European Defence: What’S in the Cards for PESCO?

No. 91 October 2017

European Defence: What’s in the CARDs for PESCO?

Sven Biscop

projects could be. At their bilateral meeting on Suddenly everything is happening at 13 July 2017, they announced joint initiatives, once: Permanent Structured Cooperation among others, to develop major land combat, (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual artillery, and maritime patrol systems, and a Review on Defence (CARD), the combat aircraft, while confirming their European Defence Fund (EDF)… The support for the Eurodrone programme with launch of PESCO is expected before the Spain and Italy, and launching structured end of the year or in early 2018 at the cooperation between their cyber commands. latest. Now that things seem to be moving fast, let us make sure that they Other EU Member States should be able to move in the right direction. join all of these. Indeed, they will have to. For if Paris and Berlin effectively do what they seem to be announcing, i.e. creating a Franco- Leading the way are the European German military industrial complex (I know I Commission on the one hand and France and am not mincing my words), then the other Germany on the other. They are focusing on Member States will have to plug in or their the heart of the matter: the urgent need for own defence industry will not survive. Even Europeans to start designing, building and British defence industry may find it imperative procuring all future major equipment together, to join in. At the same time, France and instead of competing each other into the Germany effectively need others to join, for in ground. many areas even together they cannot reach the critical mass of investors and customers The Commission seeks to provide incentives. needed to make a project economically viable. In the next budgetary cycle, post-2020, the capability window of the EDF, the European France and Germany therefore need to Defence Industrial Development Programme establish a core group that agrees on the way (EDIDP), should amount to €5 billion per ahead. Which is why together with Italy and year, from which up to 20% can be funded Spain they submitted a first detailed proposal from the EU budget, for multinational projects for the activation of PESCO (which has that address a commonly identified shortfall. already been underwritten by Belgium). What For projects in the framework of PESCO, an could be done through PESCO, how could it additional bonus of 10% is foreseen. France be done and, most importantly, why should we and Germany are proposing what those do it?

EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations WHAT? capacity, if its battalions or its fighter aircraft The current debate is strongly focused on can be anchored in a multinational formation. projects. Understandably so, for projects Rather than having to field all support units render PESCO tangible. Around a dozen itself, combat support and combat service Member States that have expressed an interest support will be provided through a in joining PESCO have tentatively identified combination of pooling and division of labour nearly 40 projects that could be undertaken in between the participating States. Just like that framework. Many of these however are Belgian-Dutch naval cooperation: a ship sails unrelated to any EU objective. Member States under the Belgian flag with a Belgian crew or not unexpectedly looked for projects that they under the Dutch flag with a Dutch crew, but were going to do anyway that could credibly there is only one naval command and one be re-labelled as a contribution to PESCO. naval operations school, only the Dutch provide logistics, maintenance and training for It is urgent therefore to prioritize, collectively. all frigates, and only the Belgians for all mine- The proposal mentions “strategic defence hunters. capabilities projects”. The number one priority should without any doubt be strategic Apart from a reference to making better use of enablers: their absence affects all Member existing multinational structures such as States’ capacity to deploy, and it cannot be Eurocorps, this dimension is not now remedied by any Member State alone. Without discussed very much in the context of PESCO. this top-down but collective political steering, But it is exactly what Germany and its partners the interests of industry and of individual are doing in the context of the Framework States will prevail, and the added value of Nations Concept (FNC), under the aegis of PESCO will remain very limited. NATO. Both schemes can fit together, however. If, hypothetically, 15 Member States Capability projects is only the first layer of would join PESCO, that does not mean that all what could be done through PESCO. The 15 have to do everything together. In some second layer is to create more integrated areas, especially strategic enablers, there could forces, so that additional capabilities will be indeed be only one cluster of all or nearly all operated in the most cost-effective way 15. But in other areas, there can be more than possible. Once a project has delivered, would one cluster within the PESCO group. Thus, it not make more sense to operate the when it comes to land forces, the German-led resulting capability as a single force, co-owned FNC group with the Dutch, the Czechs and by all participating States, rather than to divide others could constitute one building-block of it up again? Thus a drone fleet, or a transport PESCO, one multinational corps structure, and fleet could emerge, for example. Individual a French-led group with for example the drones or aircraft can still be owned by Belgians and the Spanish another. individual Member States, but they could rely on a single structure for command, logistics, Even if all Member States were to spend more, maintenance and training, and they can all if they all do so separately, they will not be able follow the same rhythm of upgrades. Such to address the strategic capability shortfalls. If integration should be wired into PESCO from they do so collectively, PESCO will act as a the start. multiplier.

