SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS EXCHIANGE

GEORGE C. HOMANS

ABST RACT To consider social behavior as an exchange of goods may clarify the relations among four bodies of the- ory: behavioral psychology, economics, propositions about the dynamics of influence, and propositions about the structure of small groups.

THE PROBLEMS OF SMALL-GROUP RESEARCH what happens in elementary social be- This essay will hope to honor the memory havior, even though we may not be able to of Georg Simmel in two different ways. So explain why the propositions should take far as it pretends to be suggestive rather the form they do. A great amount of work than conclusive, its tone will be Simmel's; has been done, and more appears every day, and its subject, too, will be one of his. Be- but what it all amounts to in the shape of cause Simmel, in essays such as those on a set of propositions from which, under sociability, games, coquetry, and conversa- specified conditions, many of the observa- tion, was an analyst of elementary social tional results might be derived, is not at all behavior, we call him an ancestor of what clear-and yet to state such a set is the is known today as small-group research. first aim of science. For what we are really studying in small The third job is to begin to show how the groups is elementary social behavior: what propositions that empirically hold good in happens when two or three persons are in small groups may be derived from some set a position to influence one another, the sort of still more general propositions. "Still of thing of which those massive structures more general" means only that empirical called "classes," "firms," "communities," propositions other than ours may also be and "societies" must ultimately be com- derived from the set. This derivation would posed. constitute the explanatory stage in the As I survey small-group research today, science of elementary social behavior, for I feel that, apart from just keeping on with explanation is derivation.' (I myself sus- it, three sorts of things need to be done. The pect that the more general set will turn out first is to show the relation between the re- to contain the propositions of behavioral sults of experimental work done under psychology. I hold myself to be an "ulti- laboratory conditions and the results of mate psychological reductionist,"but I can- quasi- anthropological field research on not know that I am right so long as the re- what those of us who do it are pleased to duction has not been carried out.) call "real-life" groups in industry and else- I have come to think that all three of where. If the experimental work has any- these jobs would be furtheredby our adopt- thing to do with real life-and I am per- ing the view that interaction between per- suaded that it has everything to do-its sons is an exchange of goods, material and propositions cannot be inconsistent with non-material. This is one of the oldest those discovered through the field work. theories of social behavior, and one that we But the consistency has not yet been demon- still use every day to interpret our own be- strated in any systematic way. havior, as when we say, "I found so-and-so The second job is to pull together in some rewarding"; or "I got a great deal out of set of general propositions the actual re- him"; or, even, "Talking with him took a sults, from the laboratory and from the great deal out of me." But, perhaps just be- field, of work on small groups-propositions 1 See R. B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation that at least sum up, to an approximation, (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1953). 597

This content downloaded from 154.059.124.074 on May 13, 2020 13:11:02 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 598 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY cause it is so obvious, this view has been he is interested in what determines changes much neglected by social scientists. So far in the rate of emission of learned behavior, as I know, the only theoretical work that whether pecks at a target or something else. makes explicit use of it is Marcel Mauss's The more hungry the pigeon, the less Essai sur le don, published in 1925, which is corn or other food it has gotten in the re- ancient as social science goes.2 It may be cent past, the more often it will peck. By the that the tradition of neglect is now chang- same token, if the behavior is often re- ing and that, for instance, the psychologists inforced, if the pigeon is given much corn who interpret behavior in terms of trans- every time it pecks, the rate of emission will actions may be coming back to something fall off as the pigeon gets satiated. If, on the of the sort I have in mind.3 other hand, the behavior is not reinforced An incidental advantage of an exchange at all, then, too, its rate of emission will theory is that it might bring sociology closer tend to fall off, though a long time may pass to economics-that science of man most ad- before it stops altogether, before it is ex- vanced, most capable of application, and, tinguished. In the emission of many kinds of intellectually, most isolated. Economics behavior the pigeon incurs aversive stimula- studies exchange carried out under special tion, or what I shall call "cost" for short, circumstancesand with a most useful built- and this, too, will lead in time to a decrease in numerical measure of value. What are in the emission rate. Fatigue is an example the laws of the general phenomenon of of a "cost." Extinction, satiation, and cost, which economic behavior is one class? by decreasing the rate of emission of a par- In what follows I shall suggest some ticular kind of behavior, render more prob- reasons for the usefulness of a theory of so- able the emission of some other kind of cial behavior as exchange and suggest the behavior, including doing nothing. I shall nature of the propositions such a theory only add that even a hard-boiled psycholo- might contain. gist puts "emotional" behavior, as well as such things as pecking, among the uncondi- AN EXCHANGE PARADIGM tioned responses that may be reinforced in I start with the link to behavioral psy- operant conditioning. As a statement of the chology and the kind of statement it makes propositions of behavioral psychology, the about the behavior of an experimental ani- foregoing is, of course, inadequate for any mal such as the pigeon.4 As a pigeon ex- purpose except my present one. plores its cage in the laboratory, it happens We may look on the pigeon as engaged to peck a target, whereupon the psycholo- in an exchange-pecks for corn-with the gist feeds it corn. The evidence is that it psychologist, but let us not dwell upon that, will peck the target again; it has learned the for the behavior of the pigeon hardly de- behavior, or, as my friend Skinner says, the termines the behavior of the psychologist at behavior has been reinforced, and the all. Let us turn to a situation where the ex- pigeon has undergone operant conditioning. change is real, that is, where the determina- This kind of psychologist is not interested tion is mutual. Suppose we are dealing with in how the behavior was learned: "learning two men. Each is emitting behavior re- theory" is a poor name for his field. Instead, inforced to some degree by the behavior of 2Translated by I. Cunnison as The Gift (Glen- the other. How it was in the past that each coe, Ill.: Free Press, 1954). learned the behavior he emits and how he 8 In social anthropology D. L. Oliver is working learned to find the other's behavior re- along these lines, and I owe much to him. See also inforcing we are not concerned with. It is T. M. Newcomb, "The Prediction of Interpersonal enough that each does find the other's be- Attraction," American Psychologist, XI (1956), 575-86. havior reinforcing, and I shall call the re- 'B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior inforcers-the equivalent of the pigeon's (New York: Macmillan Co., 1953). corn-values, for this, I think, is what we

This content downloaded from 154.059.124.074 on May 13, 2020 13:11:02 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS EXCHANGE 599 mean by this term. As he emits behavior, tivities of the group. Festinger and his col- each man may incur costs, and each man leagues consider two kinds of reinforcing has more than one course of behavior open activity: the symbolic behavior we call "so- to him. cial approval" (sentiment) and activity This seems to me the paradigm of ele- valuable in other ways, such as doing some- mentary social behavior, and the problem of thing interesting. the elementary sociologist is to state prop- The other variable they work with they ositions relating the variations in the values call communicationand others call interac- and costs of each man to his frequency dis- tion. This is a frequency variable; it is a tribution of behavior among alternatives, measure of the frequency of emission of where the values (in the mathematical valuable and costly verbal behavior. We sense) taken by these variable for one man must bear in mind that, in general, the one determinein part their values for the other.5 kind of variable is a function of the other. I see no reason to believe that the prop- Festinger and his co-workers show that ositions of behavioralpsychology do not ap- the more cohesive a group is, that is, the ply to this situation, though the complexity more valuable the sentiment or activity the of their implications in the concrete case members exchange with one another, the may be great indeed. In particular,we must greater the average frequency of interaction suppose that, with men as with pigeons, of the members.6With men, as with pigeons, an increase in extinction, satiation, or aver- the greater the reinforcement, the more sive stimulation of any one kind of behavior often is the reinforced behavior emitted. will increase the probability of emission of The more cohesive a group, too, the greater some other kind. The problem is not, as it the change that memberscan produce in the is often stated, merely, what a man's values behavior of other members in the direction are, what he has learned in the past to find of renderingthese activities more valuable.7 reinforcing,but how much of any one value That is, the more valuable the activities his behavior is getting him now. The more that members get, the more valuable those he gets, the less valuable any further unit of that they must give. For if a person is emit- that value is to him, and the less often he ting behavior of a certain kind, and other will emit behavior reinforcedby it. people do not find it particularly rewarding, these others will suffer their own production THE INFLUENCE PROCESS of sentiment and activity, in time, to fall off. We do not, I think, possess the kind of But perhaps the first person has found their studies of two-person interaction that sentiment and activity rewarding, and, if would either bear out these propositions or he is to keep on getting them, he must make fail to do so. But we