Kentucky Highways

Some History and Prospects for Planning

by Timothy Collins Sarah Dewees Ronald D Eller prepared by the UK Appalachian Center Highways:

Some History and Prospects for Planning

PART I — Kentucky Highways and History: ‘Golden Triangle’ and ‘Problem Crescent’ By Timothy Collins Page 1

PART II — Interstate 66: The Need for Integrated Planning of a New Corridor in Appalachian Kentucky By Sarah Dewees, Timothy Collins, and Ronald D Eller Page 26

The Appalachian Center 110 Maxwelton Court Lexington, KY 40508-0347 606-257-4852

December, 1996 Photograph Captions and Credits: COVER: Cartwright-Cumberland City Road, Clinton County, late 1930s source: University of Kentucky Archives FACING: Scene in Eastern Kentucky, late 1930s source: National Archives, Washington D. C. PAGE 9: Road Construction, Lawrence County, late 1930s source: University of Kentucky Archives PAGE 11: Sand Gap-Kirby Knob Road, Jackson County, late 1930s source: University of Kentucky Archives PAGE 17: Packhorse Librarians, Greasy Creek, late 1930s source: University of Kentucky Archives

This publication was funded in part by a grant from the Appalachian Regional Commission. PART I

Kentucky Highways and History: ‘Golden Triangle’ and ‘Problem Crescent’

by Timothy Collins Introduction1 companies were reluctant to invest their Kentucky is a state with rich and poor own revenues or support taxation for areas. Some areas are vital links in the state, highways, so there was limited enthusiasm regional, national, and international economy, for road construction in many counties. while other parts barely get by because they are considered to be economic backwaters. ‘Golden Triangle’ Some areas have plenty of jobs. Others do not. and ‘Problem Crescent’ Some areas have access to good roads. Others During and after the 1820s, a network of do not. Those areas without access to good privately owned turnpikes under state charter roads are relatively isolated, especially in was built across Central Kentucky, with Appalachia. They tend to be out of the eco- Lexington, then an emerging manufacturing nomic mainstream. city, at its center. Road building was limited in Kentucky has many symptoms of uneven other sections (Clark, 1977; Caudill, 1963; economic development, and they are nothing Bowman and Haynes, 1963). The “Golden new. The economic, political, and social Triangle” of Louisville, Lexington, and problems of some areas — which have af- was taking shape, linked fected the whole state — date to the by a highway network that became the basis Commonwealth’s very beginnings. Lack of for much of the modern road system. Because good roads appears to be one major reason for of sectionalism, pressure for public funding of uneven development. Besides topography, roads had much to do with the growing there are least three historic factors that are economic intersts of Louisville, and to some crucial to understanding Kentucky’s problem extent, Lexington. of uneven development and highways: The “Problem Crescent” (Bowman and Haynes, 1963), a loosely defined area which 1) Until shortly after the turn of the century, extends from the Appalachian counties of the road building, with few exceptions, was east, across the southern counties, and turns considered mostly a local matter in Ken- north just east of the western coalfields (Map tucky. In fact, there was considerable 1), also took shape as commercial develop- resistance to any efforts to develop a state- ment burgeoned elsewhere. While the state funded road system with any regional was first in the country to establish a highway cohesiveness. Road planning really did not department in 1835 (Kentucky Encyclopedia, emerge until well after World War II, when 1992), the department was abolished in the the federal government became far more 1850s. Private road operators wanted to keep active in road financing. the state out of their lucrative business funded by state underwriting and tolls. 2) Even before the exploitation of Appalachia As market horizons expanded from local for coal, there apparently were limited areas to become regional, national, and even resources for road construction in Eastern international, farmers and manufacturers Kentucky, compared with other parts of the demanded better transportation. Gradually, state, especially in the central Bluegrass highways became a budget priority in Frank- area. fort. But the 1891 Constitution actually for- bade state involvement in highway develop- 3) Coal development — which occurred ment until voters amended it in 1909 to let the mainly through the auspices of large-scale state set up highway funds (Kentucky Encyclo- firms located outside the region — relied pedia, 1992). As late as 1912, road construction heavily on railroads until about the end of was chiefly a local affair financed by subscrip- World War II. Interests from outside the tion, privately built toll roads granted under state, as well as from Louisville, were state charter, and county-built highways active in railroad building. Because of the (Kentucky Bureau of Agriculture, Labor and heavy capital investments in railroads, coal Statistics, c.1929).

Roads as ‘Commonwealth’ 1 This is a revised and expanded essay excerpted largely In 1912, the Legislature established an from the unpublished dissertation of Timothy Collins, Tapestry Of Conflicts: A Political Economy Of Education And advisory Department of Public Roads. By Economic Development In Kentucky, 1995, the University of 1914, the State Highway Department was Kentucky. allowed to set standards for construction and

1 maintenance. There was a Road Fund based help plan and fund highway construction. The on a 5-cent gasoline tax and an auto license Legislature then passed a law allowing the tax. There was also a tax of 5 cents per $100 of state to provide $3 for every $1 counties raised property. Revenue from these taxes was to through bond issues. Almost every county allow state funds to build roads to connect took on highway debt in the 1920s (Kentucky county seats. By this time, there was an Bureau of Agriculture, Labor, and Statistics, increasing federal presence in road building c.1929). During the 1920s, road construction through the Office of Public Roads. In 1916, boomed, and county leaders painted the Congress passed the Federal Road Aid Act, possibilities in romantic terms. Between 1921 which became the basis of the federal-state and 1923, the state spent $6.7 million to gravel partnership in road construction. The act and grade 513 miles of road. In 1923, the mandated states to set up Highway Depart- Department of Transportation attempted to ments and to identify 7 percent of their public boost tourism by preparing publications and rural roads as U.S. highways. In Kentucky, the promotional materials (Kentucky Bicentennial Agricultural Roads Agency was merged with Commission, 1992). the Office of Public Roads (Kentucky Bicenten- But the progress was not smooth, as nial Commission, 1992). conflicting sentiments of people from various There was a marked increase in the state’s interest groups and regions blocked highway role in highway construction during the 1920s. improvements. In 1924, voters rejected a In 1920, the Legislature created a Highway statewide $75-million bond issue; $50 million Commission, and the Department of State was for roads, $8.25 million for higher educa- Roads and Highways designated a 4,000-mile tion, $5 million for schools, and the rest for primary road system. The Legislature also other purposes. McVey (1949) noted the state enacted a 1-cent gasoline tax, along with a 60- was up against its constitutional debt limit and cent horsepower tax (Kentucky Bicentennial needed funds for expansion. There was Commission, 1992). In 1922, voters approved a criticism that the proposed bond issue served constitutional amendment to allow the state to too many interests. McVey listed three reasons

MAP 1: Geographic Features of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

MAP 1: Geographic Features of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Legend

Kentucky Counties

Metropolitan Counties 1994

Outline of Kentucky ARC region

"Problem Cresent" Counties

Kentucky Eastern Coalfield

Kentucky Western Coalfield

Connecting Highways

Appalachian Corridor Highways

Interstate Highways

Kentucky Parkways

Miles produced by the UK Appalachian Center 0 50 100 prepared by the UK Appalachian Center

2 prepared by the UK Appalachian Center Cities of the Commonwealth Kentucky 3 for opposition: 1) fear of increasing the debt; 2) cases, little more than dirt trails, despite the inadequate plans to repay the interest; and 3) major spate of roadbuilding in the 1920s. In too much state debt already. fact, roads remained a huge problem for more The failed reform effort also suggests than 30 years (Pearce, 1987), as the tax-starved fragmentation of the state’s political and state struggled to raise construction funds that economic leadership that accompanied poor counties were unwilling or unable to massive changes in national and global provide. In the wake of the bond-issue defeat markets after World War I. Many Kentuckians in 1924, the Legislature again increased the from politics and business interests saw the gasoline tax in 1926 (Kentucky Bicentennial need to build roads to keep up with these Commission, 1992). changes. But there was not total unity on this way of thinking. It is logical to suggest that some — those from coal interests, among Depression and ‘Detour State’ others — did not want new roads because coal The Depression, with its public works hauling depended on privately financed programs, offered new opportunities for road railroads. In addition, agrarian interests might building, including federal funds to assist have wanted roads to transport goods to the states. Gov. , after a protracted market, but they did not want roads to foster battle, managed to get a sales tax passed in industrial development. Opposition also came 1934; one-third of it was dedicated to county from toll-road owners. There is evidence to roads. A.B. “Happy” Chandler, running for argue that there were concerted efforts to his first term as Governor in 1935, campaigned preserve relatively isolated markets in order to against that tax and had it repealed, replacing keep wages down and avoid price competition it with a tax on luxuries. According to Pearce that would threaten the profitability of local (1987), Chandler believed it was the businesses. government’s duty to build roads (including The impact of these conflicts on Eastern the state’s first modern four-lane highway Kentucky was clear. Development of the between Frankfort and Lexington and a rural highway system was slowed, and planning roads program), but he strenuously objected to efforts, such as they were, were thwarted. the sales tax. Road building remained largely a local matter, In 1936, the Chandler Legislature set up the with minimal state activity. According to Division of Rural Highways and renamed the Caudill (1963), many Appalachian counties Department of Public Roads the Kentucky did take on substantial highway debt, figuring Highway Department as part of Chandler’s a continuing coal boom would allow repay- larger reorganization of state government. ment through taxes on workers. When the Main roads in the mountains were macadam- Depression hit, many counties, with their tax ized during the 1930s with the help of federal revenues slashed, fell into default as workers funds. During 1940 and 1941, 1,170 miles of lost their jobs and businesses went under. roads were upgraded at a cost of $24.3 million. Without a regional planning strategy that In addition, another $2 million was given to helped all counties to develop at a more even counties for road building (Kentucky Bicenten- rate, road improvements of the 1920s failed to nial Commission, 1992). open up the state and the mountain region, Through the 1950s, however, Kentucky even though the state had 3,700 miles of lagged behind most states in highway build- surfaced roads in the federal system by 1927. ing. Table 1 shows conditions near the end of As Map 2 suggests, large sections of the state, World War II. The reputation as a “detour especially in Appalachia, lacked adequate state” (Pearce, 1987) was well-deserved. Two roads. The poorest counties had, in many maps give an indication of the highway

TABLE 1: Miles of High-type Surface Roads per 1,000 Square Miles in 1944 for Kentucky and Neighboring States.

