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The Development of Theory of Mind According to False Belief Performance of Children Ages 3 to 5

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The Development of Theory of Mind According to False Belief Performance of Children Ages 3 to 5 Kuram ve Uygulamada Eğitim Bilimleri • Educational Sciences: Theory & Practice - 11(4) • Autumn • 1821-1826 ©2011 Eğitim Danışmanlığı ve Araştırmaları İletişim Hizmetleri Tic. Ltd. Şti. The Development of Theory of Mind According to False Belief Performance of Children Ages 3 to 5 Bahar KEÇELİ KAYSILI a Funda ACARLAR Ankara University Ankara University Abstract This study has examined the role of age in the false belief understanding in typically developing children and to determine if the different type of false belief tasks affects performance on false belief. The survey research de- sign was used. False belief understanding was measured in 72 children between the ages of 3.00 to 5.11 year old. The sample consisted of 12 children in each age group and age groups were divided into six month period. Four false belief tasks were conducted. The findings of this study indicated that the false belief understanding of Turkish speaking children between the ages of 3.0 to 5.11 year old had some similarities as well as some dif- ferences to children speaking other than Turkish. 3 year old children seemed to have developed an understan- ding of the own false belief before they developed a clear understanding of others’ false belief. It was clear that the rapid change of understanding false belief seemed to have appeared at 4.6 year old. Key Words Theory of Mind, False Belief, Mind Reading. Theory of mind refers to an understanding of men- use of mental state words and pretend play (Miller, tal states such as belief, desire and knowledge that 2006). Between 3 and 5 years of age, important de- enables us to explain and predict others’ behavior velopmental changes in theory of mind take place (Wellman & Estes, 1986). In brief, theory of mind (de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Flavell, Everett, Croft, is to be able to reflect on the contents of one’s own & Flavell, 1981; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; and other minds (Baron-Cohen, 2000). Develop- Youngblade & Dunn, 1995). Two year old children mental evidence suggests that such thinking is not might understand desires, perception, and emo- automatic for young children, who must develop a tions (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995; Wellman, Philips, number of skills in order to reach the adult level & Rodriguez, 2000). Children at three years can of competence in understanding of mental states. distinguish between the mental and physical Precursors of theory of mind include joint atten- worlds and from three years of age children can tion, appreciation of intentionality, recognition grasp the subjectivity of thoughts (Flavell, Flavell, that different people have different perspectives, Green, & Moses, 1990; Watson, Gelman, & Well- man, 1998; Wellman & Estes, 1986). Three and four year olds also distinguish thinking from do- a Bahar KEÇELİ KAYSILI is currently a lecturer and ing (Flavell, Green & Flavell, 1995). Mental states a doctorate student at the Department of Special are not only non-physical; they also provide the Education, Her research interests include teac- causes and explanations for persons’ actions and hing language and communication to children experiences (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). Most with autism and developmental relationships subsequent research on the development of theory between language and theory of mind. Corres- pondence: Bahar Keçeli Kaysılı, Ankara Univer- of mind has concerned false beliefs between 3 and sity, Faculty of Educational Sciences, Department 5 years of age, and their role in the prediction or of Special Education, Ankara/Turkey. E-mail: explanation of behavior, and in attempts to manip- [email protected] Phone: +90 312 ulate behavior. Wimmer and Perner (1983) showed 363 33 50/3014. 1821 EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES: THEORY & PRACTICE that a full-fledged TOM doesn’t develop before the Without doubt, there is a relation between lan- age of 3/4. They set up a series of experimental tests guage and false belief understanding. There are in order to check whether children between 3 and three possibilities about this relation: theory of 5 years of age were able to attribute a false belief mind depends on language; or language depends to someone else. Comprehending false belief is on theory of mind; or both depend on a third fac- the clearest sign of understanding a critical aspect tor (Astington & Jenkins, 1999). Granti (2004) of the mind: its subjectivity and its susceptibility suggested that Turkish speaking children start to to manipulation by information (Dennett, 1978; establish some understanding about other minds Wimmer & Perner, 1983). starting around 3 years of