do have studies of his own behavior more valuable to the larger numbers of persons that suggest that others. In short, the propositions of behav- they may apply, notably the studies by ioral psychology imply a tendency toward Festinger, Schachter,Back, and their associ- a certain proportionality between the value ates on the dynamics of influence. One of tn AthArc .of the. hAhn%;1'ir n mnn CilyPc the variables they work with they call co- hesiveness, defined as anything that attracts 6K. W. Back, "The Exertion of Influence through people to take part in a group. Cohesive- Social Communication," in L. Festinger, K. Back, S. ness is a value variable; it refers to the de- Schachter, H. H. Kelley, and J. Thibaut (eds.), Theory and Experiment in Social Communication gree of reinforcementpeople find in the ac- (Ann Arbor: Research Center for Dynamics, Uni- versity of Michigan, 1950), pp. 5Ibid., pp. 297-329. The discussionof "double 21-36. contingency"by T. Parsonsand E. A. Shils could 'S. Schachter, N. Ellertson, D. McBride, and D. easily lead to a similar paradigm (see Toward a Gregory, "An Experimental Study of Cohesiveness General Theory of Action [Cambridge, Mass.: and Productivity," Human Relations, IV (1951), HarvardUniversity Press, 1951], pp. 14-16). 229-38.

This content downloaded from 154.059.124.074 on May 13, 2020 13:11:02 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 600 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY and the value to him of the behavior they latter often appear to be in practical equi- give him.8 librium, and by this I mean nothing fancy. Schachter also studied the behavior of I do not mean that all real-life groups are members of a group toward two kinds of in equilibrium.I certainly do not mean that other members, "conformers" and "devi- all groups must tend to equilibrium. I do ates."9 I assume that conformersare people not mean that groups have built-in antidotes whose activity the other membersfind valu- to change: there is no homeostasis here. able. For conformity is behavior that co- I do not mean that we assume equilibrium. incides to a degree with some group stand- I mean only that we sometimes observe it, ard or norm, and the only meaning I can that for the time we are with a group-and assign to norm is "a verbal description of it is often short-there is no great change behavior that many members find it valu- in the values of the variables we choose to able for the actual behavior of themselves measure. If, for instance, person A is inter- and others to conform to." By the same acting with B more than with C both at the token, a deviate is a memberwhose behavior beginning and at the end of the study, then is not particularly valuable. Now Schachter at least by this crude measure the group is shows that, as the membersof a group come in equilibrium. to see another member as a deviate, their Many of the Festinger-Schachterstudies interaction with him-communication ad- are experimental, and their propositions dressed to getting him to change his behav- about the process of influence seem to me to ior-goes up, the faster the more cohesive imply the kind of proposition that empiri- the group. The membersneed not talk to the cally holds good of real-life groups in prac- other conformersso much; they are relative- tical equilibrium. For instance, Festinger et ly satiated by the conformers'behavior: they al. find that, the more cohesive a group is, have gotten what they want out of them. the greater the change that members can But if the deviate, by failing to change his produce in the behavior of other members. behavior, fails to reinforce the members, If the influence is exerted in the direction they start to withhold social approval from of conformity to group norms, then, when him: the deviate gets low sociometric choice the process of influencehas accomplishedall at the end of the experiment. And in the the change of which it is capable, the propo- most cohesive groups-those Schachtercalls sition should hold good that, the more co- "high cohesive-relevant"-interaction with hesive a group is, the larger the number of the deviate also falls off in the end and is members that conform to its norms. And it lowest among those members that rejected does hold good.10 him most strongly, as if they had given him Again, Schachterfound, in the experiment up as a bad job. But how plonking can we I summarized above, that in the most co- get? These findings are utterly in line with hesive groups and at the end, when the ef- everyday experience. fort to influence the deviate had failed, members interacted little with the deviate PRACTICAL EQUILIBRIUM and gave him little in the way of sociometric At the beginning of this paper I suggested choice. Now two of the propositions that that one of the tasks of small-groupresearch hold good most often of real-life groups in was to show the relation between the results practical equilibrium are precisely that the of experimental work done under labora- more closely a member's activity conforms tory conditions and the results of field re- to the norms the more interaction he re- search on real-life small groups. Now the ceives from other members and the more 8 Skinner, op. cit., p. 100. liking choices he gets from them too. From 'S. Schachter, "Deviation, Rejection, and Com- 0 L. Festinger, S. Schachter, and K. Back, Social munication," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psy- Pressures in InformnalGroups (New York: Harper chology, XLVI (1951), 190-207. & Bros., 1950), pp. 72-100.

