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Exogamic Or Endogamic ST. PETERSBURG UNIVERSITY THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF DYNAMIC GAMES (Russian Chapter) GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT The Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management GTM2013 June 26-28, 2013, St. Petersburg, Russia ABSTRACTS Edited by Leon A. Petrosyan and Nikolay A. Zenkevich St. Petersburg University St. Petersburg 2013 УДК 518.9, 517.9, 681.3.07 GAME THEORY AND MANAGEMENT. Collected abstracts of papers presented on the Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management / Editors Leon A. Petrosyan and Nikolay A. Zenkevich. – SPb.: Graduate School of Management SPbU, 2013. – 274 p. The collection contains abstracts of papers accepted for the Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 26–28, 2013, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented abstracts belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The abstract volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments. Computer design: Tatyana Grigorova and Andrey Zyatchin © Copyright of the authors, 2013 © SPbU, 2013 ТЕОРИЯ ИГР И МЕНЕДЖМЕНТ. Сборник тезисов 7-ой международной конференции по теории игр и менеджменту / Под ред. Л.А. Петросяна и Н.А. Зенкевича. – СПб.: Высшая школа менеджмента СПбГУ, 2013. – 274 с. Сборник содержит тезисы докладов участников 7-ой международной конференции по теории игр и менеджменту (26–28 июня 2013 года, Высшая школа менеджмента, Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, Санкт- Петербург, Россия). Представленные тезисы относятся к теории игр и её приложениям в менеджменте. Тезисы представляют интерес для научных работников, аспирантов и студентов старших курсов университетов, специализирующихся по менеджменту, экономике и прикладной математике. Компьютерная верстка: Т.B. Григорова и А.В. Зятчин © Коллектив авторов, 2013 © СПбГУ, 2013 CONTENTS WELCOME ADDRESS.............................................................................................................. 9 WELCOME .................................................................................................................................10 One Guaranteed Search Problem on Trees.........................................................................12 Tatiana Abramovskaya Dynamic Stability of Strategic Alliances ..............................................................................14 Georgii Aleksandrov and Nikolay Zenkevich The Spec trum Value for Coalitional Games .......................................................................15 Mikel Álvarez-Mozos, Ziv Hellman and Eyal Winter Universal Nash Equilibrium for n-player Differential Games......................................18 Yurii Averboukh Pursuit-Evasion Game on the 1-skeleton of Regular Pol yhe dr ons ..............................21 Abdulla Azamov, Atamurat Kuchkarov and Azamat Holboyev On Gaming Situations that Simulate Partici pation in the Competition for a J ob....21 Abdulla Azamov and Abduhakim Mamanazarov Coordinating a Three-echelon Supply Chain with Uncertain Demand and Random Yield in Production ............................................28 Sudarshan Bardhan and Bibhas Chandra Giri Codes of Conduct and Bad Reputation ................................................................................30 Juan Block Intergenerational Solidarity within a Closing Pension Fund .........................................34 Tim Boonen, Anja De Waegenaere and Henk Norde Investments in R&D under Trade Liberalization: Monopolistic Competition Model ...........................................................................................37 Igor Bykadorov, Sergey Kokovin and Evgeny Zhelobodko Rewarding Idleness ....................................................................................................................41 Andrea Canidio and Thomas Gall A Coopetitive Game Theory Approach to Asymmetric R&D Alliances ....................46 David Carfì and Fabrizio Lanzafame The Effecti veness of Altruistic Lobbying: a Model Study ...............................................50 Pavel Chebotarev, Zoya Lezina, Anton Loginov and Yana Tsodikova A Weighted Deegan-Packel Social Capital Index ..............................................................54 Michela Chessa and Anna Khmelnitskaya Centr al Asian Gas in Eur asian Power Game ......................................................................56 Onur Cobanli Power in Game Theory .............................................................................................................59 Rodolfo Coelho Prates Dynamic Contests with Bankruptcy ......................................................................................61 Luis Corchon Love Game - Two S i de d Ma tchi ng .........................................................................................62 Suresh Deman Decompositions of Bbivariate Distributions, Areas of Random Triangles, and Bidding Games .............................................................64 Victor Domansky and Victoria Kreps A Matrix Approach to an Efficient Myerson Value on Union Stable Structures ....68 Hua Dong, Hao Sun, Genjiu Xu The Inverse Problem for Binomial Semivalues of Cooperative TU games................72 Irinel Dragan Consistency and the Core of Multi-Sided Assignment Markets ...................................73 Francesc Llerena, Marina Nunez and Carles Rafels Service Quality Level Choice on Oligopoly Competition ................................................76 Margarita Gladkova, Nikolay Zenkevich and Maria Kazantseva A Problem of Purpose Resource Use in the Two-Level Control Systems ...................78 Olga Gorbaneva and Gennady Ougolnitsky Multicriteria Coalitional Model of Decision-making over the Set of Projects with Constant Matrix of Payoffs in the Noncooperati ve Game ..............81 Xeniya Grigorieva and Pauline Shaikina Opti mal Contr ol of S IR Epi de mic Model wi th Virus Mutati ons .................................82 Elena Gubar and Quanyan Zhu Interaction Between Social Groups in Extended SIR Model..........................................85 Elena Gubar and Ekaterina Zhitkova Stochastic Bankruptcy Games ................................................................................................87 Helga Habis and P. Jean-Jacques Herings Communication and Coordination in Social Networks: Action as Communication Device. .........................................................................................89 Jia-Ping Huang, Maurice Koster and Ines Lindner Equilibrium in Secure Strategies in the Bertrand-Edge wor th Duopol y Model ........92 Mikhail Iskakov and Alexey Iskakov Resource Monotonic Allocations and the Core in Joint Investment Problems .........95 Josep Izquierdo and Carlos Rafels Comparison of the χ -value and the Shapley-value from an Economic Point of View with Respect to Fair Distribution of Collectively Earned Profits.......97 Susanne Jene and Stephan Zelewski Extensi ve Parti al Cooperati ve Game with Multi-Coalition Structure.........................99 Ji Zhihong, Gao Hongwei and Hu Jinsong Bargaining in Cooperative Games ...................................................................................... 100 Dominik Karos The Axiomatization of the Prenucleolus for Some Classes of Veto-Balanced Games........................................................................................................ 102 Ilya Katsev, Rene van Den Brink and Gerard van der Laan Overconfidence, Imperfect Competition, and Evolution .............................................. 103 Karen Khachatryan The Average Covering Tree Value for Directed Graph Games ................................ 104 Anna Khmelnitskaya, Ozer Selcuk and Dolf Talman The Shapley Value for TU Games with Oriented Graph Cooperation Structures...... 106 Anna Khmelnitskaya, Ozer Selcuk and Dolf Talman Two-Factor Model of Monopolistic Competi tion and Market Integration ............ 108 Sergey Kichko, Sergey Kokovin and Evgeny Zhelobodko Informed Middleman and Asymme tric Infor mati on..................................................... 111 Irina Kirysheva Generalized Model of “Vanishing Cities” ......................................................................... 112 Sergey Kokovin, Maxim Gorynov and Evgeny Zhelobodko The Relationship Between Discrete and Continuous Equilibria in Barg aining Model .............................................................................................................. 115 Aleksei Kondratev Application of Stochastic Cooperative Games in the Analysis of the Interaction of Economic Agents............................................................................... 117 Pavel Konyukhovskiy and Alexandra Malova Experiment with Efficient Groves-Ledyard Mechanism for Resource Allocation ...... 120 Galina Boldyreva, Nikolay Korgin and Vsevolod Korepanov Time Consistency of Strategic Alliances: Case Study Approach ............................... 122 Anastasia Koroleva Design and Implementation of Optimal Natural Resource Manage ment Sys te ms ............................................................................................................. 123 Serkan Kucuksenel Switching Lines for Optimal Feedback Control in Game of Two Pursuers against One Evader................................................................................. 125 Sergey Kumkov and Valerii Patsko An Axiomatization of the Nucleolus of Assignment Games ......................................... 128 Francesc Llerena, Marina Nunez and
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