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Hiscox WTPV Jun 2009.Indd JUNE 2009 Table of contents Transnational terrorism 2 Profi le: Colombia’s elections 3 Worldwide terrorist activity 4 Africa Americas Asia Europe Middle East and North Africa In-depth 8 Coming up 9 Prabhakaran, seen here addressing the Tamil people from an undisclosed location, was reportedly killed on 18 May SRI LANKA Military sources on 18 May reported the death of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran one day after the separatist group had issued a statement that it would silence its guns as the battle for control of its last remaining territory drew to a close. The government For more information about Hiscox or Control for months had been claiming that it was on the verge of eliminating Risks, please contact: the LTTE – intact supply routes, resilience among separatist fi ghters and poor weather were among the factors that prolonged the fi ghting. Stephen Ashwell Tel: 020 7448 6725 1 Great St Helen’s, London EC3A 6HX Prabhakaran has been a fearsome executioner of the violent campaign for [email protected] a Tamil homeland and his leadership was central to the LTTE’s strength. www.hiscox.com However, strategic errors in the months leading up to his reported death proved fatal. The LTTE now faces a debilitating leadership vacuum; Peter Simpson high-profi le fi gures to have reportedly been killed include Prabhakaran’s Tel: 020 7970 2373 son Charles Antony, political chief B Nadesan and Peace Secretariat Cottons Centre, Cottons Lane, Director S Puleedevan. However, while reports of the LTTE’s demise London SE1 2QG have been widely welcomed, there are plenty of challenges ahead. [email protected] Devolution and development plans for ‘liberated’ areas are unconvincing www.control-risks.com and the confl ict has proved costly in both human and economic terms. Law and order will be a growing concern, particularly given the weapons in circulation, while the terrorism threat has not disappeared. Prepared by for Note: Hiscox Syndicates and Control Risks request that recipients do not forward the contents outside the distribution list. Any breach of this will lead to removal from the distribution list. Transnational groups and Islamist extremism JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH ARREST Malaysian Home Minister Hishamuddin Hussein on 8 May confi rmed that the country’s security service had captured fugitive terrorist Mas Selamat Kastari, the leader of the Singaporean cell of the Islamist extremist Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) network. Mas Selamat had previously escaped from a Singaporean prison in February 2008. Malaysian security sources claimed to have captured Mas Selamat in the southern city of Johor Bahru based on a tip off from Singaporean intelligence. Mas Selamat’s capture should modestly improve the security environment in Singapore and the wider region. A number of dangerous operators – namely JI and various splinter groups – remain at large, but the intelligence yield from Mas Selamat’s interrogation should further deplete JI’s already diminished capacity to launch terrorist attacks. Such a high- The Singapore-based Straits Times reports the capture of profi le arrest should also further undermine JI’s recruitment Mas Selamat Kastari and radicalisation efforts. Mas Selamat’s interrogation is QIM members following a shootout approximately 40 miles likely to shed new light on JI’s dispersed network – notably (60km) from the border with Algeria. In July 2008, the two in neighbouring areas in Indonesia – and refresh regional governments discussed setting up joint military patrols intelligence agencies’ assessments of terrorist threats. along the border and exchanging intelligence to combat With JI no longer the region’s main terrorist organisation, the insurgency and criminal groups operating in the region. the intelligence community will face a challenge in tracking emerging hardline splinter groups. It is unknown whether ITALY INVESTIGATION Mas Selamat had been planning any attacks while on the run. Italian media reports on 12 May reported that two French DEATH OF SENIOR ALGERIAN MILITANT nationals arrested in the south-eastern port city of Bari in November 2008 in connection with immigration offences Media reports quoting sources in the security forces on 2 were now the subject of a terrorism investigation. The two May indicated that Abu Harith al-Libya, a senior leader are Bassam Ayachi, a Syrian-born imam (prayer leader), and of Algeria’s main domestic extremist group al-Qaida in the Raphael Gendron, a computer engineer and convert to Islam. Islamic Maghreb (QIM), had been killed in clashes with the They were originally arrested in November 2008 after arriving security forces in Tanan, about 1,500 miles (2,410km) south in Bari from Greece driving a camper van containing fi ve of the capital Algiers, near the border with Mali. Another illegal immigrants. Police seized a computer and the contents member of QIM was reportedly killed in the