This content downloaded from 154.059.124.074 on May 13, 2020 13:11:02 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). SOCIALBEHAVIOR AS EXCHANGE 601 these main propositions a number of others same frequenciesas he did at the beginning, may be derived that also hold good.-' the group is for that period in equilibrium. Yet we must ever rememberthat the truth Let us then ask why any one member's be- of the proposition linking conformity to lik- havior should persist. Suppose he is emit- ing may on occasion be masked by the truth ting behavior of value Al. Why does he not of other propositions. If, for instance, the let his behavior get worse (less valuable or man that conforms to the norms most close- reinforcing to the others) until it stands at ly also exerts some authority over the group, Al - AA? True, the sentiments expressed this may render liking for him somewhat by others toward him are apt to decline in less than it might otherwise have been.12 value (become less reinforcing to him), so Be that as it may, I suggest that the labo- that what he gets from them may be Si ratory experimentson influence imply prop- - AS. But it is conceivable that, since ositions about the behavior of members of most activity carries cost, a decline in the small groups, when the process of influence value of what he emits will mean a reduc- has workeditself out, that are identical with tion in cost to him that more than offsets propositions that hold good of real-life his losses in sentiment. Where, then, does groups in equilibrium. This is hardly sur- he stabilize his behavior? This is the prob- prising if all we mean by equilibriumis that lem of social control.'3 all the change of which the system is, under Mankind has always assumed that a per- present conditions, capable has been ef- son stabilizes his behavior, at least in the fected, so that no further change occurs. short run, at the point where he is doing the Nor would this be the first time that statics best he can for himself under the circum- has turned out to be a special case of dy- stances, though his best may not be a "ra- namics. tional" best, and what he can do may not be at all easy to specify, except that he is PROFIT AND SOCIAL CONTROL not apt to think like one of the theoretical Though I have treated equilibriumas an antagonists in the Theory of Games. Before observed fact, it is a fact that cries for ex- a sociologist rejects this answer out of hand planation. I shall not, as structural-func- for its horrid profit-seekingimplications, he tional sociologists do, use an assumed equi- will do well to ask himself if he can offer any librium as a means of explaining, or trying other answer to the question posed. I think to explain, why the other features of a social he will find that he cannot. Yet experiments system should be what they are. Rather, designed to test the truth of the answer are I shall take practical equilibrium as some- extraordinarilyrare. thing that is itself to be explained by the I shall review one that seems to me to other features of the system. provide a little support for the theory, If every member of a group emits at the though it was not meant to do so. The ex- end of, and during, a period of time much periment is reported by H. B. Gerard, a the same kinds of behavior and in much the member of the Festinger-Schachter team, " For propositions holding good of groups in under the title "The Anchorageof Opinions practical equilibrium see G. C. Homans, The Hu- in Face-to-Face Groups."''4The experiment- mnanGroup (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., er formed artificial groups whose members 1950), and H. W. Riecken and G. C. Homans, met to discuss a case in industrial relations "Psychological Aspects of Social Structure," in G. Lindsey (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology and to express their opinions about its prob- (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing able outcome. The groupswere of two kinds: Co., 1954), II, 786-832. high-attractiongroups, whose memberswere 2See Homans, op. cit., pp. 244-48, and R. F. told that they would like one another very Bales, "The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups," much, and low-attraction groups, whose in A. P. Hare, E. F. Borgatta, and R. F. Bales (eds.), Small Groups (New York: A. A. Knopf, '3 Homans, op. cit., pp. 281-301. 1953), pp. 450-56. HumanH Relations, VII (1954), 313-25.

