John Delury is director of the China Boom Project and associate director of the Center on U .S.-China Relations at the Asia Society.

North Korea: 20 Years of Solitude John Delury

With the American people thirsting for progress will only take place once the reality a new foreign policy, transcending the of the Kim Jong-il regime is accepted as the aggrieved, insular doctrines of “regime starting point of change. change,” “pre-emptive war” and the “global war on terror ,” a breakthrough might be Failed Foreign Policy found in a most unlikely place—the Demo - Before making history , we need to look at cratic People’s Republic of Korea. North where history has brought us so far. The Korea’s alienation from the world communi - current framework for dealing with North ty is a grave threat to peace in East Asia. Korea evolved back in the late 1980s in the But with the right kind of American leader - wake of two game-changing developments: ship, North Korea can be coaxed back into the end of the Cold War and the birth of concord with its Asia-Pacific neighbors. The the North Korean nuclear weapons pro - new Obama administration has a chance to gram. The fall of the Soviet Union, com - make history by ending the 60 -year conflict bined with successful capitalist transitions that divides the Korean peninsula, and re - across East Asia and Eastern Europe, dealt a versing the two decades of solitude that has crushing blow to the already crippled North exiled an entire nation from the global Korean economy—a relic of unrepentant community . communism. The Free World’s victory over After 20 years, it is time to acknowl- communism lulled many in the West into a edge that the conventional strategies— complacent view that the North Korean po - belligerent quarantine and ambivalent litical and economic system would be over - engagement—have failed to achieve positive run by the “end of history.” Many assumed outcomes for the United States, East Asia, it was simply a matter of time before the or the North Korean people. America is North Korean domino tumbled and fell. now at a crossroads of opportunity to refor - But other observers rejected such mulate our basic political strategy and alter Whiggish confidence in the post-Cold War the underlying nature of U.S.-North Korean moment. North Korea, particularly when relations—as opposed to repeating the pen - threatening to go nuclear, became the epit- dulum swings of the Bush-Clinton-Bush ome of the rogue regime and pariah state, years. However disagreeable, the leadership the embodiment of terror and evil. Whereas in Pyongyang is a reality. Diplomatic the “end of history” paradigm assumed that

© 2008 World Policy Institute 75 time would do the work of diplomacy, the despair. Over the past decade, the Py - “axis of evil” rubric placed North Korea ongyang leadership developed enough outside diplomacy, and by extension, history weapons-grade plutonium for a half-dozen itself. Only military intervention by “mod - nuclear weapons, tested long-range missiles ern” outside nations could remove the and a nuclear device, and participated in nu - “pygmy” of Pyongyang, as George W. Bush clear sharing activities, involving Pakistan tellingly called Kim Jong-il . and allegedly Syria. Kim Jong-il’s “military On the basis of this end-of-the- world scenario, the North Korea ©AP/Korea News Service policies of Bush 4 1, Bill Clinton, and Bush 43 oscillated along a sin - gle spectrum. At the hard end was the quarantine approach, sanction - ing and isolating Pyongyang in the hopes of inducing “regime change.” On the soft end of the spectrum was an ambivalent form of engage - ment, focused on the immediate issues of denuclearization. Hawks circled, wishing they could swoop down with direct military force, but lacked political muscle and— especially after the wars in Afghan- istan and Iraq—military resources to do so. Doves cooed, quietly wait - ing for history to do its handiwork, and sweep aside the government on the other side of the negotiating table. The last two decades have shown that first” regime , backed by armed forces of 1.2 neither isolating North Korea nor half- million , maintains firm control over politi - heartedly negotiating with Pyongyang cal power (even now, amidst reports of works. Instead, North Korea stands as one Kim’s ill health, the regime appears rela - of the most striking failures of post–Cold tively stable). The United States, mean - War U .S. foreign policy. The United States while, has 28,500 troops stationed in South has been unable to stop North Korea’s nu - Korea . The American military presence—at clear program, end the Korean War, under - an estimated annual cost of $5 billion —is a mine or liberalize the Kim regime, integrate drain on resources in an era of rapidly esca - North Korea into the world economy, or lating defense spending. America’s troops reconcile North and South Korea. Any of are also a major strain on the U.S. -South these outcomes would have constituted Korean alliance, which has frayed in recent some kind of progress—none has been years. achieved. Instead, since the end of the Cold War, Bold Bilateral Initiative tens of millions of Koreans have died of The challenge facing the Obama administra - famine, millions more suffered poverty and tion is to transform a useful, short-term

