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E N O T Russian Aviation in Support of the Maneuver Defense

Dr. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles

FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE

Open Source, Foreign Perspective, Underconsidered/Understudied Topics The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an open source research organization of the U.S. . It was founded in 1986 as an innovative program that brought together military specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics derived from unclassified, foreign media. Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special insight and highly collaborative work by conducting unclassified research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered.

Authors' Backgrounds:

Dr. Grau has published over 200 articles and studies on tactical, operational and geopolitical subjects. His book, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, was published in 1996. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet- Afghan War, co-authored with Ali Jalali, was published in 1998. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost was published in 2001. The ’s Do-It-Yourself, Nazi-Bashing Guerrilla Warfare Manual and Passing It On: Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan’s Frontier were published in 2011. Operation Anaconda: America’s First Battle In Afghanistan and Mountain Warfare And Other Lofty Problems: Foreign Ideas On High-Altitude Combat, co-authored with Charles K. Bartles, were also published in 2011. Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian-Chechen Wars 1994-2009, co- authored with Dodge Billingsley, was published in 2012. Afghanistan: Preparing for the Bolshevik Incursion into Afghanistan and Attack on India, which is a translation of General Snesarev’s 1921 classic work, was published in 2014. From Fabric Wings to Supersonic Fighters and Drones: A History of Military Aviation on Both Sides of the North-West Frontier, with Brian Cloughley and Andrew Roe, was published in 2015.

Charles K. Bartles is an analyst and Russian linguist at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His specific research areas include Russian and Central Asian military force structure, modernization, tactics, officer and enlisted professional development, and security assistance programs. Chuck is also an imagery officer and Major in the Army Reserve at the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCCIMD). He has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and has served as a security assistance officer at embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Chuck has a BA in Russian from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, an MA in Russian and Eastern European Studies from the University of Kansas, a certificate in Geospatial Information Systems from the University of Missouri-Kansas City, and certificates in Database Administration and Computer Programming from Johnson County Community College.

Previous Publication: This paper was originally published in the U.S. Army Aviation Digest's October-December issue (https://www.rucker.army.mil/aviationdigest/assets/archive/ AVN_DIG_2018_10-12.pdf). It is being posted on the Foreign Military Studies Office website with permission from the publisher.

FMSO has provided some editing, format, and graphics to this paper to conform to organizational standards. Academic conventions, source referencing, and citation style are those of the author.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. USSIAN R VIATION A IN SUPPORT OF THE

MANEUVER DEFENSE манёвренная оборона

aneuver defense [манёвренная оборона] M is a form of defense By Dr. Lester W. Grau and Mr. Charles K. Bartles whose goal is to inflict enemy casualties, gain time, and pre- He commits the minimum possible maneuver war, continuous trench serve friendly forces with the combat power to his fixing force lines, engineered and fixed defenses extending across continents, as oc- potential loss of territory. It that conducts shaping operations to control the depth and breadth of the curred in Europe in World Wars I and is conducted, as a rule, when enemy’s advance. The fixing force II will not occur. According to Rus- there are insufficient forces also retains the terrain required to sian military guidance, the maneu- and means available to con- conduct the striking force’s decisive ver defense, eventually leading to a duct a positional defense (Min- counterattack” (Department of the positional defense will be their pri- istry of Defense of the [DA], 2001). This differs from mary defense and will be conducted Federation, 2001). This dif- the Russian concept in that the Rus- by the maneuver brigades as their fers from the U.S. concept of sians do not intend to permit the base formation (Ministry of Defense the mobile defense which “is a enemy to advance in order to coun- of the Russian Federation, 2013).* [type of] defensive operation terattack. They intend to fight the Ever since the Gulf war, ground forc- that concentrates on the de- enemy and reduce his forces with- out becoming decisively engaged. es have realized that unprotected struction or defeat of the en- Russian maneuver battalions and maneuver in the open may lead to emy through a decisive attack brigades conduct maneuver de- decimation. Less modern ground by a striking force. It focuses fense, whereas the U.S. considers forces have attempted to negate on destroying the attacking mobile defense as a corps-level fight this by moving the fight to terrain force by permitting the enemy (DA, 2001).* In future conventional that defeats or degrades high-pre- cision systems—mountains, jungles, to advance into a position that *“Units smaller than a corps do not normally exposes him to counterattack conduct a mobile defense because of their extensive forests, swamps, and cit- and envelopment. The com- inability to fight multiple engagements ies—while conducting a long-term throughout the width, depth, and height of the war of attrition to sap the political mander holds the majority of AO, while simultaneously resourcing striking, his available combat power in fixing, and reserve forces.” This is not to say *Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, that Russian army groups would not conduct 2013. This is a major change since Stalin’s a striking force for his decisive maneuver defense, nor that their concepts will infamous order 227 issued on 28 July 1942-“Не operation, a major counterat- differ radically from those of a U.S. Corps. Rather, шагу назад” [Not one step backwards]-which the training and planning for such is at lower condemned thousands of Soviet soldiers to die tack. level in the Russian force. needlessly in positional defense.

