John Delury is director of the China Boom Project and associate director of the Center on U .S.-China Relations at the Asia Society. North Korea: 20 Years of Solitude John Delury With the American people thirsting for progress will only take place once the reality a new foreign policy, transcending the of the Kim Jong-il regime is accepted as the aggrieved, insular doctrines of “regime starting point of change. change,” “pre-emptive war” and the “global war on terror ,” a breakthrough might be Failed Foreign Policy found in a most unlikely place—the Demo - Before making history , we need to look at cratic People’s Republic of Korea. North where history has brought us so far. The Korea’s alienation from the world communi - current framework for dealing with North ty is a grave threat to peace in East Asia. Korea evolved back in the late 1980s in the But with the right kind of American leader - wake of two game-changing developments: ship, North Korea can be coaxed back into the end of the Cold War and the birth of concord with its Asia-Pacific neighbors. The the North Korean nuclear weapons pro - new Obama administration has a chance to gram. The fall of the Soviet Union, com - make history by ending the 60 -year conflict bined with successful capitalist transitions that divides the Korean peninsula, and re - across East Asia and Eastern Europe, dealt a versing the two decades of solitude that has crushing blow to the already crippled North exiled an entire nation from the global Korean economy—a relic of unrepentant community . communism. The Free World’s victory over After 20 years, it is time to acknowl- communism lulled many in the West into a edge that the conventional strategies— complacent view that the North Korean po - belligerent quarantine and ambivalent litical and economic system would be over - engagement—have failed to achieve positive run by the “end of history.” Many assumed outcomes for the United States, East Asia, it was simply a matter of time before the or the North Korean people. America is North Korean domino tumbled and fell. now at a crossroads of opportunity to refor - But other observers rejected such mulate our basic political strategy and alter Whiggish confidence in the post-Cold War the underlying nature of U.S.-North Korean moment. North Korea, particularly when relations—as opposed to repeating the pen - threatening to go nuclear, became the epit- dulum swings of the Bush-Clinton-Bush ome of the rogue regime and pariah state, years. However disagreeable, the leadership the embodiment of terror and evil. Whereas in Pyongyang is a reality. Diplomatic the “end of history” paradigm assumed that © 2008 World Policy Institute 75 time would do the work of diplomacy, the despair. Over the past decade, the Py - “axis of evil” rubric placed North Korea ongyang leadership developed enough outside diplomacy, and by extension, history weapons-grade plutonium for a half-dozen itself. Only military intervention by “mod - nuclear weapons, tested long-range missiles ern” outside nations could remove the and a nuclear device, and participated in nu - “pygmy” of Pyongyang, as George W. Bush clear sharing activities, involving Pakistan tellingly called Kim Jong-il . and allegedly Syria. Kim Jong-il’s “military On the basis of this end-of-the- world scenario, the North Korea ©AP/Korea News Service policies of Bush 4 1, Bill Clinton, and Bush 43 oscillated along a sin - gle spectrum. At the hard end was the quarantine approach, sanction - ing and isolating Pyongyang in the hopes of inducing “regime change.” On the soft end of the spectrum was an ambivalent form of engage - ment, focused on the immediate issues of denuclearization. Hawks circled, wishing they could swoop down with direct military force, but lacked political muscle and— especially after the wars in Afghan- istan and Iraq—military resources to do so. Doves cooed, quietly wait - ing for history to do its handiwork, and sweep aside the government on the other side of the negotiating table. The last two decades have shown that first” regime , backed by armed forces of 1.2 neither isolating North Korea nor half- million , maintains firm control over politi - heartedly negotiating with Pyongyang cal power (even now, amidst reports of works. Instead, North Korea stands as one Kim’s ill health, the regime appears rela - of the most striking failures of post–Cold tively stable). The United States, mean - War U .S. foreign policy. The United States while, has 28,500 troops stationed in South has been unable to stop North Korea’s nu - Korea . The American military presence—at clear program, end the Korean War, under - an estimated annual cost of $5 billion —is a mine or liberalize the Kim regime, integrate drain on resources in an era of rapidly esca - North Korea into the world economy, or lating defense spending. America’s troops reconcile North and South Korea. Any of are also a major strain on