When policies fail –

Forced Eradication programs’ unintended consequences and their effect on rebel strength

Christoph Grafinger

Master's Thesis

Spring 2019

Wordcount: 15 276 words

Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University

Supervisor: Nina von Uexkull

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Table of Contents Introduction ...... 3 Literature Review: ...... 4 Natural Ressources: ...... 4 Incentives to join rebel groups ...... 5 Rebel Governance: ...... 6 Unintended Consequences: ...... 7 Research gap ...... 9 Theory ...... 10 Research Design ...... 12 Methodology ...... 12 Assumptions ...... 12 Research Question: ...... 13 Types of measurement ...... 13 Case selection: ...... 15 Definitions of Supply Sided Policy: ...... 16 Cases: ...... 17 Unintended Consequences of eradication programs in Afghanistan: ...... 17 Drug eradication in Afghanistan: ...... 20 Linking the Taliban to Drug Cultivation: ...... 22 Troop Sizes of the Taliban ...... 33 Incident reports ...... 35 Taliban finances through Opium cultivation – the Taliban war economy ...... 37 Conclusion of the analysis on Afghanistan: ...... 37 Unintended consequences of coca eradication in Colombia: ...... 38 FARC income from Coca ...... 40 Coca eradication in Colombia ...... 40 Rebel Strength of the FARC ...... 41 Troop Sizes...... 52 Incident reports: ...... 54 Conclusion of Colombian eradication effects ...... 58 Case comparison: ...... 58 Alternative explanations, limitations, confounding variables: ...... 59 Conclusion ...... 60 Bibliography ...... 61

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Abstract:

Research on supply reducing drug policy shows so called ‘unintended consequences’, following their implementation. This thesis focuses on such consequences, specifically of eradication programs, which show an increase in application in the period of 2005 and 2011. To link drug policy and conflict studies the aim of this thesis is the policies effects on the rebels who control territory, related to the cultivation of drugs. The thesis studies the rebel’s strength before, during and after the increased efforts in eradication in two cases, Colombia and Afghanistan. A connection between the effects of eradication programs and the strength of rebels can be established, although different outcomes in the cases are shown. Additionally, some insight into the underlying mechanism, connecting the means of income for farmers in rebel territory and unintended consequences of eradication programs, is gained. Introduction:

The international drug control regime established by the UN in three resolutions, 1961, 1971 and 1988, creates a basis for signatory’s countries approaches to drug policy, with an overall goal of a drug free world. The implications and consequences of the implementations of such policy guidelines have led to numerous “unintended consequences”. Mainly a flourishing global criminal market for illicit substances, linked to drug cartels, international crime and terrorism (CND, 2009, p.14). This global perspective has as much an international impact as it has a national one. This allows for a local perspective on the issues the main drug producing countries encounter. Afghanistan, responsible for roughly 90% of the global opium and heroin production, and Colombia, which produces about 60% of the global demand for cocaine, extracted from the locally grown coca leaf. The impact these drugs have on the local economy and its population are as diverse as they are extreme. Both countries have a history of a long- standing insurgency, Colombia´s Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Afghan Taliban. Both these groups allegedly weren´t involved in the production and trafficking of drugs first, but during the progression of their insurgency encountered numerous problems and benefits of already existing drug cultivation by local farmers, mostly in regions outside the grasp of the local government (Labrousse, 2005, p. 172-173). This, very generally, lead to a form of cooperation between the drug cultivators and the rebel groups. Forms of Rebel Governance established, trading a tax on the drug income for security promises from the rebel groups for physical and economic security of the rural population.

When these two realities, an international drug framework with the intention of a drug free world and local realities of drugs as a mean of income as well as insurgency finance collide with each other a conflict of major magnitude seems unavoidable. The so called “War on Drugs” unfolded and a range of policies aiming at the elimination of drug cultivation and counter insurgency were implemented and executed in the specific countries. 3

The aim of this paper is to first showcase the consequences of these policies, focusing on eradication programs, on the drug cultivators and then link these to their effects on the insurgency groups and their strength. This formulates the research question; “How do eradication programs impact rebel strength in countries with high levels of illicit drug production?”. The research gap this thesis aims to fill lies in the connection of drug policy research and conflict studies, by spanning theories of unintended consequences of drug policy further to rebel strength and peasant grievances in connection to selective incentives.

Literature Review:

To first give an overview of previous research done, this section builds a theoretical basis for the theory this thesis proposes. Each part of the literature reviews topics builds on each other to help understand what this thesis aims to explain, starting with natural resources and conflict.

Natural Ressources:

Kalyvas contributions to drugs as a resource and the organization of their extraction are portrayed in his work on civil war and organized crime from 2015. By portraying a discussion on organized crime in the context of civil war, Kalyvas explains the changing nature of civil wars and how criminal organisation can be defined and connected to conflict research. The transition of income sources for insurgencies - supported by superpowers during the cold war, into extraction of natural resources - changed the conditions for rebels to survive after their support diminished with the end of the cold war (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010, p.426-427). A criticism of a model of ‘criminal rebels’ helps to further understand the perseverance of ideology in comparison with criminal intent, on the example of the FARC, referencing research by Sanchez and Diaz from 2007. Even though the connection of drug related income and the FARC can clearly be shown, the drug production has been existent before the FARC. Through gaining control over territory the FARC stepped into an existing structure of rural income opportunities, which they control by taxation. Framing them however, as a criminal organization would be a wrong categorisation (Kalyvas, 2015 p.1521; Sanchez & Diaz, 2007). Sanchez and Diaz findings indicate that the increase in drug production is linked to the geographic intensification of the conflict in Colombia (Sanchez & Diaz, 2007).

James Piazza in a paper from 2012, links research on terrorism and political violence to the income from rebel groups. By depicting the involvement of the rebel groups in the drug trade and production the article asks the question if drug production can be linked to an increase in

4 terrorist activity. His results show a clear connection and shed light on the importance of the income generated by the rebel group through the drug production and terrorist activity especially in regions directly linked to drug production (Piazza, 2012, p.230-231).

This leads into the argumentation from Collier and Hoeffler, based on Greed and Grievance in 2004, questioning the motives of rebellion as movements based on grievances in contrast to greed to gain access to natural resources, foreign support and support by diaspora groups. When related to selective incentives the question of grievances in relation to greed from the peasant community and drug cultivation is an important discussion. In the context of Kalyvas work this shifts the perspective that rebel groups are more driven by economic incentives than political grievances. Colliers and Hoefflers research further shows that countries with high rates of poverty and the onset of lootable natural resources, including illicit ones increases the risk of conflict (2004, p.26).

Michel Ross contributions, in a paper from 2004 show that the presence of drugs stands in connection with a prolonging of conflict by financing rebel groups through the drug income.

Scott Gates and David Lektzian in a paper from 2004 investigate the connection of drug production and their influence on political institutions and military conflict. Their findings show a significant relationship between the corruption of such institutions and the onset of civil conflict (Gates, Lektzian, 2004). Through the access of rebel groups to natural resources their capacity can be increased and create additional incentives for rebels to join. Secondly it weakens state structures and ability to provide public goods. Overall the weakening of state capacities shows a stronger relation to drug activity, than strengthen the rebel groups, but support for both can be found (ibid., p. 26-27).

Following the natural resource research, the next section aims at the connection of the resources and the territory they exist in, to the communities and people living in the territories. To show the circumstantial conditions of drug policies, rebel strength and the local communities Lichbachs theory on rebel peasants and selective incentives serves a theoretical basis.

Incentives to join rebel groups

A paper by Mark Lichbach from 1994, gives insight into the circumstances of rebel resistance and what factors influence their decision to join them. A linkage of peasant grievances and market economy stand as the explanatory variable. Without the possibility to create economic income for their own subsistence, grievances are created that lead peasants to rebel. This

5 relationship is better defined by Lichbach as; “peasant struggles are rebellions against the market's destabilization of peasant communities” (Lichbach, 1994, p.384). While this argumentation allows for some insight, it has been criticised by rational theorists, mainly Mancur Olson, and further developed by Lichbach himself. Lichbachs causal argument evolves around Selective Incentives and how they contribute to overcome Collective Action problems for peasants to join a rebellion. Lichbach defines three conditions: the availability of private goods as some benefit for the peasants. The different impact on the participating peasants in the rebellion and free riders. And the condition under which participation is rewarded with an extra private good or side payment, an extra benefit that is only provided to participants (ibid, p.388-389). This framework builds the multiplicity of payoffs for the peasants, including divisible and excludable private goods as well as non- divisible and nonexcludable public goods (ibid. p.389). This allows for a casual mechanism linking peasant communities and their motivations to associate themselves with rebel groups.

Relating this to the subject of the production of illicit substances, I argue that the decision for local farmers in rebel controlled or contested areas to cultivate illicit substances can be defined as a form of rebellion and contest of an official legal structure. The provision of private goods can be framed as the income made through the selling of illicit crops, in a criminal structure of drug trafficking and production provided by the rebel groups. Additionally, the provision of security for the farmers and their crop fields by the rebel group, stands as another exclusive private good. Nonexcludable public goods can be defined in some form of rebel governance that allow for organization of society during wartime, which will be further defined in the rebel governance section.

While Lichbach´s research is more focused on individual preferences and the mechanisms behind individual decision making, the following topic of rebel governance gives greater insight into the relationship between communities under rebel control and the controlling role the rebels take in the unusual circumstances of social order during wartime. This helps the thesis to create an argument that policy decisions made with a purpose to weaken rebels also influences the population.

Rebel Governance: Ana Arjona´s research on rebel governance builds upon a ‘theory of social order’ during wartime. The theory is built on the idea that despite the onset of (civil) war, civilian life is still functioning, but exists based on a different set of rules for behaviour. This functions around a structure of informal and/or formal rules, norms and practices (Arjona, 2016, p.21). These are

6 created by some form of institutions and civilians can build their expectations around predictable outcomes based on the structures. This order in war zones is managed by the relationship between combatants and local actors, in territories which are contested or under control of rebel groups (ibid. p.21-22).

