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Final Report EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION EXPERT MISSION REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA - REGIONAL ELECTIONS 7 March 2010 Final Report (April 2010) 7 March 2010 This report was funded through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights. The views expressed herein are those of the consultants and therefore in no way reflect the official opinion of the Commission. EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION EXPERT MISSION (EU EEM) Page: 0 Republic of Nicaragua – Regional Elections, 7 March 2010 Final Report TABLE OF CONTENT I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... 1 II. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 4 III. POLITICAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 5 1. NATIONAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................... 5 2. REGIONAL BACKGROUND ................................................................................................... 6 IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGIONAL ELECTIONS ................................................. 7 1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK .......................................................................................................... 7 2. REGIONAL ELECTION SYSTEM ............................................................................................ 7 V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ....................................................................................... 8 1. STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION, MEMBERSHIP APPOINTMENTS .......................................... 8 2. FUNCTIONING ..................................................................................................................... 9 3. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION .............................................................................................. 10 4. VOTER REGISTRATION, VERIFICATION, ID CARDS DELIVERING (CIVIL REGISTER) ........... 10 VI. ELECTION CAMPAIGN ................................................................................................... 11 1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTION CAMPAIGNING .......................................................... 11 2. REGIONAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ..................................................................................... 12 VII. THE MEDIA ....................................................................................................................... 13 1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 13 2. MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN THE 2010 REGIONAL ELECTIONS .................................................... 13 VIII. ELECTION OBSERVATION ............................................................................................ 15 1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 15 2. NATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION ................................................................................ 15 3. INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION ....................................................................... 16 IX. ELECTION DAY ............................................................................................................... 17 1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK, QUALITY OF POLLING PROCEDURES ................................................ 17 2. ELECTION DAY OBSERVATIONS ........................................................................................ 17 3. ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS .......................................................................................... 18 4. ACTIVITY OF THE CEM, CER, CSE ................................................................................... 19 X. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS ........................................................................................ 19 1. LEGAL FRAMEWORK, GENERAL PROCEDURES .................................................................. 19 2. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 23 XI. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................... 24 1. LEGAL REFORM ................................................................................................................ 24 2. VOTER REGISTRATION ..................................................................................................... 25 3. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION ............................................................................................ 26 4. ELECTORAL PROCEDURES ................................................................................................ 27 5. PUBLICATION OF RESULTS ................................................................................................ 27 6. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS .............................................................................................. 28 7. MEDIA ............................................................................................................................. 28 8. FINAL RECOMMENDATION ............................................................................................... 29 XII. ANNEXES .......................................................................................................................... 30 1. ANNEX A: RESULTS ......................................................................................................... 30 2. ANNEX B: LIST OF CONTACTS ........................................................................................... 32 EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION EXPERT MISSION (EU EEM) Page: 1 Republic of Nicaragua – Regional Elections, 7 March 2010 Final Report I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Regional elections took place on 7 March 2010 to elect a total of 90 members of the Councils of the Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast. The elections were organized in the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and in the South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS). Despite some shortcomings, the process was in appearance consistent and rather well organized, with the notable exception of its final – and decisive – part (see section on Complaints and Appeals). These serious weaknesses, involving the possibility of fraud in certain RAAS constituencies during the aggregation of results, which the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) failed to redress, underlined once again the exigency of a deep legal reform to enhance the confidence of the electorate as regards the electoral processes and administration. The lack of transparency and the political manipulation of the deficient legal framework were at the root of most problems encountered during this election. In principle, the election law could generally be considered acceptable for the conduct of democratic elections, but only if implemented in good faith. However, it does give way to misapplications if abused. In this very case, the irregular allocation of four seats1 in the RAAS during the post-election period affected the final composition of its regional Council and could possibly affect its political balance. The pre-election environment did not experience significant social tension despite political polarization, probably because political parties at central level regarded these municipal elections as marginal ones. The historical low level of voters’ participation in the regional elections was once again confirmed (36,7 %). This is mainly due to the lack of credibility of the autonomic institutions so far and the lack of public trust in electoral systems as well as in the political parties in general. Regional councils are viewed by voters as weak institutions with little autonomy and not in the position of representing people’s interests. The voter registration process was neither fully reliable nor satisfactorily inclusive: inaccuracy of the voters’ lists due to the presence of an unknown amount of deceased and expatriate citizens; illegal participation of some political parties in handling identity card applications and subsequent distribution to citizens and the lack of institutional civic awareness campaigns. The official number of registered voters was 290,854. During the electoral campaign, the parties, especially the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC), the National Liberal Alliance (ALN) and the National Liberation Sandinista Front (FSLN), accused each other of all kinds of serious irregularities2 prior to the Election Day without being always in a position to provide hard evidence thereof. 1 Out of a total of forty five. 2 i.e. minors having been issued with ID cards, FSLN manipulating small parties to gain control of the second JRV member, the existence of a strategy developed by FSLN to implement fraud, mismanagement of public funds, manipulation of the voter register to allow the non resident military to vote. EUROPEAN UNION ELECTION EXPERT MISSION (EU EEM) Page: 2 Republic of Nicaragua – Regional Elections, 7 March 2010 Final Report The politicisation of the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE) in favour of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) casts doubts on its ability to act as an independent State institution, its actions appearing as politically motivated. Notwithstanding the criticism rising from a part of the political actors, particularly with reference to the 2008 Municipal Elections, the CSE continued to operate showing a degree of haughtiness; some of its most relevant actions
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