'subject'to'a' variety'of'chronic'diseases'['.'.'.'.']'I'I'have'li)le'doubt'that' be too weak to thrive. This was yet another way to it'will'be'found'that'these'eﬀects,'like'disease'and'early' deaths,'are'conﬁned'mostly'to'mula)oes.'(“Two' explain the census numbers. Josiah Nott articulate it, Lectures”'231)'' explaining that “mulatto women are particularly delicate, and subject to a variety of chronic diseases” including, as the census seemed to demonstrate, insanity. His explanation fell in line

Image'from'Strange(Science(h)p://www.strangescience.net/sthom1.htm' with an understanding of insanity as being the product of a naturally weak constitution that has been subjected to any number of possible traumas— bodily injury, extreme heat, anxiety, fear, grief, separation from loved ones, the sight of a public execution, excessive drinking, even “long-continued watchfulness” over a sick person (Skultans 45-6).

All of these, of course, were conditions to which Child,'“The'Quadroons”' Brown,'Clotel' enslaved people were regularly subjected, and The$slow$recovery$of$her$ The$slow$recovery$of$her$ reason$se0led$into$the$most$ reason$se0led$into$the$most$ abolitionists dedicated to illustrating the brutality intense$melancholy…$In$a$few$ intense$melancholy…In$a$few$ months$more,"poor$Xarifa$was$ days$the$poor$girl$died$of$a$ of the institution of slavery regularly narrated a"raving"maniac.$That$pure$ broken$heart.$(99)$ such incidents. One popular formula in such temple$was$desecrated;$that$ loving$heart$was$broken;$and$ accounts was the sympathetic “tragic mulatta,” a that$beau>ful$head$fractured$ against$the$wall$in$the"frenzy" staple of sentimental abolitionist fiction. The of"despair."(284)" theory of “hybrid” individuals being constitutionally prone to insanity dovetailed with the tragedy of many fictional mulattos, which was insanity and death. Lydia Maria Child’s “The Quadroons” is an example of this formula, in which the second-generation heroine descends into self-destructive madness. Having become “a raving maniac,” she kills herself by dashing her head against the wall in, as Child describes it, “the frenzy of despair.”

William Wells Brown used Child’s story as a source of his novel, and reproduced some passages almost verbatim—including this heroine’s death. In these cases, his exclusions are particular telling. In his version of the passage, he removes the violent language of “raving” and “frenzy,” instead having his heroine quietly succumb to melancholy. Brown’s revision is not radical, and he certainly doesn’t upend the tragic mulatta tradition. It does seem telling, however, that he removes the more extreme language of madness. In doing so, he arguably removes both the menace and the burden of Child’s character by writing for her a speedy and quiet death.

Just as Brown seems to take views of Black insanity into account when he constructs his fictional characters, so does Frederick Douglass seem similarly influenced in telling his own life story. In Brown’s words, first-person narratives offer “a living refutation of the doctrine of the inferiority of the African race.” That is, it has already been widely agreed, exactly what Douglass does in his Narrative; he has often been described as constructing himself in the mold of “the representative man.” To this, I would add that he specifically refutes understandings of the influence of slavery and freedom on sanity.

Any first-person narrative of slavery that addressed the question of insanity had to contend with the fact that the concept could be—and often was—adjusted to support notions of white supremancy. Prudhomme and Musto pointed this out, noting that when statistics revealed high black insanity rates, they were taken as evidence of black inferiority. At other historical moments, however, insanity rates among Black Americans were found to be low—in which case, the explanation reversed. In these cases, insanity was explained as a condition brought on by the anxieties of civilization.

If Douglass had described slavery as a brutalizing institution but denied that his experience of it had any adverse effect on his mental health, he would have opened himself—and, in turn, all Black Americans—up to the explanation that they were invulnerable to insanity because they were a more “primitive” race.

