German-Polish Reconciliation in Comparative Perspective: Lessons for Japan? ドイツ・ポーランド和解を比較的視野に置く——日本にとっての教訓たり得るか

Lily Gardner-Feldman

Japan, has chosen to entertain the possibility of a paradigm shift in how Japan deals with China German-Polish Reconciliation in and South Korea. In a June 2009 visit to the Comparative Perspective: Lessons Republic of Korea as head of the Democratic for Japan?1 Party of Japan (DPJ), when elaborating on his vision for an East Asian or Asian-Pacific Lily Gardner Feldman Community, Hatoyama drew on the Franco- German experience of creating a regional The Japanese Case and the Benefits of organization for embedding their relationship Comparison on foundations of permanent peace.

In 2008 and 2009, a series of historical issues once again defined the public space of Japanese-South Korean and Japanese-Chinese relations: the revisionist essay of General Tamogami Toshio; Prime Minister Aso Taro’s acknowledgement of the use of slave labor in his family’s wartime mine; new flare-ups in the longstanding territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu and Takeshima/Dokdo islets; ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine; and Japanese government approval of another amnesiac history textbook whitewashing Japan’s World War II aggression.2

These developments could be viewed as another episode in the periodic eruption of Hatoyama (left) and Lee in Seoul, October history-related problems that have affected 9, 2009 Japan’s bilateral ties openly since 1982, with the anticipation that they will ebb and flow Since assuming office, Prime Minister depending on domestic and international Hatoyama’s first visit to Seoul instead of circumstances. Alternatively, these events also Washington, D.C. (usually the first destination), could be understood as contaminants that severely impede Japan’s foreign policy, with the and his pledge that neither he nor any of his hope that now is a time to imagine fundamental cabinet members will visit the Yasukuni Shrine, change. have signaled his interest in Japan’s Asian neighbors and his emphasis on a reconciliatory Hatoyama Yukio, the new Prime Minister of tone toward them.

1 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

In addition to the election victory of the the goal and underestimating the considerable Democratic Party of Japan, there are signs that obstacles, crises, and vicissitudes that have a path toward genuine reconciliation inaccompanied these long processes of bilateral Northeast Asia might now be approachable. peace-making, and whose surmounting has First, there is the reality of generational permitted authentication of reconciliation. change, which means the physicalParticularly notable in Jennifer Lind’s work is disappearance of some conservative,the assumption that there has been no backlash nationalist, and right-wing forces opposed to to the German government’s confrontation with reconciliation and the emergence of a cohort the past. While not as ferocious as the right- with no historical experience of World War II. wing backlash in Japan, there was intense Second, there is evidence of a growingGerman opposition to government and societal differentiated view among some conservatives, reconciliation behavior on a variety of for example the Yomiuri Shimbun’s War occasions. The key lesson to be learned from Responsibility Reexamination Committee and those German experiences is that eventually (?) Watanabe Tsuneo’s criticism of ministerial political and moral vision by German leaders visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.3 Third, public successfully challenged the opposition and opinion surveys demonstrate that “thethereby authenticated and strengthened affirmative view of the war...is being rejected reconciliation. Political and moral avoidance by the wider society.”4 are not part of the toolbox of reconciliation.7

As scholars and practitioners have sought to The following analysis of German-Polish understand the power of history issues in Asia experience with reconciliation is useful for the and the possibilities for ending the logjam over Japanese case as it reveals both the persistence reconciliation, in the last decade many have of historical issues and a robust looked to Germany’s experience with a foreign institutionalization that can limit the past’s policy of reconciliation. The literature on explosive potential. It also refers to three other Northeast Asian reconciliation that considers cases of reconciliation in German foreign policy the German case is welcome, but it is limited in – relations with France, Israel and the Czech four significant ways: (1) Often the references Republic – to demonstrate the pattern and to Germany are glancing or anecdotal.5 (2) richness of the German example. The essay Where greater elaboration does occur, it concludes with a brief review of the Japanese centers on single topics, such as memory, case under Prime Minister Hatoyama. narratives, textbooks, education, or territorial Comparison is utilized here as an analytical disputes, largely ignoring the many other framework and as a clarifier of choices with examples of Germany’s non-governmental keen awareness that simple replication is bilateral institutions and most of theneither desirable nor possible for the Japanese governmental illustrations.6 (3) The most situation. Even when there are inevitable developed arguments for learning from the systemic and political culture differences, German case focus on either Franco-German or comparison can sharpen the contours of debate German-Polish relations, excluding the rich and illuminate policy preferences. Thomas lessons provided by Germany’s partnerships Berger alerts us to three key differences with Israel and the Czech Republic, the two between Germany and Japan: in historical cases where history issues in fact have been experiences; in allied involvement in shaping stickiest. (4) Even where there is a fuller new narratives; and in the treatment of Germany, the understanding of international/regional settings in which the two the German model of reconciliation is flawed, countries evolved from pariah status after overestimating harmony and perfect peace as World War II.8 Yet, as he points out, the two

2 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF countries face the same challenge ofcommunity of fate that involves confronting the indelibility of the past at a time vicissitudes.10 Reconciliation is a long and when history issues are high on the global difficult process, as German chancellor Willy agenda. At a time when Japan shows signs of a Brandt noted when writing about German- political will and commitment to grapple with Polish reconciliation in 1976: “The soil in which the past, Germany can provide an important reconciliation could flourish required careful guide for the opportunities and hurdles etched spadework.”11 Germany’s first chancellor, in the long, arduous and necessary process of Konrad Adenauer, had also used a gardening reconciliation. metaphor when speaking of Franco-German reconciliation and the 1963 friendship treaty The Significance of the Polish Case between the two countries: “This friendship between France and Germany is like a rose that I have a maximal, “thick” definition ofwill always have buds and flowers,” and he reconciliation that has also been called 12 added “thorns.” It is this dual character of “structural.” By "reconciliation" I mean the abundant blooms and sharp points that is at the process of building long-term peace and heart of my understanding of reconciliation. cooperation between former enemies through bilateral institutions and relationships across In outlining my framework of reconciliation, I governments and societies. Reconciliation try to answer the basic question of whether involves the development of friendship, trust, German-Polish relations are durable, and empathy and magnanimity. It involves both therefore reparable, after the downturn in their ethical and emotional dimensions and practical relationship in the years 2000-2007 and material aspects. In fact, two German (particularly the last two years under Jaroslaw words, according to Polish analyst Artur Kaczynski as Prime Minister), or whether they Hajnicz, embrace the full meaning ofwere permanently damaged. The downturn was 9 reconciliation: Versöhnung and Aussöhnung. real, but it has to be considered against the Germany’s pursuit of reconciliation hasbackdrop of the accumulated relationship built consistently reflected both meanings, melding over forty years and against the reality of less moral imperative with pragmatic interest. This public, stable and positive institutional concept of reconciliation does not infuse peace relations at both the governmental and societal with a vision of harmony and tension-free levels. My approach is to see relations both coexistence, but rather integrates differences horizontally (over time) and vertically (across between peoples. Productive contention about levels). In many respects, the dimensions of history in a shared and cooperative framework reconciliation evident in German-Polish for identifying and softening (but notrelations can be identified also in Germany’s eliminating) divergence is a more realistic goal relations with France, Israel and the Czech than perfect peace. Authentication ofRepublic. reconciliation thus emerges from challenge. The Four Dimensions of Reconciliation The sense of reconciliation used here for the German-Polish relationship accords with the In reconciliation, the mix of pragmatism and characterizations of Marek Prawda morality- as motives differs depending on reconciliation means the management of history, leadership, institutions and diversity in a cooperative framework; of international context, that is the political Wladyslaw Bartoszewski – reconciliationdynamics of the process. I will address these incorporates squabbles within a family; and of four dimensions in the German-Polish case and Dieter Bingen - reconciliation means arefer to findings from the other cases. Using

