11 2013 HOEP/AP/SIPA

The conference: last exit peace? by Florence Gaub

On May 7, Russia and the United States agreed held in June 2012 in Geneva. Russia, another key to host a conference (in June in Geneva) with an player in the Syrian crisis, supported Iran’s at- aim to settling the Syrian crisis. This would be the tendance at ‘Geneva-I’ and has already made clear first occasion that unites and that it wishes Iran to be present at ­‘Geneva-II’ (as regime representatives at ministerial level. It also the upcoming conference is referred to). This is takes place at a time of heightened expectations in line with Iran’s own ­expectations, as its Vice that a solution to a conflict that has displaced 1.5 President Mohammad-Javad Mohammadizadeh million Syrians and cost at least 70,000 lives will declared: “Iran expects to be part of the process finally be found. While the conference can argu- to restore peace and a better livelihood to the ably be seen as a breakthrough in and for itself, people of Syria”. At the time of writing, it was not a successful outcome depends on a number of clear whether Iran would be present at the con- delicate factors. ference, as France has voiced objections against it. What is clear, however, is that whether absent Participation or present, Iran will influence the outcome either way. A conference can be considered a success only when the decisions taken there have binding Both the Syrian regime and the opposition have value to all the conflicting parties. In order to indirectly confirmed attendance, which would achieve this, the event needs to assemble the thus become the first time for them to meet at an right kind and level of participants: the more official gathering. Preconditions raised on earlier stakeholders are present, the more binding the occasions have been dropped, meaning that both conference’s outcome will be. This is particularly sides have accepted to engage with the represent- true if an excluded stakeholder has the potential atives from the other camp regardless of whether to sabotage the agreed peace process. In Syria’s they ‘have blood on their hands’. It is also likely case, the key stakeholders are of course the re- that the approach will be diplomatic rather than gime in ­ and the opposition, as well as confrontational, which explains the decision , Russia, the United States, Qatar, Saudi to hold the meeting at ministerial rather than Arabia, the Arab League, the European Union - head-of-state level. In the latter scenario, in fact, and Iran. the sheer presence of President Bashar ­al-Assad (whose fate remains a key bone of contention) Suspected to support the regime with weapons as would fuel an adversarial dynamic. much as personnel, and itself under sanctions be- cause of its alleged nuclear weapons programme, Another important point related to the ­conference Iran was not invited to the first Syria conference is the amount of authority representatives will

European Union Institute for Security Studies May 2013 1 have to speak and make concessions on behalf of It is therefore to be expected that the agenda will the party/faction they represent. This is unlikely to focus, at least initially, on those aspects which are be a major problem for the regime (which forms an not only less contentious but may ultimately help apparently cohesive front) but might become one create the necessary conditions for further politi- for the opposition. Already fragmented on the po- cal talks. These include the implementation of a litical side between the ­Syrian National ­Coalition ceasefire, the establishment of humanitarian cor- (SNC) - its main political body - and other, smaller ridors, and the release of political prisoners. This factions such as the National ­Coordination Com- might not be enough for some of the ­stakeholders mittee for ­Democratic Change, the political level present - Turkey has already made explicit de- has had difficulties asserting its control over the mands to the United States that it wishes for Free (FSA). ­concrete outcomes rather than more diplomatic talks which would only buy al-Assad time. This is reflected in the FSA’s initial rejection of ­SNC-appointed Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto and Potential outcomes its quick and rather self-confident declaration that it will not attend ‘Geneva-II’, although no invita- The agreement to meet can per se be considered tion had even been issued. Yet any decision taken a major success. Nevertheless, the conference at the conference will have to be ­accepted by the harbours a few risks as well. If decisions made on FSA and other political players - or be ­supported the occasion are ignored or contested by actors by an actor capable of enforcing it against their on the ground (e.g. a ceasefire by the FSA), this will. could cast doubt on the representativeness of ac- tors present at the conference and thereby put into Agenda question the legitimacy and effectiveness of any process initiated there. Similarly, the exclusion In principle, ‘Geneva-II’ will build upon the of certain parties could lead to them ­deliberately ­agreement reached at ‘Geneva-I’ in 2012, which torpedoing the whole process, which could in clearly outlined the steps to be taken in order turn lead to more violence on the ground. to settle the conflict. These include (apart from and beyond the immediate cessation of violence) Yet the conference presents opportunities as the establishment of a transitional government, well: albeit timidly, it signals a dent in the the review of the constitutional order, and free ­zero-sum-game thinking that has prevailed so ­multi-party elections. far, since both sides have agreed to meet with- out preconditions. As in any peace negotiation, This agreement presents, however, a number the challenge now is to help the conflicting par- of shortfalls as it came into being without either ties formulate non-exclusionary demands which warring faction being present. Consequently, the have a realistic chance of being implemented. A ­Syrian regime has already declared that it will single conference is unlikely to achieve this (or not be a party to any meeting that would ‘harm more), but it is a start. national sovereignty’ - which includes the fate of the president, and the form of government as well Just like other international players who have as the constitution. According to the regime in committed themselves to a political rather than ­Damascus, any of these are only be changed by the military solution, the European Union has an in- Syrian people ‘through the ballot boxes’ during the terest in seeing at least a modest success emerge next presidential elections, to be held in 2014. from ‘Geneva-II’. The conference’s failure would discredit the political solution at large and be a That being said, the regime enacted a new boon to those who advocate the military option. ­constitution in 2012 which nominally includes In this context, a credible and lasting ceasefire some of the required changes, such as a multi- could be considered a major achievement. party system and the limitation of the president’s ­mandate to two terms. Although the ensuing ref- erendum that approved the constitutional change Florence Gaub is a Senior Analyst at the EUISS. can hardly be considered fair, it is evident that the Syrian regime - under these circumstances - sees no need to discuss a new constitution. This limits the scope of the conference’s agenda ­considerably, given that the government’s own composition, ­performance and legitimacy are indeed at the heart of the ­conflict.

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QN-AL-13-011-2A-N | ISSN 2315-1129