DOCSLIB.ORG

Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation: a Bibliographic Essay

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation: a Bibliographic Essay WALTER N. GREGORY SKEPTICISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND EXPLANATION: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY This is a selective bibliography in which references are classified by topics. The topics are listed roughly in the order in which they are taken up in the text. SKEPTICISM Positions of Skepticism: A Historical Survey Ontological Skepticism. Since the distinction between ontological and epistemological skepticism is generally conflated in the literature it is often difficult to isolate those authors who are genuine ontological skep­ tics. Probably the first serious ontological skeptic and nihilist was the sophist Gorgias who argued in his treatise 'On That Which Is Not, or On Nature', that nothing exists. There have been a number of ontological skeptics and nihilists regarding God's existence including Bertrand Rus­ sell in Sceptical Essays (New York: W.W. Norton, 1928) and Why I Am Not a Christian (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957) and Albert Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus (New York: Random House, 1955). Although perhaps no one was ever a genuine ontological skeptic concerning the existence of other minds, a true solipsist, arguments for solipsism can be found in Johann Fichte, The Vocation of Man (Indianapolis: Bobbs­ Merrill, 1956), chs. 5 and 6; and Russell, Human Knowledge (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), pt. 3, ch. 2. The most famous ontological skeptic regarding the existence of a nonmental external world is undoubt­ edly Bishop George Berkeley in Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Phi/onous and A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Other famous idealists include Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind; and F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London: Oxford University Press, 1930). Several versions of phenomenalism are discussed in detail in Cornman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Un­ iversity Press, 1975), which contains numerous bibliographic references­ see especially the appendix. 315 316 BIBLIOGRAPHY Epistemological Skepticism. Beginning with Socrates' assessment of his own wisdom as not thinking "that I know what I do not know", found in Plato, Apologia 21d, there have been a great many outright epis­ temological skeptics and philosophers who have advanced epistemological skeptical arguments. The most famous, and last, Pyrrhonian was Sextus Empiricus whose principle works were Pyrrhoniarum Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos. Translations of these works are contained in Sextus Empiricus (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933). Erasmus appeared as a religious skeptic in a controversy with Luther in the sixteenth century. His views are expressed in In Praise of Folly and De Libero Arbitrio. Montaigne, in Apologie de Raymond Sebond, was another religious skeptic who argued that human powers alone were incapable of achieving true knowledge which could only be attained through faith. A major skeptic who greatly influenced Hume was Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique. Secondary sources on skepticism in ancient philosophy include E.R. Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1913); Norman Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics, from Pyrrho to Sextus (London: Macmillan, 1869); and Eduard Zeller (Oswald J. Reichel, trans.), The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962). David Hume as Skeptic. Hume's skeptical views are contained in David Hume (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.), A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1888); An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding . (Oxford: Clarendon, 1894), and David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947). Principal commen­ taries on these works include A.G.N. Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); T.H. Green, General Introduction to Hume's Treatise (London: Oxford University Press, 1874); N. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941); J.A. Passmore, Hume's Intentions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); and David C. Stove, Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973). Articles devoted to Hume's skepticism are legion but the following con­ stitute some of more recent: W.L. Robison, 'Hume's Scepticism', Dialogue 12 (1973),87-99; J.O. Nelson, 'Two Main Questions Concerning Hume's "Treatise" and "Enquiry" " Philosophical Review 81 (1972), 333-360; J. Kekes, 'Beliefs and Scepticism', Philosophical Forum 1 (1969), 353-358; J.E. Adler, 'Stove on Hume's Inductive Scepticism', Australasian Journal BIBLIOGRAPHY 317 of Philosophy 53 (1975), 167-170; and T.L. Beauchamp and T.A. Mappes, 'Is Hume Really a Sceptic About Induction', American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975), 119-129. For an extensive treatment of skepticism in the modern period of the history of philosophy including Hume, see the following works by Richard H. Popkin: 'David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyr­ rhonism', Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1950-1951), 385-407; 'Berkeley and Pyrrhonism', Review of Metaphysics 5 (1951-1952), 223-246; 'David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy', Review of Metaphysics 6 (1952- 1953), 65-81; 'The Sceptical Crisis and the Rise of Modern Philosophy', Review of Metaphysics 7 (1953-1954), 132-151, 307-322, 499-510; 'The Skeptical Precursors of David Hume', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (1955), 61-71; The History of Scepticism From Erasmus to Descartes (New York: Humanities Press, 1964); and 'The High Road to Pyrrhonism', American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965), 1-15. Contemporary Works on Skepticism Skeptics. One of the growing list of philosophers who has seriously at­ tempted to defend skepticism in the twentieth century is Peter