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WALTER N. GREGORY

SKEPTICISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND : A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

This is a selective bibliography in which references are classified by topics. The topics are listed roughly in the order in which they are taken up in the text.

SKEPTICISM

Positions of Skepticism: A Historical Survey Ontological Skepticism. Since the distinction between ontological and epistemological skepticism is generally conflated in the literature it is often difficult to isolate those authors who are genuine ontological skep• tics. Probably the first serious ontological skeptic and nihilist was the who argued in his treatise 'On That Which Is Not, or On ', that nothing exists. There have been a number of ontological skeptics and nihilists regarding God's existence including Bertrand Rus• sell in Sceptical Essays (New York: W.W. Norton, 1928) and Why I Am Not a Christian (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957) and Albert Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus (New York: Random House, 1955). Although perhaps no one was ever a genuine ontological skeptic concerning the existence of other minds, a true solipsist, for can be found in Johann Fichte, The Vocation of Man (Indianapolis: Bobbs• Merrill, 1956), chs. 5 and 6; and Russell, Human (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), pt. 3, ch. 2. The most famous ontological skeptic regarding the existence of a nonmental external world is undoubt• edly Bishop in Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Phi/onous and A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Other famous idealists include Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind; and F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London: Oxford University Press, 1930). Several versions of are discussed in detail in Cornman, , , and (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Un• iversity Press, 1975), which contains numerous bibliographic references• see especially the appendix. 315 316 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Epistemological Skepticism. Beginning with ' assessment of his own wisdom as not thinking "that I know what I do not know", found in , Apologia 21d, there have been a great many outright epis• temological skeptics and who have advanced epistemological skeptical arguments. The most famous, and last, Pyrrhonian was whose principle works were Pyrrhoniarum Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos. of these works are contained in Sextus Empiricus (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933). Erasmus appeared as a religious skeptic in a controversy with Luther in the sixteenth century. His views are expressed in In Praise of Folly and De Libero Arbitrio. Montaigne, in Apologie de Raymond Sebond, was another religious skeptic who argued that human powers alone were incapable of achieving true knowledge which could only be attained through faith. A major skeptic who greatly influenced Hume was , Dictionnaire Historique et Critique. Secondary sources on skepticism in ancient include E.R. Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1913); Norman Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics, from to Sextus (London: Macmillan, 1869); and Eduard Zeller (Oswald J. Reichel, trans.), The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962).

David Hume as Skeptic. Hume's skeptical views are contained in (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.), A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1888); An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding . . . (Oxford: Clarendon, 1894), and David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947). Principal commen• taries on these works include A.G.N. Flew, Hume's Philosophy of (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); T.H. Green, General Introduction to Hume's Treatise (London: Oxford University Press, 1874); N. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941); J.A. Passmore, Hume's Intentions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); and David C. Stove, Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973). Articles devoted to Hume's skepticism are legion but the following con• stitute some of more recent: W.L. Robison, 'Hume's Scepticism', Dialogue 12 (1973),87-99; J.O. Nelson, 'Two Main Questions Concerning Hume's "Treatise" and "Enquiry" " Philosophical Review 81 (1972), 333-360; J. Kekes, 'Beliefs and Scepticism', Philosophical Forum 1 (1969), 353-358; J.E. Adler, 'Stove on Hume's Inductive Scepticism', Australasian Journal BIBLIOGRAPHY 317

of Philosophy 53 (1975), 167-170; and T.L. Beauchamp and T.A. Mappes, 'Is Hume Really a Sceptic About Induction', American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975), 119-129. For an extensive treatment of skepticism in the modern period of the history of philosophy including Hume, see the following works by Richard H. Popkin: 'David Hume: His and His Critique of Pyr• rhonism', Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1950-1951), 385-407; 'Berkeley and Pyrrhonism', Review of 5 (1951-1952), 223-246; 'David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy', Review of Metaphysics 6 (1952- 1953), 65-81; 'The Sceptical Crisis and the Rise of ', Review of Metaphysics 7 (1953-1954), 132-151, 307-322, 499-510; 'The Skeptical Precursors of David Hume', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (1955), 61-71; The History of Scepticism From Erasmus to Descartes (New York: Humanities Press, 1964); and 'The High Road to Pyrrhonism', American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965), 1-15.

Contemporary Works on Skepticism Skeptics. One of the growing list of philosophers who has seriously at• tempted to defend skepticism in the twentieth century is Peter Unger. His book Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975) con• tains revised versions of the following papers; 'A Defense of Skepticism', Philosophical Review 80 (1971), 198-219; 'An for Skepticism', Philosophical Exchange 1 (1974), 131-155; 'Propositional Verbs and Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972), 301-312; 'The Wages of Scepticism', American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973), 177-187; 'Two Types of Scepticism', Philosophical Studies 25 (1974), 77-98; and'', in M.K. Munitz and P. Unger (eds.), Semantics and Philosophy (New York: New York University Press, 1974). Various responses to Unger's position are listed in the next section. Another serious argument for epistemological skepticism is in K. Lehrer, 'Why Not Skepticism', The Philosophical Forum 23 (1971), 283- 298. See also, Lehrer, 'Skepticism and Conceptual Change' in R. Chis• holm and R.J. Swartz (eds.), Empirical Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973). See also I.T. Oakley, 'An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justified Beliefs', American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976), 221-228.

Critics of Skepticism. G.E. Moore vigorously attacked skepticism after the turn of the century. His anti skeptical papers are included in these 318 BIBLIOGRAPHY

collections of his essays: Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), and Philosophical Papers (New York: Humanities Press, 1959). Moore's position was strongly criticized by Wittgenstein although he remained a staunch antiskeptic himself. Most of Wittgen• stein's criticisms are collected in G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.) (D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans.), (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). The following are relatively recent articles which are generally critical towards skepticism: P. Olscamp, 'Wittgenstein's Re• futation of Skepticism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1965-1966), 239-247; J. Wolfe, 'Dreaming and Skepticism', Mind 80 (1971), 605-606; J. Agassi, 'The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepti• cism', Philosophical Studies 22 (1971), 49-50; J. Kekes, 'Skepticism and External Questions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1971), 325-340; R.L. PurtiIl, 'Some Varieties of Epistemological Skepticism', Philosophia 1 (1971), 107-116; R.L. Purtill, 'Epistemological Skepticism Again', Philosophical Forum 3 (1972), 138-144; T. Clarke, 'The Legacy of Skepticism', Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972), 745-769; G.W. Barnes, 'Unger's Defense of Skepticism', Philosophical Studies 24 (1973), 119-124; K. Nielson, 'On Refusing to Play the Skeptic's Game', Dialogue 11 (1972), 348-359; C.E. Marks, ', Scepticism, and the Private Lan• guage Argument', Philosophical Studies 28 (1975), 151-171; R. Almeder, 'Defeasibility and Scepticism', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1973),238-244; J. Door, 'Scepticism and Dogmatism', 16 (1973), 214-220; and J. Margolis, 'Skepticism, , and Pragma• tism', American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977), 119-128.

FOUNDATIONAL THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION

Traditional Foundationalism Descartes' Foundationalism. The classical English (1911) of Descartes' works is E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes (New York: Dover, 1955). A more recent translation is G.E.M. Anscombe and P.T. Geach (eds. and trans.), Descartes: Phil• osophical Writings (London: Nelson, 1954). Descartes' principal writings concerning foundationalism are Meditations on First Philosophy, Dis• course on Method, and . Contemporary sources on Descartes' foundational theory of knowledge include: H.G. Frankfurt, 'Descartes' Validation of ', American BIBLIOGRAPHY 319

Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965), 149-160; A.K. Stout, 'The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes', Mind 38 (1929), 330-342, 458-472; and N. Malcolm, 'Dreaming and Skepticism', Philosophical Review 63 (1956), 14- 37. Some of the above and other articles on Descartes' are collected in the following anthologies: A. Sesonske and N. Fleming (eds.), Meta-meditations (Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth, 1966); and W. Doney (ed.), Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Doubleday, 1967).

