sign in sign up
<<
Home , Ludwig Wittgenstein

Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013)

AndrewLugg

Wittgenstein’sTrue

Abstract The centralremarks of the Tractatus are without substantial content or consequence, remarks at theboundaries of sense that dissolveinto .While theysay nothing,theyencapsulatelogicalfeatures of languageand theworld.Unasserted, they expressthoughts, thetruth of which Wittgensteintakestobeunassailableand definitive, while asserted,they are out-and-out .Whatismanifest in linguistic practice is no more sayable – andnolesssignificant – thanwhatis manifest in logical ,mathematicalequationsand theprinciplesof mechanics.

1. Understandingthe Tractatus seems to espouse philosophical opinions and defend adistinctive philosophicalpoint of viewinthe Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP 1955/1961) 1 .There is no shaking the impression thatheisfully engaged in thephilosophicalenterprise, and it doeshim adisservice to interpret himasdismissing root and branch. Besides criticising traditional philosophy and pioneering anew approach to philosophical problems, he promotes what looksfor allthe like philosophicalideas. This is how the Tractatus was read at the by , Frank Ramsey andthe members of the

1 References to Wittgenstein’s works be given using the abbreviations mentioned in the list of references.

33 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA

Circle,not least Rudolf Carnapand ,and how it is stillwidely read. It cannot be by chancethat Wittgenstein refers to “the thoughts whichare expressedin[the book]—or similar thoughts” and avers that “in it thoughts are expressed”,indeed writes: “[T]he truth of the thoughts communicated [mitgeteilten]here seems to me unassailableand definitive[unantastbar und definitiv]” (TLP 1955: 27-29/TLP 1961: 3-5, with “ forth” for “mitgeteilten”). Yet in 6.54, thepenultimate remark of thebook, Wittgensteinfamously andnotoriously says: “My are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finallyrecognizes them as senseless[unsinnig]” (TLP1955; TLP 1961 has “nonsensical” for “unsinnig”). Can this apparentcontradictionbe removed and if so,how?2 Thereare two markedlydifferent sortsofsentence in the Tractatus.Wittgensteinhas manycomments on theviewsof individualphilosophers and the history and character of philosophy.Thus he says: “[T]hewhole of philosophyisfull of [the most fundamental confusions]” (3.324), “The logical symbolism of Fregeand Russell[does] notexclude allerrors” (3.325), and “The Darwiniantheoryhas no moretodowith philosophy than any otherhypothesis of natural ” (4.1122). (Also compare 3.143, 3.318,3.325, 4.003,4.113, 5.132, 5.525and 5.5422.) But there are also many philosophical-soundingremarks in the Tractatus comparabletothe remarksofgreat of thepast. Thus Wittgenstein says: “Theworld is everythingthat is thecase.The world is the totality of facts, notofthings” (1-1.1), “Anamemeans an . Theobject is its ” (3.203), and “Logicis... a reflectionofthe world. Logicistranscendental” (6.13). Since remarksofthe first sort, stripped of hyperbole, are implausibly regarded either as indisputablytrueorasplainly nonsensical (oras fundamental to the Tractatus), Wittgensteinismost charitably

2 Except where explicitly noted, Icite TLP 1955, the translationpreparedbyC.K. Ogden and F. Ramsey,this havingbeen vetted by Wittgensteinhimself. Idonot attemptto coverall that hasbeensaidabout Wittgenstein’scharacterisations of his own remarks, just touch brieflyonsome of theleading ways theyhavebeenunderstood. My main object is to resuscitate and developaline of interpretation advanced in my (2003).Iattempt to clarify,refineand deepen whatIsaid there, not leastregardingWittgenstein’sconception of “showing” andits role in the Tractatus.

34 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013) regarded as referring to thesecond sort of remark in hisPreface and 6.54,and thequestionbecomes howtheseremarks, manifestly centraltohis thinking,are to be understood. When the spotlight is turned on what seem to be straight-out philosophicalremarks in thebook, it is temptingtothink achoice has to be made between regarding them as unassailably and definitively true and regarding them as nonsensical. It seems,ashas beennoted, “quite unacceptable ...thatone andthe same series of pronouncementsshould be both devoid of sense andunassailably true”,and it is scarcely possible that “Wittgensteincould ... have it both ways” (Ayer1985: 20,30). Moreover, given thechoice, the more acceptable – certainly the usual – response is that Wittgensteinisbetter regardedasthinkingthe “contents[of the Tractatus]true” (30).Suchaninterpretation, however,laboursunder the difficulty thatWittgenstein does notappeartobespeakingout of turn in 6.54, never minddabbling in ironyorspeakingtongue- in-cheek. Rather he seems to be sayingwhat he and believing what he says. Furthermore his of hisown sentencesat6.54 does notfeellikeanoptionalextra, to be taken with apinchofsalt.Tothe contrary,there is acase to be made for the view that “ideasthat Wittgenstein presents [atthe end of the Tractatus]haveall been carefully built up to, andemerge, as the naturalconsequence of the main discussion of the book” (White 2006:125). While it may turn outthat 6.54 has to be ignored, this is surelyaremedy of last resort. Perhaps the tidiest solution, were it available,wouldbetoread Wittgensteinasreferring at the beginning andthe endofthe Tractatus to different remarks. There wouldbenocontradiction were he thinking in the Prefaceofhis treatment of and andthinkingat6.54ofhis treatment of the world, valueand philosophy (compare Child 2011:72, also Black 1964: 381-382). The chief snagwiththis is that it is hard to discern anydifference in tone, evenlogical status,between the two sortsofremarks. While Wittgenstein applaudssome of what philosophers sayabout logicand languageand deplores mostofwhat theysay about the world and , thereisnoindication in thetextthat he regarded hisown remarks about the twosets of topicsdifferently. He does

