Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837- 839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65. d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606- 1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737- 1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802- 1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839- 1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030- 2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788- 852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect. I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties. Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring: I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

I shall explain why.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion. Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring: I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Footnotes

1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag be recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.

2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345; Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA 924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.

3 16 Phil. 366, 378.

4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil. 486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil. 179.

5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.

6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 110 Phil. 150.

7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.

9 93 Phil.. 68,.

10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S. Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances.

11 129 SCRA 174.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.

Prudencio de Guzman for appellant. First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:

El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p. 52).

In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.

But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.

In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.

G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant. E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, absolving defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof thereon.

In the language of the decision appealed from:

The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law course in the defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case.

Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:

"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.

(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".

It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges and universities," reading:

1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools offer full or partial scholarships to deserving students — for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students should be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good only if the students concerned continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these scholarships.

2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schools since their credentials would not be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right to authorize such transfer. that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund were made, and even recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation.

In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private Schools, namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.

The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.

We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend personal equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant,

There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad, JJ., concur. Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

Resolution March 18, 1954

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners. Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy- one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:

1946 (August) 206 121 18 1946 (November) 477 228 43 1947 749 340 0 1948 899 409 11 1949 1,218 532 164 1950 1,316 893 26 1951 2,068 879 196 1952 2,738 1,033 426 1953 2,555 968 284 TOTAL 12,230 5,421 1,168

Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act No. 972.

(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally an in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David stated:

The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous judicial history of more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which the postponement of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the Supreme court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State. (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the provision" expecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word `admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act. (p. 93.) Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma of being graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject. (p.89)

x x x x x x x x x

The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be competent evidence in certain cases upon that question. (p.93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law. (2) The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3) The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of admission of the practice of law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)

Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)

But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444) Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)

The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under 42a scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility fir the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p. 445)

The relation at the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar is an attache of the courts. The quality of justice dispense by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)

Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking countries. (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6 Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes the most solid of all titles." If the courts and judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the government. They took this institution along with the power traditionally exercise to determine who should constitute its attorney at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional provisions. While the legislature may legislate with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it does legislate a fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications do not constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course of the proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law. (p. 450)

Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true that the legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53, 19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.

The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that the act of the court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment of the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside. (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

It is indispensible to the administration of justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60 A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions." One is admitted to the bar "for something more than private gain." He becomes an "officer of the court", and ,like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the end of justice. His cooperation with the court is due "whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, "It has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause he ought to be removed." (p.727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they, respectively, belong for, three years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. "Attorneys and Counselors", said that court, "are not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be entrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650-651).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions: Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.

Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court. — A.C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the government. — 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.

If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress of a judicial inquiry. — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII of the Constitution provides:

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. the primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercise within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña took examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The court said: Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the passage of this act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.

The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should grant him license to practice law in the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now "possesses the necessary qualifications of learning and ability."

But it is contented that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the prescribed examination "upon motion before the Supreme Court" accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates without examination. It is contented that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised.

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word "may," as used in the above citation from Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of Guariña, the Court held:

In the various cases wherein applications for the admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.

In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

In the light of this affirmative proof of his defieciency on that occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof if his possession of the necessary qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should be denied.

In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above- cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is made, is entitled "An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors," approved March 28, 1884, in force July 1, 1874." The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the following: "And every application for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law or office or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules". — In re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.

. . . After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, "and part in the aforesaid law school," and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their admission to the bar. (p. 647.) Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the character of evidence which should be received by the court as conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law, it could only be done by a general law, persons or classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a reasonable basis for different one, having no just relation to the subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill. 66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes — First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The one who commenced on the 3rd. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:

But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition." This right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the "estate" acquired in them — that is, the right to continue their prosecution — is often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine, requiring medications to establish the possession on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517; see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N.W. 468.

This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right. That fact in no matter affect the power of the Legislature to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its favors.

A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without examination, all who had served in the military or naval forces of the United States during the World War and received a honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as "World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held |unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151- 153 as follows:

The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not generally on all. (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for this classification ? If there is none, and none has been given, then the classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing rules.

4. The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

R E S O L U T I O N

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribed to this decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same: 1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 19461 Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.

Number of candidates 206

Number of candidates whose grades were 12 raised

73'S 6

72'S 6

Number of candidates who passed 85

Number of candidates who failed 121

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 18 972 Percentage of success (per 41.62 cent) Percentage of failure (per 58.74 cent) Passing grade (per 72 cent) November, 1946 Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.

Number of candidates 481

Number of candidates whose grades were 19 raised

(72 per cent and above 73 per cent --- Minutes of March 31, 1947)

Number of candidates who passed 249

Number of candidates who failed 228

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 43 972 Percentage of success (per 52.20 cent) Percentage of failure (per 47.80 cent) Passing grade (per 72 (By resolution of the Court). cent) October, 1947 Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.

Number of candidates 749

Number of candidates whose grades were 43 raised

70.55 per cent with 2 subject below 50 1 per cent

69 per cent 40

68 per cent 2

Number of candidates who passed 409

Number of candidates who failed 340

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 972 Percentage of success (per 54.59 cent) Percentage of failure (per 45.41 cent) Passing grade (per 69 cent) (by resolution of the Court).

Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law. August, 1948 Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.

Number of candidates 899

Number of candidates whose grades were 64 raised

71's 29

70's 35

Number of candidates who passed 490

Number of candidates who failed 409

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 11 972 Percentage of success (per 62.40 cent) Percentage of failure (per 37.60 cent) Passing grade (per 70 cent) (by resolution of the Court). August, 1949 Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.

Number of candidates 1,218

Number of candidates whose grades were 55 raised (74's)

Number of candidates who passed 686

Number of candidates who failed 532

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 164 972 Percentage of success (per 56.28 cent) Percentage of failure (per 43.72 cent) Passing grade (per 74 cent) (by resolution of the Court). August, 1950 Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,2 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.

Number of candidates 1,316

Number of candidates whose grades were 38 raised (The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).

Number of candidates who passed 432

Number of candidates who failed 894

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 26 972 Percentage of success (per 32.14 cent) Percentage of failure (per 67.86 cent) Passing grade (per 75 cent) August, 1951 Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.

Number of candidates 2,068

Number of candidates whose grades were 112 raised (74's)

Number of candidates who passed 1,189

Number of candidates who failed 879

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 196 972 Percentage of success (per 57.49 cent) Percentage of failure (per 42.51 cent) Passing grade (per 75 cent) August, 1952 Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.