Lewis's Foundationalism. C.I.Lewis's books, Mind and the World Order (New York: Scribner's, 1929), and An of Knowledge and Valua• tion (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1946) contain the core of Lewis's founda• tional theory of knowledge. His important articles on epistemology include: 'Experience and Meaning', Philosophical Review 43 (1934), 125- 146; 'Professor Chisholm and ', Journal of Philosophy 45 (1948),517-524; and 'Replies to my Critics', inP.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Phil• osophy ofC.!. Lewis (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1968), pp. 653-676. There is a great deal of literature on Lewis's epistemology. Two of the more important works are: H. Reichenbach, 'Are Phenomenal Reports Absolutely Certain?' Philosophical Review 61 (1952), 147-159; and N. Goodman, 'Sense and Certainty', Philosophical Review 61 (1952), 160-167. Lewis's 'The Given Element in Empirical Knowledge', Philosophical Review 61 (1952), 168-175, is a reply to these two papers and all three are collected in R.M. Chisholm and R.J. Swartz (eds.), Empirical Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973). Also included in Empirical Knowledge, pp. 203-223 and 459-470, are R. Firth, 'The Anatomy of Certainty', Philosophical Review 76 (1967), 3-27, and 'Coherence, Cer• tainty, and Epistemic Priority', Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964), 545-557. Among other important critical works are R.M. Chisholm, 'The Problem of Empiricism', Journal of Philosophy 45 (1948), 512-517; R.M. Chisholm, 'Theory of Knowledge', in R. Chisholm et al. (eds.), Philosophy (Engle• wood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964); R. Firth, R.B. Brandt, et al., 'Commemorative Symposium on C.1. Lewis', Journal of Philosophy 61 (1964), 545-570; M.A. Slote, 'Empirical Certainty and the Theory of Important Criteria', Inquiry 10 (1967),21-37; and M. Pastin, 'C.1. Lewis's Radical Foundationalism', Nous 9 (1975), 407-420.

Chisholm's Foundationalism. Among Chisholm's many works the following are more directly concerned with his version of foundationalism: Per- 320 BIBLIOGRAPHY ceiving: A Philosophic Study (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1957); Theory of Knowledge, 1st ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); 2nd ed., 1977; 'The Foundation of Empirical Statements', in K. Ajdu• kiewicz (ed.), The Foundation of Statements and Decisions (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1965), pp. 111-120; 'Russell on the Foundations of Empirical Knowledge', in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1944); 'On the Nature of Empirical ', in Empirical Knowledge, op. cit.; 'On a Principle of Epistemic Preferability', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 30 (1969),294-301; " 'Appear', 'Take', and 'Evident' ", Journal of Philosophy 53 (1956), 722-731; 'The of Knowing', Journal of Philosophy 60 (1963), 773-795; 'Sentences About Believing', Proceedings of the Aristo• telian Society 56 (1955-1956),125-148; and The (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1973). There have been a great many articles and books which have addressed Chisholm's epistemology. The following is a list of works that Chisholm has cited in the second edition of Theory of Knowledge: F.L. , Induc• tion and Justification (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974); K. Lehrer, Knowledge (London: Oxford University Press, 1974); N. Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); W. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963); W. Sellars, 'Empiricism and the ', in Empirical Knowledge, op. cit.; W. Sellars, 'Givenness and Explanatory Coherence', Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973), 612-624; P.L. Quinn, 'Some Epistemic Implications of "Crucial Experiments" " Studies in the History and 5 (1975),59-72; R. Keirn, 'Epistemic Values and Epistemic Viewpoints', T.J. Steel, 'Knowledge and the Self-Presenting', and J.T. Stevenson, 'On Doxastic Responsibility', in K. Lehrer (ed.), Analysis and Metaphysics (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975) pp. 79-92, 145-150, 229-253 resp.; W.P. Alston, 'Two Types of Foundationalism', Journal of Philosophy 73 (1976), 165-185; H. Kyburg, 'On a Certain Form of Philosophical Argument', American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970), 229-237; J. Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton, N.J.: Prin• ceton University Press, 1974); J. Pollock, 'Chisholm's Definition of Knowledge', Philosophical Studies 19 (1968), 72-76; C.I. Lewis, 'Profes• sor Chisholm and Empiricism', op. cit.; and especially H. Heidelberger, 'Chisholm's Epistemic Principles', Nous 3 (1969), 73-82. Analysis and Metaphysics is a Festschrift dedicated to Professor Chisholm which con- BIBLIOGRAPHY 321

tains many articles on Chisholm's epistemological views written by his former students. Articles concerning epistemology in this anthology not listed above include J.F. Ross, 'Testimonial Evidence'; K. Lehrer, 'Reason and Consistency'; M. Hanen, 'Confirmation, Explanation, and Acceptance'; and J. Canfield, '''I Know That I am in Pain" Is Senseless'.

Other Recent Foundational Theories. Some other foundational theories of justification can be found in John A. Pollock, Knowledge and Justification (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974); A. Quinton, The Nature of Things (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973); and D.M. Armstrong, Belief, Truth, and Knowledge (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973). Skeptical Arguments Against Foundationalism Arguments Against a Foundation of Certainty. Both Reichenbach's 'Are Phenomenal Reports Absolutely Certain?', op. cit., and Goodman's 'Sense and Certainty', op. cit., are critical of the possibility of an absolutely certain foundational base of knowledge. Cornman has responded to both in 'On the Certainty of Given Reports', Nous 12 (1978), 93-118. Other significant papers which discuss the problems of establishing a certain foundation of knowledge and the different senses of certainty, incorrigibil• ity, indefeasibility, and so on, include R. Firth, 'The Anatomy of Cer• tainty', op. cit., and 'Coherence, Certainty, and Epistemic Priority' op. cit.; W. Sellars, 'Givenness and Explanatory Coherence', Journal of Phil• osophy 70 (1973), 612-624; H. Heidelberger, 'Knowledge, Certainty, and Probability', Inquiry 6 (1963), 242-250; and D. Rynin, 'Knowledge, Sensation, and Certainty', in A. Stroll (ed.), Epistemology (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). The attempt to secure a certain foundation for knowledge led to the debate among the logical positivists concerning the existence and status of protocol or basic statements. Two main protagonists on this debate were O. Neurath in 'Sociology and ' (M. Magnus and R. Raico, trans.), and 'Protocol Sentences', (F. Schick, trans.), both in A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical (New York: Free Press, 1959) and Foundation of the Social (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941); and M. Schlick in 'The Foundation of Knowledge', (D. Rynin, trans.), in and in Empirical Knowledge, op. cit. Other positivists concerned with basic statements include R. Carnap (M. Black, trans.), 322 BIBLIOGRAPHY

The (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1934), and The Logical Syntax of Language (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1964); C. Hempel, 'On the Logical Positivists' Theory of Truth', Analysis 2 (1934-1935), 49-59; and A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover, 1946), Foundations of Empirical Knowledge (New York: St. Martin's, 1940), ch. 2, 'Basic ', in M. Black (ed.), (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950), and The Problem of Knowledge (New York: St. Martin's, 1956). I. Schef• fler, Science and (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967) has an enlightening discussion of this controversy. More recently some philosophers have attacked the certainty of ob• servation reports on the grounds that all are necessarily 'theory-laden' and that there is no distinction to be drawn on the basis of some epistemic priority between an observational vocabulary and a theo• retical vocabulary. Included in this group are N.R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958); T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); P.K. Feyerabend, 'Explanation, Reduction and Empiric• ism', in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), Scientific Explanation, Space, and Time (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962); P. Achin• stein, 'The Problem of Theoretical Terms', American Philosophical Quar• terly 2 (1965), 193-203; 'Theoretical Terms and Partial Interpretations', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (1964), 89-105, and Con• cepts of Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), chs. 5 and 6; M. Spector, 'Theory and ', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (1966), 1-20, 89-104; and M. Hesse, The Structure of Scien• tific Inference (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), ch. 1. Defenders of the thesis that there is a class of observation sentences where truth or falsity can be determined independently of theoretical con• siderations, or at least that there are epistemic grounds for drawing an observational-theoretical distinction, include E. Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961), ch. 5; G. Maxwell, 'The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities', in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), op. cit., pp. 3-27; R. Carnap, ' and Mean• ing', Philosophy of Science 3 (1936), 419-471; and E. Nagel, Theory and Observation', in M. Mandelbaum (ed.), Observation and Theory in Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971). Cornman, in chapter 4 of Per• ception, Common Sense, and Science, op. cit., replies to critics who oppose any sort of observational-theoretical dichotomy. BIBLIOGRAPHY 323

