Iran: the $1 Trillion Growth Opportunity? (2016)
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The Iranian Intervention in the Arab States Affairs: Pretension and Facts
European Journal of Social Sciences ISSN 1450-2267 Vol. 57 No 2 November, 2018, pp.255-267 http://www.europeanjournalofsocialsciences.com/ The Iranian Intervention in the Arab States Affairs: Pretension and Facts Abdulrahman Al-Fawwaz Associate Professor Department of Humanities, Al-Balqa' Applied University P.O.Box: 15008 Amman 11134 Jordan E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] Abstract Iran, being one of the dominating super powers in the region has been known for its aggressive role in the entire world. The Arab region is exclusively recognized as its strategic position and the substantial availability of natural resources. In the past and even today, the west world have been protecting the global interest in the region and throughout the history, hostilities have been flaring up that affected the internal stability and peace situation. Among this, the role of Iran is dominated towards its intervention within the Arab States. The purpose of the paper is to analyze the Iranian interventions in the Arab States affairs. It tends to investigate that the specific conflicts created by Iran and the impact of those conflicts towards the peace and stability of the Arab States. The findings of the paper are obtained through secondary analysis and it reveals that the major intervention done by Iran in the Arab States are towards religious affairs, territorial, and security affairs, political and trading affairs. Moreover, the Iranian intervention is now expanded towards the military intervention in the Arab States as well, which is affecting the political stability of the region. As the present political situation is sensitive; therefore, much of the policy implications are considered weaker due to the fulfillment of state interest and security. -
Iran and Central Asia: a Cultural Perspective1
Iran and Central Asia: A Cultural Perspective1 Davood Kiani One of the most important tools utilized by states to maximize their impact in foreign affairs is public diplomacy and to this extent, public diplomacy is considered a source of soft power. The robust use of public diplomacy can enhance and reinforce the soft power of countries. Central Asia is among the regions that have an ever increasing relevance to regional and international affairs in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, and is currently considered a critical subsystem for our country. The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards this region is, on one hand, built on the foundation of converging factors in political, economic, and cultural arenas and looking towards opportunities for influence and cooperation. On the other hand, considering the divergent components, it also faces challenges and threats, the sum of which continues to effect the orientation of Iranian foreign policy towards the region. This article will study Iranian public diplomacy in this region and examine the opportunities and challenges, as well as, provide and proper model for a successful public diplomacy in the region of Central Asia, while taking into account the Islamic Republic of Iran’s tools and potential. Keywords: Public diplomacy, foreign affairs, Central Asia, Islamic Republic of Iran 1 This article is based on “Cultural Policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Central Asia” a research funded by Islamic Azad University, Qum Branch Assistant Professor, Islamic Azad University of Qom ([email protected]) (Received: 20 January 2014 Accepted: 5 June 2014) Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, Vol. -
Iran: a New Era Forecast for Iinterview Conclusion After the Lifting Iranian Sectors of Sanctions PANORAMA March 2016 IRAN: SHARP TURN AHEAD, DRIVE CAREFULLY
2 9 11 13 Iran: A new era Forecast for IInterview Conclusion after the lifting Iranian sectors of sanctions PANORAMA March 2016 IRAN: SHARP TURN AHEAD, DRIVE CAREFULLY COFACE ECONOMIC PUBLICATIONS By the Group Mediterranean & Africa Economists fter five years of sanctions, The lifting of sanctions, following the P5+1 the lack of investment and the downturn Iran is finally to rejoin the agreement, will have a significant effect in the oil market. The low price of the oil global community. The on raising Iran’s output. Coface expects barrel may cost Iran 2.8% of its GDP if it return of Iran should have real GDP growth to stand at 3.8% this remains unchanged (i.e. 33 USD/b). an effect on international year. A Morever, the country’s isolation, obsolete growth through the oil However, moving from autarky to infrastructures and weakened banking channel but above all, will bring huge openness is a sharp manoeuvre to system will challenge the positive dynam- changes to Iran itself. International manage. The country may face adverse ics of its reintegration into the global sanctions have impacted the Iranian effects from trade liberalisation. The surge world trade market. economy. Two consecutive years of in capital inflows and increased oil exports negative growth and runaway inflation could lead to an exchange rate Nevertheless, there are sectors other than have tested Iran’s resistance model to its appreciation that would be a hurdle to the oil that will benefit from the lifting of limit. The lifting of the EU embargo will competitiveness of non-oil exports. -