76 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • WINTER 2008/09 mechanism to prevent war (the Six Party When real economic benefit is to be Talks) into a far-reaching process of creat- reaped from normal economic contacts with ing peace on the Korean peninsula. This the world, the financial temptation of sell - would require bracketing, to some extent, ing nuclear technology, or leveraging the the nuclear issue and the human rights nuclear threat in exchange for aid, diminish - issues. The goal of diplomatic engagement es. Reports by the UN World Food Program with North Korea needs to be redefined indicate that regions of North Korea are facing famine conditions again, adding urgency to a moment in which Pyongyang might recipro - cate a bold gesture on our part. In fact, beneath the surface of bellicose anti-American rhetoric, Pyongyang has consistently sent the message that it seeks normal relations with the United States. It might seem inconceivable that the regime could suddenly make peace with the Americans, after basing its legitimacy for so long on resisting American hegemony. But it seemed equally preposterous in 1971, with the Cultural Revolu - tion still raging, that Mao Zedong might welcome Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon to Beijing . Without waiting for the next ©AP/Kyodo News mini-drama in the interminable succession of carrots and sticks over as ending its isolation—from the dynamism the Yongbyon nuclear plant , my suggestion of East Asian economic development, the would be for the Obama administration to socio-political progress of the southern dispatch a peace mission to Pyongyang. Vice half of the peninsula, and the basic tenets President Joe Biden has a long record of of international law and humane gover - working on the Korean issue, and might be nance. Ending 60 years of antagonism a good candidate to act as the senior Ameri - with the United States and South Korea can emissary. Approaches might be made to would help the North build economic, Seoul and Pyongyang about the idea of political , and military ties to the outside Biden traveling along with a high-ranking world, and lay the foundations for rudi- South Korean envoy. Biden would initiate mentary political trust between North substantive peace talks, including the Korea and its neighbors. Defusing the establishment of a U .S. Liaison Office in nuclear threat would come in turn as the Pyongyang . natural outgrowth of reconciliation . When Biden could also pave the way for Pyongyang ceases to feel threatened, the Pyongyang to do the same in Washington. motive for a nuclear weapons program The liaison offices would be initial steps in a weakens. broader initiative to peel away legal restric -

North Korea: 20 Years of Solitude 77 tions on travel and commerce between the development of our strategy—is likely to two countries, with requisite care to restrict be not only supportive, but a source of drug, counterfeit , and arms trade. The guidance . ( The bottom line is that Beijing American emissary could explore how to has the clearest picture of what is really go - bring North Korea under the Nunn-Lugar ing on in Pyongyang .) Act on decommissioning nuclear facilities, Let’s look at these three partners in as well as create a sustainable energy and order of difficulty, from easy to hard. economic growth plan to foster expanded international trade, investment, financing , Beijing: A Steady Hand and development in the North . We are likely to see Beijing playing a steady, supportive role in the Korean peace Steady Multilateral Diplomacy initiative. Again, history should be consid - Achieving this breakthrough in North ered. The North Korean nuclear crises of Korean relations would demand bold the last two decades played out against the leadership and skilled diplomacy on the dramatic backdrop of China’s rapid “peace - part of the United States. The first step is ful rise” and the North’s equally precipitous bilateral—signaling to Pyongyang that decline. China and North Korea pursued America wants to inaugurate a new way of radically divergent socio-economic paths doing business. But the bilateral move must through the late twentieth century . North be accomplished in tandem with nimble Korea reached its peak of economic and multilateral diplomacy, to ensure the key industrial development in the mid-1970s, players—South Korea, China, Japan , and at which point its per capita gross domestic Russia—are fully vested with us in this en - product ( GDP ) was many times greater than deavor. I’ll leave it to the new administra - China’s. But just as Deng Xiaoping was tion’s Russian advisors to think through the leading China out of the fog of the Cultural Moscow angle. But the contours of a peace Revolution to embrace market reforms initiative led by Korea’s East Asian neigh - and economic opening, North Korea bors are not difficult to see . plunged deeper into the socialist abyss. Washington will have to work with Even during the horrific famine of the late two leaders—South Korea’s Lee Myung-bak 1990s, Pyongyang hesitated to open its and Japan’s Taro Aso—who are relatively borders to aid. Those were the very years weak domestically and tend toward a hard- that China aggressively entered the world, line stance on North Korea. Fortunately, negotiated World Trade Organization mem - we should have a strong partner in Beijing bership, bid to host the 2008 Olympics, with Hu Jintao . All three leaders will be privatized more of the state sector, and at - taking cues from their constituencies. Bold tracted foreign investors at unprecedented engagement with North Korea is likely to rates . galvanize support among dormant forces In spite of its economic success and in South Korea. The response in Japan is yearning for stature, Beijing struggled to harder to gauge. At a minimum, Washing - find a seat of honor at the table of great ton must work with Tokyo to defuse the ef - powers. It was hard to wash off the stain of forts of nationalist and right-wing elements, the June 4, 1989 , massacre in Tiananmen which are likely to use rapprochement with Square. And when China, from its perch on North Korea to advance their militarist the UN Security Council, preached the doc - agendas. China’s political elite—so long as trine of non-interference in domestic affairs, Beijing remains intimately involved in the critics saw it as nothing more than the de -