35 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA not split thedifferenceand mark “Theworld is everything that is the case” off from “Aname meansanobject” and “Logic is transcendental”.Indeedwhat he says about theworld andstatesof affairsatthe beginning of the Tractatus shadesinto his discussion of picturesand propositional (andhis discussion of logic and language), which in turn shades into his remarksatthe end of the book abouthappiness, life anddeath. Another commonly-defendedway of negotiating the problem of interpretingWittgenstein’s remarkstakeshim to be meaning to convey unassailable and definitive truths despite – even in of – the nonsensicalityofhis sentences (compareAnscombe 1959: 162, Malcolm1967: 331, and Hacker 2001: 139-143). This is an attractive option if only because in alettertoRussell on 19 August 1919,Wittgenstein declares thedistinction between “what canbe expressed (gesagt) by prop[osition]s ...and what cannot be expressed by prop[osition]s, but only shown (gezeigt)” to be fundamental,indeedspeaks of it as “the cardinalproblemof philosophy” (McGuinness 2008:98).Such an interpretationis, however, also hard to accept. It presumes Wittgenstein is committed to the dubious thatnonsense can communicate and takes his own (nonsensical)sentences to carry important about the world,language,logicand much else besides.Indeed attributing such aviewtohim is as unjust as it is uncharitable, there beingnothing in the Tractatus to suggest that he disagrees with whatheisreported to have said much later: “Most of us thinkthere is nonsense that makessenseand nonsense which doesnot. ...But these arenonsenseinthe same sense, the only in the jingle of thewords” (AWL: 64). Amore radical proposal, one stoutly defended in some quarters, is that Wittgensteinbites the bullet andregards his remarks as gibberish pure and simple (compare Diamond 1991 and the essays in Craryand Read 2000). On this view it is not insignificant that Wittgenstein deprecatedcalling his book “” “[u]nless onesays ...the whole book is nonsense” (CCO:20, dated 23 April1922). Butevenacceptingthatheisagreeing, ratherthan disputing, that thebookitselfisnonsense(and allowing that what seems to make sense is disguisednonsense),itisdifficult to

36 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013) disregard or dilutehis observation in thePreface about the unassailable and definitivetruth of histhoughts. On the faceofit, Wittgensteinisaswedded to regarding his remarksastrueasto regarding them as nonsensical, andheseems to take himself, no two ways about it, to be expressing thoughts about logic, language and the world.Alsowerehepalmingoff nonsense as sense, how couldheclaim anything non-sayable is showable?Onceeverything goes,there seems to be no preservingthe distinction between showing and saying,the very thinginthe Tractatus that is,arguably, “strikingly original, for its period” (Mounce 2001: 187;for further criticism seeWhite2006: 125-130,and Hacker2000). If none of these interpretations is tenable, the only remaining possibility is thatWittgenstein reckoned his remarks in the Preface and at 6.54 to be fully compatible (and hadnotruck withthe of significant nonsense). Such areading of thetexthas the notable advantage that Wittgenstein does not appeartohave believed he was skatingonthin ice or to have been, consciously or unconsciously,pulling afast one.Itnot only recognisesthat Wittgensteinproclaimsinnouncertain terms that his thoughts are unassailablyand definitively true andhis propositions nonsensical, it also allows for thefactthat he set great, if notoverwhelming, store on thesay/show distinction. Moreover it explains how he was able to take in strideRussell’s observationinhis Introduction to the Tractatus that “Mr Wittgensteinmanages to say agood deal about what cannot be said” (TLP 1955: 22/TLP 1961: xxi), and it accountsfor his apparent indifference to theobjection when Russell reportedly pressed it in 1929 (Wood 1957:156). While it is by no means clearthat the remarksinthe Preface and 6.54 can be reconciled, only an interpretationthattakes himashavingitboth ways cansave himfrom thecharge of failing to see – or being unable to admit – thathehad set his sights too high.

2. Wittgenstein’sthoughtsastautologies Wittgensteinwouldhave some explaining to do were he equating “” and “” andtaking themastheyoccur in the Preface and 6.54 to mean the same. Butthisisnot howhe understands them. His primaryaim wastoconvey histhinkingas

37 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA effectively and as vividlyashecould,and it is more than likely that he is using the twowords in two ways. He states that “thevalue” of the book is “greater ...[t]he more thenailhas beenhit on thehead” (TLP 1955:29, TLP 1961: 3-5), andthe possibility that he contradictshimself so blatantlyishardtocredit. He was nota careless thinker butneither was he especially concerned with technicalniceties, and it is good policytoreservejudgement regarding his useoftricky like “thought” and “proposition” priortoacareful examinationofthe contextinwhich they occur. As hasbeennoted, Wittgenstein “thought intuitively,not discursively” (McGuinness 2002: 135), andwhat he says in the Preface and6.54 – in fact, Iwould say, the whole book – has to be read as recording the consideredreflections of an inspirational thinker ratherthan the hypotheses of aphilosopher concernedwith spelling out every detail andpre-empting every possible objection. WhenWittgensteinspeaksofhis unassailably and definitively true thoughts –“Theworld is everythingthat is the case”, “Aname means an object”, “Logic is transcendental” andthe rest – he is not using “thought” in the sensespecified in thebodyofthe Tractatus. No suchremark is “[a] logical pictureofthe facts” (3), letalone partof“apicture of the world” (3.01). “The worldiseverything thatisthe case”,tosay nothingof“Aname meansanobject” and “Logic is transcendental”,does not logically picture afactin Wittgenstein’s (orany ordinary) sense of “logic”, “picture” or “fact”.Morestrikingly still, remarks of this sort fail to possess what he takestobethe crucialcharacteristic of pictures, thatofbeing both capable of being true and capable of being false. Thoughts thatare unassailably and definitively true cannotbeanything but true,and thoughts that cannot be anything but true arenot pictures (or thoughts officially understood). What Wittgensteinisclaiming in his Preface must be that he is expressing thoughtsinthe book – histhoughts about thoughts at 3and 3.01 included – in an anodyne senseof“thought”,i.e.heissayingwhathethinks. It is no surprise that Wittgenstein should describe himselfas expressing thoughts thatare unassailablyand definitively true. He recognises thathemay have erred – he says the truthofhis thoughts “seems” to him unassailable and definitive (TLP 1955: 29;

38 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013)