3 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF the four factors permits a full panorama of the für christlich-jüdische Zusammenarbeit) and relationship rather than a snap-shot. the Protestant-backed Peace with Israel (Friede mit Israel) movement. History Acknowledgment of Grievances In the recasting of relations after conflict, there are three sequential factors which may take the The second stage of history’s shaping role in form of stages relating to history: the past as reconciliation, Germany’s acknowledgment of stimulus, the acknowledgement of grievances, grievances, involved converting the affective, and the past as present. Looking at “History” in moral component into pragmatic and material this nuanced sense gives us a greater capacity needs and formal political commitment. In the to situate contemporary German-Polish Polish case, as with France, Israel and the relations. Czech Republic, the acknowledgment entailed The Past as Stimulus the language referring to historical issues in bilateral treaties and in major statements as In the Franco-German and German-Israeli well as symbolic expressions of reconciliation. cases, the French and Israeli governments For example, the December 1970 Treaty were initially very reluctant to deal with between the Federal Republic of Germany and Germany because of the horrors of World War the People’s Republic of Poland on the Basis for II and the Holocaust. These attitudes changed Normalizing Their Relations acknowledged quite quickly, beginning around 1950, and Poland as “the first victim” of a murderous there was a willingness to engage on both sides World War II and recognized the Oder-Neisse using moral arguments, as a direct response to line as Poland’s western border, albeit de facto the past. There was a similar reticence in 13 and not de jure. Poland, due to the nature of the Nazi crimes. In all three cases, one can describe the starting position as one of enmity. Due to the Cold War, governmental action initiating a process of reconciliation occurred much later in the Polish case, coming only with détente in the 1970s, and even later in the German-Czech case, after 1989.

Religious organizations in society played an important role in lubricating the government process in the cases of France and Israel, just as they did in the German-Polish case in the 1950s and 1960s, as acknowledged by government leaders. As with France and Israel, religious efforts began early in Poland. As with France, in the Polish case it was both Protestant and Catholic actors who led the way, as would be the case much later in the German- Czech example, after 1989. In the German- Israeli case, spiritual initiatives transcended The 1970 Warsaw Treaty between Germany religions, for example the Societies for and Poland settled outstanding border Christian-Jewish Cooperation Gesellschaften( issues with the Oder-Neisse line

4 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

Other agreements recognizing historicalor asserted a fresh start in relations compared grievances followed: 1972 diplomatic relations; to the past. 1990 Border Treaty; 1991 Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Treaty; 1972, 1975 Positive manifestations do not preclude and 1991 compensation payments (without missteps such as Chancellor Kohl’s first choice calling them restitution to individuals or of location for the joint mass with Prime reparations to the state); 2000 agreement on Minister Mazowiecki: Gora Swietej Anny slave and forced labor (with Poland providing (Annaberg, as it is known in German), which roughly one quarter of the recipients and was vigorously rejected by Poles for the Nazis receiving approximately one quarter of the had memorialized there the Germans killed funds). The Polish case demonstrates that some during the Polish uprisings of 1920-21. This issues of history can be frozen and revived only faux pas was reminiscent of the German-Israeli years later, mirroring the German-Israeli case; case: In 1971, the German government opened for example, it was only in 1965, thirteen years its first cultural week in Israel on the after the 1952 Reparations Agreement, that anniversary of Kristallnacht. diplomatic relations were concluded between The Past as Present Germany and Israel. In the Czech case, victims of Nazism received their first compensation The third expression of history’s importance for from Germany only in 1997. reconciliation has two main features: (1) debates about the past, which can be divisive With respect to statements and symbolic but necessary to authenticate the relationship; events, we should note their appearance before and (2) affirmative commitments in joint efforts and after 1989. Before 1989 there were at least to confront the past. The past is neither ten instances in the Polish case, including the forgotten nor represents a mere footnote; 1958 speech at Warsaw university by Carlo rather it is a “productive irritant” to be Schmid, a key Social Democratic leader, who confronted constantly. Regarding the debates, was also involved in reconciliation with France there are the three familiar historical issues and Israel; Brandt’s 1970 kneeling at the that have separated Germans and Poles in the memorial for the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising; and period 2000-2007: the Center against Expulsion the 1981 “Package Initiative” (Paket-Initiative) (Vertreibungszentrum) first proposed by Erika through which ordinary Germans demonstrated Steinbach (Christian Democratic Union their help for Polish society after theBundestag member and president of the promulgation of martial law. There were also Federation of Expellees) and to be created in ten “firsts” after 1989, including the November Berlin with official approval; restitution and 1989 joint mass by Tadeusz Mazowiecki and compensation claims initiated by the Prussian Helmut Kohl in Krzyzowa/Kreisau; the first Claims Society (Preußische Treuhand) that speech of a German president, Roman Herzog, provoked the Polish Sejm claim for reparations for the fiftieth anniversary of the Warsaw from Germany to the Polish state; and the Uprising in 1994; the first speech of a Polish return or restitution of confiscated, looted and Foreign Minister, Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, to displaced cultural assets. the German parliament in April 1995; the first speech of a German president, Johannes Rau, Despite many heated debates in society and on to the Sejm in 2004. There are similar examples the part of politicians, the first and second from Germany’s relations with France, Israel issues do seem susceptible to resolution by the and the Czech Republic: treaties, agreements, two governments. Even under the last statements, symbolic acts that acknowledged (Jaroslaw Kaczynski) Polish government, there past misdeeds, memorialized historical events were bilateral consultations on the Expulsion

