EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004

Introduction

The implications of a dominant party system for the successful consolidation of democracy, Realising effective and sustainable has long been an issue of interest amongst democratic governance in Southern political scientists in democracies the world- Africa and beyond. over1. In a context in which one party dominates the political landscape and faces little prospect of electoral defeat, then concerns arise surrounding the possibility of declining government response to public opinion; loss of accountability; and the overall The Dominant Party System: erosion of democratic principles and Challenges for South Africa’s development of authoritarian methods of rule. Since 1994, elections in South Africa, which Second Decade of Democracy have seen repeated overwhelming victory for the ruling African National Congress (ANC), have succeeded in projecting the nation’s young democracy into the limelight with regards to this particular political debate. The national celebrations in April of this year, By marking 10 years of freedom and democracy in South Africa, took place against the Heidi Brooks backdrop of a clear ANC electoral victory at the 14 April polls, in which the ruling party and former liberation movement succeeded in securing 69.68 % of the national vote. Given that the ANC is now set to rule for the next 5 years at least, what challenges does the dominant party system present for South Africa’s second decade of democracy?

There is no doubt that the ruling ANC has commanded a legitimate electoral victory. However, surveys of public opinion and voter intentions have suggested that this is not matched by unquestionable voter satisfaction and contentment with the current government

1 See for example, T.J. Pempel (1990) Uncommon Democracies: the One Party ISBN: 1-919814-71-X Dominant Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University ISSN: 1811-7449 Press, for a study of party dominance in the © EISA, 2004 advanced industrialised countries. Arian and Barnes (1974) also discuss the dominant party systems of Italy and Israel. Giliomee and Simkins (1999) look at the dominant party regimes of South Africa, Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia. - 1 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 and its delivery. Space, in fact, exists for a over a fairly long duration of time that even political opposition to appeal to the interests of opposition parties make little if any dent on the electorate, not least South Africa’s black the political hegemony of a dominant ruling majority. In the absence of a credible party” (2004: 10). The existence of this opposition, however, South Africans continue scenario is clearly a cause for concern if we to vote largely according to racial identity. concur with the negative view that the This has subsequently entrenched the political dominant party system is inimical to dominance of the ANC, which continues to be democracy. Much of the debate surrounding perceived as the party representing the black the incompatibility of the dominant party majority; and has spurred the withdrawal from system and democracy are centred round the the democratic process of those sections of the theory that the alternation of power is crucial electorate who do not identify with the for democracy2. It has been argued that “one dominant party. The weakness of the political party dominance becomes problematic when a and parliamentary opposition equally raises governing party sees less and less need to concerns over how we can ensure that respond to public opinion because it is assured government remains accountable to its of re-election” (Africa et al, 2003: 2). citizens. As a result, “increasingly the debate Existence of political opposition within a is not just about whether democracy in South competitive party system presents alternatives Africa will survive, but about the quality of to the governing party and, therefore, that democracy” (Southall, 2001: 1). While stimulates debate within society over ideas and there appears to be no real threat to democracy policies; and allows society to question the in South Africa, it does face several challenges actions and choices of government. Moreover, over the coming years, and successful it is argued that countervailing forces, the most democratic consolidation will depend upon effective of which is existence of a strong alertness to the emergence of the undemocratic political opposition, are essential to check features frequently associated with dominant transgression toward authoritarian tendencies party systems. and abuse of power by the incumbency (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999: 337). This is a This article is therefore an exploration of these viewpoint vehemently argued by Giliomee & various challenges. The paper begins by Simkins in their useful, while somewhat providing a conceptualisation, exploring the cynical, analysis of one party domination and various theoretical arguments and debates democracy, The Awkward Embrace. For surrounding the dominant party system and them, in a dominant party system, “the vital democracy. The following section then seeks elements of democracy, namely genuine to provide an understanding of the nature of competition and uncertainty in electoral the dominant party system in the South outcomes, are removed in a process that is African political setting. This is done through self-sustaining” (1999: 340). It is argued that a brief overview of the nation’s three this process is characterised by a blurring of democratic elections and examination of both the boundary between party and state, which the ruling ANC as dominant party, and the role has the effect of reducing the likely formation and nature of political opposition in South of independent groups from within civil Africa. This is then followed by an analysis society that are autonomous from the ruling and discussion of the implications of this party; and a growing ‘preponderance’ of system and the challenges for South Africa’s political power, leading to abuse of office and second decade of democracy. “arbitrary decision-making that undermines the integrity of democratic institutions, Conceptualising Dominant Party particularly that of the legislature and its Systems: A Literature Survey ability to check the executive” (ibid).