Number of candidates 2,738

Number of candidates whose grades were 163 raised (74's)

Number of candidates who passed 1,705

Number of candidates who failed 1,033

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 426 972 Percentage of success (per 62.27 cent) Percentage of failure (per 37.73 cent) Passing grade (per 75 cent) August, 1953 Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.

Number of candidates 2,555

Number of candidates whose grades were 100 raised (74's)

Number of candidates who passed 1,570

Number of candidates who failed 986

Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 284 972 Percentage of success (per 61.04 cent) Percentage of failure (per 38.96 cent) Passing grade (per 75 cent)

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the years in which they took the bar examinations, with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONER UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av. MRD- Agunod, Filemon L. 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4 1. MRD- Cunanan, Albino 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45 2. MRD- Mejia, Flaviano V. 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85 3. 1948 MRD- Orlina, Soledad R. 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9 4. MRD- Vivero, Antonio Lu. 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95 5. MRD- Gatchalian, Salud 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65 6. 1949 7. Abaya, Jesus A. 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8 MRD- Advincula, David D. 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5 8. 9. Agraviador, Alfredo 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8 L. 10. Alacar, Pascual C. 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05 11. Amog, Pedro M. 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2 12. Apolinario, Miguel 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95 S. 13. Aquino, Maximo G. 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15 14. Asinas, Candido D. 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65 15. Baldivino, Jose B. 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95 16. Balintona, 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70 Bernardo 17. Banawa, Angel L. 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3 18. Bandala, Anacleto 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6 A. 19. Bandon, Alawadin 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35 L. 20. Baquero, Benjamin 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5 21. Blanco, Jose 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5 22. Buenaluz, 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85 Victoriano T. 23. Canda, Benjamin 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55 S. 24. Canon, Guillermo 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9 25. Carlos, Estela S. 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8 26. Cerezo, Gregorio 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4 O. 27. Clarin, Manuel L. 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95 28. Claudo, Conrado 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4 O. 29. Condevillamar, 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65 Antonio V. MRD- Cornejo, Crisanto 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4 30. R. 31. Corona, Olvido D. 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15 32. Dizon, Marcial C. 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1 33. Enriquez, Agustin 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75 P. 34. Espiritu, Irineo E. 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8 35. Fernandez, 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95 Macario J. 36. Gallardo, Amando 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95 C. 37. Garcia, Freidrich M. 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7 38. Garcia, Julian L. 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15 39. Garcia, Leon Mo. 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85 40. Garcia, Pedro V. 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6 41. Garcia, Santiago C. 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8 42. Genoves, Pedro 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7 43. Gonzales, Amado 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65 P. 44. Guia, Odon R. de 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9 45. Fernandez, Simeon 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85 46. Jakosalem, Filoteo 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6 47. Jesus, Felipe D. de 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45 48. Jocom, Jacobo M. 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65 49. Juares, Nicolas 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70 50. Kalalang, Remigio 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3 51. Layumas, Vicente 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3 L. 52. Leyson, Amancio 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15 F. 53. Libanan, Marcelino 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75 54. Lim, Jose E. 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15 55. Lim, Jose F. 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4 56. Linao, Mariano M. 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75 57. Lopez, Angelo P. 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71 58. Lopez, Eliezar M. 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7 59. Lopez, Nicanor S. 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55 60. Manoleto, Proceso 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95 D. 61. Mancao, Alfredo P. 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95 62. Manera, Mariano A. 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71 63. Mercado, Arsenio 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95 N. 64. Miranda, Benjamin 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55 G. 65. Manad, Andres B. 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15 1948 66. Orosco, Casimiro 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9 P. 67. Padua, Manuel C. 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1 68. Palang, Basilio S. 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6 69. Palma, Cuadrato 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5 70. Pañganiban, Jose 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6 V. 71. Pareja, Felipe 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75 72. Patalinjug, Eriberto 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25 73. Paulin, Jose C. 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1 74. Pido, Serafin C. 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05 75. Pimentel, Luis P. 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6 76. Plantilla, Rodrigo 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55 C. 77. Regalario, Benito 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55 B. 78. Robis, Casto P. 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9 79. Rodil, Francisco C. 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75 80. Rodriguez, Mariano 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35 I. 81. Romero, Crispulo 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85 P. 82. Saez, Porfirio D. 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71 83. Saliguma, 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8 Crisogono D. 84. Samano, Fortunato 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9 A. 85. Santos, Faustina C. 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5 86. Santos, Josefina R. 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 72.3 87. Seludo, Ananias G. 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25 88. Semilia, Rafael I. 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 71.25 89. Telan, Gaudencio 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85 90. Tesorero, Leocadio 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65 T. 91. Torre, Valentin S. 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4 de la 92. Torres, Ariston L. 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4 93. Veyra, Zosimo C. 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65 de 94. Viado, Jose 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7 95. Villacarlos, Delfin 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85 A. 96. Villamil, Leonor S. 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6 97. Zabala, Amando A. 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6 1950 MRD- Cruz, Filomeno de 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4 98. la 99. Española, Pablo S. 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2 100. Foronda, Clarencio 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9 J. 101. Hechanova, 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3 Vicente MRD- Peñalosa, Osias R. 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2 102. 103. Sarmiento, Floro A. 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15 MRD- Torre, Catalino P. 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25 104. 105. Ungson, Fernando 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8 S. 1951 106. Abasolo, Romulo 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7 107. Adeva, Daniel G. 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4 108. Aguilar, Vicente Z. 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25 109. Amodia, Juan T. 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35 MRD- Añosa, Pablo S. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6 110. 111. Antiola, Anastacio 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05 R. 112. Aquino, S. Rey A. 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1 113. Atienza, Manuel G. 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85 114. Avanceña, Alfonso 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8 MRD- Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25 115. 116. Barinaga, Jeremias 68 69 73 70 74 50 80 79 71.2 L. MRD- Barrientos, 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25 117. Ambrosio D. MRD- Benitez, Tomas P. 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2 118. 119. Biason, Sixto F. 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25 MRD- Briñas, Isagani A. 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95 120. 121. Buela, Arcadio P. 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75 122. Cabilao, Leonardo 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25 S. 123. Cabrera, Ireneo M. 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4 124. Cacacho, Emilio V. 125. Calilung, Soledad 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65 C. MRD- Calimlim, Jose B. 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65 126. 127. Calimlim, Pedro B. 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70 128. Camello, Sotero H. 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55 129. Campos, Juan A. 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15 130. Castillo, Antonio 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65 del MRD- Castillo, Dominador 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1 131. Ad. MRD- Castro, Jesus B. 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85 132. 133. Casuga, 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95 Bienvenido B. 134. Cabangbang, 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2 Santiago B. 135. Cruz, Federico S. 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65 136. Dacanay, Eufemio 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05 P. 137. Deysolong, 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85 Felisberto MRD- Dimaano, Jr., Jose 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5 138. N. 139. Espinosa, Domingo 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6 L. MRD- Farol, Evencia C. 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25 140. 141. Felix, Conrado S. 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75 142. Fernan, Pablo L. 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35 143. Gandioco, Salvador 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1 G. 144. Gastardo, Crispin 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9 B. 145. Genson, Angelo B. 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 69.55 146. Guiani, Guinald M. 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 71.5 147. Guina, Graciano P. 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6 MRD- Homeres, 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35 148. Praxedes P. 149. Ibarra, Venancio M. 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 71.9 150. Imperial, Monico L. 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7 MRD- Ibasco, Jr., 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 70.85 151. Emiliano M. 152. Inandan, Fortunato 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 72.5 C. 153. Jimenez, Florencio 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05 C. 154. Kintanar, Woodrow 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95 M. 155. Languido, Cesar V. 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 70.55 156. Lavilles, Cesar L. 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55 157. Llenos, Francisco 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75 U. 158. Leon, Marcelo D. 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75 de 159. Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35 160. Machachor, Oscar 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15 MRD- Magsino, 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75 161. Encarnacion MRD- Maligaya, Demetrio 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3 162. M. 163. Manio, Gregorio 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65 164. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 62.05 MRD- Marcial, Meynardo 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15 165. R. 166. Martin, Benjamin S. 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1 MRD- Monterroyo, 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95 167. Catalina S. MRD- Montero, 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75 168. Leodegario C. 169. Monzon, Candido 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05 T. 170. Natividad, Alberto 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2 M. MRD- Navallo, Capistrano 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1 171. C. 172. Nisce, Camilo Z. 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5 MRD- Ocampo, Antonio 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75 173. F. de 174. Olaviar, Jose O. 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5 MRD- Perez, Cesario Z. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 72.95 175. 176. Pogado, Causin O. 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95 177. Ramos-Balmori, 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 70.2 Manuela 178. Recinto, Ireneo I. 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3 MRD- Redor, Francisco 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70 179. K. MRD- Regis, Deogracias 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35 180. A. 181. Rigor, Estelita C. 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9 MRD- Rimorin-Gordo, 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15 182. Estela 183. Rosario, Prisco del 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65 184. Rosario, Vicente D. 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2 del 185. Saavedra, Felipe 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 70.35 186. Salazar, Alfredo N. 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85 187. Salem, Romulo R. 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 73 188. Foz, Julita A. 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5 189. Santa Ana, 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73 Candido T. 190. Santos, Aquilino 72 66 69 65 68 70 81 71 71.7 191. Santos, Valeriano 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1 V. 192. Suico, Samuel 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3 193. Suson, Teodorico 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35 194. Tado, Florentino P. 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7 195. Tapayan, Domingo 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75 A. MRD- 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7 Tiausas, Miguel V. 196. 197. Torres, Carlos P. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6 198. Tria, Hipolito 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05 199. Velasco, Avelino A. 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1 200. Villa, Francisco C. 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2 201. Villagonzalo, Job 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25 R. 202. Villarama, Jr., 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45 Pedro 1952 203. Abacon, Pablo 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7 MRP- Abad, Agapito 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95 204. MRP- Abella, Ludovico B. 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7 205. MRP- Abellera, Geronimo 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7 206. F. MRP- Abenojar, Agapito 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9 207. N. 208. Alandy, Doroteo R. 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2 209. Alano, Fabian T. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9 MRP- Alcantara, Pablo V. 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65 210. 211. Arcangel, Agustin 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85 Ag. 212. Acosta, Dionisio N. 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8 MRP- Abinguna, Agapito 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 73.65 213. C. 214. Adove, Nehemias 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55 C. 215. Adrias, Inocencio 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4 C. 216. Aglugub, Andres R. 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65 217. Andrada, Mariano 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73. L. MRP- Almeda, Serafin V. 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75 218. 219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7 Felicidad MRP- Amodia, Juan T. 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 71.4 220. MRP- Antonio, Felino A. 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 73.3 221. MRP- Antonio, Jose S. 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 73.75 222. 223. Añonuevo, Ramos 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7 B. 224. Aquino, S. Rey A. 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 67.7 225. Arteche, Filomeno 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 70.8 D. MRP- Arribas, Isaac M. 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 72.2 226. MRP- Azucena, Ceferino 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95 227. D. 228. Atienza, Ricardo 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85 229. Balacuit, Camilo N. 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 73.3 MRP- Baclig, Cayetano S. 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 73 230. 231. Balcita, Oscar C. 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 70.65 232. Barilea, Dominador 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5 Z. MRP- Banta, Jose Y. 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95 233. MRP- Barrientos, 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7 234. Ambrosio D. 235. Batucan, Jose M. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2 236. Bautista, Atilano C. 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25 237. Bautista, Celso J. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75 238. Belderon, Jose 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65 MRP- Belo, Victor B. 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85 239. MRP- Bejec, Conceso D. 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15 240. MRP- Beltran, Gervasio 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95 241. M. MRP- Benaojan, 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85 242. Robustiano O. MRP- Beriña, Roger C. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85 243. MRP- Bihis, Marcelo M. 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45 244. MRP- Binaoro, Vicente M. 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75 245. MRP- Bobila, Rosalio B. 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05 246. 247. Buenafe, Avelina 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75 R. 248. Bueno, Anastacio 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15 F. 249. Borres, Maximino 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9 L. MRP- Cabegin, Cesar V. 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2 250. MRP- Cabello, Melecio F. 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 71 70.5 251. MRP- Cabrera, Irineo M. 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3 252. 253. Cabreros, Paulino 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85 N. 254. Calayag, Florentino 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6 R. MRP- Calzada, Cesar de 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85 255. la 256. Canabal, Isabel 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 73.7 MRP- Cabugao, Pablo N. 76 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8 257. 258. Calañgi, Mateo C. 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8 259. Canda, Benjamin 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95 S. 260. Cantoria, Eulogio 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71 261. Capacio, Jr., 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 70.65 Conrado 262. Capitulo, Alejandro 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2 P. MRP- Calupitan, Jr., 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15 263. Alfredo MRP- Caluya, Arsenio V. 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9 264. MRP- Campanilla, 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65 265. Mariano B. MRP- Campos, Juan A. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 73.25 266. 267. Cardoso, Angelita 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8 G. 268. Cartagena, 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65 Herminio R. MRP- Castro, Daniel T. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 73.15 269. 270. Cauntay, 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2 Gaudencio V. 271. Castro, Pedro L. de 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 73.35 272. Cerio, Juan A. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75 273. Colorado, Alfonso 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6 R. 274. Chavez, Doroteo 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 73.1 M. 275. Chavez, Honorato 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 73.65 A. MRP- Cobangbang, 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 73.85 276. Orlando B. 277. Cortez, Armando 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1 R. 278. Crisostomo, Jesus 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45 L. MRP- Cornejo, Crisanto 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7 279. R. MRP- Cruz, Raymundo 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95 280. MRP- Cunanan, Jose C. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4 281. 282. Cunanan, Salvador 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45 F. 283. Cimafranca, 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35 Agustin B. 284. Crisol, Getulio R. 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8 MRP- Dusi, Felicisimo R. 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.85 285. MRP- Datu, Alfredo J. 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5 286. 287. Dacuma, Luis B. 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25 MRP- Degamo, Pedro R. 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65 288. 289. Delgado, Vicente 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65 N. MRP- Diolazo, Ernesto A. 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25 290. 291. Dionisio, Jr., 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8 Guillermo MRP- Dichoso, Alberto M. 71 77 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65 292. MRP- Dipasupil, Claudio 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9 293. R. MRP- Delgado, Abner 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35 294. MRP- Domingo, 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2 295. Dominador T. 296. Ducusin, Agapito B. 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05 MRP- Duque, Antonio S. 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9 297. 298. Duque, Castulo 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65 299. Ebbah, Percival B. 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95 300. Edisa, Sulpicio 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72 301. Edradan, Rosa C. 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4 MRP- Enage, Jacinto N. 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2 302. MRP- Encarnacion, 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65 303. Alfonso B. 304. Encarnacion, Cesar 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1 305. Estoista, Agustin A. 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7 MRP- Fabros, Jose B. 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05 306. MRP- Fajardo, Balbino P. 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9 307. 308. Fajardo, Genaro P. 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5 309. Evangelista, 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15 Felicidad P. 310. Familara, 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.85 Raymundo Z. 311. Fariñas, Dionisio 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75 312. Favila, Hilario B. 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2 MRP- Feliciano, Alberto I. 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25 313. MRP- Fernando, Lope F. 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73 314. MRP- Flores, Dionisio S. 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05 315. MRP- Fortich, Benjamin 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35 316. B. MRP- Fuente, Jose S. de 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55 317. la 318. Fohmantes, 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9 Nazario S. MRP- Fuggan, Lorenzo B. 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85 319. 320. Gabuya, Jesus S. 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75 321. Galang, Victor N. 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95 322. Gaerlan, Manuel L. 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15 323. Galem, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05 324. Gallardo, Jose Pe 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85 B. MRP- Gallos, Cirilo B. 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85 325. 326. Galindo, Eulalio D. 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 73.4 327. Galman, Patrocinio 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15 G. 328. Gamalinda, Carlos 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55 S. 329. Gamboa, Antonio 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95 G. 330. Gannod, Jose A. 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25 MRP- Garcia, Matias N. 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8 331. MRP- Ganete, Carmelo 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3 332. 