Combat units can be operated more cost- HOW? effectively as well, by anchoring them into Launching projects requires participating States multinational frameworks. Even a smaller to invest. Integrating forces requires them to State can maintain a significant combat bring capabilities to the table. Hence the need

EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 2 for binding commitments, to ensure that Council launches operations by unanimity, of everybody contributes a fair share, and course, but no Member State that is in PESCO continues to do so over time. The same debate should vote for an operation and then decline is of course taking place in NATO, where to take part in it. Or, if it does not possess any Allies have pledged “to aim to move towards relevant capability (a land-locked country the 2% guideline” by 2024. In the debate on without a navy can hardly take part in PESCO, a commitment to increase defence Operation Sophia or Atalanta), to co-fund it. budgets in real terms is on the table, in order The fact remains however that in recent years to reach “agreed objectives”. What those the most substantial operations, in terms of objectives are, is not spelled out however, numbers deployed and risk incurred, have been because many States will simply not now spend conducted outside the EU or NATO as much as 2% of GDP on defence. At the framework, by individual States or ad hoc same time it would hardly make sense for coalitions. States to say, in the context of PESCO, that 1.5% is enough when they have already signed Once enacted by the Council, these up to 2% in NATO. commitments will be not just politically but legally binding as well, unlike NATO’s Wales Much more important, because more realistic, pledge. More like the Maastricht criteria, in and mentioned explicitly, is the commitment effect. That does create another dynamic. To for 20% of total defence spending to be this day not all members of the Eurozone fulfil invested. First of all, investment is key to kick- all criteria, but they fulfil most. A proposal for starting PESCO. Second, this forces States a governance mechanism is on the table, who now spend two thirds or more on salaries including sanctions for non-compliance, that to increase defence spending anyway, but will see to it that PESCO becomes equally without spelling it out. And in the EDIDP, successful. For those joining PESCO, CARD which is a form of common funding, they now can be an important assessment tool, but then have an important incentive to fulfil this it should be made compulsory (and not just obligation. Some pundits belittle the EDIDP, supported “to a maximum extent stating that €5 billion per year is not much acknowledging [its] voluntary nature”, as is compared to the more than €200 billion that now the proposal). If not linked to the the EU-28 spend on defence. But compared to concrete commitments made in PESCO, the €45 billion or so of this total that is spent CARD will probably have but little impact. on investment (€35 billion without the UK), it is a sizeable amount of money. If it is put to These criteria make for an “inclusive and use to launch a limited number of key projects, ambitious” PESCO, as the proposal states, it can really orient the decisions of the because they are realistic. They are within reach participating States. Furthermore, under of every Member State that wants to, which PESCO States would commit to multinational will then ipso facto have the right to join. projects as the default option and launch national projects only when no other option is WHY? available. Thanks to the legally binding nature of PESCO and the financial contribution by the We generate capabilities so that we can use Commission, a new defence initiative has more them when necessary. Therefore, participating chance of success through the EU. But why is Member States would also commit to provide an integrated European initiative necessary in “substantial support with means and the first place? Because Europeans need to capabilities” to every CSDP operation. The achieve strategic autonomy, as the EU Global

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Strategy (EUGS) points out. That means the remains undefined (to the quiet exasperation of capacity to undertake certain vital military tasks many involved in this task). This makes it at all times, if necessary therefore by ourselves, difficult to prioritise and quantify capability without recourse to any non-European assets. initiatives through PESCO. Therefore the plan is for PESCO to create a “coherent full spectrum force package”. What proved impossible at 28, can still happen within the group of Member States that join What are these tasks exactly that we should be PESCO, however. In fact, an ambitious able to carry out autonomously? On 14 proposal is already on the table. One of the November 2016, the Council adopted the flagship projects envisaged by France, Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, Germany, Italy and Spain is the creation of an intended to operationalize the EUGS. This “EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core” or plan lists an ambitious range of operations that EUFOR CROC.1 A hideous acronym, but an the EU should be able to undertake, from excellent idea: to produce not a “readiness “joint crisis management operations in force”, but a concrete list of force elements, situations of high security risk in the regions which would accelerate the force sensing surrounding the EU” and “joint stabilisation process after the Council has decided to launch operations, including air and special an operation. This would be an important operations”, through air security and maritime improvement on the existing generic Force security operations, to capacity-building. The Catalogue. The scale of this land-centric CROC fact that among EU officials this list is is none other than that of the Headline Goal: commonly known as “the annex of the annex” 60,000 troops, or a corps headquarters, three indicates that its impact on what is actually divisions and 9 to 12 brigades. As this is to be happening is limited. achieved by the PESCO group alone, and of course without the UK, it represents a The reason is that the Implementation Plan significant increase in the level of ambition for does not specify how many operations the EU the participating Member States. has to be able to conduct simultaneously, only that “a number of [these] may be executed The initiators explicitly state that they “do not concurrently”. Nor does it give any indication strive for a European army, but envision of the envisaged scale of these operations. In deployable and interoperable force fact, the Implementation Plan limits the scale components ready to be employed under one by stating that the EU should be capable of command and as one multinational coherent these operations based on “previously agreed full spectrum force package for the most goals and commitments”, i.e. the existing demanding EU crisis response operations”. Yet Headline Goal. In reality, strategic autonomy creating this package will definitely imply a far- cannot be achieved within that framework, but reaching degree of integration of forces, along Member States were not willing, at 28, to open the lines described above. If seen through to the Headline Goal for debate. An update of the end, ever more multinational procurement, the five Illustrative Scenarios that drive the multinational capability development, and identification of military requirements, by the multinational formations will logically and EU Military Staff, will feed into an update of automatically lead to the next step in European the Capability Development Plan, by the defence: ex ante multinational defence European Defence Agency, by the end of planning. Just like over the years the Belgian 2018. But since they cannot go beyond the and Dutch navies have grown so close that, current Headline Goal, the actual military level though it was never the stated intent, they now of ambition concomitant with the EUGS have to plan together (and continue to provide