2 In a recent issue of EISA’s Election Update, See for example, Huntington, S. 1991. The Matlosa and Karume, categorised the Third Wave: Democratization in the Late dominant party system as a system “in which Twentieth Century, Norman, University of despite the multi-party situation, only one Oklahoma Press; Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F. 1997. ‘Modernization: Theories and Facts”, party is so dominant that it directs the political World Politics, 49; and debates in Giliomee and system and is firmly in control of state power Simkins (eds) (1999) - 2 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004

the use of illegitimate means, such as The dominant party system has therefore aforementioned electoral manipulation and frequently been linked to concerns over the even coercion, as a method of retaining power emergence of autocratic regimes and the one and electoral dominance, it is crucial to note party state, not least within the Africa context. that this is not a feature which can be applied While the definition of democracy should by to dominant party systems across the board. no means be reduced to the holding of Rather, political dominance can equally be elections, elections are undoubtedly a key achieved via democratic means. Therefore, in vehicle by which the political leadership is some cases, although possibilities for able to retain dominance. A number of states, alternation may seem acutely remote, for example, have witnessed the manipulation dominance has been won through competitive of electoral laws and regulations by the elections and the “politics of consensus” incumbent party with the intention of (Matlosa & Karume, 2004: 14). Not only does disadvantaging opposition and ensuring the this confer a legitimacy on the dominant ruling retention of power. Elections in Zimbabwe in party by the electorate, but the party cannot 2000 and 2002 are, themselves, a case in hand. ignore existence of political opposition (Chan, The ongoing political crisis of legitimacy 1976: 4 cited in Friedman, 1999:100) and also, currently being played out in the country lends therefore, voter preferences (Friedman, 1999: credence to those further aspects of “the 100). South Africa is formally a multiparty process of entrenching dominance” (Giliomee system in which one party is dominant. It is & Simkins, 1999: 340), which extend beyond hence not a ‘given’ that the dominant party the formal electoral arena, to undermining the can rely on continued dominance. Rather, democratic system at large. The dominant Arian & Barnes propose that “the politician of party trend in a number of African states since the dominant party can rely on electoral independence has seen the regression and stability if he makes the appropriate decisions; reversal of democratic gains with regard to he can rely on the cooperation of the satellite successful transitions in the region, and a parties and the harmlessness of the opposition threat to attempts at democratic consolidation. if he has electoral stability” (1974: 614). The issue of being able to retain dominance On the other hand, others have advocated far therefore acquires added importance. Under more caution over branding the dominant circumstances in which continued dominance party system as irreconcilable with the is not inevitable, Arian and Barnes suggest advancement of democracy. Arian and Barnes that, rather, “political strategy is determining” in fact hail the system as a “stabilising and the dominant party must position itself mechanism” in an article aptly entitled The strategically within the society and strategise Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of ‘vis-à-vis’ the opposition (Arian & Barnes, Democratic Stability. Writing in 1974, their 1974: 599). analysis is based upon examination of the dominant parties and party systems in Israel Under a system in which party dominance has and Italy from the 1960s and 1940s been won within the democratic rules of the respectively. However, the authors provide game, the dominant party therefore has to relevant insights into the nature of these function within the boundaries of the systems which could be applied to others, and democratic system. Within this system are prove particularly useful to study of the rules and institutions which administer checks dominant party system in South Africa. Their and balances on abuse of power - although it contention that the dominant party system be should be noted that their effectiveness is conceived as “a model of how democracy and dependent upon how advanced such a system stability may be combined under difficult is, and the effectiveness and autonomy of conditions” (1974: 593), as well as “its mechanisms and institutions in place. Equally, superiority as a means to stability in the ideology by which the party is identified fragmented polities” (1974: 600), is worth by the electorate also puts certain constraints considering in the South African case. on its “freedom of maneuver” (Arian & Barnes, 1974: 597). However, while Furthermore, while dominant party systems continuing dominance is by no means assured, have not infrequently been characterised by Arian and Barnes have also argued that “the - 3 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 dominant party is the authority that defines the crucial point raised by Arian and Barnes is that boundaries between the permissible and the “dominant parties exist in dominant party unacceptable” (ibid). It is therefore at a systems. Long dominance by one party affects distinct advantage to the opposition. (Arian & the way the other political forces perceive the Barnes, 599-600). For a dominant party, such political system…the dominant party comes to as a former liberation movement, that holds a be identified with the regime and even with particularly symbolic identity and historically the epoch. Opposition parties are reduced to a significant role, this gains added weight. The role of carping and sniping rather than that of dominant party is able to consume the national developing immediate alternatives” (Arian & political agenda at large. Giliomee and Barnes, 1974: 599). As such, within the Simkins, drawing upon the work of Pempel confinements of this ‘system’, in which one (1990), refer to the party as administering an party is dominant, the strategy and response of “historic project”, generating “even more the opposition inevitably come to be driven by dominance” (1999:xvi). that of the dominant party.

However, it should be noted that much also Given this above outline of some of the depends on the nature and legitimacy of that theories concerning the nature of the dominant dominance. Taking the aforementioned party system and its relationship to democracy, example of those parties that emerged from the it is important next to contextualise our liberation struggle against colonial rule, such analysis. This following discussion seeks to parties are able to use their liberation facilitate an understanding of the extent to credentials to retain support (Baregu, 2004; which some of the arguments surrounding the Suttner, 2004). Moreover, the resonance this dominant party system and its compatibility can hold with the majority of the electorate (or otherwise) with the development and should not be underestimated. Often, it serves consolidation of a healthy democracy apply to to not only legitimate the party as a hegemonic the South African case. power, but also to delegitimate the opposition. As the dominant party comes to represent the Electoral Dominance of the ANC nation and democracy, opposition can be depicted as opposing the national project The ongoing debate surrounding South (Myburgh, 2004; Suttner, 2004). On the other Africa’s dominant party system has gained hand, it is also important not to overstate the increased significance over the nation’s three case, as Friedman points out that democratic elections. To enable a more ‘delegitimation’ of opposition is by no means informed examination of the South African a ‘gift’ given to the dominant party. Rather, context, this section will briefly cover the “conditions must exist in which the electorate results of these elections. In 1994, the ANC is open to delegitimation” (Friedman, entered into the Government of National Unity 1999:101). Society’s response to, and (GNU) with 62.65 % of votes, alongside the continuation or cessation of support for, the National Party (NP) - now the New National dominant party is therefore also determined by Party (NNP) - with 20.39 % and the Inkatha society’s perception of the opposition and its Freedom Party (IFP) with 10.54 % (EISA, identity, strategy and actions. Given the 1999). The 1994 political transition brought political weight of the dominant party, about the