333. Gilbang, Gaudioso 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 70.5 R. 334. Gofredo, Claro C. 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9 335. Gomez, Jose S. 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85 MRP- Gosiaoco, Lorenzo 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35 336. V. MRP- Gonzales, Rafael 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05 337. C. MRP- Gracia, Eulalia L. 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3 338. de 339. Grageda, Jose M. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75 A. 340. Guzman, Juan de 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6 MRP- Guzman, Mateo de 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9 341. 342. Guzman, Salvador 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75 B. 343. Guzman, Salvador 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75 T. de 344. Habelito, Geronimo 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65 E. 345. Hedriana, Naterno 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9 G. 346. Hernandez, Quintin 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6 B. 1952 347. Homeres, Agustin 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7 R. 348. Ines, Leonilo F. 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55 349. Jamer, Alipio S. 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72 MRP- Ibasco, Jr., 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8 350. Emiliano M. MRP- Jardinico, Jr., 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8 351. Emilio MRP- Jaen, Justiniano F. 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85 352. 353. Jaring, Antonio S. 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75 MRP- Javier, Aquilino M. 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05 354. 355. Jomuad, Francisco 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4 MRP- Jose, Nestor L. 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7 356. 357. La Q, Jose M. 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5 358. Leon, Brigido C. de 67 75 78 91 78 51 72 80 72.55 359. Leones, Constante 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73 B. 360. Liboro, Horacio T. 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4 361. Llanera, Cesar L. 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73 362. Lomontod, Jose P. 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2 363. Luna, Lucito 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4 MRP- Luz, Lauro L. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95 364. MRP- Macasaet, Tomas 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5 365. S. 366. Magbiray, 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05 Godofredo V. 367. Majarais, Rodolfo 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 72.85 P. MRP- Makabenta, 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3 368. Eduardo MRP- Malapit, Justiniano 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1 369. S. 370. Maloles, Iluminado 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3 M. 371. Maniquis, Daniel R. 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1 372. Maraña, Arsenio 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9 373. Marasigan, 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 72.75 Napoleon MRP- Marco, Jaime P. 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9 374. MRP- Martir, Osmundo P. 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95 375. MRP- Masancay, 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2 376. Amando E. MRP- Mati-ong, Ignacio 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3 377. T. 378. Mara, Guillermo L. 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 72.35 MRP- Mercado, Felipe A. 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9 379. MRP- Miculob, Eugenio 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8 380. P. 381. Mison, Rafael M. 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95 Jr., MRP- Monponbanua, 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1 382. Antonio D. MRP- Montero, 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15 383. Leodegario C. 384. Morada, Servillano 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9 S. 385. Mocorro, Generoso 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73 MRP- Mosquera, 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15 386. Estanislao L. 387. Motus, Rodentor P. 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75 388. Macario, Pedro R. 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15 MRP- Nadela, Geredion 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15 389. T. MRP- Nazareno, Romeo 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05 390. P. 391. Nieto, Benedicto S. 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9 MRP- Noguera, 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15 392. Raymundo MRP- Nodado, Domiciano 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6 393. R. 394. Nono, Pacifico G. 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35 MRP- Nuval, Manuel R. 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65 395. 396. Ocampo, Augusto 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7 397. Oliveros, Amado A. 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9 398. Opiña, Jr., Pedro 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85 MRP- Olaviar, Jose O. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8 399. MRP- Olandesca, Per O. 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45 400. 401. Orden, Apolonio J. 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45 402. Ortiz, Melencio T. 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1 MRP- Pablo, Fedelino S. 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95 403. 404. Pacifico, Vicente V. 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95 MRP- Paderna, Perfecto 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6 405. D. 406. Padlan, Crispin M. 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65 407. Padilla, Jose C. 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3 408. Padilla, Jr., 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95 Estanislao E. MRP- Palma, Bartolome 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25 409. MRP- Papa, Angel A. 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45 410. MRP- Parayno, Mario V. 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65 411. 412. Pariña, Santos L. 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85 MRP- Pasion, Anastacio 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55 413. 414. Pastrana, Rizal R. 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65 MRP- Paulin, Jose O. 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9 415. MRP- Pelaez, Jr., Vicente 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2 416. C. 417. Peña, Jesus 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4 418. Perez, Toribio R. 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25 419. Pestaño, 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2 Melquiades MRP- Pido, Serafin C. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15 420. 421. Pinlac, Filemon 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55 422. Poblete, Celso B. 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15 MRP- Piza, Luz 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8 423. 424. Puzon, Eduardo S. 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05 425. Quetulio, Josefina 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9 D. MRP- Quipanes, Melchor 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55 426. V. MRP- Quietson, Bayani 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 72.85 427. R. 428. Racho, Macario D. 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55 429. Ramirez, Sabas P. 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65 MRP- Raffiñan, Jose A. 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25 430. MRP- Ramos, Patricio S. 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25 431. MRP- Ramos-Balmori, 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45 432. Manuela MRP- Raro, Celso 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4 433. MRP- Rayos, Victor S. 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9 434. 435. Revilla, Mariano S. 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35 436. Reyes, Abdon L. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85 437. Reyes, Domingo B. 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7 438. Reyes, Francisco 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9 M. 439. Reyes, Lozano M. 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35 MRP- Reyes, Oscar R. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65 440. 441. Rigonan, Cesar V. 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7 442. Rivera, Honorio 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2 MRP- Rivero, 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6 443. Buenaventura A. MRP- Robles, Enrique 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7 444. 445. Rodriguez, Orestes 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25 Arellano 446. Roldan, Jose V. 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9 447. Rosario, Adelaida 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15 R. del 448. Rosario, Restituto 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1 F. del MRP- Sabelino, Conrado 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.95 449. S. 450. San Juan, Damaso 77 86 72 89 59 76 65 72 71.6 451. Sañiel, Felix L. 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1 452. Samaniego, Jesus 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6 B. MRP- Sandoval, 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.95 453. Emmanuel M. MRP- Sanidad, 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95 454. Emmanuel Q. 455. Santiago, Jr., 75 76 84 93 63 65 59 70 71.8 Cristobal 456. Santillan, Juanito 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.25 Ll. MRP- Santos, Rodolfo C. 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7 457. MRP- Santos, Ruperto M. 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75 458. MRP- Santos, Aquilino C. 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8 459. MRP- Santos, Rufino A. 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3 460. 461. Suanding, Bantas 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1 MRP- Sulit, Feliz M. 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5 462. 463. Songco, Felicisimo 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.35 G. 464. Soriano, Aniceto S. 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7 465. Suarez, Pablo D. 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9 MRP- Sybico, Jesus L. 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.05 466. 467. Tabaque, Benjamin 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85 R. MRP- Tan Kiang, Clarita 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.95 468. MRP- Tando, Amado T. 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72 469. 470. Tasico, Severo E. 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65 471. Tiburcio, Ismael P. 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.15 MRP- Tiongson, Federico 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 50 73.45 472. T. MRP- Tolentino, Jesus C. 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4 473. 474. Torrijas, Alfredo A. 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3 MRP- Tobias, Artemio M. 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55 475. MRP- Trillana, Jr., 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8 476. Apolonio MRP- Trinidad, Manuel O. 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8 477. 478. Trinidad, Pedro O. 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8 MRP- Udarbe, Flavio J. 80 82 77 82 67 56 68 75 72.6 479. 480. Umali, Osmundo C. 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7 481. Umayam, Juanito 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71 C. MRP- Usita, Gelacio U. 75 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55 482. 483. Valino, Francisco 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7 M. 484. Varela, Dominador 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85 M. 485. Vega, Macairog L. 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8 de MRP- Velasco, 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85 486. Emmanuel D. 487. Velez, Maria E. 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05 MRP- Venal, Artemio V. 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65 488. 489. Venus, Conrado B. 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05 MRP- Verzosa, Federico 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 73.7 490. B. MRP- Villafuerte, Eduardo 75 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 71.2 491. V. MRP- Villanueva, Cecilio 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.95 492. C. 493. Villar, Custodio R. 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75 MRP- Villaseñor, 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 73.15 494. Leonidas F. 495. Viterbo, Jose H. 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65 496. Yaranon, Pedro 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85 MRP- Yasay, Mariano R. 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1 497. MRP- Ygay, Venancio M. 73 80 83 84 62 59 72 77 72.65 498. 499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 75 73.95 500. Zamora, Alberto 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3 501. Rigonan, Felipe C. 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in subjects passed in previous examinations, showing the years in which they took the examinations together with their grades and averages, and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 72