age. Children’s perfor- mance revealed highest level of understanding for Widely used versions of first order false belief tasks the verb sanmak “think with implication of false are the appearance reality distinction, the unex- belief” as compared to other mental verbs, but pected contents false belief and change in location understanding of mental verbs did not precede tasks. They are called first-order tests because they false belief understanding. Aksu-Koç, Aydın, Avcı, only involve inferring one person’s mental state. Sefer and Yaşa (2005), suggested that a sig¬nificant According to Wellman et al. (2001) study allowed interaction effect between age and type of task an estimate of the probability of passing the false showing that 4 year-olds scored higher than 3 year- belief task at various ages: At 2.5 years, children olds on false belief tasks but no age effect found were less than likely to pass false belief tasks; at 3 on appearance-reality tasks. Shatz, Diesendruck, years 8 months, children were 50% correct; and at Martinez-Beck and Akar, (2003), investigated 4 years 8 months children were about 75% correct. whether differences in the lexical explicitness with Younger children (3 years and 5 months or young- which languages express false belief influence chil- er) either fail or perform at chance levels, whereas dren’s performance on standard false belief tasks. older children pass the task, giving an adult like Bayramoğlu and Hohenberger (2007) investigated answer at better than chance levels (Flavell, 1999; the theory of mind development of 4 and 5 year old Moses & Flavell, 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Turkish preschoolers. The results indicated that a Individual differences in children’s theory of mind main effect of age was found. Researchers suggest have been proposed by Bartsch and Estes (1996). that 4 year old children can predict the actions of These are individual differences in antecedent someone with a false belief and there are measur- causes, individual differences in the consequences able individual differences in the mind reading of arriving early or late to a theory of mind, the abilities of young children (Wellman et al., 2001). possibility of qualitative differences in theory of Therefore, it is important to conduct studies in mind across individuals (family variables, other languages other than English. It would certainly cognitive and language abilities and various social add weight to findings about mind reading abili- outcome measures). Children in different countries ties of young children if they are replicated. Also it performed differently in the false belief tasks: At 44 is important to determine the relationship between months, American children were 50% correct, Aus- false belief understanding and other areas like lan- tralians were 69% correct and Japanese were 40% guage, cognitive constructs and social outcomes.In correct (Wellman et al., 2001). Nevertheless, within Turkey there are several studies investigated theory each country the age profile had a similar shape, of mind performances of children between 3 to 5 with poor performance in younger children and years old (Aksu-Koç et al., 2005; Granti, 2004). In better performance in older children. The research these studies standard false belief tasks were ad- literature suggests that there are measurable indi- ministered. Also in this study standard false belief vidual differences in the mind reading abilities of tasks (appearance-reality and unexpected content young children (Lewis & Osborne, 1990; Slaughter and three versions of change in location) were ad- & Gopnik, 1996), and that these individual differ- ministered. ences are correlated with variables like family vari- The aim of the present study was to examine the ables, other cognitive constructs like language and role of age in the false belief understanding in various social outcome measures (Hughes, 1998; Turkish speaking children and to determine if the Jenkins & Astington, 2000; Ruffman, Perner, & Par- different type of false belief tasks affects perform- kin, 1999; Slaughter & Repacholi, 2003; Yağmurlu, ance on false belief. Kazak-Berument, & Çelimli, 2005). 1822 KEÇELİ KAYSILI, ACARLAR / The Development of Theory of Mind According to False Belief Performance of Children... Method rally specific and syntactically straightforward enable most 3 year olds to attribute false beliefs of Model others. Therefore questions were posed with tem- While conducting the research, which was aimed poral markers and with specific false belief verb to determine the role of age in the false belief un- form “san” (What will X think (san) is inside the derstanding in Turkish speaking children and to box before I opened it?). A score of 0 to 3 was given determine if the different type of false belief tasks for the unexpected content task. affects performance on false belief, the survey Three “change in location” false belief tasks (Baron- research design was
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