ISSN 2522-9842 Social development and Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, – 2020

Early identification of threats as the means of fighting against hybrid warfare (with a focus on the south Caucasus)

Khayal Iskandarov * A; Piotr Gawliczek B A War College of the Armed Forces, Republic of B University of Warmia and Mazury, Poland

Received: July 29, 2020 | Revised: August 20, 2020 | Accepted: August 31, 2020

DOI: 10.33445/sds.2020.10.4.9

Abstract Early identification of the most recent hybrid threats (incident at Keshikchidag, the escalation in the border between and Azerbaijan, in July 2020, etc.) in the South Caucasus, enabled the nations to sidestep the repercussions of the provocation, most probably initiated by the external actors. This is the primary reason why the authors developed this paper. The importance of early identification in fighting against hybrid threats has been highlighted in the paper. The authors elaborated on the examples occured in the South Caucasus countries, as well as beyond the region. The challenges of identifying hybrid threats ahve been specified. The scenarios have been presented regarding the hybrid aggressors and hybrid threats in the South Caucasus region. Key words: Hybrid warfare, hybrid threat, South Caucasus, gray zone, early identification.

Introduction As disinformation and hybrid campaigns are combination of unexplained incidents – “things often unpredictable and deliberately confusing, it going wrong” – would indicate a coordinated is important to detect them as early as possible. assault. An additional complication is that hybrid Early indicators should be established to enable threats could develop from the convergence of a more agile responses to hybrid threats, especially number of already existing social, technical or in the early phase of the conflict cycle (Thiele, economic problems which is then exploited by an 2015). Governments, but also the police, media, adversary – without it having been necessarily the private sector and civil society groups, need to planned, masterminded or coordinated (Giles, improve detection and analytical capabilities, 2019). Various authors (Luke Coffey, Axel basing their findings on comprehensive Hagelstam, Jarno Limnéll, Chris Kremidas- monitoring and data gathering. This means Courtney, etc.) have addressed an issue of investing in both the tools needed to detect the identifying hybrid threats. However, an early hostile narratives that are gaining momentum identification of hybrid threats as a means of and, in the experts, needed to make sense of this fighting against hybrid warfare has not been information. It undeniably requires more systematically studied, especially with regard to resources and investment (“Hybrid and the South Caucasus region. The objective of the transnational threats”, 2018). The main question paper is to highlight the importance of the early in this paper is “how to identify hybrid threat identification of hybrid threats with a focus on the before it is too late?” At a low intensity, it might South Caucasus region. The research methods even be difficult for the victim to know that they primarily used in the book are comparative are under attack. A key task is to determine what analysis and synthesis.

* Corresponding author: War College of the Armed Forces, Republic of Azerbaijan, e-mail: [email protected], ORCID: 0000-0001-8975-6530