The aim of the rebels is to hold territory and maximize the benefits the territory gives them access to. This includes “economic resources, accessing key networks, recruiting new members, and gaining popular support” (ibid. p.45). The control over the population and their support functions in two ways, one is obedience and the other spontaneous support. Mass obedience is a key factor for rebel governance, but without voluntary support long term control over territory is not possible (ibid. p.46-47). Arjona further suggest that civilians hold preferences, which are safety, no fear of physical harm and death, and the way they are governed, assuming civilians “care about the institutions they have to follow” (ibid. p.47). This frames the concept for the necessity of a social contract between the rebels and the population to control territory, gain local support and access resources on a long-term basis (ibid. p. 48).

Arjonas findings conclude for one the incentives for members of local communities to join rebels are increased when rebel groups already show existing structures, differing from the collective action problem existent when rebel groups are forming in the beginning (ibid. p.295- 296). Furthermore, an important aspect for the creation of institutional structures is a set of long-term goals by the rebels, without a “long time horizon”, chaos is more likely to emerge and rebel governance unlikely to evolve (ibid. p.298). By enabling civilian life under the condition of expectable processes by the rebels, a daily routine is made possible (ibid. p.299- 300).

Arjonas research in combination with Lichbachs work on selective incentives creates a framework for this thesis argument of civilian cooperation with rebel groups holding territory for economic incentives but also local support and recruitment.

Finally, the theory of unintended consequences builds the basis for analysis of drug policy impacts and in this thesis creates the theory for the independent variable proposed.

Unintended Consequences: In 2009 a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, which for the first time in a long-standing history of the international drug control system, stated so called ‘unintended consequences’. These side effects of a drug control regime involve a flourishing criminal market, linked to drug cartels, international crime and terrorism (CND, 2009, p.14).

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Pierre-Arnaud Chouvy in his paper “A Typology of the Unintended Consequences of Drug Crop Reduction” provides a framework for a causal mechanism linking supply sided policy and their effects on local farmers.

Chouvys article provides an extensive definition and framework of unintended consequences, which consist of two main types of unintended consequences. First the unintended consequences of an action, which Chouvy phrases as ‘direct (unintended) consequences’ and then secondly the unintended consequences of the intended consequences, which he calls ‘collateral (unintended) consequences’ (Chouvy, 2013. p.219-220). These types of action, in his typology, have three different effects, first a ‘beneficial’ one, which though unintended, creates some positive outcome. Secondly a harmful effect, which has a hurting effect on the population effected. Thirdly a perverse effect, which describes counterproductive effects, contrary to the original intent of the action (ibid. p.221). Following this typology Chouvy describes, in Figure 1, how this relates to the example of unintended consequences eradication can have after implementation. The original ‘Intended consequence’ of the policy implementation is suppressed cultivation. The beneficial side-effect of eradication in ‘direct unintended consequences’ is described as a restoration of the official law, the harmful effects as an increase in violence and the perverse effect as a term called ‘Ballon effect’, describing the territorial shift of drug production (ibid. p.221). The second type of unintended consequences are ‘Collateral Unintended Consequences’, which are additional consequences created by the first type of unintended consequences. These again have beneficial, harmful and perverse effects. The beneficial collateral consequence is described in a price hike. This is explained through a reduction in available crops, the price for the illicit substance rises, following economic logic of supply and demand (ibid. p.221). The harmful side of the ‘Collateral Unintended Consequence’ is shown as an increase in poverty. The Perverse consequence is stated as an increase in cultivation explained in an effort from cultivators to rebalance supply and meet demand. This illustrates a reverse effect of the initially intended consequence; a reduction of illicit crop cultivation (ibid. p.221).

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Figure 1

Chouvy, 2013

The literature on unintended consequences goes as far as linking the intention of supply sided policy, to reduce or eliminate drug production, to a mechanism of grievances for drug cultivators in the local economies. The aim of this thesis is to string this existing mechanism further and show that these perverse unintended consequences have a deeper impact on conflict settings in which a functioning insurgency group is taking over state tasks and benefit further from these effects. Meaning, the insurgency groups strength increases through the policies that aim at decreasing their means of income, creating an additional collateral consequence.

A second perspective comes from counterinsurgency efforts that are tied to the counternarcotic programs of US intervention. As these are closely linked their intentions are two-fold, eliminating drug production and trafficking and dismantling the rebel groups (Chouvy, 2009, p.117-118). This intention again creates unintended consequences and the assumption of this paper, another counterproductive policy and perverse unintended consequence.

Research gap

When looking at the existing literature on drugs as a natural resource and income source for rebel groups a variety of topics have been covered and can be identified in Peace and Conflict Studies, Terrorism Research, Political Science and Criminal Justice literature. Peace and Conflict Studies focus on the relationship of drugs and the onset and duration of war, the formation of institutional structures in rebel-controlled territory, rebel recruitment among the local population, forms of organized crime in civil wars and the question of rebel incentives between greed and grievance claims. The framework the criminal justice literature provides can link all these topics together, for the assumptions of this thesis to function. The proposed research gap this thesis locates itself is by adding an additional step to the ‘unintended consequences model’ explaining the counterproductive side-effects supply reduction policies

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have and show how it potentially influences rebel strength. While previous research in the field of drug policy research has been done on the effects of drug policy, the link to rebel strength has only seen mentions but no explicit data collection. This thesis takes two well researched cases, Colombia and Afghanistan, both examples of long-term insurgencies with a link to illicit substance production. Then analyses the relationship of the realities local communities encounter and the supply reduction policies implemented, to produce evidence that mentioned policies not only work counterproductive on illicit crop reduction but also counterproductive in weakening the economic and support basis for the rebel groups.

Figure 1.1 Intended consequence: Weaken rebel strength Chouvy, 2013

Collateral unintended consequences

Beneficial Harmful Perverse

Increase Increase Increase rebel rebel income Local recruitment community and strength grievances Theory

Counternarcotic efforts can be linked to counterinsurgency tactics which aim at reducing the rebel groups income sources. Through the addition of a further step in the theory of unintended consequences, seen in Figure 1.1, collateral unintended consequences for counterinsurgency efforts to reduce rebel’s capacity to fight can be depicted. The counternarcotic effects have negative implications on rebel strength leading to harmful outcomes, which are shown in an increase of local grievances, these grievances create a ‘perverse’ effect that is the increase in rebel recruitment, by incentives for locals to join the rebels. Additionally, through the beneficial collateral consequences of eradication programs prices for drugs increase and through the perverse effects production increases. Both lead to a beneficial outcome for the rebel groups creating an increase in rebel income. 10

Based on research by Chouvy and Mansfield explaining the counterproductive nature of supply reduction policies, my theory proposes that rebel groups exploit existing structures of illicit crop production and the negative implications eradication programs create to strengthen themselves by increasing troop sizes and income through the drug trade to gain territory and additional access to resources as well as local support. Furthermore, the proposed theory sheds light on the underlying mechanisms of local grievances. These create incentives for the local communities to support the rebels who contest or control the territory the communities exist in. To highlight the relationship of the existing theory and the addition this thesis proposes, Figure 1.2 below shows the causal framework of the theory.

Causal Framework: Figure 1.2

Crop Eradication Increase in Program Rebel

Strength

Rebel security & institutional structure Destruction of create local support and Increase in drug farmers means of incentives to join rebel production & rebel income: grievances group recruitment

The causal mechanism is based on the independent variable, crop eradication programs and the dependent variable relative rebel strength. Through the unintended consequences of eradication programs local grievances are created which is the first part of the underlying mechanism. The provision of security and public goods by the rebel group creates incentives for the local population to join the rebel cause. This leads to an increase in rebel recruitment and an increase in drug production, allowing for increased troop sizes and economic income. Ultimately leading to an increase in relative rebel strength.

Hypothesis:

The proposed hypothesis is based on a twostep process for the in-case analysis. First the relationship between eradication programs and relative rebel strength leads to the first hypothesis:

H1: Eradication programs are associated with an increase in rebel strength

A second contributing hypothesis can be derived from the existing research models from Chouvy explaining how eradication programs create counterproductive outcomes that lead to 11 an increase in drug production, this increase in drug production can be linked to an increase in the income generated by the rebel groups. This can happen through either directly linking the rebels to drug cultivation and trafficking as well as established structures for taxation of the drug production.

H2: An increase in drug production leads to an increase in rebel income

The underlying mechanism leading to the outcome of the theoretical framework are defined in local grievances that lead to an increase in incentives for local communities to join the rebels, creating the third hypothesis:

H3: Local grievances are created by eradication programs that lead to an increase in rebel support

Research Design

Methodology:

The analysis this thesis offers is based on a theory building process tracing method in a small- N case study, that aims at explaining the relationship of the independent variable (IV), eradication programs, on the dependent variable (DP), relative rebel strength. This is based on qualitative research identifying observable indicators for the independent and dependent variable to create evidence for their correlation. By linking the relationship of IV and DP to an underlying causal mechanism of farmer grievances and rebel support this causal bridge allows for a deeper understanding of the specific cases. After the analysis of the in-case processes a comparison between the two cases, rebel insurgency in Colombia and Afghanistan, can be done for a coherent theory to develop and create a framework for potential future research on similar cases; rebel-controlled territory in Myanmar for example. Overall the use of qualitative methods is more intended for theory building and can be difficult for generalization, which would be better done by large-n quantitative studies. Therefore, this thesis sees its limitations for applicability to other cases, as the conditions in the case selection are very specific. The in-case variation is based on temporal variation researching the condition of the dependent variable, rebel strength, before, during and after observed peaks in eradication programs. Furthermore, the cross-country comparison of Afghanistan and Colombia adds spatial variation.