5 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

Center, and a German commitment toprolonged German unwillingness to provide Europeanize the subject matter. With the new restitution to Czech victims of Nazism; and the Donald Tusk government, there seems to be planned Expulsion Center in Berlin. In the case acceptance of the reality of the Centerof Israel, the past has also returned, both in the combined with a German-Polish agreement to statements of the German literary figure Martin work collaboratively on joint historical projects Walser about the oppressive obligation to such as the exchange of exhibitions and the memorialize the Holocaust, and in anti-Semitic creation of a World War II museum in Danzig. statements of the mainstream German Yet, the past does not disappear completely, for politicians Jürgen Möllemann (FDP) and Martin example in the contentious debate about Hohmann (CDU). Like Polish leaders, Israeli membership of the board that will oversee the leaders have warned Germans not to confuse creation of the Expulsion Center. victims and perpetrators. Concerning anti- Semitism in Germany, while the Israeli On the issue of restitution and reparations, in government has expressed concern, as the Schroeder government there were joint Germany’s partner in reconciliation it has also German-Polish statements and actions rejecting lauded the German government’s efforts to the Prussian Claims Society’s initiatives and combat this phenomenon. There are also the Sejm’s counter response. Even though recent, outstanding restitution issues for some Chancellor Angela Merkel rejected Prime citizens of Israel, which the German Minister Kazcynski’s October 2006 proposal for government has refused to recognize. We the mutual relinquishment of claims (the so- should note, however, that Germany has paid called “zero option”), she has repeatedly come 62 billion Euros in total restitution and out against any German claims forreparations payments since 1952 (about one compensation from Poland, most recently third to individual Israelis and the state of during Tusk’s trip to Berlin in December 2007. Israel). Even in Franco-German relations, where the past has played a lesser role than in The art question seems to be the thorniest in the cases of Poland, Israel and the Czech terms of resolution, with entrenched positions Republic, there was significant concern over on both sides, and German observers labeling President Jacques Chirac’s 2004 invitation to cultural property in Poland the “last German Schröder to attend the commemoration of the 14 prisoners of war.” In 2006, Klaus Ziemer, sixtieth anniversary of D-Day. director of the German Historical Institute in Warsaw, proposed that governments draw on the experience of deliberations between German and Polish art historians who together have effected a paradigm shift by developing the concept of “common cultural legacy” ein( gemeinsames Kulturerbe) for sharing rather than a national, sovereign focus.

The “return of the past” has also been evident in German-Czech relations: the property claims of Sudeten Germans; their call for rescission of the immediate postwar Benes Decrees and related laws that permitted expropriation and exonerated Czech excesses in the expulsion of Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia; the Chirac, Schröder and Blair at D-Day

6 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

Ceremony German-Czech case, as is the personal link between Schröder and Czech Prime Minister Spidla. Merkel’s time as a student in Prague, The second set of activities dealing on a regular and her ability to speak Czech, contributed to basis with the past, but in an affirmative way, the personal connections she has developed to are the actions of various civil societyCzech leaders. In all of these cases, personal organizations. There are too many toties helped ease difficult political relations. enumerate, but we can identify three that are present in the Polish case and across the other Unlike in the French and Israeli cases, but three cases: the bilateral textbook commission, similar to the Czech case, during the early the Action Reconciliation/Service for Peace years of the Cold War, what Helmut Schmidt (Aktion Sühnezeichen/Friedensdienste) and the described as the “formal” impersonal German Historical Institute. Neither Israel nor diplomacy of communism made it difficult to the Czech Republic has the latter in formal develop friendly relations between German and terms, but they do have some equivalent: the Polish leaders, but it was not impossible, as the German-Czech Historians Commissionpersonal ties between Helmut Schmidt and (Deutsch-Tschechische Historikerkommission) Edward Gierek demonstrated. and the Institutes of German History in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. These three organizations in all As an East German who grew up in the German cases are linked in their goals (education about Democratic Republic near the Polish border, the past; inculcation of a “culture ofAngela Merkel has been unique among German remembrance” - Erinnerungskultur), means chancellors in her ability to connect with Polish (meetings, publications) nature of history leaders on a personal level. Interaction with the (broad conception but with a focus also on new Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz World War II and the Holocaust) and effect Marcinkiewicz during her December 2005 trip (creation of bilateral networks; successor to Warsaw was aided by the fact that both generations; and a model for otherleaders were physicists by training, and that international dyads). she recognized the personal dimension in all aspects of politics. When relations were tense Leadership between Germany and Poland in spring 2007 and needed redirection, both sides sought to The second factor determining reconciliation is develop a positive personal chemistry between leadership. In relations of reconciliation, Chancellor Merkel and President Lech leadership has to be visionary, willing to Kaczynski. With the new Polish government in overcome domestic opposition, and capable of fall 2007, there was the sense, later borne out, creating leadership duos, often based on that the long-standing personal connection personal chemistry with political leaders in the (since the early 1990s) between Merkel and other country, and often spanning ideological Donald Tusk would contribute to the airing and lines. In the Franco-German and German-Israeli resolution of bilateral and EU differences. reconciliation this happened early on with Adenuaer’s special relationship with de Gaulle Institutions and with Ben-Gurion, but has continued throughout the life of the relationshipsRelations of reconciliation are distinguished by (Schmidt-Giscard; Kohl-Mitterrand; Schröder- a very high degree of bilateral Chirac) (Brandt-Meir; Strauss-Peres, Fischer- institutionalization at both the societal and Sharon, Merkel-Olmert). The close personal governmental levels. The Franco-German relationship between Vaclav Havel and Richard tandem, dating from the 1963 Elysée Treaty, is von Weizsäcker is often mentioned in the the best known example, but the German-

7 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

Israeli relationship is a close second, and augment official behavior on a German-Polish ties also display significant daily basis (much of the societal dimensions of institutionalization at both levels. activity in the Polish, French, The German-Czech case is the least Israeli and Czech cases). institutionalized, in part due to the hermetically-sealed nature of Czechoslovak (3) Conduits, where they perform communism after 1968. tasks, e.g. dealing with political oppositions, that officialdom Societal Organizations cannot always do. Here we see the German political foundations in the The plethora of societal connections between Polish case (offices after 1989) and Germany and Poland are quite well-known, but in the other three country cases five features that cross the four cases bear with similar goals (confrontation emphasis: (1) The institutions are not ad hoc, with the past – Aufarbeitung der but exist with regularity over time and involve Vergangenheit; European regeneration; (2) they span every area of integration; comparative public societal life from culture to economics, from policy), means (meetings, science to trade unions, from sports encounters exchanges, publications) and to religious organizations, from sister cities to outcomes. In the Polish and Czech youth exchange, from German political cases, there was the additional foundations to individual party ties, from goal of democratization. In the friendship associations to academic Polish case, before 1989 the connections; (3) they often have as patrons Friedrich Ebert Foundation (in the government or former government officials; (4) 1970s) and the Konrad Adenauer they maintain independent agendas, even when Foundation (after 1982) had they receive government funding; and (5) they contacts that were useful to their show solidarity with the bilateral partner in German parties in power. times of official crisis. As in the French and Israeli cases, the Polish-German societal (4) Competitors, where societal connections predated official relations. actors oppose official behavior (German expellee attitudes A sixth characteristic of societal organizations regarding the Oder-Neisse border in reconciliation relates to their relationships to in the 1960s and 1970s; the governments. There are four distinct roles that activity of German non- societal actors can play: governmental actors during the emergence of Solidarnosc; the (1) Catalysts, where they provide German expellee calls from 2000 the initial stimulus for official on for a Center Against Expulsion). relations (e.g., lay and church In all three Polish cases, the non- hierarchy in the Polish and French governmental actors influenced cases; economic actors in the governments either in the short- Polish and Israeli cases; academic term or the long-term. Recent and student connections in the examples of competition are Polish and Israeli cases; dissidents present in the other country cases, in the Polish and Czech cases). for example the German media criticism of Israel during the (2) Complements, where they second intifada in the Middle East

