Nietzsche's Ethics of the Future

fascist philosopher was born. Though even a minimally thoughtful reading of his work would render this myth invalidated, this remained the very prob- lem in the way of clearing up the misconception surrounding Nietzsche’s Nietzsche’s Ethics of the Future: Creative thought and his name. For beyond the deplorable editing work that the Nazi philosophers did to transform Nietzsche’s message, the very association of Valuation and the Life of Self-Development his name to fascist parties and figures dissuaded many from touching his works. Thankfully there were a few thinkers early on who fought to expose this myth for what it was, and to let Nietzsche’s thought speak for itself.2 Alex Obrigewitsch Much work has since been done as well, and continues to be argued in the pages of Nietzsche scholarship. But the question remains a contested one: what exactly is Nietzsche’s ethics? You must change your life. In his On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche studies the historical lin- —Rainer Maria Rilke, “Archaic Torso of Apollo” eage of our moral values, in order to uncover their origin. In doing this, he Every animal is driven to pasture with a blow. discovers that, like all things human, they are rooted in our nature, our man- —Heraclitus, Fragment 11 ner of life.3 Nietzsche then diagnoses “modern morality” (essentially Judeo- Christian values) as an illness, as life-denying, and proposes to create a dif- Nietzsche’s future, his posthumous life, which incorporates our past, present, ferent ethics, based upon a revaluation or transvaluation of all values (See and future interpretations and evaluations of his work, is riddled with com- GM III §26-27).4 Such a transformation of our values would be a radically plications and misunderstandings.1 His conception of existence as the strug- new ethics; but the book that he was to write elucidating this ethics of the gle of absolute differences leads to him devaluing and debasing democracy future was never written, due to his sudden descent into madness. Nietzsche in the political sphere, as well as utilitarianism and deontology in the ethical sphere – for all three come down to an essential equality of human beings 2Cf., for example, Georges Bataille, “Nietzsche and the Fascists,” in Visions of Excess, ed. (in terms of rights, calculability, and rationality, respectively). What sort of and trans. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985); and Walter Kauf- ethics might this strange figure profess, then? Based on a fundamental mis- mann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton: Princeton Universtiy Press, 1974). Kaufmann did much to make Nietzsche readable in English, both by his translations understanding of the central concept of his thinking, the will to power, com- and the work done in this book, where he works through the myth in order to uncover its bined with the willful propagation and proliferation of this very misunder- falsity as a defamation of the truth. standing by Nietzsche’s sister and the Nazi party, the myth of Nietzsche as a 3Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, “from ‘Homer’s Contest’,” in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (Toronto: Penguin, 1976), page 32: “When one speaks of humanity, 1Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, in The Basic Writings of Nietzsche, ed. and trans. the idea is fundamental that this is something which separates and distinguishes man from Walter Kaufmann (Toronto: Random House, 2000), “Why I Write Such Good Books,” §1: nature. In reality, however, there is no such separation: “natural” qualities and those called “The time hasn’t come for me yet: some are born posthumously”; and in the “Preface,” 1, to truly “human” are inseparably grown together.” the same work, where Nietzsche makes the now famous proclamation, “Above all, do not 4Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan mistake me for someone else.” Such mistakes have conceived of a monstrous birth. J. Swensen (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998). 781 792 provides us with a critique of morality, but does he offer anything to replace is this seething force which seeks expression as perpetual intensification and it? Looking to his notebooks, posthumously collated and published as The increase. And the “forms” to which Conway refers? These “forms” are the Will to Power, in conjunction with scattered hints and traces throughout his forms of life (in the Wittgensteinian sense) which manifestly express the will corpus, it is possible to garner an understanding of what such an ethics of to power, the arrangements of the fundamental differential forces or affects transvaluation might be. By combining elements from these sources with an which underwrite what we consider “reality.” What the will to power wills in understanding of Nietzsche’s metaphysics and ontology (which is insepara- self-overcoming is a new valuation, produced by a new hierarchy of forces, ble from his ethics, as shall be seen), I aim to dispel the misperception that affects, or drives – this manifests itself as a different form of life, a different Nietzsche’s ethics espouses conflict with others, egoism, and promotes vio- way of living and acting, and thus a different way of affirmatively relating lent spectacles of dominant power displays. Rather, it shall be shown that the oneself to life. conflict and domination is not expressed externally, upon others, but rather The real, according to Nietzsche, is an illusion, an error. For reality as inwardly, in relation to oneself. Nietzsche’s ethics explicates a way of liv- perceived by the senses or through consciousness is a by-product of forces ing by means of creative valuation, a life of affirmation and self-overcoming, and drives, and their affective interpretation. This means that every fact, aimed at development and improvement, as well as increase, of one’s life and insofar as it is always already interpreted (not thematically by consciousness, character. An ethos, then, in the Greek sense, aimed ever towards the future, but “unconsciously” by the forces and drives that make us up, that we “really” in line with human life, as well as life more generally. are), is not separate from value.5 Everything appears as though “colored” or The thought of Nietzsche could rightly be considered a Lebensphilosophie, filtered by our moral evaluations which shape our world by means of our in that its content and concerns can always be traced genealogically back to form of life.6 Our morals and values are thus “symptoms and sign languages” the fundament of life. Life is, for Nietzsche, a vital force of expression, an (WP §258) which can be semiotically translated back to the arrangement or élan vital, which works itself through all things. It is inextricably bound up conflictual relationship of struggle between our passions and fundamental with the will to power, which is an interminable intensification of life, whose affective forces. And this is precisely what allows Nietzsche to diagnose the expression is the increase of power, of force, of affective potential. Daniel W. metaphysical illness ailing humanity, the Weltschmerz which has plagued us Conway describes the will to power as “the irrepressible surge of life [which] since at least the late nineteenth century – it is our system of values, our form legitimates the continual obsolescence of formerly vital forms and the con- of life, and thus the arrangement of our passions and drives, what we desire tinual creation of new forms,”(538) which connects it with another concept and affirm and what we prohibit and repress, which is producing our mass intertwined with life in Nietzsche’s thought, that being “self-overcoming.” Self-overcoming is the movement of the obsolescence of what was and the continual creation of what will be, to which Conway refers. It is inherent in the futurity of life, as the rolling wave which consumes what was in bringing 5Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, forth what is to come, the cascading triumph of life of which Percy Shel- ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1968), §260: “we first make a thing painful by investing it with an evaluation. The extent of moral evaluations: they play a part in almost ley wrote. Nietzsche refers to self-overcoming as “the law of life the law every sense impression. Our world is colored by them.” of the necessary “self-overcoming” in the essence of life” (GM III §27). Self- 6Cf. WP §256: “I understand by “morality” a system of evaluation that partially coincides overcoming is essential and necessary for life because life is will to power, it with the conditions of a creature’s life.” 803 814 depression. Nietzsche links this to the historical effects of the ubiquity of the expense of difference, distance, and struggle (promoting death at the ex- Christianity and its life-denying desire for the “otherworldly.”7 pense of life, in other words).9 Luckily for us, morality is not a categorical Valuation, then, is a creative process – it prescribes and precludes the determination of reason; because it is a historical product of our lives, based possibilities and the relations open to our lives. Everything that is possible upon our valuations, there remains the possibility of transforming our lives is framed by a certain valuation which determines or delimits our reactions by transforming our values. But how would we do this? This is the proposal and our responses to these phenomena. As Nietzsche puts it, “there are no of Nietzsche’s ethics of the future – his future ethics, which

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