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Game Theory and Management GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT FACULTY OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS & CONTROL PROCESSES St. Petersburg University THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF DYNAMIC GAMES (Russian Chapter) GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT The Fourth International Conference Game Theory and Management GTM2010 June 28-30, 2010, St. Petersburg, Russia ABSTRACTS Edited by Leon A. Petrosyan and Nikolay A. Zenkevich Graduate School of Management St. Petersburg University St. Petersburg 2010 УДК 518.9, 517.9, 681.3.07 GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT. Collected abstracts of papers presented on the Fourth International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan, Nikolay A. Zenkevich. – SPb.: Graduate School of Management SPbU, 2010. – 264 p. The collection contains abstracts of papers accepted for the International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 28–30, 2010, St. Petersburg University, Russia). The presented abstracts belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The abstract volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments. Computer design: Anna V. Iljina, Andrew V. Zyatchin © Copyright of the authors only, 2010 ТЕОРИЯ ИГР И МЕНЕДЖМЕНТ. Сб. тезисов 4-й международной конференции по теории игр и менеджменту / Под ред. Л. А Петросяна, Н. А. Зенкевича. – СПб.: Высшая школа менеджмента СПбГУ, 2010. – 264 с. Сборник содержит тезисы докладов участников 4-й международной конференции по теории игр и менеджменту (28–30 июня 2010 года, Высшая школа менеджмента, Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, Россия). Представленные тезисы относятся к теории игр и её приложениям в менеджменте. Тезисы представляют интерес для научных работников, аспирантов и студентов старших курсов университетов, специализирующихся по менеджменту, экономике и прикладной математике. Компьютерная верстка: А.В. Ильина, А.В. Зятчин © Коллектив авторов, 2010 CONTENTS WELCOME ADDRESS ................................................................................................. 9 WELCOME................................................................................................................... 10 Graph Searching Games with a Radius of Capture................................................... 12 Tatiana Abramovskaya and Nikolai Petrov Dynamics and Stability of Constitutions, Coalitions, and Clubs ............................. 14 Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin The Incompatibility Banzhaf Value ............................................................................ 15 José Alonso-Meijide, Mikel Álvarez-Mozos and Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro Finitely Repeated Bilateral Trade with Renegotiation .............................................. 18 Georgy Artemov, Sergei Guriev and Dmitriy Kvasov Bidder-Optimal Signal Structure in a First-Price Auction ....................................... 20 Helmuts Azacis and Peter Vida Purified Folk Theorem with Heterogeneous Time Preferences............................... 21 Romeo Balanquit On Existence and Uniqueness of Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Economies of Partial Commitment with Capital and Labor ........................................................... 23 Lukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffet and Łukasz Woźny Clearing Supply and Demand under Bilateral Constraints ...................................... 27 Olivier Bochet, Rahmi Ilkilic and Herve Moulin Product Diversity under Monopolistic Competition.................................................. 28 Igor A. Bykadorov Manufacturer-Retailer-Consumer Relationship in the Differential Games Framework .................................................................................................................... 31 Igor A. Bykadorov, Andrea Ellero and Elena Moretti Bargaining One-dimensional Policies and the Efficiency of Super Majority Rules............................................................................................................................... 33 Daniel Cardona and Clara Ponsati Dividing and Discarding: A Procedure for Taking Decisions with Non-Transferable Utility...................................................................................... 34 Vinicius Carrasco and William Fuchs Extension of a Game Problem in the Class of Finitely Additive Measures.............. 35 Alexander G. Chentsov and Julia V. Shapar NE-Strong Cooperative Solutions in Differential Games.......................................... 39 Sergey Chistyakov and Leon Petrosyan Multipath Multiuser Scheduling Game for Elastic Traffic....................................... 