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December 1942 By Joseph Miranda

Note: Axis units are in plaintext; Soviet units are in italics.

Operation Uranus

n 19 November 1942 the launched O Operation Uranus, the envelopment of German Sixth Army then fi ghting in Stalingrad. Uranus went off much as planned, with Soviet assault forces breaking through the Romanian units on Sixth Army’s fl anks and then driving deep to link up to the west of Stalingrad on the 22nd. Of course, that created a crisis within the German high command. First, Sixth Army, commanded by Gen. , was trapped. That wasn’t initially seen as fatal: large Soviet snipers press forward along Sixth Army’s defensive perimeter inside the city. German formations had been cut off

in the previous year’s Soviet winter southern portion of the front in included units already on the front: counteroffensive and had then been Russia. Sixth Army therefore had to be Sixth Army in the Stalingrad , sustained by aerial supply until relief saved. To salvage the situation, Hitler Fourth Panzer Army on the Don, plus forces were assembled and broke turned to one of his top commanders, the remnants of Third and Fourth through to them. The major threat Field Marshal . Romanian Armies. That appeared to at fi rst seemed to be be a sizable force, but only a fraction A (AGA), driving on the Caucasus Manstein in Command of the army group’s strength could be oilfi elds far to the south, could be concentrated for the relief mission, cut off by the next Soviet move. Manstein was given command of a designated Operation Winterstorm. Even so, all understood Stalingrad new formation designated Army Group Manstein made Fourth Panzer was the linchpin in the German Don (AGD), after the Russian river Army (commanded by Gen. Hermann 12 December: Winterstorm kicks off. strategic defense along the entire that was a locus of the fi ghting. AGD Hoth) responsible for the relief effort.