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av. 1. Amao, Sulpicio M. 1946 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.5 1950 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4 2. Baldo, Olegario Ga. 1951 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9 1952 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.75 1953 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7 3. Blanco, Jose B. MRD-1949 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.15 1951 64 71 58 65 68 70 75 71 66.95 4. Condeno, Mateo 1950 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 92 69.3 1951 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 81 67.85 5. Ducusin, Agapito B. MRD-1949 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 60 68.65 1950 60 71 55 67 67 75 56 89 68.1 6. Garcia, Manuel N. MRD-1949 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 80 69.25 1950 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 84 60.3 7. Luna, Lucito A. 1946 63 53 69 76 75 76 57 69 66.55 1952 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4 8. Maraña, Arsenio s. 1949 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 75 69.35 1952 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9 9. Montano, Manuel M. 1951 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 64.8 1952 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4 1953 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65 10. Peña, Jesus S. 1950 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 46.2 1951 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 66.4 1952 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4 11. Placido, Sr., Isidro 1950 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 67.75 1951 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 71 66.8 12. Rementizo, Filemon S. 1949 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.65 1951 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.05 1952 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7 13. Amao, Sulpicio M. 1952 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.35 1953 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9 14. Rodulfa, Juan T. 1951 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.75 1952 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1 15. Sanchez, Juan J. 1948 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5 MRD-1949 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68 1951 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8 16. Santos, Constantino 1952 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.65 1953 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4 17. Santos, Salvador H. 1951 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.85 1952 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1 1953 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70 18. Sevilla, Macario C. MRD-1948 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1 MRD-1949 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68 1950 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45 MRD-1951 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3 1953 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05 Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some candidates--85 in all--presented motions for reconsideration of their grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av. 1. Acenas, Calixto R. 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45 2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8 3. Alejandro, Exequiel 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4 4. Andres, Gregorio M. 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7 5. Arnaiz, Antonio E. 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4 6. Asis, Floriano U. de 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25 7. Bacaiso, Celestino M. 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95 8. Bala, Florencio F. 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 67 9. Baldo, Olegario A. 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7 10. Barrios, Benjamin O. 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95 11. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35 12. Burgos, Dominador 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05 C. 13. Cariño, Eldo J. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73 14. Casar, Dimapuro 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35 15. Castañeda, Gregorio 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95 16. Estrellado, Benjamin 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2 R. 17. Fabunan, Edilberto C. 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1 18. Feril, Domingo B. 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6 19. Fernandez, Alejandro 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8 G. 20. Gapus, Rosita S. 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9 (Miss) 21. Garcia, Rafael B. 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65 22. Gracia, Miguel L. de 73 68 75 59 80 51 72 71 71 23. Gungon, Armando G. 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6 24. Gutierrez, Antonio S. 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1 25. Ilejay, Abraham I. 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7 26. Leon, Benjamin La. 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35 De 27. Lugtu, Felipe L. 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9 28. Lukman, Abdul- 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45 Hamid 29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85 G. 30. Maloles, Julius G. 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.75 31. Mandi, Santiago P. 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1 32. Margete, Rufino C. 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75 33. Melocoton, Nestorio 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35 B. 34. Molina, Manuel C. 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95 35. Muñoz, Mariano A. 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75 36. Navarro, 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73 Buenaventura M. 37. Nodado, Domiciano 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7 R. 38. Papas, Sisenando B. 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66 39. Pagulayan-Sy, 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4 Fernando 40. Padula, Benjamin C. 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05 41. Pasno, Enrique M. 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85 42. Peña, Jr., Narciso 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55 43. Peralta, Rodolfo P. 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7 44. Pigar, Leopoldo R. 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75 45. Publico, Paciano L. 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6 46. Radaza, Leovigildo 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2 47. Ramos, Bernardo M. 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1 48. Rabaino, Andres D. 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65 49. Ravanera, Oscar N. 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6 50. Renovilla, Jose M. 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5 51. Sabaot, Solomon B. 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85 52. Sumaway, Ricardo S. 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1 53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O. 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55 54. Vera, Federico V. de 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9 55. Viray, Venancio 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15 Bustos 56. Ylaya, Angela P. 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5 (Miss)