14 Aviation Digest October–December 2018 Back to Table of Contents will of the enemy. This difficult ter- maneuver but stalemated into posi- battalion with its own tanks, mo- rain will also be a valuable ally in tional mountain combat enabled by torized rifle, artillery, antitank, and future conventional maneuver war, fires. The Vietnam War was about support subunits capable of fighting as will camouflage, electronic and the maneuver of the helicopter, but and sustaining independently over aerial masking, effective air de- difficult terrain dominated the bat- a large area. The Russian maneuver fense systems, and secure messag- tlefield. The antitank-guided missile brigades now have one or two bat- ing. Maneuver defense will clearly and precision-guided munitions cur- talion tactical groups and are work- be a feature of future conventional rently threaten maneuver. Still, ad- ing to achieve four (Grau, 2014). The maneuver war. One thing that may vances in fires, electronic counter- Russians have a long history of con- change dramatically is the funda- measures (ECM), robotics, and air ducting a fragmented defense on a mental concept of the main linear, defense may enable maneuver. The fragmented battlefield. The Russian positional defense that the ma- proved quite adept at Civil War is replete with such exam- neuver defense leads to. Perhaps hiding and surviving in difficult ter- ples (Ministry of Defense of the Rus- the main linear defense will be an- rain during the 78-day air sian Federation, 2002). During the chored in difficult terrain. Perhaps war (Operation Allied Force). What Second World War, in addition to its the main defense will more closely they lacked was a ground force to large conventional force, the Sovi- resemble the security zone maneu- combat at the termination of the ets fielded the largest partisan army ver defense. The main defense may bombing (Grau & Bartles, 2016). in history. It conducted a fragment- become an expanded security zone ed offense and defense against a containing counterstrike/counterat- The fragmented battlefield has be- linear German force (Grau & Gress, tack forces and a concentration of come common following the Gulf 2010). Afghanistan, Chechnya, and high-precision weapon systems. War. The Soviet-Afghan War, the An- now also featured fragmented golan Civil War, the Chadian-Libyan offense and defense. Open flanks may be covered by conflict, the Battle of Mogadishu, maneuvering artillery fires, avia- Operation Enduring Freedom, most FIGURE 1 shows a Russian motor- tion, and positional forces not un- of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the ized rifle brigade in a notional po- der duress. The Russian concept of Libyan Civil War, the Sudan conflict, sitional defense (Grau & Bartles, maneuver by fire may dominate the and the Saudi Arabian-Yemen con- 2016). It has three motorized rifle battlefield as it alone may enable flict—all have involved fragmented battalions, a tank battalion, four maneuver (Grau & Bartles, 2016). battlefields (Kalachev, 2016). How artillery battalions, two air defense do peer forces fight conventional battalions, an engineer battalion, a The linear battlefield may be re- maneuver war on a fragmented bat- signal battalion, a support battalion, placed by the fragmented [очаговый] tlefield? Permanent combined arms an Unmanned Aerial (UAV) battlefield where brigades maneu- battalions appear to be an impor- company, and an electronic warfare ver like naval fleets, deploying ma- tant component. For decades, the company. It is defending in two ech- neuver and fire subunits over large Soviets and Russians have strug- elons with two battalions forward areas protected by air defense sys- gled with fielding, training, support- and two back. The location of forc- tems, electronic warfare, and par- ing, and fighting a combined arms es, systems, and distances will be ticulate smoke. Strong points will be established and abandoned, ar- tillery fires will maneuver, and dif- ficult terrain will become the future fortresses and redoubts. The First World War on the Western Front was a positional fight where artil- lery, field fortifications, and inter- locking machine gun fire prevented maneuver. The First World War on the Eastern Front, however, was not positional, but fluid. The antithesis to the stalemate in the West was the tank. Yet, the tank did not spell the end of the linear defense. During the Second World War, the tank en- abled maneuver in some places, but in other places, difficult terrain and integrated defenses prevented ma- neuver, and fires prevailed. The Ko- rean War began with a great deal of Figure 1. Motorized rifle brigade in a notional positional defense.