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Results and discussion Early identification of hybrid threats and its weapon once or twice; a hybrid adversary must challenges be able to train personnel in the effective, The actions to prevent hybrid threats go from combined, coordinated use of multiple weapons identifying risks, vulnerabilities and knowledge systems and have a means by which the logistics and situation awareness (launching a hybrid risk necessary to sustain those systems are assured. study to identify the main vulnerabilities that Finally, complex terrain is critical in enabling a may affect national structures and networks, hybrid adversary to effectively confront a carry out a study on hybrid risks in neighboring modern military opponent (Chuka & Born, 2014, countries, create a fusion cell capable of 16). receiving and analyzing classified and open Tactics and strategies regarding hybrid source information on hybrid threats, setting up warfare used in different situations are based on a Center for Excellence for “Countering the the analysis of the situation and available Hybrid Threats”) are complemented by actions capabilities. According to Chambers (2016), the aimed at developing and increasing individual contemporary characteristics of hybrid threats and collective resilience (improving the are a generalization and should be applied to protection and resilience of critical individual situations differently in order to help infrastructure in relevant sectors, increasing the understand the situation on the ground and resilience of space infrastructures, improving develop an appropriate response. awareness and resilience within existing training There are some quintessential examples in mechanisms and coordination) (Cîrdei & Ispas, the history about early identification of hybrid 2017). According to Giles (2019), key indicators threats. Capitalizing on a migration card would probably comprise a mixture of attempted to exploit the Russian-speaking traditional and novel ones. Traditional warning community in Germany, alleging through signs would include the arrival in the country, or Russian mass media that Russian girl, Lisa was in a specific region, of meaningful numbers of a raped by Muslim migrants in order to provoke a specific type of foreign visitors; or civil wave of discontent and thus weaken the demonstrations turning into a staged position of Chancellor Angela Merkel (Bajarūnas confrontation; or a sudden or escalating pattern & Keršanskas, 2019). The case dominated of sabotage. New indicators would be German headlines for two weeks in January connected with foreign emphasis on the 2016. In the end, German police established that importance of information warfare and conflict, the story was fake – she had been with a friend exploiting new technological possibilities to the that night (Treverton, et. al., 2018). In February maximum in pursuing old principles of 2017, a draft report was sent to the speaker of subversion and information warfare. the Lithuanian parliament claiming that German Christopher Bowers has identified three soldiers, who are leading NATO’s new battle characteristics of hybrid actors on the group there, had raped a teenager (Sahin, 2017). operational level: maturity, capability, and The rationale behind this report was to complex terrain. Maturity describes the degree undermine the credibility of NATO’s decision of organization and cohesion; depth of after Warsaw summit to increase its presence in leadership; responsiveness to internal Baltic countries and Poland. However, the rumor leadership and external forces (state sponsor); was quickly revealed as fake news and did not support of a population; evidence of long-term trigger further reactions (Sahin, 2017). This goals and the ability to collectively pursue example brings the early identification of any achievement of those goals. Capability refers to threat to the fore. the capacity of a hybrid adversary to be able to Each time we face a new security challenge, a field, employ, and sustain some elements of a defense or security contractor is waiting in the modern military. It is not enough to use a wings to sell us a solution. In the case of hybrid 103 ISSN 2522-9842 Social development and Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, – 2020 threats, there is no one-size-fits-all solution nor (supporting conflict, annexation), and new system we can just buy to mitigate them. clandestine operations; Instead, everything we’ve learned from previous − apply various tools of propaganda, fake examples tells us that we must adapt our legal new, cyber-trolling, also hacking and other frameworks and working culture and improve forms of cyber warfare. the connective tissue between ministries and The South Caucasus and early identification organizations to enable our own governments of hybrid threats. Retrospective analysis and organizations to better protect our societies South Caucasus is one of the regions located (Kremidas-Courtney, 2019). The activities in in the proximity of three major and ambitious hybrid warfare are typically designed to stay Eurasian states: , Russia, and Iran within the grey zone that may be outside of a (Iskandarov, 2019). Turkey is an actor, which target’s detection capabilities and underneath more or less balance the Russia-Iran tandem. the target’s estimated threshold of major Russia is the most influential actor in the South escalation. The activities are also calibrated in a Caucasus, claiming the region to be a part of its way that they do not allow a justified military so-called “near abroad”. The elements of hybrid response under international law, unless the warfare were initially observed in the countries, hybrid threat actor considers such escalation to which were striving hard to get out of Russian be beneficial for attaining its goals (Eronen & sphere of influence, namely in the cases of Cederberg, n.d.). Joseph Votel an et al. defined Azerbaijan and Georgia. The key point in Russia’s grey-zone conflicts as a segment of the conflict striving for the control over the “near abroad” continuum “characterized by intense political, was to incorporate the South Caucasian states economic, information, and military into the Russia-dominated CIS. It needed little competition more fervent in nature than normal effort with Armenia, but it was rather difficult steady-state diplomacy, yet short of with Azerbaijan and Georgia; however, neither conventional war” (Chambers, 2016). Armenia was a reliable Russian ally at the In order to come up with the conclusive beginning of 1990s as it used to be later. When findings regarding the identification of hybrid the initial Armenian attempts to set up good threats in the South Caucasus, it is important to relations with Turkey collapsed, the only understand the geopolitics and state of affairs in Armenian choice was to rely on Russia as its the region. most important ally. The Russian troops stayed Nilsson considers various modes of influence in Armenia and allegedly were also involved in an external actor may use in order to change (or the Karabakh war (Kopeček, 2010). sometimes preserve) the status quo, that can be Azerbaijan lost the favour of Russia mostly identified as security threats (Tarkhan-Mouravi, during the tenure of the President Abulfez 2016): Elchibey between 1992-1993. In this time Russia − support/disrupt the sustainability of the probably helped to originate the Talysh and existing regime through assistance/sanctions Lezgin separatism in Azerbaijan, which ceased and sabotage; support one of the sides during after Elchibey’s stepdown in June 1993 regime change, or influence the procedure of (Kopeček, 2010). Despite the war with Armenia, such change; the involvement of frontline forces in the − induce and promote gradual change of a capital, the struggle for authority, and even the regime, through (promise of) support or fratricidal massacre threatened independence integration based on conditionality, or threaten of Azerbaijan. The Ganja uprising of June 4, 1993 withdrawal of such support, or using incentive- was one of the events that posed such a threat. based pressures or rewards (bribes) to influence At that time, an armed clash took place in Ganja elite regime preferences; between the military forces led by the former − impose regime change by force, including corps commander of the Azerbaijani Army, pro- regime change on a part of the territory Russian colonel Suret Huseynov and

