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What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? University of Southern Denmark What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? Peters, Uwe Published in: Erkenntnis DOI: 10.1007/s10670-020-00252-1 Publication date: 2020 Document version: Final published version Document license: CC BY Citation for pulished version (APA): Peters, U. (2020). What Is the Function of Confirmation Bias? Erkenntnis. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020- 00252-1 Go to publication entry in University of Southern Denmark's Research Portal Terms of use This work is brought to you by the University of Southern Denmark. Unless otherwise specified it has been shared according to the terms for self-archiving. If no other license is stated, these terms apply: • You may download this work for personal use only. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying this open access version If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details and we will investigate your claim. Please direct all enquiries to [email protected] Download date: 01. Oct. 2021 Erkenntnis https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00252-1 ORIGINAL RESEARCH What Is the Function of Confrmation Bias? Uwe Peters1,2 Received: 7 May 2019 / Accepted: 27 March 2020 © The Author(s) 2020 Abstract Confrmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To ofer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the ‘reality-matching account’. According to the account, confrmation bias evolved because it helps us infuence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them. This can result in signifcant developmental and epistemic benefts for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don’t become epistemically disconnected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. While that might not be the only evolved function of confrmation bias, it is an important one that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias. In recent years, confrmation bias (or ‘myside bias’),1 that is, people’s tendency to search for information that supports their beliefs and ignore or distort data contra- dicting them (Nickerson 1998; Myers and DeWall 2015: 357), has frequently been discussed in the media, the sciences, and philosophy. The bias has, for example, been mentioned in debates on the spread of “fake news” (Stibel 2018), on the “rep- lication crisis” in the sciences (Ball 2017; Lilienfeld 2017), the impact of cognitive diversity in philosophy (Peters 2019a; Peters et al. forthcoming; Draper and Nichols 2013; De Cruz and De Smedt 2016), the role of values in inquiry (Steel 2018; Peters 1 Mercier and Sperber (2017) and others prefer the term ‘myside bias’ to ‘confrmation bias’ because people don’t have a general tendency to confrm any hypothesis that comes to their mind but only ones that are on ‘their side’ of a debate. I shall here use the term ‘confrmation bias’ because it is more com- mon and in any case typically understood in the way just mentioned. * Uwe Peters [email protected] 1 Department of Philosophy, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark 2 Department of Psychology, King’s College London, De Crespigny Park, Camberwell, London SE5 8AB, UK Vol.:(0123456789)1 3 U. Peters 2018), and the evolution of human reasoning (Norman 2016; Mercier and Sperber 2017; Sterelny 2018; Dutilh Novaes 2018). Confrmation bias is typically viewed as an epistemically pernicious tendency. For instance, Mercier and Sperber (2017: 215) maintain that the bias impedes the formation of well-founded beliefs, reduces people’s ability to correct their mistaken views, and makes them, when they reason on their own, “become overconfdent” (Mercier 2016: 110). In the same vein, Steel (2018) holds that the bias involves an “epistemic distortion [that] consists of unjustifably favoring supporting evidence for [one’s] belief, which can result in the belief becoming unreasonably confdent or extreme” (897). Similarly, Peters (2018) writes that confrmation bias “leads to par- tial, and therewith for the individual less reliable, information processing” (15). The bias is not only taken to be epistemically problematic, but also thought to be a “ubiquitous” (Nickerson 1998: 208), “built-in feature of the mind” (Haidt 2012: 105), found in both everyday and abstract reasoning tasks (Evans 1996), indepen- dently of subjects’ intelligence, cognitive ability, or motivation to avoid it (Stanovich et al. 2013; Lord et al. 1984). Given its seemingly dysfunctional character, the appar- ent pervasiveness of confrmation bias raises a puzzle: If the bias is indeed epistemi- cally problematic, why is it still with us today? By defnition, dysfunctional traits should be more prone to extinction than functional ones (Nickerson 1998). Might confrmation bias be