STATE MILES STATE MILES 266.8 N. Carolina 89.6 Illinois 211.1 Tennessee 77.2 W. 117.0 Kentucky 61.1 SOURCE: Hall, 1947 4 MAP 2: Kentucky’s Highway System in 1929. 5 problems of the time. Map 3 shows the now ). There was minimal west- situation in 1950. Notice that the “Golden bound traffic out of Louisville on U.S. 60. The Triangle” counties had the highest concentra- volume of traffic southbound from Louisville tion of paved roads serving farms, while tapered considerably, but was comparable to Eastern and South Central Kentucky — the the southbound flow out of Evansville- “Problem Crescent” — had minimal road Henderson south of Bowling Green. Bowling systems. In addition, as might be expected, the Green appears to have had a relatively strong poorest Appalachian counties, which were westbound connection along U.S. 68 and behind in 1929, remained behind in 1950. Map 4 shows road use in 1952, reinforces Kentucky 80, compared with the eastbound Map 3, and demonstrates geographic fragmen- connection toward Somerset. At Bowling tation that hampered cohesive development Green, U.S. 68 heads northeast toward Lexing- not only in Eastern Kentucky, but across the ton, but was not a major artery. There were no state. Starting in Western Kentucky, it appears east-west federal highways cutting across there was good north-south traffic with solid southeastern Kentucky, and none has been east-west connections in a rough triangle built. (The Commonwealth built the running south from Evansville, IN, including Cumberland , a four-lane toll road Owensboro and Henderson, to the Tennessee that parallels Kentucky 80). border (U.S. 41, now the ), Traffic patterns clearly defined the “Golden west to Paducah (U.S. 60), and into the Missis- Triangle,” connecting Louisville, Frankfort, sippi Delta counties, with several different Lexington, and the Greater Cincinnati area. routes, including U.S. 62 and Kentucky 80. The South of Lexington, two arteries — U.S. 27 and eastern side of the triangle includes the western coalfield, which had far better roads U.S. 25 — appear to have traffic volume than in the eastern coalfield. slightly less than along U.S. 31W south of There was a definite break between the Bowling Green. The paucity of traffic volume western area and the next north-south corridor east of Bowling Green and southeast of to the east, which ran from Louisville to Lexington is striking. It emphasizes the lack of Bowling Green along U.S. 31W (near what is good roads and delineates the so-called

MAP 3: Percent of Farms on Paved Roads, 1950.

Percent 4% to 17% 17% to 23% 23% to 29% 29% to 45% 45% to 95%

source: Bowman and Haynes, 196 Miles produced by:

0 25 50 the University of Kentucky Appalachian Center

6 MAP 4: Volume of Road Use for Major Higways, 1952. 7 “Problem Crescent.” develop state parks sparked this trend. In Struggle for Better Roads 1948, his first year in office, Clements em- Many mountain counties were relatively barked on a massive highway building heavily populated. But because development program that lasted into the mid 1950s. of the timber and the coal industries was tied Funded partly by a 2-cent gasoline tax, it was to railroads, not highways, there was little tax dubbed the farm-market rural road program revenue dedicated to highway building. and run by a commissioner of rural highways Geography, topography, and poverty also (Pearce, 1987). At this point, highway plan- played a role in the slow pace of road build- ning was limited to mapmaking (Grayson, ing. The lack of roads presented a major 1996). barrier to many forms of economic develop- ment for jobs creation, much less access to Roads and Development schools, health care, and other amenities The 1950s were characterized by limited necessary for healthy, sustainable communi- funds and philosophical struggles over the ties. best way to fund road construction. Planning The ties between mines and railroads began to emerge as part of the road building deteriorated during World War II. Caudill process (Grayson, 1996). Still, there was a (1963) cited the importance of road building to crucial area of agreement: Roads were vital to the post World War II coal economy, where economic development. For example, highway much of the most easily accessible coal had revenues were used to fund tourism and been removed. With the success of smaller- public information in 1950. In addition, the scale truck coal operators during and immedi- Legislature gave the Department of Highways ately after the war, large-scale coal operators the authority to acquire rights-of-way in 1954 realized railroads directly to the mine mouth (Kentucky Bicentennial Commission, 1992). were too expensive, and they began demand- With economic development in mind, state ing improved coal-hauling roads in the officials in 1954 also issued $38.5 million in mountains. These demands were a major nonvoted revenue bonds to finance the factor in heightening Frankfort’s involvement Kentucky Turnpike south of Louisville. The in highway construction. bond issue was authorized through the By World War II, Kentucky had shifted original Kentucky Turnpike Authority, which most highway spending to the state level. was found unconstitutional because it did not Martin (1945) said Kentucky’s road spending require that citizens vote on the newly ac- was about 50 percent above the national quired debt. average, while local road expenditures were below average. He attributed the high spend- : Roads ing to rurality, rough topography, and the late and Economic Development start at road building. But roads also were Happy Chandler (1955-1959) did not let important for patronage (for example, Pearce, constitutional stumbling blocks halt road 1987), as well as maintaining a modicum of building. He took the issue to the people. state control over local political machines. Chandler’s successful request to legislators Given conditions of both political relationships and voters for a $100-million bond issue and the overall economy — with the wide- included a discussion of conflicting philoso- spread need for unskilled labor and the state’s phies of government finance that partly own poor financial condition — Frankfort had characterized the long-running debate over a definite stake in keeping road expenditures road building in Kentucky: high. This allowed party bosses to maintain a low-wage work force to keep workers em- I was opposed to the Highway Author- ployed and beholden to the entrenched ity Act enacted by a former Legislature political powers. Roads were vital to which, by leasing device, would have Kentucky’s political currency, greasing bank permitted the Department of Highways accounts of contractors and political officials, to contract a debt without limitation and providing minimal subsistence for work- and without a vote of the people [for ers. the Kentucky Turnpike]. No debt There were other reasons for better roads. should ever be fastened upon the There were those who were interested in people of Kentucky without their industrialization and a burgeoning tourist consent. . . . The Highway Authority industry. A program of Gov. to Act was held unconstitutional as 8 9 violating Section 50 of the Constitution mented Chandler’s statements, setting three of Kentucky, which plainly provides categories of general economic effects that that any debt contracted on behalf of come from a good road system: reduced the Commonwealth shall not become vehicle operation costs, time savings, and effective until it has been submitted to reduced costs from accidents. While the study the people at a general election and has emphasized the positive effects of received a majority of all the votes cast roadbuilding, it had nothing to say about the for and against it (Kentucky General negatives. It did not, for example, address the Assembly. House of Representatives, loss of shopping and jobs in local communi- 1956b:85). ties. It instead saw benefits in widening market areas (Kentucky Legislative Research No matter whether the debt was voted or Commission, 1992:1): nonvoted, there was considerable momentum to build new roads in the Commonwealth. By Cheaper, faster, and more dependable the end of the 1950s, plans were drawn to highway transportation will bring begin to open up some sections of Eastern various other advantages to Kentuck- Kentucky using the federally funded interstate ians. More and better goods will be highway system and improvements to existing obtainable at lower prices because roads. Chandler’s proclamation for his second goods can be economically shipped special legislative session in 1956 (Kentucky into more distant marketing areas and General Assembly. House of Representatives, people will be able to travel greater 1956b:82), illustrated the core philosophy distances to reach the more desirable behind road building: “. . . [T]he industrial shopping centers. Residents will be development of the Commonwealth of Ken- able to live further away from their jobs tucky is directly dependent upon an adequate and employers will be able to draw system of highway transportation,” and “. . . labor from greater distances. Farmers the present highway transportation system is, will be able to market their goods by reasons of existing limitations, inadequate inexpensively and to choose the more to the needs of an expanding economy and is desirable areas in which to market such detrimental to the location and expansion of goods. Recreation areas throughout the industries. . . .” Chandler also sought to state will become more accessible and broaden public support for highway construc- people will have a greater amount of tion by pointing out that roads are “. . . leisure time to devote to such activities inadequate to meet the demands of present . . . It is difficult to think of any impor- day needs and unsafe for modern travel. . . .” tant econommic or social activity in the In his address to the first special legislative state which will not reap considerable session, Chandler said industrial leaders with benefit from a more adequate system of whom he met expressed concerns about modern highways. highways. He cited a “dramatic illustration” where the Mathieson Hydrocarbon Chemical Crucial to Chandler’s roads program was Co. in Doe Run (Meade County) had to ferry the $100-million bond issue that the Legisla- its trucks across the Ohio River into Indiana in ture passed and voters approved in Novem- order to move its products to customers on the ber, 1956, by nearly a six-to-one margin. This east coast (Kentucky General Assembly. measure, which had tremendous impact on House of Representatives, 1956b:87). He called Eastern Kentucky, was a far cry from the for an increase in truck size and weights, as defeated road-bond issue in the 1920s. It was well as an increased fuel tax to alter dedicated solely to highways, and the state Kentucky’s image as a “detour state” for had little debt at the time. The bill required truckers. that various taxes on motor vehicles and fuels In November, 1956, the University of could not drop below the present rates for 30 Kentucky Bureau of Business Research in the years; they were earmarked to pay off the College of Commerce published Financing bonds. In the Senate, amendments permitted Kentucky’s Roads and Streets. The report cited funding for bridge and tunnel construction the importance of roads from an economic and and set aside proceeds from 2/7 of the gaso- social perspective, linking roads and economic line tax for rural and secondary roads. growth of agriculture, industry, commerce, Chandler, who argued that all counties education, and tourism. The study comple- would benefit from the bond issue, sought the 10 11 debt to meet anticipated nine-to-one matching Economic Research, 1962:7). requirements of the interstate highway system The second phase was an ambitious state- set up by Eisenhower’s National Defense financed plan that included toll and primary Highway Act of 1954.2 Over time, these state roads. Combs assumed that uneven develop- and federal funds would be earmarked for ment was blocking job opportunities and construction of Interstates 64 and 75, both of sought to open up transportation links to which passed through Appalachia. Chandler impoverished and declining areas with so- used about $70 million of the $100-million called “development roads.” His Kentucky issue during his term. Governor’s Program Evaluation Group (1963:19) was highly critical of how the road Bert T. Combs: system had “‘just grown’” without planning, ‘Development Roads’ while construction and maintenance had been When Bert T. Combs became governor in “unduly influenced by political consider- 1959, there were major changes in the ations.” The federal system gave Kentucky Commonwealth’s approach to road construc- national linkages, but Combs emphasized tion. Combs believed a comprehensive roads building highways to tie the eastern and program could weave Kentucky together into western ends of the state into closer contact an integrated economic framework, overcom- with the more populous and more industrial- ing geographic fragmentation that often ized central area: connected regions with larger, out-of-state urban areas (Kentucky Governor’s Program Kentucky, to meet the problem, placed Evaluation group, 1963). The major problem greater emphasis than ever before on was that there was no first-class highway an effective highway planning program traversing either the north and south nor east and for the first time a realistic relation- and west lengths of the state. Part of the ship was given to the economic impli- ambitious program grew out of federal cations of highway location. . . . Financ- funding that continued historic patterns of ing was made available for this to be road building and solidified the “Golden done. Full utilization has been made of Triangle”: the federal funds available for assis- tance in constructing the major systems The new system of interstate and of highways. The ability and the will to Defense Highways will give Kentucky do this was facilitated by planning and 616.2 miles of superhighways (does the basing of road building plans on not include I-24 and numerous spur economics (Kentucky Governor’s routes). This system will tie Louisville, Program Evaluation Group, 1963:19). Lexington, and Covington together in a triangular pattern and connect them with cities in the east, south, west and The emergence of road planning based on north of the state. (Kentucky Depart- economics ran into political limits. Combs, ment of Commerce. Division of constrained by constitutional debt require- ments that severely limited state authority to 2 The idea of an interstate highway system was nothing borrow, set up another Turnpike Authority to new. For example, in 1922, the U.S. Army created the Pershing map for highways for national defense, which build an east-west toll-road system to comple- showed 56,000 miles of strategically important roads, ment the north-south interstate system. This based on state plans. In 1937, President Franklin D. agency had to meet requirements of the court Roosevelt asked the Bureau of Public Roads to plan six decision that overturned the 1950s Turnpike interstate toll roads; in 1939, the bureau suggested a 26,700-mile system. In 1944, Congress passed a Federal Authority. The new quasi-government author- Aid Act designating an interstate system, but did not ity was set up as a special corporation of the appropriate construction funds. In 1955, an advisory Commonwealth to perform “‘essential govern- committed headed by Gen. Lucius Clay recommended to ment functions and to serve the public pur- President Dwight D. Eisenhower an interstate system. That year, Congress defeated a plan to fund the system poses of constructing, acquiring, financing and using bond issues. In 1956, however, Congress adopted a operating turnpike and other road projects for plan to build a 41,000-mile instestate system with a the use, safety, convenience, and general Highway Trust Fund that used revenues from taxes on welfare of the traveling public.’” The authority motor fuels, tires, trucks, and buses. The federal-state match for road construction was 90/10 (Kentucky had the power to “‘issue turnpike revenue Bicentennial Commission, 1992). bonds of the authority payable solely from the