Unger. His book Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975) con­ tains revised versions of the following papers; 'A Defense of Skepticism', Philosophical Review 80 (1971), 198-219; 'An Argument for Skepticism', Philosophical Exchange 1 (1974), 131-155; 'Propositional Verbs and Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972), 301-312; 'The Wages of Scepticism', American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973), 177-187; 'Two Types of Scepticism', Philosophical Studies 25 (1974), 77-98; and'Truth', in M.K. Munitz and P. Unger (eds.), Semantics and Philosophy (New York: New York University Press, 1974). Various responses to Unger's position are listed in the next section. Another serious argument for epistemological skepticism is in K. Lehrer, 'Why Not Skepticism', The Philosophical Forum 23 (1971), 283- 298. See also, Lehrer, 'Skepticism and Conceptual Change' in R. Chis­ holm and R.J. Swartz (eds.), Empirical Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973). See also I.T. Oakley, 'An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justified Beliefs', American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976), 221-228. Critics of Skepticism. G.E. Moore vigorously attacked skepticism after the turn of the century. His anti skeptical papers are included in these 318 BIBLIOGRAPHY collections of his essays: Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), and Philosophical Papers (New York: Humanities Press, 1959). Moore's position was strongly criticized by Wittgenstein although he remained a staunch antiskeptic himself. Most of Wittgen­ stein's criticisms are collected in G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.) (D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans.), On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). The following are relatively recent articles which are generally critical towards skepticism: P. Olscamp, 'Wittgenstein's Re­ futation of Skepticism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1965-1966), 239-247; J. Wolfe, 'Dreaming and Skepticism', Mind 80 (1971), 605-606; J. Agassi, 'The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepti­ cism', Philosophical Studies 22 (1971), 49-50; J. Kekes, 'Skepticism and External Questions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1971), 325-340; R.L. PurtiIl, 'Some Varieties of Epistemological Skepticism', Philosophia 1 (1971), 107-116; R.L. Purtill, 'Epistemological Skepticism Again', Philosophical Forum 3 (1972), 138-144; T. Clarke, 'The Legacy of Skepticism', Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972), 745-769; G.W. Barnes, 'Unger's Defense of Skepticism', Philosophical Studies 24 (1973), 119-124; K. Nielson, 'On Refusing to Play the Skeptic's Game', Dialogue 11 (1972), 348-359; C.E. Marks, 'Verificationism, Scepticism, and the Private Lan­ guage Argument', Philosophical Studies 28 (1975), 151-171; R. Almeder, 'Defeasibility and Scepticism', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1973),238-244; J. Door, 'Scepticism and Dogmatism', Inquiry 16 (1973), 214-220; and J. Margolis, 'Skepticism, Foundationalism, and Pragma­ tism', American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977), 119-128. FOUNDATIONAL THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION Traditional Foundationalism Descartes' Foundationalism. The classical English translation (1911) of Descartes' works is E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes (New York: Dover, 1955). A more recent translation is G.E.M. Anscombe and P.T. Geach (eds. and trans.), Descartes: Phil­ osophical Writings (London: Nelson, 1954). Descartes' principal writings concerning foundationalism are Meditations on First Philosophy, Dis­ course on Method, and Principles of Philosophy. Contemporary sources on Descartes' foundational theory of knowledge include: H.G. Frankfurt, 'Descartes' Validation of Reason', American BIBLIOGRAPHY 319 Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965), 149-160; A.K. Stout, 'The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes', Mind 38 (1929),
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Beyond Skepticism Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: the Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory Robert Justin Lipkin
    Cornell Law Review Volume 75 Article 2 Issue 4 May 1990 Beyond Skepticism Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory Robert Justin Lipkin Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert Justin Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory , 75 Cornell L. Rev. 810 (1990) Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol75/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. BEYOND SKEPTICISM, FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE NEW FUZZINESS: THE ROLE OF WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM IN LEGAL THEORY Robert Justin Liphint TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION .............................................. 812 I. FOUNDATIONALISM AND SKEPTICISM ..................... 816 A. The Problem of Skepticism ........................ 816 B. Skepticism and Nihilism ........................... 819 1. Theoretical and PracticalSkepticism ................ 820 2. Subjectivism and Relativism ....................... 821 3. Epistemic and Conceptual Skepticism ................ 821 4. Radical Skepticism ............................... 822 C. Modified Skepticism ............................... 824 II. NEW FOUNDATIONALISM
    [Show full text]
  • Curriculum Vitae