78 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • WINTER 2008/09 fensive rationalization of one authoritarian reserve of closeness likened by Mao to that state providing cover for others. But Ameri - of “lips and teeth.” ca’s “global war on terror” tarnished the no - The legacy of sadae emboldened Beijing tion of principled intervention and foreign to try to bring the North Koreans to the ne - policy activism. The second nuclear crisis in gotiating table. But in the face of threaten - North Korea erupted in 2003 at the conflu - ing statements out of Washington, Py - ence of these trends, presenting Beijing ongyang would often fall back on its default with a rare opportunity to demonstrate how posture of juche —most dramatically when its non-confrontational, non-interventionist North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on approach to international relations could the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons achieve better outcomes than America’s wars fought in the name of our security and their Obama’s immediate task is freedom . Beijing made itself to enlist Beijing’s leadership in headquarters of the new Six “ Party Talks, and China transforming the Six Party Talks emerged as the lead country in North Korean negotiations. into the Korean Peace Process . Beijing is willing to take the initiative on North Korea in part be - in 2003 and tested a nuclear device in 2”006, cause of long-standing ties to Pyongyang. both done without Beijing’s support. De - For centuries, China fought alongside spite these assertions of autonomy, Beijing Koreans in their struggles against foreign avoided a falling out with Pyongyang. Chi - aggressors—particularly the Japanese. nese diplomats made earnest and creative ef - Korean kings of the Choson Dynasty forts to get the Americans and North Kore - acknowledged the supremacy of Ming ans talking. And to his credit, George W. and Qing China in return for autonomy Bush welcomed Chinese involvement and and aid, a relationship known as sadae publicly acknowledged Beijing’s construc - (serving the great). The spirit of this tive role in the Six Party Talks. special relationship was revived in the President Obama’s immediate task is to post-imperial era. The Chinese Communist keep that positive momentum going, and Party and Korean Workers’ Party forged enlist Beijing’s leadership in transforming fraternal bonds during the anti-Japanese the Six Party Talks into the Korean Peace resistance in the 1930s. Beijing’s decision Process. From the perspective of improving in 1950 to send hundreds of thousands Sino-U .S. relations, North Korea is one of of troops to support the North Koreans the most promising areas of diplomatic co - against the American-led UN forces consoli - operation between our two countries. Bei - dated their “elder brother-younger brother” jing looks increasingly inclined to take a relationship. Kim Il-sung, the long-serving leadership role on the global stage. Chinese North Korean autocrat, later championed President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen the autarkic national philosophy of juche Jiabao would be candidates for the Nobel (self-reliance) and resisted becoming a Peace Prize if they helped broker a lasting satellite of either Beijing or Moscow—just accord. A comprehensive peace and reconcil - as Mao Zedong recoiled against any domi - iation process on the Korean peninsula, with nance by the Soviets after Stalin . But economic development playing a driving Beijing-Pyongyang relations maintained a role, is also very much in China’s interest.