104 ISSN 2522-9842 Social development and Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, – 2020 government forces. The operation to disarm afterwards by unknown individuals. He soon military unit 709, controlled by Huseynov, failed, appeared in Russia. However, shortly killing 35 people on both sides. Government afterwards, Huseynov was arrested there and officials sent to Ganja were taken hostage by handed over to (“Heydər Əliyev qiyamı Huseynov’s gang (“Müxalifətin 4 iyun savaşı”, belə yatırdı”, 2015). 2018). Huseynov and his armed men marched The most apparent Russian influence was towards Baku, forcing Elchibey to step down. evident in the politics of Georgia. The first Then was the only choice of the Russian involvement in Georgia was probably nation that could save the country. When he the overthrow of the President Zviad came to power Azerbaijan was teetering on the Gamsakhurdia in 1992 by paramilitary forces led brink of civil war. Aliyev shared a power deal by Kitovani, Ioseliani and Sigua, equipped with with Huseinov, the former becoming president the arms gained from the Russian military bases and the latter prime minister with “extended in Georgia (Kopeček, 2010). After his overthrow, competences”. It seemed that Azerbaijan, ruled Gamsakhurdia relocated to Chechnya where he by the Aliyev-Huseynov doublet, was to become was granted asylum by the Russian republic's a loyal Russian ally as it joined the CIS in leader, Dzhokhar Dudayev, who was pursuing September 1993. After that, however, Heydar his own independence bid from Moscow. In Aliyev refused the Moscow-led mediation in the September 1993, Gamsakhurdia returned to Karabakh conflict, as well as the prevalently Georgia to lead forces against the government, Russian peacekeeping forces, and set up the but former President Eduard Shevardnadze mediations in the frame of the CSCE Minsk managed to suppress the revolt with the military Group (Kopeček, 2010). Moreover, despite the assistance of Russia. According to official pressure coming from Russia and Iran, as well as records, Gamsakhurdia died on New Year's Eve the strong opposition of Surat Huseynov, 1993 from a self-inflicted single gunshot wound President Heydar Aliyev managed the to the head. A later examination reported two realization of the “Contract of the Century” in bullet holes to the head, fueling speculation that September 1994 with the participation of 11 the Georgian leader had been murdered major foreign oil companies (BP, Amoco, (Rimple, 2007). The Russian involvement was Unocal, LUKoil, Statoil, Exxon, TPAO, Pennzoil, predominantly observed in the South Ossetian McDermott; Ramco; Delta Nimir) representing (in 1990s) and Abkhazian (in 1992) conflicts six countries (UK, USA, Russia, Norway, Turkey (Kopeček, 2010), which ended up with the and Saudi Arabia) and Western states gained an secession of two separatist regions from opportunity to participate in the oil and gas Georgia. production of the Azerbaijani sector of the Similarly, to Heydar Aliyev, Shevardnadze (Mammadzada, Iskandarov, balanced between Russia and the West; Gasanov, 2020). On October 4, 1994, another nevertheless, unlike Aliyev he had to allow revolt was initiated by Surat Huseynov against Russian military bases in the Georgian territory, President Heydar Aliyev. The president as well as prevalently Russian peacekeeping addressed the people with regard to the revolt. forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On the His exceptional prestige among the population contrary Shevardnadze has been capable to join soon led to the gathering of hundreds of Western backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline thousands of people in front of the President’s project, to close one of the Russian military Office in support of the government. Thus, bases in Vaziani in the outskirts of Tbilisi, and unlike the uprising of June 4, 1993, Heydar even to host US military advisers in Pankisi Aliyev prevented the revolt without firing a gorge. Pankisi then became the place of indirect single shot. Surat Huseynov was removed from Russian-US clash in 2002, when Russian aircrafts the post of Prime Minister on October 7. The bombed Pankisi, accusing Georgia of sheltering most interesting point is about the arrest of Chechen rebels (Kopeček, 