Among those who have advanced skeptical arguments concerning the certainty of memory reports are Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London: George Allen and Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1921), chs. 4 and 9; An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc.; London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1940), ch. II; c.o. Broad, Mind and Its Place in Nature (London: Kegan Paul, 1925), ch. 5; and H.H. Price, 'Memory Knowledge', Proceedings of the Aristote• lian Society, (supplement) 15 (1936), 16-33. C.1. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, op. cit., ch. 11, advances an "a priori justification" of memory; and N. Malcolm, 'Three Lectures on Memory', in Knowledge and Certainty (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), and G.E.M. Anscombe, 'The Reality of the Past', in M. Black (ed.), Philosophical Anal• ysis, op. cit., have criticized Russell's skepticism about memory reports.

On the Nonfoundational as Certain or Probable Relative to the Founda• tional: The Entailment of Nonbasic Sentences by Basic Sentences. Various phenomenalists have held that basic sense-data sentences entail non-basic physical object sentences. See, for instance G.E. Moore's papers in Philosophical Studies, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, and Philosophi• cal Papers; Bertrand Russell in 'The Philosophy of ', in R.C. Marsh (ed.), Essays in Logic and Knowledge (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1956), pp. 175-282; and An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, op. cit. R. Chisholm's famous objection to phenomenalism of this sort appears in Perceiving, op. cit., pp. 189-197. Subjunctive analyses ofphysi• cal object sentences in terms of sense-data sentences were offered by A.J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic, op. cit., chs. 7 and 8; Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, op. cit., ch. 5, and "Phenomenalism", in Philosophi• cal Essays (New York: St. Martin's, 1954). Ayer rejects this theory in The Problem of Knowledge, op. cit., ch. 3. c.1. Lewis offered a probabilistic analysis in An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, op. cit., chs. 7 and 8, which was criticized by Cornman in chapter 3 of Perception, Common Sense, and Science. Chisholm criticized the theory in 'The Problem of Empiricism', and Lewis replied in 'Professor Chisholm and Empricism'. For more complete bibliographic references on phenomenalism and the analysis of physical object sentences, as well as detailed discussions of various sorts of phenomenalism, see Cornman's Perception, Common Sence, and Science, appendix and pt. 1, respectively.

Inductive Inference from Basic Sentences to Nonbasic Sentences: Enumera- 324 BIBLIOGRAPHY

tive Induction. A.J. Ayer's argument in The Problem of Knowledge that the existence of other minds is justified can be viewed, as it is in Chapter 10 of this book, as an enumerative inductive inference. A. P1antinga discusses Ayer's argument and criticizes this approach in God and Other Minds (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), ch. 10.

Analogical Arguments. Analogical arguments for the existence of God have their primary source in Aquinas, Summa Theologica. The analogical argument for other minds was suggested by Descartes in Discourse on Method, pt. 5, and Locke in Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 4, ch. 3, par. 27, and it was explicitly stated by Hume in Treatise of Human Nature, book I, pt. 3, section 16. More recent proponents include c.1. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, p. 143; C.D. Broad, Mind and Its Place in Nature; S. Hampshire, 'Analogy of Feeling', Mind 61 (1952), 1-12; H.H. Price, 'Our Evidence for Other Minds', Philosophy 13 (1938), 425-436; and B. Russell, Human Knowledge (Atlantic High• lands: Humanities Press, 1948), pp. 438-486. Plantinga criticizes these arguments in God and Other Minds, ch. 8.

Hypothetical Induction and Inference to the Best Explanation. G. Harman has argued that all reasonable inductive inferences are inferences to the best explanation in 'The Inference to the Best Explanation', Philosophical Review 74 (1965),88-95; 'Knowledge, Inference, and Explanation', Ameri• can Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1968), 164-173; and Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeto~ University Press, 1973). W. Gregory, 'Explanationism', unpublished; and R. Ennis, 'Enumerative Induction and Best Explana• tion', Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 523-529, are critical of Harman's position. Harman replies to Ennis in 'Enumerative Induction is Inference to the Best Explanation', Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 529-533. I. Niiniluoto and R. Toumela, Theoretical and Hypothetico• Inductive Inference (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973) discusses hypothetical induction as it relates to . R. Chisholm objects to hypothe• tical induction in Theory of Knowledge.

Nonfoundational Theories of Justification The views of many nonfoundationalists can be found in the references cited in the section above entitled "Skeptical Arguments Against Founda• tionalism". We should at this point however list those philosophers who are understood to be the dominent contemporary nonfoundationa1ists. BIBLIOGRAPHY 325

Although Rescher's Coherence Theory of Truth is primarily a defense of a nonfoundational theory of truth it contains material relevant to a coher• ence theory of justification as well. Sellars and Quine are also commonly thought to be nonfoundationalists, although it is argued in this book that they need not be interpreted this way. Sellars's most important works on the topic appear in 'Givenness and Explanatory Coherence'; Science, Perception, and Reality, and 'The Structure of Knowledge', Machette Foundation Lectures given at the University of Texas in 1971. Quine's works on justification include The Web of Belief, with J. Ullian (New York: Random House); and 'Epistemology Naturalized' in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 69-90. Other nonfoundationalist views are expressed in L. Bonjour, 'Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation', American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), 1-14; 'The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowl• edge', Philosophical Studies 30 (1976), 281-312; and D.B. Annis 'A Con• textualist Theory of Epistemic Justification', American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978), 213-220.

Theories ofProbability and Rational Belief General Discussions of Probability. An outstanding introductory text on probability and inductive logic is B. Skyrms, Choice and Chance, 2nd ed. (Encinco, Cal.: Dickenson, 1975). Among other comprehensive surveys of the field are E. Nagel, Principles of the Theory of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939); I.J. Good, Probability and the Weigh• ing of Evidence (London: C. Griffin, 1950); R. Carnap, Logical Founda• tions of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950); W. Kneale, Probability and Induction (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949); I. Hacking, The Emergence of Probability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); and W. Salmon, The Foundation of Scientific Inference (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966). See R.L. Slaght, 'Induction, Ac• ceptance and Rational Belief', in M. Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance and Rational Belief (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1970), for an extensive listing of references on probability as well as other related areas. A.N. Kolmogorov, Foundations of the Theory of Probability (New York: Chelsea, 1950) is the classical work on the axiomatic mathematics of probability. Other mathematical treatments of probability include H. Cramer, The Elements of the Probability Theory (New York: Krieger, 1955); W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and Its Applica• tions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1950); and R. Carnap and R.C. 326 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jeffrey (eds.), Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

Interpretations of Probabilities: Frequency Theory. J. Venn, The Logic of Chance (New York: Chelsea, 1962) is one of the earliest frequency theo• rists. Another is R. von Mises, Probability, Statistics, and Truth, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1939). Reichenbach's views are expressed in The Theory of Probability (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949) and Experience and Prediction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938), section 5. W. Salmon has defended Reichenbach's theory in The Founda• tion of Scientific Inference; and 'Vindication of Induction', in H. Feigl and G. Maxwell (eds.), Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 245-256. I. Hacking discusses Salmon's views in 'One Problem about Induction', in I. Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductive Logic, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1968), pp. 44-57, and 'Salmon's Vindication of Induction', Journal of Philosophy 62 (1965), 260-266. See also I. Levi, 'Hacking Salmon on In• duction', Journal of Philosophy 62 (1965), 481-487.