    BAS C. VAN FRAASSEN Curriculum Vitae Last updated 3/6/2019 I. Personal and Academic History .................................................................................................................... 1 List of Degrees Earned ........................................................................................................................................................ 1 Title of Ph.D. Thesis ........................................................................................................................................................... 1 Positions held ..................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Invited lectures and lecture series ........................................................................................................................................ 1 List of Honors, Prizes ......................................................................................................................................................... 4 Research Grants .................................................................................................................................................................. 4 Non-Academic Publications ................................................................................................................................................ 5 II. Professional Activities .................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophical Analysis on the Nature and Forms of Information—From the Perspective of Marxist Philosophy †
    Proceedings Philosophical Analysis on the Nature and Forms of Information—From the Perspective of Marxist Philosophy † Mingfang Feng 1 and Liang Feng 2,* 1 School of Economics & Law, Shaanxi University of Technology, No.1, First Eastern Ring Road, Hanzhong 723001, China; [email protected] 2 School of Marxism Studies, Xi’an Jiaotong University, No.28 Xianning West Road, Xi’an 710049, China * Correspondence: [email protected] † Presented at the IS4SI 2017 Summit DIGITALISATION FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY, Gothenburg, Sweden, 12–16 June 2017. Published: 8 June 2017 Abstract: The aim of this research essay attempt to reveal the nature of information form the perspective of Marxist Philosophy. The nature of Information is the first question that philosophy of information science and technology research must be answered, thus the problem is still debated. According to Marxist dialectical materialism method to the essence of information has made the analysis and argumentation, points out the essence of information between what is and its internal contact things, and this contact information is presented. Due to the connection between the protean and endless things, thus produce the endless, full of beautiful things in eyes, each are not identical information. To grasp the nature of information, must pay attention to and the specific form of information and information processing, the reorganization, transmission, storage, use and so on. Keywords: information; nature; connection; philosophy of information 1. Introduction The development of information science and technology has spar ked the nature of information exploration after World War II. The question that ‘What is the nature of information?’ is always unable to avoid in information science and philosophical technology research.
    [Show full text]
  • The Tyranny of Method: a Pragmatic Defense of Philosophical Pluralism
    THE TYRANNY OF METHOD: A PRAGMATIC DEFENSE OF PHILOSOPHICAL PLURALISM Vincent M. Colapietro Abstract: The history of philosophy is in no small measure a series of attempts to institute a fail-safe method. In response to what they take to be the scandal of disagreement (disagreement itself being judged as scandalous), a number of historically influential philosophers (e.g., Descartes, Peirce, Husserl, and Carnap) have time and again tried to craft a method for guaranteeing agreement. In light of the failure of these attempts, this tendency might be seen as remotely analogous to what is called in psychoanalytic parlance a “repetition compulsion.” In any event, historical reflections on this repeated tendency promise to be illuminating. But there is a polemical purpose animating these historical reflections. The author tries, in light of these reflections, to render plausible the suggestion that this tendency amounts to a tyranny of method and, in turn, such tyranny results in an inevitable impoverishment of philosophical thought. THE TOPIC of my essay is best brought into focus by recalling a central figure in the history of Western philosophy. 1 This recollection is, however, far from methodologically innocent. My deliberate turn toward a pivotal moment in our intellectual history – in brief, my turn toward history – will provide the basis for my critique of what I am disposed to identify as the tyranny of method. This tyranny is not so much exercised by any particular method as by the repeated impulse to institute a philosophical method of allegedly revolutionary significance. Most often, this impulse is bound up with the hope that philosophy can transform itself into a science (an unquestionable form of certain knowledge) either by adopting the method of science itself (e.g., the efforts of C.
    [Show full text]
  • Defense of Reductionism About Testimonial Justification of Beliefs
    Page 1 Forthcoming in Noûs A Defense of Reductionism about Testimonial Justification of Beliefs TOMOJI SHOGENJI Rhode Island College Abstract This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the effect that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presumption of people’s truthfulness we cannot interpret their utterances as testimony with propositional contents. This paper contends that the epistemic subject can interpret utterances as testimony with propositional contents without presupposing the credibility of testimony, and that evidence available to the normal epistemic subject can justify her trust in testimony. I. Introduction There has recently been a considerable interest in anti-reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs, according to which we cannot justify our trust in testimony by perceptual and memorial evidence.1 The reason for the interest is not the enticement of skepticism. Recent anti-reductionists hold that we are prima facie justified in trusting testimony simply because it is testimony. This means that there is a presumption in favor of testimony that it is credible unless contrary evidence is available. I will use the term “anti-reductionism” to refer to this non-skeptical version of anti-reductionism about testimonial justification. The more traditional position is reductionism, of which the most prominent advocate is David Hume.