This content downloaded from 154.059.124.074 on May 13, 2020 13:11:02 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 602 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY memberswere told that they would not find to have been interested only in the differ- one another particularly likable. ences in the sums of the rows, which show At a later time the experimenter called that there is more shifting toward the group, the members in separately, asked them and less shifting toward the paid partici- again to express their opinions on the out- pant, in the high-attraction than in the low- come of the case, and counted the number attraction condition. This is in line with a that had changed their opinions to bring proposition suggested earlier. If you think them into accord with those of other mem- that the members of a group can give you bers of their groups. At the same time, a much-in this case, liking-you are apt to paid participant entered into a further dis- give them much-in this case, a change to cussion of the case with each member, al- an opinion in accordancewith their views- ways taking, on the probable outcome of or you will not get the liking. And, by the the case, a position opposed to that taken same token, if the group can give you little by the bulk of the other members of the of value, you will not be ready to give it group to which the person belonged. The much of value. Indeed, you may change your opinion so as to depart from agreementeven TABLE 1 further, to move, that is, toward the view PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS CHANGING TOWARD held by the paid participant. SOMEONE IN THE GROUP So far so good, but, when I first scanned Mild Strong these tables, I was less struck by the differ- Agree- Disagree- Disagree- ence between them than by their similarity. ment ment ment The same classes of people in both tables High attraction.... 0 12 44 Low attraction... . 0 15 9 showed much the same relative propensities to change their opinions, no matter whether the change was toward the group or toward TABLE 2 the paid participant. We see, for instance, PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS CHANGING TOWARD that those who change least are the high- THE PAID PARTICIPANT attraction, agreement people and the low- Mild Strong attraction, strong-disagreement ones. And Agree- Disagree- Disagree- those who change most are the high-attrac- ment ment ment tion, strong-disagreement people and the High attraction.... 7 13 25 Low attraction. .. . 20 38 8 low-attraction, mild-disagreementones. How am I to interpret these particular re- experimenter counted the number of per- sults? Since the experimenterdid not discuss sons shifting toward the opinion of the paid them, I am free to offer my own explana- participant. tion. The behavior emitted by the subjects The experiment had many interesting re- is opinion and changes in opinion. For this sults, from which I choose only those behavior they have learned to expect two summed up in Tables 1 and 2. The three possible kinds of reinforcement.Agreement different agreement classes are made up of with the group gets the subject favorable people who, at the original sessions, ex- sentiment (acceptance) from it, and the ex- pressed different degrees of agreement with periment was designed to give this reinforce- the opinions of other members of their ment a higher value in the high-attraction groups. And the figure 44, for instance, condition than in the low-attraction one. means that, of all members of high-attrac- The second kind of possible reinforcement tion groups whose initial opinions were is what I shall call the "maintenanceof one's strongly in disagreementwith those of other personal integrity," which a subject gets by members, 44 per cent shifted their opinion sticking to his own opinion in the face of dis- later toward that of others. agreementwith the group. The experimenter In these results the experimenter seems does not mention this reward, but I cannot

This content downloaded from 154.059.124.074 on May 13, 2020 13:11:02 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). SOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS EXCHANGE 603 make sense of the results without something ment people, and, like them, they are prone much like it. In different degrees for differ- to change their opinions, in this case, more ent subjects, depending on their initial posi- toward the paid participant. The subjects tions, these rewards are in competition with in the other two cells, who have medium one another: they are alternatives. They are profits, display medium propensities to not absolutely scarce goods, but some per- change. sons cannot get both at once. If we define profit as rewardless cost, and Since the rewards are alternatives, let me if cost is value foregone, I suggest that we introduce a familiar assumption from eco- have here some evidence for the proposition nomics-that the cost of a particular course that change in behavioris greatest when per- of action is the equivalent