Back to Table https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd 15 of Contents responsibility of 10 by 10 kilometers (frontage and depth, respectively), and a company position is up to 2 kilometers in frontage and up to 1 ki- lometer in depth. There is a distance of up to 1.5 kilometers in depth be- tween positions, which ensures mu- tual support of defending subunits and allows maneuver to the subse- quent position (Artemyev, 2017).

FIGURE 3 shows a Russian motor- ized rifle brigade in a maneuver de- fense (Artemyev, 2017). Battalion positions are shown and company fighting positions are depicted with- in the battalion positions, showing that the companies will fight from more than one position within each battalion position. The brigade de- fends against an attack from the west with its tank battalion to the north and the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion to the south. The 2nd Mo- torized Rifle Battalion is deployed further to the west in forward po- sitions and is not initially shown on this diagram. The tank and 3rd Mo- Figure 2. Motorized rifle battalion in a notional positional defense. torized Rifle Battalion cover three enemy high-speed avenues of ap- adjusted to fit the demands of the of a continuous line of contact and proach. The northern approaches situation, threat, forces available, by extensive use of raiding and are considered the most danger- and terrain. commando detachments, flanking ous. The enemy initially engages actions, and infiltration. The ma- the 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion, FIGURE 2 shows a Russian motor- neuver defense may become the which forces the enemy to deploy ized rifle battalion in a notional po- “normal” defense, with the position- and slows its advance while Russian sitional defense. It has three motor- al defense as an anomaly. In a ma- artillery or aviation fire damages ized rifle companies and an organic neuver defense, within the brigade, the enemy advance. The 2nd Mo- battery and AGS (Avtoma- the battalion is assigned an area of torized Rifle Battalion does not be- tischeskyi Granatmyot Stankovyi)-17 automatic launcher pla- toon, plus attached tanks, air de- fense systems, and flame-thrower weapons. The location of forces, systems, and distances will be ad- justed to fit the demands of the situ- ation, threat, forces available, and terrain (Grau & Bartles, 2016).

Soviet/Russian positional defenses are dug in and have been difficult to overcome, but expected forces ra- tios and the experience from recent conflicts have demonstrated that positional defense may work well in urban terrain and mountains, but is not the norm elsewhere. Armed conflicts during recent decades are characterized by the absence Figure 3. Motorized rifle brigade in a maneuver defense.