North Korea: 20 Years of Solitude 79 The North Korean border is a funnel for Seoul grows out of frustration that South destabilizing elements, with Koreans flee- Korea is so often sidelined in the negotiat - ing poverty and misery to travel the under - ing process. Thus we are faced with a real ground railroad across China to asylum in dilemma: how to pursue an ambitious en - third countries, to stay and live illegally in gagement agenda and be willing to deal di - China, or to be preyed upon by the vicious rectly with Pyongyang, without violating human trafficking rings operating along our solidarity with Seoul —inadvertently the border . Economic revival in North generating more hard-line views by making Korea could reduce this flow of refugees; it South Koreans feel, yet again, cut out from could also stimulate recovery in China’s the process, ignored by the Americans , and northeastern provinces, which have strug - disrespected by the North. gled economically since the reforms of Some rough patches are almost in - the 1990s . evitable in trying to balance outreach to Py - Historically, a strong, prosperous, stable ongyang with fidelity to Seoul. Fortunately, Korean peninsula is good for China; whereas a key political factor is running in favor of a instability and civil strife on the peninsula peace initiative. “Conservative ,” in the Ko - are often the prelude to serious trouble for rean political context , is comprised of two the continent. A vocal minority of Chinese main positions—taking a hard-line on the Machiavellis, whether online or in Commu - North and being strongly pro-American. If nist Party headquarters in Zhongnanhai, forced to choose, South Korean President might resist changes to the status quo, and Lee Myung-bak is likely to pursue close argue that a divided, on-again, off-again nu - relations with the White House over con - clear Pyongyang means leverage for Beijing. frontation with Pyongyang. President But steadier hands and clearer heads are Obama’s administration should do every - likely to see how regional interests and na - thing in its power to make this choice as tional interests coincide, and provide crucial painless as possible—that is to say, while support in this endeavor. pursuing a bilateral initiative to end the antagonism with North Korea, Washing- Seoul : Political Divides ton should consult with and involve South The conservative government in Seoul leans Korea as much as possible. In brokering toward a “tough” line on the North, and a peace, we should look for opportunities Pyongyang has reciprocated with relentless to nurture the economic synergy between invective against President Lee Myung-bak the North , which is rich in mineral re - since his inauguration in February. This sources and cheap labor, with South poses an obvious and immediate problem for Korea’s strengths in agriculture, exports , the United States, as it is crucial to align and services. Mutual economic benefit our peace initiative with the democratically would be the cornerstone in helping elected government in Seoul. After all, the Koreans to rebuild a shared sense of the overarching purpose of engaging North future. The new White House should Korea is to bring peace to the peninsula and make it clear to the South that its goal in catalyze the process of reconciliation and resolving the conflict is to get out of reintegration between North and South. the way, so that Pyongyang and Seoul The Republic of Korea is not only a stalwart can make greater progress in their own military ally; it is the real protagonist, along process of reconciliation, without the con - with the North, in the drama of Korea’s di - founding triangulation of all problems via vision. In fact, much of the toughness in Washington .

80 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • WINTER 2008/09 An even more important underlying just as easily morph into an anti-govern - force at work that should generate support ment, pro-American movement to support in South Korea for a U .S.-led peace initia - real engagement. tive is the will of the people. Conventional wisdom has it that South Koreans are am - Tokyo: A Reluctant Partner bivalent about reunification. Seoul’s wired, Involving Japan in the endeavor to alter hypermodern youth, in stark contrast to stu - North Korean relations may prove trickiest dent activists of even a decade ago, are seen of all. Prime Minister Taro Aso is a long- as uninspired by the reuni - fication ideal. Their mid - dle-class parents, whose in - The will to reunify among South comes still hadn’t recovered Koreans runs much deeper than from the 1997 Asian finan - “ cial crisis before the cur - pocketbook considerations, and rent financial tsunami hit, worry over the huge costs should not be underestimated. of absorbing the North’s decimated economy. And the political standing hawk on North Korea. Japan”ese roadmap is harder to chart than it used public opinion also continues to harden, to be. For decades, the dream of reunifica - centering on two concerns—the abduction tion was imagined as occurring after the issue and the security threat. Kim regime collapsed. Today, South Kore - North Korean agents kidnapped Japan - ans entertain the possibility that they may ese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s. During have to somehow combine with the Kim Kim Jong-il’s 2002 summit with Prime regime in a hybrid political and military Minister Koizumi, Kim publicly acknowl - structure, rather than simply fill a vacuum edged and apologized for a dozen kidnap - in the North with Southern institutions pings, and arranged for five abductees to and laws. visit their homeland (contrary to the terms These are daunting economic and politi - of the “visit,” they remained in Japan). But cal challenges, so it should be no surprise the Japanese public disputes Pyongyang’s that opinion polls reflect mixed sentiments assertion that eight abductees already passed about the future. But the will to reunify away, and believes a much higher number among South Koreans runs much deeper were originally taken hostage. than pocketbook considerations, and should North Korea’s abduction of Japanese not be underestimated. Reunification is people decades ago was a brazen violation something close to a civic religion. The of international law, state sovereignty, and South Korean public is likely to support human freedom. The burden lies squarely wholeheartedly a robust effort out of Wash - on the government in Pyongyang to ensure ington to engage the North in the work of a full accounting. It must be added, how- creating peace and prosperity for the whole ever, that many Koreans and Chinese , who peninsula—and would very possibly oppose empathize personally with families of the its own government if Seoul were perceived missing, might have mixed feelings in to be dragging its feet or creating obstacles watching the Japanese government aggres - to rapprochement. The outpouring of anti- sively seek redress for past crimes of other government, anti-American sentiment in Asian states, considering its own track the beef demonstrations this spring could record in historical accountability. And the