Logical and Epistemic Interpretation. J.M. Keynes in A Treatise on Prob• ability (London: Macmillan, 1921) is the classical statement of the logical interpretation of probabilities, with Carnp's Logical Foundtions of Prob• ability being the most thorough statement of the view. J.G. Kemeny, 'Carnap's Theory of Probability and Induction', in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1963), pp. 719-738, is a clear account of Carnap's theory. H.E. Kyburg, Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961) is a more recent work written from the logical standpoint, and Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability contains Carnap's most recent elaboration of his epistemic and 'personalistic' view. W. Salmon's The Foundation of Scientific Inference; 'Carnap's Inductive Logic', Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), 725-739; 'The Justification of Inductive Rules of Inference', in The Problem of Inductive Logic, pp. 24-43; and 'Vindication of Induction', contain substantial criticism of the logical interpretation of probabilities.

Propensity Interpretation. K. Popper gives his propensity interpretations in 'The Propensity Interpretation of Probability and the Quantum Theory', BIBLIOGRAPHY 327

in S. Korner (ed.), Observation and Interpretation: A Symposium of Philo• sophers and Physicists (New York: Dover, 1957); and 'The Propensity Interpretation of Probability', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (1959-1960), 25-42. I. Levi, Gambling with Truth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), ch. 14, gives a statement of the theory. L. Sklar criticizes the view in 'Is Probability a Dispositional Property?', Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970),355-366; and 'Unfair to Frequencies', Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973),41-52; and Levi responds in ' ... But Fair to Chance', Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973), 52-55. J.H. Fetzer defends the theory in 'A Single Case Propensity Theory of Explanation', Synthese 28 (1974), 171-198; and H.E. Kyburg criticizes it in 'Propensities and Probabilities', British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science 25 (1974),358-375. I. Hacking, Logic of Statistical Inference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965) takes a modified Popperian propensity point of view.

Subjective Interpretation. A valuable anthology on the subjectivist's inter• pretation of probabilities is H.E. Kyburg and H.E. Smokier (eds.), Studies in Subjective Probability (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964). This collection contains de Finetti's classic 'Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources', pp. 93-158. Other proponents of the theory include F.P. Ramsey, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), pp. 74--82; L.J. Savage, The Foundation of Statistics (New York: Dover, 1954); and R.c. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). K. Lehrer has argued for a subjectivist interpretation in 'Evidence, Meaning, and Conceptual Change: A Subjective Approach', in G. Pearce and P. Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973), pp. 94--122; Knowledge, pp. 136ff.; and 'Truth, Evidence, and Inference', American Philosophical Quarterly 11 (1974), 79-92. Critics of subjectivism include H.E. Kyburg, 'Bets and Beliefs', American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1968), 54--63; W. Salmon, The Foundations of Scientific Inference, pp. 68, 79-82; and W. Gregory, 'Evidence, Subjectivism, and Lehrer', unpublished.

Strict Coherence, Conditionalization, and the Lottery Paradox. Concerning the topics of coherence, strict coherence, and Dutch Book bets, see A. Shimony, 'Coherence and the Axioms of Confirmation', Journal of Sym• bolic Logic 20 (1955), 1-28; R. Carnap and R.C. Jeffrey, Studies in In• ductive Logic and Probability, pp. 12-15, 105-117; R.C. Jeffrey, The Logic 328 BIBLIOGRAPHY

of Decision; B. Skyrms, Choice and Chance, pp. 186-189; and W. L. Harper, 'Rational Belief Change, Popper Functions, and Counterfactuals', Synthese 30 (1975),221-262. Conditionalization is discussed in Carnap and Jeffrey, Studies in In• ductive Logic and Probability, pp. 15-16; R. Hilpinin, Rules of Acceptance and Inductive Logic (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1968), pp. 15-23; B. Skyrms, Choice and Chance, pp. 170-198; R.C. Jeffrey, Logic of Decision, pp. 153-161; 'Probable Knowledge' in I. Lakatos (ed.), The Pro• blem of Inductive Logic (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1968), pp. 166-180; 'Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief', in M. Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, pp. 157-185; W. Harper and H.E. Kyburg, 'The Jones Case', British Journal for the Phi• losophy of Science 19 (1968),247-251; I. Levi, 'If Jones Only Knew More!', British Journal for the Philosphy of Science 20 (1969), 153-159; 'Probability and Evidence', in Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief, pp. 134-156; 'Probability Kinematics', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (1967), 197-209; and P. Teller, 'Conditionalization and Observation', Synthese 26 (1973),218-258. H.E. Kyburg first discussed the lottery paradox in Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief His other statements on the topic are in 'Prob• ability and Randomness', Theoria 29 (1963),27-55; 'Probability, Ration• ality, and a Rule of Detachment', in Y. Bar-Hillel (ed.), Proceedings of the 1964 Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1965), and 'Conjunctivitis', in M. Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief Other writings on the topic include Hilpinin, Rules of Acceptance and Inductive Logic, chs. 2 and 4; G. Harman, Thought, chs. 2 and 10; K. Lehrer, Knowledge; 'Justification, Explanation, and Induction', in M. Swain (ed.), Induction, Acceptance, and Rational Belief; and I. Levi, 'Induction, Reason and Consistency', British Journalfor the Philosophy of Science 21 (1970), 103- 114. INDEX OF NAMES

Achenstein, P. 322 Cornman, J. W. 20,21,52,55,98,123, Adler, J. 317 195, 224, 250, 254, 259, 263-265, Agassi, 1. 318 273,280,294,315,321-323 Almeder, R. 318 Cramer, H. 325 Alston, W. P. 320 Annis, O. B. 325 de Finetti, B. 327 Anscombe, G. E. M. 318,323 Descartes, R. xxii, xxix, 27,29,31,53, Aquinas, T. 324 57, 83, 127, 131, 157, 163, 191, Armstrong, D. M. 321 285,299,309,318,319,324 Aune,B. 135,136,155 Doney, W. 319 Ayer, A. J. 268, 269, 280, 321-324 Door, J. 318

Bar-Hillel, Y. 328 Einstein, A. 147,148,175 Barker, S. 234, 235, 240-242,250, 251 Ennis, R. 324 Barnes, G. W. 318 Erasmus, D. 316 Bayle, P. 316 Beauchamp, T. xxix, 317 Feigl, H. 3,5,20,283,322,326 Berkeley, G. 315 Feller, W. 325 Bevan, E. R. 316 Fetzer, J. 123,224,327 Black, M. 321-323 Feyerabend, P. 56, 322 Bonjour, L. 325 Firth, R. 56, 102, 123, 132, 155,319, Bradley, F. H. 315 321 Brandt, R. B. 319 Fleming, N. 319 Broad, C. D. 323,324 Flew, A. G. N. 316 Butts, R. 195, 223 Frankfurt, H. G. 319 Friedman, K. 237-240,250,251 Camus, A. 315 Canfield, J. 321 Galileo 249 Carnap, R. 9,20, SO, 51, 55, 56,64,78, Geach, P. 224,318 91, 103, 109, 123, 165, 228, 234, Glashow, S. 250 290-292,321,322,325-328 Good, I. J. 325 Chappell, V. C. xxix Goodman, N. 16,36-44,56-60,67,74, Chisholm, R. 55, 56, 78, 87-93, 96- 75,78,107,226,233,234,240-243, 102, 109, 110, 127, 128, 131-135, 250,251,289,297,319,321 138, 155, 157, 163, 191, 218,219, Green, T. H. 316 224, 270, 285, 287, 309-312, 317- Gregory, W. 324,327 324 Clarke, T. 318 Hacking, I. 6, 20, 325-327 329 330 INDEX OF NAMES