or have been adaptive? Some philosophers are optimistic, arguing that the bias has in fact signifcant advantages for the individual, groups, or both (Mercier and Sperber 2017; Norman 2016; Smart 2018; Peters 2018). Others are pessimistic. For instance, Dutilh Novaes (2018) maintains that confrmation bias makes subjects less able to anticipate other people’s viewpoints, and so, “given the importance of being able to appreciate one’s interlocutor’s perspective for social interaction”, is “best not seen as an adaptation” (520). In the following, I discuss three recent proposals of the adaptationist kind, men- tion reservations about them, and develop a novel account of the evolution of con- frmation bias that challenges a key assumption underlying current research on the bias, namely that the bias thwarts reliable belief formation and truth tracking. The account holds that while searching for information supporting one’s pre-existing beliefs and ignoring contradictory data is disadvantageous when that what one takes to be reality is and stays diferent from what one believes it to be, it is benef- cial when, as the result of one’s processing information in that way, that reality is changed so that it matches one’s beliefs. I call this process reality matching and con- tend that it frequently occurs when the beliefs at issue are about people and social structures (i.e., relationships between individuals, groups, and socio-political institu- tions). In these situations, confrmation bias is highly efective for us to be confdent about our beliefs even when there is insufcient evidence or subjective motivation available to us to support them. This helps us infuence and ‘mould’ people and 1 3 ?What Is the Function of Confrmation Bias social structures so that they ft our beliefs,2 which is an adaptive property of con- frmation bias. It can result in signifcant developmental and epistemic benefts for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don’t become epistemically discon- nected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. I shall not argue that the adaptive function of confrmation bias that this reality- matching account highlights is the only evolved function of the bias. Rather, I pro- pose that it is one important function that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias. In Sects. 1 and 2, I distinguish confrmation bias from related cognitions before briefy introducing some recent empirical evidence supporting the existence of the bias. In Sect. 3, I motivate the search for an evolutionary explanation of confr- mation bias and critically discuss three recent proposals. In Sects. 4 and 5, I then develop and support the reality-matching account as an alternative. 1 Confrmation Bias and Friends The term ‘confrmation bias’ has been used to refer to various distinct ways in which beliefs and expectations can infuence the selection, retention, and evaluation of evi- dence (Klayman 1995; Nickerson 1998). Hahn and Harris (2014) ofer a list of them including four types of cognitions: (1) hypothesis-determined information seeking and interpretation, (2) failures to pursue a falsifcationist strategy in contexts of con- ditional reasoning, (3) a resistance to change a belief or opinion once formed, and (4) overconfdence or an illusion of validity of one’s own view. Hahn and Harries note that while all of these cognitions have been labeled ‘con- frmation bias’, (1)–(4) are also sometimes viewed as components of ‘motivated reasoning’ (or ‘wishful thinking’) (ibid: 45), i.e., information processing that leads people to arrive at the conclusions they favor (Kunda 1990). In fact, as Nickerson (1998: 176) notes, confrmation bias comes in two diferent favors: “motivated” and “unmotivated” confrmation bias. And the operation of the former can be understood as motivated reasoning itself, because it too involves partial information processing to buttress a view that one wants to be true (ibid). Unmotivated confrmation bias, however, operates when people process data in one-sided, partial ways that support their predetermined views no matter whether they favor them. So confrmation bias is also importantly diferent from motivated reasoning, as it can take efect in the absence of a preferred view and might lead one to support even beliefs that one wants to be false (e.g., when one believes the catastrophic efects of climate change are unavoidable; Steel 2018). Despite overlapping with motivated reasoning, confrmation bias can thus plau- sibly be (and typically is) construed as a distinctive cognition. It is thought to be a subject’s largely automatic and unconscious tendency to (i) seek support for her 2 Researchers working on folk psychology might be reminded of the ‘mindshaping’ view of folk psy- chology (Mameli 2001; Zawidzki 2013).
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