2010). Surat Huseynov. Huseynov was abducted shortly Thus, the history proves that, an early 105 ISSN 2522-9842 Social development and Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, – 2020 identification of hybrid threat is of paramount political agenda; importance. Unlike and Zviad − integrated hybrid tools into their doctrinal Gamsakhurdia, President Heydar Aliyev’s thinking; discernment enabled him to identify the danger − access to a wide array of assets and of Surat Huseynov and the power behind him capabilities, including tools enabling crossing and nip the threat in the bud. the geographic distance. That is a history of about three decades ago. All these typical features are being observed A lot of things have changes in this period, either overtly or covertly in all countries of the including the tactics of hybrid warfare. It is South Caucasus. Russia is the most active necessary to keep in mind that the art of external actor in the region. Russia’s interests competitive politics, including warfare, is have been fully maintained in Armenia (at least developing all the time and we often encounter till Pashinyan’s leadership), partially in new mutations or rehashes of previously well- Azerbaijan (through the representatives of the known doctrinal approaches (Eronen & “fifth column”). Georgian society has Cederberg, n.d.). All military doctrines are an substantially refused the Russian ideology and evolution of previous ones, and influenced by excluded the Russian involvement in their the technical, political, social and economic country. There are three scenarios regarding forces shaping the battlefield at every level. hybrid aggressors and hybrid threats in the Today’s Russian approach is broadly rooted in South Caucasus: some distinctive characteristics of today’s Russia 1) external actors may directly involved in and past practice, but more specifically is the the internal affairs of the regional countries; product of a series of military-political debates 2) external actors may use their contacts, and organizational developments that came to namely the representative of the “fifth column” fruition following the 2008 Georgian War in order to destabilize the regional countries; (Galeotti, 2018). The nations in the South 3) external actors may exploit the regional Caucasus lose the sight of this fact and therefore countries against each other. have been suffering throughout the centuries. For the time being, the first scenario is not Hybrid threats need to be pre-empted by both conceivable against a backdrop of international “passive” elements, such as increased resilience condemn. Till Pashinyan’s leadership Armenia against shock or surprise and more active ones was not concerned with the second scenario. including robust measures to prepare and Today the second and third scenarios are more protect the functions and structures that are prevalent and most probably will be so in the most likely to be targeted by hybrid attacks. For foreseeable future, since they are more these purposes, the importance of sufficient civil convenient for external actors. preparedness arrangements, a free press, an The “police-citizen” confrontation that took educated public and an effective legal place on June 7, 2020 in Baku is an example of framework cannot be overstated. the early identification of hybrid threat Hybrid actors have demonstrated their intent (“Yasamal hadisələri”, 2020). It might be seen by applying tools of hybrid influencing to simple, but in fact is very serious. Thus, one of advance their political agenda. According to the residents of the building ignores the two-day Eronen and Cederberg (n.d.), the high-end strict quarantine regime against a backdrop of hybrid threats are the most dangerous and Covid-19 pandemic. Conflict arises when a difficult to be deterred and countered. They police officer who is monitoring the situation typically have: approaches him and warns. The next day, police − an outspoken revisionist or even officers break into the apartments, use insulting revolutionary political agenda; expressions, and record their actions. It was a − well-developed instruments of national deliberate provocation against the police with power providing the means supporting the purpose of undermining their reputation in the

