69-12,325 SPERRY, James Russell, 1938- ORGANIZED LABOR and ITS FIGHT AGAINST MILITARY and INDUSTRIAL CONSCRIPTION, 1917-1945. Un
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ORGANIZED LABOR AND ITS FIGHT AGAINST MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL CONSCRIPTION, 1917-1945 Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Sperry, James Russell, 1938- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 04/10/2021 13:39:18 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/287513 This dissertation has been microfilmed exactly as received 69-12,325 SPERRY, James Russell, 1938- ORGANIZED LABOR AND ITS FIGHT AGAINST MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL CONSCRIPTION, 1917-1945. University of Arizona, Ph.D., 1969 History, modern University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan © COPYRIGHTED BY JAMES RUSSELL SPERRY 1969 iii ORG AM ZED LABOR AMD ITS FIGHT AGAINST MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL CONSCRIPTION, 1917-1945 *>y James Russell Sperry A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 19 6 9 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA GRADUATE COLLEGE I hereby recommend that this dissertation prepared under my direction by James Russell Sperry entitled ORGANIZED LABOR AND ITS FIGHT AGAINST MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL CONSCRIPTION, 1917-1945 be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy ^/ f•• Dissertation Director Date After inspection of the final copy of the dissertation, the following members of the Final Examination Committee concur in its approval and recommend its acceptance:" h'inLi f1 // / ts? ^— //,,///<<•f This approval and acceptance is contingent on the candidate's adequate performance and defense of this dissertation at the final oral examination. The inclusion of this sheet bound into the library copy of the dissertation is evidence of satisfactory performance at the final examination. STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University- Library to be made available to borrowers under the rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in vtfiole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder. SIGHED: 4. yf ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There are a number of persons to whom the author is deeply indebted because of their aid during the compilation and writing of this dissertation. First of all, at every library where the author was privileged to research he was treated courteously and given considerable personal assistance in examining pertinent manuscripts. This was especially true at the Selective Service Library where head librarian, Mrs. Mary E. Snyder and Director of Research and Statistics, Mr. Kenneth McG-ill, devoted considerable time and energy in aiding the author. To these two fine people the author is extremely grateful. The author is also appreciative of the encouragement of the history faculty at The University of Arizona, and particularly to Professors James A. Beatson and J. Robert Vignery whose comments and constructive criticism aided the author in completing the manuscript. To the author's advisor, Professor H.E. Bateman, a special note of thanks is offered, althougjh this is an all too meager token for the encouragement, interest, and time spent working with the author during his years in graduate school and the period during which this paper was written. The author readily acknowledges that whatever research skills he may iv V have developed are due to the tutelage of this fine gentleman and scholar. Lastly, to my wife Sue I owe a special debt. Her patience and understanding made the researching and writing of this manuscript an enjoyable and fascinating experience* TABLE OP CONTENTS PAGE ABSTRACT vii CHAPTER I. A WARTIME DILEMMA: THE UNION WORKER AS " SOLDIER OR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCER 1 II. ON THE PERIPHERY: ORGANIZED LABOR AND DEFENSE STRATEGY" BETWEEN THE WARS 64 III. THE 'SOWING OP DRAGON'S TEETH': AMERICA EMBARKS UPON PEACETIME CONSCRIPTION .... 123 IV. THE CRUCIAL YEARS: AMERICA WEIGHS NATIONAL SERVICE, 1941-1943 178 V. LABOR'S GREATEST BATTLE: THE CHALLENGE OP NATIONAL SERVICE, 1943-1945 230 ANNOTATED LIST OP REFERENCES 287 vl ABSTRACT Organized labor in the United States played a unique, but sometimes baffling role during the Second World War. Union workers, affiliated with either the American Federation of Labor or Congress of Industrial Organizations, served in two primary capacities during this twentieth century crisis. They worked to supply the weapons and materials needed to carry out the successful completion of the conflict, and at the same time provided a continuous supply of manpower for the battlefields. Many complex problems developed from this situation which basically revolve around tne question of where the American worker could best be utilized, and whether or not the worker would serve his country voluntarily or be sent to defense plants through industrial conscription# Organized labor feared military and industrial conscription because it believed the draft could be used to destroy trade unionism in America. The problem emerged in 1917 when the AFL opposed Selective Service. Samuel Gompers took the lead in directing labor's opposition, indicating tnat voluntary recruitment would meet the nation's manpower demands. After Selective Service was enacted, organized labor accepted this as a necessary evil, but vil viii attempted to assure labor rights by fighting for labor representation on local and district draft boards, and preventing the extension of the draft to include the manipulation of America's workers by national service. As the war progressed an informal conscription policy was adopted by Enoch Crowder, Director of Selective Service, i/ihen he instituted General Hugh Johnson's controversial "work-or-fight" plan — a development vehemently opposed by organized labor. In the decades between the wars labor was primarily concerned with domestic problems. However, the major catalyst for labor's increased isolationism was the fear of conscription. This became particularly evident in the 1930's when the army began unveiling its various Industrial Mobiliza tion Plans, which the trade unionists interpreted as an attempt to destroy organized labor under the guise of defense necessity. Labor-military relations were strained during this period. This was unfortunate because such distrust harmed the effectiveness of defense cooperation in the early stages of the Second World War. In 1940 organized labor found itself confronted by the Burke-Wadsworth Selective Service Bill, the first peacetime conscription bill in American history. The Burke- Wadsworth Bill, the creation of Grenville Clark, was solidly opposed by organized labor. Eventually Selective ix Service was passed when President Roosevelt and his worthy- Republican challenger, Wendell Willkie, supported the measure. Labor had decried peacetime conscription as "undemocratic" and a break with American tradition, but its effectiveness was hindered by the fissure between the AFL and CIO. As early as 1941 leaders of organized labor anticipated that the "logical" extension of the military draft, national service, would soon be pursued. In late 1942 G-renville Clark presented to the President a preliminary draft of a national service bill which could be used to control American manpower. Roosevelt, as was the case in 1940 with the Selective Service Bill, at first refused to endorse industrial conscription. The President followed a voluntary policy, approved by labor, which attempted to utilize Paul McNutt's War Manpower Commission. Extreme pressure was placed upon Roosevelt to change his position. Finally, much to the dismay of labor, the President, in his State of the Union Addresses in 1944 and 1945, endorsed industrial conscription. This time, however, labor presented a united front in its opposition to this form of conscription. A split within the administration, the President's timing and labor opposition all combined to thwart the bid for industrial conscription — a plan opposed by organized labor from 1917 through 1945. CHAPTER I A WARTIME DILEMMA: THE UNION WORKER AS SOLDIER OR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCER Organized labor in the United States played a unique, but sometimes baffling role during the Second World War, Union workers, affiliated with either the American Federation of Labor or Congress of Industrial Organizations, served in two primary capacities during this twentieth century crisis. They worked to supply the weapons and materials needed to carry out the successful completion of the conflict, and at the same time provided a continuous supply of manpower for the battlefields. Many complex problems developed from this situation which basically revolve around the question of where the American worker could best be utilized. Eventually the key leaders of labor, business, government, and the military became involved in a series of attempts to settle the multitude of difficulties surrounding this facet of industrial mobilization. The chameleon-like nature of the wartime problems of industrial mobilization include such diverse topics as