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Environmental Impact of Munition and Propellant Disposal (Impact Environnemental De L’Élimination Des Munitions Et Des Combustibles)

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Environmental Impact of Munition and Propellant Disposal (Impact Environnemental De L’Élimination Des Munitions Et Des Combustibles) NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION ORGANISATION AC/323(AVT-115)TP/274 www.rto.nato.int RTO TECHNICAL REPORT TR-AVT-115 Environmental Impact of Munition and Propellant Disposal (Impact environnemental de l’élimination des munitions et des combustibles) Final Report of Task Group AVT-115. Published February 2010 Distribution and Availability on Back Cover NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION ORGANISATION AC/323(AVT-115)TP/274 www.rto.nato.int RTO TECHNICAL REPORT TR-AVT-115 Environmental Impact of Munition and Propellant Disposal (Impact environnemental de l’élimination des munitions et des combustibles) Final Report of Task Group AVT-115. The Research and Technology Organisation (RTO) of NATO RTO is the single focus in NATO for Defence Research and Technology activities. Its mission is to conduct and promote co-operative research and information exchange. The objective is to support the development and effective use of national defence research and technology and to meet the military needs of the Alliance, to maintain a technological lead, and to provide advice to NATO and national decision makers. The RTO performs its mission with the support of an extensive network of national experts. It also ensures effective co-ordination with other NATO bodies involved in R&T activities. RTO reports both to the Military Committee of NATO and to the Conference of National Armament Directors. It comprises a Research and Technology Board (RTB) as the highest level of national representation and the Research and Technology Agency (RTA), a dedicated staff with its headquarters in Neuilly, near Paris, France. In order to facilitate contacts with the military users and other NATO activities, a small part of the RTA staff is located in NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The Brussels staff also co-ordinates RTO’s co-operation with nations in Middle and Eastern Europe, to which RTO attaches particular importance especially as working together in the field of research is one of the more promising areas of co-operation. The total spectrum of R&T activities is covered by the following 7 bodies: • AVT Applied Vehicle Technology Panel • HFM Human Factors and Medicine Panel • IST Information Systems Technology Panel • NMSG NATO Modelling and Simulation Group • SAS System Analysis and Studies Panel • SCI Systems Concepts and Integration Panel • SET Sensors and Electronics Technology Panel These bodies are made up of national representatives as well as generally recognised ‘world class’ scientists. They also provide a communication link to military users and other NATO bodies. RTO’s scientific and technological work is carried out by Technical Teams, created for specific activities and with a specific duration. Such Technical Teams can organise workshops, symposia, field trials, lecture series and training courses. An important function of these Technical Teams is to ensure the continuity of the expert networks. RTO builds upon earlier co-operation in defence research and technology as set-up under the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development (AGARD) and the Defence Research Group (DRG). AGARD and the DRG share common roots in that they were both established at the initiative of Dr Theodore von Kármán, a leading aerospace scientist, who early on recognised the importance of scientific support for the Allied Armed Forces. RTO is capitalising on these common roots in order to provide the Alliance and the NATO nations with a strong scientific and technological basis that will guarantee a solid base for the future. The content of this publication has been reproduced directly from material supplied by RTO or the authors. Published February 2010 Copyright © RTO/NATO 2010 All Rights Reserved ISBN 978-92-837-0105-7 Single copies of this publication or of a part of it may be made for individual use only. The approval of the RTA Information Management Systems Branch is required for more than one copy to be made or an extract included in another publication. Requests to do so should be sent to the address on the back cover. ii RTO-TR-AVT-115 Table of Contents Page Glossary vi AVT-115 Programme Committee viii Executive Summary and Synthèse ES-1 Chapter 1 – Introduction 1-1 1.1 Background 1-1 1.2 Approach 1-1 Chapter 2 – Review of Capabilities and Needs 2-1 2.1 Introduction 2-1 2.2 Utilization Process State of Ammunition with Expired Storage Term in Republic of Bulgaria 2-1 to 2005 2.2.1 Introduction 2-1 2.2.2 Programme for Utilization and Destruction of Unwarranted Ammunition in the 2-2 Territory of Republic of Bulgaria 2.2.3 