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the required budget, of course) in order to allies and partners as a group is not an maintain the same degree of integration. objective of the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) – so it doesn’t. What PESCO If air and naval forces are added at the same does is to formulate the level of ambition for scale, and all the enablers required to project the strategic autonomy of a group of European them, this is the military level of ambition that states. That strategic autonomy does not (yet) Europeans need if they really want to live up to include territorial defence, but only the the political level of ambition expressed in the protection of Europe against threats falling EUGS. That requires thinking on a truly short of the Article 5 threshold, and European scale. We should not allow our expeditionary operations across the spectrum. thinking to be limited to the highest level of This collective level of ambition must be ambition of any individual Member State, as a incorporated into the NDPP, in between the military officer rightly told me. Perhaps no level of ambition for NATO as a whole and individual European country sees the need for the targets for every individual ally, in order to a carrier group or a fleet of armed drones, but ensure that the future capability mix does take that doesn’t mean that it cannot be a into account the need for European strategic requirement for Europe as a whole. autonomy. As the proposal explicitly mentions, PESCO will thus “strengthen the European MORE QUESTIONS pillar within the Alliance”. Questions remain, notably about how Germany sees the exact link between PESCO, Just like in NATO, the proposal is that the pushed mostly by the foreign ministry, and the participating States in PESCO should submit a FNC, which comes first on the agenda of the “national implementation plan” outlining how defence establishment. As a German official they plan to reach the targets to which they put it to me, so far both initiatives have been have committed. Two phases, 2018-2021 and “de-conflicted, but not yet coordinated”. In 2021-2025, are envisaged, so that commitments some views, the Bundeswehr should prioritize can be sequenced. Those that are both NATO the FNC, understood to aim at high-intensity allies and members of PESCO could draw up a operations in the context only of collective single plan. It is at the national level that defence; force generation for expeditionary NATO and PESCO targets must be operations would remain a challenge.2 But even coordinated in the first place. if the majority of the force package that the German-led FNC group is building would Very importantly, at the 13 July Franco- indeed focus on territorial defence, some German meeting it was also announced that in existing modules clearly are of an expeditionary 2018 French troops will deploy to Lithuania, in nature, notably the anchoring of the Dutch air- the context of the German-led prepositioned mobile brigade in the German air-mobile NATO-forces. At the same time, Germany and division. This and other modules that can serve France will support the G5 Sahel countries3 both territorial defence and expeditionary with training and equipment. These might just operations could be pre-identified as part of be “courtesy deployments”, as a NATO official the CROC. worded it to me. But it could also be seen as a symbolic expression of the crafting of a new This relates to the broader question of where strategic consensus between the two States PESCO fits in the EU-NATO relationship. who, if they now act upon their ambitious Assuring the strategic autonomy of European proposals, will constitute the core of European defence.

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CONCLUSION stronger than at any time in the past two Will they do it? That is the ultimate question, of decades. Perhaps, just perhaps, I will next write course. Having been writing about European a paper explaining the success of PESCO. defence for nearly twenty years now, I have written more than one article in which I Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop, an Honorary Fellow proclaimed that the moment for a breakthrough of the European Security and Defence had arrived – only to see it come and go. And College, is the director of Egmont’s Europe yet I remain (cautiously) optimistic, because in the World programme and lectures at optimism is in my nature, for one, but also Ghent University. The author thanks his because today there are objective reasons for my colleagues Brig-Gen. (Ret.) Jo Coelmont and optimism. With France and Germany and the Prof. Dr. Alexander Mattelaer as well as Commission championing European defence, the many officers and diplomats who shared putting concrete and ambitious proposals on the their insights with him. table and offering incentives, leadership is

REFERENCES 1 Two other flagship projects under consideration are a centre of excellence for EU training missions, and a “military Schengen” aiming to facilitate movement across Member States. 2 Rainer L. Glatz and Martin Zapfe, “Ambitious Framework Nation: Germany in NATO”. SWP Comments No. 34. Berlin, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2017, 8pp. 3 Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali and Niger.

Royal Institute for International Relations

The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author(s) alone, and they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Egmont Institute. Founded in 1947, EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations is an independent and non-profit Brussels-based think tank dedicated to interdisciplinary research. www.egmontinstitute.be