NO. 35 MAY 2021 Introduction

Civil War in A Further Escalation of Violence Looms on the Horizon Felix Heiduk

Military installations have been attacked in various towns in Myanmar’s interior over the past few days. Among other things, military airfields that the air force had used to attack ethnic minority rebel bases in the east and north of the country were fired upon. So far, no one has claimed responsibility for the attacks, but it can be assumed that they are connected to the newly formed alliance between the former democratic government and ethnic minorities. In view of this development, the violent conflicts in Myanmar threaten to spread from the border regions to the entire country, in- cluding large urban centres. If the violence were indeed to escalate in the coming weeks, Myanmar would be further destabilised politically, economically, and socially.

Since its independence in 1948, Myanmar Against this background, the civil wars in (which was called Burma until three de- the country’s hinterland, which are often cades ago) has experienced a series of interlinked with illicit economic activities, bloody civil wars in its border regions. The have been perpetuated for decades. opponents have been the central govern- Over time, some EAOs even succeeded in ment – dominated by the largest ethnic establishing state-like structures and ad- group, the Bamar – and various armed ministered the territories under their con- groups recruited primarily from ethnic trol largely autonomously from the central minorities. More than two dozen “ethnic government. In 2015, the government and armed organisations” (EAOs) emerged over 10 predominantly smaller EAOs signed a time – some with only several hundred ceasefire (the NCA – National Ceasefire members, others with tens of thousands – Agreement). In the same year, Aung San waging guerrilla warfare against the central Suu Kyi emerged victorious in the country’s government and the military, the Tatmad- first free elections since 1990. During her aw. Ethnic minorities predominantly live in first term as de facto head of government, the inaccessible mountainous terrain of she tried several times, following up on the Myanmar’s hinterland. They perceive NCA, to initiate a national peace and recon- themselves to be marginalised politically, ciliation process within the framework of socially, and economically and exposed to the “Union Peace Conference – 21st Cen- brutal crackdowns by the security forces, tury Panglong”, but with little success. This which often target the civilian population. was mainly because the , who see

themselves as praetorians and guardians of Little Chance for Negotiations the unity of the nation, continued the fight against alleged “separatists” militarily. Since Against this background, it seems highly 1962, the military has been the de facto unrealistic that constructive negotiations dominant political and economic actor in can be initiated between the military the country. The generals initiated a liber- government and the in the near alisation process in 2010, which brought future. Both sides operate according to a free elections, freedom of the press, and the zero-sum logic, thus perceiving the conflict formation of a civilian government. But as an existential dispute about the future they seized power again on 1 February 2021 of the country. This leaves little room for after the National League of Democracy understanding or compromise. There is also (NLD), led by , swept the a lack of political incentives to compromise elections in November of the previous year. on either side. The generals are unwilling to The coup prevented the formation of an abandon power after a military coup that NLD-led government with an absolute ma- brought months of unrest and hundreds of jority in parliament. As a result of the coup, deaths. This is also true for the rank-and- there are now signs of a further escalation file soldiers and police officers, who would of violent conflicts. A de facto counter- have to fear extensive reprisals if civilian government has emerged from the NLD in rule were to be restored. Additionally, many the form of the Committee Representing of their families are housed in military (CRPH). It has not only bases; the generals use them as bargaining called for armed resistance against the mili- chips to deter potential deserters. Thus, the tary, but has also closed ranks with the junta is still counting on the loyalty of its ethnic minority parties. A National Unity rank and file. A split of the armed forces Government (NUG) was formed for this pur- between hardliners and reformers would pose. In addition, some of the EAOs have only be conceivable if the power of the already signalled their support for the NUG. generals around Min Aung Hlaing were to Leading opposition politicians made calls erode. However, such a scenario does not from the underground or from exile for de- seem very likely at present. mocracy activists to move to areas con- On the other hand, the CRPH leadership, trolled by EAOs, be trained there as guerril- with hundreds of its supporters having las, and then take up the armed struggle been killed, has no incentive to make a against the military government together compromise either. The majority of the with the EAOs. The opposition members opposition – which, unlike in previous remaining in the cities of central Myanmar protests, is broadly anchored in society and were told they should continue demonstra- includes students and monks as well as, tions and civil disobedience actions in among others, administrative staff, doctors, parallel. and trade unionists – accepts neither the The military junta does not recognise the coup nor would it accept any future govern- unity government, and security forces con- ment in which the military is involved. tinue to crack down on the ongoing mass Members of the counter-government have protests. Only recently did junta leader repeatedly stated in public that they are General Min Aung Hlaing again announce currently ruling out negotiations with the that the democratic opposition was solely military leadership. Moreover, the closing to blame for the escalation of violence. of ranks with the ethnic minorities under According to press reports, more than 750 the unity government increases the pres- people have been killed by the police and sure on the CRPH to be tough on the military in recent weeks, in many cases by Tatmadaw. In the view of many minority targeted shots to the head. Thousands are in representatives, this is precisely what the detention or under house arrest, including NLD, which forms the core of the CRPH, almost the entire leadership of the NLD. failed to do during Aung San Suu Kyi’s first