8 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

when the German government German-Polish institutionalization did not showed solidarity with Israel; the witness massive proliferation, which then did opposition of the Sudetendeutsche take place in the second period. As a third Expellee Association feature of institutionalization, there is the (Sudetendeutsche creation and realization of a framework for Landsmannschaft) to the German regular government-to-government government’s strong support of consultations and visits. As with Franco- Czech membership in the EU). German and German-Israeli relations, there are also joint cabinet meetings. German-Polish institutionalization has been deliberately Governmental Institutions patterned after the Franco-German case. As in Franco-German and German-Israeli My focus here is on the third German-Polish relations, the connections between German period, labeled as “frosty” or an “ice age” from and Polish societal actors dominated until the 2000-2007,16 beginning with Erika Steinbach’s first major official breakthrough, in 1970, although there were governmental interactions initiative for a Center Against Expulsion and and institutions in economics beforehand, continuing with the installation in Poland of the echoing the priority given to this area in Kaczynski twins. The latter introduced into Germany’s relations with Israel (Reparations officialdom a heavy dose of populistic Agreement 1952) and with France (European nationalism that meant frequent public Coal and Steel Community 1952). Like the criticisms of Germany over history, often in other three cases, German-Polish institutional response to societal actors in Germany, such as ties evolved gradually. There have been three the Prussian Claims Society, and sometimes in main stages of institutional developments: response to German government initiatives, for 1970-1989 in which the new legal framework of example the German-Russian gas pipeline the 1970 treaty produced new institutions, but agreement between Gerhard Schröder and in a circumscribed way due to the reality of Vladimir Putin. communism in Poland; 1989-2000, the “golden years” of phenomenal bilateral growth in Analysts differ over whether this period institutions following the 1989 agreements and between 2005-2007 constituted a defining the 1991 treaty on the heels of the Cold War’s moment for ties, moving them away end;15 and (3) 2000-2007 when the relationship permanently from partnership, or whether this was severely tested by differences between the was a temporary breakdown in an otherwise two governments but institutionalsolid relationship of reconciliation. Observers developments remained stable. who emphasize the ingrained nature of differences see only ritual in the relationship. As with Franco-German and German-Israeli Those who believe that the process of relations and even in the more infant German- reconciliation has not been irretrievably Czech partnership, the first hallmark ofinterrupted emphasize the strength of societal reconciliation is institutionalization across all ties, and the blending of interests and values policy fields: defense, economics, science and that join Poland and Germany. As in German- technology, the environment, law,Israeli, Franco-German and German-Czech transportation. In the Polish case, as in the relations, reconciliation is occasionally French and Czech cases, there is the added punctuated by crisis. The test of reconciliation dimension of cross-border cooperation.is the ability to weather such periods. Secondly, parallel to Franco-German and German-Israeli relations, the first period of The view advanced here is one of optimism for

9 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

German-Polish relations, where reconciliation’s to problems in German-Polish relations took robustness is borne out by three developments two forms: the establishment of a broad in the period 2000-2007: the continuity and framework to help guide relations, and the purpose of bilateral visits; the style andcreation of issue-specific mechanisms. Already substance of statements about the relationship; in late 2004 (taking effect in 2005), there were and the nature of proposed solutions to two major responses to the difficulties in disputes. relations surrounding the reparations and restitution issue: the appointment in the Continuity and Purpose. With the exception of German and Polish foreign ministries of Lech Kaczynski’s June 2006 cancellation of a Coordinators for German-Polish Societal and Weimar Triangle (Germany, France andCross-Border Cooperation, and the Poland) meeting after he was lampooned by the announcement of the German-Polish Year German paper die tageszeitung, there was a under the patronage of the German and Polish regular exchange of visits at the level of heads presidents. These choices reminded one of the of government and state, including President developments in Franco-German relations with Köhler (August 2005 and May 2006),the inauguration of the Blaesheim Process of Chancellor Merkel (December 2005 and March even more regular official meetings (following 2007), President Lech Kaczynski (March 2006) the Franco-German discord at the 2000 EU and Prime Minister Jaroslaw KaczynskiNice summit on new decision-making rules) (October 2006). There were also six joint and the creation of a second level of meetings between the two cabinets in the coordinators (as part of the 40th anniversary of period 2000 and 2006, as well as frequent the Elysée treaty in 2003). Issue-specific meetings of the defense ministers and foreign consultation mechanisms in German-Polish ministers. The uniform purpose, even on the relations included the working group on energy Polish side, was to “improve” and “deepen” the and the dialogue between the German Minister 17 relationship. of State for Culture and the Polish Culture Minister over the Center for Expulsion. Style and Substance. The German government used the occasion of visits to be non-Finally, beyond the highly public institutional confrontational and patient in style, with the responses to general and specific problems, the goal of not inflaming relations. Polish leaders optimistic scenario would point to the during visits also tried to be lessquotidian, detailed and often quiet policy confrontational than on other occasions,cooperation between 2000 and 2007 in three reprising a German emphasis on the need for policy arenas: cross-border activity, the openness, honesty and a constructive approach environment and defense. to differences.18 The sober and pragmatic style of Germany in these visits was accompanied by International Context references to the substance of relations as a “partnership” denoted by “trust” and”International Context” covers both the larger “friendship”, as well as a sensitivity to the global setting (relations with the US, with “dark chapters” of German history, indirectly Russia and NATO) and the specific regional elevating the moral dimension of ties, quite framework of the EU. On the issue of relations similar to the characterization of German- with the US and Russia, Germany and Poland Israeli and Franco-German relations in their continued to disagree over the German-Russian mature stage.19 gas pipeline, over US policy in Iraq and over missile defense (before the Russian invasion of Solutions to Disputes. Institutional responses Georgia), although the Tusk government is

10 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF looking for a détente with Russia and for less of There is an additional point that leads one to a lock-step with the US. Other ties oflong-term optimism concerning the German- reconciliation have tolerated well suchPolish dyad in the EU. As in the bilateral differences, for example concerning the US in relationship, divergence is necessary to German-Israeli relations and concerning Russia authenticate the relationship. By asserting in German-Czech relations. NATO hasitself in contentious policy debates, Poland constituted an important framework within feels it is converting into fact, even if which German-Czech and German-Polish close tentatively, the theoretical formula of equality military ties have evolved, both beforeof rights and responsibilities of all EU member- membership in the Partnership for Peace and states.21 As with France, the Polish sense of since. At the same time, the two East European greater structural symmetry between Germany countries have differed with Germany over and Poland is an important ingredient of NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine. reconciliation.