6 WORLD at WAR 36 | JUN–JUL 2014 WORLD at WAR 36 | JUN–JUL 2014 7 Hollidt had two panzer divisions Soviet Operational Doctrine: Deep Operations under XLVIII Panzer (11th and 22nd), while LVII Panzer Corps was Throughout the 1920s and 1930s Red Army commanders studied the impact of technol- assigned three more (6th, 17th and ogy and mass mobilization on warfare, especially as they had been demonstrated in World 23rd). Again, on paper that looked like War I and the Russian Civil War. One conclusion they came to was single battles could a powerful enough force; however, all no longer be decisive. For example, the German defeat of Russian armies at Tannenberg but one of those divisions were already and the Masurian Lakes in 1914 didn’t lead to the collapse of the Russian Empire, while depleted from months of fi ghting. battles such as Verdun and the Somme stretched into months without producing a decision. Only 6th Panzer, newly transferred Consequently, in future wars a successful military would have to gain a series of victories from France, was at full strength. within a theater of operations to win. That led to a new doctrine of “operations.” Army Detachment Hollidt could A key element within it was the idea of “deep battle,” in which overwhelming force muster several infantry divisions in was fi rst to be concentrated at selected sectors of a front. That concentrated force would addition to the panzers, but some of then attack and break through, driving deep and speedily into the enemy rear area while also those were low quality fi eld dislocating his front. Such offensives would be made in multiple echelons, with separate formations assembled from air force forces for the breakthrough and exploitation. The longer-range objective was to gain suf- ground personnel with little in the fi cient territory such that the enemy would be forced to withdraw from his original front line way of training or tactical readiness. positions, after which he could more easily be destroyed in a running fi ght. A series of such In the event, Hollidt’s divisions operations would bring fi nal victory theater-wide. were themselves soon tied down by Another important element was maskirovka (deception). That is, the enemy was to be Red Army pressure along the Chir kept in the dark about the overall intention and preparation of the operation. River. That left only LVII Panzer Corps Yet another element was airpower. Coordinated air attacks would support the break- (commanded by Lt. Gen. Friedrich through echelon and provide long-range cover for the exploitation. Kirchner) to make the drive northeast Interwar maneuvers showed the concept was workable, and the Red Army formed toward Stalingrad. Even then, 17th mechanized corps to carry it out, but those corps were then disbanded in the late 1930s. Panzer was slow getting to That was done, fi rst, as a result of the experience gained in the Spanish Civil War, which the front, so the start force consisted seemed to indicate massive mechanized formations couldn’t be coordinated across an active of only 6th and 23rd Panzer. Manstein, battle front given the limitations of the communication technology at the time. Second, the seeing the clock running out, neverthe- Inside the pocket, a German infantryman awaits the breakout order that never came. sponsors of those units and the doctrine to use them happened to be among the many who less ordered Kirchner to attack. A much were caught up in Stalin’s military purges. weaker than planned Winterstorm Soviet Corps Late 1942 Then the German blitzkriegs of 1939-40 fully vindicated the concept, and the Red Army therefore kicked off on 12 December. had to race to reorganize a new wave of mobile units. The Soviet winter counteroffensive of Added in 1943 1941-42 demonstrated deep operations were viable for them, as their columns drove deep Command Debate into the German line. It wasn’t until early 1942 that the Red Army began organizing its new tank and Manstein’s objective was seemingly mechanized corps (actually Western division equivalents) into tank armies (Western corps simple: break through the surrounding equivalents). Those tank armies were able to concentrate offensive power to exploit Soviet siege lines, reach Sixth Army Tank Reserve breakthroughs, and were also maintained as strategic reserves to deal with unexpected and then evacuate Paulus’s command. enemy actions. Similarly, as the Soviet Air Force rebuilt in the wake of the disaster of 1941, That combined force would fall back 33x T-34 whole “air armies” were assigned to support fronts (Western army group equivalents) to to a more defensible position and from 7x T-70 provide them with direct support. there fi ght to counter the still ongoing All that played out during the Stalingrad campaign. The Red Army concentrated strength Soviet offensive. Hitler, though, had MG 4x Su-76 4x Su-122 4x 120mm 12x 37mm along both fl anks of Sixth Army under the cover of deception operations. It then launched a other ideas: he believed Paulus could Mortar multi-echelon offensive, breaking through Romanian forces (which mostly lacked effective hold Stalingrad, and the corridor anti-tank weaponry) on the Germans’ fl anks to drive deep and complete the envelopment of Manstein was to create would be had: none of them wanted to see surely turn around the entire situation. times willing to defy Hitler, Paulus Stalingrad. When the Germans counterattacked, committed strategic reserves that turned into a permanent resupply and any perceived surplus taken away There was also the bigger picture: lacked the character needed to take stopped them. reinforcement route for Sixth Army. to be redistributed to other units.) Manstein was dealing not only with that kind of independent action. In the skies the Red air force also gave the Luftwaffe a diffi cult time Though it still Paulus’s position on the matter was Paulus’s chief of staff then offered the Stalingrad crisis, but with having to wasn’t able to gain air superiority, it’s efforts were enough to cause serious attrition within at fi rst ambiguous. Manstein encour- the opinion that, as long as Stalingrad maintain the otherwise open northern Winterstorm the German aerial supply effort. aged him to have his forces attack could be supported by aerial resup- fl ank of AGA. That also drew divisions In the larger context, the breakthrough at Stalingrad also effectively levered German southwest toward the LVII Panzer ply, Sixth Army could maintain its away from Winterstorm to screen the On 12 December, LVII Panzer Corps Army Group A away from its Caucasus drive and forced it to begin falling back toward its Corps spearhead, but Paulus claimed position. Hermann Goering agreed Kalmyk Steppe to the south, where make good progress. There was con- start line. he lacked the fuel and ammunition to commit the Luftwaffe to that effort there was a gap in the front. The siderable Luftwaffe support, and the The validity of the deep operations concept had been proven. It would be used again and to make an offensive move, and and, while it was initially successful, possible loss of Sixth Army therefore Red Army was taken by surprise. It was again by the Soviets over the next three years, until it had carried them all the his troops were also too exhausted its effectiveness steadily diminished also had to be weighed against the 75 miles to the siege lines from Hoth’s way to Berlin. ★ to attack. (Postwar analysis would in the worsening winter weather possible isolation of all of AGA. jump-off point at Kotelnikovo on the later reveal the surrounded army and stiffening Soviet air defenses. That debate at the top of the Don. If Sixth Army broke out, that dis- actually had on hand about twice the Hitler remained loath to give up ter- German command hierarchy tance would be reduced as its perim- amount of fuel and ammunition its ritory, and he was also anticipating the put Paulus in a diffi cult position. eter was extended to the southwest. Originally that operation was to have the fi eld to temporarily command commander had been led to believe arrival of the super-elite II SS Panzer Manstein was in charge of the tactical The fi rst operational objective was included both LVII Panzer Corps a number of corps or otherwise was in the pocket. It seems all the Corps on the eastern front. It wasn’t to execution of Winterstorm, while the Aksai River, about 50 miles from and Army Detachment Hollidt (an separate divisions). The panzer corps divisional and corps logistical elements arrive until February but, if Stalingrad Hitler was the overall commander the start line. Manstein’s spearhead ad hoc headquarters put in place in was on the right, Hollidt on the left. purposely underreported what they could hold out until then, it would in chief. Where Manstein was at reached it on the 13 December,

