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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V. AKINS Et Al. Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit

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FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION V. AKINS Et Al. Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 524US1 Unit: $U72 [09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN OCTOBER TERM, 1997 11 Syllabus FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION v. AKINS et al. certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit No. 96±1590. Argued January 14, 1998ÐDecided June 1, 1998 The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) seeks to remedy corruption of the political process. As relevant here, it imposes exten- sive recordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon ªpolitical commit- tee[s],º which include ªany committee, club, association or other group of persons which receivesº more than $1,000 in ªcontributionsº or ªwhich makesº more than $1,000 in ªexpendituresº in any given year, 2 U. S. C. § 431(4)(A) (emphasis added), ªfor the purpose of in¯uencing any election for Federal of®ce,º §§ 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). Assistance given to help a particular candidate will not count toward the $1,000 ªexpenditureº ceil- ing if it takes the form of a ªcommunicationº by a ªmembership organi- zation or corporationº ªto its membersºÐas long as the organization is not ªorganized primarily for the purpose of in¯uencing [any individual's] nomination...orelection.º § 431(9)(B)(iii). Respondents, voters with views often opposed to those of the American Israel Public Affairs Com- mittee (AIPAC), ®led a compliant with petitioner Federal Election Com- mission (FEC), asking the FEC to ®nd that AIPAC had violated FECA and, among other things, to order AIPAC to make public the information that FECA demands of political committees. In dismissing the com- plaint, the FEC found that AIPAC's communications fell outside FECA's membership communications exception. Nonetheless, it concluded, AIPAC was not a ªpolitical committeeº because, as an issue-oriented lobbying organization, its major purpose was not the nomination or election of candidates. The District Court granted the FEC summary judgment when it reviewed the determination, but the en banc Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the FEC's major purpose test improperly interpreted FECA's de®nition of a political committee. The case presents this Court with two questions: (1) whether respondents had standing to challenge the FEC's decision, and (2) whether an organi- zation falls outside FECA's de®nition of a ªpolitical committeeº because ªits major purposeº is not ªthe nomination or election of candidates.º Held: 1. Respondents, as voters seeking information to which they believe FECA entitles them, have standing to challenge the FEC's decision not to bring an enforcement action. Pp. 19±26. 524US1 Unit: $U72 [09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN 12 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. AKINS Syllabus (a) Respondents satisfy prudential standing requirements. FECA speci®cally provides that ª[a]ny personº who believes FECA has been violated may ®le a complaint with the FEC, § 437g(a)(1), and that ª[a]ny party aggrievedº by an FEC order dismissing such party's complaint may seek district court review of the dismissal, § 437g(a)(8)(A). His- tory associates the word ªaggrievedº with a congressional intent to cast the standing net broadlyÐbeyond the common-law interests and sub- stantive statutory rights upon which ªprudentialº standing tradition- ally rested. E. g., FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470. Moreover, respondents' asserted injuryÐtheir failure to obtain relevant informationÐis injury of a kind that FECA seeks to address. Pp. 19±20. (b) Respondents also satisfy constitutional standing requirements. Their inability to obtain information that, they claim, FECA requires AIPAC to make public meets the genuine ªinjury in factº requirement that helps assure that the court will adjudicate ª[a] concrete, living contest between adversaries.º Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 460 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). United States v. Richardson, 418 U. S. 166, distinguished. The fact that the harm at issue is widely shared does not deprive Congress of constitutional power to authorize its vindi- cation in the federal courts where the harm is concrete. See Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U. S. 440, 449±450. The informa- tional injury here, directly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is suf®ciently concrete. Respondents have also satis®ed the re- maining two constitutional standing requirements: The harm asserted is ªfairly traceableº to the FEC's decision not to issue its complaint, and the courts in this case can ªredressº that injury. Pp. 20±25. (c) Finally, FECA explicitly indicates a congressional intent to alter the traditional view that agency enforcement decisions are not sub- ject to judicial review. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, 832, distin- guished. P. 26. 2. Because of the unusual and complex circumstances in which the case arises, the second question presented cannot be addressed here, and the case must be remanded. After the FEC determined that many persons belonging to AIPAC were not ªmembersº under FEC regula- tions, the Court of Appeals overturned those regulations in another case, in part because it thought they de®ned membership organizations too narrowly in light of an organization's First Amendment right to communicate with its members. The FEC's new ªmembership organi- zationº rules could signi®cantly affect the interpretative issue presented by Question Two. Thus, the FEC should proceed to determine whether or not AIPAC's expenditures qualify as ªmembership communicationsº under the new rules, and thereby fall outside the scope of ªexpendi- 524US1 Unit: $U72 [09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 524 U. S. 11 (1998) 13 Opinion of the Court turesº that could qualify it as a ªpolitical committee.º If it decides that the communications here do not qualify, then the lower courts can still evaluate the signi®cance of the communicative context in which the case arises. If, on the other hand, it decides that they do qualify, the matter will become moot. Pp. 26±29. 101 F. 3d 731, vacated and remanded. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., ®led a dissenting opinion, in which O’Connor and Thomas, JJ., joined, post, p. 29. Solicitor General Waxman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Acting Solici- tor General Dellinger, Malcolm L. Stewart, Lawrence M. Noble, Richard B. Bader, and David Kolker. Daniel M. Schember argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Abdeen Jabara.* Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has determined that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is not a ªpolitical committeeº as de®ned by the Federal Elec- tion Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA or Act), 86 Stat. 11, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 431(4), and, for that reason, the FEC has refused to require AIPAC to make disclosures re- garding its membership, contributions, and expenditures that FECA would otherwise require. We hold that re- spondents, a group of voters, have standing to challenge the *Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were ®led for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Joel M. Gora, Steven R. Shapiro, and Ar- thur N. Eisenberg; and for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc., by James Bopp, Jr. A. Stephen Hut, Jr., Roger M. Witten, Jeffrey P. Singdahlsen, and Don- ald J. Simon ®led a brief for Common Cause as amicus curiae urging af®rmance. Briefs of amici curiae were ®led for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee by Theodore B. Olson, Mel Levine, Thomas G. Hungar, and Philip Friedman; and for the Brennan Center for Justice by Burt Neuborne. 524US1 Unit: $U72 [09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN 14 FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N v. AKINS Opinion of the Court Commission's determination in court, and we remand this case for further proceedings. I In light of our disposition of this case, we believe it neces- sary to describe its procedural background in some detail. As commonly understood, the FECA seeks to remedy any actual or perceived corruption of the political process in sev- eral important ways. The Act imposes limits upon the amounts that individuals, corporations, ªpolitical commit- teesº (including political action committees), and political parties can contribute to a candidate for federal political of- ®ce. §§ 441a(a), 441a(b), 441b. The Act also imposes limits on the amount these individuals or entities can spend in co- ordination with a candidate. (It treats these expenditures as ªcontributions toº a candidate for purposes of the Act.) § 441a(a)(7)(B)(i). As originally written, the Act set limits upon the total amount that a candidate could spend of his own money, and upon the amounts that other individuals, corporations, and ªpolitical committeesº could spend inde- pendent of a candidateÐthough the Court found that cer- tain of these last-mentioned limitations violated the First Amendment. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 39±59 (1976) (per curiam); Federal Election Comm'n v. National Con- servative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985); cf. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Fed- eral Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 613±619 (1996) (opinion of Breyer, J.). This case concerns requirements in the Act that extend beyond these better-known contribution and expenditure limitations. In particular, the Act imposes extensive rec- ordkeeping and disclosure requirements upon groups that fall within the Act's de®nition of a ªpolitical committee.º Those groups must register with the FEC, appoint a treas- urer, keep names and addresses of contributors, track the amount and purpose of disbursements, and ®le complex FEC 524US1 Unit: $U72 [09-06-00 17:28:15] PAGES PGT: OPIN Cite as: 524 U.
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