Haldane, E. S. xxix, 318 Locke, J. 324 Hamilton, W. xxix Luther, M. 316 Hampshire, S. 324 Hanen, M. 321 Maccoll, N. 316 Hanson, N. R. 322 Magnus, M. 321 Harman, G. 20, 87, 89, 98, 324, 328 Malcolm, N. 319,323 Harper, W. 56, 328 Mandelbaum, M. 322 Hegel, G. 315 Mappes, T. xxix, 317 Heidelberger, H. 93, 99-104, 123, 300, March, R. C. 323 320, 321 Margolis, J. 318 Hempel, c. 168-172, 195-199, 204- Marks, C. E. 318 209,223,224,322 Maxwell, G. 20,56,322,326 Hendel, C. W. xxix Maynard, P. 327 Hesse, M. 322 Meehl, P. 56 Hilpinen, R. 328 Melzack, R. 280 Hintikka, J. 195,223 Mill, J. S. 280,302 Hockberg, R. 280 Montaigne, M. 316 Hospers, J. 20 Moore, G. E. 77,318,323 Hume, D. xiv-xix, xxiii-xxv, xxix, 14, Motte, A. 224 281,282,316,317,324 Munitz, M. 317

Jeffrey, R. 55, 56, 78, 123, 326-328 Nagel, E. 20, 209, 224, 322, 325 Neilson, K. 318 Kaplan, D. 169,170,195 Nelson, J. o. 316 Keirn, R. 320 Neurath, O. 321 Kekes, J. 316 Newton, I. 147, 148, 209, 210, 213, Kemeny, J. G. 234,326 214,217,224,235,248 Kemp-Smith, N. 316 Niiniluoto, I. 78, 324 Keynes, J. M. 326 Kim, J. 156 Oakley, I. 298, 317 Kneale, W. 325 Olscamp, P. 318 Kolmogorov, A. 325 Korner, S. 327 Passmore, J. 316 Kripke, S. 172 Pastin, M. 78,319 Kuhn, T. 322 Paul, D. 318 Kyburg, H. 20, 56, 78,88, 89, 98, 293, Pearce, G. 327 320,326-328 Plantinga, A. 84, 85, 98, 266-269, 280,324 Lakatos, I. 20, 326, 328 Plato 316 Laudan, L. 215-217,224 Pollock,J.310,312,320,321 Lehrer, K. 25, 26, 30, 55, 56, 78, 132, Popkin, R. xxix, 317 140-147, 150, 151, 155, 156, 298, Popper, K. 56, 123, 224, 234, 235, 317,320,321,327,328 250,326-328 Levi, I. 78,326-328 Price, H. H. 323,324 Lewis, C. I. 27-29, 34-37, 55-60,63, Purtill, R. L. 318 66,67,73-7~83,98, 127, 131, 157, 163,285,299,309,319-324 Quine, W. 14,21, 128, 145-148, 151- INDEX OF NAMES 331

156, 196-199, 201, 208-210, 215- Slote, M. A. 319 218, 223-226, 234, 241, 243, 250, SmokIer, H. E. 327 251,271,280,325 Sober, E. 235-237,250 Quinn, P. 1. 320 Socrates 316 Quinton, A. 321 So sa, E. 156 Spector, M. 322 Raico, R. 321 Steel, T. J. 320 Ramsey, F. P. 250,327 Stevenson, J. T. 320 Reichel, O. J. 316 Stout, A. K. 319 Reichenbach, H. 5, 20, 32-34, 43-48, Stove, D. 316 55,283,289,319,321,326 Stroll, A. 321 Reid, T. xviii Suppes, P. 195,280 Rescher, N. 155,320,325 Swain, M. 78,325,328 Robison, W. 1. 326 Swartz, R. 55, 56, 78, 99, 123, 155, Ross, G. xxix, 318 317,319 Ross, J. 321 Rudner, R. 225,250 Teller, P. 56,328 Russell, B. 315,320,323,324 Tuomela, R. 78, 324 Rynin, D. 321 Ullian, J. 14, 21, 196, 199, 208-210, Salmon, W. 5, 6, 20, 21, 123, 195, 217, 218, 224, 225, 234, 243, 250, ~23,283,292, 325-327 251,325 Savage, J. 327 Unger, P. 26,55,75,298,317 Scheffler, I. 322 Schick, F. 321 Venn, J. 326 Schilpp, P. A. 319,320,326 von Mises, R. 326 Schlick, M. 321 von Wright, G. H. 318 Selby-Bigge, 1. A. xxix, 316 Sellars, W. 4-9, 20, 128, 145,152-156, Weidner, R. 224 320;321,325 Weinstein, S. 251 Sells, R. 224 Will, F. 1. 320 Sesonske, A. 319 Wittgenstein,1. 318 Sextus Empiricus 316 Wolfe, J. 318 Shimony, A. 327 Sklar, 1. 218,220-224, 327 Zabludowski, A. 297 Skyrms, B. 325,328 Zeller, E. 316 Slaught, R. 325 Ziff, P. 271,280 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Bold face entries indicate primary or definitional uses of the term indexed.