TLP 1961: 5) – andhedoes not hesitateinlater work to criticise, supplement andcorrect whathesaysinthe Tractatus.Atthe time of writing,however, he was convinced thatinsofar as his remarks are truetheyare necessarilytrue. Forhim “The world is everythingthat is the case”, “Aname means an object” and “Logic is transcendental” are true comewhat may.Itis, he thinks, beyond thatthe world could comprisemore or less than what is the case,that names might not mean objects (in hisspecial sense of theseterms),and logic is merely arepositoryofmundane . Forhim “[t]he objectofphilosophy is thelogical clarification of thoughts” (4.112), and he is best read as taking his thoughts to be clarifications, i.e. what he will later call grammatical propositions (compare PI §251). While it may not be self-evident that what he saysisclarificatory, uninfluenced by howthings happen to be,hebelievedthis becomesclear when hisremarks are thoughtthrough. Forhim “[e]verysentence in the Tractatus should be seen as the heading of achapter, needing further exposition” (Drury1984: 159)and further exposition showstheir truth to be unantastbar und definitiv. Wittgensteinbelieved it agrosserrortotreat philosophy as rooted in science,commonsense or thewisdom of theages, andhe neverwavered in regardingthe endeavour as essentially logicaland devoid of information properly so-called, hisown remarks included. Since philosophical observations arecategorically different from scientific observations (4.111),the expressed in the Tractatus are neither supported norundermined by scientific theory,actualorpossible.Inhis view “[t]here is no picture which is apriori true” (2.225), andeverygenuine apriori thoughtisnon-empiricaland non-picturing. In contrastto philosopherswho take themselves to be expressing substantial a priori thoughts, Wittgenstein takes his own (apriori)thoughts to be empty (anddisparages knowledge purportedly securedbypure reason, rational or the grasping of ). It is notfor nothingthat immediatelyafter describing thetruth of his thoughts as unassailableand definitive, Wittgensteinstatesthat “the valueof [the Tractatus]secondlyconsistsinthe fact thatitshowshow little has been done when these problems have been solved”.(Notice

39 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA thathedoesnot say that nothinghas been achievedwhen the problems – it is unclear whether he means all philosophical problems or justthe ones discussed in the Tractatus – have been solved.) Not without reason the remarksinthe Tractatus aresometimes treated as humdrum. speaks formanywhen he observes (inaletter to Wittgensteindated 28 June 1919): “Right at the beginning [ofthe Tractatus]Iencounter the expressions ‘to be the case [der Fall sein]’ and ‘fact [Tatsache]’ and Iconjecture that to be the case and to be afact arethe same. Theworld is everything that is the case andthe worldisthe totalityoffacts” (Frege 2011:51- 55/2003: 22-24). Thisisbothright andwrong. On the interpretationIampromoting, what Fregevolunteers as criticism is accuratedescription. Wittgensteinregards the allegedshortcoming as avirtuesince he takes the remarks Fregementions to be without substance, “the case” and “afact” being,asFrege observes, “the same”.Indeed Isee Wittgenstein as believing it indisputable that “everyfact[is]the case”,indisputable that “thatwhichisthe case [is]afact”,and indisputablethat “LetAbe afact” and “Let Abe the case” amounttothe samething.Heisnot missing atrick when he notestheseidentifications butexpressing thoughts he means to express, “Theworld is everythingthat is the case” (1), “What is the case [is] the fact” (2)and his other(philosophical)remarks beingin his view apriori insights. To put it another way, Iamsuggesting that in thePreface Wittgensteinisthinking of theremarks in thebookastautologies in the traditionalsenseofempty truisms.While he characterises the notion of atautologynarrowly as aproposition [Sätze] “true forall the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions [Elementarsätze]” (4.46), he works with anotion that covers much more (for thetwo notions of see Dreben andFloyd 1991).Thus, to mention aparticularly striking example, he takes “propositions” aboutthe internalrelationships amongcolours, tones andthe liketobetautologousinthe pre-Tractarian broad sense (4.123). To his way of thinking,his own remarks,like tautologiesinthe official Tractarian sense, “saynothing” and are “without sense” (4.461). He regards “The worldiseverythingthat

40 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013) is the case” as tautologous sinceinthe present context “theworld” is synonymous to “everythingthat is the case”,regards “Aname means an object” as tautologous since “[t]he object it names is its meaning”,and regards “Logicistranscendental” as tautologous since it is “not atheory butareflection [Spiegelbild]ofthe world” (6.13). Presumably he is notthinkingofsuch remarks as tautologies in thesense of 4.46.But he treats them as tautologies in the broader traditionalsense – at leastsoIam arguing. LaterWittgensteinwilldisparage the ’s tendency to regardthe of world,name, thoughtand the likeas“super- concepts” (compare PI §97).But in 1918, when compiling the Tractatus,heregarded his own remarks as truebycourtesyrather thanbyright,i.e.bybeing “limiting casesofthe combinations of ” (4.466) rather than“by being pictures of thereality” (4.06). It is notthat his remarks “belong to roughly the same category [as tautologies]” (Mounce 1981: 102)but that theyare logically on allfours with “Redisacolour” and “Nothingoccurs in two different placesatthe sametime”.Onceagain it is immaterial thatthe tautological character of hisremarks is notimmediately discernible,the tautologicalcharacter of many necessary truths, grammaticalremarks andtautologies of elementarylogic being equallyrecondite.Nor is it astrikeagainstreading Wittgenstein as I do that his thoughts are too imprecisely expressed to count as “definitional” (Morris2008: 22). However unclear the remarks of the Tractatus,theyare plausibly regardedaspinning down,atleast partly, themeaningsofthe terms involved. While Wittgensteindoes not explicitly distinguish between two senses of “tautology” in the Tractatus,still less refers to his own remarksastautologous, he uses theword “tautology” in the traditional,broad senseinearlier andlater writings. Thus in a remark drafted on 17 June1915 he says: “[T]he complexity of spatial objectsisalogical complexity, fortosay that onething is part of anotherisalways atautology” (NB 1979: 62). Andin1929, on returning to philosophy, he observesthat claims about shades of colour havingmore thanone degreeofbrightness “do not expressanexperience but areinsomesense tautologies” (RLF 1993: 32) andsays: “One maybetempted to saywhatIam

41 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA wonderingat[when Iamwondering at the skybeing there] is a tautology” (LE1993: 42). Moreoverwhencompiling the Tractatus, he wouldhavebeen aware of how theword “tautology” was used at the time, e.g. thatFrege writes: “[T]he number whichbelongsto the conceptFis identicalwiththe number which belongs to the Gifthe concept Fisequaltothe concept G... sounds, of course, like atautology” (1950: §73) andRussell writes: “Thelaw of tautology states that no changeismadewhenaclass of proposition is addedtoormultipliedbyitself” (1937:23).Alsoitisworth noting that in 1925 Ramsey judgedthe axiom of to be “the most evident tautology” (1990: 221).