106 ISSN 2522-9842 Social development and Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, – 2020 midst of pandemics. What is interesting here is to enhance the cooperation with the leading that, the recorded video has been spread by the Western organizations like EU and NATO based policemen themselves. This fact highlights the first and foremost on mutual interest and severity of the issue. Because it proves that, the participate in training and exercises led by them. confrontation between the policemen and Multinational and multifarious exercises would citizens was in the interest of some actors, in this be particularly helpful for the nations in the case the “fifth column”. The early identification South Caucasus to explore their strengths and of the threat enabled the government to deter a weaknesses. large scale civilian-police confrontation, which An example of a place that has done a great would have ended up with civil war. On June 4, job at building resilience to Russia’s hybrid a group of Georgian citizens violated the state warfare is Estonia. Even though the Russian border on the territory of the Keshikchidag State minority makes up roughly one-quarter of the Historical and Cultural Reserve on the population, Moscow hasn’t been able to cause Azerbaijani-Georgian state border. The the same problems using its hybrid tactics as it Georgian Border Guard was officially informed has in other places. It is clear why the Russian about the provocation and a crisis between two population in Estonia is not susceptible to nations was thwarted. It is apparently obvious Moscow’s hybrid tactics of “little green men” that, neither Georgia, nor Azerbaijan would and propaganda. Polling shows that a vast benefit from this accident. It was another hybrid majority have a lot of trust in their governing threat in the interest of most probably external institutions. For example, according to a public actors. According to academician Yagub opinion survey conducted by the Estonian Mahmudov (2019), the incident at Keshikchidag Ministry of Defense in early 2019, 66 percent of did not happen accidentally. This was a Estonians have confidence in the country’s deliberate provocation aimed at worsening the president and 56 percent in the prime minister. friendly relations between Azerbaijan, Georgia According to the same survey, 87 percent of and Turkey, which are the guarantor of peace Estonians said they have confidence in the and security in the South Caucasus. The police. Perhaps not surprisingly, The Heritage academician believes that, this provocation was Foundation’s 2018 Index of Economic Freedom committed at the order of the power centers, ranked Estonia seventh in the world in terms of which have military, political and economic economic freedom. The trust in government and interests in the South Caucasus and these police, combined with Estonia’s economic centers staged a provocation, using pro- opportunities, deny Russia the ability to use Armenian forces in Georgia. hybrid tactics. Estonia has been able to win the The escalation in the border between hybrid war even before it starts (Coffey, 2019). Armenia and Azerbaijan, in July 2020 is another Let us compare Estonia’s situation today to example of hybrid threat. Because this time the that of Ukraine’s in 2013 and 2014. Due to a escalation did not occur in Nagorno-Karabakh, dismal economic situation, and years of political but in Tovuz – internationally recognized border and economic corruption at the top of between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The objective government, Russia was able to exploit the of this escalation was to embroil Azerbaijan in situation in Ukraine. As soon as the “little green another argument, where CSTO is involved. men” appeared in Crimea, it was too late. One However, the prudence of the government does not have to look too far from home to see precluded Armenians or some other external how Russia has employed effective hybrid actors from realizing their ambition. tactics. The 2016 Presidential election is a great We have to consider that, the threats of example. Certain sectors of American society today are not preventable through national are ripe for Russia’s meddling. Certain minority resources and modes, countering them is a groups feel mistreated by the police. Some on matter of international cooperation. Thus, one the political right feel a massive distrust of of the main tools to increase hybrid resilience is the FBI. There also exists a strong cynicism of the