Republic of Uzbekistan QUICK FACTS UZBEKISTAN
Republic of Uzbekistan QUICK FACTS UZBEKISTAN ............................................................................ The telecommunications market of Uzbekistan is in the Land Area: 425, 400 sq km process of saturation and is one of the fastest growing Population: 28.2 million sectors of the economy. Uzbekistan has the highest rate GNI per capita, PPP $3,110 (WB, 2010) of growth in the number of mobile subscribers in the CIS. The growth rate of revenues from mobile services TLD: .uz lags behind the pace of growth in the number of mobile Fixed Telephones: 1.9 million (2010) subscribers. There were 24.3 million mobile subscribers GSM Telephones: 24.3 million (2011) to the end of 2011.83 Fixed Broadband: 0.15 million (2010) Internet Users: 8.8 million (2012) TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET Indicator80 Measurement Value Computers Per 100 n/a Kazakstan Internet Users Per 100 31.2 Fixed Lines Per 100 6.6 Internet Broadband Per 100 0.3 Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Mobile Subscriptions Per 100 84.0 Mobile Broadband Per 100 19.9 (est) Turkmenistan Tajikistan International Bandwidth Per 100 17.2 kb Iran There have been no changes in number of operators Afghanistan in the last 3 years: “MTS” brand from “Uzdunrobita” (established June 1991) GSM/UMTS; “Beeline” brand from “Unitel” (established in April 1996) GSM/UMTS; In August 2011, all mobile operators in Uzbekistan 84 “Ucell” brand from “COSCOM” (established in April suspended internet and messaging services for the 1996) GSM/UMTS; “Perfectum Mobile” brand from duration of university entrance exams in an attempt to “Rubicon Wireless Communication” (established in prevent cheating. Five national mobile operators shut November 1996) CDMA 2001X; “UzMoble” brand from down mobile internet, text, and picture messaging JSC “Uzbektelecom” (established in August 2000) for four hours from 9 am local time, citing “urgent CDMA-450. -
Iran Case File (April 2021)
IRAN CASE FILE April 2021 RASANAH International Institute for Iranian Studies, Al-Takhassusi St. Sahafah, Riyadh Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. P.O. Box: 12275 | Zip code: 11473 Contact us [email protected] +966112166696 Executive Summary .....................................................................................4 Internal Affairs ........................................................................................... 7 The Ideological File .............................................................................................8 1. Women and the “Political Man” ............................................................................... 8 2. Khatami and the Position of Women ......................................................................10 The Political File ............................................................................................... 12 1. The Most Notable Highlights of the Leaked Interview .............................................12 2. Consequences and Reactions .................................................................................13 3. The Position of the Iranian President and Foreign Ministry on the Interview ..........14 4. The Implications of Leaking the Interview at This Time..........................................15 The Economic File ............................................................................................. 16 1. Bitcoin’s Genesis Globally and the Start of Its Use in Iran ........................................16 2. The Importance of Bitcoin for Iran -
Biden, Congress Should Defend Terrorism Sanctions Imposed on Iran
Research memo Biden, Congress Should Defend Terrorism Sanctions Imposed on Iran By Richard Goldberg, Saeed Ghasseminejad, Behnam Ben Taleblu, Matthew Zweig, and Mark Dubowitz January 25, 2021 During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing to consider Antony Blinken’s nomination for secretary of state, Blinken was asked whether he believed it is in America’s national security interest to lift terrorism sanctions currently imposed on Iran, including sanctions targeting Iran’s central bank, national oil company, financial sector, and energy sector. “I do not,” Blinken responded. “And I think there is nothing, as I see it, inconsistent with making sure that we are doing everything possible – including the toughest possible sanctions, to deal with Iranian support for terrorism.”1 Bipartisan support for terrorism sanctions targeting Iran goes back to 1984, when the United States first designated the Islamic Republic as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. Since then, every U.S. president2 – Republican or Democrat – and Congress have taken steps to reaffirm U.S. policy opposing Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and tying sanctions relief to Iran’s cessation of terror-related activities. President Joe Biden has pledged to rejoin the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), if Iran returns to “strict compliance” with the agreement.3 Terrorism sanctions on Iran, however, should not be lifted, even if the Biden administration opts to return to the deal, unless and until Iran verifiably halts its sponsorship of terrorism. This memorandum provides an overview of Iran’s past and ongoing involvement in terrorism-related activities, a review of longstanding bipartisan congressional support for terrorism sanctions on Iran, and a list of terrorism sanctions currently imposed on Iran that should not be lifted. -
