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AZZEDDINE M. AZZAM Professor Department of Agricultural AZZEDDINE M. AZZAM Professor Department of Agricultural Economics 103E Filley Hall University of Nebraska-Lincoln Lincoln, Nebraska 68583-0922 USA Ph: 402-472-5326 E-mail: [email protected] Website: aazzam.unl.edu Professional Positions: Professor, University of Nebraska (July 1, 1996-Present) Senior Economic Advisor, Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Dubai, UAE (Feb 1, 2010 - Dec 31, 2011) Visiting Professor, University of Dubai, Dubai, UAE (Feb 1, 2010 - Dec 31, 2011) Associate Professor, University of Nebraska (July 1, 1991-June 30, 1996) Assistant Professor, University of Nebraska (April 1, 1987-June 30, 1991) Other Appointments: Chair, Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Dubai, Dubai, UAE (Fall 2010-Spring 2011) Visiting Professor, Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Dubai, UAE (Sept 2008- Sept 2009) Associate Editor, Middle East Development Journal 2008-2011 Founder and Managing Editor Review of Undergraduate Research in Agricultural and Life Sciences 2006- Founder and Editor, Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization 2001- Founder and Director, Center for Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization 2001-2012 Invited lecturer, NOVA-University Doctoral Course (Empirical Analysis of Firm and Industry Behaviour in the Food Marketing Chain), Sweden (June 7-19, 2004) Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor, Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala, Sweden (July 1999-June 2000) Visiting Professor, Universita Cattolica Del Sacro Cuore, Italy (May 1998) Teaching Fellow , HIID, Harvard University (Summer 1997) 1 Visiting Professor, Centre Regional de la Recherche Agronomique, Morocco (1993-94) Education: Ph.D.1984 Agricultural Economics, University of Nebraska, USA M.S. 1980 Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin, USA B.S. 1977 Business and Economics, University of Wisconsin, USA Research Interests: Applied Microeconomics, Agricultural & Food Economics, Empirical Industrial Organization, Quantitative Policy Analysis. Teaching Experience: Undergraduate: Microeconomics, Applied Statistics, Operations Research, Econo- metrics. Master's: Applied Microeconomic Theory, Demand and Price Analysis, Math- ematical Economics, Research Methods, Estimation and Welfare Analysis with Demand Systems. PhD: Empirical Industrial Organization, Quantitative Analysis for Microeco- nomic Research, Integrating Quantitative Methods and Economic Theory, Research Methods. MBA: Managerial Economics. Honors and Awards: Outstanding Journal Article, Honorable Mention, Canadian Agricultural Eco- nomics Society, 2011 Panelist, African Development Bank Annual Meetings, Lisbon, June 9-10, 2011 Debate Moderator, Dubai Dialogue 2011: Responsible Recovery, 27 April 2011, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Conference Chairperson, Dubai Dialogue 2010: Good Governance Matters, 10 October 2010, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Conference Chairperson, Dubai Dialogue 2010: Sustainability Matters, 26 May 2010, Dubai, United Arab Emirates Commencement Speaker - UNL Doctoral Commencement & Hooding Ceremony, May 9, 2008 2008 Excellence in Graduate Education Award - UNL Best Paper Award - The Economic Research Forum 14th Annual Conference, 28-30 December 2007, Cairo, Egypt 2 Invited speaker - the plenary sessions of the Hassan II Academy of Sciences and Techniques, Rabat, Morocco, March 21-23, 2007 PHI BETA DELTA, Honor Society of International Scholars (inducted 11/09/2006) Darrell W. Nelson Excellence in Graduate Student Advising Award (2005 Nom- inee) Listed among the Top 1000 Most-Cited Economists In The World (1990-2000) GSO Faculty Appreciation Award, Graduate Student Organization, 2004 Research Fellow, Economic Research Forum, 2000- Fulbright Scholar, 1999 Teaching Fellow (invited), HIID, Harvard University (Summer 1997) Member Future Nebraska Task force Faculty Senate Theme Editor, UNESCO Encyclopedia of Life Sciences Outstanding Recent Alumnus Award, University of Wisconsin, 1991 GSO Faculty Appreciation Award, Graduate Student Organization, 1991 Recognition Award for Contributions to Students, UNL Parents Association and Teaching Council, 1989 Finalist, Outstanding Young Professor Award, Lincoln Jaycees, 1989 Sigma Xi, 1988 Outstanding Ph.D. Student Award, UNL, 1982 Gamma Sigma Delta Honorary, 1981 I. REFEREED PUBLICATIONS Azzam, A., G. Nene, and K. Schoengold. 2014. "Hog Industry Structure and the Strin- gency of Environmental Regulation." Canadian Journal of Agicultural Economics (forthcoming). Azzam, A. and B. Rettab. 2014. "Optimal Commodity Taxation and Consumer Welfare: An Empirical Application to the UAE." International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies (forthcoming). Azzam, A. and B. Rettab. 