3. Logic, mathematicsand mathematicalphysics Thereisinany event aclose resemblance between how Wittgensteinviews hisown philosophical thoughts andhow he treats logic in the Tractatus.What he says about logic transfers with minormodifications and qualificationstohis own remarks,these being reminiscent of nothingsomuch as what he calls “logical propositions” (forhis unfussy useof“proposition” in connection with logic, see Fogelin 1987: 45-47). In his viewthe likes of “The world is everythingthat is the case” arelogically on the same footing as tautologies narrowly construed and their “correct explanation”,nolessthan the correctexplanation of “If p, then p”, “must give themapeculiar position among all propositions” (6.112).Hewas of the opinion that “philosophicalpropositions”, like “propositions of logic”, “canbenomoreempirically confirmed than theycan be empiricallyrefuted” (6.1222), are “of equal rank” (6.127) andconstitute(in part) whathevariously calls “logical scaffolding” and “the scaffolding of the world” (3.42,4.023). It is notjust that a “great many” of the major remarks of the Tractatus “can be salvaged” by noting that theyare “formal statements” (Black 1964: 381). It is that theyall can be so “rescue[d]”, “the most strikingones” included (382). In thepresentcontext it is especiallyhelpful to consider what Wittgenstein says about “logicalpropositions” at 6.124, the most important passage on “logical scaffolding”.Onaquick first look, this passage seems to pose adifficulty for theideathat the thoughts

42 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013) expressed in the Tractatus arewithoutsubstance.The trouble is that far from treatinglogical propositions – and by extension,asIsee it, his own propositions – as devoidofcontent, Wittgensteinsays: “The logicalpropositions describethe scaffolding of theworld”. Once more,however, it would be wrong to jumptoconclusions. Wittgenstein’s use of the “describe [beschreiben]” hastobe balanced against what he says elsewhere, includinghis observation at 6.11 that “[t]hepropositions of logic ... say nothing”.And, more significantlystill, at 6.124 itselfhebacktracks andadds: “or rather theypresent it [oder vielmehr, sie stellenesdar]”.Whichistosay “describe” is misleadingand logical propositions aremore accuratelyspokenofasshowing or displaying the scaffolding. (It alsohelps my causeif“darstellen” is rendered as “to be” (Schulte forthcoming), my contention being that Wittgenstein’s thoughts belong to, rather thandescribe, “the scaffolding”.) HowWittgenstein thinks of his own remarks is, Iam persuaded,equallycomparable to how he thinks of “the propositions of mathematics” in the6.2s, even howhethinksof mathematical equations. He was committed to the view that his thoughts, like “everyproposition of mathematics”, “must be self- evident [sich von selbst verstehen muß]” (6.2341; TLP1961 has “must go without saying”). For him “Theworld is everythingthatisthe case” cannomorebedismissedasgibberish than amathematical proposition/equation. Disparaging suchphilosophicalremarks because they do notcount as genuinepropositions is as biga mistake as disparaging the likesof“2+2=4”because theyare “pseudo-propositions [Scheinsätze]” (6.2). JustasWittgenstein regards mathematics as asymbolism, so – Iamsuggesting – his own “philosophicalpropositions” function as asymbolism, and “[j]ust as with thesystem of numbers onemust be able to write down any arbitrarynumber” (6.341), so with the system of thoughtsadumbrated in the Tractatus onemust be able to write down any arbitrary . Thetautologies of Wittgenstein’s system of thoughts constitute, like tautologiesnarrowly construed, “part of the symbolism, in the same way that ‘0’ is part of the symbolism of Arithmetic” (4.4611).

43 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA

Possiblymore telling,however, is that the centralremarksof the Tractatus arecomparable to the propositions of mathematical physics (asWittgensteinconstruesthem). When discussing NewtonianMechanics, Wittgenstein uses theword “proposition” to covernecessarilytrue Sätze,and it is notforcing the issueto regardhim as believing that hisown remarks have the same logical status as “themechanicalaxioms” (6.341). He writes: “Newtonian mechanics ... bringsthe description of the universe to aunified form”,and the centralremarks of the Tractatus can, Iventure to suggest, be said to do the same at amore general and abstractlevel. Philosophy as Wittgensteinunderstands it can be summarised, not too misleadingly,ashesummarisesNewtonianMechanics, namely as “an attempt to constructaccording to asingle plan all true propositions which we needfor thedescription of theworld” (6.343). Forhim philosophy also delineatesa“purely geometrical” network of concepts, “all [the] properties[of which]can be givena priori” (6.35). He holds that “thelaw of causation, thelaw of continuity in ,the law of least expenditure in nature, etc. etc., ... are apriori of possible forms of the propositions of science” (6.34), andIamadding that he is recording apriori intuitions about thepossible forms of propositions of anysort.In both areas, “theapriori certain [Gewisse]proves to be something purely logical” (6.3211).

4. Tautologies show the formalpropertiesoflanguage andthe world Recognising the kinship of Wittgenstein’s thoughts to the propositions of logic,mathematics andmechanics has thefurther advantage of clearing away much of the fogsurrounding his observations about saying and showing. Insofar as tautologies, equations and the “logical apparatus [of] physical laws” (6.3431) showthe (unsayable) “logic of the world” (6.22), his ownmore generalremarks showintheir own way “thelogical form of ” (4.121) andcorrelatively “the inexpressible”, “das Mystische” (6.522). For the purposeofdelineating featuresoflanguageand theworld, tautologies broadlyunderstood are as good as logical propositions, mathematical equations and mechanical axioms,and it is as trueof

44 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013)