Evaluation of Heavy Metals Concentration in Jajarm Bauxite Deposit in Northeast of Iran Using Environmental Pollution Indices
Malaysian Journal of Geosciences (MJG) 3(1) (2019) 12-20 Malaysian Journal of Geosciences (MJG) DOI : http://doi.org/10.26480/mjg.01.2019.12.20 ISSN: 2521-0920 (Print) ISSN: 2521-0602 (Online) CODEN: MJGAAN REVIEW ARTICLE EVALUATION OF HEAVY METALS CONCENTRATION IN JAJARM BAUXITE DEPOSIT IN NORTHEAST OF IRAN USING ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION INDICES Ali Rezaei1*, Hossein Hassani1, Seyedeh Belgheys Fard Mousavi2, Nima Jabbari3 1Department of Mining and Metallurgy Engineering, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran 2Department of Agriculture and Environmental Engineering, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran 3Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Southern California, USA *Corresponding Author E-mail: [email protected] , [email protected] This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. ARTICLE DETAILS ABSTRACT Article History: Heavy metals are known as an important group of pollutants in soil. Major sources of heavy metals are modern industries such as mining. In this study, spatial distribution and environmental behavior of heavy metals in the Jajarm Received 20 November 2018 bauxite mine have been investigated. The study area is one of the most important deposits in Iran, which includes about Accepted 21 December 2018 22 million tons of reserve. Contamination factor (CF), the average concentration (AV), the enrichment factor (EF) and Available online 4 January 2019 geoaccumulation index (GI) were factors used to assess the risk of pollution from heavy metals in the study area. Robust principal component analysis of compositional data (RPCA) was also applied as a multivariate method to find the relationship among metals. -
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 4 2012’’
In the House of Representatives, U. S., August 1, 2012. Resolved, That the House agree to the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 1905) entitled ‘‘An Act to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening activities, and for other purposes.’’, with the following HOUSE AMENDMENT TO SENATE AMENDMENT: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the amendment of the Senate, insert the following: 1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 2 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 3 ‘‘Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 4 2012’’. 5 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 6 this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Definitions. TITLE I—EXPANSION OF MULTILATERAL SANCTIONS REGIME WITH RESPECT TO IRAN Sec. 101. Sense of Congress on enforcement of multilateral sanctions regime and expansion and implementation of sanctions laws. Sec. 102. Diplomatic efforts to expand multilateral sanctions regime. TITLE II—EXPANSION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO THE ENERGY SECTOR OF IRAN AND PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY IRAN Subtitle A—Expansion of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 Sec. 201. Expansion of sanctions with respect to the energy sector of Iran. 2 Sec. 202. Imposition of sanctions with respect to transportation of crude oil from Iran and evasion of sanctions by shipping companies. Sec. 203. Expansion of sanctions with respect to development by Iran of weapons of mass destruction. Sec. -
Special Economic Zones
Iran's Special Economic Zones Amir Abad Yazd Lorestan Khalij Fars Shahid Rajaee Pars Shiraz Petroshimi Khalij Fars Booshehr Sarakhs Bandar Booshehr Sirjan Salafchegan Payam Arge Jadid Pars Special Economic Energy Zone Headquarters P.O. Box: 75391 - 154,Pars Special Economic Energy Zone Org.,Assaluyeh, Boushehr Province, I.R.Iran Tel: +987727 37 63 30 Fax: +987727 37 63 18 Email: [email protected] Web site: http://pseez.ir Pars Special Economic Energy Zone PSEEZ is located adjacent to Assaluyeh, a village on the Persian Gulf, 280 Km southeast of Bushehr, 570 Km northwest of Bandar Abbas, and a 100 Km away from the offshore southern Pars Gas Fields in the Persian Gulf. Establishment for the utilization of ١٩٩٨ Pars Special Economic Energy Zone (PSEEZ) was established in South Pars oil and gas resources and encouraging commercial activities in the field of oil, gas and petrochemical industries. Objectives Facilitating for the on-time execution of various oil and gas projects, providing the appropriate foundation to attract local and foreign partnership with the aim of developing oil, gas and petrochemical industries as well as inter-related and downstream industries, creating local job opportunities and attracting skilled and semi-skilled workforce from neighboring provinces with regards to its positive effects on economic prosperity in the provinces of Bushehr, Fars and Hormozgan. Location .Km ٥٧٠ Km. East of Port of Bushehr and ٣٠٠ This zone is located the Persian Gulf coast and Km. away from the South Pars Gas ١٠٠ West of the Port of Bandar Abbas and approximately Field (Continuation of the Qatar’s Northern Dome). -