The rhetorical demand, then, is to Douglass’)Narra$ve) demonstrate that he is at once “civilized” enough to be susceptible to insanity and But)for)the)hope)of)being)free,)I)have) no)doubt)but)that)I)should)have)killed) yet sane enough not to present a threat myself,)or)done)something)for)which) upon emancipation. Douglass I)should)have)been)killed.)(33))) I)was)broken)in)body,)soul,)and)spirit.) accomplishes this by narrating his own My)natural)elasBcity)was)crushed,)my) intellect)languished,)the)disposiBon) descent into near-madness followed by his to)read)departed…Sunday)was)my) rehabilitation and cure. This offers us only)leisure)Bme.)I)spent)this)in)a)sort) of)beastElike)stupor,)between)sleep) another way to read the famous turning and)wake.)(45)) point of the narrative—Douglass’ fight with the overseer Covey. Leading up to this confrontation, Douglass describes himself in the language of at least two versions of insanity, of both menace and burden. He describes, at one point, being haunted by the image of freedom. Saying it was “ever present to torment me with a sense of my wretched condition,” Douglass describes himself as a potential Nat Turner. He recalls that

But for the hope of being free, I have no dobut that I should have killed myself, or done something for which I should have been killed (33)

He hints at his own potential for violence, echoing the Messenger and Child’s Appeal. In a telling parallel to Cartwright’s drapetomania, moreover, he links his madness directly to freedom. But where Cartwright characterizes the yearning for freedom as the product of madness, Douglass figures freedom as the only thing preventing madness. Where the Messenger, drawing on the census, assumes that freedom would aggravate Black insanity, Douglass makes it a cure.

Building up to the transformative fight, Douglass experiences another version of madness more akin to Cartwright’s dysaethesia, wherein his “intellect languished” and he experienced a “sort of beast-like stupor between sleep and wake” (45). His invocation of “beast” echoes polygenist arguments about speciation, while the languishing intellect and sleep-like stupor recalls the image of the brutalized “idiot.”

In these two sections, then, Douglass makes himself embody two archetypal images of slave insanity—the violent Nat Turner and the insensible idiot. In order for his argument to succeed, both would need to be understood as a product of slavery, but not an intractable one. Douglass rhetorically enacts his rehabilitation in a famous chiasmus. After inviting us to, as he says, “behold a man transformed into a brute!” he then tells us “you have seen how a man was made a slave; you shall now see how a slave was made a man.” The scene of claiming manhood can be read as, in fact, reclaiming sanity, as the “man” he becomes epitomizes the Enlightenment model of civilized, rational humanity: he exposes fraud, educates fellow slaves, seeks legal counsel, challenges hypocrisy, parses theology, and, in a particularly potent act of intellectual and rhetorical control, plots a successful escape but then refuses to divulge its details, instead offering a precisely reasoned case against such disclosures.

In narrating his recovery from the brink of madness, Douglass navigates the traps laid by protean definitions of insanity, used as a mark alternately of civilization and lack thereof. IN doing so, he addresses another debate in the scientific community: the question of treatment and prognosis. Whether full recovery from madness was possible remained an open question. This was an era of increasing institutionalization—recall the Messenger’s allusion to the need for “lunatic asylums for the tens of thousands of maniacs.” Increasingly, physicians viewed the condition as incurable, requiring total and permanent separation from society. In contrast, Douglass’ version of his own life story offers a counterpoint to the logic of institutionalization. Not only was he successfully rehabilitated, but he joined society and became a respected public figure.

Child, on the other hand, offers a more Child’s(Appeal( deterministic picture. Throughout her Appeal, she • Chapter(1.(Brief(History(of(Negro(Slavery.—Its(Inevitable( describes the effects of slavery as inevitably and Eﬀect(Upon(all(Concerned(in(it.((7)(( • It(cannot(be(denied(that(human(nature(thus(operated( inescapable—effects that include viciousness, upon,(must-necessarily-yield,(more(or(less,(to(all-these( insensibility, and a “stupefied” intellect— evils.((16)( • Slavery(inevitably(makes(its(vicIms(servile(and(vicious.( descriptors all, of course, directly associated with (66)(( • Tyranny(always(dwarfs(the(intellect.((171)( insanity. • Slavery(blunts(the(feelings,(as(well(as(stupeﬁes(the( intellect.((188)(

Faced with the scientific turn of proslavery Child’s(Appeal( discourse, her response remained firmly moral The(only(true(courage(is(that(which(impels(us(to( and theological. The maniacs at the crossroads do(right(without(regard(to(consequences((207)( just didn’t figure in to Child’s rhetoric, a stance ( she makes explicitly in her Appeal: she calls upon There(is(but(one(honest(course;(and(that(is(to(do( right,(and(trust(the(consequences(to(Divine( readers to have the “courage” to do what is right, Providence((213)( “without regard to the consequences,” trusting those to “Divine Providence” (207, 213).