SWP Comment 35 May 2021

2 term in office. Instead the NLD entered a KNU, and the Kachin Independence Army fragile truce with the military. Minority (KIA) have attacked military posts, killing rights, they argue, were sold out by Aung about 30 soldiers. In early May 2021, KIA San Suu Kyi in favour of a power-sharing fighters even claimed to have shot down an arrangement with the Tatmadaw. As a air force attack helicopter. The KIA was result, the peace process, the expansion of never party to the ceasefire agreement. autonomy rights, and plans for a new feder- The military responded to the attacks by alism made little progress between 2015 bombing several villages in areas controlled and 2020. Hence, if the CRPH were to agree by EAOs. Thousands of civilians fled. There to any compromise with the Tatmadaw, are also increasing reports that new armed representatives of the ethnic minorities in groups are emerging. In response to the the NUG would most likely interpret it as coup, for example, the Chinland Defense another sell-out of their rights and interests. Force was formed, which claims to have killed dozens of military personnel. In addi- tion, established EAOs have announced that Escalation of Violence they will cooperate with the unity govern- ment and other ethnic military associations The initial calculus of the coup plotters in the fight against the military. This ap- seemed to be to take power with minimal plies, for example, to the recently strength- use of force by arresting the NLD leader- ened Brotherhood Alliance, which consists ship, banning protests, censoring the media, of the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National and shutting down the internet. This was to Democratic Alliance Army, and the Ta’ang be followed by a transition to a “disciplined National Liberation Army. There are even democracy” that would have culminated in reports of increased efforts to forge a coali- an election victory in 2022 for the military- tion of ethnic militias against the junta and backed parties, most notably the Union to lead them together against the army. Solidarity and Development Party. Such It would be a nightmare scenario for the calculus certainly did not work out. Within military if the newly formed political alli- days after the coup, there were mass pro- ance of the CRPH and the ethnic minority tests in many cities, which were violently parties were to be extended to include put down by the security forces. Recently, a broad military alliance of EAOs. Such a democracy activists fought back with home- political and military alliance, which would made weapons. In the country’s largest city, transcend ethnic boundaries and include Yangon, but also in other cities, bombs the ousted government, would be a first in were detonated in front of police stations Myanmar’s recent history. To be sure, it is and administrative buildings: 21 members still a pipe dream at present. On the one of the security forces were killed according hand, this is because some of the EAOs have to state media. Moreover, the coup com- fought the military as well as each other in pletely destroyed the already fragile peace the past. On the other hand, the Tatmadaw process with the EAOs. Back in February, have always managed to conclude bilateral the military attacked posts of the Restora- pacts with certain EAOs as part of a “divide tion Council of (RCSS), one of and conquer” strategy. This has prevented the 10 EAOs that had signed the ceasefire the formation of any overarching alliance agreement in 2015. The RCSS then declared of the major ethnic rebel groups. For exam- that the Tatmadaw had broken the agree- ple, the military has tied the largest of these ment. The Karen National Union (KNU), groups, the , to itself which, as one of the largest ethnic rebel through extensive autonomy rights and a groups, was also part of the agreement, also bilateral ceasefire. Accordingly, the leader- declared it null and void as a result of the ship of the organisation, which is externally coup. In recent weeks, the Karen National supported by , has so far not voiced Liberation Army, the armed wing of the any criticism of the coup.