Wittgenstein’s own thoughts, as of “thepropositions of logic”,that their being “tautologies shows the formal—logical—properties of language, of the world” (6.12). Otherwise put, Iamopposing the suggestionthat there is adistinction “in thetheory of the Tractatus between logicaltruths[which are‘tautologies’]and the thingsthat are ‘shewn’” (Anscombe 1959:163). Wittgenstein thinks formal/logicalpropertiesmanifest themselves in his “propositions” as well as in other logical/necessary/apriori “propositions”. But howdoremarks like “The worldisthe totalityoffacts” showlogicalproperties of languageand the world? It is unhelpful to note thatWittgensteinwrites: “‘fa’ shows [zeigt]that in itssense the object a occurs[and] twopropositions ‘fa’ and ‘ga’ [show] that they areboth about the same object” (4.1211).Nor is there much to be gleaned fromhis observation in “Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore” that “[e]ven if there were propositions of [the] form ‘Misa thing’ they wouldbesuperfluous (tautologous) because whatthis tries to sayissomething which is already seen when you see ‘M’” (AM:110). More useful, though still somewhat obscure, is what Wittgensteinsaysat6.36: “If therewerealaw of , it might run: ‘There arelawsofnature’.But that can clearly not be said:it showsitself [es zeigt sich]”.What he means, Itakeit, is that conformitytothe lawofcausalityshows itselfinscientificpractice, i.e. in theuse of mechanics and other formsofscientific representation. This prompts the thoughtthat he takes “formal— logical—propertiesoflanguage,ofthe world” to be manifest in linguistic practice, theessentialfeaturesofwhichare summed up in the unassailably anddefinitively true thoughts of the Tractatus. In the courseofdiscussing “logical propositions”,Wittgenstein writes: “It is clearthat it must show [anzeigen muß]something about theworld thatcertain combinations of symbols ...are tautologies [Tautologiensind]” (6.124),and Iamconjecturing that he believedit must show something aboutthe world that the combinations of symbols in the Tractatus aretautologies.Iread him as holdingthatit comes outinhow we talk aboutthe world that the world is everything that is the case, thatitcomes out in how thoughts are expressedthat aname means an object(compare3.2)and that it comesout in theimpossibility of languagerepresentingwhat is

45 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA mirrored in language thatlogic is transcendental(4.121).My suggestion is that allthe truths of the Tractatus,not just the “metaphysical truths” of the work, “show themselves precisely in the use of language” (Mounce2001: 188). Wittgensteinbelieved that the truthsatthe beginning of the bookare “metaphysical” in name only and that none of his “propositions” are “intended to indicate what eludes themedium of language buttodirect ourattentionto what showsitself in thatmedium” (ibid.). (Also see Griffin 1964: Chapter3,“The doctrineofshowing”.) At the risk of belabouring the obvious, Iwould mention that I takethe remarksinthe 6.3s about mathematical physics to be unusually helpful forunderstandingthe significance of the Tractatus. It is not justthat the discussion of NewtonianMechanics at 6.341- 6.343 sheds lightonhow Wittgenstein couldhavetaken hisown thoughts to be unassailably anddefinitely true, treated his own propositions as nonsensicaland justifiably availed himselfofthe distinction between sayingand showing. It also becomes clear how Wittgenstein’s thoughts can be taken – and were apparently taken by theauthorofthe Tractatus himself – to be of theessence. Nobody, least of allWittgenstein, considers Newtonian Mechanics to be trivial, and theremarks of the Tractatus,thoughdoubtless less momentous, arelikewisenon-trivial. Wittgenstein does not reckon the propositions of mathematicalphysics importantbecause, while nonsensical, theyencapsulatetruth or somehowmanagetoteach useful lessons, so why interpret himasthinking of his own propositionsthis way? Newtonian Mechanics is important since it “providesthe bricks for building theedifice of science” (6.341), and Wittgenstein’s thoughts aresimilarlyimportant since they provide the bricks forbuilding any sort of edifice.

5. Sätze as elucidations An account of Wittgenstein’s remarksofthe sortIamadvancing, thecentral pillar of which is that they are – andweremeant – to be understood as tautologous, has several obvious advantages. Once the tautological character of his thoughts is noticed, hisclaim to be expressing unassailable and definitivetruths posesnospecial problem. Noristhere any need to distinguish between hisopening

46 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013) remarksabout theworld and statesofaffairs from the remarks about language and logic that follow. Norisitnecessary to treat his concluding remarksabout the happy person and the meaning of lifeasout-of-place afterthoughts. Moreover thesay/show distinctionisaccordedthe weight Wittgenstein places on it, and showing is neitherdisparaged nortreated as adispensable extra. It only remains to consider the other half of the equation,the half about oureventuallyrecognisingthat thepropositions of the book are nonsensical. While tautologies cannot be said straight-outtobe nonsensical (andgobbledygookcannot reasonably be regardedas showing what cannot be said),itisunclear how treating Wittgenstein’s Sätze as tautologies canbesquared with takinghis declaration at 6.54 at facevalue.Still it is not outlandishtoregard whathesaysin6.54aswell-taken, even as inescapable. 6.54 is notasstraightforward as oftensupposed.Wittgenstein firstwrites: “MeineSätze erläutern dadurch,dass sieder,welcher mich versteht,amEnde als unsinnig erkennt,wenn er durschsie— aufihnen—über siehinausgesteigen ist” (TLP 1955: “My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them” /TLP 1961: “My propositions serve as elucidationsinthe following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them”.) Nexthesays(within parentheses): “He [i.e. the person who understandshim] must so to speakthrow away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it”.And he adds (on aseparate line): “He [i.e. thesameperson]must surmount these propositions;thenhewillsee theworld rightly”. Three questions immediately come to : What exactly does Wittgensteinmean by “MeineSätze” and how do theyelucidate? Why should ourcoming to recognise themasunsinnig make any difference?And howisthe metaphorofclimbingthe ladder to be understood and whydoesclimbingWittgenstein’s ladderenable us to see theworld rightly? When Wittgensteinspeaks of his Sätzeat6.54, he cannotbe working with the conception of “proposition” specified in the body of the book. No doubt,his primaryaim,hereasalways, is to hitthe