12 tolls, revenues, rentals, and other funds ton (Fayette County) to I-65 at Elizabethtown pledged for their payment, for the purpose of (Hardin County) and the Western Kentucky paying all or any part of the cost of any one or Parkway (completed in 1965) from more turnpike projects, and to refund any of Elizabethtown to I-24 (completed in 1980) near its bonds’” (Kentucky Legislative Research Kutawa (Lyon County). Commission, 1992:29). In setting up the new Table 2 shows all of the toll roads that authority this way, Combs legally circum- Kentucky financed. Their profitability is vented the antiquated Constitution, began to debatable. In terms of toll revenues, only the break historic development patterns that had Kentucky Turnpike south of Louisville was denied access to and from the mountain profitable. According to the Legislative counties, and altered the politics and econom- Research Commission (1992), the Combs ics of road building. Mountain Parkway and its extension were But not everyone bought into Combs’s more typical. In 1983-84, toll revenues totaled plans. In Eastern Kentucky, original plans $2.98 million. The lease payment (debt service) called for two two-lane extensions of the totaled $4.45 million, and other costs were Mountain Parkway, one from Campton to $1.64 million, leaving a $3.11-million deficit. Pikeville (Pike County) and one from Road Fund revenues (now comprising motor- Campton to Whitesburg (Letcher County; fuel taxes, motor vehicle use taxes, weight- Kentucky Department of Commerce. Division distance taxes, and coal severance taxes) have of Economic Research, 1962). The Campton- subsidized most of the state’s toll roads. Pikeville segment was built only as far as But a 1970 Legislative Research Commis- Salyersville (Magoffin County). Chandler sion study, Toll Roads — Economic Impact, dubbed Combs “toll-road Bertie,” calling the concluded the Combs investment had paid off. new Mountain Parkway the road to nowhere The study looked at counties with limited- (, 1991). Combs pointed out that access roads, whether toll or not, and consid- Kentucky bond brokers were “very dubious;” ered factors such as manufacturing employ- he also had trouble finding backing in New ment, personal and per-capita income, sales York City (Bert Combs, 1991:112-113). A and use tax revenue, and market value of real smaller firm was willing to take the risk, property. The study suggested that counties however, and financed the “‘development with limited-access highways had fared better highway’” at “4-plus percent” interest. Ac- than those without them. The study also noted cording to Grayson (1996), these highways a philosophical difference between the state actually exceeded expectations. and federal road building strategies. The Meanwhile, the Turnpike Authority also federal interstate highway system was in- financed construction of the Bluegrass Park- tended to link major urban centers, while the way (completed in 1965) from west of Lexing- goal of the state’s toll-road system was to link

TABLE 2: Toll Roads in Kentucky. Highway Mileage Date Opened Kentucky Turnpike 39.20 August 1, 1956 Mountain Parkway 39.00 January 14, 1963 Mountain Parkway Extension 32.24 Campton December 16, 1963 Gullett February 14, 1980 125.74 October 28, 1963 72.10 October 27, 1965 Western Kentucky Extension 7.50 December 11, 1968 Parkway 52.58 December 31, 1968 Pennyrile Parkway 58.95 January 28, 1969 23.36 December 18, 1970 Daniel Boone Parkway 62.65 October 28, 1974 Green River Parkwaya 70.24 December 15, 1972 88.52 February 28, 1973 TOTAL 672.08 aThe Green River Parkway is now called the William Natcher Parkway. SOURCE: Kentucky Legislative Research Commission, 1992:29

13 rural areas to urban areas (Kentucky Legisla- ing to complete links in the interstate and tive Research Commission, 1992). parkway system, as well as improving rural Combs did not rely only on tolls to finance and secondary roads to “pierce the barriers of his road package. In his 1960 budget message, isolation which hem in so many of Kentucky’s he sought $139.82 million for roads in his first communities and families” (Kentucky General biennium. The Legislature also gave him the Assembly, House, 1964:19). Actions included OK to use the $30 million in unused passage of a $176-million bond issue in 1964, road-bonding authority left over from Chan- of which $139 million was to be used as dler. The bill also allowed a vote on an addi- matching dollars for more highway construc- tional $100 million in debt for roads and parks, tion. Appalachian Kentucky would directly which voters passed in November, 1960. benefit from these funds. With Congressional Curiously enough, Combs’s first message to passage of legislation to set up the Appala- the 1962 Legislature only recounted accom- chian Regional Commission in 1965, there was plishments in road building (Kentucky considerable money available for the Appala- General Assembly. Senate, 1962). He had met chian Development Highway System. Federal his construction goals during the first legisla- funds were set aside for 414 miles of roads in tive session. Table 3 outlines aspects of that Eastern Kentucky based on a 70/30 federal- program, which, for a poor state, represented state match (Kentucky Bicentennial Commis- a major expenditure of resources, based sion, 1992). Breatthitt’s bond issue also was largely on a substantial increase in debt. crucial because of his pledge not to raise taxes; In addition to the major highway program, the state’s debt had increased by $516 million Combs also directed $34.7 million toward over the past 12 years (for example, see rural roads in his first biennium, claiming it Breathitt, 1984). was the greatest two-year expenditure ever. Planning began to emerge as a central The farm-to-market road system, begun under element of highway construction during Breathitt’s tenure. According to Calvin Clements, still was considered vital to agricul- Grayson (1996), then a highway engineer and tural development. Combs promised the later Transportation Cabinet secretary under Legislature the program would receive his , there was little agreement at the continued attention (Kentucky General time on the definition of planning. Even so, Assembly. Senate, 1962), illustrating his desire officials began to systematize road priorities, to weave the geographically fragmented state establishing an informal six-year plan of together in order to modernize. potential projects. The state also put planners in the Commonwealth’s 12 highway districts. Edward T. Breathitt: An Appalachian Desk evolved to coordinate Piercing ‘Barriers of Isolation’ planning for all of the corridors in the region Gov. Edward T. Breathitt (1963-1967) in order to take advantage of the newest continued efforts begun under Combs, work- source of federal highway funds. According to

Table 3: Road Building during the Combs Administration, 1960-1962.

Expenditures

• During calendar 1961, more than $122 million in construction contracts were awarded. • During calendar 1962, contracts totaled $157 million. • During the first three years, spending was 37.5 percent above all four years of the Chandler Administration. Compared with Other States

• At the end of 1962: • Kentucky was number one in miles of road improvement financed entirely with its own money. • Kentucky was second in miles of highways improved through the use of all funds, both state and federal. • Kentucky was second in dollar volume of contracts awarded for roads improved without using federal funds. • Kentucky was eighth in total dollars spent for all highway construction projects. SOURCE: Kentucky Governor’s Program Evaluation Group, 1963:20

14 Grayson, the “planning without dollars” at Hopkinsville, Nunn (1975:245-246) thought meant that the state did not have to start from it necessary to justify the four new parkways: scratch once highway money became avail- able; instead, projects got off to a faster start [They] . . . will lay open a vast, under- because a route had been laid out already. The developed region to agricultural plans also allowed Kentucky to jump quickly growth as well as industrial progress. when excess federal funds became available. And while we share a deep concern for the economic implications of this Louie B. Nunn: project you may be sure that we have ‘Corridor of Opportunity’ given careful consideration to the Like his predecessors, Gov. Louie B. Nunn broader implications of this program. It (1967-1971) was aware of uneven develop- is our conclusion that the sections ment. And, like so many previous administra- touched by these four toll roads can no tions, one response was to build roads. But longer be ignored or shut off from there was a major difference with the Chan- economic progress because of inaccessi- dler, Combs, and Breathitt administrations. bility. These roads . . . represent an Nunn did not go to voters seeking authority to opportunity for fuller participation in a increase the debt for roads. Instead, he relied better way of life. Because of this factor on existing revenues, the Kentucky Turnpike alone, construction is not only feasible, Authority, and toll roads for his major it is imperative if we are truly con- projects. cerned about the foundations for the Press Secretary Larry Van Hoose summa- future. rized the road-building record of the Adminis- tration (Nunn, 1975). Over 3,000 miles of rural Nunn saw roads as having local benefits, roads were built, considered a record. In but was not specific about what those benefits addition, construction was begun on a park- were, except as they related to economic way system from Henderson to Owensboro development. In any event, the road-building (Audubon), from Owensboro to Bowling effort was costly: Green (Green River, now Natcher), from east of Bowling Green to Somerset (Cumberland), Few investments pay better community and from London to Hazard (Daniel Boone). dividends than do good roads. Ken- The Audubon and Daniel Boone parkways tucky has made progress, but much were planned under Breathitt. remains to be done. . . . The new Nunn (1975) called the highway system, budget will allocate $36 million in road which touched 43 counties, including major revenue to match the Federal grants portions of Appalachia, a “corridor of oppor- and will mark the first time in a decade tunity.” Addition of the Green River and that tax funds have been utilized for Cumberland parkways completed linkages to Federal matching to a significant much of the “Problem Crescent,” including his degree. This budget proposes to halt home area. In 1971, Nunn (1975), speaking at the diversion of $3 million each year the Barren River State Park dedication, noted from the Road Fund to other agencies. that 683 miles of parkways had been ap- The entire road program requires proved, with 411 miles open. Also, 585 miles appropriations of $758 million for the of interstates were open, including final links next two years. I believe you will hold of Interstates 71, 75, and 65. In 1968, Congress this to be a wise investment (Nunn, had expanded the interstate system to 42,500 1975:24-25). miles, allowing for the inclusion of Interstates As Nunn came to office, the state was 275 and 471 near Cincinnati in the system beginning to feel the financial pinch of its (Kentucky Bicentennial Commission, 1992). rapid expansion in the previous eight years. For rural areas, roads manifested efforts to end Nunn believed maintenance and debt costs, isolation and open the way for economic along with the need to match federal grants, development, including tourism, which was a threatened to cripple the highway program. major part of Nunn’s economic-development He was not about to use voted bond issues for program. roads. Instead, he financed his parkway Yet there apparently was resistance. At the projects with $4.3 million in nonvoted debt Young and Adult Farmer Recognition Banquet through the Kentucky Turnpike Authority (for