of the foregone ceived profit is least. This constitutes no di- value of an alternative'5-and then add the rect demonstrationthat change in behavior definition: Profit = Reward - Cost. is least when profit is greatest, but if, when- Now consider the persons in the corre- ever a man's behaviorbrought him a balance sponding cells of the two tables. The be- of reward and cost, he changed his behavior havior of the high-attraction, agreement away from what got him, under the circum- people gets them much in the way of accept- stances, the less profit, there might well come ance by the group, and for it they must give a time when his behavior would not change up little in the way of personal integrity, for further. That is, his behavior would be sta- their views are from the start in accord with bilized, at least for the time being. And, so those of the group. Their profit is high, and far as this were true for every member of they are not prone to change their behav- a group, the group would have a social or- ior. The low-attraction,strong-disagreement ganization in equilibrium. people are getting much in integrity, and I do not say that a member would stabil- they are not giving up for it much in valu- ize his behavior at the point of greatest con- able acceptance, for they are members of ceivable profit to himself, because his profit low-attraction groups. Reward less cost is is partly at the mercy of the behavior of high for them, too, and they change little. others. It is a commonplace that the short- The high-attraction, strong-disagreement run pursuit of profit by several persons often people are getting much in the way of in- lands them in positions where all are worse tegrity, but their costs in doing so are high, off than they might conceivably be. I do not too, for they are in high-attraction groups say that the paths of behavioral change in and thus foregoing much valuable accept- which a memberpursues his profit under the ance by the group. Their profit is low, and condition that others are pursuing theirs too they are very apt to change, either toward are easy to describe or predict; and we can the group or toward the paid participant, readily conceive that in jockeying for posi- from whom they think, perhaps, they will get tion they might never arrive at any equi- some acceptance while maintaining some in- librium at all. tegrity. The low-attraction, mild-disagree- ment people do not get much in the way of DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE integrity, for they are only in mild disagree- Yet practical equilibrium is often ob- ment with the group, but neither are they served, and thus some furthercondition may giving up much in acceptance, for they are make its attainment, under some circum- membersof low-attraction groups. Their re- stance, more probable than would the indi- wards are low; their costs are low too, and vidual pursuit of profit left to itself. I can their profit-the differencebetween the two offer evidence for this further condition -is also low. In their low profit they re- only in the behavior of subgroups and not semble the high-attraction, strong-disagree- in that of individuals. Suppose that there 1"G. J. Stigler, The Theory of Price (rev. ed.; are two subgroups, working close together New York: Macmillan Co., 1952), p. 99. in a factory, the job of one being somewhat

This content downloaded from 154.059.124.074 on May 13, 2020 13:11:02 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 604 THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY differentfrom that of the other. And suppose be higher too. This last is the theory of no- that the members of the first complain and blesse oblige, which we all subscribe to, say: "We are getting the same pay as they though we all laugh at it, perhaps because are. We ought to get just a couple of dol- the noblesse often fails to oblige. To put the lars a week more to show that our work is matter in terms of profit: though the re- more responsible." When you ask them wards and costs of two persons or the mem- what they mean by "more responsible," bers of two groups may be different,yet the they say that, if they do their work wrong, profits of the two-the excess of rewardover more damage can result, and so they are cost-should tend to equality. And more under more pressure to take care.16 Some- than "should." The less-advantaged group thing like this is a common feature of indus- will at least try to attain greaterequality, as, trial behavior. It is at the heart of disputes in the example I have used, the first group not over absolute wages but over wage dif- tried to increase its profit by increasing its ferentials-indeed, at the heart of disputes pay. over rewards other than wages. I have talked of distributive justice. In what kind of propostion may we ex- Clearly, this is not the only condition deter- press observations like these? We may say mining the actual distribution of rewards that wages and responsibility give status in and costs. At the same time, never tell me the group, in