47 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA nail on thehead, andthe relevant notion of proposition must be something like “intelligible sequenceofwords”.None of themain remarks of the Tractatus is aproposition in theofficial sense,none being a “propositional in itsprojective relationtothe world” (3.12) or “apicture of reality” (4.021). “The world is everythingthat is the case” canbesaidtobe“expressed perceptively through the senses” (3.1), butitishardly a “sensibly perceptible sign (sound or written sign,etc.) of the propositionasaprojectionofthe possible state of affairs” (3.11). To Wittgenstein’s way of thinking,there is no such thing as anonsensical proposition in theTractariansense, therebeing no suchthing as apicture that does notpicture correctly or incorrectly. Forhim anonsensical proposition/picture is acontradiction in terms,picturing beingamatterofthinking whatispossible andthere being no thinkingthe illogical (3.02- 3.03). (Trickpictures purportingtoportraythe impossible are obviously not counterexamples.) When “meine Sätze” is understood as referring to Wittgenstein’s remarks ordinarily understood, the question abouthow they elucidatevirtually answersitself.Theyare “elucidatory” since they show “formal—logical—propertiesoflanguage, of theworld”. Wittgensteinisunderlining that the key remarksofthe Tractatus lay bare how we speak andthinkratherthanconveyinformation about the world, language, logic and the rest. This is not anew thought. It echoes the point expressed in 4.112 aboutphilosophical works consisting “essentiallyofelucidations” and philosophy being “an activity”, “not atheory”.Nor is it fortuitous that 6.54 follows 6.53 on “[t]he right method in philosophy”,apassage in which Wittgensteinurges philosophers “[t]o saynothingexcept whatcan be said, i.e. the propositions of naturalscience, i.e. somethingthat hasnothing to do with philosophy”.Instating this, Wittgensteinis not, as regularlyassumed, conceding that there is somethingwrong with his discussion (e.g.Kuusela2011:601). He is recognising that there is aworld of difference between the elucidatory/showable and the sayable/picturable. In stressing Wittgenstein’s observation about the elucidatory function of his Sätze,Iam not cutting myself off from providing an explanation of their nonsensicality. Tautologies must,tothe extent

48 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013) thatthey elucidate, make some sort of sense. But the possibility of their serving as elucidations does notstand andfall with their making sense(or their being recognised “finally” as unsinnig). The crucialpoint is that Wittgensteincouples elucidation and nonsensicalityand hastoberegarded as having believed his remarksare simultaneously elucidatory and nonsensical. On of interpretinghim as contradicting himself and his Sätze the same wayat6.54asinthe Preface,hehas to be understood as taking the setting forthofthoughts to be different from the setting down of propositions,i.e.hemust have reckoned it possible to read his remarks either as unassailably anddefinitively truethoughts or as nonsensical propositions. While he certainly refers to thesame(written) sentences as thoughts andpropositions, he cannot have takenhis remarks-construed-as-thoughts to be propositions or taken hisremarks-construed-as-propositions to be thoughts. The simplest andmost charitableexplanation of 6.54,Iam arguing, is that Wittgensteinisnoting that whoevergrasps his thinking will eventually seeheisnot describing, stating facts, conveying information.The gist of the passage is that the philosophical-sounding remarks in thebook arewrongly read as assertions,aspropositions in the senseoftrue-or-false pictures as opposedtotautologous thoughts that show something about languageand theworld. Though Wittgensteincannot be said to have workedwith asingle, precise notion of nonsense, he usually reserves the charge of nonsensicalityfor fraudulent statements, and in 6.54 he is – on the interpretationIfavour – saying thathis remarks arefraudulentwhen takenascontributingpositively to what is known about language,the world or anything else. His contention is that, understood as statements,his Sätze are nonsensical,i.e. cannot be said or,whatamountstothe samething, cannotbesignificantly communicated (compare Black 1964: 379). He proceedstruetoformand would have us noticethatheisnot contributing to natural science (or ). However the thoughts of the book may initiallyappear, when construed as genuinepropositions,they are nothingbut waffle.

49 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA

To avoid apossible misunderstanding, Ishould emphasisethat Iamnot interpretingthe remarks/thoughts/propositions of the Tractatus as “combinations of symbols that havethe appearance of saying something whiletheyare in fact ‘nonsensical’” (Medina 2002:9). It is no part of my argumentthat Wittgenstein’s sentences are “pseudopropositions” in the senseof“symbolic creatures that have adeceitful nature” (ibid.). As Isee it, it is amistake to think that “[w]e learn atthe end of thebook that all ‘propositions’ of the Tractatus are deceitful in thisway: theyhave apropositional appearance butare in fact unsinnig (6.54)” (ibid.). Iamsuggesting that Wittgenstein’s remarksare pseudopropositions only in the sense that logical propositions, mathematical equations and the axioms of mechanicsare, and their natureisdeceitfulonly in the sensethat they have theappearanceofstating non-trivial truths. Theyare not to be regarded as unsinnig without addition or qualification since they also have atrue, nondeceitful nature,each beingcomprehensible as atautology.Nor do Iagree that since “tautologies ...are not deceitful”, “[t]hepropositions of the Tractatus arecertainly nottautological” (Medina 2002: 9, 10). Central to how Iread6.54, then,isthe point that Wittgenstein meanstoalert thereader to the fact that the tautologousthoughts expressed in thebodyofthe work are unassertible. He is not saying hisunassailably anddefinitively true thoughts areinthe final analysisnonsensical or presuming the possibility of nonsense expressingtruth.Heisnoting – albeit not in so manywords – that anyattempt to assert the remarksofthe book,noless than tautologies narrowly understood, results in “‘non-sensical’ formations of words” (Anscombe 1959: 163). This is integral to histhinking. He takes sentences with content to be assertibleand holdsthat it is nonsensical to assert sentencesthat say nothing. In his view propositions in thesense specified in the Tractatus are assertible as wellasexpressible, tautologies merely expressible. He is able to have it both ways since he takestautologies to show, propositions to say,and thinksthe core remarksofthe bookshow without saying. There is no contradiction between the Preface and6.54, the expression of an unassailably and definitively true thought being altogetherdifferent from a(meaningful) true-or-false proposition.

50 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013)

For Wittgenstein unasserted tautologies express true thoughts while asserted ones express nothing whatsoever.