15 example, Taylor, 1971). The report argued that the state’s toll and Wendell R. Ford: interstate system was generating sufficient Facing Tough Problems secondary revenue to support itself. But the Gov. Wendell R. Ford (1971-1974) contin- revenue was not subject to taxation that would ued the road-building tradition of his prede- accrue to the Road Fund, and there was a time cessors, but on a less grand scale because of lag between scheduled debt repayments and pinched finances. During his Administration, expanded road-fund revenues. The report saw there were efforts to complete existing link- this as a short-term problem, however. It ages, without the massive projects that charac- noted that there were problems in industrial- terized the terms of Combs, Breathitt, and ized cities and predicted a rural industrial Nunn. In pursuing his highway strategy, Ford expansion. With a completed highway system, (1978) faced four major problems: the state would be in a position to offer great opportunities to transportation-intensive ° Inflation. Construction costs were up 18 businesses (Kentucky Legislative Research percent. Maintenance of an expanding Commission, 1992:2). system was increasingly difficult. A 1974 study, Kentucky’s Future Transporta- tion Needs, again delved into financing for ° Debt service increased from $26 million in different transportation modes. It concluded 1972 to $42 million in the next year and that the $33 billion in state and local highway $54.5 million in following year. needs exceeded the state’s capacity to raise revenue and recommended more research to ° By 1972, depletion of general-obligation develop financing alternatives. bond funds used to match interstate and Passage of the coal severance tax under Ford Appalachian highways, with $50 million opened the way for regional squabbling over needed in next two years. how to use the new source of revenue. Legisla- tors from coal counties in 1974 participated in ° Accelerated spending in Nunn’s last year the so-called “mountain revolt.” They success- left funds short. fully convinced Ford to set up a mechanism to return a small portion of the severance-tax For the short term, the pace of highway revenues to the mountain counties for eco- building was relatively slow. Instead of debt, nomic development. Under the Carroll Admin- Ford sought to use a pay-as-you-go approach istration, these funds would be put to work based on a 2-cent gasoline-tax increase. building roads. Necessity dictated this strategy as a 1972 study, The Road Fund Crisis, noted: Julian Carroll: Energy Crisis and Opportunities The problem boils down to a lag The state’s Road Fund cash shortage between the time debt service changed quickly. The energy crisis offered payments are due and the time it Gov. Julian Carroll3 (1974-1979) the chance to takes for generation of new revenues initiate a far-reaching road-building program through increased utilization of the designed to increase access to the newly created facilities. Furthermore Commonwealth’s eastern and western it should be noted that there is no coalfields. Highlights of his program included: provision to include in the road fund ° any portion of the newly expanded Appropriation of $56 million over four years tax base which can be attributed at for roads in coal-producing counties, in least in part to the state’s investment addition to $10 million to match an antici- in the highway system. The only pated $80 million in federal funds for energy sources of revenue are the gas tax roads. (These federal funds never material- and tolls. On the other hand, the ized.) income, sales, and property tax base have all been expanded as a direct result of highway capital improve- 3 Unless otherwise noted, quotes from governors Carroll, ments (Kentucky Legislative Re- Brown, and Collins are taken from their papers in the search Commission, 1992:2). Kentucky Archives in Frankfort.

16 17 ° Increased emphasis on an industrial-access severance-tax allocations to repay bonds issued highway program to improve the by the authority. In this case, road construction Commonwealth’s ability to attract industry, became synonymous with community develop- enhance economic development, and ment, according to Carroll. There was consider- provide for increased employment. Funding able pressure to extend the definition of coal- came from the state Department of haul roads beyond coal-producing counties to Transportation’s Industrial Access Road include so-called coal-impact counties state- Program and the Appalachian Access Road wide. Legislators from other counties actively Program, funded partially by state dollars. sought to “share the wealth” by gaining access Kentucky also received funds from the to the money, diverting it away from poorer Appalachian Development Highway counties that had long suffered the drastic Program and the Appalachian Regional effects of coal mining. For the less-developed Commission. Legislation enacted in 1974 let coal counties, which had suffered from inferior Kentucky use coal severance-tax revenue for roads since the earliest days of the Common- certain types of access projects. wealth, this represented just another effort to drain their wealth. ° As of July 1, 1977, about 677 miles (92 In 1979, Carroll’s Governor’s Task Force on percent) of Kentucky’s 737 miles of the Transportation studied different modes of interstate system were open to traffic. The transportation and financing methods. It remaining mileage was to be under con- estimated the state needed $300 million a year struction by that date, with one small over 10 years to upgrade roads, along with exception (Carroll, 1977; Kentucky General $100 million a year for maintenance. It was Assembly. House, 1978). apparently the first time that maintenance had been established as a major need (Kentucky On February 21, 1975, Carroll told the Legislative Research Commission, 1992). Kentucky Ready-Mix Concrete Association in Louisville that highways had long been a top John Y. Brown, Jr.: priority, and the energy situation made them Economic-development Roads even more important. He envisioned a 10-year, When Gov. John Y. Brown, Jr. (1979-1983), $1-billion coal-haul road project. But Federal came to office, he faced a situation similar to Highway Trust Funds were frozen. Using the the one that confronted Louie B. Nunn. There energy crisis to justify the project, he said: was a revenue shortfall, considerable debt, and General Fund revenues had been used to bail I have every intention of pressing for out the Road Fund. Brown introduced two federal assistance. It is not the obligation measures to deal with the troubled Road Fund. of Kentucky taxpayers to make coal One levied a 9-percent gasoline excise tax, cheap for electric consumers in other which, with higher gasoline prices, yielded states. more revenue than the old 9-cent-a-gallon tax. On March 11, 1975, Carroll reminded the Increased fuel prices had hurt Road Fund U.S. Senate Public Works Committee Economic revenues, costing the state perhaps $147 Development Subcommittee that Kentucky had million. The other was not a tax bill, but was spent vast sums on coal-haul roads, above and designed to relieve strain on the Road Fund. beyond Appalachian Regional Commission Brown’s road development plan used debt matching funds. To Carroll, this was part of instead of new taxes to raise revenue. economic diversification: The new law set up Economic Development Roads, vastly expanding the Kentucky Turn- We believe that the highway program, pike Authority’s powers and building on selective investments in public facilities, Carroll’s energy roads (Table 4). The measure and vocational education are providing let the authority implement projects through an improved basis for greater emphasis written agreements with the Department of on enterprise development. Transportation using Economic Development Central to Carroll’s economic-development Road revenue bonds. In his 1980 Budget program was construction and financing of Message, Brown said the state would issue $150 resource-recovery roads, broadening the million in bonds in each year of the biennium. powers of the Kentucky Turnpike Authority. No tolls could be charged on the new roads; The resource-recovery road plan used coal road rental payments to the quasi-governmen- 18 TABLE 4: Purpose Statement of HB 969-80, Brown’s Economic Development Road Legislation.

The general assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky determines as a legislative finding of fact that the economy of the Commonwealth and the consequent economic development potential of the citizens of the Commonwealth are vitally dependent upon the existence and availability of a state-wide system of safe, adequate and well-maintained highways, roads and thoroughfares; that there is a serious need for construction, reconstruction, and in some cases relocation of many such, highways, roads and thoroughfares to preserve and enhance the economic well-being and development of the Commonwealth and the health and safety of the public; and that in many cases, highways, roads and thoroughfares which are vital economic links between various sections of the Commonwealth have become, by reason of age and continued usage, obsolete and are no longer capable of affording the services required by a modern industrial society. The general assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky further determines as a legislative finding of fact that the construction, reconstruction, and relocation of a system of such economic development roads through the turnpike authority of Kentucky will preserve and enhance the economic viability of the Commonwealth, will enable the Commonwealth to prosper and make available its economic potentials to the fullest possible degree, will protect and enhance the safety, health, conve- nience and welfare of the traveling public and will therefore constitute the performance of essential governmental an public purposes (Kentucky General Assembly. Acts, 1980:1236).

Kentucky that are half built or have been built tal Turnpike Authority came from transporta- in pieces in order to really bring all parts of tion funds. Kentucky to the marketplace and have continu- In his 1980 Budget Message, Brown noted ity in our state.” that roads were his number-one concern during Despite his stated opposition to a piecemeal nine months of campaigning. He hoped to give approach to road building, Brown vetoed a local governments more control over road resolution to establish an oversight committee building, and did so by shifting more funds to develop a regional transportation plan for their way. He claimed road building was too the Appalachian counties. In vetoing the much of a political process. It was the first time measure, Brown was inconsistent in his voiced a Governor had raised the issue in public since concern for the region, noting the study would the Chandler-Combs years. In his 1980 Budget be costly, and there were numerous studies Message, Brown told legislators the process of already available, He added: “This legislation routing roads was going to be fair. He prom- would appear to give preferential treatment to ised to distribute funds statewide based on a particular area of the state, treatment which priority, need, and the return to taxpayers of other geographic areas are not afforded at this their dollars. Brown, for example, proposed the time” (Kentucky General Assembly. House, AA highway from Alexandria (Campbell 1980:2874). County) to Ashland (Boyd County); it was one Brown had a wider view of roads than of his pet projects and would open up the Carroll, who emphasized energy roads. In his Appalachian counties of Northeastern Ken- 1982 State of the Commonwealth Address, tucky. He told legislators it was not a political Brown told legislators: road because of the unserved needs of one- fourth of the state, adding: “There’s no people . . . [Y]oul look at the mountains; to vote there.” Legislators, always looking for tremendous amount[s] of investment votes, did not go along with Brown until the and improvements have been made in 1982 session. our mountains. From the mountains Meanwhile, the problem of maintenance also lay our greatest resource and in costs continued to be a concern. A 1981 study, many way[s], some of our greatest Highway Costs and Revenues: The Present Di- liability to provide our people there lemma, focused on upkeep. The study found with an equal opportunity and quality that revenues had not kept pace with costs of of life. It is only with roads that [we] will new construction and maintenance, and this ever bring a quality of life to the mountains . had contributed to the deterioration of roads. . . so you’ve got a chance to get to the Brown saw roads as an investment in the marketplace (italics added). future that would help to address some of the ills of uneven development. He said in his 1982 Brown was not making a statement support- State of the Commonwealth Address that his ing integrated planning for roads that ac- top priority was “to build those areas of counted for factors such as education and 19 overall community well-being. Maybe Brown’s bly on the [truck] decal tax. . . . I am not use of “only” stems from his loose speaking proposing that any new debt be issued style, but it is consistent with his emphasis on in this biennium from the Road Fund the bricks-and-mortar development of road until we can solidify its long-range building. Of course, roads are vital to linking financing. I know you thought that the areas into the marketplace, but they can have nickel increase [in the gas tax] passed in other functions, too. On one hand, it appears 1986 that was coupled with the decal tax that Brown sought to have a more closely had already accomplished this goal. linked highway system, but, on the other, it Unfortunately the underfunding of the appears that his view of the goal for highways education package [passed under was somewhat limited, focusing on economic Collins] and the successful court development (jobs creation) and equating that challenge to the decal by the trucking with improved quality of life. industry has undermined this goal.

