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Defunis V. Odegaard: Opinion of the Supreme Court

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Defunis V. Odegaard: Opinion of the Supreme Court UCLA National Black Law Journal Title DeFunis v. Odegaard: Opinion of the Supreme Court Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/04w3r3n1 Journal National Black Law Journal, 3(3) ISSN 0896-0194 Author NBLJ, [No author] Publication Date 1973 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California THE BLA CK LA W JO URNA L PAGE 269 THE BLACK LA WIOURNAL PAGE 269 DeFUNIS v. ODEGAARD 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973) SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON Defendants, who include the members of the cause and that the complaint failed to the Board of Regents of the University of state a claim upon which relief could be Washington, the President of the University, granted. and the Dean and certain members of the Ad- The superior court dismissed that portion missions Committee of the University of of the plaintiff's complaint seeking monetary Washington School of Law, appeal from a damages. The balance of defendants' motion judgment ordering them to admit plaintiff to dismiss was denied, and a temporary in- Marco DeFunis, Jr., as a first-year student to junction was entered enjoining the defendants the University of Washington School of Law, from admitting students to the law school "in as of September 22, 1971. a number which would preclude the admission Broadly phrased, the major question of plaintiff, Marco DeFunis, Jr., to the 1971- presented herein is whether the law school 72 first year class, should his admission even- may, in consonance with the equal protection tually be ordered by the court." After a non- provisions of the state and federal con- jury trial, the court ruled that in denying stitutions, consider the racial or ethnic plaintiff admission to the law school, the background of applicants as one factor in the University of Washington had discriminated selection of students. against him in violation of the equal protec- Marco DeFunis, Jr. (hereinafter plaintiff), tion of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth his wife, and his parents commenced an action amendment to the United States in the superior court, alleging that plaintiff, an Constitution.... applicant for admission to the University of [DeFunis' application to the law school was Washington School of Law (hereinafter law considered by a committee of six faculty school) for the class commencing September members and three law students. The law 1971, had been wrongfully denied admission school received 1601 applications for admis- in that no preference was given to residents of sion in the fall of 1971, and planned to accept the state of Washington in the admissions some 200 applications in order to arrive at a process and that persons were admitted to the first-year class that would number 145 to 150. law school with lesser qualifications than Most of the applicants were considered by the those of plaintiff. The complaint asked that committee to be qualified for law study. the court order the defendants to admit and [Each applicant was assigned a "Predicted enroll plaintiff in the law school in the fall of First-Year Average" (PFYA), based on un- 1971 and, upon the failure of defendants to do dergraduate grades and test scores. The files so, that plaintiffs recover damages in the sum of applicants with PFYAs of over 77 were of not less than $50,000. reviewed by the full committee and acted The superior court granted a temporary upon (mostly favorably) as they came in. The restraining order and order to show cause, files of applicants with PFYAs under 74.5 restraining defendants from selecting students were reviewed by the committee chairman, for admission to the law school during the and many were rejected. Some, however, were pendency of the action. Defendants, in turn, placed in a group for later review by the com- moved to dismiss the complaint on the mittee. The files of applicants with PFYAs grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction of between 74.5 and 77 were held until the pass- PAGE 270 THE BLA CK LA W JO URNA L PAGE 270 THE BLACK LA WJOURNAL ing of the application deadline, so that the full II. pool of applicants could be considered for the remaining positions in the entering class. The essence of plaintiff's Fourteenth Applicants who had previously been admitted Amendment argument is that the law school to the law school, but who had been unable to violated his right to equal protection of the enroll because of military service, were placed laws by denying him admission, yet accepting in this pool even though their PFYAs were certain minority applicants with lower below 74.5. Similarly, all files of "minority" PFYAs than plaintiff who, but for their applicants - defined by the committee as minority status, would not have been ad- "Black Americans, Chicano Americans, mitted. American Indians and Philippine Americans" To answer this contention we