6. Sinnlos and unsinnig At thisjunctureitmay be objected thatIam overlooking that Wittgensteintakes everytautologousremark to collapse into nothingness,tobe“aperfect andabsoluteblank” (Anscombe1959: 76-77, Black1964:235). Thisisnot an unreasonable criticism if only because at 4.466 Wittgensteinexplicitly speaks of the “dissolution [Auflösung]” of tautologies(TLP 1961 renders “Auflösung” as “disintegration”). (Alsosee AM:118: “Whathappens in [a ‘tautology (not alogicalproposition)’]isthat allits simple parts have meaning, but it is such that theconnexions between these paralyseordestroyone another,sothatthey are connectedinonly some irrelevant manner.”)Still the objectionisnot unanswerable. Leaving aside the fact thatthe metaphor of dissolutionismeant to getusover the hump that truth, as Wittgenstein characterises it, attaches exclusively to pictures, there is the difficulty thatheis equallywell,ifnot better, read as takingtautologiestocollapse into (trivial) truth. To borrow aphrasefromalater work, each of the sentencesofthe Tractatus is mostnaturally regarded, like “If p, then p”,as“adegenerateproposition, whichisonthe sideoftruth”, “an important pointofintersection of significant sentences” (RFM III, §33). Norisitfatal to what Iamarguing that in 6.54Wittgenstein declareshis propositions to be nonsensical (unsinnig), notsenseless (sinnlos). It is tempting to think that consistency aloneshouldhave preventedhim fromtaking his remarks as tautologies giventhat he writes: “Tautology andcontradiction arewithout sense[sind sinnlos]. ... Tautology andcontradiction are, however,not nonsensical [sind abernichtunsinnig]” (4.461-4.4611). Hadhemeanthis thoughts to be read as sinnlos whenunasserted (andasunsinnig only when asserted), would he not havesaid so? In response,Iwould reiteratethat Wittgensteinspeaks of the truth of histhoughts as unassailable and definitive andnotethat, as someonedisinclinedtodevelop his , he may havepreferredtoleave it unmentioned that he means “nonsensical if asserted”.But Iwould also underscore that he is

51 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA not entirelyconsistentinhis useof“sinnlos” and “unsinnig”.Thus at 5.1362 he writes: “‘Aknowsthat p is thecase’ is senseless[sinnlos]if pis atautology”,and at 5.5351 he refers to “sinnlose Hypothese”,in fact switches between “unsinnig” and “sinnlos”.Moretothe point thereisthe awkward fact thatwhile he criticised the Ogden/Ramseytranslation on numerous points, some quite small, he was apparently unperturbedby“unsinnig” being renderedas “senseless” at 4.124and 5.473, indeed even letsthe translation of “am Ende als unsinnig” as “finally ... as senseless” in 6.54pass withoutcomment (CCO: 19-37). The lastofmyquestions about 6.54, theone about the nature of the ladder and what is seen onceitisclimbed, now practically answers itself. Far from coming to appreciatethat Wittgenstein’s remarks (incidental comments aside)are nonsensical and philosophy acharade,weare meant – on thepresent interpretation – to notice something about theladder we havebeen climbing, specifically thatits steps do not have the character they appear to have. At the top of the ladder,wedonot have to discard the means that putusinto apositiontosee “the world aright”,onlyhaveto abandon the easyassumption that propositions have beenasserted as well as thoughts expressed. Wittgenstein’s clarifications are not lost, just the impression that theystatehow things are, andthere is no needtoexplain how aladderlacking secure steps can be climbed or how we can have fooled ourselves into thinkingwe havebeen climbingaladder without steps. Both theladderand its steps remain in place, andWittgenstein canbereadasbelieving he has providedawayto“surmount [überwinden]” his “propositions”, “to climb up beyondthem”.The message of his parting shot – “Whereof one cannotspeak, thereof one must remain silent” (7) – is not that there areno(unassertible)expressible thoughts, only thatthere are no (assertible)philosophical propositions. Onenotable reason thatWittgenstein is persistently misread,I am inclined to think,isthat nonsensical utterance is taken to be the only alternative to assertion(e.g. Conant and Dain 2011:§1).Itis insufficientlyappreciatedthat treating6.54seriouslydoes not force us to supposeWittgenstein is peddling gibberish disguised as truth or purportingtoconvey information in nonsensicalremarks. He

52 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013) does not have to be read as packaging truth in theform of nonsense or repudiating philosophy outofhand,itbeingpossible to regardhim,asIhave been arguing,asexpressing thoughts that say, state,describe, representnothing.Yet again his remarks about science clarifythe situation. He is able to slip betweenthe Scylla of accepting theideaofimportant nonsense andthe Charybdis of treating his Sätze as out-and-out nonsensicalbecause he believes that in thecaseofhis own thoughts, as in the caseofNewtonian Mechanics, “the fact that [the world] can be described by [them] asserts nothing about the world; but this asserts something,namely, that it can be describedinthat particular wayinwhichasamatter of factitisdescribed” (6.342). In particular when onereflects on his observationthat “[t]hrough theirwhole logical apparatus the physical laws stillspeak of the objects of the world” (6.3431), one canaccept that “[t]here is indeed theinexpressible [Unaussprechliches]”,which “showsitself” (6.522). When the Tractatus is interpreted as comprisingtautologies comparable to logicaltruths, mathematicalequations andthe axioms of mechanics(and is taken to showsomethingthatcannot be asserted in theformofpropositions), terms of criticism commoninthe secondaryliterature devoted to the Tractatus prove to hinder morethantheyhelp.Itispointless to debate whether Wittgenstein’s remarks aretheoretical or therapeutic, his aim being to clarify theessentialnature of representationwith an eye to showing that “thereasonwhy [the problemsofphilosophy]are posed is thatthe logic of ourlanguage is misunderstood” (TLP 1955: 27/TLP1961: 3; also compare4.003). Anditislikewise unnecessary to ask whetherWittgensteinshould be interpreted as “resolute” or “irresolute”.Hecan be readasproceedingresolutely in that his sentences aremeant without exception to express unassailably and definitelytrue thoughts thatreduce to nonsense when asserted.And he can be read as proceeding irresolutelyin thatheconceives thoughts andpropositions differently in the Preface and at 6.54 from how he officially conceives them.Itisnot thatthe theory/therapy and resolute/irresolute distinctions have no use, justthat theyhave to be handled with care and do not map straightforwardlyone on to the other.