end of a racially exclusive and however, this is likely to be greatly influenced discriminatory political system, and extension by the strategy of the ruling party. of the democratic right to the majority. Realistically, the results of the 1994 election Needless to say, therefore, that this is an were preordained and there was no other interconnected and dialectical process. The probable outcome than that the ANC would continuation of dominance by one party is win a majority in that election. The 1994 inextricably linked to both the opinion of the election was largely symbolic - “a rite of electorate (on whom the dominant party is passage” rather than a contest between parties reliant for the continuation of its political (Daniel, 2004: 13). However, the formation of legitimacy); and to the existence of political the GNU, born of ongoing negotiation competition in the form of opposition parties – between parties, brought about the need for neither of which it can ignore. However, a South Africa to embrace a politics of unity and - 4 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 consensus building. The GNU was crucial to South African political attitudes given that the the formation of the new democracy, 1994 elections had been an emotionally “incorporating the three largest parties, each charged ‘liberation election’” (Louw, 2000: representing major racial and ethnic segments 218). of the electorate” (Schlemmer, 1999: 281- 282). In a deeply divided and unequal society, However, 1999 also saw a weakening of the historically constructed along racial lines, it is political opposition in Parliament. As no surprise that voting patterns were a stark indicated in table 2 below, in 1994 148 seats indication of voting along racial lines. A were occupied by 6 opposition parties, random sample survey conducted at the time whereas, in 1999, the opposition gained only suggested that 75.2 % of blacks voted for the 134 seats, this time shared between twice as ANC, compared to only 0.8% of whites; while many parties. Having left the GNU in 1996 - 48.3 % of whites voted for the National Party feeling it would be able to do more to (IDASA, Market and Opinion Surveys, 1994). represent its constituencies as opposition - the NP saw a dramatic reduction in its support. Table 1: Election Results: (% votes for From its position as the main opposition with those parties gaining seats in the National 20.39 per cent of votes in 1994, this fell to a Assembly) mere 6.87 per cent in 1999. This is despite the Party Election Results: % Votes resignation of F.W de Klerk in 1997 and the 1994 1999 2004 NP’s attempts to revamp itself as the New ANC 62.65 66.35 69.68 National Party (NNP). In its place, the election NNP (NP) 20.39 6.87 1.65 saw the Democratic Party (DP) emerge as the IFP 10.54 8.58 6.97 official opposition under the leadership of DA (DP) 1.73 9.56 12.37 Tony Leon, obtaining 9.56 per cent of the UDM - 3.42 2.28 vote, up from 1.73 per cent in 1994. Support ID - - 1.73 for the IFP, while still remaining fairly considerable, fell from 10.54 to 8.58 per cent ACDP 0.45 1.43 1.6 in 1999. Although the election witnessed the PAC 1.25 0.71 0.73 emergence of some new extreme left and right FF 2.17 0.80 0.89 wing parties, their share of votes remained 0.07 0.30 0.35 MF fairly insignificant. Nonetheless, while a - 0.54 - FA sizeable proportion of white voters transferred AEB - 0.29 - their allegiance from the NNP to the DP, the AZAPO - 0.17 0.27 1999 election continued to reflect people Source: Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, voting largely in racial blocs. The newly 1994, 1999; Independent Electoral Commission, formed United Democratic Movement (UDM), 2004 while hoping to attract black and white voters

- and particularly to win support away from In 1999, the ANC’s share of votes some of the ANC’s black constituency - rose to 66.35 %. For some commentators, the succeeded only in garnering support from 1999 election was a “consolidation election” some disgruntled blacks in the former (Southall, 1999: 15). The ANC returned to Transkei (Louw, 2000: 221). power as the dominant party and South

Africans witnessed the smooth succession to With regard to 2004, the efficiency and power of President Mbeki; some have professionalism that characterised the suggested that the ‘reformulation’ that took elections were undoubtedly encouraging. The place amongst some opposition parties work of the IEC, and the attitude and signified a movement away from the politics involvement of civil society and political of the past; the Independent Electoral parties themselves gave the air of what Commission (IEC) played an invaluable role appeared to be a broad national project to in overcoming many of the organisational ensure elections were carried out successfully, problems of 1994; and the election served as a and signified the commitment of South Africa confirmation of what Southall terms as “South to the strengthening of its own democracy. Africa’s broad acceptance of democratic rules However, the 2004 election has also fuelled of the game” (ibid). It has also been said that growing concerns over the future of 1999 “represented the first ‘normalised’ test of - 5 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 democracy in South Africa as results indicated 1999: 14). The righting of South Africa’s past a consolidation of the dominant party system. and the significance associated with the The most significant outcome for the extension of the democratic right to the opposition in this election was the increasing majority, can, in part, help to account for why popularity of the Democratic Alliance (DA) – elections based on real policy issues, and formerly the DP in the 1999 election. They conduct of successful opposition campaigns reaffirmed their place as the main opposition grounded in the provision of real policy with 12.37 per cent of the votes, up from 9.56 alternatives, have not been forthcoming. per cent in 1999. Contrastingly, for the NNP, Nonetheless, ten years on, given the the election represented an affirmation of their tremendous hold on political power by the diminishing role on the South African political ANC, and the nature of the political opposition scene as they emerged with a mere 1.65 per which has emerged within this context, the key cent of votes. Other opposition parties fared concern lies in what implications this carries fairly poorly. The IFP saw a slight decrease in for South Africa’s second decade of its share of votes compared to 1999. The democracy. newly formed Independent Democrats (ID), lead by former Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) It has been established that dominant party member, Patricia De Lille, however, managed systems are by no means uniform (Giliomee & to draw a fairly impressive number of votes Simkins 1999, xvii - xviii). The process for its first election and secured 1.73 per cent leading to the rise of party dominance will of votes. The ANC, however, secured an differ, and may be via democratic or overwhelming 69.68 per cent of votes – an inherently undemocratic means. Giliomee and increase of 3.33 per cent since 1999. While an Simkins categorise South Africa as “a ANC victory may have come as no surprise, democratic system with a dominant party the diminishing challenge posed by the playing according to some liberal democratic opposition, and the consummate strengthening rules, but still well short of the alternation of of the ruling party’s hold over the national power” (1999: xviii). They take a particularly political agenda, raises some crucial questions negative stance on the ANC’s dominance and as to the direction democracy in South Africa the prospects it holds for democratic will take in the second decade of the country’s consolidation. However, this issue of liberation. adherence to the rules of liberal democracy is critical to our analysis. In a paper presented at On the one hand, the past ten years, to an EISA in May of this year, Rod Alence extent, have required patience and a certain highlighted a crucial point, that in South amount of caution when making predictions Africa “the emergence of a single party for South Africa’s future. In many ways it has dominant regime has coincided with the been too early to tell how sustainable this institutional strengthening of political young democracy will be, or, as some cynics contestation and constitutional government” have projected, whether South Africa would and, moreover, that the growth of this conform to the stereotyped pattern of other dominance “has not been taken as licence to African states, of a steady abuse of power and dismantle [these institutions]” (2004). In fact, authoritarian decline. Moreover, the immense in contrast to the abuse of power and social and economic challenges of reversing unconstitutional tendencies of some of the the inequalities of apartheid faced by the new ruling party’s counterparts on the continent, ANC government on coming to power would Alence goes on to state that “the government prove challenging for any new democracy, let has more consistently treated the consolidation alone one laden with a legacy of racial of democracy as a central component of its inequality and discrimination. With its status project of postapartheid governance” (ibid)3. and widespread support-base, the ANC was arguably the only party capable of carrying 3 Suttner (2004) also provides an interesting forth this project. It has also generally been discussion. He challenges the argument that accepted that change would not occur existence of a political opposition capable of overnight, and “appreciation that a well- becoming an alternative ruling party (and intentioned government is faced by therefore able to keep a check on abuse of power remarkably difficult circumstances” (Southall, by the incumbent) is a requirement for democratic consolidation. Rather, he points to - 6 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004