Martha Layne Collins: In 1990, however, Wilkinson traded a $600- Roads in the Background million road-bond issue as part of the deal to The Administration of obtain a tax increase for the Kentucky Educa- (1983-1987) probably will be remembered in tion Reform Act; $500 million was allocated for history for two efforts: the attraction of the roads and $100 million for economic develop- Toyota assembly plant in Georgetown and ment. His biennial budget presented to the 1990 efforts at education reform. In fact, Collins was Legislature also included a rural-road resurfac- the first governor in many years to place ing program, with emphasis on replacing highways somewhat in the background. There bridges that were unable to hold school buses. were no major projects launched, and little was In addition, the Legislature mandated that done on the legislative front. One piece of the state set up a six-year road-construction plan to establish and stick to priorities; that legislation, which became law without her legislation took effect under the Brereton Jones signature, set up the Extended Weight Coal Administration. Its intent was to match funding Haul System to allow a permit system for with projects in order to impose planning on overweight coal trucks on certain roads. During the process of highway development. It is the Collins years, fuel taxes were raised by a coupled with the federal Intermodal Surface nickel, and tolls were dropped on both the Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) of 1991, Mountain and Western Kentucky parkways as which mandates a 20-year planning time frame. their bonds were paid off. Meanwhile, Ken- In Kentucky, projects are identified by year in a tucky completed its interstate system with the six-year time frame and are listed by priority opening of I-264 in Louisville (Kentucky for the following 14 years. Bicentennial Commission, 1992). Wilkinson’s bond proposal was intended to cover construction costs statewide over the next : four years. Appalachian projects included ‘Locking in’ Priorities completion of Brown’s AA Highway, widening Wallace Wilkinson (1987-1991), made roads of U.S. 25E in Bell and Knox counties, and an issue in his gubernatorial race, campaigning relocation of U.S. 23 in Letcher and Pike on the uneven development that affected so counties. In his 1990 budget address, Wilkinson much of rural Kentucky. Because of strapped told legislators: finances at the beginning of his term, Wilkinson was limited in his ability to initiate new projects These projects have been on the books during his first biennium. He ended up having for years. Their needs are well docu- to redirect $35 million a year from the Trans- mented. They are legitimate. They will portation Cabinet and the Road Fund to the cost big dollars. It is my view that not State Police for traffic enforcement. In his building them costs even bigger dollars budget address to the Legislature, Wilkinson in wasted opportunities and missed said: chances for economic stimulation and diversification. These roads should be I realize that the Road Fund receipts “locked in” so that they can be com- have recently been called into question pleted without future concern about by Judicial Action in overturning an either timetables or priorities. . . . The enactment of the 1986 General Assem- return on investment is lasting and

20 economic opportunities that are opened In 1992, a Legislative Research Commission up by immediate construction start task force issued a report that included recom- paying dividends immediately (Ken- mendations on issues such as developing tucky General Assembly. House, corridors, transportation policy, financing, and 1990:212). other concerns. Table 5 summarizes these recommendations. In Wilkinson’s last year as governor, 1991, In 1995, the Kentucky Transportation the Commission on Kentucky’s Government Cabinet (1995:4) issued its Statewide Transporta- issued its report. The problems with highways tion Plan (FY 1995-2014). The document sug- were pretty much the same as they had been gests how the planning process has been for years. The section devoted to roads noted widened, noting that there are four positive constant fluctuations in the construction attributes expected from a transportation expenditures category for state roads. Accord- system: safety, efficiency, environmental ing to the report, this is the fund used to soundness, and fiscal responsibility. One balance the state’s budget. Funding priority strategy of the ongooing planning process, went to statutory programs, debt service, and according to the document, is to “properly federal matching grants. State construction, identify, scope, prioritize, and communicate resurfacing, and maintenance received a lower transportation needs.” Federal regulations priority (Kentucky Legislative Research promulgated by ISTEA are intended to en- Commission, 1992). hance the process, according to the document. The document set out four goals, not only Brereton Jones: for highways, but also for other forms of Honoring Commitments transportation: When Gov. Brereton Jones (1991-1995) came to office, the nation and state were in the throes 1) Preserve and manage the existing trans- of a recession. Road Fund dollars were still portation system. Replacement, rehabili- being transferred to the General Fund for the tation, and improvements to provide an State Police. Jones benefitted from the legacy of acceptable level of service. Use of ad- Wilkinson’s bond issue. As Jones told legisla- vanced technologies and management tors in his 1992 Budget Address: methods and managing congestion.

We all recognize how important trans- 2) Provide connections to promote eco- portation is to economic development. nomic development. Develop highway Our budget proposes that an additional and public transportation access to other $150 million of bonds be sold in fiscal forms of transportation and related year 1993 to continue the progress on facilities. Connect population and business centers in and out of state, high priority road projects initiated along with smaller centers in state. during the 1990 Session. You and I have Develop access to recreation facilites. a commitment to the people of Ken- tucky to build these roads and, together, 3) Coordinate and cooperate in we will honor it. transportation planning. Meet with seven metropolitan planning organiza- We will also take full advantage of the tions to identify long-range transporta- new Federal Highway Act and the tion improvements. Consult with elected additional funds Kentucky can attract. officials and local/regional planning We will maximize these funds and agencies outside metropolitan areas to continue to match every federal dollar coordinate improvements with cities. that we can reasonably get. We will Ensure public involvement. Evaluate continue an ambitious resurfacing and effects of transportation on land use. maintenance program to take care of Consider overall social, economic, our existing network of highways and energy, and environmental effects of bridges. We will, however, cut back on transportation decisions. Maximize unnecessary mowing to allow more impact of financial resources. money to be spent directly on mainte- nance and reconstruction (Kentucky 4) Enhance transportation safety and General Assembly. House, 1992:665). convenience. 21 TABLE 5: Selected 1992 Transportation Study Findings.

Corridors • Set up corridor system designed to four-lane standards to provide optimal access to each region of the state. • Provide set amount of Road Fund money every year to develop corridor system. • Projects not in corridor system should be constructed as they take proper place in the biennial construction plan. • The 1991-1996 6-year plan should be the starting point for all future 6-year plans. • Most of the time, the Department of Highways (DOH) list of unscheduled needs should adequately establish projects in each community, according to testimony of local elected officials.

Transportation Policy • The General Assembly should ensure that the DOH follow the biennial construction plan and gives priority to projects in the 6-year plan in subsequent biennial budgets. • DOH should be required to promptly report any deviation from the biennial construction plan; DOH also should be responsible for reporting its activities in comparision with the biennial plan. • Local officials should have proper input to express concerns about highway construction for their area. • Fiscal courts should have statutory means to exercise some accountability over county roads being improved with rural secondary funds. • There is the need for a uniform database system using geographic information system software developed by the legislative and executive branches to provide for accurate information dissemination and exchange among agencies. • Intermodal Transportation • The planning function for non-highway modes should be expanded.

Financing • Industrial access road projects should be funded with General Fund and Road Fund dollars. Local governments also should provide funds based on their ability to pay. • DOH needs to develop formal policy for requirements for local participation in highway construction projects to ensure that local jurisdictions with diverse tax bases are not accelerating projects at the expense of jurisdictions with limited financial resources. • DOH should give priority to matching federal funds, repaying debt service, funding statutory programs, maintaining existing roads, and developing the statewide corridor system. • Any decision to return added coal severance-tax revenues to coal-producing counties should include provisions to use part or all of those funds on recommended highway needs of those counties. • Funding through road tolls should be considered a viable alternative in financing all recommended needs if supplemented by federal participation. • Where federal aid is available for projects within corridors, every effort should be made to give these projects priority in order to free state funds for other corridor projects. • Intergovernmental agreements on projects should be encouraged. • Privatization, if it will accelerate completion of projects, should be explored and encouraged where practical.

22 Roads, Politics, Development gradually widened in Kentucky. Roads are and Planning still linked closely with economic develop- Much of Kentucky’s economic, physical, and ment. Despite protestations otherwise, social infrastructure lies on the periphery and politics is important. But planning discus- semi-periphery of the national scene. Early on, sions have widened to include other aspects geography played an important role in the of social life, such as community relative isolation of some areas, such as the sustainability, environment, access to Appalachian counties. Access was difficult. But education, health care, and government the relative isolation and uneven development services. today is based largely on the continuing historic 4) Road planning is a relatively new phenom- effects of natural-resources extraction, uneven enon, linked to the rise of planning for private-sector economic development, and the economic development. Historically, unequal distribution of government funding. planning has taken a back seat to politics, as For example, coal development dominated well as narrowly defined economic develop- many local economies, precluded other forms ment that focused mainly on commerce of of development, and imposed clear limits on goods and people. In terms of politics, good planning for economic diversity. Because of the roads often have ended up being built in history of the coal industry, there was an response to demands by those who have adequate physical infrastructure for coal export political power. In short, roads have tended (first railways financed largely by coal compa- to go where the votes are. nies, and more recently highways, financed 5) Economic determinations using cost-benefits largely by Frankfort with some help from analysis, which is crucial to planning, often Washington). Other forms of economic and preclude rural areas from having roads social development and planning were stunted adequate to spur new development. As a until recently. result, there has been a built-in bias in new Development patterns in other parts of the highway construction. When road projects Commonwealth have been quite different. The have been set for rural areas, they have earliest efforts at road building were aimed at responded to the needs of powerful groups. connecting cities and towns, especially in the For example, Kentucky’s farm-market “Golden Triangle.” Because of the strength of highway expenditures were aimed at one agriculture in many areas of the state, much of particular group in the rich farm areas. But the Commonwealth’s road-building policy has the program did not serve eastern Kentucky, been devoted to helping improve market which had to await the energy crisis of the connections for farmers and to provide access 1970s in order to see major, widespread to burgeoning industrial sites. This policy has highway projects that benefitted the coal included a secondary emphasis on safety. industry.