The dominant international framework for Conclusion reconciliation has been the EU, and here again we can identify the dualities that have marked This essay has provided the main contours of the other three factors of reconciliation we German-Polish reconciliation and of its have considered so far. Similar to the case of navigation of treacherous history issues; and Israel’s Free Trade Agreement, Association has indicated that similar features define Agreement and Action Plan with the EU, Germany’s other reconciliations, notably those Germany has been the key advocate for Poland with France, Israel and the Czech Republic. While the Japanese case is clearly in its infancy, (and the Czech Republic) in every step towards a sketch of Japan’s new reconciliation thinking membership. Yet, the reality of Poland’s EU and tentative practice is worthwhile along the membership has revealed differences with four dimensions outlined at the beginning of Germany over the budget, constitutional the German case. Without doubt, the process in questions and the climate and energy package. Northeast Asia will be long and difficult, All three issues were resolved with Germany requiring extreme patience on the part of extending itself beyond the regular, formal governments and societies in an environment of negotiations in order to secure an agreement in-grown skepticism and deep tradition. Yet as with Poland. We should remember that the German case demonstrates, small initial divergence does not have to be debilitating. In steps can yield to larger strides even when the case of the Franco-German pair in the EU, “many stones are scattered on the path” of research has shown that the larger the initial reconciliation.22 Moreover, Sino-Japanese and policy divergence, the greater the ultimate Japanese-South Korean relations are not jointness and influence, for example on starting from square one: there are already economic and monetary union and common powerful economic and financial links and foreign and security policy.20 There is barely an vibrant ties in popular culture. economic or foreign policy arena in the EU in which France and Germany have not floated History joint proposals. A growing sense of common purpose can be seen in the German-Polish The new Japanese government has expressed efforts toward democratization in Ukraine (e.g., its intention to be pro-active regarding the the joint visit of the German and Polish foreign past, as in Prime Minister Hatoyama’s ministers to Kiev) and towards the EU’s statement to the South Korean President Eastern Partnership (with Armenia, Azerbaijan, during a September 2009 meeting at the UN: Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). “The new Democratic Party of Japan has the

11 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF courage to face up to history.”23 Foreign Whether apology will now take the form the Minister Okada repeated this perspective in his victims require – a resolution of the Diet, not commitment to the 1995 statement by Prime just of the government – is unclear, but two Minister Murayama Tomiichi apology for aspects of the German slave labor case are Japan’s past behavior in the region. In the relevant. First, the passage of time (six decades February 2010 report of a joint Sino-Japanese for Germany) mitigates neither the victims’ history study, endorsed by the twopain nor the perpetrators’ responsibility for governments, for the first time Japan agreed to action. Second, pragmatic motives (American use “aggression” to characterize its behavior lawsuits) had to be joined by moral imperative toward China from 1937 to 1945.24 While there (President Rau’s apology and request for was no agreement about the number of Chinese forgiveness) to make the German slave labor killed in the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, the study negotiations successful. The general issue of was based on a common periodization. In many apology appears to dominate the debate about ways, it is an auspicious start that could learn appropriate Japanese initiatives. In all four German cases, the government faced useful lessons from the way the German-Czech significant domestic opposition to reconciliation Historians Commission has proceeded, overtures, including acknowledgement of including its willingness to entertain differing grievances (a form of apology), yet persevered perspectives on history within a framework of as an affirmation of the genuine desire for ongoing dialogue and engagement. Similarly, in reconciliation without major domestic a February 2010 visit to South Korea Foreign consequence. Germany has also demonstrated Minister Okada expressed his regret for the that legal formalities do not preclude Japanese occupation of Korea.25 governments from making extra-legal political exceptions: first in its decision in the 1950s to The reasoning of Prime Minister Hatoyama and initiate reparations negotiations with Israel, a Foreign Minister Okada appears both country that did not exist at the time of the philosophical - as outlined below - and Holocaust; and second in the “special funds” it pragmatic - the need for a new approach to an created on various occasions for individual expansive China. Three specific historical Jewish victims who were excluded from disputes still clog the road to reconciliation: German domestic compensation legislation. rights and demands of victims’ groups, including Korean and Chinese sex slaves Regarding the history textbook issue, Japanese (“comfort women”) and slave laborers; textbook textbook characterization of the past continues issues; and territorial disputes. to divide Japan and her neighbors, although Prime Minister Hatoyama has tried to moderate On the first issue, as an opposition party since the tone.27 At the same time, the new Japanese 2000, together with the Social Democratic Foreign Minister has been quick to suggest a Party and the Communist Party, the DPJ government-sanctioned common history initiated repeatedly bills in the Diet to address textbook among Japan, South Korea and China the emotional and material needs of “comfort to build on the existing trilateral work of women.” Yet, the Japanese legal system has scholars. Critics of the idea point to the fact proved unbending in its rejection of Korean and that it took six decades for France and Chinese victims’ claims, arguing that the Germany to write and use a government- compensation issue had been made moot by sponsored common history book. What is post-war Sino-Japanese (Joint Statement) and overlooked is the fact that there were path- Japanese-South Korean (1965 treaty)breaking achievements long before the book: agreements.26 the early creation of a Franco-German textbook