Moreover, the ANC government has given no little challenge or credible policy alternatives indication that it wishes to suppress opposition from opposition parties over time” (2004: 10). (Edigheji, 2004: 17). On the contrary, “the Of equal importance when applying particular South Africa (sic) Constitution provides for a theories of the dominant party debate to South liberal regime for the formation and operation Africa, is to understand the specific nature of of political parties, which the government has the ANC as ruling party and the origins of upheld” (ibid). democracy in South Africa, from which we cannot divorce the country’s unique political It is therefore necessary to place our analysis history. The protracted struggle against within South Africa’s specific political setting, apartheid means that the historical role of the and to exercise some caution when making ANC carries tremendous significance. It is pessimistic predictions for the future of therefore futile to analyse South Africa’s democracy. The cooperation of political democratic development without placing it in parties in this year’s elections and relative the context of its history of apartheid politics freedom given to those institutions such as the and racial separation on the one hand, and the media and civil society organisations involved politics of liberation on the other. No one in the electoral process serve to exemplify this. would disagree that this still fundamentally Time and resources were put into ensuring that serves to shape the nature of contemporary the 2004 election was run with efficiency; in South African politics. strict accordance with the electoral law; and with consideration of the rights and needs of South Africa is by no means unique in that the the electorate. Indeed, the 2004 election leading nationalist liberation movement during appears to have seen a growing respect for the its struggle became the governing party. Such role and authority of the IEC amongst both the parties have been able to command significant electorate and political parties themselves. If, political legitimacy and support during the as Southall has argued, 1999 was a reflection post-independence era, such that they are of South Africa’s acceptance of democracy as assured of a period of political power to the only “game in town” (1999: 9), then 2004 embark on a ‘nation-building project’ as the can only be seen as an encouraging indication new government. As such, systems of democratic consolidation in the country. To characterised by the dominant party syndrome reiterate the point made earlier, this is not a have tended to emerge in this context. The party that has achieved dominance via ANC, since its formation in 1912, has been undemocratic means. able to extend its appeal and expand its support base to varying groups within society, This being said, however, it is necessary to go such that it has within its ranks those on beyond the definition given by Giliomee and differing points along the ideological spectrum Simkins above, and to expand on and outline (Reddy, 2002:7-8). This has become more some of the features of the dominant party pronounced due to the precariously balanced system as it is in South Africa. Matlosa and relationship the party conducts with both Karume have described what they see as some business and capital, and with COSATU and key features of the South African setting. the SACP in the tripartite alliance (see Suttner, These are “continuous electoral victories of a 2004). This balance has to be carefully dominant party over time by huge margins maintained, as Faull points out that the party’s and, as such, reducing oppositional contest to manifesto must be crafted to “tie in the votes second fiddle; political hegemony of the ruling of trade union members, communists, the party over state institutions including control urban and rural poor, and the leafy of the largest share of the legislature and local suburbanites of the emergent middle class” government authorities; and sole (Faull, 2004: 10). An additional dimension to determination and direction of development the dominant party in the South African policy trajectories by the ruling party with context is therefore its historic alliance with labour and the political left. However, while COSATU played a valuable role in the the effectiveness and trust in constitutional political struggle, its influence on the ANC mechanisms and institutions in South Africa, government’s policies post-1990 has given which are far more likely to facilitate the labour far less to shout about, as the preservation of democracy. - 7 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 government has moved away from leftist cooperation and compromise between parties policies toward the global economic orthodoxy became crucial to both a smooth and peaceful of neo-liberalism. There consequently exists a transition and a long term environment of contentious power balance within the alliance, stability if South Africa was to survive – let in which labour and the left must consider alone set itself on a path toward democracy. which is the lesser of two evils: they can By the end of Apartheid, the ANC and its “cooperate and face marginalization”, or leadership had commanded a significant oppose their ally but risk “a government amount of support and authority, vital to coming to power that is less friendly towards overcoming past divisions and bringing labour” (Webster, 2001: 271). society at large on board the nation-building project for a new South Africa. To this extent, The breadth of the ANC comes from the we can see how the broad support base of the party’s long history and evolution as a ANC provided significant political stability. liberation movement-come-political party. Having moved in its inception from the Secondly, the liberation credentials of the middle-class black politics of an educated ANC give it a political legitimacy that is elite, to the politics of mass protest and urban difficult to rival and – perhaps more uprising of the 1970s and 80s, the party importantly – a moral legitimacy. This is extended both its ideological influence and undoubtedly reinforced by the liberation moral authority, while its longstanding policy leadership of Nelson Mandela and his cohorts; of non-racialism broadened its influence the democratic principles that formed the pillar amongst some non-blacks during the struggle of the party’s mandate; its condemnation of against apartheid. As a result, its extensive violence; and its popular appeal and mandate influence, “strong organisational structures” of non-racialism. Through the ANC’s pivotal (Reddy, 2002), and centralised leadership role in the protracted struggle, the party has (Butler, 2003: 8-9) have enabled the party to commanded a sustained political hegemony. contain the varying viewpoints and policy Thirdly, with regard to bringing about a stances within it in order to retain the cohesion democratic value system, fundamental to the and authority of the party (ibid; Reddy, 2002). South African context is that the ANC “played Interestingly, the dominant party system a major role in crafting the country’s headed by the Congress Party in post-colonial democratic constitution” (Giliomee & India - widely seen as having nurtured the Simkins, 1999, xvi). Moreover, the founding development of a democratic system in the of the party was grounded in democratic country - has been likened by Reddy to the principle and the extension of democratic ANC (Reddy, 2002). Challenging the rights to the majority. assumed negative correlation between ANC These three features provide a backdrop that dominance and democracy, and drawing on helps to explain the emergence of ANC work by Arian and Barnes (1974), he argues dominance. Nonetheless, as the ANC looks set that “both parties bring three necessary to dominate South African politics for the ingredients for democratic consolidation: foreseeable future, this has inevitably raised political stability, legitimacy and a democratic simultaneous concerns over the detrimental value system” (Reddy, 2002:1). These three implications for democracy. A key concern ingredients provide a useful means by which surrounds South Africa’s continued adherence to understand both party dominance in the to the principles of liberal democracy. One South African setting, and how these factors argument proposes that liberal democracy is can have positive implications for democratic being steadily ‘eroded’ in South Africa, and consolidation: that dominance of politics by one party and the