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Av.

1. Ala, Narciso 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5 2. Alcantara, Pedro N. 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8 3. Arellano, Antonio L. 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9 4. Buhay, Eduardo L. 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35 5. Calautit, Celestino R. 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 73.2 6. Casuncad, Sulvio P. 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05 7. Enriquez, Pelagio y 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05 Concepcion 8. Estonina, Severino 80 74 64 89 81 56 68 82 72.4 9. Fernandez, Alejandro 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8 Q. 10. Fernandez, Luis N. 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35 11. Figueroa, Alfredo A. 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3 12. Formilleza, Pedro 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25 13. Garcia, Manuel M. 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71 14. Grospe, Vicente E. 68 75 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6 15. Galema, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05 (1952) 16. Jacobo, Rafael F. 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3 17. Macalindong, 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75 Reinerio L. 18. Mangubat, Antonio M. 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45 19. Montano, Manuel M. 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65 20. Plomantes, Marcos 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6 21. Ramos, Eugenio R. 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6 22. Reyes, Juan R. 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2 23. Reyes, Santiago R. 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9 24. Rivera, Eulogio J. 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9 25. Santos, Constantino 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4 P. 26. Santos, Salvador H. 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70 27. Sevilla, Macario C. 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05 28. Villavicencio, Jose A. 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2 29. Viray, Ruperto G. 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25

There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the passing general average in the bar examination of august and November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.

SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even those subjects which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951, the President requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that interests us, the Court said:

The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subjects, which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the firs subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The only condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no more that three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or number of years intervening between each examination taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year later, and the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.

x x x x x x x x x

We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any application who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its effects. We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.

Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be its officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered.

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal profession and maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.

Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations. The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the Supreme Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the examinations for admission to other professions such as medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines, but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 1951 Bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1945 shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to afford another opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last world war.

In this will we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law "a special class who failed in the bar examination". He considered the bill a class legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar candidates for who this bill should be enacted, considered themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.

If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative act or corrective statute which Congress has the power to enact. The requirement of a "valid classification" as against class legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:

A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or classification, and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have the dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules established for each. (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926). Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits them when there are special evils with which the general laws are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special form. . . . The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to the extent of the care of correction only as in this case from 1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.

For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID Senator

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above transcribed. The President again asked the comments of this Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that both the President and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting: The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not embraced within the rule- making power of Congress, because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.' This passing mark has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the original list of successful candidates included only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first released containing the names of successful candidates covered only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948, whose general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed motions for reconsideration invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans and professors, practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President, with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of the bar examiners before the holding of the examination, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any subsequent examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions, praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged for said hearing being that some doubt had "been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new question of public interest." All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it covers bar examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within which the motion were filed, and this has been the practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function involved, in the subject and constitutional sense of the word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place, retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only when they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in certain years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against, because we no longer have any record of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the judgment of this Court by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to assume that the matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives. I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

Separate Opinions

LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in is exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate the admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial, are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average. Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

Footnotes

1 Designed as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners vice Mr. Justice Roman Ozaeta, resigned.

2 In 1946 and 1947, the members of the Supreme Court were Hon. Manuel V. Moran, Chief Justice, Ho. Ricardo Paras, Hon. Felicisimo Feria, Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Hon. Gregorio Perfecto, Ho. Carlos Hilado, Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Hon. Manuel C. Briones, Hon. Jose Hontiveros, Hon. Sabino Padilla, and Hon. Pedro Tuason, Associate Justices. In 1948, Justices Marcelino R. Montemayor and Alex. Reyes took the place of Justice Hilado, resigned, and Hontiveros, retired. Justice Roman Ozaeta was returned to the Court and Justice Sabino Padilla was appointed Secretary of Justice. In June, 1949, Justice Padilla was returned to the Tribunal, as Justice Briones resigned. In October, 1950, Justices Fernando Jugo and Felix Bautista Angelo were appointed to t he Court, as Justice Perfecto Jugo and Felix Bautista Angelo were appointed to the Court, as Justice Perfecto had died, and Justice Ozaeta had resigned. In 1951, Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran resigned and Justice Ricardo Paras was appointed Chief Justice. In 1953, Justice Felicisimo R. Feria retired.