A (Chisholm's characterization of mini• A6 66; mal foundationalism) 128, 129, A7 67,68-71; 133,135 A7a 69,70,71; acceptability xi, 69, 80, 84, 122, 139- A8 68,69,73, 180, 181; 141, 154, 183, 188, 192, 222, A9 73,74; 254, 257, 286-289, 293, 295, AI0 105, 111, 114, 118-120, 164, 300, 305-310, see also definition 165; Dl; All 181 without certainty (q.v.) 57-77 autocerebroscope 49 passim; vs. certainty 53 B (Chisholm's rule) 92, 94, 97-101, acceptability, inferential 29-31,53-61, 105, 109, 110, 127, 309, 310; 65-70, 74-76, 79, 92, 112, 114, Bl 92,94,97,105,110; 154, 157, 161, 164, 185, 192, B2 94,97,105,110; 295,299,300,312 B3 94,95-97,105,110; acceptability, initial 27, 31, 55, 69, B4 92,96,97-99,105,110; 75-79,82, 95-98, 111-119, 127- B5 109,110,114,119,122; 135, 145, 148, 158-166, 184, BRI (,relativized') 101, 102; 312, see also definition D3 BR2 102, 103-105; action xviii BR3 107,108, 109, 111, 114,118, argument that is probability 119, 122, 164-166, 182-187, 60,62 191, 192, 196, 252, 255, 259, argument to refute moderate 2 -moder• 286, 289-291, 300, 308, 309; ate, skepticism (first) xxii, xxiii• BR4 118, 119-122, 164-166, 182- xxviii, 1 ; 187, 191, 192, 196, 252, 255, extended xxv, 1 259, 286, 289-291, 300, 308, arguments: see Goodman's argument, 309 master argument, Reichenbach's basic-report 29, 30, 36, 46-54, 69-76, argument and skeptical arguments 79-86, 89-92, 98, 104-108, 112, (I-V) 113, 116, 119-122, 127, 150, assumptions: AI57,58; 160-165, 188, 191, 194, 200, A2 58,77; 257, 258, 263, 267, 272, 286, A3 61, 62, 63, 66-68, 180, 181; 289, 291, 299-304, 308-310; A4 62,63,67,68; eternalized 31,33,274 AS 63, 64-68, 165, 166,180, 181, basic statement 110, 170, 199, 263, 187-190,293; 270,310 332 INDEX OF SUBJECTS 333 behaviorism 200; 375, see also explanatory coher• analytic 112,123,267,280 ence theory and justification, belief-report 113, 140-143 nonfoundational theories believe: with certainty 102, 104, 258, common sense xxviii 305; compatibility (of statements) 64, 65, understandingly 41,45-51,107 172,173,275 blind posit 135, 138, 144, 285, 307 competitor 69, 78, 142. 143, 202, 225, bridge laws, justification of 88,90 284 complexity, see CA (condition of acceptability, q.v.) conditionalization, strict 62, 63, 78, 254, 255-258, 261-265, 272- 328 278,302 confirmation xi, 80, 92, 95, 103-111, Cartesian demon 82, 89, 96, 113, see 115, 165, 210 also Z conservatism (test for explanatory sys• Cartesian foundationalism, see founda• tems) 196,197,217-223 tional theory conservatism, principle of 13-15, 119, xvi, xviii, 172, 266, 311 165, 166, 171, 176, 177, 284, certainty xi, xxii, 25-56 passim, 59,65, see also CP, PI etc. 74, 75, 99, 106, 114, 118, 289, consistency (test for explanatory sys• 299, 304, 305, 321; tems) 196,197 and acceptability (q. v.) 53; consistency, inductive 32-36, 40, 47- believe with, see believe; 51, 56, 91, 104-109, 114, 118, and other epistemic terms 42; 121, see also definition D3 vs. probability (q.v.) 10; correspondence rules, see bridge laws of memory 323; corroboration 239 relativized to times 289; counterfactual 205, see also subjunctive of tautology 28 conditional certainty, inferential 53,54,75,84, 157 CP (Quine-Ullian conservatism principle, certainty, initial 32, 51-55, 69, 75, q.v.) 14, 15, see also master 77, 82-84, 91, 154, 162-166, argument, IX 187, see also definition D6 and credibility 27,57,58,67,98,129,139, hypotheses 140, 181, 189, 190, 219-221, certainty, senses of: probability 43-52, see also assumption Al and 58; coherence, strict reasonableness 40,41,46,50,58; credibility, inferential 62 reasonableness vs. probability 50; credibility, initial 59,60,74,116 truth-entailing 40, 45, 51, 56, 58 critical cognitivism 87,91,93,97,110, Chisholmian foundationalism, see foun• 127,131,270,300,312 dational theory cumulativity (test of theories of justifica• Chisholm's critical cognitivism, see criti• tion) 215-217, 223, 227-229, cal cognitivism 235,247,248,262,274, see also Chisholm's rule, see B definition D26 coherence, strict (of credibility, q.v.) 50, 51, 56, 64-66, 78, 144, decision, moral 10, 12,15,303, see also 165,292,327 ethics coherence theory of justification 16, deduction xvii, xxi, 15,32,88,91,266, 132, 141-145, 155, 166, 167, 267, 282, 295, 309, 310, see also derivability 334 INDEX OF SUBJECTS defeater 311, see also competitor D28 (economy, q.v.) 231,232; definitions: D 1 (acceptability, q. v.) 27, D29 (prefix-simplicity, q.v.) 245; 57,60,68-71,77,165,180,181; D30 (prefix-simplicity, q. v.) 245; Dla 165,166; D31 (matrix-simplicity, q.v.) 245 D2 (initial acceptability, q. v.) 28, De Morgan's theorem 260 79, 113, 128, 129, 312; derivability 198,235,259; D3 (inductive consistency, q.v.) inductive 171, 198; 32; logical 171, 172,260; D4 (impossibility of error) 38, probabilistic 171, 198; 39-41; see also deduction, definition D15, D5 41,42; explanation, induction and prob• D6 (initial certainty, q.v.) 51; ability D7 (justification, q.v.) 129; directly evident 91,96,110,127 D8 (E-series, q.v.) 130, 160; dispositions 103 D9 (E-parent,q.v.) 131; doxastic system 140-143 D 10 (E-ancestor, q. v.) 131; Dutch book betting 327 Dll (explanatory coherence, q.v.) 146,147,151,167; E (epistemic principle) xxi, xxiii, xxvi, D12 167, 168, 173, 174, 178; xxvii D13 (maximal explanatory coher• E-ancestor 133-140,158-162, 184-187, ence) 167,168,173,178; 306, 307, see also definition D10, 014 (P-explanation, q.v.) 170,171 E-parent and E-series -173,178,197,198,275; economy (test for explanatory systems) D15 (derivability, q.v.) 172, 173, 196, 197, 203, 204, 227, 225- 178,198,294; 251 passim, 262, 263, 274, 277, D16 (conflict) 173,178,275; 304, see also definition D28 D17 (explanatory coherence, q.v.) empirical statement, justification of, see 173,174,178,253,254; justification, theories D18 (maximal explanation set, enumeration, see induction, enumerative q.v.) 174,175; E-parent 138-140, see also definition D19 (maximal explanation set, D9, E-ancestor and E-series q.v.) 175,176-178; epistemic principle, see E O19a 176, 178; E-series 133, 137, 143-145, 157-164, D20 (maximal explanation set, 183-190, 295, 306, see also q.v.) 177,178; definition D8, E-ancestor and D20a 178, 198, 222, 253, 254; E-parent D21 (minimal version of explana• ethics 9-11, 14, 302 tion set) 179,231; evidence, theory of 74, 75, 102, 110, D22 (testable consequence) 199, 175, see also justification, theo• 202; ries of D23 (testability, q.v.) 201, 261; evident xi, xxii, see also directly evident D24 Oawlikeness, q.v.) 205,206; eviden tial ancestor, see E-ancestor D25 (scope, q.v.) 212, 213, 214, evidential parent, see E-parent 262,274; eviden tial series, see E-series D26 (cumulativity, q.v.) 215, 274; evidential test, see test for explanatory D27 (minimal experiential version) systems 231; existence claim xvi, xvii, xxiii, 2, 30, INDEX OF SUBJECTS 335

324, see also , ontological, explanatory (test for explan• physical object statement and atory systems) 196, 199, 201, skepticism, ontological 223,261 explanation 14, 89, 146-150, 154, 166- explanatory system 153,196-224 171, 214, 227, 256-259, 265, passim, 233, 237, 243,247-250, 286,295,308,313; 254,261,263,276,294 acceptability of 291, 304; vs. 169,197; direct S- 169 see also test for explanatory systems Hempelian (deductive-nomological, deductive-statistical, and induct• xvii, 200, 239 ive-statistical) 172, 197, 198, see familiarity (test for explanatory systems) also definition DIS and derivabil• 217-219 ity; fecundity (test for explanatory systems) and induction (q.v.) 195; 146, 196, 198, 222, 223, 226 justification by 272, see also explan• FF (foundational thesis of the explana• atory coherence and explanatory tory foundational theory, q. v.) foundational theories of justifi• 166, 183 cation; formal rules 250 P- (potential), see P-explanation; foundational evidence 70-74,102 and prediction 4,9, 10; foundational principles: F1 129, 130, pragmatic 168,169; 131; probabilistic 170, 171; F2 130,131; scientific 146, 200, 255, 256, see F3 131,133,157-160; also Hempelian F3.1 158, 159; explanation set 175-179, 182-203,208, F3.2 159,160-164,178,185; 216, 221, 222, 226, 229-231, F3.21 164, 174, 178, 180,183,185, 244, 249-255, 261-266, 274- 189,288; 278, 289, 292-297, 301-304; F3.22 183, 184-193, 196,250, 252, vs. explanatory system 174 256, 257, 265, 286-297, 302, see also test for explanatory systems 304,307-313; explanatory coherence 16, 151, 173, F3.221 186, 188, 192, 193, 196, 175, 178, 189, 198, 253, 254, 250-254,270-272,289-296, 286, 292, 307, see also defini• 301-304,308; tions D11, D13 and D17 FPl 53,54,75,76,122,131,157, explanatory coherence theory of justifi• 162, see also skeptical argument cation 144, 145, 146-154, 157, II, premise 1; 163, 168, 172-175, 178, 189, FP2 76, 77, 112, 121, 122, 131, 285, 308, see also coherence 157, 160-163, 299, 301, see also theory of justification and justi• skeptical arguments III, IV, and fication, nonfoundational theories V, premise 3; explanatory foundational theory of FP(1,2) 157,160; justification 13-19,48,154,163, FTl 160, 162; 168, 174-177, 183, 185, 193- FT2 161,163; 196, 250-280 passim, 285-288, FT3 162; 292-298, 301-308, 313, 314, FT4 162 see also foundational theories of foundational set 179, 188, 192, 196, justification 255-259, 264, 270, 278, 286, 336 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