12 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF commission and the conclusion already in 1951, Ministers clearly disturbed China and South shortly after the war, of a “Franco-German Korea. Hatoyama not only has promised not to Agreement on Contentious Questions ofmake such visits, but acted vigorously on his European History.” The commissioncommitment. When over fifty Japanese periodically produces recommendations for the lawmakers visited the shrine for the annual fall teaching of history and geography. The Franco- festival in October 2009, no member of German experience was not unique: even Hatoyama’s cabinet participated. Another during communism in Poland, the German- action of immense symbolic complexity is South Polish textbook commission could be created Korean president Lee Myung-bak’s invitation to and issue recommendations for teaching Japanese Emperor Akihito to visit Seoul in history as early as the 1970s. And similar 2010, the centennial of Japan’s annexation of commissions have produced results in the Korea. Similarly, there is the initiative for German-Israeli and German-Czech cases. While Prime Minister Hatoyama to visit Nanjing to the product is important, the process of jointly apologize for the 1937 massacre and for confronting the past with the goal of airing Chinese President Hu subsequently to visit differences, and not history’s homogenization, Hiroshima as an expression of Chinese peaceful is a fruitful end itself. aspirations.28 Even if the visits do not ultimately materialize, the German cases suggest that the Territorial issues deeply divide governments joint process of trying to fashion symbolic and societies in Northeast Asia. Prime Minster events can itself contribute to reconciliation. Hatoyama has called for accelerating negotiations for a treaty that would make Leadership possible joint development of undersea resources between China and Japan, and sees It is too soon to tell whether Hatoyama’s new the Dokdo/Takeshima islands as contested style of domestic politics prioritizing between Japan and South Korea (rather than reconciliation in East Asia will succeed and belonging to Japan). However, observers are how other East Asian leaders will respond with skeptical of any rapid movement on territorial their own agendas, but we do know that his disputes over either the Senkaku/Diaoyu approach of emphasizing yu-ai (fraternity, islands or the Dokdo/Takeshima islands, and, friendliness) does color his foreign policy therefore, of the prospects for reconciliation in philosophy. It encompasses cooperation and general. Again, the German-Polish case is mutual respect while recognizing 29 instructive: it was not until German unification differences. Hatoyama specifically used the in 1990 that Germany recognized de jure the term to characterize his goals vis-à-vis China, Oder-Neisse border with Poland, although it including his call to view the East China Sea as had been recognized de facto in 1970 as part of a “sea of fraternity” rather than a “sea of 30 Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik. During theconflict.” His leadership has also been intervening twenty years, Germany and Poland demonstrated in the speed with which he has were building important governmental and met with South Korean and Chinese leaders: at societal networks even as Poland’s desire for the UN in New York, in Seoul, in Beijing for de jure recognition of the border wenttrilateral meetings and in Thailand for the unfulfilled. ASEAN-plus meetings – all within one month. South Korean and Chinese leaders are certainly A final dimension of “History” is the occurrence looking to Japan for initiatives in reshaping of symbolic events that can either propel or relations.31 Noteworthy in the German cases impair the chances of reconciliation. Past visits was the reality that on a number of occasions it to the Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese Prime was leaders in the victim countries, for example

13 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

Robert Schuman in France and Vaclav Havel in the Beijing summit’s conclusions. Additionally, Czechoslovakia, who made overturesSouth Korea is pushing for security to be part concerning reconciliation. of trilateral deliberations. As they seek to develop trilateral cooperation, the Weimar Institutions Triangle, created among Germany, France, and Poland in 1991 (combining two sets of The trilateral meeting among Japan, China and reconciliation), could furnish lessons in terms South Korea in Beijing on October 10, 2009 of sectors of cooperation, mechanisms, and was only the second time the threesome had barriers to exchange. met outside the ASEAN-plus 3 meetings (the first was in December 2008 in Japan). On the bilateral front, in the Sino-Japanese and Japanese-Korean relationships both high politics issues, such as defense and North Korea, and technical issues, such as economic cooperation, food safety and green technology, have been on the agenda of the numerous official and bureaucratic visits in the first six months of the Hatoyama government. Our Franco-German and German-Israeli reconciliation cases indicate the early priority to defense and economics, while the German- Polish and German-Czech examples point to the importance of economic and technical issues during communism and defense only after the end of the Cold War. Lee, Wen and Hatoyama meet in Beijing In his October 26, 2009 major policy address to the Diet, Prime Minister Hatoyama emphasized The joint statement that emerged gave a clear the active role of citizens and society in his new indication of intentions, even if the mechanisms vision of politics. This initiative, if it bears fruit, will take time to fashion: There werecould begin to counter the argument that agreements to “1) build mutual trust in the German reconciliation’s central role for civil political field, 2) deepen economic cooperation society cannot be replicated in the Japanese taking full advantage of high complementarities case where non-governmental actors have been of the three economies, 3) expand people-to- anemic due to legal and financial strictures. people exchanges, 4) develop regional and sub- Indeed, the role of non-governmental regional cooperation, and 5) actively respond to organizations are evident as Hatoyama reaches global issues.” They also agreed to confront out to South Korea and China. The first China- together “sensitive issues,” meaning the past.32 Japan-Republic of Korea Business Summit was Three immediate challenges identified for held in Beijing in October, highlighting the role continued deliberation by the triad arethe private sector can play in new commercial economic cooperation, the environment, and and trade connections. Prior to his trip to North Korean de-nuclearization, all highly Beijing, the chairman of the Japan Business practical issues. The long-term perspective Federation impressed on Hatoyama the need includes a plan for a free-trade area. The for an intensification of economic relations with senior-level diplomatic dialogue, launched in China, while protecting Japan’s intellectual 2007, then met in February 2010 to implement property rights.

14 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

Just before Hatoyama’s visit to Seoul in As plans for a regional organization evolve, October more than thirty Japanese civil society Japan’s new government should keep in mind groups (including “comfort women” and slave that the novelty of the Franco-German model labor representatives) welcomed the Prime was the surrender of sovereignty by both Minister’s views on history, while repeating countries, a sui generis departure in their demands for apology and compensation. international relations. Rather than the At the end of October, the citizens’ group Japan supranational features of the current European Network on Wartime Sexual Violence Against Union, its intergovernmental dimensions are Women reiterated their concerns in a meeting more relevant, as are the practices of other with DPJ Diet members. There, the DPJ’s Tsuji postwar economic intergovernmental Megumi underlined the cost of inaction for organizations such as the European Free Trade Japanese plans for an East Asian Community: Area. The European experience, while not fully “If we don’t solve this problem, it would be replicable, does tell us that bilateral impossible for Japan to speak out to East Asia reconciliation and regional reconciliation go on an equal footing.”33 When Korean “comfort hand in hand. The same is surely true with women” mounted their nine hundredth protest respect to the three East Asian powers, China, before the Japanese Embassy in Seoul in Japan and South Korea, and could have January, Japanese civil society groups in Tokyo, important repercussions for relations with Osaka and Fukuoka organized signature North Korea as well. collection drives to support the victims’ goals.34 As the new Japanese government explores International Context possibilities for reconciliation, it would behoove it to take from the German experience the There is no clarity regarding the role the US insight that divergence, debate and dissension might play in fledgling reconciliation efforts by are a natural part of relations of reconciliation, the Japanese government due to the turmoil in and that crisis is necessary to test and the US-Japan relationship itself as Hatoyama authenticate the new relationship. calls for a more equal economic and security Reconciliation is distinguished from lesser relationship, moves that were met with stern partnerships by its ability to manage admonition during Secretary of Defense Robert differences in a cooperative framework. This Gates October, 2009 visit to Japan.35 There is view is clear in the words of Willy Brandt, greater clarity about the new Japanesewriting about Franco-German reconciliation government’s goal of pragmatic cooperation decades ago: concerning the creation of a regional East Asian Community (EAC), even if the precise Bonn…[took] advantage of the … form remains elusive. According to Foreign occasion to point out that the two Minister Okada, the US would not be part of nations’ special circumstances the EAC, which has some American observers would continue to yield differences concerned while others view it as a vehicle to of interest and opinion in many embed China in a way that serves American 36 fields. Friendship did not connote a interests. Relying specifically on the Franco- neglect of one’s own interests or a German model (the 1950 Schuman Plan) that lack of candor towards others.37 led to the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the European Economic Community in 1958, the proposal appears to In the end, then, reconciliation is about both involve an ASEAN plus 3 arrangement, but realism and idealism, a fact Prime issues of wider membership remain unresolved. Minister Hatoyama seems to have recognized.