clash. Despite of documents saved on its hard disk; web postings linked to it occasional attacks outside QIM’s northern strongholds, the appear to be the key evidence suggesting links to terrorism. reach of insurgent activity in the country is likely to remain confi ned to these areas, where small-scale attacks are Ayachi and Gendron, who were resident in Brussels likely to continue. However, concerns persist regarding (Belgium) at the time of their arrests, reportedly identifi ed security along the porous Algerian-Mali border because numerous potential targets for attack, including Charles de of militant activity and to the presence of criminal groups. Gaulle airport in France and unnamed targets in Italy, the UK and other countries. The reports claim that they were Abu Harith al-Libya, who as his name implies is thought involved in all stages of the terrorist process, from the to have been a Libyan national, was a key QIM operative recruitment of operatives to planning attacks. However, the suspected of helping the group to smuggle ammunition counter-terrorism police suggest that their primary role was in and drugs. He was also allegedly involved in the abduction communications, receiving statements from extremist groups of Westerners. In an incident refl ecting continued militant and posting them on the internet in European languages. activity on the Saharan border between Algeria and Mali, the Malian security forces on 26 April arrested four suspected Prepared by for 2 Note: Hiscox Syndicates and Control Risks request that recipients do not forward the contents outside the distribution list. Any breach of this will lead to removal from the distribution list. Profi le: Colombia - Electioneering, guerrilla-style CAMPAIGNING BEGINS As campaigning for Colombia’s general elections begins to gather momentum, both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN) leftist guerrilla groups will once again have to decide how they want to play their cards ahead of the polls. The groups have played an integral part in Colombia’s political life for at least the last three decades, and will seek to play a pivotal role once more. In fact, the future of both groups will be at the centre of debate because President Álvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security policy will be a key election issue. GUERRILLA STRATEGY The FARC and the ELN have undeniably been hard hit over the last seven years. Continuous military pressure during Uribe’s presidency has severely undermined their capabilities and allowed the armed forces to infl ict a series President Álvaro Uribe’s Democratic Security policy will be of heavy blows. Nevertheless, they are most probably far a key election issue from fi nished – an opinion supported by military intelligence. making too many concessions. This could be achieved if a Despite recent setbacks, the FARC in particular retains the series of large-scale disruptive attacks were to be followed capability to stage attacks throughout the country, posing by offers of serious talks. If they push too hard, they would a signifi cant security risk in some areas. In addition, while quickly go from discrediting the Democratic Security policy both groups have seen members killed or arrested, and their to legitimising another four years of hard-line military action. numbers depleted through desertion and demobilisation, The need to stay on this tightrope will lead both groups they retain a core of committed fi ghters with access to to refrain from indiscriminate attacks and concentrate weapons and funds who can stage operations with relative on presenting a combination of armed and political force. impunity. Now, to remain at the centre of the political debate and avoid being marginalised to the point that they become little more than well-armed drug-traffi cking LIMITED IMPACT rings, they need to continue showing their strength. Regardless of how successful the FARC and the ELN prove to be at striking that balance, their impact on the election and The groups’ main objective ahead of the polls is likely to be its aftermath is likely to be limited. The Democratic Security to discredit the Democratic Security policy. To do this, they policy has proven so popular that most candidates have not will engage in a dual strategy that requires careful balancing: only endorsed it, but are beginning to fi ght over who will be attacks that visibly demonstrate that they remain a signifi cant the most able to continue it, should Uribe not pursue a third force through widespread disruption of civilian life, but at the term. While most presidential candidates are likely to run same time showing they are willing to enter a political dialogue. on platforms that call for greater emphasis on social issues, This second point is critical in dictating their choice of targets they will have to constantly restate their commitment to the during the campaign; it follows the strategic shift that both Democratic Security policy and maintaining its funding.
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