FRONTIER DISPUTE (Benin/Niger)

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FRONTIER DISPUTE (Benin/Niger) FRONTIER DISPUTE (Benin/Niger) General List No.: 125 Mean(s) and date of institution of the case: Special Agreement (3 May 2002) Statement of claim/question: The Court was requested to: (a) determine the course of the boundary between the Republic of Benin and the Republic of Niger in the River Niger sector; (b) specify which State owns each of the islands in the said river, and in particular Lété Island; (c) determine the course of the boundary between the two States in the River Mekrou sector. Basis of jurisdiction invoked by the Applicant(s): Special Agreement between Benin and Niger of 15 June 2001, with entry into force on 11 April 2002 Section A – Procedural and Organizational Aspects Duration and Public sittings Duration (from – to) Public sittings Total 3 May 2002 to 12 July 2005 7, 8, 10, 11 March 2005 3 years/ 2 months / 9 days Orders Date of Order and Content Authority 9 July 2004 Authorisation of filing of reply by both Parties and President of the Chamber – fixation of 17 December 2004 as the time-limit for Guillaume the filing of the pleadings 11 September 2003 Fixing of time-limits: President of the Chamber – 28 May 2004 – Counter-Memorial by Benin and Niger Guillaume 458 Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger) Orders (cont.) Date of Order and Content Authority 16 February 2005 Constitution of new chamber of Judges (in view President Shi of resignation from the Chamber by its President Guillaume) consisting of President Ranjeva, Judges Kooijmans, Abraham and Judges ad hoc Bedjaoui and Bennouna Section B – Merits Official citation: Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, p. 90 Date of Judgment: 12 July 2005 Authoritative text: French Composition of the Court: Judge Ranjeva, Vice-President of the Court, President of the Chamber; Judges Kooijmans, Abraham; Judges ad hoc Bedjaoui, Bennouna; Registrar Couvreur. Headnotes: Geographical context – Historical background. Applicable law – Principle of uti possidetis juris – Course of the boundary to be determined by reference to the physical situation to which French colonial law was applied, as that situation existed at the dates of independence – Conse- quences of that course on the ground to be assessed in relation to present-day physical realities – Relevance of documents and maps posterior to dates of inde- pendence for purposes of applying the uti possidetis juris principle – Legal value of post-colonial effectivités. Place of colonial law (French droit d’outre-mer) – Powers of colonial authori- ties to create and abolish colonies and territorial subdivisions. Evolution of legal status of territories concerned. Principal documents relevant to the settlement of the dispute. Cartographic materials – Value of maps as evidence. Course of boundary in River Niger sector and the question of to which Party the islands in the river belong. Examination of regulative and administrative acts invoked by the Parties. Arrêté of 23 July 1900 of the Governor-General of French West Africa (AOF) and decree of 20 December 1900 of the President of the French Republic did not fix the boundaries of the third military territory – Arrêté of 1900 did not .
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