Assumptions:

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The assumptions for the analysis are that the rebel groups act as a unified entity, this thesis does not aim at potential disagreements inside rebel structures. Furthermore, the rebel’s final goal is to gain control over the existing government, through maintenance of territorial and local community control their influence is slowly but steadily spreading. I further assume that the researched rebel groups are linked to illicit substances, specifically the control over their production. Assumptions about eradication programs are that their use is aimed at eliminating drug production and the linked income source for the rebel groups. The overarching goal of international drug policy is the creation of a drug free world. Local community assumptions are based on their need for security and income sources to sustain their families. Their preferences are based on their subsistence not who controls or governs them, if the actions of the controlling party happen in an expectable way, allowing for a form of ‘normal’ daily routines (Arjona, 2016, p.47 & 299).

Research Question: The proposed research question following the causal framework is the following: “How do eradication programs impact rebel strength in countries with high levels of illicit drug production?”

Types of measurement Rebel Strength: Literature on rebel strength contributes to the definition and indicators for rebel strength in this thesis. It is mainly related to publications on mediation and assessment if peace negotiations are at a fitting moment.

Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan in their work from 2013, provide several indicators that help defining rebel strength. These include troop sizes, their strength in contesting government forces and the capability to mobilize additional support from the local communities. Additionally, the ability of rebels to procure arms and their capacity to effectively fight and challenge the government in relation to each other’s troop size (Cunningham, et. Al, 2013, p. 521-522). These assessments of rebel strength are supported by Govinda Clayton, who introduces a framework of ‘Relative Rebel Strength’ that relates to the issue of many rebel groups having insufficient personnel and access to arms, but through persistence and guerrilla warfare can contest the government on a long-term basis (p. 611-612). Stating, “the absolute strength of a belligerent is less important than its strength in relation to its opponent” (Clayton,

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2013, p. 611). DeRouen and Sobek, 2004, include factors in size of the rebel group, equipment, location and leadership structure.

Measurements for Rebel Strength are derived from reports by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Afghanistan showcasing rebel support, territorial control and incidence reports. The Colombian News Outlet Colombia Reports provides Troop Size data and the UCDP background information section contributes with additional sources for troop sizes. UNODC data on drug cultivation in Afghanistan and Colombia adds drug cultivation reports by country departments as well as a report by Camilo Echandía Castilla that contributes with territory maps and incidence reports in Colombia. Gilles Dorronsoro additionally gives indicators for rebel control and ethnic association.

This creates three different indicators used for Rebel Strength:

- Territory influenced or controlled by rebel groups through maps - Troop sizes over time by statistical data - Number of fighting incidences connected to the rebel group

Validity and reliability of the chosen indicators are created by their combination, while the single indicators might not be sufficient, a combination of three indicators with variation in validity can create functioning measurements for rebel strength.

Measurements for eradication programs, the independent variable, focus on statistical data from the RAND Corporation report on Afghanistan from 2015, UNODC Reports on Afghanistan and Colombia from 2003 until 2011 as well as reports in later stages until today. The measurements show the amount of eradication in a measurement of hectares eradicated. They are valid and reliable as they aim specifically at statistical data of eradication programs.

The measurement of the effects of eradication programs is based on the unintended consequence research by Chouvy and contextual drug research by David Mansfield. By establishing the existing problematic of such programs, the continuation for this thesis’ theory can be created. With the help of UNODC maps on drug cultivation the so-called balloon effect can be shown. The research on unintended consequences should create reliable indicators and create validity in some form. The addition of cultivation maps adds validity to the proposed theory, further indicating their effects.

To measure local grievances and the linkage to incentives for rebels to join, indicators are created based on observations made in reports by Chouvy and Mansfield in their research on the effects of eradication programs, especially interviews with local farmers and combatants. 14

These indicators are based on secondary sources, as access to the interviews themselves is not possible. The indicators are spread over a variety of qualitative source material and assessing validity and reliability is difficult as they are based on secondary source material, not allowing direct insight into the answers. They serve as contextual information adding additional information to the causal mechanism.

The measurements on increased drug production can be derived by UNODC data on drug cultivation and graphs showing the number of drugs cultivated. These measures are valid and reliable as indicators for drug production, as the UNODC provides extensive research for measurements of cultivation.

Case selection: The case selection of Afghanistan and Colombia was motivated by their unique status as two of the biggest drug producers in the world. From a methodological standpoint the cases are most-similar from an exploratory perspective, showing constants in the independent variable, eradication programs, with difference in the outcome of the dependent variable, rebel strength, across cases. Similar observations in the background variable, described in the contextual evidence of local farmer situations, can be made. Colombia is the main production country for Cocaine, by covering roughly 60% of the international criminal supply. Afghanistan produces about 90% of the worldwide heroine and the opium business is related to 53% of the countries GDP (UNODC, 2007). Both countries have a history of long-time insurgency, the longest standing conflict of the FARC in Colombia since the 1960´s and the Taliban in Afghanistan since the early 1990´s. Both insurgencies are closely linked to the production of illicit substances. Both cases have seen extensive use of eradication programs. The timeframe for a specifically high rate of these supply reduction efforts start in 2000 and end around 2010/2011. The most interesting part in both countries is the special relationship the insurgencies created with local communities, which allow them continued territorial control over occupied regions. Forms of rebel governance are established and their influence on the population and the insurgents can be observed. Overall these two cases create viable examples to research the influence of eradication programs on rebel strength and have been well researched in the past. The variance in the outcome can be explained looking at a long-term perspective. While eradication programs in both cases had short term negative effects on rebel strength, the Taliban in Afghanistan are still very prevalent until today, while the FARC in Colombia agreed to their disarmament and demobilization after a peace agreement in 2016.

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Definitions of Supply Sided Policy: Counter Narcotic efforts have a variety of policies targeting different sides of the narcotics trade, production and consumption. Supply Sided Drug Policy focuses on the reduction or elimination of illicit drug production to eliminate the original source of illicit substances in the global criminal market. Tools to achieve this goal are crop eradication programs, alternative development programs or out right bans of illicit substances (Chouvy, 2013, 225).

Eradication:

Eradication is a major part of supply reduction focused policy. It´s application is based on forced destruction of crop fields, which can be done manually, “thrashing of poppy fields by hand”, mechanically, using tractors, helicopters and planes, chemically, using “herbicides such as glyphosate, or Agent Orange” or biologically, “fungi or mycoherbicides, also known as ‘Agent Green’” (Chouvy, 2009, p.157). The eradication is executed by eradication teams which are often accompanied by the police or the military (IHRA, Briefing 6). Crop eradication programs have been used in Peru, Bolivia and Colombia against coca bushes and in Afghanistan, Laos and Myanmar against opium poppies.

Aerial Spraying:

Next to manual eradication spraying of large areas with chemicals by planes or helicopters serves as an additional form of eradication. The problem with this kind of eradication is first, through the widespread areas aerial sprayings cover, not only the cultivated drugs but also licit forms of farming are affected, secondly the chemicals have devastating impacts on the environment and human health (Ruiz, 2015, p.58-59). Aerial spraying has mostly been used in Colombia but has seen a sharp decline in the past couple of years.

The Balloon Effect:

The balloon effect is the displacement of one area of production to another one, due to eradication, based on an “economic description of what happens when, given a fairly elastic supply function but fairly inelastic demand function, temporary supply reductions lead to higher prices subsequently stimulating greater supply production” (Ruiz, 2015, p.58) , which describes the impact on drug cultivation and its spatial shifting.

Alternative Development:

Following eradication programs, substitute programs that encourage the local farmers to grow licit crops are often implemented. The goal is a transition to conventional agriculturalism. The problem with these policies is mostly based on funding, as they are long term projects that need 16 oversight and continued financial help over a long period of time, for the implemented crops to grow and allow a viable income source for the farmers (Chouvy, 2013, p.223).

Opium-Ban:

Examples for outright bans of the cultivation of opium have been seen in Myanmar and Afghanistan. Through a ban of cultivation, enforced by local institutions in agreement with the local authorities, drug cultivation is made illegal and intolerable. An Opium Ban by the Afghan Taliban back in 2000 showed strong short-term success by reducing local production to the lowest numbers in the history of Afghan opium cultivation (Chouvy, 2009, p.151). After the fall of their governance in 2001 and the Afghanistan invasion by the US, however, drug production was back to former levels of production (ibid. p.151). An Opium-Ban in Myanmar, in agreement with the locally ruling rebel groups showed some success, reducing the levels of cultivation, but eliminating the main income source for a large portion of the rural communities (ibid. p.152). The problematic of unavailable alternatives of income for farmers in short term implemented bans is consistent with other forms of supply reduction efforts. Additionally, the imbalance in supply creates price hikes for the specific substances, creating additional incentives to cultivate them (ibid. p.225).

Cases:

Unintended Consequences of eradication programs in Afghanistan:

“Opium is simultaneously a conflict good, an illicit commodity and a means of survival” - (Goodhand, 2005, p.211)

This part of the thesis aims at explaining the circumstances and context behind opium cultivation in Afghanistan to then frame the major problems eradication programs bring with them in the form of unintended consequences.

Opium production in Afghanistan by the rural population is “a means of coping with poverty and food insecurity” (Chouvy, 2009, p. 157), making forced eradication often counterproductive as it makes already difficult livelihoods even more vulnerable (ibid. p.157). The main aspect for the reasoning behind eradication programs is, next to the goal of eliminating income sources for rebel groups and efforts to tackle the root causes of drug trafficking and addiction, the perspective that opium production creates corruption and addiction (ibid. p.157-158). An additional argument from counternarcotic officials is that opium is cultivated out of choice and greed, instead of need (ibid. p.158). Chouvy however argues that 17 opium production is a consequence of “poverty related problems such as food insecurity, land scarcity and labour shortages” (ibid. p.158).

This creates a discussion for definition power over poverty and reasoning behind opium cultivation, mainly argued by the UNODC stating in 2006 “the largest opium poppy cultivation provinces are not the poorest” (UNODC, 2006, p.28) and David Mansfield and Adam Pain; “the claim of the relative wealth of farmers in the south [of Afghanistan] is not supported by the available data” (Mansfield, Pain, 2007, p.14).