15 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

Whether his notion of reconciliation resonates Pacific War,” The Asia-Pacific Journal. fully with China and South Korea remains to be 4 seen. Sven Saaler, Politics, Memory and Public Opinion. The History Textbook Controversy and Japanese Society (Tokyo: Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien, 2005), 168. Phillip A. Seaton Lily Gardner-Feldman is the Harry and Helen reaches a similar conclusion inJapan’s Gray Senior Fellow and Director of the Society, Contested Memories: The ‘Memory Rifts’ in Culture & Politics Program at the American Historical Consciousness of World War II Institute for Contemporary German Studies/The (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). Johns Hopkins University. She is the author of Germany’s Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: 5 See, for example, Masaru Tamamoto, “After From Enmity to Amity, Rowman & Littlefield, the Tsunami, How Can Japan Lead,” Far East 2012. Economic Review, Jan/Feb 2005; James C. Hsiung, “Periscoping the Future: Will China Recommended citation: Lily Gardner-Feldman, and Japan Ever Be Like France and Germany?” "German-Polish Reconciliation in Comparative in James C. Hsiung, ed., China and Japan at Perspective: Lessons for Japan?" The Asia- Odds. Deciphering the Perpetual Conflict (New Pacific Journal, 16-1-10, April 19, 2010. York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Linbo Jin, “Historical Disputes in Sino-Japanese Notes Relations,” paper presented to the Center for 1 This essay is based on a lecture on German- Northeast Asian Policy Studies, Brookings Polish relations given February 25, 2008 at the Institution, Washington, D.C., 9 June 2009; German Historical Institute in Warsaw, with Youngshik Bong, “Domestic Politics of Dokdo,” sponsorship from the Center for International paper presented to the conference “Dokdo, Relations and the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Takeshima, Liancourt Rocks: History, Territory, Warsaw. The ideas presented are drawn from and Sovereignty in Northeast Asia,” School of the author’s book From Enmity to Amity, Advanced International Studies/Johns Hopkins forthcoming. Copyright: Lily Gardner Feldman University, Washington, D.C., 26 June 2009. 2010. 6 One of the earliest comparative examinations 2 On territorial disputes, see: Reinhard Drifte, is Ernestine Schlant and J. Thomas Rimer, “Territorial Conflicts in the East China Sea – Legacies and Ambiguities: Postwar Fiction and From Missed Opportunities to Negotiation Culture in West Germany and Japan (Baltimore: Stalemate,” The Asia-Pacific Journal. On Aso The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). mining see: Michael Bazyler, “Japan Should More recent publications include Takashi Follow the International Trend and Face Its Inoguchi and Lyn Jackson, Memories of War: History of World War II Forced Labor,”The The Second World War and Japanese Historical Asia-Pacific Journal. On textbook issues, see: Memory in Comparative Perspective (Tokyo: Yoshiko Nozaki and Mark Selden, “Japanese The United Nations University Press, 1998); Textbook Controversies, Nationalism and Akiko Hashimoto, “Japanese and German Historical Memory: Intra- and Inter-national Projects of Moral Recovery: Toward a New Conflicts,” The Asia-Pacific Journal. Understanding of War Memories in Defeated Nations,” Occasional Papers in Japanese 3 On the Yomiuri project, see: “Tessa Morris- Studies, March 1999, Edwin O. Reischauer Suzuki, Who is Responsible? The Yomiuri Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard Project and the Enduring Legacy of the Asia- University; Charles S. Maier, “Foreword” in

16 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

Joshua A. Fogel, ed., The Nanjing Massacre in suggested above, this work does not capture History and Historiography (Berkeley: the complexity and ambiguity that have University of California, 2000); Sebastian characterized the German case. A further Conrad, “Entangled Memories: Versions of the comparative work that looks beyond memory Past in Germany and Japan, 1945-2001,” in and apology by considering the role of political Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 38 (1), leadership and NGOs is Yangmo Ku, 2003; Gi-Wook Shin, Soon-Won Park, and “International Reconciliation in the Postwar Daqing Yang, “Introduction”; and Andrew Era, 1945-2005: A Comparative Study of Japan- Horvat, “A Strong State, Weak Civil Society, ROK and Franco-German Relations,”Asian and Cold War Geopolitics: Why Japan Lags Perspective, vol. 32, no. 3, 2008. Behind Europe in Confronting a Negative Past,” in Gi-Wook Shin, Soon-Won Park, and Daqing 8 Thomas U. Berger,Different Beds, Same Yang, eds., Rethinking Historical Injustice and Nightmare: The Politics of History in Germany Reconciliation in Northeast Asia. The Korean and Japan, AICGS Policy Report no. 39 Experience (London and New York: Routledge, (Washington, D.C.: The American Institute for 2007); Thomas U. Berger, “A Model Penitent? Contemporary German Studies, 2009). German Historical Memory and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective,” paper presented 9 For the dual meaning, see: Artur Hajnicz, to the 47th ISA Convention, San Diego, Polens Wende und Deutschlands Vereinigung. California, 23 March 2006; Thomas U. Berger, Die Öffnung zur Normalität (Paderborn: “Dealing with Difficult Pasts: Japan’s ‘History Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995), pp. 142-61. Problem’ from a Theoretical and Comparative 10 Perspective,” in Kazuhiko Togo and Tsuyoshi See Marek Prawda’s statement when Hasegawa, eds., East Asia’s Haunted Present: Ambassador to Sweden at the Stockholm Historical Memories and the Resurgence of International Forum Truth, Justice and Nationalism (Westport, Conn: Praeger Security Reconciliation, April 23-24, 2002 International, 2008); Julian Dierkes,Postwar here (accessed December 15, 2002); the History Education in Japan and the Germanys. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung interview with Guilty Lessons (London and New York: Wladyslaw Bartoszewski, March 29, 2007 here Routledge, 2010); Soon-Won Park, “History (accessed April 17, 2007); Dieter Bingen, “Die that Opens to the Future: the First Common deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen und die History of Northeast Asia”; and Daniel Chirot, polnische Innenpolitik. Bilanz 15 Jahre nach “Europe’s Troubled World War II Memories: der Unterzeichnung des Are They That Different?” in Gi-Wook Shin and Partnerschaftsvertrags,” June 28, 2006, Daniel Sneider, eds.,Divided Memories: Hamburg University, Ringvorlesung History Textbooks and the Wars in Asia “Osteuropa heute” here (accessed January 23, (London and New York: Routledge, 2010 2007). forthcoming). 11 Willy Brandt, People and Politics: The Years 7 On the German-Polish comparison, see Yinan 1960-1975 (Boston: Little, Brown and He, The Search for Reconciliation. Sino- Company: 1978), p. 181. Japanese and German-Polish Relations Since World War II (Cambridge: Cambridge 12 For the text of the exchange between University Press, 2009). On the Franco-German Adenauer and de Gaulle on the 1963 Franco- comparison, see Jennifer Lind,Sorry States. German friendship treaty, using the rose Apologies in International Politics (Ithaca and metaphor, see: André Passeron,De Gaulle London: Cornell University Press, 2008). As Parle 1962-1966 (Paris: Fayard, 1966), p. 341.