Quantity of Conventional Ammunition in the Expired Term 2-3 2.2.4 Technological Possibilities for Utilization of Life Expired Conventional Ammunition 2-4 2.2.4.1 ‘VMZ’ Co., Sopot 2-4 2.2.4.2 ‘Trema’ Co., Tryavna 2-5 2.2.4.3 ‘Arcus’ Co., Lyaskovetz 2-5 2.2.4.4 ‘Videx’ Co., Sofia 2-5 2.2.4.5 ‘Dunarit’ Co., Russe 2-5 2.2.4.6 ‘Elovitza’ Co., Gabrovo 2-6 2.2.4.7 ‘Arsenal’ Co., Kazanlak 2-6 2.2.4.8 ‘Terem’ Co., Unit Kostenetz 2-6 2.2.4.9 University of Chemical Technology and Metallurgy (UCTM), Sofia 2-7 2.2.4.10 General Estimation of Methods, Technology and Process Equipment 2-7 2.2.5 Acts on Environment Preservation in Utilization of Conventional Ammunition in 2-8 the Expired Term 2.2.6 Conclusions 2-9 2.3 Czech Demilitarization Technologies for RDX Containing Munitions 2-10 2.4 Industrial and Other Capabilities 2-11 2.4.1 Disposal of Pyrotechnics 2-11 2.4.2 Open Detonation of Large Stockpiles of Unexploded Munitions 2-11 2.4.3 WEAG EUCLID JP 14.6 on Demilitarisation and the Environment 2-11 2.4.4 UK Assessment of the Environmental Impact of Sea Dumping 2-11 2.4.5 TTCP Weapon Study on Land Contamination 2-11 RTO-TR-AVT-115 iii 2.5 Environmental Aspects of Energetic Materials in North America 2-12 2.5.1 Canadian Programme 2-13 2.5.1.1 Characterisation of Canadian Bases 2-13 2.5.1.2 Unexploded Ordnance 2-13 2.5.1.3 Fate and Behaviour of Energetic Materials 2-15 2.5.1.4 Demilitarisation in Canada 2-15 2.5.1.5 Future Projects 2-15 2.5.2 United States Program 2-16 2.5.3 Conclusions 2-17 Chapter 3 – Extended Meeting in Sofia 3-1 3.1 Introduction 3-1 3.2 Day 1 3-2 3.2.1 Policy and Problems 3-2 – Moderator Dr. Adam S. Cumming (Dstl, UK) 3.2.1.1 UK MoD Munitions Disposal 3-3 3.2.1.2 Presentation on NATO DAT Activities 3-4 3.2.2 Critical Problems of Utilization 3-6 – Moderator Dr. Adam S. Cumming (Dstl, UK) 3.2.2.1 The State of Bulgarian Utilization Process in 2007 3-6 3.2.2.2 Priorities and Experiences in Disposal of Surplus Munition Materials in 3-7 Georgia 3.2.2.3 Development of Physicochemical Principles and Technology for Utilization 3-8 of Large-Scale Composite Solid Rocket Propellant Charges 3.2.3 Ways of Dealing with Problems: Sea Dumping, etc. 3-10 – Moderator Dr. Sonia Thiboutot (DRDC Valcartier, Canada) 3.2.3.1 Introduction 3-10 3.2.3.2 Investigation of Risks Connected to Dumped Munitions in Surface Waters 3-10 3.2.3.3 Disposal of Energetic Materials from Munitions – Integrated Fluidised Bed 3-12 Incineration 3.3 Day 2 3-13 3.3.1 Ways of Dealing with Problems: Contaminated Land 3-13 – Moderator Dr. Sonia Thiboutot (DRDC Valcartier, Canada) 3.3.1.1 Introduction 3-13 3.3.1.2 Energetic Constituents on Military Training Ranges: Deposition, 3-14 Accumulation, Characterization 3.3.1.3 Canadian R&D Programme on Environmental Aspects of Weapons 3-16 3.3.1.4 Remediation of a White Phosphorus Impact Area 3-18 3.3.2 Demilitarisation/Disposal and Counter-Terrorism: Round Table Discussion 3-20 – Moderator Nadir Serin (Defence Industries Research and Development Institute, Turkey) 3.3.2.1 Introduction 3-20 3.3.3 Ways of Dealing with Problems: Demilitarisation 3-22 – Moderator Joakim Hagvall (FOI, Sweden) 3.3.3.1 Introduction 3-22 3.3.3.2 German Demilitarization Experiences after Reunification 3-22 3.3.3.3 United States Munitions Demilitarization Priorities and Capabilities 3-24 iv RTO-TR-AVT-115 3.3.3.4 Management of Surplus Munitions – The NAMSA Approach 3-26 3.4 Day 3 3-29 3.4.1 What Must be Done Now and in the Future: Technology Gaps 3-29 – Moderator Prof. Hristo Hristov (Rakovski Defence and Staff College, Bulgaria) 3.4.1.1 New Energetic Materials and the Future of Demil 3-29 3.4.2 Poster Session 3-32 3.4.2.1 The Situation in Lithuania: The Studies on the Explosive Contamination, 3-32 Their Toxic Action and Biodegradation 3.4.2.2 Assessment of the Impacts of Military Training on Soil and Groundwater 3-33 at CFB Shilo, Manitoba, Canada 3.4.2.3 Canadian R&D Programme on Environmental Aspects of Weapons 3-33 3.4.3 Meeting Conclusions and Recommendations 3-34 3.4.3.1 Recommendations 3-34 Chapter 4 – Conclusions, Areas of Concern, Requirements and Recommendations 4-1 4.1 Conclusions 4-1 4.2 Areas of Concern 4-1 4.3 Requirements 4-2 4.4 Recommendations 4-2 Chapter 5 – Best Practice Recommendations 5-1 5.1 Recommendations 5-1 5.2 Other Supporting Material 5-2 Annex A – Presentations and Documents Supporting Capability Assessments A-1 Annex B – Presentations, Paper/Posters and Videos from the Sofia Meeting B-1 Annex C – Supporting Material and Reference Resources C-1 RTO-TR-AVT-115 v Glossary AAP Army Ammunition Plant AOP Allied Operating Procedure AP Ammonium Perchlorate ARW NATO Advanced Research Workshop AVT Applied Vehicle Technology BASF Company name BATNEEC Best Available Technology Not Entailing Excessive Costs BOFORS Company name CASG NATO CNAD Ammunition Safety Group CATNAP Cheapest Available Technology Narrowly Avoiding Prosecution CFB Canadian Forces Base CNAD Conference of National Armaments
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