41 Julia Chuyko, Tatiana Polishchuk, Vladimir Mazalov and Andrei Gurtov Simultaneous Quantity and Price - Choice in a Sequential Movement Game (SQAP) ........................................................................................................................... 44 Daniel Cracau Group Bargaining with Incomplete Information....................................................... 46 Ekaterina Demidova and Pierfrancesco La Mura Decomposition of Distributions over the Two-dimensional Integer Lattice and Multistage Bidding with Two Risky Assets ........................................................ 50 Victor Domansky and Victoria Kreps Ordinally Equivalent Power Indices ........................................................................... 53 Josep Freixas and Montserrat Pons Resale in Auctions with Financial Constraints........................................................... 54 Maria Angeles De Frutos and Maria Paz Espinosa Meeting up on a Network............................................................................................. 57 Edoardo Gallo A Very Stable Cooperative Solution for n-Person Games........................................ 58 Gianfranco Gambarelli Numerical Study of a Linear Differential Game with Two Pursuers and One Evader ............................................................................................................ 60 Sergey Ganebny, Sergey Kumkov, Valery Patsko and Stephane Le Menec The Dynamic Procedure of Information Flow Network............................................ 62 Hongwei GAO, Yeming DAI, Wenwen LI, Lin SONG and Tingting LV Models of Network Formation Game Control ........................................................... 64 Mikhail V. Goubko A Game Theoretical Study of the Wheat Market in South Italy ............................. 68 Luca Grilli and Angelo Sfrecola Cash Flow Optimization in ATMs Network Model ................................................... 69 Elena Gubar, Maria Zubareva and Julia Merzljakova On Managing Depositary Bank Risk-based Reserve................................................. 71 Anton Gurevich A Piecewise Deterministic Game Model for International GHG Emission Agreements.................................................................................................................... 72 Alain Haurie Signaling Managerial Objectives to Elicit Volunteer Effort ..................................... 73 Gert Huybrechts, Jurgen Willems, Marc Jegers, Jemima Bidee, Tim Vantilborgh and Roland Pepermans Algorithmic Bounded Rationality, Optimality and Noise ......................................... 76 Christos Ioannou and Ioannis Nompelis Solution of the Hotelling Poblem of Spatial Competition in Secure Strategies ...... 79 Mikhail Iskakov and Alexey Iskakov n-Person Stochastic Games of ''The Showcase Showdown'' ...............................82 Anna Ivashko and Evgeny E. Ivashko Optimal Strategies in the Best-choice Problem with Disorder................................. 84 Evgeny E. Ivashko The Shapley Value for Games with Restricted Cooperation .................................... 86 Ilya Katsev The Restricted Prenucleolus ........................................................................................ 90 Ilya Katsev and Elena Yanovskaya Values for Cycle-free Directed Graph Games............................................................ 94 Anna Khmelnitskaya and Dolf Talman Analysis of a Two-Person Positional Nonzero-Sum Differential Game with Integral Payoffs..................................................................................................... 95 Anatolii F. Kleimenov Graph Structures and Algorithms in Multidimensional Screening......................... 97 Sergey Kokovin, Babu Nahata, and Evgeny Zhelobodko Stochastic Cooperative Games as an Instrument for Modeling of Relations of Public Private Partnership....................................................................................... 99 Pavel Konyukhovsky and Margarita Solovyeva Virtual Implementation of Social Choice Function of Linear Aggregation.......... 102 Nikolay A. Korgin Differential Game of Advertising Management: Fashion Market......................... 105 Anastasia Koroleva and Nikolay Zenkevich Market Equilibrium in Negotiations and Growth Models ...................................... 107 Arkady Kryazhimskiy Tax Auditing Models With The Application of Theory of Search......................... 108 Suriya Kumacheva Automatization of Processing Input Data in Computational Programs ............... 111 Sergeу S. Kumkov and Denis Yu. Sannikov Quality-Price Model with Vertical Differentiation: the Effect of Cooperation.... 113 Denis V. Kuzyutin and Elina Zhukova Testing and Statistical Games.................................................................................... 115 Mikhail Lutsenko The Generalized Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution for the Multicriteria Problems ... 119 Andrey N. Lyapunov Game Theoretical Model
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