seemingly bleak prospects for the alternation Firstly, with regard to political stability, if we of power are instead directing South Africa reflect on the theoretical arguments touched on toward “mere majoritarianism and earlier regarding the benefits of a dominant electoralism” (Giliomee & Simkins, 1999). party to fragmented societies, a party whose Despite provisions and mechanisms in place to authority the electorate respects, is a protect the constitution and prevent abuse of stabilising and uniting force. Negotiation, power, Giliomee and Simkins argue that there - 8 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 is “an acute tension…between the sovereignty ensure it uses its ability and reach to give the of the constitution and the ‘sovereignty’ appearance of representing the nation, claimed by a party with an overwhelming selectively mobilising and meeting demands of majority” (1999, xviii). Others have expanded groups throughout society (ibid). They suggest on this to state that, as the ruling party sees that, while many groups will be left itself as “synonymous with ‘the people’ ‘dissatisfied’ with the party and its delivery, (meaning the black majority)”, democracy has “power remains elusive for those denied come to be interpreted as “indistinct from access as long as the dominant party can grant ANC rule” (Myburgh, 2004). This therefore sufficient rewards to maintain its dominance” has a significant effect on the way the (ibid). dominant party both perceives its political opposition, and the nature of the relationship Continued ANC support can of course be they conduct with one another. This will be partly accounted for by the “symbolism of elaborated on in more detail in the following liberation” which still remains influential section of this paper, needless to say that this amongst sections of the electorate relationship is to a large extent determined by (Schlemmer, 2004a). However, Schlemmer the dominant party. also astutely comments that “- a common feature of non-mobilised poor people in However, if in a democratic system the unequal societies is self-pity. This self-pity dominant party is unable to ignore existence of creates a powerful need for demonstrations of political opposition, then party strategy sympathy and for a leadership that ‘cares’” becomes crucial to the continuation of (ibid). Despite the limitations and absence of dominance (Arian & Barnes, 1974: 599-600). some government welfare programmes, Moreover, the legitimacy of the government therefore, he also notes that aspects such as rests on its ability to deliver the promised expanded social pensions, child grants, goods to its citizens. In the South African comprehensive social subsides, and the ANC context, this point needs further exploration. government’s “infinite patience in the face of Despite questionable government performance non-payment of local rates, service charges and policy choices; continuing and housing bonds have reinforced its image impoverishment of the black majority; and the as a ‘caring party’” (ibid). Such notions are limited reach of the government’s reinforced by the personalised and door-to- transformation project to address socio- door campaigning of President Mbeki during economic inequalities, the ANC retains a far the recent election, and the ANC campaign reaching hold over the South African polity. In slogan – ‘a better life for all’. a survey conducted by the Helen Suzman Foundation in 2002, polls “showed that only In light of this, Butler’s conclusion appears 11 per cent of ANC supporters felt that poor quite plausible, that “-the movement’s popular people and the unemployed benefited most reach and legitimacy help to render the from government polices”, while “77 per cent majority’s dire circumstances politically felt that poor people were the most neglected supportable, and its institutions ameliorate and group” (Schlemmer, 2004a). That the ANC is contain the society’s diverse conflicts” (2003: enjoying an increasing per centage of the 13). Although continuing dominance cannot nation’s vote, despite the failure of substantial be assured, a political environment and system improvements in socio-economic are created, in which the party’s dominance is transformation to manifest themselves, may essentially stabilised. Having said this, to appear as somewhat of a paradox. How then reiterate that “dominant parties exist in can we explain this continued support? ‘dominant party systems’” (Arian & Barnes, 1974: 599), it is crucial to understand the other Arian and Barnes have referred to one aspect part of the equation in this system - the of the dominant party’s strategy as “selective political opposition. mobilisation” (1974: 598). The dominant party “needs majority or near majority support in The State of Opposition Parties order to remain in power” but, at the same time, must be careful about promising Southall has observed that in South Africa, “everything to everyone” (ibid). The party there is considerable debate over “the role, therefore simultaneously needs to strategically functions, legitimacy and capacity of political - 9 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 opposition” (2001: 1). As highlighted by table given the nation’s unique political history. 2, the past three elections have seen the This political history has served, for the opposition occupy a decreasing number of moment at least, to map out the nation’s seats in Parliament, which, simultaneously, are political demography largely along racial lines being shared between a growing number of and, subsequently, has seen the emergence of a opposition parties. The strength of opposition, dominant ruling party representing the black however, is not solely defined by the number majority. of seats in its possession. The fragmentation and weakening of the opposition is also Considering theoretical discussions on the indicated by the various party identities, significance of the system in which dominant strategies, alignments and realignments over parties function, it is suggested that the role of this period. opposition comes to be dependent on, and determined by, the dominant party. In South Table 2: National Elections: Seats in Africa, given the powerful liberation Parliament and seats lost/gained 1994 – symbolism of the ANC, it boasts significant 2004 leverage within the system. As Reddy has Party 1994 1999 2004 argued, “the scope of opposition politics is No of No +/- No +/- undoubtedly narrowed and limited to relating seats of of to the dominant party” (2002: 3). seats seats ANC 252 266 +14 279 +13 A key strategy of the dominant party, which in DA (DP) 7 38 +31 50 +12 turn limits the cards that the opposition can IFP 43 34 -9 28 -6 play, is that in assuming “‘the centre’ of the UDM - 14 +14 9 -5 ideological and policy spectrum”, while at the ID - - - 7 +7 same time housing a diversity of opinions and NNP (NP) 82 28 -54 7 -21 viewpoints (ibid), it is able essentially to take ACDP 2 6 +4 6 the sting out of challenges and criticisms that FF+ 9 3 -6 4 +1 come from the opposition. In the 2004 election UCDP - 3 +3 3 campaign, for example, opposition parties PAC 5 3 -2 3 such as the DA and UDM, using campaign MF 0 1 +1 2 +1 strategies which target criticism of government AZAPO - 1 +1 2 +1 performance – particularly with regard to AEB - 1 +1 - -1 service delivery and response to HIV/AIDS – FA - 2 +2 - -2 largely failed, as the government had already Total seats 400 400 400 taken note of these issues prior to the election Total 6 12 +6 11 -1 (Schlemmer, 2004b: 7). Indeed, the ANC opposition appeared to have dealt with many of the issues parties in raised by opposition, and more, within its “a parliament better life for all” manifesto. Through placing Total 148 134 -14 