Fundamentalism from the Perspective of Liberal Tolerance
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Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 2003 Fundamentalism from the Perspective of Liberal Tolerance Leslie C. Griffin University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the Religion Law Commons Recommended Citation Griffin, Leslie C., "Fundamentalism from the Perspective of Liberal Tolerance" (2003). Scholarly Works. 720. https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/720 This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FUNDAMENTALISM FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LIBERAL TOLERANCE Leslie C. Griffin* "[T]he historical origin of political liberalism (and of liberalism more generally) is the Reformation and its aftermath, with the long controversies over religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries."' Liberals and liberal theorists have never forgotten the Wars of Religion. Although the seventeenth century "has often been called the century of reason and genius"2 (because of Descartes, Hobbes, Corneille, Pascal, Locke and others), Locke scholar Hans Aarsleff reminds us that: For the vast majority of the men and women who lived in Europe during Locke's century, the immediate reality was very different. It was a time of violence, death, rape, war, and devastation on a vast scale. It was years of religious strife caused by sectarian disputes over the right reading of Scriptures and the flaunting of royal despotism justified by the doctrine of the divine right of kings. It was a world of constant religious and political intolerance and repression, and of ensuing dislocation that made fugitives wander across the lands of Europe in search of peace and security.' The exhaustion from these wars "eventually led to the formulation and often reluctant acceptance of some form of the principle of toleration."' The acceptance of toleration was reluctant because all sides wanted their vision of the truth to conquer their erroneous neighbors. Nonetheless, despite its limitations, liberal tolerance brought to citizens a truce that * Larry & Joanne Doherty Chair in Legal Ethics, University of Houston Law Center. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xxvi (1996). 2 Hans Aarsleff, Locke's influence, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO LOCKE 252, 254 (Vere Chappell ed., 1994). 3 Id. (emphasis added). " JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 1 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE]. 1631 HeinOnline -- 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1631 2002-2003 1632 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:4 religious intolerance had not provided. Because of this history, liberals fear religious excess and intolerance, and are prone to see it wherever fundamentalism occurs. The preeminent proponent of liberalism, John Rawls, identifies religion as liberalism's ongoing challenge. He asks: "How is it possible for those holding religious doctrines, some based on religious authority, for example, the Church or the Bible, to hold at the same time a reasonable political conception that supports a reasonable constitutional democratic regime?"5 Although many religious worldviews can support democracy, Rawls concludes that fundamentalisms, whether religious or philosophical, are generally incompatible with liberal democracy, and are "politically unreasonable."6 Politically unreasonable groups test the limits of our tolerance. According to Rawls, political liberalism is the theory that emerges from the first original position, which is composed of citizens of liberal societies who choose from behind the veil of ignorance.7 Four central features of this political liberalism explain why fundamentalism can be incompatible with democracy and thus politically unreasonable. The Warriors of Religion in Europe believed their religion was true, so they fought to establish it as the religion of the state or prince. But Rawlsian liberals accept (first) pluralism among people's comprehensive beliefs. To fundamentalists who proclaim one truth, liberals respond that no one comprehensive doctrine compels the allegiance of all citizens. Pluralism is an abiding feature of our lives and will not fade. Therefore, (second) a politicalconception of justice must be found that does not impose one comprehensive doctrine (like Catholicism, Kantianism or Islam) on one's fellow citizens. The political conception of justice will be based on (third) an overlapping consensus in which citizens can agree on the political and constitutional essentials of their society, even though they disagree about their comprehensive doctrines. Finally, decisions within the overlapping consensus should be made only on the basis of reasons that appeal to all citizens, and so citizens must employ (fourth) public reason. Public reason means that citizens should not appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines but to arguments that their fellow citizens may "reasonably be expected to endorse."8 5 JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in COLLECTED PAPERS 573, 588 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason]. 6 Id.at 613. 7 JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 30 (1999). 8 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 225. HeinOnline -- 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1632 2002-2003 2003] LIBERAL TOLERANCE 1633 These four features of political liberalism explain both the tension between religion and democracy, as well as why toleration is required in a liberal democracy. Believers instinctively want their own comprehensive perspective to govern all aspects of life. Yet pluralism renders this desire impossible, unless force is used to impose one's views on another. Instead of inflicting their views on others, citizens should meet on the common ground of political justice, an independent "module" shared by all. Toleration of different perspectives "mitigates" the "conflict between democracy and reasonable religious doctrines."9 Instead of establishing one comprehensive doctrine, liberalism recognizes a constitutional right of religious liberty and defends a purely political conception of justice in which religious doctrines are not imposed on citizens. Rawls concludes "that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine accepts some form of the political argument for toleration."1 Rawls asserts that his modem vision of liberalism "completes and extends" the old principle of toleration that arose from the Wars of Religion in Europe.1 Toleration offered only a modus vivendi and was inherently unstable. Although it put an end to war, the principle of toleration allowed for the possibility that groups would wait until they gained more members, and then use their power to build a society that was consistent with their comprehensive doctrine. Such tolerant societies, in which groups were always waiting for the opportunity to impose their views on others, were never stable. Modern democracies require more, and so Rawls argues that consensus should replace toleration. Today, citizens need a political, overlapping consensus that does not shift as religions gain adherents. Such consensus provides social stability, which has "very 'great value.""' 2 Imposing one's comprehensive view upsets stability, and so is (morally) forbidden in a constitutional democracy. This means that the political conception of justice has to be "affirmed by citizens irrespective of the political strength of their comprehensive view."'3 Some comprehensive doctrines simply cannot accept toleration, consensus, a political conception of justice, or democracy. "[F]undamentalist religious doctrines.., will reject the ideas of public reason and deliberative democracy. They will 9 RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason, supra note 5, at 611. 10 Id. at 612. 11JOHN RAWLS, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, in COLLECTED PAPERS 421, 437 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999); see also RAWLS, supra note 1, at 154. 12 RAWLS, supra note 1, at 139. 13 RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 1. HeinOnline -- 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1633 2002-2003 1634 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 24:4 say that democracy leads to a culture contrary to their religion .... They assert that the religiously true, or the philosophically true, overrides the politically reasonable."'' 4 Rawls "simply say[s]" that such doctrines are "politically unreasonable."' 5 They challenge the stability of democratic institutions by their intolerance. Who are these politically unreasonable fundamentalists? The term "fundamentalism" has its origins in American Protestantism, from The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth, a series of essays about the Bible and Christian faith, which was distributed widely between 1910 and 1915. "The term fundamentalist itself was coined by Baptist editor Curtis Lee Laws in 1920 as a designation for those who were ready 'to do battle royal for the Fundamentals.""' 6 Those Fundamentalists are remembered for their opposition to evolution. In the 1990s, an era of resurgent fundamentalism, the Fundamentalism Project sought a definition of fundamentalism that could apply to all religions across the world, not only Christianity or American Protestantism. Among the numerous features of fundamentalism, I emphasize five: 1) its opposition to modernity; 2) its selective appropriation of the past; 3) its totalitarian impulse; 4) its "pronounced" commitment to patriarchy; and 5) its militancy.'7 About modernity, (first) fundamentalists dislike especially "the adoption