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Soviet Mechanized crew training resulted in their not being used in late 1941, as they’d proven unwieldy and In January 1943 the tank corps had their armed with submachineguns to protect the tank corps and one mechanized corps plus Forces in 1942-43 properly even within their limited capacities. the personnel qualifi ed to command them were strength boosted with the addition of a regi- from enemy close assault. Later, all three some army-level support formations. Home As a result the Red Army lost multitudes scarce. That armor was then parceled out to ment of mortars and another of self-propelled of its companies would be armed in that way. In 1943 the Red Army started deploying Pre-World War II Soviet armored doctrine of tanks both to enemy action and breakdowns create numerous independent tank brigades guns (Su-76s and Su-122s). Effectively, they The motorized rifl e brigade of the tank large numbers of self-propelled guns in the called for different types of tanks to be used in 1941. By 1942, however, the Soviets had that were attached to rifl e divisions on an as- became corps artillery. The engineer contingent corps was also a combined arms formation. tank and mechanized corps. They provided for different missions based on the operational switched to employing just a few basic tank needed basis. By March 1942 the worst of the was expanded to a full battalion, while anti- It included three rifl e battalions, a mortar direct artillery support, as well as performing situation (which was also true of many other types: light models such as the T-60 and T-70, crisis had passed, and the Soviets again began tank and anti-aircraft units were also added. battalion, a 76mm gun battalion plus some anti-tank work, while compensating somewhat nations’ militaries’ nascent doctrines at the the heavy KV-1 and 2 (the latter armed with a organizing large armored formations. They The diagram shows what full-strength units additional units. It was intended to hold for the ongoing lack of divisional artillery. time). “Infantry support tanks” would assist howitzer for infantry support), and the general were called tank corps and mechanized corps. looked like, though bear in mind it wouldn’t be the ground taken by the tank brigades. Soviet artillery, while present in large in the initial breakthrough. Short-range purpose T-34 armed with a 76mm gun. While termed “corps,” they were until mid-1943 that many of the subordinate The mechanized corps was a powerful numbers at higher echelons, had diffi culties “penetration tanks” would overrun enemy Overall, top prewar Soviet commanders actually division-sized formations by Western units were actually available in the fi eld. formation. It was intended to be the mate to concentrating fi res during the mid-war artillery positions, command posts and logistics had sound military educations. The 1941 standards. The new tank corps were fairly One particularly valuable sub-formation the tank corps, holding ground they seized. period owing to a lack of radio equipment installations. Finally, “fast tanks” would drive shortfall came about because many of them slender formations: they included three tank was the tank reserve: a pool of extra tanks Each of its three mechanized brigades had and communications personnel. Hence the deep into the enemy rear. Together, they would had been killed or imprisoned during Stalin’s brigades, a motorized rifl e brigade plus and crew to replace losses in combat and an organic tank regiment, and there was also tendency of most corps and artillery was to attain an overall operational breakthrough. prewar purge. It took the fi rst year of the some support units (engineers, recon). There from breakdowns. They allowed the tank a corps-level tank brigade. Its support units deploy as direct-fi re weapons. That gave the The German invasion of the USSR quickly German invasion to sort out which surviving was little in the way of divisional artillery, corps to sustain a fi ght in the face of losses. were similar to those of the tank corps. Germans an advantage insofar as their fi re revealed the fl aws in that approach. First, leaders had the potential for commanding largely because the Soviets found it diffi cult to Tank brigades were combined arms task The Red Army created full tank armies control procedures were superior. The Germans there were too many different tank types, larger formations. That sorting had largely been coordinate those guns under mobile conditions. forces. Total tank strength was about equal starting in mid-1942. They originally had exploited that, and their better training, to some of which simply proved ineffective in completed by the time of Operation Uranus, Corps logistics were also minimal. The total to that of a German panzer battalion, and two tank corps plus some added cavalry and maintain a tactical edge; though, as Stalingrad the fi eld. That category particularly included the Red Army’s Stalingrad counteroffensive. strength of a tank corps, about 7,800 men, was included a mix of light T-60s and T-70s and infantry divisions. It was quickly found those demonstrated, it was at the operational level multi-turreted “land battleships” and other Also coming to the forefront at that time half the size of a German division, though with medium T-34s. Heavier tanks were found in non-mechanized units slowed operations, the campaign was going to be decided. ★ super-heavy vehicles. Logistical requirements were new Soviet armored formations. The Red a tank strength of 170 vehicles it compared regiments assigned at higher echelons. The so the organization was fi nalized at two for them proved overwhelming, and poor Army had disbanded its prewar tank divisions well to the panzer formations in that regard. brigade’s rifl e battalion included a company

