Optimal Design of Dutch Auctions with Discrete Bid Levels. Doctor Of
OPTIMAL DESIGN OF DUTCH AUCTIONS WITH DISCRETE BID LEVELS Zhen Li, B.A., M.S. Dissertation Prepared for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS May 2010 APPROVED: Ching-Chung Kuo, Major Professor and Program Coordinator for Operations Management Robert J. Pavur, Minor Professor Grant Miles, Committee Member Vicki L. Goodwin, Chair of the Department of Management O. Finley Graves, Dean of the College of Business Michael Monticino, Dean of the Robert B. Toulouse School of Graduate Studies Li, Zhen. Optimal design of Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels. Doctor of Philosophy (Management), May 2010, 224 pp., 34 tables, 30 illustrations, references, 142 titles. The theory of auction has become an active research area spanning multiple disciplines such as economics, finance, marketing and management science. But a close examination of it reveals that most of the existing studies deal with ascending (i.e., English) auctions in which it is assumed that the bid increments are continuous. There is a clear lack of research on optimal descending (i.e., Dutch) auction design with discrete bid levels. This dissertation aims to fill this void by considering single-unit, open-bid, first price Dutch auctions in which the bid levels are restricted to a finite set of values, the number of bidders may be certain or uncertain, and a secret reserve price may be present or absent. These types of auctions are most attractive for selling products that are perishable (e.g., flowers) or whose value decreases with time (e.g., air flight seats and concert tickets) (Carare and Rothkopf, 2005).
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