16 Aviation Digest October–December 2018 Back to Table of Contents come decisively engaged. Rather, it shallow security zone consisting of north and south companies move withdraws to the north and through a motorized rifle squad in ambush to directly back to new positions in an the tank battalion, moves past the the north; a motorized rifle platoon alternate line while the combined 1st Motorized Rifle Battalion, and reinforced with a tank, obstacles, arms reserve and antilanding re- occupies a defensive position in the and two mixed minefields in the cen- serve cover the center. The central north. ter; and a tank in ambush protected company moves further back on line by a mixed minefield. The battalion with the forward company reserves The enemy then engages the tank mortar battery is in the security and the on-order positions of the battalion and the 3rd Motorized zone in support of these elements. combined arms reserve and anti- Rifle Battalion, which again forces As the security zone elements with- landing reserve in an intermediate the enemy to deploy, while Russian draw and reposition, the enemy is line. The battalion command post, aviation or artillery fire once more met by three motorized rifle compa- mortar battery, and three artillery damages the enemy advance. Nei- nies (of two platoons each) on line. batteries move behind the final po- ther battalion becomes decisively The companies are reinforced by a sition shown in Figure 4. The enemy engaged, but withdraws. The tank tank platoon and protected by sev- advance encounters a line of six battalion withdraws under the cov- en mixed minefields. Man-portable platoons that cause the enemy to ering fire of the 1st Motorized Rifle air defense systems (MANPADS) are deploy and slow down while being Battalion, moves through the 2nd moved up to the rear of the com- hit with artillery or aviation strikes. Motorized Rifle Battalion, and as- pany positions. The mortar battery This line does not become decisively sumes a central defensive position has repositioned behind the center engaged, but withdraws behind the to the east. The 3rd Motorized Rifle company. There are four firing lines two companies now on an alternate Battalion moves directly back and for the antitank reserve protecting line with on-order positions for the goes on line with the 2nd Motorized the flanks and junctures of the com- combined arms reserve and anti- Rifle Battalion to its north. The en- panies. The third platoons of the landing reserve. Again, the enemy emy continues to advance and is en- forward companies occupy fight- attack is slowed and punished, and gaged by the 1st Motorized Rifle Bat- ing positions in an intermediate line then the line withdraws to its east- talion and the tank battalion, which from which they can cover the with- ern position with the battalion on again forces the enemy to deploy drawal of their companies. Three this alternate line. After slowing and while being engaged by Russian ar- self-propelled artillery batteries are punishing the advancing enemy, the tillery or aviation. The 1st Motorized located each in support of a forward battalion withdraws to its next bat- Rifle Battalion and tank battalion do company, but able to mass fires. The talion box, handing the battle off to not become decisively engaged, but battalion command post is centrally a supporting battalion. move to a new position north of the located. tank battalion. The enemy continues The battalion defends a 10 kilometer to advance and is engaged by Rus- The companies do not become deci- by 10 kilometer box. Russians con- sian artillery or aviation fires while sively engaged, but withdraw under sider that normally, there will be a deploying against the 2nd and 3rd the covering fire of their rear pla- 2–2.5 kilometer distance between Motorized Rifle Battalions. The 2nd toon to take up new positions. The intermediate and alternate lines. and 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalions do not become decisively engaged. The 2nd Motorized Rifle Battalion again moves directly back and goes on line with the tank battalion to its north. The 2nd Motorized Rifle Bat- talion moves through the 1st Motor- ized Rifle Battalion and tank battal- ion to take up a reserve position or to deploy as a forward detachment to start the sequence again.

FIGURE 4 shows a Russian motor- ized rifle battalion in a maneuver de- fense within its initial battalion box (in this case, it is the initial position of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion in the brigade defense). The battal- ion is facing an enemy attack from the west and has a reconnaissance patrol forward. The battalion has a Figure 4. Motorized rifle battalion in the maneuver defense.