Taking a closer look at Mansfields research in Afghanistan the context of weather conditions ,access to land and technical equipment are major drivers in the decision to grow opium. “The majority of households do not produce sufficient wheat flour to meet their basic food requirements even if they cultivated wheat on their land since landholdings are typically to small, household members to numerous and wheat yield too low (Mansfield, 2007, p.19-20).

This shows that not all the land available to Afghan farmers is devoted to opium production, in fact only 7% of total irrigated land (Chouvy, 2009, p.135). When it comes to draught in

Figure 2

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Afghanistan farmers rely on a sustainable income source and in some cases weather conditions only allow for one harvest a year. The main licit crop grown in Afghanistan is wheat, which links the fluctuations in its harvest to opium production (Chouvy, 2009, p.135). Overall Opium has an economic superiority over wheat, which can be illustrated in the gross income per hectare in Afghanistan in 2006. Opium had a gross income per hectare of 5,400$ compared to 550$ for wheat (ibid. p.136).

However gross income numbers often don´t get the whole picture as “resource-poor households have no or insufficient land to feed their members” (ibid. p.139), making opium production more likely in areas with small land holdings and access to irrigated water and markets is difficult (Chouvy, 2009, p.139; Mansfield, 2002, p.3). This creates the necessity for sharecropping among poor communities with little access to land, providing work force for the labour intense opium harvest (Chouvy, 2009, p.139). The end of this circle of dependency created through food security and small or no access to land, is the opium credit system, called “salaam” (ibid). The system allows advanced payments for later repayments in crops, which is especially helpful for poor Afghan farmers with low harvest income, that need to survive through the winter months (ibid). Opium being the most lucrative crop, the credits are mostly bound to opium crops. Paying the credits back creates another problem though, as opium prices fluctuate over the years and repayment of the credits can be double the price the crops are worth (ibid). This creates two insecurities for the farmers, first if opium production is too high, prices are lower, making it harder to repay their credits. Secondly, if their harvest is destroyed by eradication, which is more likely among poor farmers who cannot pay off corrupt policeman, they need to take an additional credit or have no mean of income (Smith, 2008; Chouvy, 2013 p. 222).

The fluctuations in “dry farm gate-price” and its relationship for farmers to grow opium, can be seen in Figure 2.1. The average dry farm gate price in 2004-2005 stands at roughly 150$ per kilogram, with a decline in price down to about 60$ in 2009-2010. The average price then continuous to rise again, up to over 250$ per kilogram in 2011 and 2012. This better illustrates the decision making of farmers to grow opium, but also explains the complication when it comes to decision-making on credit repayment.

This introduction into the reasoning behind Afghan farmers to grow opium serves as a way to make the reader understand the background of the Afghan economy and the conditions in rural

19 areas. Following up are the unintended consequences that have been observed following eradication programs.

In the set of policies for supply reduction including Alternative Development, banning of crop cultivation by the authorities and eradication programs, this thesis focuses on eradication programs as they are the most coercive practices and unintended consequences are well researched (Chouvy, 2013, p.222).

The intention of crop eradication is the suppression of drug cultivation. Which is countered by the two more obvious unintended consequences, crop displacement and increase in illicit crop cultivation (ibid). These are described in Chouvys typology on unintended consequences as perverse effects of collateral unintended consequences (ibid.). Further unintended consequences are violent confrontations of insurgency groups and eradication teams in areas controlled by the insurgency, this is categorized as a direct unintended consequence by Chouvy as the use of force against the forceful disruption of opium cultivation by the authorities is foreseeable and used to prevent eradication from happening (ibid.). Additionally, an increase in poverty and debt can be an unintended consequence. As described earlier, poverty deals as a main driver of illegal opium production and with opium “sold ahead of the harvest […] eradication prevents the repayment of debts” (ibid.). Food shortages and school dropouts caused by the loss of income through the destruction of the farmers crops are unintended consequences. Opium income is both used to buy food and create the possibility of sending children to school, if that income is lost this has a direct impact on the whole community (ibid.). This can ultimately lead to rural exodus, prostitution, deforestation and poaching (ibid.). When it comes to causality it is important to note these different forms of unintended consequences do not always cause each other. Chouvy explains this in: “harmful unintended consequences of forced eradication do not always cause the occurring of perverse unintended consequences” and “perverse unintended consequences rarely occur outside of preceding harmful unintended consequences” (Chouvy, 2013, p. 223). Chouvy further states that “here […] causality can only be assumed—because it can hardly be scientifically proven—on the basis of previous observations (correlations), and also of induction” (2013, p.222).

Drug eradication in Afghanistan: Drug eradication programs in Afghanistan had constant levels of application until 2005, with rising numbers in drug cultivation the US mission in Afghanistan sought for ways of eliminating the revenue sources of the remerging Taliban (Coyne; et. Al, 2016, p. 95-96 & Nathan, 2009, p.332). In 2005 the American congress authorized to use three-hundred-million US Dollar of American aid money, for poppy eradication in Afghanistan (Nathan, 2009, p.333). The result 20 saw a peak in eradication efforts from 2005 until 2007, which can be seen in Figure (3.1), counted in hectares eradicated. In 2005 and 2006, about 15000 hectares have been eradicated. This is followed up by roughly 19000 hectares from 2006 until 2007. The eradication measures beforehand from 2004-2005 only show about 5000 hectares eradicated, while after 2007 until 2008, the levels were at five to six thousand hectares. Most of the eradication has been undertaken in the south of the country, a territory mainly controlled or contested by the Taliban, which will be established further in the upcoming sections. Therefore, peaks in eradication efforts allow for an analysis for their effects on the Taliban.

Figure 3.1 (Source, Greenfield; et al, 2015, p. 169)

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Figure 3.2

When compared to overall opium cultivation levels in Afghanistan, the amount of cultivation by hectares shows a decrease from about 190 000 hectares in 2007 to 155 000 hectares in 2008, seen in Figure 3.2. Further decline in cultivation is seen in 2009 and 2010 down to about 120 000 hectares. But when looking at the complete picture, production in 2011 is already slowly increasing to 130 000 hectares, 150 000 hectares in 2012 and then a sudden jump to 210 000 hectares in 2013. This follows Chouvys research on unintended consequences, highlighting the counterproductive effects of eradication programs leading to an overall increase in drug production (Chouvy, 2013, p.222).

Linking the Taliban to Drug Cultivation:

“The hundreds of millions of dollars we spend on crop eradication has not had any damage on the Taliban. On the contrary, it has helped them recruit. This is the least effective programme ever," Richard Holbrooke, 2009 (Kennedy, 2009)

Taxation, Corruption and Protection

The taxation of opium cultivating farmers was initially introduced by the Taliban during their reign before the US Invasion in 2001. It took two forms, ‘ushr’, which is a 10 % tax on local

22 opium farmers and ‘zakat’, which is a 20% tax on opium involved traders (Goodhand, 2005, p.203). During their resurgence these forms of taxation were re-established and controlled by local commanders who collect the tax (Peters, 2009, p.18). The commanders are tracking the amounts farmers cultivated and the money earned, by maintaining informants (Peters, 2009, p.18).

While the taxation is an income source for the Taliban, it also served as a form of protection for the local farmers. Reports of corrupt police forces assigned with the task of eradication taking bribes from more wealthy opium cultivating communities, have an impact on the poor fraction of local farmers. Quoting an article by Graeme Smith during his research in Afghanistan in 2008: “Most of them [comment by the author: interviewed opium farmers] admitted a personal role in the illegal opium industry, and half of them said their poppy fields had been targeted by government eradication efforts, suggesting they suffer more eradication than other Afghan farmers. Several of them voiced frustration that the government officials take bribes for turning a blind eye to the drug trade while punishing poor opium growers” (Smith, 2008).

The corruption and insecurity, not just from contested territories but also eradication programs, does not allow the rural population a continuation of their subsistence. Which lead many into the arms of the Taliban, who create some form of security for their livelihoods. This is supported by reports from different sources. An interview by a former Canadian army major stating “the current eradication program is pushing the farmers to the Taliban because there is no alternative livelihoods program […] Then there is the corrupt ripple effect to the poppy eradication where the Afghan National Police take bribes for not eradicating certain poppy fields” (Rubin, 2007). Ahmed Rashid recalls in his 2010 book about the history of Afghanistan, “the Taliban soon reappeared in the south, once more taxing farmers on their poppy crop while at the same time promising to protect them against any government moves to eradicate it” (Rashid, 2010, p.226). In an interview with local farmers and Graeme Smith, one of the farmers states “they were cutting them [poppies] down, but now those areas are controlled by mujahideen and now cannot cut them down” (Smith, 2008).

While these quotes might not serve as scientific evidence for an explanation for farmers to join the Taliban or favour their rule over the government, it creates a picture for the negative influence’s eradication programs have on the rural population and how it is helping the Taliban more than it is harming them.

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To show the effects of eradication and link the Taliban to drug cultivation a range of maps depicting first, the areas in which drug cultivation is prevalent and then show the influence of the Taliban over these territories. This is going to be shown on a developing timeframe starting in 2005 and ending in 2009 by using UNODC maps on opium cultivation in Afghanistan and maps of Taliban presence.