293,296,304,305,308 154, 164-166, 182-187, 191, foundational statement 237,271 196, 252, 255, 258, 272, 286, foundational theory of justification 28, 289-291,299,303,308; 34,37-40,44,47,48,53,55,69, see also Lewis principle 75-77, 83, 98, 109, 121, 122, 127-157 passim, 249, 272, 299, impossibility of error 36-40, see also 308; definition D4 Cartesian 29, 31, 83, 84, 127, 131, incompatibility, see compatibility 157, 163, 285, 309, 318, 319; independence of information (Friedman) Chismolmian 157, 163, 285, 309, 238,239 320; induction xv, xviii, 92, 93, 323; Lewisian 84, 127, 131, 157, 163, analogical 88-91, 171, 266, 268, 285,309,319; 310,324; minimal 128-130, 133, 157, 160, asymptotic rules for 5,6,16; 163, 164; enumerative 5, 9, 15, 84, 86, 91, vs. nonfoundational theories (q.v.) 152, 171, 193, 266-269, 300, 312; 309,310,324; Pollock's 310-312; hypothetical 5, 15, 19, 87-91, 98, traditional 26-31, 35, 57, 75, 83, 144, 171, 189-193, 269, 288, 84, 93, 127, 131, 318-320; 295,296,300,309,310; see also A and justification, theories justification of xxvi, 292, 293, see of also vindication; new riddle of 16,21,297; G 47,48,92; straight rule 7, 8, 15, 16, 283, 284, GI48,51; 292; see also HI etc. vindication of 5, 8, 284, see also generality (test for explanatory systems) vindication; 169, 196, 197, 208-214, 230, see also skepticism about induction 260,261 inductive consistency, see consistency generalizations 152, 164 inference to the best explanation 87, given-report 29-35, 52, 56, 102, 107, 89,270,288,310,324 108,113,289; inference, principles of 4, 132 eternalized 261; initial conditions 170, 171, 265, 270, future 36-44 passim; 273 scien tific 48-51 229 Goodman's argument against H2 (q. v.) 37,38-43 Jamesian principle 178 Goodman's calculus of simpilcity, see justification xi, xvii, 18, 144, 150, 174, simplicity 180; and explanation 150,272,292; Humean skepticism, see skepticism of knowledge vs. justification of hypotheses (initial certainty, q.v.): HI action 4; 32, 33-35, 91, 289, 290, see pragmatic 3,4; also Reichenbach's argument; see also evidence, validation and H2 35, 36-45, 48-50, 289, 290, vindication see also Goodman's argument; justification, theories of xxvi, xxviii, H3 51, 52, 77, 91, 103-122 passim, 3-15, 68, 229, 284, 286, 292, INDEX OF SUBJECTS 337

295, 298, 301, 302, 305-307; premise XI 17, 19, 194, 279,280, vs. theories of evidence (q.v.) 304; 287,297,298,313; lottery theory 312,313; premise XII 17; mixed theory 312, 313; premise XIII 17,18,287,288,313; nonfoundational theories 122, 127- premise XIV 18, 19, 279, 288, 296, 156 passim, 285,292,306,324, 297; 325; premise XV 18; subjectivist theory 140-144; premise XVI 18,20,287,314; see also coherence, explanatory premise XVII 19,20,288; coherence, explanatory founda• premise XVIII 19,288; tional and foundational theories of premise XIX 19,194,314 justification M, Si (three theses of moderate, skep• lawlikeness (test for explanatory systems) ticism, q.v.) xxii-xxv, 1, 2, 25, 196, 204-209, see also definition 194,279,298,301; D24 M, S, 2, 25,26,31,53,54,76,77, lemma 1 (Ll, distinct from Lewis 110,111,127,299,300, see also principle Ll) 161, 162 skeptical argument I, premise 9; Lewis foundationalism, see foundational M, S2 111, 112, 113,119,120,127, theory 300, see also skeptical argument Lewis principle 27, 34, 35, 58,73,74; IV, premise 6; Ll 27,28; M, S3 120, 121, 122, 155,162-164, L2 28,29; 176, 190-193, 196, 249, 252, L3 29,53-61,66,67, 75, 83,299, 255, 256, 260, 265, 279, 301, see also skeptical argument II, see also skeptical argument V, premise 9; premise 6 L4 29,53-61,66-70,73-75; MEl (minimum extra information) set see also certainty and hypotheses 235, 236 logical positivism 321 memory-report 54, 77, 117-122, 154, lottery paradox 27, 78, 182, 292, 163, 171, 194, 257, 286, 291, 293,308,328 300,301,304,310 metaphysics 13, 14, 20, 172, 284 master argument against moderate skep• MN (minimal evidential test q.v.) 203, ticism xxviii, 1-3, 190, 193, 247, 204,208,248,249; 281, 282, 295; MN* 249; premise I 1,287; MN.1 208,248; premise II 1, 19, 194, 279, 287, MN.2 208,248,249; 298,301,313; MN.3 208,248,249,262; premise III 1, 13,17,18,284,288; MN.4 208,248,249,262; premise IV 12, 13, 283, 284, see MN.5 214, 248, 249, 262; also VP3; MN.6 216,217,248,249,262; premise V 12,13,284; MN.7 229, 230-232, 248, 249, 262; premise VI 12,13,284; MN.8 246,248,249,262 premise VII 12,13,284-287; modality 72 premise VIII 12, 13, 17, 18, 285; premise IX 16, 287, 301,306, 312, N (principle of coherence theory) 132, 313, see also CP1; 134; premise X 17, 19, 194, 279, 283, N1 134, 135-140, 144, 145, 149, 287,297,301-305,313; 150,306,307; 338 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

N2 134, 135, 141, 144, 145, 148- parasitic information (Friedman) 238, 150,158,159,306-308; 239 N2.1 145, 151, 160; perception xv, xviii, 13, 81,94,97,101, N3 135,138-145,150,307; 106, 109, 117, 121, 129, 257, see also coherence and explanatory 263,264,276,305 coherence theories of justification P-explanation 170-172, 178, 179, 197- , methodological 8 203, 208, 216, 221, 227-233, nihilism, ontological xi, xv, xviii, 281, 243, 246-249, 253-261, 263, see also skepticism, ontological 270-276,295 and existence claim phenomenal statement 32-34,72 nomological connection 153 phenomenal term 29,55, 108 nonbasic statement 31, 36-38, 45-48, phenomenalism 323; 54, 75-122 passim, 160, 161, analytic 80,112,267 165, 191, 259, 300, 309, see also phenomenalistic analyses 83 basic-report, basic statement physical object statement xviii, 69- nonfoundational theories of justification, 72,81,82,113; see justification probabilistic vs. sUbjunctive analyses normal forms 170,179,231,244-246, 83,98,323; 260,264,265,274,294 see also existence claim, skepticism normal human being, see standard about physical objects and skep• observer ticism, ontological physics 147,173,217 observation-report 46-48, 54, 77, 80, physiology 272,277 82, 97, 105-122 passim, 150, PP1305,313 154, 163, 188, 194, 257, 286, primitive predicate 205,240,243 290,295,300-310,322 principle of last resort (Sklar) 222 observation statement 148-154, 170, principles and such: see A, assumptions, 171,199,200,224,263 B, CA, conservatism, CP, defini• observation term 29, 55, 85, 86, 108, tions, E, foundational principles, 109, 228, 250, see also theoreti• hypotheses (HI etc.), Jamesian, cal term Lewis, M, Si, MN etc., N etc., Occam's razor 225,227,228 OE, PI etc., PPl, R, ST, SI, TI, OE (Quine) 148, 149 T2, VP1 etc., and Z ontology 225, 226, see also meta• probability 10, 27, 67, 79-122, 326; physics and nihilism frequency interpretation 5, 27, 34, other minds, problem of 88, 113, 64, 83, 102, 103, 123, 206; 266, 267, 278, 280, 315, 324, logical interpretation (Carnap) 27, see also skepticism about physical 62, 64, 87, 91, 102, 103, 291, objects etc. 326; propensity interpretation 27, 83, PI (conservatism, q.v.) 218, 219-221; 102,103,123,326; PIa 219,220; relativized (to persons, times or Plb 219,220; evidence) 34, 43, 56, 188, 289, PIc 219,220; 290; P2 218,219,221; single case problem 102,123; P3 218, 221-223, see also CP; SUbjectivist interpretation 27, 64, P4 220,221; 66,83,102,103,327 P5 221,222 INOEX OF SUBJECTS 339 probability calculus 32, 50, 55, 58, 63, , statement, and such, see basic, 70, 100, 109, 139, 140, 224, belief, given, memory, observa• 292,325 tion, phenomenal, physical object, probability kinematics 44 nonbasic, psychological, Ramsey, probability of one 44, 50, 78 theoretical and universal psychological-report 30, 113 simplicity (test for explanatory systems) psychophysics 276, 289, see also phys- 146, 196, 197, 203, 204, 225- iology 251 passim, 296; matrix- 244, 245, 262, 274, see also qualitative predicate 204-208 definition 031; quantitation (test for explanatory sys• prefix- 245, 246, 262, 274, 277, tems) 208, 223, 247-249, 262, see also definitions 029 and 030 274 simplicity, descriptive 5; quarks 230, 232,250 Goodman's calculus 233,240-245; and information content 233, 234; R xi, 89, 90, 107; structural 243 R1 52, 137, 138; "situation 1" (Sl, distinct from Sl, R2 137, 149, 150, 158, 159 above) 104,105; Ramsey-sentence 228-232 S2 106,107; rationality xxvi, 221 S3 107,108,109 reasonableness xi, xiv, xix, xxvii, 7, 8, skeptical argument I 30, 52-57, 111, 14, 16, 26, 27, 42, 87, 94, 98, 229; 99, 303, 306, see also acceptabili• premise 1 30, 57, 75, see also ty, certainty and justification Lewis principle L4; refutability (test for explanatory sys• premise 3 34,35,50-53; tems) 146,196-202 premise 5 54, 76, see also skeptical refutation xix, xxi; argument III, premise 1; vs. convincing xxv premise 6 54,76,77; Reichenbach's argument against HI premise 8 54,76,77; 33, 34 premise 9 54, 76, 79, see also M, S, relevance (negative) 141, 142, 155 skeptical argument II 53, 54, 55-57, rigidity 63 67,75,111,299; premise 7 76, see also skeptical Sl (Lehrer theory) 140,141-143 argument III, premise 2; scientific explanation, see explanation premise 9 57, see also Lewis princi• 4,6,9,10 ple L3; scientific millenium 153 premise 10 76 scientific realism 324 skeptical argument III 75, 76, 77, 98, scientific theory, justification of 190, 111,299,300; 199, see also explanatory system premise 1 79, 98, 113-116, 119, scope (test for explanatory systems) see also skeptical argument I, 146, 196, 208-215, 223, 235, premise 5; 247, 248, 262, 263, 274, 304, premise 2 79, 80, 87, 98-101, see also definition 025 109-111, see also skeptical argu• self-completeness 241, 251 ment II, premise 7 self-presenting state 91,92 skeptical argument IV 112,300,301; sentence, eternalized 182, 183, 195, premise 1 113-121; 259,260,273 premise 2 116,119-122; 340 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

