Nathanael Greene and the Myth of the Valiant Few
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NATHANAEL GREENE AND THE MYTH OF THE VALIANT FEW David R. Smith Dissertation Prepared for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS December 2017 APPROVED: Guy Chet, Committee Chair Christopher Fuhrmann, Committee Member Richard McCaslin, Committee Member Walter Roberts, Committee Member Richard Vedder, Committee Member Harold Tanner, Chair of the Department of History David Holdeman, Dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Social Sciences Victor Prybutok, Dean of the Toulouse Graduate School Smith, David R. Nathanael Greene and the Myth of the Valiant Few. Doctor of Philosophy (History), December 2017, 308 pp., 8 maps, bibliography, 38 primary resource titles, 308 secondary resource titles. Nathan Greene is the Revolutionary Warfare general most associated with unconventional warfare. The historiography of the southern campaign of the revolution uniformly agrees he was a guerrilla leader. Best evidence shows, however, that Nathanael Greene was completely conventional -- that his strategy, operations, tactics, and logistics all strongly resembled that of Washington in the northern theater and of the British commanders against whom he fought in the south. By establishing that Greene was within the mainstream of eighteenth-century military science this dissertation also challenges the prevailing historiography of the American Revolution in general, especially its military aspects. The historiography overwhelmingly argues the myth of the valiant few -- the notion that a minority of colonists persuaded an apathetic majority to follow them in overthrowing the royal government, eking out an improbable victory. Broad and thorough research indicates the Patriot faction in the American Revolution was a clear majority not only throughout the colonies but in each individual colony. Far from the miraculous victory current historiography postulates, American independence was based on the most prosaic of principles -- manpower advantage. Copyright 2017 by David R. Smith ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I want to thank Dr. Guy Chet for his advice and leadership during the preparation of this dissertation. I also want to thank the members of my dissertation committee for their time and input: Dr. Christopher Fuhrmann, Dr. Richard McCaslin, Dr. Walter Roberts, and Dr. Richard Vedder. In addition, I want to thank Dr. Roberts for his initial willingness to take a chance on me and his guidance during my early semesters in the department. Nothing required him to take that chance, and the opportunity it gave me is one for which I will always be grateful. I would also like to thank Dr. Robert Citino for his service on my board during my comprehensive examinations. All maps not otherwise acknowledged are courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy at West Point. The map of the Territorial Departments of the Continental Army on page 72 is from The Continental Army, by Robert K. Wright, Jr., published by the Center for Military History. The map on page 151 is courtesy of the Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division. I dedicate this dissertation to the two greatest women I have ever known: Vickie Lynn Swaringen Smith – who made it possible and Kellye Renae Guinn Smith – who made it worthwhile. Between the two of them, God never blessed any man more than he has blessed me. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................................................................... iii LIST OF MAPS ................................................................................................................................... v CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 2. PROLOGUE: THE EARLY YEARS ................................................................................. 25 CHAPTER 3. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ....................................................................................... 31 Civilian Control of the Military .......................................................................................... 32 Induction and Desertion ................................................................................................... 48 Civilians in the War Zone .................................................................................................. 60 CHAPTER 4. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION ................................................................... 68 CHAPTER 5. LEADERSHIP AND TRAINING ..................................................................................... 92 Leadership ......................................................................................................................... 93 Training ........................................................................................................................... 100 CHAPTER 6. LOGISTICS ................................................................................................................ 107 CHAPTER 7. INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS ................................................................ 127 Intelligence, Counter Intelligence, and Security ............................................................. 127 Command and Control .................................................................................................... 142 CHAPTER 8. STRATEGY ................................................................................................................ 156 CHAPTER 9. OPERATIONS ........................................................................................................... 182 CHAPTER 10. TACTICS ................................................................................................................. 208 CHAPTER 11. SOUTH CAROLINA: A CASE STUDY ........................................................................ 225 CHAPTER 12. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 255 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................................ 286 iv LIST OF MAPS Page MAP 1: Continental Army Territorial Departments ..................................................................... 75 MAP 2: The Battle of Guilford Courthouse ................................................................................. 150 MAP 3: Map of North America showing the Proclamation Line of 1763 .................................. 159 MAP 4: Population Density in the Thirteen Colonies, 1775 ...................................................... 161 MAP 5: The War in the South, 1781 .......................................................................................... 172 MAP 6: Operations in New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania May 1777-July1778 ............. 188 MAP 7: The War in the South, 1781 .......................................................................................... 192 MAP 8: Battle of Guilford Courthouse ....................................................................................... 210 v CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Nathanael Greene emerged into the historical limelight in a starring role, Revolutionary War general. Most Patriot generals served in the French and Indian War, the Indian wars, or both. Greene’s only military experience prior to the American Revolution was local militia training. He began the war as a private, was almost immediately promoted to brigadier general, and with only one significant lapse performed well at every position he held, command or staff. Such inexperience was unusual but not unheard of for a person who attained Greene’s stature. This dissertation is not a biography of Greene in the traditional sense, or even a military biography. Rather, it examines individual aspects of Greene’s military practice, showing that all were well within the mainstream of eighteenth-century warfare. In the process, it proves that Greene, although an excellent general, succeeded primarily because he held a significant manpower advantage over his enemy. Several twentieth-century historians argue that Greene’s southern operations were significantly different from those that Continental Army Commander-in-Chief George Washington or Major General Horatio Gates conducted in the north. These scholars suggest Greene was an innovator who brought new insights to eighteenth-century military campaigns. According to them, Greene’s military operations resembled modern irregular warfare, and Greene was a harbinger of modern guerrilla tactics.1 Other historians hail Greene’s 1 John Morgan Dederer, “Making Bricks without Straw: Nathanael Greene’s Southern Campaigns and Mao Tse- Tung’s Mobile War,” Military Affairs 47:3 (1983): 115-117; Steven E. Siry, Greene: Revolutionary General (Washington: Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), xii, 64-65; Don Higginbotham, “Some Reflections on the South in the 1 achievements without focusing on his methods – they point out that Greene was General Washington’s best subordinate commander and that he excelled in administrative ability and civil-military relations2 – but they generally accept the judgment that as a commander, Greene was an original and innovative military mind, who foreshadowed various elements of modern warfare. This dissertation does not dispute Greene’s competence; what this dissertation challenges is the notion that Greene was unconventional. Most American Revolution historians writing on the southern campaign focus