Back to Table https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd 17 of Contents The rate of advance of the enemy system at the strategic and opera- from 3–10 kilometers away, as well fighting through the defensive po- tional-strategic levels (provided by as fires to the flanks of an attack- sitions is problematic; however, the the VKS air defense troops), and ing enemy, are less numerous (Arte- Russians calculate that, should the the operational and tactical levels myev, 2017). Russian defensive positions prove provided by air defense assets or- stable, standard values in average ganic to the ground troops, airborne There will be a limited number of conditions find that the enemy may (VDV), and naval infantry* (there army aviation sorties available be capable of covering the distance are two air defense battalions in and, in the absence of a fixed front between defensive lines in 1–1.5 most maneuver brigades). This inte- line, they should not be expended hours. Depending on the location of grated, and overlapping air defense in fragmented efforts. They must supporting helipads, aviation sup- system, frees the Russian provide a decisive effect against port must function quickly and ef- from many air defense-related mis- the most dangerous threats while fectively to mitigate this advance, sions, allowing it to concentrate on preserving decisive power for the particularly should the enemy at- other missions. Since the Russian final defensive effort in a positional tempt to flank or encircle the de- ground forces, unlike the U.S. Army, defense. In a maneuver defense, fenders using ground and air as- possess no manned aviation assets, defending forces displace from line sault forces (Artemyev, 2017). most combat support of the Rus- to line on order or under pressure. sian ground forces, airborne, and The enemy will attempt to pursue Thus, in a maneuver defense, de- naval infantry is now accomplished these forces, interdict their routes fending troops displace from line by the Russian “army aviation.” Rus- of withdrawal, and attack from the to line both deliberately and when sian army aviation belongs to the flanks and rear. Army aviation may forced. The enemy organizes pur- air force and consists of helicopter support covering forces and rear suit with the interdiction of routes aviation and close air support air- guards; attack enemy flanking de- of withdrawal and attacks from the craft such as the SU-25 Frogfoot tachments; and slow the enemy flanks and rear. These actions re- (single-seat twin-engine jet). Ma- pursuit. In some sectors, maneuver quire separate fire support in which neuver defense is fast-moving and withdrawal may be combined with army aviation units are assigned fluid. Since the maneuver defense holding actions and use of flanking to support covering-force subunits is based on not becoming decisively and raiding detachments. Aviation and rear guards, to engage flanking engaged, the defender and attacker support to ground forces in the ma- detachments, and to slow the rate are spending 60–65% of a battle in neuver defense includes: of pursuit. In certain sectors, ma- maneuver. Consequently, artillery neuver will be combined with block- fire has less time to destroy an en- -Air support to containing actions ing and employment of flanking and emy effectively before the enemy [авиационной подержке raiding detachments (Artemyev, has moved (Artemyev, 2017). сковывающих деиствий]; 2017). Artillery, antitank weapons, and -Air support to troop maneuver RUSSIAN AVIATION FIRES aviation strikes are concentrated [авиационной подержке маневра IN SUPPORT OF against the most threatening en- войск]; emy axes of advance. The efforts MANEUVER DEFENSE of these systems should be dis- -Air support to raids tributed by time and place. Impact [авиационной подержке The Soviet Air Force had the larg- areas from artillery concentration est air force in the world. Today, the produce zones of dust and smoke, рейдовых деиствий]; and is much smaller which can reach 1,000 meters al- than the U.S. Air Force after hav- titude and remain for 20 minutes. -Air support to flanking actions ing undergone force reductions and Visibility within these zones does [авиационной подержке much restructuring. Currently, the not exceed 500–1,200 meters. In- обходящих деиствий] (VKS) troduction of aviation strikes in an (Artemyev, 2017). consists of three main branches: the area will severely curtail artillery space troops, who operate Russian fires and fire density. It also raises The aviation requirements will be re- and ground-based space the problem of airspace deconflic- duced during air support to contain- infrastructure; the air defense tion. In a defense, the bulk of tank, ing actions as ground forces fight to troops, who operate strategic air antitank, and artillery fire is con- hold prepared positions. The line of defense systems such as the S-300, centrated within 3 kilometers of the contact is determined on the most S-400, and S-500; and the Russian forward edge of defenses while fires likely enemy avenue of approach Air Force, who operate all non-naval (which is, as a rule, limited by physi- aviation and large UAVs. The Rus- *Although the just the term “ground forces” is generally used throughout this document, the cal features, barrier lines, or by en- sian military has fielded a modern, concepts are equally applicable to ’s other gineer and troop terrain prepara- extensive, integrated air defense mechanized infantry forces, the Russian airborne tions). Army aviation units are on (VDV) and naval infantry.