Opium cultivation in 2005 and 2006, before the eradication peaks:

The main areas affected by opium cultivation in 2005 and 2006 are the southern regions of Helmland, Farah and Kandahar, as well as the northern regions of Balkh and Badakhshan, which can be seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. These regions show high to very high levels of opium poppy on agricultural land. The region of Nagahar shows a development of low levels of opium cultivation in comparison to 2006. Overall low to moderate levels of cultivation can be seen in almost every province of the country, except a line of provinces ranging from the North in Kunduz and Taloqan to the capital Kabul, Logar, Ghazni and Paktia in 2005, that develop low to moderate levels of cultivation in 2006. When compared to a UN estimate map of expanding No Go Zones in 2005, Figure 4.3, and a map of estimated Taliban presence by the Senlis Council in 2006, Figure 4.4 it marks the areas in which the Taliban have some influence in this time frame. The No go zone areas in 2005 are limited to the proximity to the Pakistani border, indicating the region of Nagahar in the east of the country, following the Pakistani border through the Zabul region, with high risk for aid workers in 2005. Some areas in the middle part of Kandahar and Uruzgan into the northern part of Helmland and Nimroz are also marked for High-Risk No-Go Zones in estimates by the UN. An additional map provided by the Senlis council (their updated name is the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS)) marks the Taliban influence in 2006 in almost 50% of the country, this involves the provinces of Nuristan, Laghman, Kunar and Nangarhar in the east, Wardak, Logar, Paktiya, Khost, Ghazni and Paktika in the south-east, as well as Zabul, Uruzgan, Kandahar, Helmland, Farah and Nimroz in the south.

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When the cultivation maps are compared to the Taliban influence map a connection can be shown although it isn’t as strong and a direct correlation in the years of 2005 and 2006 can only be assumed as the available data only gives some indications for the Taliban presence and no accurate assessment can be made. But the territories with high drug cultivation in the South especially Kandahar, Helmland and Farah show indications for Taliban activity and can be connected to drug cultivation.

Figure 4.1

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Figure 4.2

Figure 4.3

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Figure 4.4 Source: D´Souza, 2006, p. 536

Cultivation in 2007 and 2008 during and after the eradication: The development of drug cultivation in 2007 and 2008 show a much clearer picture, depicted in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. In 2007 most of the cultivation from the north shifted to the north- western provinces of Faryab and Badghis with Moderate to High and Very High levels of cultivation, according to Figure 4.5 by the UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey. Cultivation in the Balch province has been lowered from moderate to high cultivation in 2006 to ‘considered opium free’ in 2007. The province of Nangarhar developed from moderate levels in 2006 to high and very high cultivation in 2007. The regions in the South, Farah, Helmland and Kandahar show consistent and even increasing areas of high opium cultivation in 2007 especially the northern part of Helmland. Furthermore, the northern part of Nimroz developed from moderate cultivation to very high levels crossing the province border to Farah. Overall production in 2007 shows 190 000 hectares of cultivation, which is an all-time high since 1994 (Figure 3.2). 2008 then shows the potential effect of an increase in eradication programs, almost completely reducing opium cultivation in the North, West and East of the country to opium free or very low to low levels (Figure 4.6). This is however challenged by expert opinions stating “that the reduction in poppy planting stemmed from biblically awful weather and a decline in the price of opium gum” after “huge stores of opium gum wrapped in cloth litter Afghanistan, waiting for the time the epic 2007 crop could be worked off” (Nathan, 2009, p.333) Most interestingly the province of Nangharhar reduced the levels of cultivation from a moderate/high level to very low/low levels of cultivation. The South however persists with

27 continuing very high levels of cultivation and expanding areas along the already existing areas in Helmland, Kandahar, Farah, Nimroz and Uruzgan, shown in Figure 4.6. This explains the drop of overall cultivation in 2008 from 155 000 hectares cultivated, showing a decrease of 35 000 hectares of cultivation to the previous year. Taliban presence in the meanwhile expanded to 72% of Afghanistan in 2008, according to ICOS estimates in November 2008 (Figure 4.8). Especially the regions of Kandahar and Helmland in the South and Nangahar in the East are heavily contested, indicated by the number of insurgents, civilian and military fatalities indicted as green, yellow and red dots on Figure 4.8. The areas marked in red on the map in Figure 4.8 show the presence of the Taliban in almost every region surrounding centre and north-eastern provinces of Afghanistan indicated as substantial presence of the Taliban. Only the regions in grey, Jowzjan, Sar-e-pul and Samangan, are indicated as light Taliban presence. Figure 4.7 shows a map estimating the risk for foreign workers entering the specific provinces, related to Taliban presence. The southern regions of Helmland, Kandahar, the northern part of Nimroz, Pakista, some areas in Khost and Paktia as well as Nangahar are indicated as extreme risk and hostile environment. High risk areas indicated in orange mark the southern region of Farah, the southern parts of Nimroz as well as the areas around Nangahar reaching north, south and west, in the bordering Kabul territory, and Logar and Wardak.

Figure 4.5

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Figure 4.6

Figure 4.7 Source: Cordesman; Burke, 2009

Comparing the map of drug cultivation in 2008 and the Taliban influence areas, cultivation of

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Figure 4.8

Referenced in: Cordesman; Burke, 2009 opium shifted south into areas with strong Taliban presence and high-risk areas for foreigners. Production in the eastern parts of the country, especially Nangahar, although influenced by the Taliban, show low to no levels of cultivation. These maps indicate a connection of Taliban controlled areas with high levels of drug cultivation, allowing for the argument of a connection of these cultivation and rebel presence.

The cultivation maps in 2009, seen in figure 4.9.1 show a further increase in production in the Southern territories of Helmland, Kandahar, Uruzgan as well as Northern Nimroz along and into the province border of the Farah region, with high to very high levels, spreading along the already established cultivation territory. Additionally, production in the western territories of Bagdhis show a re-emergence of very high levels of production in 2009. The 2010 metrics see decreasing levels in all the regions, previously affected but overall again picture shifting cultivation territory. Compared to the influence maps, the territories with increasing and/or re- emerging cultivation trends can be placed in the territory of the Taliban in 2009 and 2010, depicted in Figures 4.9.3., indicated in blue, and figure 4.9.4, marked in green. Overall levels of cultivation in rebel-controlled territory has increased and shifted completely to it.

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The last section on drug cultivation and rebel influence serves two purposes, linking the drug production in the specific territories to rebel presence and pointing to the first indicator of an increase in rebel strength. The territory influenced by the Taliban has clearly expanded from 2005 until 2008 and especially the South can be linked to drug cultivation. With eradication increase especially in the Southern regions progress can be rated as both a success and a failure. The production in the northern regions has seen a clear reduction in production, but levels of cultivation shifted South and even though most of their efforts were aimed at the South no real progress can be shown. Moreover, following Chouvys observations of unintended consequences, an increase in production in the Helmland, Kandahar, Nimroz and Farah regions is shown.

This falls in line with UNODC observations stating: “In 2009, 99% of the total cultivation took place in just seven provinces in the Southern and Western regions, including the most insecure provinces in the country. These seven provinces are Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, Zabul, Farah and Badghis. This reality confirms the link between insecurity and opium cultivation observed since 2007” (UNODC, 2009, p.7)

Figure 4.9.1

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Figure 4.9.2

Figure 4.9.3, Source: Cordesman, 2018

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Figure 4.9.4; Source: Dorronsoro, 2009

The next section leads this thesis to additional indicators of rebel strength starting with troop size observations and incidence reports.

Troop Sizes of the Taliban Troop Size data for rebel groups is scarcely available and mostly based on estimates as it is difficult to assess the inside structures of the Taliban and rebel groups overall. The UCDP database allows for some estimates in the additional information section on conflict actors. The estimates in this section are taken from this database, which holds its sources from the Military Balance Yearbook (MBY) published yearly by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The estimates for the troop size of the Taliban in 2005 are formulated as “thousands of troops” indicated by the UCDP as numbers below and up to one thousand combatants. In 2006 troop sizes are estimated at a wide range, but an overall increase to 4000 to 25 000 troops under Taliban control. In 2007 an increase or decrease is hard to analyse as the estimated 33 numbers range from at least 5000 active fighters assessed by the United States and Pakistani sources indicate between 10 000 and 15 000 fighters (UCDP). An overall decrease can be indicated if the high estimates of 25 000 of the previous year are accurate, but no clear conclusion can be made. The 2008 estimates are commented by US military sources which see an increase in Taliban strength by 20-30% (UCDP). The MBY estimates several thousand fighters, setting the lower end of estimation at 5 000 fighters and the high estimates at 20 000 fighters. Additional sources place the Taliban strength at somewhere in between 10 000 and 20 000 fighters (UCDP). This allows for a suggestion of an increase, following the US source reports, which additionally adds strengthening levels of organizational and military capacity. In 2009, troop estimates indicate an increase setting the number of fighters between 10 000 and 20 000, according to the Afghan government the Taliban have 15 000 fighters (UCDP). Overall this indicates an increase or at least stable estimate in troop sizes. In 2010 Taliban troop sizes show estimates of 10 000 to 20 000 fighters, according to the MBY and additional sources set the number of fighters at thirty-six thousand. This indicates an additional increase in troop sizes. Overall an increase in troop sizes from 2005 until 2010 can be seen, even though estimates are not sufficient for an annual analysis. This can be interpreted as an increase in rebel strength as troop sizes allow for more territorial control and capacity to contest the government. When compared to troop sizes of the Afghan government the prevalence and influence of the Taliban shows an impact on their own troop capacities outranging the Taliban. While in 2005 the Afghan military had between 25 000 - 27 000 fighters a steady increase in military personnel can be observed. Increasing in 2006 to 36 000, 2007 to 50 000 fighters, 2008 to 70 000 fighters and in 2009 up to 100 000 fighters, according to UCDP estimates. These increasing numbers can be interpreted as a response to increased Taliban activity and reported troop sizes.

Overall troop sizes of rebel groups even if outranged by government troops are only a fraction of the assessment of their strength. As rebel groups and especially the Taliban act with guerrilla tactics aiming at contesting the government, which follows Claytons argument about relative rebel strength; ““the absolute strength of a belligerent is less important than its strength in relation to its opponent” (Clayton, 2013, p. 611).

After assessing the troop sizes of the Taliban an additional indicator of rebel strength, are reports of assaults and incidences of violence related to the Taliban.

