WL KNO EDGE NCE ISM SA ER IS E A TE N K N O K C E N N T N I S E S J E N A 3 V H A A N H Z И O E P W O I T E D N E Z I A M I C O N O C C I O T N S H O E L C A I N M Z E N O T Russian Aviation in Support of the Maneuver Defense Dr. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles FOREIGN MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE Open Source, Foreign Perspective, Underconsidered/Understudied Topics The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an open source research organization of the U.S. Army. It was founded in 1986 as an innovative program that brought together military specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics derived from unclassified, foreign media. Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special insight and highly collaborative work by conducting unclassified research on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered. Authors' Backgrounds: Dr. Grau has published over 200 articles and studies on tactical, operational and geopolitical subjects. His book, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan, was published in 1996. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet- Afghan War, co-authored with Ali Jalali, was published in 1998. The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost was published in 2001. The Red Army’s Do-It-Yourself, Nazi-Bashing Guerrilla Warfare Manual and Passing It On: Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan’s Frontier were published in 2011. Operation Anaconda: America’s First Major Battle In Afghanistan and Mountain Warfare And Other Lofty Problems: Foreign Ideas On High-Altitude Combat, co-authored with Charles K. Bartles, were also published in 2011. Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen Tactics in the Russian-Chechen Wars 1994-2009, co- authored with Dodge Billingsley, was published in 2012. Afghanistan: Preparing for the Bolshevik Incursion into Afghanistan and Attack on India, which is a translation of General Snesarev’s 1921 classic work, was published in 2014. From Fabric Wings to Supersonic Fighters and Drones: A History of Military Aviation on Both Sides of the North-West Frontier, with Brian Cloughley and Andrew Roe, was published in 2015. Charles K. Bartles is an analyst and Russian linguist at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. His specific research areas include Russian and Central Asian military force structure, modernization, tactics, officer and enlisted professional development, and security assistance programs. Chuck is also an imagery officer and Major in the Army Reserve at the Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCCIMD). He has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and has served as a security assistance officer at embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Chuck has a BA in Russian from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, an MA in Russian and Eastern European Studies from the University of Kansas, a certificate in Geospatial Information Systems from the University of Missouri-Kansas City, and certificates in Database Administration and Computer Programming from Johnson County Community College. Previous Publication: This paper was originally published in the U.S. Army Aviation Digest's October-December issue (https://www.rucker.army.mil/aviationdigest/assets/archive/ AVN_DIG_2018_10-12.pdf). It is being posted on the Foreign Military Studies Office website with permission from the publisher. FMSO has provided some editing, format, and graphics to this paper to conform to organizational standards. Academic conventions, source referencing, and citation style are those of the author. The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. USSIAN R VIATION A IN SUPPORT OF THE MANEUVER DEFENSE манёвренная оборона aneuver defense [манёвренная оборона] M is a form of defense By Dr. Lester W. Grau and Mr. Charles K. Bartles whose goal is to inflict enemy casualties, gain time, and pre- He commits the minimum possible maneuver war, continuous trench serve friendly forces with the combat power to his fixing force lines, engineered and fixed defenses extending across continents, as oc- potential loss of territory. It that conducts shaping operations to control the depth and breadth of the curred in Europe in World Wars I and is conducted, as a rule, when enemy’s advance. The fixing force II will not occur. According to Rus- there are insufficient forces also retains the terrain required to sian military guidance, the maneu- and means available to con- conduct the striking force’s decisive ver defense, eventually leading to a duct a positional defense (Min- counterattack” (Department of the positional defense will be their pri- istry of Defense of the Russian Army [DA], 2001). This differs from mary defense and will be conducted Federation, 2001). This dif- the Russian concept in that the Rus- by the maneuver brigades as their fers from the U.S. concept of sians do not intend to permit the base formation (Ministry of Defense the mobile defense which “is a enemy to advance in order to coun- of the Russian Federation, 2013).