WALTER N. GREGORY SKEPTICISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND EXPLANATION: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY This is a selective bibliography in which references are classified by topics. The topics are listed roughly in the order in which they are taken up in the text. SKEPTICISM Positions of Skepticism: A Historical Survey Ontological Skepticism. Since the distinction between ontological and epistemological skepticism is generally conflated in the literature it is often difficult to isolate those authors who are genuine ontological skep­ tics. Probably the first serious ontological skeptic and nihilist was the sophist Gorgias who argued in his treatise 'On That Which Is Not, or On Nature', that nothing exists. There have been a number of ontological skeptics and nihilists regarding God's existence including Bertrand Rus­ sell in Sceptical Essays (New York: W.W. Norton, 1928) and Why I Am Not a Christian (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957) and Albert Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus (New York: Random House, 1955). Although perhaps no one was ever a genuine ontological skeptic concerning the existence of other minds, a true solipsist, arguments for solipsism can be found in Johann Fichte, The Vocation of Man (Indianapolis: Bobbs­ Merrill, 1956), chs. 5 and 6; and Russell, Human Knowledge (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), pt. 3, ch. 2. The most famous ontological skeptic regarding the existence of a nonmental external world is undoubt­ edly Bishop George Berkeley in Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Phi/onous and A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Other famous idealists include Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind; and F.H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (London: Oxford University Press, 1930). Several versions of phenomenalism are discussed in detail in Cornman, Perception, Common Sense, and Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Un­ iversity Press, 1975), which contains numerous bibliographic references­ see especially the appendix. 315 316 BIBLIOGRAPHY Epistemological Skepticism. Beginning with Socrates' assessment of his own wisdom as not thinking "that I know what I do not know", found in Plato, Apologia 21d, there have been a great many outright epis­ temological skeptics and philosophers who have advanced epistemological skeptical arguments. The most famous, and last, Pyrrhonian was Sextus Empiricus whose principle works were Pyrrhoniarum Hypotyposes and Adversus Mathematicos. Translations of these works are contained in Sextus Empiricus (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1933). Erasmus appeared as a religious skeptic in a controversy with Luther in the sixteenth century. His views are expressed in In Praise of Folly and De Libero Arbitrio. Montaigne, in Apologie de Raymond Sebond, was another religious skeptic who argued that human powers alone were incapable of achieving true knowledge which could only be attained through faith. A major skeptic who greatly influenced Hume was Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire Historique et Critique. Secondary sources on skepticism in ancient philosophy include E.R. Bevan, Stoics and Sceptics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1913); Norman Maccoll, The Greek Sceptics, from Pyrrho to Sextus (London: Macmillan, 1869); and Eduard Zeller (Oswald J. Reichel, trans.), The Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962). David Hume as Skeptic. Hume's skeptical views are contained in David Hume (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed.), A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon, 1888); An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding . (Oxford: Clarendon, 1894), and David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947). Principal commen­ taries on these works include A.G.N. Flew, Hume's Philosophy of Belief (New York: Humanities Press, 1961); T.H. Green, General Introduction to Hume's Treatise (London: Oxford University Press, 1874); N. Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London: Macmillan, 1941); J.A. Passmore, Hume's Intentions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); and David C. Stove, Probability and Hume's Inductive Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973). Articles devoted to Hume's skepticism are legion but the following con­ stitute some of more recent: W.L. Robison, 'Hume's Scepticism', Dialogue 12 (1973),87-99; J.O. Nelson, 'Two Main Questions Concerning Hume's "Treatise" and "Enquiry" " Philosophical Review 81 (1972), 333-360; J. Kekes, 'Beliefs and Scepticism', Philosophical Forum 1 (1969), 353-358; J.E. Adler, 'Stove on Hume's Inductive Scepticism', Australasian Journal BIBLIOGRAPHY 317 of Philosophy 53 (1975), 167-170; and T.L. Beauchamp and T.A. Mappes, 'Is Hume Really a Sceptic About Induction', American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975), 119-129. For an extensive treatment of skepticism in the modern period of the history of philosophy including