18 Aviation Digest October–December 2018 Back to Table of Contents combat support aircraft (Artemyev, 2017).

The army aviation containment zone will concentrate on repelling or denying the enemy air by engag- ing its airborne assault force and enemy fire support helicopters. It is permissible for aviation to enter this zone either by skirting the friendly tactical air defense zone during the cross-country flight of the enemy airborne assault force or flying di- rectly through friendly air defenses upon detecting attack groups of enemy fire support helicopters (Ar- temyev, 2017).* In FIGURE 5, three enemy gunships (in dark blue), pre- Figure 5. Aviation engagement maneuver defense. sumably leading an air assault, are flying directly toward the defending call at ground alert positions at es- raiding detachments’ withdrawal by tank battalion. A Russian helicopter tablished helipads and prepared to transitioning to the air support to has overflown the battalion position carry out successive strikes against troop maneuver mission (Artemyev, (hopefully after getting the applica- targets discovered during combat 2017). ble air defense into “weapons tight” (Artemyev, 2017). or “weapons hold”) and is engaging Air support to flanking actions is a the enemy gunships in aerial com- Army aviation requirements dif- logical continuation of air support bat and calling for reinforcement. fer considerably during air support to containing actions. The recon- to troop maneuver. Ground forces naissance fire systems of army avia- RUSSIAN RECONNAIS- usually maneuver from line to line tion will be determine the nature SANCE IN SUPPORT OF along specified routes; however, the of aviation unit actions (Artemyev, location of enemy flanking and en- 2017). ARMY AVIATION circling attacks can only be predict- ed. Consequently, the limited forces Continuous aviation support will The Russians divide the informa- and assets can provide a unified re- rely on established airborne “loiter tion space into the far zone and sponse package only if the informa- areas” and strip-alert forces while near zones with separate reconnais- tion component and reconnaissance retaining some aircraft for rapid- sance/intelligence groups attend- fire component are working capably response reconnaissance fire mis- ing to each. One of the difficulties to provide timely ground and air sions. For support of maneuver de- in detecting enemy forces in areas ambushes (Artemyev, 2017).* fense, Army aviation should divide with ground relief are the cut-out the combat employment area into or “shadow” zones behind hills, in Air support to raids places strict active and containment zones. valleys, or in other places where demands on rapid action. Raiding reserve forces and loitering helicop- detachments, moving in the rear of The active zone is delineated by ters hide. Unmanned aerial an enemy force, have a limited time priority fire engagement of enemy from the organic brigade UAV Com- to carry out their mission, move out ground targets, which are limited pany or external UAVs, reconnais- of the way of enemy attack, and ei- by the flanks and unit boundaries to sance aircraft, and satellites can ther rejoin the main body or occupy the space between the positions of provide a look into the far “shadow” a designated defensive line. Along the ground forces being supported. zones with a priority of early detec- with the time restraints, air support This will permit the defending bri- tion of enemy airborne systems. The must achieve surprise while not re- gade to concentrate its firepower reconnaissance effort is directed to vealing the activity of the raiding (and antitank reserve) to delay and those axes presenting the greatest detachment prematurely. Subse- erode the attacking enemy. In this danger of armed enemy air penetra- instance, an enemy tank unit is at- quently, aviation should support the *Helicopter air-to-air combat has long been tacking the northern flank of the trained for and practiced by Russian army *The Russian reconnaissance fire complex links Russian brigade (Figure 5) and is aviation. See Lester W. Grau & James H. Adams. reconnaissance assets with a command and fire attacked by army aviation SU-25 (2003, January–February). Air Defense with an direction center with dedicated artillery, missiles, attitude: Helicopter versus helicopter combat. and aviation for destruction of priority enemy Military Review. targets upon detection in near real time.