SWP Comment 35 May 2021

3 It therefore appears unlikely that the the end of April, was publicly lauded a Tatmadaw could suffer a military defeat by success by the participants. The result of the EAOs anytime soon. This is not to say, the summit was a “five-point consensus”, however, that the links between the demo- which, in accordance with the ASEAN un- cratic opposition and at least some militari- animity principle, was also agreed to by ly strong EAOs will not have any conse- junta leader Min Aung Hlaing. It stipulated quences. Quite the contrary, it seems plau- an end to violence, dialogue between all sible to assume that it will not only lead to parties to the conflict, facilitation of the an escalation of violence in the border consensus by an ASEAN special envoy, regions, but also gradually affect the central humanitarian aid to be provided by ASEAN, © Stiftung Wissenschaft areas of Myanmar. The extent and duration and a visit to Myanmar by an ASEAN dele- und Politik, 2021 of the violence is likely to depend heavily gation, including a special ambassador. All rights reserved on how durable the alliance between the However, neither a condemnation of the ousted NLD government and the ethnic coup was given, nor sanctions imposed. The This Comment reflects minorities will be. CRPH and human rights organisations the author’s views. What is more, a further escalation of offered the criticism that, by inviting Min The online version of violence is likely to exacerbate the down- Aung Hlaing to the meeting, ASEAN had this publication contains ward political and economic trends in effectively given legitimacy to the junta on functioning links to other Myanmar. The country is already on the the international stage. Representatives of SWP texts and other relevant brink of economic collapse. According to UN the CRPH were not invited. To make mat- sources. estimates, more than half of the population ters worse, just days after the summit, the SWP Comments are subject will be living in poverty by 2022. Politically, junta declared that it would have to estab- to internal peer review, fact- the country is currently largely ungoverna- lish “stability” in Myanmar before the five- checking and copy-editing. ble for the junta. Demonstrations, strikes, point consensus could be implemented. The For further information on and civil disobedience have left, among generals thus showed how little they are our quality control pro- other sectors, education, public health, and interested in mediation attempts, even if cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- parts of Myanmar’s industry dysfunctional, these are procured by neighbouring states. berlin.org/en/about-swp/ making it increasingly difficult for the It is therefore unlikely that external quality-management-for- military leadership to provide key public actors will be able to significantly influence swp-publications/ services and keep the economy going. the Tatmadaw’s strategic calculus or behav- iour on the ground. Even if existing sanc- SWP tions were to be tightened by, for example, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik ASEAN as a Mediator the United States and the European Union German Institute for (EU), this is unlikely to change. For one International and With a continuing standoff in Myanmar thing, not all of Myanmar’s neighbouring Security Affairs and the UN Security Council stopping short states support meddling in what they per- of condemning the coup as well as any fur- ceive to be Myanmar’s internal affairs. For Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin ther action due to opposition from Russia another, the military has learnt since the Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 and China, there have been increasing calls 1980s to maintain its power grip in the Fax +49 30 880 07-100 at home and abroad for weeks for the Asso- face of international sanctions. In 2021, the www.swp-berlin.org ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) military leadership around General Min [email protected] to take on a mediating role. Some member Aung Hlaing seems determined to turn the states of the organisation had criticised the country back into a military dictatorship by ISSN (Print) 1861-1761 ISSN (Online) 2747-5107 coup in an unusually direct manner. Many force. A further escalation of violence doi: 10.18449/2021C35 of the ASEAN countries fear that the crisis seems inevitable. Further displacements in Myanmar could have far-reaching nega- and a humanitarian crisis would be just (English version of tive consequences for regional stability. some of the direct consequences. Germany SWP-Aktuell 41/2021) A first ASEAN meeting on the situation and the EU would therefore be well-advised in Myanmar, which took place in Jakarta at to prepare for such scenarios now.

Dr Felix Heiduk is a Senior Associate in the Asia Division at SWP.

SWP Comment 35 May 2021

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