121 -13 focus on the party’s achievements over the opposition past ten years, while also pledging that it will seats continue to do better, the ANC managed to Source: Table compiled from figures by the IEC, cover the salient issues; and opposition 1994, 1999, 2004 campaigning on the grounds of government failure to meet expectations in areas of service Many analysts predicted that the racial census delivery and job creation, was met with and of 1994 would, over time, come to be replaced counteracted by the “people’s contract to by policy and issue-based voting as race loses create work and fight poverty”’. its significance amongst the electorate. Moreover, as democracy matures in South Perhaps the more salient issue, therefore, has Africa, this would of course be accompanied been opposition failure to present manifestos by the emergence of strengthening opposition substantially different to that of the ruling parties challenging government power. The party. Parties take similar stances on many opposing argument to this, however, seriously major issues, such as macro-economic policy, questions the prospects of this in South Africa, with the ANC and DA both advocating - 10 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 promotion of economic growth and job ANC as their first choice of political party creation through investment (Herzenberg, (Schlemmer, 2004a). This group could clearly 2004:15). For Schrire, the major political therefore be open to alternatives. parties in South Africa do not vary greatly in ‘ideology’ (in terms of being left, centre or Opposition parties have hence largely been right on the political spectrum) but, rather, are criticised for failing to “transcend identity broadly ‘centrist’ (2001: 141). Absence of a politics” (Edigheji, 2004: 16), and their class-based politics in South Africa has re- election campaign strategies targeting emphasised, instead, political affiliation based minority communities have lent credence to on historical ties (Schrire, 2001:141). The this accusation. For some parties that have black majority continue to identify with the emerged out of the apartheid era, many are ANC, and the political opposition, rather than unavoidably tarred with the brush of racism. compete with the ANC for the African vote, This has arguably been the fate of the NNP, has turned to appealing to those groups outside and events following the 2004 election have of the ANC’s hold – largely the White, Indian seen the party formally disband. Despite its and Coloured communities. change in leadership since 1994 and the about-turn in its strategy to work in co- South Africa’s apartheid legacy, in operation with the ANC government, as combination with the boundaries of the opposed to against it, as the party that created dominant party system within which political and administered apartheid it was never likely parties operate, serves to highlight the to win over the black majority. Furthermore, continuing prevalence of racial identity in its ambiguous stance left its supporters and South African politics. The tendency, target groups in the white and coloured therefore, has been for party campaigns to communities uncertain of its policies and mirror racial identities as the opposition principles, and feeling that the party provides continue to seek support from South Africa’s no security or solid guarantees to its minority and, historically, more privileged constituencies4. communities. Furthermore, with the exception of white business, the ANC does not need the The manifestos of many of the smaller parties vote of the white minority to retain dominance appeal to too narrow and specific an interest (Giliomee, Myburgh & Schlemmer, 2001: group. The far right-white parties, such as the 167). Although parties such as the DA and Afrikaner Vryheidsfront Plus (VF/FF) or NNP may take a more ‘pro-business’ stance Afrikaner EenheidsBeweging (AEB), for than the ANC, and therefore seem more likely example, making demands for a separate to court the interests and favour of capital, Afrikaner nation, have found no real place for even this avenue remains closed to the themselves in the new South Africa, and both opposition as Southall points out that business the PAC and Azanian People’s Organisation has entered into agreement with the ANC as (AZAPO) have seen a decline in their support “only [they]…could both call on and contain base over the years since 1994. These majority support while also implementing a Africanist parties, rejecting a non-racial neoliberal program” (1999: 11-12). Hence, politics and advocating an extreme left while the years since 1994 have seen the viewpoint, have failed to posit a realistic and emergence of a wealthy black middle class, viable project for South Africa’s future that this group are the beneficiaries of the ANC’s would inspire the trust of any significant policies of affirmative action and black proportion of the electorate. The African economic empowerment. We are therefore yet Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), while it still to see the growth of an autonomous, and saw a marginal increase in votes in the 2004 indeed multiracial, grouping from within the election, and has retained all of its 6 seats in middle classes that would hold prospects for parliament, is appealing to a narrow interest the formation of an independent political force challenging the ruling party. This being said, however, polls conducted by the Helen 4 See the article by Lanegran, K. ‘South Africa’s Suzman Foundation/Mark Data have shown 1999 Election: Consolidating a Dominant Party that out of Africans with middle-income levels System’ for deeper analysis of voter perceptions (R 8000 per month) only 40 per cent hold the of opposition parties; campaign styles and strategies. - 11 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004

group and has made little dent on the political However, the past two elections have seen the landscape. party make little headway in this regard. In 1999, the DA made a major campaign faux- The IFP, the second largest opposition party, pas with its ‘fight back’ slogan - far too easily over the past ten years has succeeded in interpreted as ‘fight black’ (Lanegran, 1999: maintaining a sufficient amount of support to 94) ’. Indeed, its slogan for the 2004 campaign give it political weight in South Africa – of “South Africa deserves better” - while particularly in its traditional stronghold of attempting to suggest that all South Africans Kwazulu Natal. However, this support is ‘deserve better’ than the ANC has been able to gradually declining. In fact, one of the most muster over the past ten years – could interesting outcomes of the 2004 election was similarly be taken to hold connotations of the party’s loss of this highly contested South Africa deserving ‘better’ than a black province to the ANC. The ANC received government. Effects of such campaigns are 46.98 per cent of votes in Kwazulu Natal likely to have a detrimental impact on the compared to its 39.38 per cent in the 1999 black majority’s perception of the political provincial election, whereas the IFP per opposition. Unfortunately the party’s centage declined to 36.82 compared to 41.9 in predominantly white leadership only serves to 1999 (IEC, 2004). This has presented some reinforce this image. As Lanegran notes, The significant gains for the ANC government, as 1999 “aggressive ‘Fight Back’ message was it now holds all 9 provincial premierships. directed to racial minorities who felt This result perhaps serves to show a threatened by their country’s rapid changes in combination of changes taking place amongst general and affirmative action in particular” the electorate in the province, in the form of (1999: 93). the maturation of the electorate in the urban centres; and the growing concern of voters In 2004, therefore, the DA has had to work to with socio-economic issues rather than with rid itself of the image of being a white party. Zulu nationalism and the history of the Zulu However, while this time it approached the nation. For the IFP, the election result is a election under a banner which claimed to be reflection of the limitations of relying on working for the betterment of all South symbolism of ethnic identity to retain support. Africans, a still prominent feature of the campaign has been use of the “politics of fear” The DA continues to retain its position as the (Landsberg, 2004). A prominent feature of this main opposition, and emerged stronger from election campaign has been to raise in the this election with 12.37 per cent of the vote minds of voters the dangers of the ANC and 50 seats in Parliament, compared to 9.56 obtaining a two-thirds majority, and hence per cent and 38 seats in 1999. Since having the power