consider three - were placed in this pool, regardless of implicit, subordinate questions: (A) whether PFYA. race can ever be considered as one factor in [DeFunis had junior-senior grades averag- the admissions policy of a state law school or ing 3.71. He took the LSAT three times, and whether racial classifications are per se un- his scores (512, 566, 688) average 582; his constitutional because the equal protection of writing test scores averaged 61. Under the the laws requires that law school admissions U.W. system, his PFYA was 76.23. His file be "colorblind"; (B) if consideration of race is was placed in the pool. not per se unconstitutional, what is the ap- [DeFunis was placed on a waiting list, and propriate standard of review to be applied in ultimately not admitted. Of those applicants determining the constitutionality of such a admitted, 74 had lower PFYAs than did classification; and (C) when the appropriate DeFunis. Of the 74, 36 were minority standard is applied does the specific minority students, 22 were returning veterans, and 16 admissions policy employed by the law school were thought by the committee to deserve ad- pass constitutional muster? mission "on the basis of other information contained in their files." Of the 36 minority students admitted, 18 actually enrolled. The A. trial court found that some of the minority ad- mittees had undergraduate grades and LSAT Relying solely on Brown v. Board of Educa- 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 scores that would have placed them in the tion, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. group rejected by the committee chairman, (1954), the trial court held that a state law but for their racial or ethnic characteristics.] school can never consider race as one criterion in its selection of first-year students. In The trial court concluded . that, in denying holding that all such racial classifications are plaintiff admission to the law school, the per se unconstitutional, the trial court stated University of Washington discriminated in its oral opinion: against him and did not accord to him equal Since no more than 150 applicants were to protection of the laws as guaranteed by the be admitted the admission of less qualified fourteenth amendment to the United States resulted in a denial of places to those Constitution; and therefore, that plaintiff otherwise qualified. The plaintiff and others in should be admitted to the law school for the this group have not, in my opinion, been ac- class of 1974, beginning September 22, 1971. corded equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In 1954 the United States Supreme Court decided that public education must be equally I. available to all regardless of race. After that decision the Fourteenth Amend- ment could not longer be stretched to accom- [The Washington Supreme Court conclud- modate the needs of any race. Policies of dis- ed that DeFunis had standing to challenge the crimination will inevitably lead to reprisals. In law school's minority-admissions policy.] my opinion the only safe rule is to treat all THE BLACK LA W JOURNAL PAGE 271 THE BLACK LA WJOURNAL PAGE 271 races alike, and I feel that is what is required preferences to certain disadvantaged racial under the equal protection clause. minorities will be to stigmatize whites. In Brown v. Board of Education, supra, the O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing Supreme Court addressed a question of the Access of Minority Groups to Higher primary importance at page 493, 74 S.Ct. at Education, 80 Yale L.J. 699, 713 (1971). page 691: [6] While Brown v. Board of Education, Does segregation of children in public schools supra, certainly provides a starting point for solely on the basis of race, even though the our analysis of the instant case, we do not physical facilities and other "tangible" factors agree with the trial court that Brown is dis- may be equal, deprive the children of the positive here. Subsequent decisions of the minority group of equal educational oppor- United States Supreme Court have made it tunities? We believe that it does. clear that in some circumstances a racial The Court in Brown held the equal protec- criterion may be used - and indeed in some tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment circumstances must be used - by public prohibits state law from requiring the opera- educational institutions in bringing about tion of racially segregated, dual school racial balance. School systems which were systems of public education and requires that formerly segregated de jure now have an the system be converted into a unitary, non- affirmative duty to remedy racial imbal- racially segregated system. In so holding, the ance .... Court noted that segregation inevitably [7] Thus, the Constitution is color con- stigmatizes Black children: scious to prevent the perpetuation of discrimi- To separate them from others of similar age nation and to undo the effects of past segrega- and qualifications solely because of their race tion.
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