    [Show full text]
  • Plato's Symposium: the Ethics of Desire
    Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire FRISBEE C. C. SHEFFIELD 1 Contents Introduction 1 1. Ero¯s and the Good Life 8 2. Socrates’ Speech: The Nature of Ero¯s 40 3. Socrates’ Speech: The Aim of Ero¯s 75 4. Socrates’ Speech: The Activity of Ero¯s 112 5. Socrates’ Speech: Concern for Others? 154 6. ‘Nothing to do with Human AVairs?’: Alcibiades’ Response to Socrates 183 7. Shadow Lovers: The Symposiasts and Socrates 207 Conclusion 225 Appendix : Socratic Psychology or Tripartition in the Symposium? 227 References 240 Index 249 Introduction In the Symposium Plato invites us to imagine the following scene: A pair of lovers are locked in an embrace and Hephaestus stands over them with his mending tools asking: ‘What is it that you human beings really want from each other?’ The lovers are puzzled, and he asks them again: ‘Is this your heart’s desire, for the two of you to become parts of the same whole, and never to separate, day or night? If that is your desire, I’d like to weld you together and join you into something whole, so that the two of you are made into one. Look at your love and see if this is what you desire: wouldn’t this be all that you want?’ No one, apparently, would think that mere sex is the reason each lover takes such deep joy in being with the other. The soul of each lover apparently longs for something else, but cannot say what it is. The beloved holds out the promise of something beyond itself, but that something lovers are unable to name.1 Hephaestus’ question is a pressing one.
    [Show full text]
  • What Is a Philosophical Analysis?
    JEFFREY C. KING WHAT IS A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS? (Received 24 January 1996) It is common for philosophers to offer philosophical accounts or analyses, as they are sometimes called, of knowledge, autonomy, representation, (moral) goodness, reference, and even modesty.1 These philosophical analyses raise deep questions. What is it that is being analyzed (i.e. what sorts of things are the objects of analysis)? What sort of thing is the analysis itself (a proposition? sentence?)? Under what conditions is an analysis correct? How can a correct analysis be informative? How, if at all, does the production of philo- sophical analyses differ from what scientists do? The purpose of the present paper is to provide answers to these questions. The traditional answers to the ®rst and last of these questions are that concepts are the objects of philosophical analysis and that philo- sophical analyses differ from the results of scienti®c investigation in being conceptual analyses. Like many philosophers I am suspicious of the notions of concept and conceptual analysis as traditionally understood. Though the critique of these notions is beyond the scope of the present work, the answers I shall give to the questions raised above shall not invoke concepts (understood as things distinct from properties).2 I count it as a virtue of my account that it is able to provide answers to the questions raised above without an appeal to concepts. And to the extent that it has been felt that concepts are needed to answer these questions, the present account weakens the case for positing concepts. Before addressing these questions, however, we shall make the simplifying assumption that analyses are given in a ªcanonical formº.
    [Show full text]
  • Following the Argument Where It Leads
    Following The Argument Where It Leads Thomas Kelly Princeton University [email protected] Abstract: Throughout the history of western philosophy, the Socratic injunction to ‘follow the argument where it leads’ has exerted a powerful attraction. But what is it, exactly, to follow the argument where it leads? I explore this intellectual ideal and offer a modest proposal as to how we should understand it. On my proposal, following the argument where it leaves involves a kind of modalized reasonableness. I then consider the relationship between the ideal and common sense or 'Moorean' responses to revisionary philosophical theorizing. 1. Introduction Bertrand Russell devoted the thirteenth chapter of his History of Western Philosophy to the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. He concluded his discussion with a rather unflattering assessment: There is little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better: If he cannot, he need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece or of modern times (1945: 463). The extent to which this is a fair assessment of Aquinas is controversial.1 My purpose in what follows, however, is not to defend Aquinas; nor is it to substantiate the charges that Russell brings against him.