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Incident reports

When looking at UCDP data in battle-related deaths overall numbers are increasing from 1628 battle-related deaths in the period from 2005-2006 up to 12 401 battle-related deaths in the period of 2007 to 2008 during the conflict between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Especially suicide bombings in urban centres saw a sharp increase in 2006. The areas of attack are spread over the Eastern and Southern territories of Taliban influence, especially in the Provinces of Nangahar, Kandahar and Helmland (Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1, Source: UCDP

Additional statistics on insurgent attacks by the ISAF Strategic Advisory Group in 2009, shown in Figure 5.2, indicates the increases in attacks. While the number of attacks in 2007 range from the lower four-hundreds in the beginning of the year to almost one-thousand attacks in September 2007; the number of attacks in 2008 went all the way up to over 1400 in July 2008, especially incidences involving direct fire, indicated by the blue bars in the graphic, as well as IED attacks, shown in the red bars, show large increases in comparison to 2007. The graphic summarizes on the top left insurgent attacks were up 64% overall when comparing the period of January until April in 2008 and 2009, indicating further increase in violence for the following year. Direct fire attacks were up 57% and IED attacks increased by 81%.

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Figure 5.2

Referenced in: Cordesman; Burke, 2009

Figure 5.3

Referenced in: Cordesman; Burke, 2009 These observations are further confirmed by a report by the UNDSS, showing the rise in security incidents from 2003 until 2009, in Figure 5.3. In 2006, marked by the red bar, incidents begin to increase in comparison to the previous, seeing the highest level during August 2006

36 with about 600 plus incidences. This trend of increased incidents follows in 2007, marked in blue, showing the highest numbers in July with about 650 reported incidents. 2008 marks an additional increase, marked in purple, with the highest numbers in August, slightly below 1000 incidents. 2009 shows the highest numbers seen during the period of January 2007 and April 2009, with about 1100 security incidents reported, indicated in the light-yellow bar.

To summarize, these findings show a sharp increase in military action by the Taliban from 2006 until 2009, making them significantly grow in strength over that period.

Taliban finances through Opium cultivation – the Taliban war economy In a commentary of the 2008 Afghanistan Opium Survey the UNODC director Antonio Costa links opium cultivation directly to the Taliban, reporting an estimated total income of about half a billion dollar in the country. These numbers are the added values achieved by taxation of opium cultivation, which generated an estimate of 50-70$ million in 2008.Additionally the processing of opium and its trafficking “may have raised an additional $200-$400 million” (UNODC, 2008, p.2). Not all this money is attributed to the Taliban as Costa remarks, the benefiters of this income are “war-lords, drug-lords and insurgents” (ibid.). But due to increased presence and control of the Taliban more and more of the controlled opium economy falls into the hand of the Taliban. Exact estimates per year are hard to measure and more specific data is unavailable, which makes me conclude that the Opium income is certainly linked to the Taliban, but only general assumptions can be made about the exact income generated per year. When compared to overall drug production in the country, Figure 3.2, and farm-gate prices over time, Figure 2, the income of the Taliban, derived from the numbers provided by the UNODC, can be estimated in the range of 300-500 million US dollar per year since 2006. Fluctuations in supply benefit the price of opium, making lower harvest numbers only beneficial to the insurgency through increased prices, created from constant demand. This makes the overall income from the Opium economy a stable source for the Taliban (Rubin, 2007).

Conclusion of the analysis on Afghanistan: After drawing a theory driven picture of the Afghan Opium situation in the first section and the establishment of an overall increase in strength of the Taliban in the country, their connection can be claimed. Even though causality is questionable the observations presented allow for some indication that eradication programs strengthen the Taliban more than they weaken them. Mostly through the control over drug cultivated territory and a constant source of income through taxation and trafficking of opium and its processed form, heroin. When going back to the theoretical framework of collateral consequences and the aim of this thesis to add an 37 additional part, rebel strength, all three parts see some support in the research. The beneficial consequences, described in an increase in rebel income, can be stated as observable, through an increase in rebel territory over opium cultivated land and the raising of taxes, income increases. Additionally, the price hikes after a reduction in supply further stabilizes the rebel groups income. Evidence for harmful unintended consequences, can be seen in the first section of the Afghanistan case, describing the difficulties, especially poor farmers, experience through eradication efforts. Perverse effects, described as an increase in rebel recruitment cannot be observed in the capacity of this study, as access to meaningful data is not available. The rebel strength however, show clear indicators of increasement over the period of the application of eradication programs, showing increased rebel strength in a temporal variation of before and after. A clear causality is not possible to establish as too many confounders influence the conditions for rebels to grow. A connection between the effects of eradication programs on rebel strength can however be made, as the territory contested and controlled by the rebels is affected by drug cultivation and the local mechanisms of grievances and support can be shown. All in all there is some support for the theory that unintended consequences of eradication programs can be associated with rebel strength, but clear causality is not possible to assess.

Unintended consequences of coca eradication in Colombia:

This section allows for insight into the context of the Colombian drug economy and unintended consequences from eradication programs.

The unintended consequences created through eradication efforts in Colombia can be described in displacement of coca cultivation away from state-controlled territory, an impact on the environment like deforestation and destruction of eco-systems and the creation of grievances by the rural population dependent on the income from coca (Ruiz, et. Al, 2015 p. 62-65; Britain, 2009, p.111-112).

The research on unintended consequence in Colombia is mostly based on Aerial spraying which is the main instrument of eradication, showing good results in the reduction of coca crops but also creating health problems, increase in infant mortality, higher homicide rates and school dropouts (Rozo, 2012, p.17-18).

The context of farmers moving from licit crops to coca cultivation is based on underlying issues of land distribution, paramilitary pressure and difficulties in creating income through heavy price fluctuations caused on economic policy in Colombia (Britan, 2009, p.109).

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The FARC actually supported eradication programs in their territory under their supervision to oversee the process and create security for the farmers, “without bringing excessive cultural, economic, or physical harm to the rural population” (Britan, 2009, p.97), in order for meaningful substitute programs to take place, this was however opposed by the Colombian government (Britan, 2009, p.97-98).

Taxation and protection of coca by the FARC: When the FARC established increasing control over territory in the 1990´s, coca cultivation was already widely spread among the rural population to cope with poverty and poor access to land (Britain, 2009, p.99). Based on an ideologically motivated model of taxation, aimed at regulating the “peasants’ shift to illicit crop plantations as a supplementary income” (Britain, 2009, p.99). The taxation of farmers is only applied to the richer farmers in their territory, excluding the poor cultivators, framed in redistribution of wealth (Britain, 2009, p.100). Secondly, the FARC taxes the trading and distribution of coca paste with a 7 to 15% tax, based on price fluctuations, in exchange for undisrupted trade. Additionally, Colombians with wealth over one million US-Dollars are charged with a 10% tax, used for ammunition, weapons and “social and economic services, such as credit, public works, and cultural programs to the local peasantry (Britain, 2009, p.102). The taxation system thereby has two purposes, increase the fighting capacities of the FARC to sustain their insurgency and gain popular support by the provision of public goods and protection. The protection of the farmers from “the military, the paramilitaries, the drug police, and the drug traffickers” allows for a form of ‘normality’ (ibid. p.103). Later, the FARC took over some of the roles of distributors, trafficking, shipping and selling the coca products to the cartels and criminal groups, acting as an intermediary (ibid. p.107). In interviews with coca farmers conducted by Britain in the Putumayo region one respondent stated “It was only when the government started to threaten and attack our lands and communities that the trouble started. Unlike what the papers and television say, it was not the FARC that caused us problems, but it is certainly the FARC who protects us as best they can from them” (ibid. p.108). However, the circumstances of this statement are unclear it creates some insight into the perception of the local population of the FARC and their rule over the population in controlled territory.

This section allows for some argumentation that an underlying mechanism between the eradication programs execution and rebel strength is present. The FARC can create income from their taxation of the coca economy to increase their fighting capacities and create public goods and protection, increasing public support and incentives to join the rebel group.

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FARC income from Coca According to a statement by the Colombian Defence Minister in 2012 the FARC can be related to about 40-50 percent of a criminal cocaine-market worth about 6-7 billion dollar, which would set their income at between 2.4 and 3.5 billion $ (O'Gorman, 2012). These sources are mere estimates and the real income the FARC makes from maintaining coca cultivation is unknown, it serves however as a vague average for their income over time.

Coca eradication in Colombia In 2000 the so called ‘Plan Colombia’ was introduced in support of the US government to push the Colombian economy with alternative development programs for the rural areas affected with coca cultivation (Rosen, 2014, p.43). With the election of President Alvaro Uribe in 2002, the focus shifted to a military approach and supply reduction measures, especially aerial and manual eradication. An active fight against the FARC emerged and eradication efforts saw a steady increase (ibid. p.43).

The main eradication efforts in Colombia are aerial spraying and manual eradication, which both saw an increase in 2005 and then steadily decrease until 2016, shown in Figure 6 by the green (aerial spraying) and grey (manual eradication) line. The highest numbers in hectares of coca cultivation manually eradicated was in 2008 with about 95 000 hectares. Coca cultivation between 2005 and 2011, the timeframe of this analysis, was at its highest in

Figure 6, Source: UNODC, 2017

2007 with roughly 100 000 hectares affected from coca cultivation, indicated in the blue bars in Figure 6. In 2005 it was slightly below 90 000 hectares, 2006 saw a decrease down to about

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80 000 hectares. In 2008 cultivation saw about 80 000 hectares, 2009 about 75 000 hectares and 2010 down to the lowest numbers in that period with about 62 000 hectares. In 2011 a slight increase to about 65 000 hectares of coca cultivation can be seen. Overall levels of cultivation in that period are steady but decreasing.

The indication of a peak period of eradication, between 2006 and 2011, allows for a temporal analysis of the implemented programs before and after, undertaken in the following section on rebel strength.

Rebel Strength of the FARC

To establish a relationship between the FARC, drug cultivation and their territorial expanse in several maps, data is investigated to create evidence for the connection and progression of these topics.