Several themes emerge when analyzing the Road building in Kentucky has occurred on history of road building in Kentucky, they a political and economic landscape character- include: ized by limited financial resources. Officials in 1) Road building is both a political and eco- Frankfort had to launch a road-building nomic process. It links highly visible bricks- program that the state had to pay for by itself. and-mortar projects with the need for The state-financed parkway projects that politicians to show real, measurable ensued came at the same time that the state had progress to help garner votes, create jobs for to come up with revenue to match require- workers, and provide publically financed ments for building interstate highways. Eco- avenues for the commerce of private nomic development to create jobs was one businesses. Since World War II, decisions on driving force behind road construction. But the the location of roads have been made from politics of road building sometimes fragmented the top down; the role of local elites has the state, resulting in fighting among regions typically been to advocate for new construc- and leaders of various sectors of the economy. tion. Some payoffs of road building appear evident, 2) Because of political and economic consider- but they are not always as clear cut as leaders ations, road building across the Common- suggest. As we suggest in Part II of this publica- wealth has been uneven, with some areas, tion, road building is necessary for economic especially eastern Kentucky, remaining development, but is not sufficient to ensure relatively underserved. beneficial development of the whole commu- 3) The stated purpose of road building has nity or the whole region.

23 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bert Combs the Politician: An Oral History. 1991. (Ed.: Robinson, George W.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Bowman, Mary Jean; Haynes, W. Warren. 1963. Resources and People in East Kentucky: Problems and Potentials of a Lagging Economy. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.

Breathitt, Edward T. 1984. The Public Papers of Governor Edward T. Breathitt, 1963-1967. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Brown, John Young, Jr. Various years. Documents of Governor John Y. Brown, Jr. Frankfort: Kentucky State Archives.

Caudill, Harry M. 1963. Night Comes to the Cumberlands: A Biography of a Depressed Area. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Carroll, Julian M. Various years. Documents of Governor Julian M. Carroll. Frankfort: Kentucky State Archives.

Clark, Thomas D. 1977. A . Lexington: The John Bradford Press.

Collins, Martha Layne. Various years. Documents of Governor Martha Layne Collins. Frankfort: Kentucky State Archives.

Ford, Wendell H. 1978. The Public Papers of Wendell H. Ford, 1971-1974. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Grayson, Calvin. 1996. Personal Interview, May 31, 1996.

Kentucky Bureau of Agriculture, Labor and Statistics. 1928? “Kentucky: Natural Resources, Industrial Statistics.” (Ed.: Seiller, Edward F.) Frankfort: The Bureau. Bulletin, no. 34.

Kentucky Department of Commerce. Division of Economic Research. 1962. “Kentucky Electronics.” Frankfort: The Department.

The Kentucky Encyclopedia. 1992. (Eds: Kleber, John E.; Clark, Thomas D.; Harrison, Lowell H.; Klotter, James C.) Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.

Kentucky General Assembly. Various years. Acts of the General Assembly. Frankfort: Kentucky General Assembly. Legislative Research Commission.

Kentucky General Assembly. House of Representatives. Various years. Journal of the House of Representa- tives of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. . . Frankfort: Kentucky Legislative Research Commission.

Kentucky General Assembly. Senate. Various years. Journal of the Senate of the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. . . Frankfort: Kentucky Legislative Research Commission.

Kentucky Governor’s Program Evaluation Group. 1963. “Kentucky Beyond the Crossroads: Basic Decisions for Progress Put the State on the Road to a Brighter Future: A Report.” Frankfort: Office of the Governor.

Kentucky Legislative Research Commission. 1992. “Report of the Task Force to Study Highway Needs.” Frankfort: The Commission. Research Report No. 258.

Kentucky Bicentennial Commission. Kentucky Transportation: A 200 Year Calendar of History — 1792 to

24 1992. . . . 1992? Frankfort?: Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Kentucky Progress Magazine. 1929. “Highway Map of Kentucky.” 2(1):26-27 (October, 1929).

Kentucky Transportation Cabinet. 1995. Statewide Transportation Plan (FY 1995-2014). Frankfort: The Cabinet.

Martin, James W. 1945. “Government: The People’s Business.” In: Kentucky: Designs for Her Future. (Ed.: Beers, Howard W.) Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. pp. 196-222.

McVey, Frank L. 1949. The Gates Open Slowly: A History of . Lexington: University of Kentucky Press.

Nunn, Louie B. 1975. The Public Papers of Governor Louie B. Nunn, 1967-1971. (Eds: Sexton, Robert F.; Bellardo, Lewis, Jr.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Pearce, John Ed. 1987. Divide and Dissent: Kentucky Politics, 1930-1963. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Taylor, Livingston. 1971. “The Nunn Years: A governmental, political review: He ran risky course and boldness won out.” In: Louisville Courier-Journal, December 5, 1971, p. A 1.

25 PART II

Interstate 66: The Need for Integrated Planningof a New Corridor in Appala- chian Kentucky

by Sarah Dewees, Timothy Collins, and Ronald D Eller Background: Appalachian Kentucky

“While a good transportation system by itself will not solve the prob- lems of Appalachian Kentucky, the problems of Appalachian Kentucky cannot be solved without a good transportation system.”

The eastern segment of the proposed Southern Kentucky Corridor (Interstate 66) would run through one of the most severely distressed regions of the nation. Forty-nine counties in Eastern Kentucky are designated as part of the federally defined Appalachian region. Many of these counties are the site of concentrated poverty, unemployment, and low education levels. The Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC) has designated 38 of these 49 counties as “severely distressed”; they are among the poorest in Appalachia. In the 49 counties, more than 31 percent of the citizens live below the nationally established poverty level, compared with an average of 19 percent for the state and 13.1 percent for the nation ( Bureau of the Cenus, 1990). Average per-capita income in these counties was $12,410 a year, compared with $16,889 for the whole state (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1993). Between 1980 and 1990, per-capita income in these counties declined from 67 percent to 60 percent of the national average. The income disparity between mountain counties and the rest of the Commonwealth, moreover, has increased markedly during the 1980s (Kentucky Appalachian Task Force, 1995). As a result of the high rates of poverty and unemployment, there are high levels of govern- ment transfer payments in the areas of health care and income maintenance. While the percent of total income from transfer payments for Kentucky was about 23 percent, for the eastern portion of the state it averaged 35.9 percent (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1993). Almost 22.8 per- cent of all Eastern Kentucky citizens were eligible for Medicaid, compared with 14 percent for the state (Good Samaritan Foundation, 1995). There are similar challenges in the area of public health services. Over 22 percent of the women in eastern Kentucky leave the region to deliver their babies. In other areas of the state, such as the Purchase Area Development District in Western Kentucky, 98 percent of all women deliver their babies locally (Meyers, 1996). The loss of health care clientele to larger markets removes money from the local economy. Health dollars circulate about 1.5 times before leaving a local community, and the loss of these dollars means the loss of valuable capital for the area (University of Kentucky Center for Rural Health, 1995).

While a good transportation system by itself will not solve the problems of Appalachian Kentucky, the problems of Appalachian Kentucky cannot be solved without a good transportation system. A good transportation system can improve the distribution of goods and services within a region, stimulating economic growth and promoting more efficient use of resources. Reduced transportation costs in an area make it more attractive for business development. Lower transporta- tion costs also promote better access to health and social services, and can facilitate regional integra- tion of these services. Roads also can help to improve community and civic infrastructure. There is still a need for roads that link communities to county seats and that connect county seats to major highway corri-dors. Currently, there is no east-west U.S. highway in Southeastern Kentucky, much less an interstate. In addition, there are limited numbers of roads that connect the population centers with the existing multi-lane intra-regional highways. In 1994, Gov. Brereton C. Jones appointed a group of community leaders from Eastern Kentucky to the Kentucky Appalachian Task Force to evaluate progress and identify challenges in communities there. This task force issued its report, Communities of Hope, in early 1995 and outlined recommendations for improving the quality of life in Eastern Kentucky. Notably, the transportation committee’s vision statement called for a “safe, environmentally acceptable and financially respon- sible transportation system which provides mobility of people and commerce, promotes regional development, and enhances the quality of life in Appalachia” (Kentucky Appalachian Task Force, 1995:73). Such a vision suggests the need for comprehensive planning for a roadway that could have a major impact on the region. Planning will be needed to integrate various facets of economic, social, and political life in order to increase citizens’ well-being in the region. Among the other recommen- dations of the committee were suggestions for improving transportation infrastructure, including intra-regional highway links and increased funding for highway construction, with a priority on distressed counties. The committee also called for constructing I-66 from I-81 in Virginia to I-57 in Illinois.

Highways as a Development Tool in Appalachia The use of transportation infrastructure as an economic-development tool has a long history in the Appalachian region. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy established the President’s Appala- chian Regional Commission (PARC), a task force dedicated to researching problems of the area. PARC found that the core of the region, the location of the highest levels of poverty and unemploy- ment, was almost entirely bypassed by the U.S. interstate system and was severely underserved by adequate transportation networks. After Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson pressed for passage of the slain President’s program. Federal activity at the time culminated in the Appalachian Regional Development Act (ARDA), signed into law in 1965. Working with the hypothesis that the economy of an area is greatly enhanced by increased accessibility, ARDA’s authors emphasized transportation infrastructure improvement as the number-one priority of the bill. Kennedy’s PARC report, published in 1964, stated:

. . . [D]evelopmental activity in Appalachia cannot proceed until the regional isolation has been overcome. Its cities and towns, its areas of natural wealth and its areas of recreation and industrial potential must be penetrated by a transportation network which provides access to and from the rest of the Nation. . . . Its penetration by an adequate transportation network is the first requisite of its full participation in industrial America (President’s Appalachian Regional Commission, 1964:10).

Of the $1.768 billion authorized under the 1965 Appalachian Regional Development Act, $1.165 billion, or 66 percent, was dedicated to construction of an Appalachian Development High- way System (Gauthier, 1973). This system was a proposed network of corridors designed to link communities and designated growth centers in the Appalachian region to interstate-highway corridors and regional markets.

The major goals of this new system were: 1) to link key centers in the region to national markets, thus helping to make them competitive for growth; 2) to provide for more efficient flows of commerce through the region in order to enhance the devel- opment potential of isolated areas traversed by the new routes; 3) to facilitate the commutation of people to new jobs and public services to be developed along the System; 4) to open up new sites for development (Appalachian Regional Commission, 1973:10).

“‘What you saw happen with Highway 15 and Highway 80 in the 1960s and 1970s is a small model of what you could see if I-66 is built. It opened up many regional activities, such as people capitalizing on educational opportunities.’”

— Charlie Simpson, Hazard Community College Framers of the legislation also anticipated that “commuting fields for the major job centers in and around Appalachia would be enlarged because more people would be able to travel greater dis- tances in less time to the jobs and services being developed” (Appalachian Regional Commission, 1973:10).