107 ISSN 2522-9842 Social development and Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, – 2020 federal government in some sectors of American different methods to counter them before it is society (Coffey, 2019). too late. A small place like the South Caucasus One of the most concrete outcomes of the riddled with frozen conflicts always attracts efforts to counter hybrid threats is to have a look attention of researchers. At times, hybrid at what it has experienced, what it has lost and activities may appear to have ceased, such as in achieved and what direction it should take next. the case of so-called frozen conflicts or during The Hybrid Centre of Excellence in Estonia has perceived peace time, while that particular developed a concept for its three Communities situation may in reality serve the greater goals of Interest (COI). Three COIs with their of the threat actor, or serve as time used to networking, analysis, training and exercise prepare the ground for future operations activities have succeeded in promoting both (Eronen & Cederberg, n.d.). situational awareness, resilience and response Countering hybrid threats requires a strong capabilities in participating countries. The COI collaborative involvement of different actors. on Hybrid Influencing is led by the United Because of this, many Western countries have Kingdom, the sub-COI on Non-state Actors by begun to emphasize the importance of whole of Sweden, and the COI on Vulnerabilities and nation and whole of government principles in Resilience by Finland. In summer of 2018, they preparing for today’s cyber and hybrid threats convened networks to share best practices on (Limnéll, 2019). Through strengthening public issues such as legal resilience, maritime and and private governance, and seeking deeper and harbor safety, energy networks, drones and broader cooperation among institutions, election interference (Hagelstam, 2018). nations, civil society and the private sector, we Sweden and Finland are perfect examples for can turn globalization and our greater the South Caucasus countries. interconnectedness from a vulnerability into an Since Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008 advantage (Kremidas-Courtney, 2019). This hybrid threats have received a great deal of mostly means adopting the Finnish attention in the South Caucasus. The events comprehensive security-model, although each took place prior to and during that conflict have state adds their own characteristics into the encouraged the scholars, and policymakers to model. The Finnish model has nevertheless examine the vulnerability of particular nations in received increasing amounts of prestigious the region to hybrid threats and introduce international attention (Limnéll, 2019). Conclusions The South Caucasus region is a place where the conflict, while meeting the criteria of grey-zone interests of ambitious actors clash. The conflict. In addition, unlike various regions in neighboring countries’ growing influence has Europe (for instance Scandinavian countries, Baltic become a considerable concern for the last three states and etc.) the threats do not solely emanate decades, because these countries have been from external actors, the countries in the region increasingly engaged in unconventional might be manipulated against each other through operations with a claim to undermine Western different means. That’s why early identification of hegemony. Western community in its turn applies hybrid threats is of utmost importance in order its own tools to offset them in the region. In prevent further repercussions not only for the addition these unconventional strategies region, but also for the Western community in employed fall mostly outside the purview of broader context, since Europe has vital interests international treaties, laws and norms. Therefore, regarding the regional energy and transport their actions fall short of engagement in hybrid projects. References Chambers, J. (2016). Countering grey-zone Generation Warfare’ and Implications for the hybrid threats, An Analysis of Russia’s ‘New US Army. October 18, 2016. 108 ISSN 2522-9842 Social development and Security, Vol. 10, No. 4, – 2020

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