Coca cultivation in 2006 can be seen in four different areas I will categorize as Northeast, East, South, and West, shown in Figure 7.1. The northern regions include the provinces of Magdalena on the coast, Bolivar, Antioquia and Cordoba north of central Colombia. The north-eastern parts cover Norte de Santander and Arauca in the northeast, bordering Venezuela. The east; Vichada, as well as the provinces of Meta, Guaviare, and Vaupes southeast of the centre. The southern regions include Amazonas in the far southeast, Caquetá, Putumayo, Nariño and Cauca in the south. The Western regions cover the provinces of Choco, and Valle. All the mentioned regions see cultivation of coca, the north shows low to middle levels of cultivation density, ranging from 0.1 – 1.0 hectares (ha) per square kilometre (km2) for the lower levels indicated in yellow and 1.1 – 4.0 ha/km2 for the mid-levels of cultivation density. The same goes for cultivation levels in the northeast, in 2006. The eastern regions see low, middle and high levels of cultivation, especially the Vichada and the Meta region indicate high levels of cultivation, which are measured by cultivation above 4 hectares per km2. The southern regions see low, middle and high levels, having lower levels of cultivation in the southeast and high levels along the border region in Putumayo and Nariño in 2006.

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Figure 7.1

Figure 7.2 shows the territory affected by the FARC insurgency indicated in levels of red, dark red being the highest measurement of favourability towards rebel control; governmental army control is shown in shades of grey,

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Figure 7.2, Source: Castilla, 2011

light grey being favoured the most towards the army (FF.MM. means the Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, the Colombian Army). The territories favouring towards the FARC during 2003 until 2006 are the regions in Sucre, Bolivar and Antioquia in the north, Norte de Santander and Arauca in the north-east, the eastern and southern parts of the Meta province, the northern regions of Guaviare, as well as the north-western part of Vaupes and the North-eastern part of Guainía. The southern provinces favoured towards the FARC are south-western parts of Putumayo and almost the whole department of Nariño in the South-west. Their influence further goes through parts of the Cauca, Caquetá and southern Choco departments. When the cultivation map from 2006 (Figure 7.1) and the rebel territory map (7.2) are compared to each other there is a clear overlap of territories affected by coca cultivation and FARC 43 presence. Especially the departments Nariño, Putumayo and Meta show a strong connection between rebel presence and high levels of cultivation density. The northern regions south of Sucre and the Vichada department however show mid and high levels of

Figure 7.3

44 cultivation but no indications of rebel presence of the FARC, it can however be attributed to additional rebel and armed groups present in Colombia, for example the National Liberation Army and the ‘Puntilleros’ (Colombia Reports, 2019), among others. In 2007 (Figure 7.3) overall density shows an increase in all departments with previous coca cultivation. Territories in the North, East and South show more areas with high density of cultivation above the 4.0 ha/km2 levels. The north-eastern parts show a slight increase. In 2008 (Figure 7.4) cultivation in the North has shifted from northern Antioquia to the southern Bolivar region. Overall density in the Meta region declined from high to low/mid-levels of density, the same goes for the Vichada department. Cultivation in the south shows a slight decrease in Putumayo, but a further increase in density in Nariño, to more areas with high density. This

45 follows the logic of the Balloon effect, shifting cultivation from one area to another.

Figure 7.4

46

Figure 7.5

47

Over the period from 2009 to 2010 overall density levels sharply decline in the whole country, indicating a short-term effect of increased eradication efforts in the previous years (Figure 6). The departments of Nariño, Putumayo and Bolivar, previously showing high density levels of cultivation above the 4.0 ha/km2 mark, reduced to low and middle levels of cultivation, in many cases below 1.0 ha/km2, in 2010 (Figure 7.5). Overall cultivation is present but only a

Figure 7.6, Source: Castilla, 2011

48 small area in the Cauca and Nariño region shows high levels of cultivation density.

The map on FARC influence from 2007-2010 (Figure 7.6) also indicates a decrease in territorial control when compared to the previous figures (7.2). The map shows lost control over almost all of the territory in the Meta and Guaviare region in the east, only leaving a small area in the south with low levels of favourability. Control in the north has been completely lost, indicating high levels of army presence. The southern regions also indicate lower levels of favourability towards the FARC but hold control over Nariño and the western part of Putumayo. The western regions see a slight decrease in favourability, the eastern parts of Choco however see increased areas of control. Control in the Cauca areas decreases, only standing in a few areas of the department. This indicates an overall decrease of influence during the time of observation. The favourability in the department of Arauca has completely shifted to the Colombian army’s control. When compared to the cultivation levels a clear relation of decline in territorial control and lower levels of cultivation density can be seen. To show the effects after high applications of eradication programs the cultivation density (Figure 7.7) and FARC controlled territory of 2011 (Figure 7.8) gives additional insight. High levels of cultivation density can be seen in the southern departments of Nariño and Putumayo, especially along the border to Ecuador, indicating that some of the production shifted across the border in previous years, re-emerging in Colombia after increased eradication efforts (UNODC (Ecuador), 2010, p. 15-17). The Cauca region sustained it´s high density cultivation levels from the previous year and see´s additional increase from low to middle levels of density, shown in Figure 7.7. In the Guaviare region a return to high levels of density can be observed in a small area in the south of the department. The other regions in the country don´t see changes, sustaining low to middle levels of cultivation density in 2011. The FARC influence (Figure 7.8) re-emerges in the department of Arauca in the east and strengthened in Norte de Santander. For the first time the border regions of Putumayo see high levels of FARC control, however declining in the western part of Nariño, indicating

49

Figure 7.7

displacement further east, to Putumayo, an area that saw FARC influence only in the western parts. Territory in the eastern part of Guaviare sees increasing levels of influence from the 50

FARC. Additionally, presence in the Choco region increased and new areas in the northern department of La Guajira along the Venezuelan border see FARC activity. Some areas in Antioquia department see re-emerging FARC control. The Cauca region maintains its FARC presence from the previous years.

Figure 7.8, Castilla, 2011

When again comparing drug cultivation and FARC influence, increases in cultivation density follow FARC control, especially in the Putumayo department in 2011. Although no connection between FARC re-emergence in the Choco and Antioquia departments show new areas of coca cultivation. The already affected areas see a constant up and down, but no new coca territory emerges when under FARC control.

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Concluding the territorial section of the analysis a couple of observations can be made. First the shifting of density in cultivation, described as Balloon effect can be seen over the course of increased eradication efforts following the Chouvys theory. Secondly areas with drug cultivation have a higher chance for FARC or rebel group presence than areas under government control. This links the rebel group to drug production and its maintenance. Furthermore, eradication programs in combination with army activity shows decreases in the territorial control of the FARC during the programs implementation but seems to re-emerge after their imminent effects of cultivation decrease and can re-emerge together with renewed control over territory by the FARC. Cultivation overall does decrease during and shortly after eradication efforts, although increases afterwards. The overall territory the FARC showed presence in has decreased from 2006 to 2011, indicating a decline in rebel strength, even if presence over time can be argued as steady.

To show further indicators for the strength of the FARC insurgency the following section covers the troop size numbers of the FARC.

Troop Sizes

Figure 8, Source: Colombia reports

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To establish troop sizes of the FARC data from the UCDP reports on active fighters inside the rebel group, as well as a collection of local news reports by the Colombia Reports news outlet, creates the basis for fighters associated with the FARC.

The troop sizes of the FARC in 2005 is estimated by UCDP background data at roughly 18 000 fighters, compared to Figure 8, estimates by the collection of Colombian news reports from the news outlet Colombia reports, set the troop size numbers at about 14 000 fighters (UCDP - FARC). In 2006 the numbers decrease to 12 000 fighters according to UCDP data, derived from the Military Balance report, Colombia report estimates show the same number with about 12 000 fighters. In 2007 UCDP data suggests steady troop sizes staying at 12 000 fighters. Figure 8 indicates numbers of about 10 000 fighters in 2007, an additional decrease to the previous year. In 2008 according to UCDP estimates the number of 12 000 fighters maintains, while Colombia reports numbers are further decreasing to roughly 9 000 fighters. In 2009 UCDP data stays at about 12 000 troops and again Colombia reports estimates shows a slight decrease to about 8 500 fighters. 11 000 fighters can be attributed to the FARC in 2010 according to UCDP, Colombia reports sets their estimates at above 9 000 fighters, indicating a slight increase to the previous year. The final year of analysis 2011 sets troop sizes to 8000 fighters according to the UCDP, while Colombia reports, shows a slight increase just above 9000 fighters (Figure 8).

During the same period the Colombian National Army had an already strong force with 207 000 active fighters in 2005, this number stays at that number until 2008, when an additional 50 000 fighters set the overall number of fighters to 254 259 fighters, with a peak of 285 220 fighters in 2010 (UCDP Colombian Government). Comparing these numbers to the FARC rebel fighters gives insight into the ambition of the Colombian government with US support to suppress the FARCs presence and decrease their strength.

This shows an overall trend of declining troop sizes and can be argued as an additional indicator for a decrease in rebel strength during the observed period.

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Incident reports: To give a third indicator for rebel strength battle-related deaths and incident reports involving the FARC are considered to assess their strength.