premise 3 121, see also foundational subjectivist theory of justification, see principle FP1; justification premise 4 113; SUbjunctive conditional 81-83,205-207, premise 6 120 266 skeptical argument V 120, 162, 299, systemic test, see test for explanatory 301; systems premise 2 122, 162, 163, 194 skepticism (epistemological) xi, 127, T1 (theorem of probability) 32, 33,63, 155, 183, 196, 250, 255, 265, 66,111,166; 281,316; T232,33 first level xiv, xv, 281; testability (test for explanatory systems) Humean (second level, moderate" 196-203, 208, 215, 223, 229,

or moderate2 -moderate, )xvi-xix, 247,261,263,274,296, see also xxiv-xxviii, 1, 281; definitions D22 and D23 impossible to believe xiv, xviii, xxiii; test for explanatory systems, formal about induction (q. v.) xxi, xxviii, 1, 226, 227, 232; 19,24,282,288,314; hierarchy of 223,248; moderate xii, 194, 282; nonevidential 146, 155, 202, 213, moderate, xvi, xx-xxiii, xxvi, xxvii, 221-223,263; 1, 3, 11-13, 17-19, 25, 26, 75, syntactic 227,232,233; 279-283, 287, 288, 296-301, systemic 146, 196, 261-263, 286; see also M, Si; see also conservatism, consistency,

moderate2 xiv, xv-xvii, xxiii; cumulativity, economy, explanat•

moderate2 -moderate, xxi, xxv, 1, ory relevance, familiarity, fecun• 11; dity, generality, lawlikeness, neurotic 114,115; quantitation, refutability, scope, about physical objects, the past, the simplicity, testability, truth and future and other minds xv, xviii• universality xxvi, 3, 11-13, 18, 19, 25, 31, theoretical entity 227, 228, 232 76, 110, 111, 120, 193-196, theoretical statement 153, 154, 188, 249, 252, 255-257, 261, 265- 195,201,250,322 267, 279, 281, 288, 310, 314; theoretical term 147,230,262, see also refutation of xiii-xxviii, xx-xxiv, observation term see also master argument; topic- 29,55 second level xiii-xvi, xix-xxiii; traditional foundationalism, see founda• strong X1l1, xvi; tional theory weak, 25,26; truth (test for explanatory systems) 196

weak2 xii, xiv, xv; truth, coherence theory 150-152, 155;

weak2 -moderate, xvi-xx, xxvi, 17, correspondence theory 145,152; 19,34 pragmatic theory 152 skepticism, ontological xi, xii, xv, xviii, 315 of science 151 solipsism 315 universal statement 210, 211, 214,216, ST (systemic tests, q. v.) 248 217; standard observer 228,264,265 nonprobabilistic 207, 262, 275, 276 state 234 universality (test for explanatory sys• straight rule of induction, see induction tems) 196, 204-209, 223, 224, INDEX OF SUBJECTS 341

229, 230, 247-249, 262, 263, VPI (principle of vindication) 4, 5-8, 274,277 283; VP2 6,7; validation 4, 8, 9, see also vindication VP3 7, 12, 283, see also master vindication xxviii, 3, 5, 8, 12,283,284, argument, premise IV see also VP1, VP2 and VP3 Z (Cartesian demon thesis, q.v.) 95, 96, 97 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES IN PHILOSOPHY

Editors: , Univ. of Pittsburgh and KEITH LEHRER, Univ. of Arizona

Board of Consulting Editors: Jonathan Bennett, Alan Gibbard, Stalnaker, and Robert G. Turnbull

1. JAY F. ROSENBERG, Linguistic Representation, 1974. 2. WILFRID SELLARS, Essays in Philosophy and Its History, 1974. 3. DICKINSON S. MILLER, Philosophical Analysis and Human Welfare. Selected Essays and Chapters from Six Decades. Edited with an Introduction by Lloyd D. Easton, 1975. 4. KEITH LEHRER (ed.), Analysis and Metaphysics. Essays in Honor of R. M. Chisholm. 1975. 5. CARL GINET, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, 1975. 6. PETER H. HARE and EDWARD H. MADDEN, Causing, Perceiving and Believing. An Examination of the Philosophy ofe. J. Ducasse, 1975. 7. HECTOR-NERI CASTANEDA, Thinking and Doing. The Philosophical Foundations of Institutions, 1975. 8. JOHN L. POLLOCK, Subjunctive Reasoning, 1976. 9. BRUCE AUNE, Reason and Action, 1977. 10. GEORGE SCHLESINGER, Religion and Scientific Method, 1977. 11. YIRMIAHU YOVEL (ed.), Philosophy of History and Action. Papers presented at the first Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, December 1974, 1978. 12. JOSEPH C. PITT, The Philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars: Queries and Extensions, 1978. 13. ALVIN I. GOLDMAN and , Values and Morals. Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt, 1978. 14. MICHAEL J. LOUX, Substance and Attribute. A Study in Ontology, 1978. 15. (ed.), The Philosophy of : Discussion and Replies, 1979. 16. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Retribution, Justice, and Therapy. Essays in the , 1979. 17. GEORGE S. PAPPAS, Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology, 1979. 18. JAMES W. CORNMAN, Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation, 1980. 19. , Time and Cause. Essays presented to Richard Taylor, 1980. 20. DONALD NUTE, Topics in Conditional Logic, 1980