Back to Table https://us.army.mil/suite/page/usaace-dotd 19 of Contents tion of the Russian information zone (Artemyev, 2017).

As shown in FIGURE 6, the 2nd Mo- torized Rifle Battalion is withdraw- ing through the tank battalion to its next position. The enemy is follow- ing in strength with an enemy tank battalion attacking the northern flank of the brigade’s tank battal- ion. An enemy mechanized battal- ion with mobile air defense is facing the tank battalion main defenses. Two enemy battalion task forces are moving in column into the space between the tank battalion and 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion. A tank battalion is attacking directly into the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion. Figure 6. Deep intelligence picture for a brigade in a maneuver defense (Artemyev, 2017). Several Russian howitzers have been knocked out by the enemy. enemy company task force to the destruction. Identification, Friend or Army aviation responds with heli- north of their position, a battalion Foe (IFF) systems are crucial and, in copter gunships following aviation task force to the center of their po- some sectors, air defense will go on turning points (PPM) [поворотный sition, and a company task force to “weapons tight” or “weapons hold” пункт маршрута (ППМ)] to at- the south of their position. It shows status. tack the enemy on the flanks and the height and engagement areas unit boundaries or to the point of of friendly systems. It plans an army CONCLUSION combat deployment (PBR) [пунут aviation attack involving SU-25 Frogfoot close air support aircraft боевого расхождения (ПБР)]. In conventional maneuver war un- and helicopter gunships against der nuclear-threatened conditions, the northern enemy company task The far zone data are usually pro- maneuver defense leading to a po- force. The initial target of the SU-25 vided as a flat map (Figure 6) and sitional defense seems most likely will be the enemy air defense ve- the near zone data as a 3-dimen- to Russian theorists and planners. hicle. Artillery will concentrate on sional model (Figure 7). They unify Skilled maneuver defense is de- the attacking battalion task force the data provided by the brigade signed to destroy enemy systems at and southern company task force. and reconnaissance augmented long range and then withdraw with- Enemy air defenses are high prior- by UAV and other reconnaissance out becoming decisively engaged. ity for army aviation and artillery systems. The reconnaissance strike Aviation and artillery are key to this group receive the same data. In this case, the enemy has massed sig- nificant combat power against the brigade, which is in danger of hav- ing elements surrounded should the planned withdrawals not go as planned. Further, the presence of enemy air defenses will cause the army aviation to pass through these weapons kill zones. The Avenger (U.S.), Roland (French/German), Ge- pard (German), Strela-10/Tunguska ( and successor states), and similar air defense systems are high priority targets for artillery and army aviation (Artemyev, 2017).

FIGURE 7 concentrates on the initial position of the 3rd Motorized Rifle Battalion and posits an attack by an Figure 7. Observation zones for aviation units in support of the maneuver defense (Artemyev, 2017).