17 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

13 According to the 1945 Potsdam Agreement Anzeiger (Bonn), October 30, 2006. among the US, France, the UK and the Soviet 19 Union, formal recognition of the border would Bundesregierung, “Nie wieder Politik zu have to await a settlement between the four Lasten unserer Nachbarn,” December 2, 2005, powers and a united Germany. here (accessed December 12, 2005); Bundeskanzlerin, “Looking ahead to the Future 14 Reinhard Müller, “Rückgabe von Beutekunst. in German-Polish Relations,” December 2, 2005 Die letzten deutschen Kriegsgefangenen,” here (accessed January 17, 2006); Frankfurter Allgemeine FAZ.NET, July 26, Süddeutsche Zeitung,” Polen will Zwist mit 2007 here. Konrad Schuller, “Streit um Deutschland beilegen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, ‘Beutekunst’. Goethe in Krakau,”Frankfurter March 9, 2006; Holger Schmale, “Der Charme Allgemeine FAZ.NET, July 27, 2007here des kleinen Mannes,” Berliner Zeitung, March (accessed January 8, 2008). 31, 2006; Michael Fischer, “Neuer Ton in den deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen,” Associated 15 The term is Dieter Bingen’s. See “Die Press, October 30, 2006; Die Bundeskanzlerin, deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen nach 1945,” “Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel an Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 5-6/2005, der Universität Warschau,” March 16, 2007 January 31, 2005. here (accessed March 20, 2007);Associated

16 Press, “Merkel: Wir wollen freundschaftliches Thomas Roser, “Deutsch-polnischeVerhältnis zu Polen,” Associated Press, October Beziehungen; Schwieriger Gast,Frankfurter 28, 2006. Rundschau, October 30, 2006; Spiegel Online, ,”Merkel wünscht sich Freundschaft zu Polen,” 20 On the relationship between initial Spiegel Online, October 28, 2006. divergence on the one hand and ultimate jointness and influence on the other, see: 17 See, for example, Jacques Schuster, “Polens Douglas Webber, ed.,The Franco-German Präsident verabschiedet sich mit Relationship in the European Union (London Gesprächsangeboten aus Berlin,”Die Welt, and New York: Routledge, 1999), particularly March 10, 2006; Sybille Korte, “Erste positive “Conclusions.” Signale nach Monaten der Abkühlung,” Agence France Presse, October 27, 2006; Associated 21 Interview with Janusz Reiter, former Polish Press, “Merkel für bessere Zusammenarbeit ambassador to Germany, Der Spiegel, no. 2, mit Polen in der EU,” Associated Press, October January 7, 2008. 28, 2006; Associated Press, “Steinmeier wirbt für Verbesserung von deutsch-polnischem 22 This is the title of a book by one of the Verhältnis,” Associated Press, October 26, important societal architects of German-Israeli 2006. reconciliation, Erich Lüth

18 Der Bundespräsident, “Tischrede von23 Quoted in The Korea Herald, September 25, Bundespräsident Horst Köhler beim2009. Abendessen zu Ehren des polnischen Präsidenten Lech Kaczynski und Frau Maria 24 China Daily, “Japan Admits War ‘Act of Kaczynski im Schloss Bellevue,” March 8, 2006 Aggression,’” China Daily, February 2, 2010. here (accessed May 19, 2006); Agence France Presse, “Kaczynski: Gute Beziehungen wichtig 25 The Japan Times, “Foreign Minister in für Polen und Deutschland,”Agence France Seoul,” The Japan Times, February 14, 2010. Presse, March 8, 2006;General-Anzeiger (Bonn), “Kein Grund zur Sorge,” General- 26 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, “China Blasts

18 8 | 16 | 1 APJ | JF

Japan Court Ruling on Compensation for Constructive Ties,” Korea Times, September Wartime Sex Slaves,” BBC Monitoring Asia 24, 2009; BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “China- Pacific, March 5, 2010; China Daily, “China Japan Ties Get Good Statr in Japan’s New Goads Japan for Quick Action on Sex Slaves,” Government – Official,”BBC Worldwide China Daily, March 6, 2010; Jung Sung-ki, Monitoring, October 9, 2009. “Tokyo urged to Compensate for ‘Comfort 32 Women,” Korea Times, March 15, 2010; Korea The Korea Herald, “Korea, China, Japan,” The Times, “Individual War Victims,” Korea Times, Korea Herald, October 14, 2009. March 15, 2010. 33 Quoted in Mariko Kato, “’Comfort Women’ 27 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, “South Korea Bill Gets New Life,” The Japan Times, October Raps Japan’s New Education Handbook on 29, 2009. Disputed Islands,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 34 December 25, 2009. Oh Young-jin, “Ex-‘Comfort Women’ To Hold 900th Protest,” Korea Times, January 10, 2010. 35 28 BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, “Japan Seeks For an overview of US-Japan relations with ‘New Beginning’ with South Korea in 2010 – the new Hatoyama government, see: Envoy,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, January Congressional Research Service, “Japan-U.S. 28, 2010; Martin Fackler, “With Japan, U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for May Be Losing Diplomatic Ground to China,” Congress, 7-5700, November 25, 2009. See The New York Times, January 24, 2010 also: Mark Beeson, “East Asian Regionalism and the End of the Asia-Pacific: After American 29 BBC Worldwide Monitoring, “Japan PM Hegemony,” The Asia-Pacific Journal; and Mark Interviewed on ‘Enriching’ Japan-China Ties,” Beeson, “The United States and East Asia: The BBC Worldwide Monitoring, October 9, 2009. Decline of Long-Distance Leadership,”The Asia-Pacific Journal. 30 Quoted in David McNeill, “New Japanese Prime Minister Aims to Spread a Little love 36 G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan Among Asian Rivals,” The Irish Times, October article, “A New Japan, a New Asia,” The New 23, 2009. York Times, January 22, 2010.

31 Na Jeong-ju, “”Lee, Hatoyama Vow37 Brandt, People and Politics, p. 129.

German-Polish Reconciliation in Comparative Perspective: Lessons for Japan? ドイツ・ポーランド和解を比較的視野に置 く——日本にとっての教訓たり得るか

German-Polish Reconciliation in Comparative Perspective: Lessons for Japan? ドイツ・ポーランド和解を比較的視野に置く——日本にとっての教訓たり得るか