2014. "Estimation and Application of a Complete Demand System for the UAE." International Journal of Emerging Markets (forthcoming). Bairagi, S. and A. Azzam. 2014. "Does the Grameen Bank Exert Market Power over Borrowers." Applied Economics Letters 21:866-869. Nene, G., A. Yiannaka, A. Azzam, and S. Kachman. 2013. "The Effect of Wal-Mart on the Economic Growth of Nebraska Counties." International Research Journal of Applied Finance 4:1394-1406. 3 Bouras, D. and A. Azzam. 2013. Market and Welfare Effects of Multi-product Merg- ers with Reference to the Tyson-IBP Merger. Journal of Business and Economics Research 11:521-536. Azzam, A. and B. Rettab. 2013. "Food Price Cap Policy and Household Welfare in the UAE." International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies 6:64-77. Azzam, A. and B. Rettab. 2013. "Market Power versus Cost-Efficiency Under Uncertainty in the GCC Banking Industry." Applied Economics 15:2011-2022. Azzam, A. and B. Rettab. 2012. "A Welfare Measure of Consumer Vunlnerability to Rising Food Prices of food Imports in the UAE." Food Policy 5:554-560. Azzam, A. and B. Rettab. 2011. "Are Restrictions on Foreign-Ownership Counter- Productive: Evidence from Dubai, United Arab Emirates." International Journal of Economic Policy in Emerging Economies 4:1-19. Rettab, B. and A. Azzam. 2011. "Performance of Family and Non-Family Firms with Self-Selection: Evidence from Dubai." Modern Economy 2:625-6432. Panagiotou, D. and A. Azzam. 2010. "Trade Bans, Imperfect Competition, and Welfare: BSE and the US Beef Industry."Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 58:109- 129. Rettab, B., T. Kwaak, and A. Azzam. 2010. " An Optimization Procedure for Estimating the Stock of Capital: Application to Ten Production Sectors of Dubai." Regional and Sectoral Economic Studies 10:113-119. Azzam, A., B. Rettab, and M. Morada. 2010. "Revealed Comparative Advantage - Where It is Least Expected: Dubai."International Journal of Trade and Global Markets 3:199-216. Achy, L. A. Azzam, and K. Sekkat. 2009. "Coping with Data Limitations when Measuring Oligopoly Power in a Developing Country." Regional and Sectoral Economic Studies 9:85-96. Rettab, B. and A. Azzam. 2008. "Re-Export Intensity and Trade Costs: Port Facilities and Services." Maritime Economics & Logistics 10:229-242. Azzam, A. and H. Andersson. 2008. "Measuring Price Effects of Concentration in Mixed Oligopoly: An Application to the Swedish Beef-Slaughter Industry." Journal of In- dustry, Competition, and Trade 8:21-31. 4 Coelho, A.R., D.R. Mark, and A. Azzam. 2008. "Understanding Basis Risk Associated with Fed Cattle Livestock Risk Protection Insurance." Journal of Extension 46:Article 1R1B6. Azzam, A. and C. Skinner. 2007. "Vertical Economies and the Structure of U.S. Hog Farms." Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 55:349-364. Njoroge, K., E. Yiannaka, K. Giannakas, and A. Azzam . 2007. "Market and Welfare Effects of the U.S. Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act." Southern Economic Journal 74:290-311. Azzam, A. 2007. Review of The Nature of the Farm - Contracts, Risk, and Organization in Agriculture by Douglas W. Allen and Dean Lueck. Agribusiness: An International Journal 23:293-294. Schroeter, J., A. Azzam, and D. Aiken. 2006. "Anti-Corporate Farming Laws and Industry Structure: The Case of Cattle Feeding." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 88:1000-1014. Schroeter, J. A. Azzam and M. Zhang. 2006. "Measuring Market Power in Bilateral Oligopoly." Chapter 6 in H. Kaiser and N. Suzuki (eds), New Empirical Industrial Organization & the Food System. Peter Lang Publishing Company, New York. Azzam, A. and E. Pagoulatos. 2006. "Testing Oligopolistic and Oligopsonistic Behavior: An Application to the U.S. Meat Packing Industry." Chapter 8 in H. Kaiser and N. Suzuki (eds), New Empirical Industrial Organization & the Food System. Peter Lang Publishing Company, New York. Azzam, A. and K. Sekkat. 2005. "Measuring Total-Factor Productivity Growth under Drought Conditions: The Case of Morocco." Journal of North African Studies 10:19- 32. Azzam, A., E. Lopez, and R. Lopez. 2004. "Imperfect Competition and Total Factor Productivity Growth." Journal of Productivity Analysis 23:173-184. Schroeter, J. R. and A. Azzam. 2004. "Captive Supplies and Cash Market Prices for Fed Cattle: The Role of Delivery Timing Incentives." Agribusiness: An International Journal 20:347-362. Azzam, A. and S. Salvador. 2004. "Information Pooling and Collusion: An Empirical Test." Information Economics and Policy 16:275-286. 5 Azzam, A. 2003. "Market Transparency and Market Structure: The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85:387-395. Schroeter, J. and A. Azzam. 2003. "Captive Supplies and the Spot Market Price of Fed Cattle: The Plant-Level Relationship." Agribusiness: An International Journal 19:489-504.
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