Figure 9.1

The UCDP database on the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian Government report the total amount of battle-related deaths in the period of 2005 until 2011 at 3 169 (Figure 9.1, UCDP). Starting on a peak of roughly 1 200 battle-related deaths in 2005, the numbers slowly decline, only showing minor fighting incidents in the following years not passing the threshold of 500 battle-related deaths from 2006 to 2011. Most of the fights are in the Southern regions of Cauca, Caquetá and Norte de Santander, seen in the lower right part of Figure 9.1 in the red circles at the map. This can be interpreted as a decrease in

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Figure 9.2, Source: Castilla, 2011

fighting activities, however consistent presence of the FARC. Additional data on incident reports by a Colombian study in Spanish by Camilo Castilla in 2011 allows for further insight into the FARC presence. The Figures 9.2 to 9.4 show Spanish text in the description of the graphic and stating “Relacion entre los combates de las FF.MM y las acciones de las FARC (Promedio annual ‘specific years’ segun departamentos) this can be translated to The Relationship between the combat of the 55

FF.MM (Colombian army) and the actions of the FARC (The annual medium in ‘specific year, according to departments) (translation by the author). It describes the number of medium incidents initiated over the time periods by the FARC and the Colombian Army. In the period of 2003 until 2006 the annual medium incidents by the FARC, shown in Figure 9.2 indicated in the red bars, show seven departments with more than 50 incidents, including Antioquia, Meta, Caquetá, Arauca, Putumayo, Nariño and Cauca. The departments of Tolima, Valle, Huila and Norte de Santander show high amounts of incidents just below the 50 mark threshold. The highest annual medium incidents are shown in the Cauca and Narino region during 2003 and 2006, Cauca almost reaching a medium of 100 incidents and Narino at about 75. All of the departments see at least some fighting by the FARC, with the lowest numbers in the Amazonas department.

Fighting in the regions continues in during the period of 2007 and 2010, however drastically decreases, as shown in Figure 9.3. The graphics conversion from the scaling marks is expanded from a threshold of 50, up to 100, due to army combat increasing over 300 medium incidents, this is important to note as the comparison to the previous year’s scale could be perceived as smaller. Overall medium incidents by the FARC have decreased during that period The highest number of medium incidents can be seen in the Cauca region, at about 75 medium incidents, followed by Nariño at about 45. Meta, Caqueta, Antioquia, Tolima, Putumayo, Huila and Norte de Santander still see constant numbers of medium incidents, however see a decrease to about 30 medium incidents during that period, down from 50 in the previous period. All departments still experience some fighting, but overall decreased. However, it is difficult to assess as the larger scaling of Figure 9.3, doesn’t allow much analysis in the lower numbers. Figure 9.4 sees a continuation of FARC incidents in 2011 with less fighting in the Cauca region down to about 50 medium incidents, but still the department with the highest amount of medium incidents. Narino sees an increase to the previous period between 35-40 medium incidents. Meta, Caqueta, Antioquia, Tolima, Putumayo, Huila, Valle and Norte de Santander hold constant numbers between 25-35 medium incidents in 2011 showing slight increases but constant levels in comparison to the previous period. Overall fighting in the rest of the countries has decreased to non or almost no fighting incidents by the FARC (Figure 9.4). To conclude this section fighting overall decreased in the timeframe when compared to the numbers before the eradication programs peak and after in 2011. While FARC presence again

56 is stable and show constant numbers of fighting incidents, the overall average is declining over time, indicating a decrease in rebel strength.

Figure 9.4, Source:Figure 9.3, Castilla,Source: 2011Castilla, 2011

Combining the three indicators chosen to determine rebel strength the concluding assessment shows a decrease in territory control, troop sizes fighter numbers and medium fighting incidents during 2011 in comparison to the period before eradication peaks in 2005/2006. Even though 57 decreasing the rebels are still holding territory and even gained new one after the eradication and government offensives. So, a clear assessment of rebel strength is not completely possible but can be indicated as overall decreasing.

Conclusion of Colombian eradication effects

The case of Colombia is based on a long struggle of the rural population, ultimately leading to the development of illicit crop cultivation of the coca leaf to create income for their subsistence. The eradication programs aimed at reducing the crops do have an effect on the amount of cultivation, however they also have an effect on the rural population and create an opportunity for insurgency groups to use the blame of these communities on the government to step in as a provisioner of public goods and protection, mirroring state structures. However, the strength of the Colombian army and the determination with which the eradication programs are executed, ultimately lead to the weakening of the rebel group. When applied to the theoretical model, it can only partially be applied. Local grievances exist and can be observed, the rebels create incentives for the rural population to support their cause and the rebel group does sustain its presence. But their overall strength is diminishing even with the negative effects of the eradication programs. This found its final reality in the signing of a peace agreement in 2016 between the FARC and the government after Alvaro Uribe. A connection of the independent variable, eradication programs to the dependent variable, rebel strength can be established, however it is negative contrary to the first proposed Hypothesis, suggesting an increase in rebel strength.

Case comparison:

The cases of Afghanistan and Colombia when compared in this analysis show a difference in the outcome of the dependent variable. The Taliban increased the strength of their rebel group after the peak in eradication, while the Colombian FARC decreased in rebel strength. Both rebel groups can be linked to drug cultivation, through taxation and forms of protection. However, their relationship to the rural population do have different mechanisms. The FARC bases its insurgency on ideological incentives to create socialist structures, creating public goods from parts of the income by the drug economy; the other part is used for improvement in fighting capacities, especially weapons and ammunition. The Taliban do create some form of rebel governance and maintain local institutions, their goal is based on the fall of the Afghan

58 government and implementation of a religious state. The main difference when comparing the proposed theoretical implications to the analysis of the specific cases is that the perverse collateral unintended consequences, increasing rebel strength, show different results. The Taliban gained strength while the FARC weakened over time. This can be attributed to differences in the capabilities of the government armies to contest the rebels – the Afghan army had to increase their military capacities in troop sizes with the threat of re-emerging Taliban, the Colombian army maintained an already existing strength and benefited further from US support to challenge and weaken the rebels. So, the eradication programs in combination with military support, can be attributed to counterinsurgency efforts in both countries but the capacities differ. Both cases see impacts of the eradication programs on the local population and create some support for the rebel groups, although a clear connection is difficult to assess, especially in Afghanistan. In Colombia local support is expressed in some cases and give some indication for rebel support. Both rebel groups managed to sustain their rebellion and stand as a consistent threat to the government, the Taliban however show stronger indications of expanding influence, than the FARC. All in all, some evidence for the proposed theory can be derived from the two cases and a connection between the unintended consequences and rebel strength can be established, neither case allows for actual causality, the underlying mechanism of local support serves as a contributing factor to rebel strength.

Alternative explanations, limitations, confounding variables:

There are multiple confounders when it comes to the growth or demobilization of rebel groups, in these cases I will focus on a couple of important side notes, that expand the limitations of this thesis and cannot be included in the analysis although they can increase the cases contextual frameworks. In Afghanistan foreign support from Pakistan, based on ethnic linkages of the Pashtun heritage, is an important aspect to mention as the Taliban used Pakistan as a hiding spot after their defeat in the US Invasion (Rashid, 2010, p.227). Furthermore, Pakistani support of Ammunition, Guns and Money have been reported by US and international sources (D´Souza, 2006, p.527). This supports the Taliban’s income sources and allows for stronger fighting capacities. In Colombia the foreign support by US funding largely increased the national army’s capacity to fight the FARC, making it a contributing factor when it comes to their rebel strength. Availability of research on the Colombian peasantry is limited through research being mostly conducted in the Spanish language, which makes it difficult to gain a better understanding of the process related

59 to the subject. Overall time and space limitations reduced the contextual framework that would have been helpful for better understanding of the long-lasting conflicts in the specific countries. All parts of the thesis could be expanded further with deeper analysis of the specific mechanisms especially the connections of local grievances and rebel support, as well as rebel governance structures, these however expand the scope of this research.

Conclusion:

After the portrayal of the impact of unintended consequences on the rural population and an extensive analysis of rebel strength for the Taliban and FARC, the thesis can be summarized in the observed indicators giving some support for the theoretical framework proposed. The unintended consequences in Afghanistan create difficulties for the rural population to create income, making it possible for the Taliban to create protection for the population and use illicit crop cultivation as an additional income source to fund their operations. Rebel strength over the period of eradication peaks increases in the case of the Taliban, supporting the proposed hypothesis one. Support for Hypothesis two can only be assumed as indicators for an increase in rebel income are scarce, however a stable income derived from overall stable cultivation numbers and fluctuating opium prices create some evidence for continued income from opium cultivation. The case of Colombia rejects the first hypothesis seeing a decline in rebel strength after increased eradication efforts. Evidence for the underlying mechanism of rebel support from the population has been created but a clear indication cannot be established in the scope of this thesis. The second hypothesis assuming an increase in rebel income, can only be partially confirmed as drug cultivation overall diminishes, but sustains itself over time, creating a constant income source, through taxation efforts. The third hypothesis is only partly covered in a contextual framework and only partial evidence for a connection between local grievances and rebel support can be shown. All in all the research on the topic was able to create a clear connection of both rebel groups to drug cultivation. A connection between drug eradication programs and rebel strength can be established. The research question “How do eradication programs impact rebel strength in countries with high levels of illicit drug production?” can be answered with variation in the outcome, showing increase and decrease of rebel strength by comparing the two selected cases. Additional insight by future research could focus on the relationship between drug cultivating farmers and the rebel groups. If accessible, interviews with rural communities could give great insight into the mechanism. Concluding words can be attributed to the importance of research of unintended consequences of eradication programs, which are still being implemented and even renewed in the case of the newly elected Colombian President Duque (King, Wherry, 2018). The international drug regime under UN supervision 60 needs to overcome its diplomatic hurdles and alter the existing framework with evidence-based approaches to create functioning tools for realistic drug policy. Otherwise rebel groups will continue to fund their operations with drug related activities and criminal organisations prosper, while the affected rural communities continue to suffer under counterproductive measures. Long-term alternative development programs with sufficient long-term funding show some evidence for success but continue to struggle under the dominant prevalence of illicit substances outreaching licit crops as an income source (Chouvy, 2013, p.223). Drug policies in my opinion are a crucial part of peace and conflict research, especially with newly emerging threats of dominant drug cartels and overall failure of past efforts, often linked to counterinsurgency goals. A holistic approach connecting local issues to a global framework is necessary not just to understand but also find solutions for future applications of functioning, inclusive drug policies aiming at harm reduction and alternatives to counterproductive supply reduction efforts.

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