the U.S. -South these outcomes would have constituted Korean alliance, which has frayed in recent some kind of progress—none has been years. achieved. Instead, since the end of the Cold War, Bold Bilateral Initiative tens of millions of Koreans have died of The challenge facing the Obama administra - famine, millions more suffered poverty and tion is to transform a useful, short-term 76 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • WINTER 2008/09 mechanism to prevent war (the Six Party When real economic benefit is to be Talks) into a far-reaching process of creat- reaped from normal economic contacts with ing peace on the Korean peninsula. This the world, the financial temptation of sell - would require bracketing, to some extent, ing nuclear technology, or leveraging the the nuclear issue and the human rights nuclear threat in exchange for aid, diminish - issues. The goal of diplomatic engagement es. Reports by the UN World Food Program with North Korea needs to be redefined indicate that regions of North Korea are facing famine conditions again, adding urgency to a moment in which Pyongyang might recipro - cate a bold gesture on our part. In fact, beneath the surface of bellicose anti-American rhetoric, Pyongyang has consistently sent the message that it seeks normal relations with the United States. It might seem inconceivable that the regime could suddenly make peace with the Americans, after basing its legitimacy for so long on resisting American hegemony. But it seemed equally preposterous in 1971, with the Cultural Revolu - tion still raging, that Mao Zedong might welcome Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon to Beijing . Without waiting for the next ©AP/Kyodo News mini-drama in the interminable succession of carrots and sticks over as ending its isolation—from the dynamism the Yongbyon nuclear plant , my suggestion of East Asian economic development, the would be for the Obama administration to socio-political progress of the southern dispatch a peace mission to Pyongyang. Vice half of the peninsula, and the basic tenets President Joe Biden has a long record of of international law and humane gover - working on the Korean issue, and might be nance. Ending 60 years of antagonism a good candidate to act as the senior Ameri - with the United States and South Korea can emissary. Approaches might be made to would help the North build economic, Seoul and Pyongyang about the idea of political , and military ties to the outside Biden traveling along with a high-ranking world, and lay the foundations for rudi- South Korean envoy. Biden would initiate mentary political trust between North substantive peace talks, including the Korea and its neighbors. Defusing the establishment of a U .S. Liaison Office in nuclear threat would come in turn as the Pyongyang . natural outgrowth of reconciliation . When Biden could also pave the way for Pyongyang ceases to feel threatened, the Pyongyang to do the same in Washington. motive for a nuclear weapons program The liaison offices would be initial steps in a weakens. broader initiative to peel away legal restric - North Korea: 20 Years of Solitude 77 tions on travel and commerce between the development of our strategy—is likely to two countries, with requisite care to restrict be not only supportive, but a source of drug, counterfeit , and arms trade. The guidance . ( The bottom line is that Beijing American emissary could explore how to has the clearest picture of what is really go - bring North Korea under the Nunn-Lugar ing on in Pyongyang .) Act on decommissioning nuclear facilities, Let’s look at these three partners in as well as create a sustainable energy and order of difficulty, from easy to hard. economic growth plan to foster expanded international trade, investment, financing , Beijing: A Steady Hand and development in the North . We are likely to see Beijing playing a steady, supportive role in the Korean peace Steady Multilateral Diplomacy initiative. Again, history should be consid - Achieving this breakthrough in North ered. The North Korean nuclear crises of Korean relations would demand bold the last two decades played out against the leadership and skilled diplomacy on the dramatic backdrop of China’s rapid “peace - part of the United States. The first step is ful rise” and the North’s equally precipitous bilateral—signaling to Pyongyang that decline. China and North Korea pursued America wants to inaugurate a new way of radically divergent socio-economic paths doing business. But the bilateral move must through the late twentieth century . North be accomplished in tandem with nimble Korea reached its peak of economic and multilateral diplomacy, to ensure the key industrial development in the mid-1970s, players—South Korea, China, Japan , and at which point its per capita gross domestic Russia—are fully vested with us in this en - product ( GDP ) was many times greater than deavor.