By the early 1980s, the economic-development impacts of transportation infrastructure improvement in the region were already apparent. According to a 1982 ARC publication, a 1981 study revealed that the Appalachian Development Highway System had played a vital role in stimulating growth in the region. About 400,000 new jobs had been created along or near the Appalachian corridors, and a major share of the region’s industrial growth could be linked to the corridor system. The results of the study indicated that almost 60 percent of new manufacturing plants employing 50 or more persons that had located in Appalachia since 1965 had selected sites within 30 minutes of an existing or planned corridor (Appalachian Regional Commission, 1982). In a special survey of local develop- ment districts, ARC found that about 81 percent of the new jobs created in the region between 1980 and 1986 were near the interstate or development highways (Widner, 1990). Between 1980 and 1993, 58 percent of all new firms established in Appalachian Kentucky located within 10 miles of an interstate or parkway. Of all new firms in Appalachian Kentucky hiring 50 or more people, 60 percent located within 10 miles of an interstate highway or parkway (Kentucky Cabinet for Eco- nomic Development, 1993).

Highways as a Development Tool in Kentucky Of all the new firms that located in the Commonwealth of Kentucky between 1980 and 1993, 72 percent located within 10 miles of an interstate highway or a parkway (Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development, 1993). Of all new firms hiring 50 or more people, 81.4 percent located within 10 miles of an interstate highway or parkway. According to ARC, a 1981 study found that over 58 firms locating in Appalachian Kentucky since 1965 had located within 30 minutes or less driving time from a corridor funded by the Appalachian Development Highway System. These firms employed over 3,091 persons (Appalachian Regional Commission, 1982). In the 49 Kentucky Appalachian counties, transportation improvements have generally “opened up” major sections of the region to industrial expansion and commercial development. But there remain significant holes in the road system, a problem that members of the Kentucky Appala- chian Task Force (1995) noted with their first recommendation, which sought completion of the ARC corridors in Kentucky. Along the new roads, however, there are new hospitals and rural health clinics that have improved the health of the region’s residents. Advancements in communication, housing, and education have opened new opportunities for growth. Greater physical infrastructure capacity has made it easier to provide services in many areas of Appalachian Kentucky. It is also easier for citizens of the region to travel to health centers such as Lexington, political centers such as Frankfort, and recreational areas throughout the state. Improved roads seem to have made eastern Kentucky more attractive for business because of reduced transportation costs. Generally, those areas that have improved access to high- ways have demonstrated greater growth. Poverty rates in the foothill counties along Interstates 64 and 75, for example, ranged from 16 to 35 percent, and the economies in some of these areas were more diversified (Eller, et al, 1994). In contrast, poverty rates in counties clustered in the heart of the region, where the main corridor highway system has had less impact, were above 38 percent. These persistently distressed communities contain fewer public services, have older public facilities, and smaller, declining populations. Similar successes and contrasts exist in housing, education, employ- ment, and other measures of quality of life (Kentucky Appalachian Task Force, 1995). The current ARC Kentucky Highway Development plan was designed to integrate highway construction as part of a comprehensive planning process that included public and private involvement and tied highway development to development of human talents and potential. The Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission, an organization that spearheaded regional- development strategies in the early 1960s, wrote in its vision statement: “Specific . . . actions must aid and advise individual citizens and citizen groups in achieving self-help activities; citizens must be brought closer to government, and citizens and profession- als, within and outside of government, must be helped to work more closely together in mutual understanding and interests” (Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission, 1960:V). The Commission’s development plan for Eastern Kentucky focused on ways to link infrastructure development to human and social-capacity building. Highways 15 and 80, linking London, Hazard, and Whitesburg, have allowed for not only more efficient movement of citizens, but also have opened up regional access to the community colleges and health centers in the region. Charlie Simpson, director of Hazard Community College’s Business and Industry Technical Assis- tance Center, said, “What you saw happen with Highway 15 and Highway 80 in the 1960s and 1970s is a small model of what you could see if I-66 is built. It opened up many regional activities, such as people capitalizing on educational opportunities” (Simpson, 1996). Construction of highways 15 and 80 not only reduced travel time between the population centers of London, Hazard, and Whitesburg, but also opened up opportunities for human and social-capacity improvement. While advancements in transportation have improved the quality of life for many Eastern Kentucky residents, there is still a need for development as part of a larger plan of connect- ing highways. Many of the roads linking population centers such as Pikeville, Jenkins, Hazard, and London are substandard. Currently there is no direct, high-speed link between Interstate 75 and Knott, Perry, and Pike Counties.

The I-66 Corridor in Eastern Kentucky The proposed I-66 corridor would travel directly through 28 counties in Southern Kentucky, and would lie adjacent to 35 other counties (Appendix A). Of the 28 Kentucky counties that would experience a “direct impact” from construction of the I-66 corridor (the highway would cross the county borders), 11 are in Appalachia. Of these 11 Appalachian counties, ARC considers seven to be distressed. Of the 35 counties that would experience an indirect impact (the highway would be constructed in a bordering county), 21 are Appalachian (Map 1). ARC considers these to be dis-

MAP 1: Southern Kentucky Corridor (I-66) Direct and Indirect Impact Counties. SOURCE: Kentucky Transportation Center, 1995; Prepared by UK Appalachian Center

Range 1

Direct Impact (28 counties)

Indirect Impact (35 counties)

ARC Boundary tressed. There are 32 counties in Appalachian Kentucky that would be directly or indirectly affected by construction of the highway.

The 32 Appalachian counties that the I-66 corridor would directly or indirectly affect are among the poorest in the state. Their total population in poverty averaged a little over 33 percent, compared with 30.7 percent for the 49 Appalachian Counties and 19 percent for the state (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990). The average per-capita income for the impact counties was $12,423, compared with $16,889 for the state and $20,800 for the nation (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1993). The percent of total income from transfer payments for the impact counties was 37.49 percent, compared with about 23 percent for the state and 17.3 percent for the nation. Charts 1, 2 and 3 illustrate these comparisons. Although the primary-impact counties seemed to have almost the same poverty rate as the Kentucky Appalachian counties, the secondary-impact counties had slightly higher rates. The average for all impact counties was thus higher than the Kentucky Appalachian counties, and the average for each set of counties was significantly higher than the whole state or the nation. The counties that would be directly or indirectly affected by construction of the east-west highway had some of the highest poverty rates in the state and the nation. The primary-impact counties had a slightly higher per-capita income than the Kentucky Appalachian counties. These impact counties contain economic growth centers such as Pikeville and Hazard that would be linked to larger markets with I-66. Average per-capita income in these coun- ties was still much lower than the entire state. Secondary-impact counties have a per-capita income lower than the Kentucky Appalachian counties and significantly lower than the whole state. The impact counties as a group still had a much lower per-capita income than the state and the nation. Again, this data suggests that the proposed corridor would pass through a region in need of devel- opment. Transfer payments from the federal government in the form of income mainte-

CHART 1: Percent of Total Population in Poverty, 1990.

SOURCE: U.S. Census, 1990; Prepared by UK Appalachian Center

45.00%

40.00%

34.68% Percent of Total 35.00% 33.08% Population in Poverty 30.76% 30.02% 30.00%

25.00%

20.00% 19.00%

15.10% 15.00%

10.00%

5.00%

0.00% Direct Indirect All impact Appalachian Kentucky U.S. impact impact counties counties CHART 2: Per-capita Income, 1990.

SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1993; Prepared by UK Appalachian Center

$21,000 - $20,800

$19,000 - P I

$17,000 - $16,889

$15,000 -

$13,010 $13,000 - $12,423 $12,410 $11,837

$11,000 -

$9,000 -

$7,000 -

$5,000 - Direct Indirect All impact Appalachian Kentucky U.S. impact impact counties counties

CHART 3: Percent of Total Income from Transfer Payments.

SOURCE: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of the Census, 1993; Prepared by UK Appalachian Center

45.00%

40.17 40.00% 37.49% 35.86% 34.82% 35.00% Percent of Tota Income from Transfer Payments 30.00%

25.00% 23.04%

20.00% 17.30

15.00

10.00

5.00%

0.00% Direct Indirect All impact Appalachian Kentucky U.S. impact impact counties counties nance, Aid for Families with Dependent Children, and health care are an indicator of underdevelop- ment. The percent of income from transfer payments for the primary- and secondary-impact coun- ties was much higher than the state and the nation as a whole.

The Comprehensive Development Potential of Interstate 66 The eastern segment of the proposed Kentucky I-66 corridor would run through one of the most severely distressed areas of our nation. The affected counties demonstrate very high poverty levels, low education levels, and high unemployment. These counties also receive a very high level of federal transfer payments, with the portion of total income from transfer payments as high as 45 percent for some counties. While improved transportation infrastructure will not solve the problems of Appalachian Kentucky, the use of transportation infrastructure as a development tool for distressed regions has both theoretical and historical support. The potential economic development benefits of the I-66 corridor for Southeastern Kentucky are numerous. Construction of the corridor would more closely link the trade centers of Williamson, WV, and Pikeville, Hazard, Jenkins, London, and Somerset, KY to each other and to regional, national, and global markets through other interstate highways. If the highway system were built using a plan that includes connector roads, and four-lane north-south routes, such as U.S. 119 and U.S. 23, it would go a long way toward making transportation more efficient in the region. Development also needs to account for comprehensive regional, economic, and community planning in order to increase the positive impacts. Commercial development, mostly in service and retail sectors, is likely to occur along the corridor in response to increased traffic volume. Gerald Altman (1996), Executive Director of the Pike County Chamber of Commerce, said, “If I-66 is built, we will expect to see tremendous growth in the areas of tourism, commerce, and industry. There are several mountain tops which have been opened up for development. We expect to see development in these spots if I-66 is constructed.” Reduced hauling costs of inputs and outputs could make the region more competitive for industry, enabling the attraction of additional business in the corridor and encouraging the expansion of existing firms. Reduced driving time to southeastern Kentucky could open it up for tourism development. Areas previously considered ‘unreachable’ could accommodate recreational and cultural tourists. The corridor region might potentially become more economically competitive, attracting new industries and tourists to the corridor, strengthening local economies. Transportation infrastructure, however, is not only linked to economic development. Better highways also improve the potential to provide health and social services to an area. Im- proved roads should make health centers within the region, such as Hazard and Pikeville, more accessible, avoiding the loss of health clients to larger markets such as Lexington. The benefits are much broader than just reduced driving time. Improved roads could facilitate the integration of existing health-care provider services across county lines, and within multi-county regions, provid- ing greater economies of scale and more efficient use of resources. Improved roads could also help integrate high-cost social services in poor rural areas. Reduced driving time makes it easier to integrate child and family services, such as daycare, across county lines. The corridor could also improve the potential for providing educational services to people in Southeastern Kentucky by promoting increased access to education opportunities. Evelyn Bernitt (1996), Public Relations Coordinator for Hazard Community College, said, “[The I-66 corri- dor] would be a great benefit to this area because so many people want to get an education close to home. . . . [B]etter roads increase the chances of new students coming to us.” Improved roads might create a larger commuting pool for existing educational facilities and job training programs, and may promote the regional integration of these services. Simpson (1996) said, “Whenever you have more people becoming mobile, you expect them to capitalize on educational opportunities. I would expect more people to seek out job training.” The I-66 corridor could also provide improved access to job training and higher-education opportunities outside of the region. “A community’s economic infrastructure alone cannot explain its well- being. Factors such as the presence of civic organizations and their viability, citizens’ sense of community, and the existence of entrepreneurship all greatly influence the use of resources in a commu- nity.”