Soviet Motorized Brigade which was actually good going given the weather. Once across the Aksai, Soviet Mechanized Corps 1942 LVII’s Panzer’s next objective was the Myshkova River, where XLVIII Panzer Corps was to join in the effort. It Added in 1943 was there the drive began breaking down. Soviet Fifty-First Army, which was holding the line in front of LVII Panzer, recovered from the initial SMG 40 Trucks shock of the attack and dug in. 6x 120mm 99 men In the Kremlin the Soviet high Mortar Tank Reserve SMG command was also debating the 4x 76.2mm 4x 37mm Guns 4x 7 Arm. Cars Cannon situation. Their initial plan had 6x 82mm been to fi rst crush the Stalingrad Mortar 2x LMG Mine pocket, then deal with the relief force. 12x LMG 4x 45mm 18x AT 2x HMG Guns Rifles Manstein’s advance was unsettling the Soviet Mechanized Brigade situation, however; so Stalin decided 6x 82mm Mortar Soviet Tank Brigade to switch the priority to blocking the relief operation: Stalingrad could be reduced later. The reinforcements he sent to accomplish that were Second 12x 76.2mm Guards and Fifth Shock Armies, 23x T-34 both of which included powerful SMG 16x T-70 403 men armored and artillery formations. 151 men 146 men 3x Arm. Cars On 14 December the Red Army 12x 120mm AT Rifles 52 men counterattacked XLVIII Panzer Corps, 4x 37mm which was to the left of LVII Panzer, 1x T-34 1x T-70 Guns tying it down and making it impossible 7x Armored Cars 95 men Fuel for it to join Winterstorm. Two days 12x 37mm 101 men later the Soviets launched Operation SMG 4x 76.2mm Little Saturn, attacking Italian Eighth 10x T-34 10x T-34 3x Lt. 10x T-70 Guns Ammo Army to the northwest of AGD. to further divert attention and combat deployed onto the front. Nonetheless, Arm. Cars 8x 82mm Manstein was thereby faced with power away from Winterstorm. Making 17th Panzer Division moved up, and Mortar th 44 men 6x ATR the possibility his entire left fl ank things worse, a combination of precipi- by the 19 the Germans had created a Medical would be destroyed and his relief force tation and freezing temperatures then bridgehead over the Myshkova. There 18x ATR thereby also cut off. Accordingly he further slowed Hoth’s advance. As well, remained only about 30 miles to go. scraped together units to meet the new Soviet resistance continued to stiffen as Manstein set up a codeword with 12x LMG threat. All that, of course, only worked the newly arriving reinforcement units Paulus as the signal for Sixth Army 3x HMG

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