20 Aviation Digest October–December 2018 Back to Table of Contents long-range destruction, but never fire engagement zones within the the standard S-8 rocket, several of work the same target simultaneous- limits of the phases of fire engage- which may be employed in aerial ly. Artillery fights the enemy in front ment of the enemy; and combat against enemy helicopters, of the ground formation, whereas UAVs, and cruise missiles. aviation fights any enemy trying -preserving decisive might for the fi- to flank or encircle the defenders. nal stage of the mobile defense zone A key target for both is mobile en- with simultaneous execution of mis- emy air defense. The Soviets, and sions of air support to troops on all now the Russians, have long worked defensive lines (Artemyev, 2017). on developing a system that could detect, target, and destroy high- Army aviation units will conduct priority targets in near real time. reconnaissance-strike actions to The Russian reconnaissance fire destroy highly mobile important complex now links reconnaissance enemy targets. Such actions will assets with a command and fire di- be employed on fully independent rection center with dedicated artil- axes (zones of active operations) in lery, missiles, and aviation for de- spaces between zones and positions struction of priority enemy targets and on the flanks of attacking ene- in near real time. This system is tied my groupings 3–10 kilometers away in with the aviation and maneuver from defending or counterattacking headquarters and will be involved units. The substantial increase in the in the maneuver defense when ap- independence of army aviation unit Photo by Charles Rosemond propriate. operations in conducting reconnais- sance-strike actions drove a new Mr. Charles Bartles is a researcher and Russian Russian aviation does not like to approach to evaluating fire engage- linguist at the Foreign Military Studies Office. His research areas include Russian and Central fly over friendly formations during ment targets based on determining Asian military force structure, modernization, battle, as this will require shutting the priority of their destruction and tactics, and officer and enlisted professional off indirect fire artillery and mor- on selecting the status of the attack development. Chuck is also a Major, imagery, and tars and putting air defense weap- target (Artemyev, 2017). space operations officer in the Army Reserve. ons in “weapons tight” or “weapons Dr. Lester Grau is a retired Infantry Officer, Russian hold” status. Russian artillery is Training for aerial combat by Rus- Foreign Affairs Officer, and research director of the usually positioned closer to the For- sian helicopters has been engaged Foreign Military Studies Office. He has published ward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) in for at least 15 years and uses 15 books and 250 articles for professional journals. He and Chuck Bartles published The than Western artillery and conducts chain guns, the SA-18 Igla (surface- Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics and much of its defensive fire from di- to-air missile), and air-to-air rockets. Modernization of the , rect lay or low trajectory to avoid There are at least 10 derivations of which may be found at https://community.apan. org/wg/tradoc-2/fmso/ airspace difficulties. The problem still remains warning or shutting off References: mortars and air defense systems. Russian army aviation will overfly Artemyev, A. (2017). Подержка с воздука: Kalachev, D. (2016). Оборона-тоже маневр: Армейская авиация в маневренной обороне Мотострелковый батальон и маневренная friendly formations when enemy сухопутных войск. [Air support: Army aviation оборона [Defense is also maneuver-The helicopter gunships approach the in ground troops mobile defense]. Армейский motorized rifle battalion and maneuver сборник [Army Digest], 8, 39–46. defense]. Армейскнй сборник [Army Digest], formation, as these gunships may 10, 27–34. be escorting an air assault intent on Department of the Army. (2001). Tactics (Field cutting off defending units before Manual 3-90, Chapter 10). Washington, DC: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Headquarters, Department of the Army. (2001). “Манёвренная оборона,” (Военный they can withdraw. Russian army энциклопедический словар в двух томак aviation has an aerial combat role Grau, L. W. (2014, February). Restructuring [Military encyclopedic dictionary in two volumes]), Volume II. : Ripol Klassik and trains for it using air-to-air mis- the tactical Russian army for unconventional warfare. Red Diamond, (5)2. Retrieved from Publishing House, 27. siles and chain gun fire. https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/ fmso/m/fmso-monographs/195087 Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. (2002). Очаговая Оборона [Fragmented Russian army aviation has changed Grau, L. W., & Bartles, C. K. (2016). The Russian defense]. Военная Энциклопедия [Military procedures and tactics, techniques, way of war: force structure, tactics and Encyclopedia], Volume VI. Moscow: Voyenizdat, 214. and procedures to deal with the flu- modernization of the Russian ground forces. Retrieved from http://www.armyupress.army. id nature of the maneuver defense. mil/Portals/7/Hot%20Spots/Documents/ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Priority importance is given to: Russia/2017-07-The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau- Bartles.pdf (2013). Боевой Устав Сукопитных Вонск, Частъ 2 (Баталъон Рота) Combat Charter of Sukopitnykh Vonsk, Part 2 [Ground troops field -preserving the combat potential of Grau, L. W., & Gress, M. (Eds.). (2010). The manual, part 2 (Battalion, Company)], Moscow: supported troops through rational red army do-it-yourself Nazi-bashing guerrilla Voyenizdat, 801. warfare manual (The partisan’s companion). distribution of forces and assets to Havertown, PA: CASEMATE PUBLISHERS.

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