Better roads also can promote community development and help build social infrastruc- ture. Luloff and Swanson (1995:**) define social infrastructure as “people in a local society coming together to address local needs, or as a community’s ability to act collectively.” A community’s economic infrastructure alone cannot explain its well-being. Factors such as the presence of civic organizations and their viability, citizens’ sense of community, and the existence of entrepreneurship all greatly influence the use of resources in a community (Flora, et al, 1992). A viable social infra- structure, regardless of its ambiguous character, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for community economic and social development. People, not roads, make decisions, and it is people who must determine a community’s development options and take action (Flora, et al, 1992). Partici- pation in civic life and creating public partnerships are prerequisites for sustainable community development. Transportation infrastructure is often a prerequisite for building community partner- ships in the mountains, because geography can be a barrier to getting people together. By their nature, most rural areas are dispersed geographically. With favorable communication and transpor- tation systems, however, rural Americans do not have to be socially isolated (Wimberly, 1988). There is a need to overcome the current geographic divisions that hinder community building. Increased access to other communities, to local government meetings, and to regional planning meetings could potentially foster the growth of citizen involvement in southeastern Kentucky. The current climate of rural development suggests the need to integrate I-66 planning to include a wide variety of regional- and community-development priorities. Leadership for this integrated planning comes from the federal government and from state governments and local residents. One basis for highway planning appears to be the needs of residents living in the commu- nities along the route. In a world built on mobility and change, it is crucial to consider the “interac- tion” of different forms of transportation, including the new electronic forms, as well as other elements of community development, such as roads, sites, land use, water control, timber manage- ment, recreation development, training and education, community facilities, and housing (Kentucky Bicentennial Commission, 1992). The 1991 federal Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) — which is intended to give state and local governments more flexibility in working out solutions to transportation problems — seeks to make the national transportation system economi- cally efficient and environmentally sound. As part of its basic philosophy of integrating activities, the legislation also is intended to link all forms of transportation and provide improved access to all kinds of shipping facilities, including airports. Statewide transportation planning for rural areas is designed to support rural economic growth, tourism development, recreational development, and Indian tribal concerns. Depending on the type of rural or small-city project, planning efforts include the cooperation and consultation with local officials (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1993). ISTEA also is intended to spur creative thinking and to broaden partnerships to include business, labor, government, and educational communities in order to bolster economic growth and create jobs (Smith, 1994). In so doing, it increases requirements for public involvement in highway planning (Unsworth, 1994). Environmental concerns are also receiving consideration from the Federal High- way Administration under ISTEA, with an eye toward impacts on air quality, noise, wetlands, hazardous waste sites, water quality, and historic resources (Finch, 1994). ARC, which has been noted for its road-building over the years, now includes physical infrastructure as one of five basic goals that are designed to increase the access of residents to basic services and activities (Appalachian Regional Com-mission, 1996). The Kentucky Appalachian Task Force (1995), which held meetings in communities throughout Eastern Kentucky, also recommended that highway planning be integrated with other elements of the comprehensive development of quality communities. Transportation has become critical to societal goals such as economic develop- ment, growth management, and minority employment (Larson and Rao, 1989). The changing land- scape of government policy suggests several themes. Increased traffic implies that there will be more pressure to build roads. Yet, uneven regional development and competition for scarce road-building dollars may impede road-building or make it difficult to establish priorities on projects. The situation is competitive, and road planning will need to consider broader goals, while using solid technical analysis and good communication of needs in an atmosphere of increased accountability. In an era of declining federal road-building funds, there is a need for increased partnerships among local and state governments, as well as the private sector. Without integrated planning, an interstate highway may serve simply as a “people mover,” causing a loss of health care and retail customers to larger markets and hastening outmigration from the region. Without strategic planning to capitalize on the potential benefits of I- 66, possible social service and educational improvements will be lost, and the economic benefits of the corridor will go mostly to the primary-impact counties. If this were to happen, it would worsen the current condition of uneven development. Thus it is important that road construction be part of an integrated planning process. A rural region has limited potential for development if it lacks competitive transporta- tion infrastructure, and a significant percentage of its population lacks access to job sites, basic services, and social interaction. While transportation infrastructure improvements are most often associated with economic development, there are also many associated benefits for human and social infrastructure development. Transportation infrastructure is a prerequisite for building community partnerships, because geography can serve as a barrier to people getting together. Better roads can facilitate not only the distribution of health, educational, social, and community services, but can also promote the integration of these services across county lines. Not only is distribution of goods and services within a region improved, but so is the potential to bring educational and cultural events in from outside the region. Comprehensive development includes not only improvements in economic opportunities, but also improvements in human potential and social capacity. If they are part of a larger strategy, physical infrastructure improvements also can result in greater improve- ments in a community’s “capacity” for development, both by strengthening local economies through economic development and by facilitating social and community development. Comprehensive development may in the long term help reduce public expenditures for transfer payments in the Appalachian region of Eastern Kentucky. While transportation infrastruc- ture improvement can be a costly development tool, it appears there are many benefits for long-run economic and social improvement of impoverished regions, especially if highway building is linked with other aspects of community and regional planning. Bibliography

Altman, Gerald, Executive Director, Pike County Chamber of Commerce. 1996. Telephone interview, February 22, 1996.

Appalachian Regional Commission. 1973. The Appalachian Development Highway System Study, Washington, D.C.: The Commission.

Appalachian Regional Commission. 1982. “Appalachian Highways are the Catalysts of Change.” In: Appalachia, 15:4(8-17).

Appalachian Regional Commission. 1996. Setting a Regional Agenda: ARC Strategic Plan. Washington, DC: The Commission.

Bernitt, Evelyn. 1996. Coordinator of Public Relations, Hazard Community College. Telephone interview, February 22, 1996.

Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of the Census. 1993. Regional Economic Information System.

Eastern Kentucky Regional Planning Commission. 1960. Program 60: A Decade of Action for Progress. Hazard, KY: The Commission.

Eller, Ronald D, et al. 1994. Kentucky’s Distressed Communities: A Report on Poverty in Appalachian Kentucky. Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Appalachian Center.

Finch, Ginny. 1994. “Environmental Research: Helping Highways Improve the Quality of Life.” In: Public Roads, 57:3(Winter)(30-31).

Flora, Corneila; Jan Flora, Jacqueline D. Spears, Louis E. Swanson, with Mark Lapping and Mark L. Weinburg. 1992. Rural Communities, Legacy and Change. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Gauthier, Howard. 1973. “The Appalachian Development Highway System: Development for Whom?” In: Economic Geography, 49(103-108).

Good Samaritan Foundation, Inc. 1995. County Profiles, Volume I, October 1995.

Kaye, Ira. 1985. “Rural Transportation.” In: Rural Society in the U.S.: Issues for the 1980s. (eds.: Don Dillman and Daryl Hobbs).

Kentucky Appalachian Task Force. 1995. Communities of Hope: Preparing for the Future in Appala- chian Kentucky, Report to Governor Brereton Jones.

Kentucky Bicentennial Commission. 1992. Kentucky Transportation:: A 200 Year Calendar of History — 1792 to 1992. . . . Frankfort, KY: The Commission.

Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development. Department of Commerce. 1993. Kentucky Directory of Manufacturers. Frankfort: The Cabinet.

Kentucky Progress Magazine. 1929. “Highway Map of Kentucky.” 2(1):26-27. October, 1929.

Larson, Thomas D. and Kant Rao. 1989. Process for Recapitalizing Highway Transportation Systems. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board, National Research Council.

Luloff, A. E. and Louis Swanson. 1995. “Community Agency and Disaffection: Enhancing Collective Resources.” In: Investing in People. (eds.: Lionel J. Beaulieu and David Mulkey) Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Myers, Dr. Wayne. 1996. University of Kentucky. Center for Rural Health. Telephone interview, February 15, 1996.

President’s Appalachian Regional Commission. 1964. Appalachia - A Report. Washington, DC: The Commission.

Putnam, Robert E. 1995. “Bowling Alone: America’s Decline in Social Capital.” In: American Journal of Democracy, 6:10(65-78).

Simpson, Charlie, Director of Hazard Community College’s Business and Industry Technological Assistance Center. 1996. Telephone interview on March 3, 1996.

Smith, Theresa M. 1994. “The Impact of Highway Infrastructure on Economic Performance.” In: Public Roads 57:4 Spring (8-14).

University of Kentucky. Center for Rural Health. 1995. UK Rural Health Initiative 3:3(1), Fall/Winter 1995.

Unsworth, Dennis J. 1994. “Redefining Public Involvement” In: Journal of Management Engineering, 10:4 July/August(13-15).

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census.

U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Office of Technology Applications, Safety and System Applications. 1993: ISTEA: Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, Selected Fact Sheets. Washington, DC: The Department.

Widner, Ralph R. 1990. “Appalachian Development After 25 Years: An Assessment.” In: Eco- nomic Development Quarterly, 4:4(291-312) November.

Wimberly, Ron. 1988. “Rural Transportation Infrastructure.” In: Rural Economic Development in the 1980’s, Prospects for the Future. (eds.: David Brown, J. Norman Reid, Herman Bluestone, David McGranahon, and Sara Mazie). Washington, DC: Agriculture and Rural Economy Division, Ecoomic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Rural Development Research Report No. 69. APPENDIX 1: Proposed Route Description for I-66 Corridor.

Proposed Route Description for Southern Kentucky Corridor (I-66)

1. KY 80/US 68 from Kentucky-Missouri State Line to the intersection with William Natcher Parkway at Bowling Green. 2. William Natcher Parkway from KY 80/US 68 intersection to 1-65. 3. 1-65 from William Natcher Parkway to the Cumberland Parkway. 4. Cumberland Parkway from 1-65 to US 27 (Somerset). 5. KY 80 from US 27 at Somerset to 1-75. 6. Daniel Boone Parkway from 1-75 to KY 15 at Hazard. 7. KY 80 from KY 15 at Hazard to US 23 and US 460 in Floyd County. 8. US 23 and US 460 from KY 80 to US 119 at Pikeville. 9. US 119 from US 23 and US 460 at Pikeville to South Williamson (Kentucky - West Virginia State Line). 10. US 23 and US 119 from Pikeville (intersection of US 119 and US 23/460) to Jenkins and Jenkins to Virginia State Line. 11. US 119 from Jenkins to KY 15 at Whitesburg. 12. KY 15 from US 119 (Whitesburg) to the intersection of KY 80 and Danial Boone Parkway at Hazard. 13. 1-24 from Kentucky-Tennessee State Line to US 60 interchange at Paducah 14. US 60 from 1-24 in Paducah to US 51/62 at Wickliffe. 15. US 52/62 from US 60 at Wickliffe to Kentucky 80 in Carlisle County. 16. from KY 80 interchange at Mayfield to 1-24. 17. KY 121 from Purchase Parkway interchange at Mayfield to Wickliffe in Ballard County.