Child’s appeal is to her readers’ morality, which she J.C.$Pritchard$on$moral$insanity$ contrasts to that of slaveholders. The latter were The$intellectual$facul-es$ appear$to$have$sustained$ described in the language of moral insanity, a but$li5le$injury,$while&the& feelings&and&aﬀec0ons…are& forerunner to the later image of the sociopath. This strangely&perverted&and& depraved…the$individual$is$ version of insanity leaves, in the words of Pritchard, found$to$be&incapable…&of& conduc0ng&himself&with& “the feelings strangely perverted and depraved,” decency&and$propriety$in$ the$business$of$life.$(qtd$in$ rendering an individual “incapable of conducting himself Skultans$181)$ with decency.” Abolitionist literature relied heavily on Image$from$J.C.$Lavater,$Essays$on$physiognomy,$designed$to$promote$the$knowledge$and$the$love$of$mankind.$$$London:$John$ Murray,$1789;$1792;$1810.$Reprinted$from$hKp://www.rootenbergbooks.com/$$ images of the depraved slaveholder: scenes of punishment in Child’s Appeal border on what we might today label torture porn. In one, a slaveholder slowly dismembers his victim, throwing each body part into the fire as he lectures the other slaves, whom he has forced to watch. The only reaction to the scene that we get is from the slaveholder himself, who says that he “had never enjoyed himself so well at a ball as he had enjoyed himself that evening” (26). He is quite obviously morally insane, and here the slaves don’t figure in to the calculus of morality or sanity at all. They are voiceless victims and onlookers, vehicles for the reader’s moral outrage.

Douglass’ first-person narration of these Douglass’)Narra$ve) scenes of punishment intervenes in the slaveholder/reader opposition by inserting Captain'Anthony '' Douglass' He#would#at#+mes# The(ﬁrst($me(I(ever(witnessed(this( himself—and, by extension, his fellow slaves. seem#to#take#great# horrible(exhibi$on…I(was(quite(a(child,( Describing the whipping of his aunt, he pleasure#in#whipping#a# but(I(well(remember(it.(I(never(shall( slave.(No(words,(no( forget(it(whilst(I(remember(any(thing…It( balances the description of brutality with his tears,(no(prayers,(from( struck(me(with(an(awful(force.(It(was( his(gory(vic$m,(seemed( the(bloodFstained(gate,(the(entrance(to( own reaction to it. Much like Child’s to(move(his(iron(heart( the(hell(of(slavery,(through(which(I(was( from(its(bloody( about(to(pass.(It(was(a(most(terrible( description, the slaveholder takes sadistic purpose.((15)( spectacle.#I#wish#I#could#commit#to# paper#the#feelings#with#which#I#beheld# pleasure in the violence. What Douglass adds, it.((15)) however, is his own language of revulsion and outrage. His reaction is not just one that readers will sympathize with, but one that emphasizes his moral health. Although he was not the victim of this brutal punishment, witnessing it evokes emotions so powerful that they exceed even his capacious powers of description: “I wish,” he writes, “I could commit to paper the feelings with which I beheld it.” If moral insanity is a lack of feelings or decency, Douglass casts himself as, yet again, a model of sanity.

This emphasis on his own sense of decency contests the deterministic picture implied by Child’s language—his revulsion at such violence counters Child’s depiction of enslaved people as potentially, though understandably, “malignant and revengeful.” Slavery, as described by Douglass, is indeed brutal, but not all of its victims are destined to become insensible or depraved. For Douglass, the slave is not a passive vessel of brutality but rather an upstanding moral agent who bears witness to others’ depravity.