the sense that a man who takes that notions of justice are not a strong in- high responsibility and gets high wages is fluence on behavior, though we sociologists admired, other things equal. Then, if the often neglect them. Distributive justice members of one group score higher on re- may be one of the conditions of group sponsibility than do the membersof another, equilibrium. there is a felt need on the part of the first to score higher on pay too. There is a pres- EXCHANGE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE sure, which shows itself in complaints, to I shall end by reviewing almost the only bring the status factors, as I have called study I am aware of that begins to show in them, into line with one another. If they are detail how a stable and differentiatedsocial in line, a condition of status congruence is structure in a real-life group might arise out said to exist. In this condition the workers of a process of exchange between members. may find their jobs dull or irksome,but they This is Peter Blau's description of the be- will not complain about the relative position havior of sixteen agents in a federal law- of groups. enforcement agency.17 But there may be a more illuminatingway The agents had the duty of investigating of looking at the matter. In my example I firms and preparing reports on the firms' have consideredonly responsibilityand pay, compliance with the law. Since the reports but these may be enough, for they represent might lead to legal action against the firms, the two kinds of thing that come into the the agents had to prepare them carefully, in problem. Pay is clearly a reward; responsi- the proper form, and take strict account of bility may be looked on, less clearly, as a the many regulations that might apply. The cost. It means constraint and worry-or agents were often in doubt what they should peace of mind foregone. Then the proposi- do, and then they were supposed to take the tion about status congruence becomes this: question to their supervisor.This they were If the costs of the membersof one group are reluctant to do, for they naturally believed higher than those of another, distributive that thus confessing to him their inability justice requiresthat their rewardsshould be to solve a problem would reflect on their higher too. But the thing works both ways: competence, affect the official ratings he If the rewards are higher. the costs should 17 Peter M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy 16 G. C. Homans, "Status among Clerical Work- (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 99- ers," Human Organization, XII (1953), 5-10. 116.

This content downloaded from 154.059.124.074 on May 13, 2020 13:11:02 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). SOCIALBEHAVIOR AS EXCHANGE 605 made of their work, and so hurt their chances of that advice, the cost lying precisely in the for promotion. So agents often asked other foregone value of time to do his own work. agents for help and advice, and, though this Blau suggests that something of the same was nominally forbidden, the supervisor sort was true of an agent who went to a usually let it pass. more competent colleague for advice: the Blau ascertained the ratings the supervi- more often he went, the more costly to him, sor made of the agents, and he also asked in feelings of inferiority, became any further the agents to rate one another. The two request. "The repeated admission of his in- opinions agreed closely. Fewer agents were ability to solve his own problems ... under- regarded as highly competent than were mined the self-confidenceof the worker and regarded as of middle or low competence; his standing in the group."20 competence, or the ability to solve technical The result was that the less competent problems, was a fairly scarce good. One or agents went to the more competent ones for two of the more competent agents would not help less often than they might have done if give help and advice when asked, and so the costs of repeated admissions of inferi- received few interactions and little liking. ority had been less high and that, while A man that will not exchange, that will not many agents sought out the few highly com- give you what he has when you need it, will petent ones, no single agent sought out the not get from you the only thing you are, in latter much. Had they done so (to look at this case, able to give him in return, your the exchange from the other side), the costs regard. to the highly competent in interruptions to But most of the more competent agents their own work would have become exorbi- were willing to give help, and of them Blau tant. Yet the need of the less competent for says: help was still not fully satisfied. Under these circumstances they tended to turn for help A consultationcan be consideredan exchange of values: both participantsgain something, to agents more nearly like themselves in and both have to pay a price. The questioning competence. Though the help they got was agent is enabled to perform better than he not