53 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA

Nothing Ihavesaid entails thatthe Tractatus is lesssophisticated or moreelusive thanusually supposed. My point is that thealready difficult task of fathoming what Wittgenstein is driving at is made more difficultwhen his description of his own remarks in the Preface is takentobeinserious conflictwithhis description of themat6.54. When he is read as speakinghis mind in both sets of remarksand as referring to his thoughtsdifferently fromhow he refers to hispropositions, thesubtlety of hisphilosophy shines through and what he is driving at is more readilyappreciated.His discussion is highlymodulated andsyncopated,and allowing that he expresses true thoughts,wesaveourselves the unrewarding task of explaining awaymuch of whathesays – andwhat he saysabout what he says. There is no substitute fortracing Wittgenstein’s steps andattemptingtofigureout what he says remark by remark and why he might havetaken himselftobeexpressing unassertible thoughts. More common ways of interpreting the text may render it moredigestiblebut only at the price of simplifyinghis message and opening him to harsh criticism.3

References Anscombe, G.E.M., 1959. An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.London: Hutchinson. Ayer,A.J., 1985. Wittgenstein.London: Weidenfeld andNicholson. Black,M., 1964. ACompanion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Child, W., 2011. Wittgenstein.London: . Conant, J. andDainE., 2011. “Throwingthe BabyOut”.In: R. Read and M.A.Lavery,eds.2011. Beyondthe TractatusWars.London: Routledge, pp. 66-83. Crary, A. andReadR., eds.2000. TheNew Wittgenstein.London: Routledge. Diamond, C.,1991. “Throwing Away theLadder”.In: C. Diamond, The RealisticSpirit.:MIT Press, pp.179-204. Dreben, B. and Floyd, J., 1991. “Tautology:How nottoUse aWord”. Synthese 87 (1), pp.23-49.

3 Iamindebted to Lynne Cohen, Mauro Engelmann, Paul Forster and Richard Schmitt forusefuldiscussion andcomments,and Ihavebenefited to no little degree from the critical observations of two anonymous refereesfor this journal.

54 Nordic Wittgenstein Review 2(2013)

Drury, M., 1984. “Conversations withWittgenstein”.In: R. Rhees, ed. 1984. RecollectionsofWittgenstein.Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress, pp.97-171. Fogelin,R., 1987. Wittgenstein.London: Routledge. Frege, G.,1950. TheFoundations of Arithmetic.Oxford: Blackwell. Frege, G.,2003. “Frege’s LetterstoWittgenstein aboutthe Tractatus”,trans. R. H. Schmitt. BertrandRussell Society Quarterly #120, pp. 13-31. Frege, G.,2011. “Frege-Wittgenstein Correspondence”,trans. B. Drebenand J. Floyd. In:E.dePellerin,ed. 2011. InteractiveWittgenstein.Dordrecht: Springer, pp.15-74. Griffin, J.,1964. Wittgenstein’s .Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hacker,P.M.S.,2000. “Washetryingtowhistle it?” In: A. Crary and R. Read, eds. 2000. TheNew Wittgenstein.London: Routledge,pp. 353-388. Hacker,P.M.S.,2001. Wittgenstein:Connections and Controversies.Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress. Kuusela,O., 2011. “TheDevelopment of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy”.In: O. Kuuselaand M. McGinn,eds.2011. TheOxford Handbook of Wittgenstein.OxfordUniversityPress,pp. 597-619. Lugg,A., 2003. “Wittgenstein’s Tractatus:TrueThoughtsand Nonsensical Propositions”. Philosophical Investigations,26(4),pp. 332-347. Malcolm, N.,1967. “Wittgenstein”.In: P. Edwards, ed.1967. Encyclopedia of Philosophy,vol.8.London: Macmillan, pp. 327-340. McGuinness, B.,2002. ApproachestoWittgenstein.London: Routledge. McGuinness, B.,ed. 2008. Wittgenstein in Cambridge.Oxford: Blackwell. Medina, J., 2002. TheUnity of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy.Albany: SUNY Press. Morris,M., 2008. Wittgenstein andthe Tractatus.London: Routledge. Mounce,H.O., 1981. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.Chicago:UniversityofChicago Press. Mounce, H.O., 2001. “Critical Notice”. Philosophical Investigations,24(2),pp. 185-192. Ramsey,F.P., 1990. Philosophical Papers.Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. Read, R. andLavery, M.A., eds. 2011. Beyondthe Tractatus Wars.London: Routledge. Russell,B., 1937. PrinciplesofMathematics,2nd ed. London: Allenand Unwin. Schulte, J.,forthcoming. “ and ”.In: L. Perissinotto, ed. “In derFinsternis dieser Zeit”:Ethics, ,and Politics in Wittgenstein. Frankfurt am Main: Ontos Verlag. White, R.M.,2006. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.London: Continuum. Wittgenstein,L., 1955. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. C.K. Ogdenand F.P.Ramsey.London: KeganPaul, Trench, Trubner. [TLP 1955]

55 Andrew Lugg BY-NC-SA

Wittgenstein,L., 1961. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,trans.D.F.Pears andB. F. McGuinness. London: Routledge andKegan Paul.[TLP 1961] Wittgenstein,L., 1968. Philosophical Investigations.3rd ed., ed. G.E.M. Anscombeand R. Rhees, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe.Oxford: Blackwell.[PI] Wittgenstein, L.,1973. Letters to C.K. Ogden.Ed. G.H. vonWright. Oxford: Blackwell.[CCO] Wittgenstein, L.,1978. Remarksonthe Foundations of Mathematics.3rd ed., ed. G.H. vonWright, R. Rhees and G.E.M. Anscombe,trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell. [RFM] Wittgenstein, L. 1979a. Notes Dictated to G. E. Moore in .In: Wittgenstein, L., Notebooks 1914-1916.2nd ed., ed.G.H.von Wright andG.E.M.Anscombe, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford:Blackwell, pp. 108-119. [AM] Wittgenstein, L.,1979b. Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge, 1932-1935.Ed. A. Ambrose.Oxford:Blackwell. [AWL] Wood, A.,1957. Bertrand Russell:The Passionate Skeptic.London: Allenand Unwin.

Biographical note After studying electrical engineering in London, Andrew Lugg uprooted to the USA, where he obtained aPhD in philosophy, after whichhemoved to Canada, where he taught for some 30 yearswith brief stintsinEurope andthe USA.Before turning his attentiontothe history of analyticphilosophy he wrotefor adecadeorsoonscience. He is theauthorofafairnumberofarticlesand two books, Pseudociencia, Racionalismo yCientismo and Wittgenstein’s Investigations 1- 133.Atpresentheiswriting on Wittgenstein andcolourand hasin mindabook on Quine’s philosophy.

56