What I hope I’ve demonstrated by considering the use and revision of tropes like Nat Turner, the brutalized idiot, the tragic mulatta, and the depraved madman, is that a rhetorical analysis of abolitionist literature is enriched by an interdisciplinary view that takes contemporary science and statistics into account. This fluid approach to generic boundaries allows us to see how abolitionists were responding not only to political and theological, but also scientific proslavery arguments, and that the latter reveal yet another layer of complexity in the exigency and their responses to it.

Moreover, it bears considering who addressed, and who seemingly ignored, the complications that proslavery science added to their rhetorical tasks. In my limited reading, the difference fell along gender and racial lines, but the larger picture is likely to be more complex and therefore more useful.

If I may zoom out even more, I’d like to speculate about the ways in which these observations could be useful to our understanding of contemporary conversations about race rooted in data that speak to questions of intellect and psychology. I am certainly not the first to observe that even today, a malleable set of psychological definitions and diagnoses often pathologize people of color—and that, simultaneously, people of color are still to a large extent excluded from the institutions that control these definitions. For Brown and Douglass I argue that this exclusion led them to use narrative strategies to counter scientific arguments. Stepan and Gilmer argue that after 1870, such responses were increasingly delegitimized as science became, in the public view, value neutral and virtually uncontestable mode of cognition. However, it is worth asking whether the strategies of these abolitionists might be considered ancestors to narrative strategies that are still in use today.

Contemporary+conversa/ons+around+ Douglass’ “representative man,” like Brown’s quan/ta/ve+pictures+of+racial+disparity+ George Green, was an utterly moral model • Can+we+consider+Douglass’+and+Brown’s+paragons+ of+sanity+as+precursors+to+today’s+“poli/cs+of+ citizen—I would suggest that he prefigures today’s respectability?”++ “politics of respectability.” To what extent, I • If+so,+might+that+strategy+be+viewed+as+a+narra/ve+ response+to+quan/ta/ve+arguments+such+as+“the+ wonder, can those politics be understood as a achievement+gap?”++ • How+do+such+arguments+further+marginalize+ narrative response to bleak statistics about Black people+with+disabili/es?+ • Are+there+descendants+of+Child+in+the+ educational prospects in constructions such as “the conversa/on,+who+oﬀer+well+inten/oned+ arguments+that+inadvertently+reinforce+white+ achievement gap?” supremacist+interpreta/ons+of+racial+disparity?+ How, too, do such arguments further marginalize people with disabilities, from whom they distance themselves in order to gain legitimacy, suggesting that disability does justify marginalization?

And speaking of the achievement gap, which we know is much discussed but little contested, might we find some descendants of Child among the discussants—well intended arguments that fail to challenge—indeed sometimes even unwittingly reinforce—premises that bolster white supremacist views of reality?

I’ll leave it there, in hopes that these questions might open the door to conversation— though I certainly welcome your responses to my reading of Child, Douglass and Brown as well.

Works&Cited& Brown,&William&Wells.&Clotel;'or,'the'President’s'Daughter.& &1853.'Ed.&Robert&S.&Levine.&Boston:&Bedford&St.& &MarAn’s,&2000.& Cartwright,&Samuel.&“Report&on&the&Diseases&and&Physical& &PeculiariAes&of&the&Negro&Race.”&New'Orleans'Medical' 'and'Surgical'Journal&May&1851.&Google'Books.&Web.&20& &March&2010.&& Child,&Lydia&Maria.&An'Appeal'in'Favor'of'that'Class'of' 'Americans'Called'Africans.&New&York:&John&S.&Taylor,& &1836.&& TT.“The&Quadroons.”&Clotel;'or,'the'President’s'Daughter.' 'Bedford&Cultural&Ed.&Robert&S.&Levine.&Boston:&Bedford& &St.&MarAn’s,&2000.& Douglass,&Frederick.&NarraFve'of'the'Life'of'Frederick' 'Douglass.'1845.&I'Was'Born'a'Slave.&Ed.&Yuval&Taylor.& &Chicago:&Lawrence&Hill,&1999.& &