the most valuable, it was of a kind they couldotherwise have done,without exposing his could themselves return on occasion. With difficultiesto his supervisor.By asking for such agents they could exchange help and advice, he implicitly pays his respect to the liking, without the exchange becoming on superior proficiency of his colleague. This either side too great a confession of inferi- acknowledgmentof inferiorityis the cost of ority. receivingassistance. The consultantgains pres- The highly competent agents tended to tige, in returnfor whichhe is willingto devote enter into exchanges,that is, to interact with some time to the consultationand permitit to disrupthis own work.The followingremark of many others. But, in the more equal ex- an agent illustratesthis: "I like giving advice. changes I have just spoken of, less compe- It's flattering,I suppose,if you feel that others tent agents tended to pair off as partners. cometo you for advice.'8 That is, they interacted with a smaller num- ber of people, but interacted often with these Blau goes on to say: "All agents liked few. I think I could show why pair relations being consulted, but the value of any one of in these more equal exchangeswould be more very many consultationsbecame deflated for economical for an agent than a wider dis- experts, and the price they paid in frequent tribution of favors. But perhaps I have gone interruptions became inflated."19This im- far enough. The final pattern of this social plies that, the more prestige an agent re- structure was one in which a small number ceived, the less was the increment of value of highly competent agents exchanged ad- of that prestige; the more advice an agent vice for prestige with a large number of gave, the greater was the increment of cost others less competent and in which the less `8 ]bid., p. 108. l Ibid., p. 108. 20 Ibid., p. 109.

This content downloaded from 154.059.124.074 on May 13, 2020 13:11:02 PM All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c). 606 THE AMERICAN JOURNALOF SOCIOLOGY competent agents exchanged, in pairs and to others try to get much from them, and in trios, both help and liking on more nearly persons that get much from others are under equal terms. pressure to give much to them. This process Blau shows, then, that a social structure of influence tends to work out at equilibrium in equilibriummight be the result of a proc- to a balance in the exchanges. For a person ess of exchanging behavior rewarding and engaged in exchange, what he gives may be costly in different degrees, in which the in- a cost to him, just as what he gets may be a crement of reward and cost varied with the reward, and his behavior changes less as frequency of the behavior, that is, with the profit, that is, reward less cost, tends to a frequency of interaction. Note that the be- maximum. Not only does he seek a maxi- havior of the agents seems also to have satis- mum for himself, but he tries to see to it fied my second condition of equilibrium: the that no one in his group makes more profit more competent agents took more responsi- than he does. The cost and the value of what bility for the work, either their own or he gives and of what he gets vary with the others', than did the less competent ones, quantity of what he gives and gets. It is sur- but they also got more for it in the way of prising how familiar these propositions are; prestige. I suspect that the same kind of it is surprising, too, how propositions about explanation could be given for the structure the dynamics of exchange can begin to gen- of many "informal"groups. erate the static thing we call "group struc- ture" and, in so doing, generate also some of SUMMARY the propositions about group structure that The current of theory in small-group students of real-life groups have stated. job In we research is to make the connection between our unguardedmoments sociologists find words like "reward"and "cost" slipping experimental and real-life studies, to con- into what we say. Human nature will break that empirically solidate the propositions in upon even our most elaborate theories. hold good in the two fields, and to show how But we seldom let it have its way with us these propositions might be derived from a and follow up systematically what these still more general set. One way of doing this words imply.2' Of all our many "approach- job would be to revive and make more rigor- es" to social behavior, the one that sees it ous the oldest of theories of social behavior as an economy is the most neglected, and -social behavior as exchange. yet it is the one we use every moment of our Some of the statements of such a theory lives-except when we write sociology. might be the following. Social behavior is an HARVARD TUNIVERSITY exchange of goods, material goods but also 'The White-CollarJob (Ann Arbor: Survey non-material ones, such as the symbols of Research Center, University of Michigan, 1953), approvalor prestige. Persons that give much pp. 115-27.

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