to alter the constitution. A positioning itself as a major contender, the DA further tactic used by Tony Leon has been to has posed a threat to ANC authority – instil in South Africans the fear of their particularly in its strategy of raising democracy turning into a one-party state, with “uncomfortable issues and questions” over encroaching authoritarian tendencies and government decisions, attempting to detract worrying levels of centralised power should the electorate from ANC ‘successes’ by the ANC be re-elected to government bringing up issues of government (Edigheji, 2004: 17). accountability and corruption (Rapoo, 2004: 20). Although the DA has proven itself to be a This tactic of installing fear into the electorate largely white party, as many previous white has fuelled criticisms of the opposition failing supporters of the NNP have transferred their to formulate concrete policies on which to allegiance to it, it has also garnered support campaign and which would persuade the from sections of the wealthier Coloured electorate that they pose a viable alternative to electorate. The 2004 election campaign also the ANC. The DA also strongly criticised the saw the DA attempting to make inroads into government’s dealings with President Mugabe the black community. The party has in Zimbabwe during its campaign. While acknowledged that to increase its support base Mbeki’s stance on the Zimbabwean situation by any significant degree will require has been an issue of concern to many South attracting the votes of the African majority. Africans, it is unlikely to be a vote-winner - 12 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 amongst the black majority. Crucially, the preference have revealed that while the ANC weakness in opposition campaigning has been has secured its dominance by consensus its failure to appeal to black majority interests. through the ballot, the African vote for the Instead of the issue of an ANC two-thirds ANC is by no means set in stone. Whereas, in majority, rather it is socio-economic issues October 1994, 61 per cent of voters stated that such as the high unemployment rate, poverty they would vote for the ANC in a National and growing inequality that are uppermost in Government election, by October 2002 this the minds of the majority of black voters had decreased to 42%. Confining this survey (Schlemmer, 2004b: 7). Edigheji argues that to Black voters alone, 79 per cent expressed underlying the “one party state” campaign the intention to vote for the ANC in issue of the opposition is that minority parties September/October 1994. This decreased to 76 in SA want “an entitlement to votes, whether per cent in February/March 1999, and to 55 or not they identify with, and speak to, the per cent by September/October 2002 (Africa et wishes and aspirations of majority (sic) of al, 2003). The ruling party is therefore clearly voters” (2004:17). not insulated from loss of support. The figures cited earlier, reflecting voter scepticism of the In terms of the smaller opposition parties, they extent to which the poor actually benefit the continue to represent too narrow a policy most from government polices, lend credence agenda or target support group to appeal to or to this. The crux of the matter however, is that capture the vote of any significant number of the opposition has failed to present voters with the electorate. This can be said of parties such any viable or attractive alternatives to the as the ACDP; United Christian Democratic current government and, as such, the electorate Party (UCDP); Afrikaner VF/FF; (Indian) is continuing to vote along racial lines. The Minority Front (MF); and the IFP. In short, fear politics promulgated by sections of the “the electorate does not see current opposition opposition over South Africa declining into a parties as representing their interests” (Habib one party state is an insult to the intelligence & Taylor, 2001:215). In addition to this, their and ability of the electorate to make an growing number has led to increased independent choice that will guide their own fragmentation of opposition to the dominant future should they be presented with ANC in Parliament, and has largely negated alternatives. As Butler quite legitimately opportunities for any potential challenge to its suggests, “it may be the current absence of power. credible opposition parties reflecting the interests of the discontented, rather than Having outlined the nature of both ANC as unshakeable affiliation, that secures current dominant party, and the nature of political ANC control” (2003:9). Edigheji has gone so opposition that has taken shape to date, what far as to say that it is this situation “that will then can we say of its implications? give rise to a one party state, rather than Opposition party alignments and strategies; anything the ANC does” (2004: 18). voter behaviour and participation; and the extent and reach of dominant party’s political A point which is particularly relevant to power and hegemony present certain countries in the developing world - not least challenges to the consolidation of democracy South Africa - is that “democratic in South Africa over the next ten years. consolidation…is dependent on the government’s ability to address the widespread Challenges for the Second Decade of poverty and economic inequalities within the Democracy society” (Habib & Taylor, 2001: 210). The lack of serious policy alternatives from the One of the most significant aspects of the opposition goes some way to explaining the democracy debate is the behaviour of the continuous re-election of the ANC to power, electorate (and particularly in South Africa’s despite indications of dissatisfaction amongst case, the various racial segments of the its support base over government delivery. The electorate) to the dominant party system. A major challenge for opposition parties, crucial aspect with regard to this is that, therefore, is to begin appealing to the African despite the ANC’s electoral dominance, voter, and this will require a significant change surveys of voting intentions and party in the opposition’s strategy. As Schlemmer - 13 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 has argued, parties “will have to try to convey who voted - 76.73 per cent of registered voters the additional benefits that alternative policies - slightly less than 60% of the whole eligible could yield” (Schlemmer, 2004b:9). More population (IEC, 2004; Schlemmer, 2004b). importantly, however, he argues that such a Afrobarometer has also revealed increasing strategy cannot be administered through rallies numbers of people in their surveys expressing and campaigning in the immediate pre-election the intention not to vote (Africa et al, 2003). period. Rather, it “requires a more sustained While declining voter participation is a engagement with interest groups…and a common feature of maturing democracies, the demonstration of what a stronger constructive concern is that in South Africa it is opposition can offer” (ibid). As Habib and symptomatic of party dominance and, more Taylor quite concisely put it, “parties must not importantly, that it may become more only exist in a legal or organizational sense, pronounced over coming years. The worrying but they must also be mechanisms that enable connotations of these figures, is that in a representation and express the social interests political system in which the outcome of of significant constituencies in society” (2001: elections are a foregone conclusion, voters can 209). tend to think that there is no point in casting their vote. Given the lack of confidence voters A further challenge for opposition is to reverse appear to hold in available opposition parties, the demotivation and withdrawal from the some votes for the ANC may come from those democratic process of those sections of the voters who feel it is the only party likely to get population who do not identify with the ANC into power. – namely South Africa’s White, Indian and Coloured communities. One view would The two key issues of concern arising from the predict that, at best, this could amount to a identity politics and narrow policy more pronounced apathy and resignation over programmes of opposition within the forthcoming years. At worst, dissatisfied dominant party system, are therefore that they sentiments may take the form of outright both maintain the alienation and rejection of the principles of democracy and marginalisation of South Africa’s minority the values it seeks to instil. One such communities into exclusive racial political consequence, for example, could be that groupings; and act as a deterrent to the support extremist and separatist groups who do not of the African electorate, who continue to see feel