Legal Profession- In re: Cunanan

Resolution Cunanan, et. al 18March1954

FACTS OF THE CASE: In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the ―Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.‖ Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%, 1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950- 1953 – 75%).

Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed constantly and maintained firmly. The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court. Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to ―cure‖ are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary. Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void. HELD:

Under the authority of the court:

1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect. 2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.4

The facts follow.

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.

At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their second child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family, as member of its active staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospital’s Treasurer.11

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13 In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children.19

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He would gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife’s own jewelry to finance his gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.23

In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.24

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his means whenever he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.28

During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and gambling habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses’ children from 1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.30

Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.32

To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s) interview with Benjamin’s brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.35

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x x x x x

SO ORDERED.37 Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision.47

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48

Hence, this petition.

For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;

II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and

III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.51 This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53

To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not.

In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another.57

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.59 The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.60

But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and the appellate court’s rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.621avvphi1.zw+

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin’s deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with Benjamin’s brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondent’s testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

The facts follow.

In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.24

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48

Hence, this petition.

For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;

III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not.

III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES* MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No. 602 dated March 20, 2009.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Sergio L. Pestaño, concurring; rollo, pp. 78-89.

2 Rollo, pp. 110-111.

3 Id. at 35-45.

4 Art. 36 of the Family Code provides in full:

Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. [as amended by Executive Order No. 227 dated July 17, 1987]

5 TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, p. 4.

6 Id. at 12.

7 Id. at 17.

8 Id. at 14; Exhibit "3."

9 Id. at 13, 15.

10 Id. at 21-23.

11 Id. at 10.

12 Rollo, p. 48.

13 Id. at 35.

14 TSN, January 6, 1995, pp. 3, 8-9.

15 Rollo, p. 36.

16 Id. at 37. 17 Id.

18 Id. at 40.

19 Id. at 44.

20 Id. at 40.

21 Id.

22 Id. at 36.

23 Id. at 40.

24 Id. at 48-49.

25 Id. at 42, 49.

26 Id. at 49.

27 TSN, December 7, 1994, morning, pp. 23-25.

28 Id. at 26.

29 TSN, August 31, 1995, pp. 5-26.

30 Id. at 7-9.

31 Rollo, p. 38.

32 Id. at 39.

33 Id. at 41.

34 Id. at 54-55.

35 Id. at 42.

36 Id. at 35-45.

37 Id. at 45.

38 Id. at 47-65.

39 Id. at 64. 40 G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20.

41 335 Phil. 664 (1997).

42 Rollo, pp. 80-81.

43 Docketed as G.R. No. 150479.

44 CA rollo, pp. 199-202.

45 Rollo, pp. 78-79.

46 Supra note 1.

47 Pertinent portion of the CA’s Amended Decision dated November 17, 2003 reads:

The foregoing considered and taking a cue on the adoption x x x of the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of the new "Rule On Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages" (A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC) which took effect on March 15, 2003, this Court hereby RECONSIDERS itself and GRANTS the motion for reconsideration filed by the herein petitioner-appellee on November 29, 2000. Consequently, respondent- appellant’s appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the DECISION of the court below declaring the marriage between CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING and BENJAMIN G. TING null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines is hereby AFFIRMED.

WHEREFORE, in view thereof, we can not do any less but sustain the decision dated 29 August 2002 of the court below in Civil Case No. CEB-14826 declaring the marriage between petitioner-appellee Carmen Velez-Ting and respondent- appellant Benjamin G. Ting void from the beginning under Article 36, Family Code (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987).

Consequently, the Decision of this Court promulgated on October 19, 2000 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one rendered AFFIRMING the appealed Decision of the Court a quo.

SO ORDERED. (Id. at 88-89.)

48 Rollo, pp. 110-111.

49 De Mesa v. Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc., G.R. Nos. 153063-70, August 19, 2005, 467 SCRA 433, 440.

50 Id. at 438. 51 Art. 8 of the Civil Code provides in full:

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.

52 G.R. Nos. 174153 and 174299, October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160.

53 Id. at 308-312. (Citations and emphasis omitted.)

54 408 Phil. 713 (2001).

55 G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353.

56 G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009.

57 Supra note 41, at 680.

58 Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840 (2000).

59 Id. at 850.

60 Rationale for the New Rules as submitted by the Committee on the Revision of Rules to the Supreme Court, November 11, 2002, p. 3, as cited in Sta. Maria, Jr., Court Procedures in Family Law Cases, 2007 ed., pp. 10-11.

61 Supra note 40, at 34.

62 Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 58, at 850-851.

63 Rollo, p. 39.

64 Id. at 54-55.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant. Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its Civil Case No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million pesos in damages against his wife and parents- in-law, the defendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena,1 all surnamed "Escaño," respectively.2

The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are the following:

Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce, Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was the culmination of a previous love affair and was duly registered with the local civil register.

Vicenta's letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage, indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with a friend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, they had planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be the governess of their first-born; they started saving money in a piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, their engagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagement ring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love for Pastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and they reconciled. This time they planned to get married and then elope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought some of her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Mary's Hall, which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the elopement did not, however, materialize because when Vicente went back to her classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke (t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, the Escaño spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynes suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be an invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due to the lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priest for the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. The recelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948 Mamerto Escaño was handed by a maid, whose name he claims he does not remember, a letter purportedly coming from San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel; Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. "M"), while still solicitous of her husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.

Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeable disposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her being called a "jellyfish." She was not prevented by her parents from communicating with Pastor (Exh. "1-Escaño"), but her letters became less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948 the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. "2-Escaño"). Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign the petition (Exh. "B-5"). The case was dismissed without prejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh. "B-4").

