Massive Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico

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Massive Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico S. HRG. 111–653, Pt. 1 MASSIVE OIL SPILL IN THE GULF OF MEXICO HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION TO REVIEW ISSUES RELATED TO DEEPWATER OFFSHORE EXPLORATION FOR PETROLEUM AND THE ACCIDENT IN THE GULF OF MEXICO IN- VOLVING THE OFFSHORE OIL RIG DEEPWATER HORIZON MAY 11, 2010 ( Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 61–700 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, [email protected]. COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico, Chairman BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska RON WYDEN, Oregon RICHARD BURR, North Carolina TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MARIA CANTWELL, Washington JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona BLANCHE L. LINCOLN, Arkansas ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont JIM BUNNING, Kentucky EVAN BAYH, Indiana JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama DEBBIE STABENOW, Michigan BOB CORKER, Tennessee MARK UDALL, Colorado JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROBERT M. SIMON, Staff Director SAM E. FOWLER, Chief Counsel MCKIE CAMPBELL, Republican Staff Director KAREN K. BILLUPS, Republican Chief Counsel (II) C O N T E N T S STATEMENTS Page Beck, F.E., Associate Professor of Petroleum Engineering, Texas A&M Uni- versity, College Station, TX ................................................................................. 6 Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator From New Mexico ........................................ 1 Danenberger, Elmer P., III, Former Chief, Offshore Regulatory Program, Minerals Management Service, Department of the Interior ............................ 11 McKay, Lamar, President and Chairman, BP America, Inc. ............................... 34 Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator From Alaska ............................................... 4 Newman, Steven, Chief Executive Officer, Transocean Ltd. ............................... 40 Probert, Tim, President, Global Business Lines, and Chief Health, Safety and Environmental Officer, Halliburton ............................................................ 45 APPENDIX Responses to additional questions .......................................................................... 75 (III) MASSIVE OIL SPILL IN THE GULF OF MEXICO TUESDAY, MAY 11, 2010 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room SR– 325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Jeff Bingaman, chair- man, presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW MEXICO The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. We’re here today because of a disaster that never should have happened. The sobering reality is that, despite the losses and damage that have already been suffered, we do not yet know what the full impact of this disaster will be. We should begin by remembering the 11 people who lost their lives in the explosion at the Deepwater Horizon rig and express deep sympathy for their families. I’m glad to be a co-sponsor, along with Senator Murkowski, of the Senate resolution that Senator Landrieu and other Gulf State Senators are offering and authoring, expressing the condolences that I know we all share. I hope the Senate will act on that resolution as soon as possible. I’d also, of course, like to express our concern for all in the Gulf region whose jobs and way of life, are threatened by the effects of this Deepwater Horizon disaster. We owe it to them to see that dis- asters like this never happen again. This hearing is the start of the Energy Committee’s oversight of issues related to offshore oil development and the catastrophic blowout that occurred in the Gulf on the evening of April 20. It is the first of what I expect to be several hearings on these issues. Next week we’ll be receiving testimony from Secretary of Interior Ken Salazar on these events and issues. Our goal in the hearings is to create a thorough factual record and an informed discussion of the very important questions pre- sented by the disaster. The disaster raised here both technological and regulatory questions. We have an obligation to bring a level of seriousness to this endeavor and to determine as quickly as pos- sible and to the best of our ability the appropriate next steps. As those steps become clear through the testimony we receive and the investigative work of our committee staff, I intend to work with Senator Murkowski, the ranking member, and other members of the committee on a bipartisan basis to develop and introduce (1) 2 and advance any necessary and appropriate legislation through the Senate. At the heart of this disaster are three interrelated systems: a technological system of materials and equipment; second, a human system of persons who operated the technological system; and third, a regulatory system. Those interrelated systems failed in a way that many have said was virtually impossible. We need to ex- amine closely the extent to which each of these systems failed to do what it was supposed to do. I don’t believe it’s enough to just label this catastrophic failure as an unpredictable and unforeseeable occurrence. I don’t believe it’s adequate to simply chalk what happened up to a view that acci- dents do happen. If this is like other catastrophic failures of tech- nological systems in modern history, whether it was the sinking of the Titanic, Three Mile Island, or the loss of the Challenger, we will likely discover that there was a cascade of failures and tech- nical and human and regulatory errors. So our examination of what happened here will have the goal of putting in place improved systems to ensure that this type of catas- trophe never happens again. We will also be looking to identify any problems or risks that might exist for operations that are ongoing so that we can ensure that they are addressed with quick and ap- propriate action to safeguard human lives and the environment. We will begin the process today with two panels of excellent wit- nesses, and I welcome all of them. The first panel we will hear from is composed of two technical experts. One has long experience in the industry, as well as an independent view as a highly re- garded university professor. The other is a retired expert from the Minerals Management Service of the Department of the Interior, with long experience in overseeing safety of offshore oil and gas op- erations. After our first panel has given us a baseline of information and perspective on best practices for controlling oil and gas wells and overseeing their safety, we’ll hear from a second panel composed of leaders of the three companies involved in this accident, BP, Transocean, and Halliburton. They’ll provide us the information currently at their disposal on the disaster, the steps being taken to deal with the aftermath, and their future plans for continued in- vestigation and remediation. [The prepared statement of Senator Landrieu follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARY L. LANDRIEU, U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing to examine the ter- rible tragedy that occurred on April 20, 2011 and the record of offshore exploration and development of petroleum. Our nation lost 11 men in this terrible accident. Our thoughts and prayers are with their families and with those that are injured. Today, along with all of the Senators from the Gulf Coast, and with the Chairman and Ranking Member of this Committee, I introduced a Senate Resolution in their memory. We must not forget them. And we must do everything we can to prevent an inci- dent kike this from happening again. In short, we need to learn from this. But we most learn the right lessons. We Can’t Retreat Some have suggested that we put a halt to all new offshore drilling. I believe it would be a terrible mistake to retreat from domestic energy production. In the face 3 of this disaster, it may seem easy to simply ban offshore oil and gas. But banning offshore drilling will not keep industry workers safe and it won’t prevent our shores from the threat of an oil spill. Why? Because unless we stop using oil, then we have to get it from somewhere. We could stop drilling here, but then we would simply import more than we already do from Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Venezuela and elsewhere. Transporting larger quantities of oil from far away places will increase, not de- crease, our risks. That’s because we need to get it from there to our gas tanks in massive oil tankers. And periodically, those tankers crash. In fact, according to the National Academy of Sciences, oil tankers spill about 4 times as much oil as offshore drilling does, on average. Of course, it is also true that when we rely on energy production overseas, we are exporting it to countries whose environmental standards are lower, and whom have fewer resources to mitigate the impacts. Why not stop using oil? America must reduce its oil consumption, for national security, and yes, for envi- ronmental reasons. But we need to be realistic. Today America consumes about 20 million barrels of oil each day. We produce about 5 million barrels of oil per here. We produce another 3 million barrels worth of biofuels. I believe that the right course is reducing our oil consumption by promoting safe and clean alternative energy while increasing our domestic production. That is the true environmental stance. In that way, the United States takes responsibility for its production needs. And we would extricate ourselves from any number of geo- political hotspots.
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