Turkmen Language: Alphabet, Structure and Writing
International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Growth Evaluation www.allmultidisciplinaryjournal.com International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Growth Evaluation ISSN: 2582-7138 Received: 03-07-2021; Accepted: 19-07-2021 www.allmultidisciplinaryjournal.com Volume 2; Issue 4; July-August 2021; Page No. 663-664 Turkmen Language: Alphabet, structure and writing Homayoun Mahmoodi Lecture, Department of Turkmani, Education Faculty, Jawzjan University, Sheberghan, Afghanistan Corresponding Author: Homayoun Mahmoodi Abstract The Turkmen Language is classified as one of the Turkic people worldwide, with approximately 1 million more languages which are all in the Ural-Altaic language family. speaking it as a second language. The majority of Turkmen Like all Turkic languages, the Turkmen Language is an speakers are located in Eurasia and Central Asia, with the agglutinative language that has productive inflectional and highest concentrations located in Turkmenistan, Iran, and derivational suffixes which are affixed to a word like “beads Afghanistan. on a string”. Turkmen is spoken natively by about 7 million Keywords: Turkmen, Afghanistan, Alphabet, structure 1. Introduction Turkmen are part of the ethno-linguistic Turkic continuum that stretches from western China to western Turkey. They share a claim to western-Turkic (Oguz) heritage along with Azerbaijanis and Turks in Turkey (Golden 1972) [4]. Despite a distinct twenty-first century identity, Turkmen culture and traditions historically overlapped with that of other Turks. The term “Turkic” refers to this cultural and linguistic heritage that all Turkic-language speaking groups share. Nevertheless, a separate Turkmen sense of identity was born out of their particular historical experience. A nomadic heritage, distinctively Oguz dialects, and tribal traditions contribute greatly to the identity that sets Turkmen apart from other Turkic groups and shape a specifically Turkmen sense of ethnic identity. -
13905 Monday MARCH 15, 2021 Esfand 25, 1399 Sha’Aban 1, 1442
WWW.TEHRANTIMES.COM I N T E R N A T I O N A L D A I L Y 8 Pages Price 50,000 Rials 1.00 EURO 4.00 AED 42nd year No.13905 Monday MARCH 15, 2021 Esfand 25, 1399 Sha’aban 1, 1442 Pompeo admits Trump Iran takes two gold COVID-19 inflicts $1.1 Iranology Foundation to admin failed to bring Iran medals at Karate-1 billion in losses on host intl. conference on to negotiating table Page 2 Premier League Page 3 Isfahan tourism Page 6 Persian poet Nezami Page 8 Rouhani inaugurates 2nd, 3rd phases Russia can play constructive role of Persian Gulf water transfer project TEHRAN – Iranian President Hassan Rou- experts and engineers from the private hani on Sunday ordered the beginning of sector and will transform the central and the second and third phases of Iran’s major eastern plateaus of the country. in bringing JCPOA back to life water desalination and transfer project which The project aims to promote production, See page 3 is aimed at supplying Persian Gulf water to industry, and agriculture, as well as provide central and eastern Iran through pipelines. drinkable water to residents in arid areas. This project, which is aimed at elimi- Maintaining the country’s food security nating poverty and balanced development and creating new job opportunities and of the country’s central regions, is going to also maintaining the already existing jobs be implemented with a total investment of in industrial and production units are also 1.28 quadrillion rials (about $30.47 billion). -
Secondary Sanctions on the Iranian Financial Sector Create De Facto Embargo with Lasting Implications for the Biden Administration
Secondary Sanctions on the Iranian Financial Sector Create De Facto Embargo with Lasting Implications for the Biden Administration Abigail Eineman IRAN WATCH REPORT John P. Caves III January 2021 1 Introduction During their confirmation hearings last week in the U.S. Senate, President Joe Biden's key national security nominees noted that the new administration was prepared to return to the nuclear accord with Iran, but warned that such a return would not be swift. First, Iran would have to resume compliance with the accord's nuclear restrictions in a verifiable manner, according to Secretary of State designate Antony Blinken, at which point the United States would resume compliance as well. President Biden’s choice for director of national intelligence, Avril Haines, estimated during her confirmation hearing that “we are a long ways from that.”1 Compliance for the United States would mean reversing at least part of the Trump administration's “maximum pressure” campaign—a set of overlapping trade and financial restrictions on almost every part of Iran's economy. The outgoing administration made such a reversal more challenging, particularly as a result of the sanctions imposed on Iran's financial sector in the administration's final months. On October 8, 2020, the United States designated Iran’s financial sector pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902 and sanctioned eighteen Iranian banks.2 In doing so, the U.S. Treasury Department applied secondary sanctions to Iran's entire financial sector for the first time, potentially barring foreign entities from the U.S. financial system should they do business with Iranian banks.