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughter's marriage to Pastor (Exh. "D"). On 10 September 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. "D"-2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.

But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, the following:

1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendant Vicenta F. Escaño liable for damages and in dismissing the complaint;.

2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and the heirs of Doña Mena Escaño liable for damages;.

3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay the damages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.

4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief sought by the plaintiff.

That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, Pastor Tenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escaño, were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of our civil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Both parties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which was performed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in the presence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown that said priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnize marriages.

The chaplain's alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorization from the parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law, is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separation of Church and State but also because Act 3613 of the Philippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force at the time) expressly provided that —

SEC. 1. Essential requisites. Essential requisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent. (Emphasis supplied)

The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only a formal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give the marriage civil effects,3 and this is emphasized by section 27 of said marriage act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements. No marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when it was performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the marriage was perfectly legal.

The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence the validity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary is positively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745; Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note here that in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of the solemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, when Vicenta's parents consulted Father Reynes and the archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta in abandoning her original action for annulment and subsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that her marriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.

Defendant Vicenta Escaño argues that when she contracted the marriage she was under the undue influence of Pacita Noel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy with appellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for argument's sake, the truth of that contention, and assuming that Vicenta's consent was vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did not render her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and the marriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civil court. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicenta's suit for annulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis was dismissed for non-prosecution.

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen.4 She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time, expressly provided:

Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar. 1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant Pastor Tenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court. Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified by acts of private parties (Civil Code,Art. 17, jam quot.); and additionally, because the mere appearance of a non-resident consort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originally had none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband" from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of "legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of a marriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with the previous doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject, particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of the Philippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, our statutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917, when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Code of the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effect merely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889, prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Of these, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855, is of particular interest. Said this Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, it results that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal significance. The claims of the very children to participate in the estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated and acknowledged natural children. The children of adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasis supplied) Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such union is adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.

True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) would depend on the territory where the question arises. Anomalies of this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer to them was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 667:

The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

However, the plaintiff-appellant's charge that his wife's parents, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and his wife, the late Doña Mena Escaño, alienated the affections of their daughter and influenced her conduct toward her husband are not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the Escaño's animosity toward him strikes us to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastor's own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh. "2- Escaño" and "Vicenta," Rec. on App., pp. 270-274). In these letters he expressly apologized to the defendants for "misjudging them" and for the "great unhappiness" caused by his "impulsive blunders" and "sinful pride," "effrontery and audacity" [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had he openly asked for her hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage, and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parents of Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of their religion upon advice that the previous one was canonically defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony was had it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escaño and his wife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That the spouses Escaño did not seek to compel or induce their daughter to assent to the recelebration but respected her decision, or that they abided by her resolve, does not constitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does the fact that Vicenta's parents sent her money while she was in the United States; for it was natural that they should not wish their daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).

There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved. SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin. — The law distinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himself in the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in a stranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, such distinction between the liability of parents and that of strangers is only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his own malicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unless he acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthy motives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child in good faith with respect to his child's marital relations in the interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child not terminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and be extremely solicitous for, his child's welfare and happiness, even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in the separation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce or annulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation, or where his advice or interference are indiscreet or unfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liable for consequences resulting from recklessness. He may in good faith take his child into his home and afford him or her protection and support, so long as he has not maliciously enticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or cause him or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule has more frequently been applied in the case of advice given to a married daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case of advice given to a son.

Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen.

In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable by appellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escaño, it is proper to take into account, against his patently unreasonable claim for a million pesos in damages, that (a) the marriage was celebrated in secret, and its failure was not characterized by publicity or undue humiliation on appellant's part; (b) that the parties never lived together; and (c) that there is evidence that appellant had originally agreed to the annulment of the marriage, although such a promise was legally invalid, being against public policy (cf. Art. 88, Civ. Code). While appellant is unable to remarry under our law, this fact is a consequence of the indissoluble character of the union that appellant entered into voluntarily and with open eyes rather than of her divorce and her second marriage. All told, we are of the opinion that appellant should recover P25,000 only by way of moral damages and attorney's fees.

With regard to the P45,000 damages awarded to the defendants, Dr. Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño, by the court below, we opine that the same are excessive. While the filing of this unfounded suit must have wounded said defendants' feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the court below, is that said defendants were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. This Court, therefore, reduces the damages awarded to P5,000 only. Summing up, the Court rules:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country;

(2) That the remarriage of divorced wife and her co-habitation with a person other than the lawful husband entitle the latter to a decree of legal separation conformably to Philippine law;

(3) That the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one consort entitles the other to recover damages;

(4) That an action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño;

(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Neither party to recover costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 The latter was substituted by her heirs when she died during the pendency of the case in the trial court.

2 The original complaint included the Roman Catholic Church as a defendant, sought to be enjoined from acting on a petition for the ecclesiastical annulment of the marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escaño; the case against the defendant Church was dismissed on a joint motion.

3 In the present Civil Code the contrary rule obtains (Art. 53). 4 She was naturalized as an American citizen only on 8 August 1958.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant. Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated. But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy. The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.

So ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants. Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al. Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al. J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to deny the motion.

2San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

3Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.

Regino Hermosisima for petitioner. F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.

On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.

The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:

Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.

Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:

ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court shall entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.

ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the concurrence of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.

The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought within one year, computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.

Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:

Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be broken.1awphîl.nèt

Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:

Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly. Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.

Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered into by a male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.

Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even though approved by the parent or guardian.

Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for seduction shall not be affected.

Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.

Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.

Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses but also compensation for mental and moral suffering.

Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties, who cause a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person who is rejected.

Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return what he or she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.

These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:

The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the American States.

See statutes of:

Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344 Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762 Nevada 1943 — p. 75 Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141 New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223 California 1939 — p. 1245 Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326 Indiana 1936 — p. 1009 Michigan 1935 — p. 201 New York 1935 Pennsylvania p. 450

The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation when it provided for breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)

The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:

Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.

Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."

The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 — consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the balance representing expenses incurred to support the child — and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.

With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant. Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.

Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:

Dear Bet —

Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.

Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — That would only create a scandal.

Paquing

But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:

NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .

PAKING

Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.

On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."

On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the possibility of an amicable element. The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.

Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.

Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances of settling the case amicably were nil.

On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an amicable settlement was being negotiated.

A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)

Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L- 16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959). In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would have it so.

It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above- described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award. PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.