Hume, see the following works by Richard H. Popkin: 'David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of Pyr­ rhonism', Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1950-1951), 385-407; 'Berkeley and Pyrrhonism', Review of Metaphysics 5 (1951-1952), 223-246; 'David Hume and the Pyrrhonian Controversy', Review of Metaphysics 6 (1952- 1953), 65-81; 'The Sceptical Crisis and the Rise of Modern Philosophy', Review of Metaphysics 7 (1953-1954), 132-151, 307-322, 499-510; 'The Skeptical Precursors of David Hume', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16 (1955), 61-71; The History of Scepticism From Erasmus to Descartes (New York: Humanities Press, 1964); and 'The High Road to Pyrrhonism', American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965), 1-15. Contemporary Works on Skepticism Skeptics. One of the growing list of philosophers who has seriously at­ tempted to defend skepticism in the twentieth century is Peter Unger. His book Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975) con­ tains revised versions of the following papers; 'A Defense of Skepticism', Philosophical Review 80 (1971), 198-219; 'An Argument for Skepticism', Philosophical Exchange 1 (1974), 131-155; 'Propositional Verbs and Knowledge', Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972), 301-312; 'The Wages of Scepticism', American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973), 177-187; 'Two Types of Scepticism', Philosophical Studies 25 (1974), 77-98; and'Truth', in M.K. Munitz and P. Unger (eds.), Semantics and Philosophy (New York: New York University Press, 1974). Various responses to Unger's position are listed in the next section. Another serious argument for epistemological skepticism is in K. Lehrer, 'Why Not Skepticism', The Philosophical Forum 23 (1971), 283- 298. See also, Lehrer, 'Skepticism and Conceptual Change' in R. Chis­ holm and R.J. Swartz (eds.), Empirical Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973). See also I.T. Oakley, 'An Argument for Scepticism Concerning Justified Beliefs', American Philosophical Quarterly 13 (1976), 221-228. Critics of Skepticism. G.E. Moore vigorously attacked skepticism after the turn of the century. His anti skeptical papers are included in these 318 BIBLIOGRAPHY collections of his essays: Some Main Problems of Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), Philosophical Studies (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1922), and Philosophical Papers (New York: Humanities Press, 1959). Moore's position was strongly criticized by Wittgenstein although he remained a staunch antiskeptic himself. Most of Wittgen­ stein's criticisms are collected in G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (eds.) (D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, trans.), On Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969). The following are relatively recent articles which are generally critical towards skepticism: P. Olscamp, 'Wittgenstein's Re­ futation of Skepticism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (1965-1966), 239-247; J. Wolfe, 'Dreaming and Skepticism', Mind 80 (1971), 605-606; J. Agassi, 'The Standard Misinterpretation of Skepti­ cism', Philosophical Studies 22 (1971), 49-50; J. Kekes, 'Skepticism and External Questions', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (1971), 325-340; R.L. PurtiIl, 'Some Varieties of Epistemological Skepticism', Philosophia 1 (1971), 107-116; R.L. Purtill, 'Epistemological Skepticism Again', Philosophical Forum 3 (1972), 138-144; T. Clarke, 'The Legacy of Skepticism', Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972), 745-769; G.W. Barnes, 'Unger's Defense of Skepticism', Philosophical Studies 24 (1973), 119-124; K. Nielson, 'On Refusing to Play the Skeptic's Game', Dialogue 11 (1972), 348-359; C.E. Marks, 'Verificationism, Scepticism, and the Private Lan­ guage Argument', Philosophical Studies 28 (1975), 151-171; R. Almeder, 'Defeasibility and Scepticism', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1973),238-244; J. Door, 'Scepticism and Dogmatism', Inquiry 16 (1973), 214-220; and J. Margolis, 'Skepticism, Foundationalism, and Pragma­ tism', American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977), 119-128. FOUNDATIONAL THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION Traditional Foundationalism Descartes' Foundationalism. The classical English translation (1911) of Descartes' works is E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, The Philosophical Works of Descartes (New York: Dover, 1955). A more recent translation is G.E.M. Anscombe and P.T. Geach (eds. and trans.), Descartes: Phil­ osophical Writings (London: Nelson, 1954). Descartes' principal writings concerning foundationalism are Meditations on First Philosophy, Dis­ course on Method, and Principles of Philosophy. Contemporary sources on Descartes' foundational theory of knowledge include: H.G. Frankfurt, 'Descartes' Validation of Reason', American BIBLIOGRAPHY 319 Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965), 149-160; A.K. Stout, 'The Basis of Knowledge in Descartes', Mind 38 (1929),