North Korea: 20 Years of Solitude 81 role of right-wing organizations in fanning Solutions and Antidotes the flames of anti-North Korean opinion in The solution to the myriad problems created Japan suggests ulterior political motives at by North Korea’s long isolation is, quite work. simply, to end the isolation. The antidote In summer 2008, Tokyo and Pyongyang to North Korea’s evasive hostility, always were making progress on a full investigation linked to a demand for “face,” is full en - of the fate of the abductees, but the sudden gagement. The Obama administration, even retirement of Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in its honeymoon period, would come under pulled the rug out from under these negoti - fire domestically from critics on the right ations. Taro Aso seems inclined to follow and left—from hawks on national security hawkish instincts and try the hard-line ap - and hawks on human rights. But a middle proach to force the issue. This is unlikely to course of robust, determined engagement, bear any fruit. The major breakthrough in embracing the bilateral relationship while the abduction issue occurred because Koizu - coordinating the multilateral diplomacy, has mi traveled personally to Pyongyang, and the potential to reverse 20 years of failed made it clear how urgent it was to resolve foreign policy. There are, of course, risks and the issue, not only for its own sake, but as uncertainties. North Korean domestic poli - part of the process of normalizing relations tics are still a bit of a black box: whether with Japan. Kim Jong-il found this com - the question is Kim Jong-il’s health, succes - pelling and responded in kind. Since Koi- sion plans, or the strength of the “reform zumi left office in 2006 , the backroom oli - and opening” faction in Pyongyang. There garchic nature of the ruling Liberal Demo - is also the risk that we could get bogged cratic Party has reasserted itself and the down in back-and-forth over peace talks as prime ministership is once again weak. we have become, to some extent, mired in Shinzo Abe lasted one year in office, so the trench warfare of nuclear negotiations. did Fukuda. Who knows how long Aso And it could prove especially difficult to will last? balance bilateral action with multilateral As with Lee Myung-bak, Japan’s leader - coordination, depending on domestic politi - ship is unlikely to insist on a hard approach cal developments in each of the involved to North Korea if it jeopardizes the prized parties. transpacific alliance. There are compelling Even calculated boldness inevitably en - reasons why Tokyo would want to play a tails risks, and they may be less than the constructive role in normalization. For one, dangers of surrendering to the superficial Japan stands to benefit, like South Korea safety of the status quo. We would be wise and China, from the economic opening of not to repeat the mistake of Presidents Clin - North Korea. Second, resolution of out - ton and Bush—waiting for the next North standing issues over the fate of the ab - Korean crisis to come to us, or waiting until ductees is more likely to come as a conse - the end of a second term before investing quence of genuine peace (rather than as a serious resources in finding a solution. Seiz - precondition for ambivalent engagement). ing the initiative is imperative. President Third, tying North Korea into an effective Obama and Vice President Biden have the process of economic exchange and political opportunity to do for North Korea what trust would remove a major security threat Kissinger and Nixon did for China, and to from Japan’s border, to the applause of usher in a new chapter in the history of Japan’s pacifist majority . northeast Asia. •

82 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • WINTER 2008/09