* [type of] defensive operation terattack. They intend to fight the Ever since the Gulf war, ground forc- that concentrates on the de- enemy and reduce his forces with- out becoming decisively engaged. es have realized that unprotected struction or defeat of the en- Russian maneuver battalions and maneuver in the open may lead to emy through a decisive attack brigades conduct maneuver de- decimation. Less modern ground by a striking force. It focuses fense, whereas the U.S. considers forces have attempted to negate on destroying the attacking mobile defense as a corps-level fight this by moving the fight to terrain force by permitting the enemy (DA, 2001).* In future conventional that defeats or degrades high-pre- cision systems—mountains, jungles, to advance into a position that *“Units smaller than a corps do not normally exposes him to counterattack conduct a mobile defense because of their extensive forests, swamps, and cit- and envelopment. The com- inability to fight multiple engagements ies—while conducting a long-term throughout the width, depth, and height of the war of attrition to sap the political mander holds the majority of AO, while simultaneously resourcing striking, his available combat power in fixing, and reserve forces.” This is not to say *Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, that Russian army groups would not conduct 2013. This is a major change since Stalin’s a striking force for his decisive maneuver defense, nor that their concepts will infamous order 227 issued on 28 July 1942-“Не operation, a major counterat- differ radically from those of a U.S. Corps. Rather, шагу назад” [Not one step backwards]-which the training and planning for such is at lower condemned thousands of Soviet soldiers to die tack. level in the Russian force. needlessly in positional defense. 14 Aviation Digest October–December 2018 Back to Table of Contents will of the enemy. This difficult ter- maneuver but stalemated into posi- battalion with its own tanks, mo- rain will also be a valuable ally in tional mountain combat enabled by torized rifle, artillery, antitank, and future conventional maneuver war, fires. The Vietnam War was about support subunits capable of fighting as will camouflage, electronic and the maneuver of the helicopter, but and sustaining independently over aerial masking, effective air de- difficult terrain dominated the bat- a large area. The Russian maneuver fense systems, and secure messag- tlefield. The antitank-guided missile brigades now have one or two bat- ing. Maneuver defense will clearly and precision-guided munitions cur- talion tactical groups and are work- be a feature of future conventional rently threaten maneuver. Still, ad- ing to achieve four (Grau, 2014). The maneuver war. One thing that may vances in fires, electronic counter- Russians have a long history of con- change dramatically is the funda- measures (ECM), robotics, and air ducting a fragmented defense on a mental concept of the main linear, defense may enable maneuver. The fragmented battlefield. The Russian positional defense that the ma- Serbian Army proved quite adept at Civil War is replete with such exam- neuver defense leads to. Perhaps hiding and surviving in difficult ter- ples (Ministry of Defense of the Rus- the main linear defense will be an- rain during the 78-day Kosovo air sian Federation, 2002). During the chored in difficult terrain. Perhaps war (Operation Allied Force). What Second World War, in addition to its the main defense will more closely they lacked was a ground force to large conventional force, the Sovi- resemble the security zone maneu- combat at the termination of the ets fielded the largest partisan army ver defense. The main defense may bombing (Grau & Bartles, 2016). in history. It conducted a fragment- become an expanded security zone ed offense and defense against a containing counterstrike/counterat- The fragmented battlefield has be- linear German force (Grau & Gress, tack forces and a concentration of come common following the Gulf 2010). Afghanistan, Chechnya, and high-precision weapon systems. War. The Soviet-Afghan War, the An- now Syria also featured fragmented golan Civil War, the Chadian-Libyan offense and defense. Open flanks may be covered by conflict, the Battle of Mogadishu, maneuvering artillery fires, avia- Operation Enduring Freedom, most FIGURE 1 shows a Russian motor- tion, and positional forces not un- of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the ized rifle brigade in a notional po- der duress. The Russian concept of Libyan Civil War, the Sudan conflict, sitional defense (Grau & Bartles, maneuver by fire may dominate the and the Saudi Arabian-Yemen con- 2016).