    [Show full text]
  • The Theory of Descriptions 1. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970): Mathematician, Logician, and Philosopher
    Louis deRosset { Spring 2019 Russell: The Theory of Descriptions 1. Bertrand Russell (1872-1970): mathematician, logician, and philosopher. He's one of the founders of analytic philosophy. \On Denoting" is a founding document of analytic philosophy. It is a paradigm of philosophical analysis. An analysis of a concept/phenomenon c: a recipe for eliminating c-vocabulary from our theories which still captures all of the facts the c-vocabulary targets. FOR EXAMPLE: \The Name View Analysis of Identity." 2. Russell's target: Denoting Phrases By a \denoting phrase" I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present King of France, the centre of mass of the Solar System at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution of the sun round the earth. (479) Includes: • universals: \all F 's" (\each"/\every") • existentials: \some F " (\at least one") • indefinite descriptions: \an F " • definite descriptions: \the F " Later additions: • negative existentials: \no F 's" (480) • Genitives: \my F " (\your"/\their"/\Joe's"/etc.) (484) • Empty Proper Names: \Apollo", \Hamlet", etc. (491) Russell proposes to analyze denoting phrases. 3. Why Analyze Denoting Phrases? Russell's Project: The distinction between acquaintance and knowledge about is the distinction between the things we have presentation of, and the things we only reach by means of denoting phrases. [. ] In perception we have acquaintance with the objects of perception, and in thought we have acquaintance with objects of a more abstract logical character; but we do not necessarily have acquaintance with the objects denoted by phrases composed of words with whose meanings we are ac- quainted.
    [Show full text]
  • The Problem of Induction
    The Problem of Induction Gilbert Harman Department of Philosophy, Princeton University Sanjeev R. Kulkarni Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University July 19, 2005 The Problem The problem of induction is sometimes motivated via a comparison between rules of induction and rules of deduction. Valid deductive rules are necessarily truth preserving, while inductive rules are not. So, for example, one valid deductive rule might be this: (D) From premises of the form “All F are G” and “a is F ,” the corresponding conclusion of the form “a is G” follows. The rule (D) is illustrated in the following depressing argument: (DA) All people are mortal. I am a person. So, I am mortal. The rule here is “valid” in the sense that there is no possible way in which premises satisfying the rule can be true without the corresponding conclusion also being true. A possible inductive rule might be this: (I) From premises of the form “Many many F s are known to be G,” “There are no known cases of F s that are not G,” and “a is F ,” the corresponding conclusion can be inferred of the form “a is G.” The rule (I) might be illustrated in the following “inductive argument.” (IA) Many many people are known to have been moral. There are no known cases of people who are not mortal. I am a person. So, I am mortal. 1 The rule (I) is not valid in the way that the deductive rule (D) is valid. The “premises” of the inductive inference (IA) could be true even though its “con- clusion” is not true.
    [Show full text]
  • “Forms of Philosophical Skepticism”
    “Forms of Philosophical Skepticism” James Conant Handout of Quotations, Examples, and Other Things I. Russell and the Nomads 1. Bertrand Russell’s Table Any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print…. All this seems to be so evident as to be hardly worth stating, except in answer to a man who doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this may be reasonably doubted, and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure that we have stated it in a form that is wholly true. To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the table. To the eye it is oblong, brown and shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it gives out a wooden sound…. [Then Russell proceeds to consider each of these qualities of the table.] The shape of the table is no better. … [T]he 'real' shape is not what we see; it is something inferred from what we see. And what we see is constantly changing in shape as we, move about the room; so that here again the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the appearance of the table. … Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience by sight or touch or hearing.
    [Show full text]
  • Politics and Philosophy in the Left Vienna Circle
    Intersubjective Accountability: Politics and Philosophy in the Left Vienna Circle Thomas Uebel The University of Manchester In different places Rudolf Carnap and Otto Neurath affirmed “a noteworthy agreement” and an “inner link” between their philosophy of science and political movements agitating for radical socio-economic change. Given the normative abstinence of Vienna Circle philosophy, indeed the metaethical com- mitments of its verificationism, this claim presents a major interpretive chal- lenge that is only heightened when Neurath’s engagement for the socialization of national economies is taken into account. It is argued here that Carnap’s and Neurath’s positions are saved from inconsistency once some careful distinc- tions are understood and it is recognized that they, together with the other members of the Circle, adhered to an epistemic norm here called “intersubjective accountability.” 1. Introduction The question of the political potential possessed by the philosophies of the Vienna Circle is complex for more than one reason. It is so partly due to the politically heterogeneous membership of the Circle, partly due to the dif- ficult if not extreme political circumstances under which they had to operate, and partly due to the variable meanings of the parameter “political,” some of which are and some of which are not compatible with, in turn, variable ver- sions of the doctrine of the value-neutrality of science. For instance, philos- ophies of science may steadfastly be standing guard against pseudo-scientific nonsense being paraded as worthy of credence in public discourse, this con- cern for intellectual hygene becoming “political” depending on who spouts An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop “Positivismus als gesellschaftliches und politsches Projekt” convened by Eric Hilgendorf at the University of Münster in January 2017 and I thank the participants for discussions.
    [Show full text]