a part of the new South Africa may begin opposition as unrepresentative of their to take a more organised form. Either way, interests. The tendency of some parties to rely marginalisation is likely to be compounded by on adverse criticism of the ANC in power, will both the continuation of racial politics under a only strengthen both the dominance of the dominant party system in which South ruling party, and its tendency to portray Africa’s minorities do not feel they are opposition as racist opponents of socio- represented; and the political ambiguity and economic transformation. This serves only to weakness of opposition to the dominant party “play into the hands” of the dominant party which, rather than increasing the influence of (see Giliome & Simkins, 1999: 12-13), which minority groups, is likely only to further their is able to convince its own supporters of the withdrawal. opposition’s desire to subvert the national project and reverse the gains of the black This is a trend that has already begun and majority. For the ruling party and its could be set to continue should there be no supporters “opposition is frequently identified significant shifts in political competition over with the creation of obstacles to delivery and the next decade. It should be said however that the protection of illegitimate special interests” analysis of this cannot be restricted to minority (Schrire, 2001: 147) communities alone, as South Africa’s three democratic elections have witnessed declining With regard to overcoming racial politics, voter turnout and indications of voters’ non- then, the challenges to maintaining and participation at large. Voter turnout decreased consolidating democracy similarly lie with from 89.30 per cent in 1999, to 76.73 per cent ruling party. As the ANC does not need the in the 2004 election (Kotze, 2004). This support of the white minority to retain amounts to approximately 15.8 million people dominance, it has displayed a tendency to - 14 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 abandon non-racialism and has instead placed (2001: 140). This can be seen most starkly in emphasis on its “liberation struggle heritage” the ANC’s response to the DA. In contrast to (Maloka, 2001: 235) in order to appeal to its the formation of various alliances between own supporters. Continued elevation of the major opposition parties and the dominant liberation struggle in the politics of the ruling ruling party, the DA has become known for its party may have a destabilising effect on more ‘robust’ and adversarial stance. This has democracy. The current political predicament created a considerable degree of animosity in Zimbabwe has demonstrated the volatility between the DA and ANC government in the of the racial issue within politics, and the 2004 election. If we concur with Myburgh’s threat to democracy that the failure to move interpretation that “for Mbeki the opposition fully beyond race can present. In Zimbabwe, were welcome to participate in the elections, threat to the power of the long standing but once the will of the people had been freely dominant party has seen the resurfacing of the expressed and the ANC returned to power, issue of racial identity and its manipulation by there should be unity in action, and the a political leadership determined to retain that minority should submit to the majority” power. Some commentators on South Africa (2004), then increasing intolerance of have therefore understandably warned of the opposition – in particular when opposition authoritarian and oppressive tendencies that takes a critical stance against the ruling party – can emerge from this type of unrivalled could well be a warning sign to look out for. dominance5. It is therefore necessary to look closely at the Of further significance to the dominant party forms of political strategy that have emerged system debate in South Africa are the under the dominant party system6. For some conflicting interpretations between the ruling parties, the limited scope available to the ANC and the political opposition over the role opposition has cast the politics of cooperation that opposition should play in the new with the ruling party in a more attractive light, democracy. Thus, while South Africa is and as having the potential to be the most formally a multi-party democracy with electorally lucrative option for opposition institutionalised political opposition, “the key parties. The strategy of the NNP has involved debates revolve around which interests should allying with the ANC, claiming that it will be represented by which party and how should best be able to represent the interests of its this opposition be expressed” (Schrire, 2001: supporters through cooperation with the ruling 141). South Africa’s political history of party, rather that through continuous ‘attacks’ discrimination against the black majority on its actions (Schrire, 2001: 142). However, renders this a delicate and controversial issue. the strategy has both spurred ongoing decline A prominent criticism has been the tendency in the NNP’s support base, while adding to the for the ANC leadership to display intolerance parliamentary strength of the ANC. Most have of criticism (both from opposition parties and argued that NNP leverage and influence within within its own ranks) and to view opposition the alliance has been largely negligible as enemies of the transformation project (Schrire, 2001: 143), and events since the 2004 (Myburgh, 2004). As Schrire has described, election have culminated in the effective while the ANC “recognizes the philosophical disbanding of the party, and its merger with justifications for an opposition, it harbours the ANC. serious reservations about the nature of opposition…Given its unqualified In equal contrast to the DA, has been the “co- commitment to ‘transformation’, it maintains optive opposition” strategy adopted by the that opposition based upon a rejection of IFP. This has provided the party with fundamental socio-economic change is not participation in government and policy legitimate…[and]…it does not accept the (Schrire, 2001: 142). On the other hand, this legitimacy of opposition parties that are based has largely benefited “party leaders upon the representation of minority interests” individually” (ibid). The lack of influence that

5 See, for example, Giliomee and Simkins 6 Schrire has identified and provides analysis of (1999:343 – 350). Their analysis emphasises the what he sees as “three broad opposition ‘dangers’ of dominant party rule and its potential strategies: robust, co-optive and co-operative” to suppress political competition. (2001:141) - 15 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 this form of politics has awarded the party at power by joining the dominant party. In the large, and the extent to which IFP supporters floor crossing of March-April 2003, NNP have benefited, is reflected in the party’s defections in the Western Cape saw the declining support since 1994 (see tables 1 & province handed over to the ANC, while in the 2). National Assembly, nine MPs from the UDM The strategies of both parties are an indication crossed over to the ANC (Myburgh, 2003: 34). of party desire to retain access to the channels In the recent floor crossing window from the 1 of power, rather than to retain party principles to 15 September this year, the ANC acquired or prioritise the concerns of supporters. 326 councillors. The only parties not left at a Indeed, the NNP’s brief fling with the DP in loss were the ID and DA, who still only gained the formation of the DA in 2000 (as the former 39 seats and 20 seats respectively (IEC, 2004). witnessed reams of its supporters fleeing to the The significance of these political re- DP in the 1999 election), only for it to enter alignments is that they entail a loss of into an alliance with the ANC in 2001, is but accountability to supporters and diminishing an example of this. Under ANC dominance, it competitiveness of the multi-party system. As could be argued that an ’if you can’t beat ’em, Myburgh describes, “There is little incentive join ’em’ mentality has taken root amongst for a defector to the ANC to represent the sections of the political opposition. This interests of his electorate once he has crossed political opportunism on the part of some over. From the moment a defector joins his parties - both the ruling ANC and opposition new party, he falls under its discipline…There (Habib & Nadvi, 2002: 333) - can be is no real mechanism by which aggrieved interpreted as symptomatic of the dominant voters can make such defectors to the ruling party system. As mounting an effective party answer for their actions either” (2003: challenge to the ruling party seems so far from 36). reach, parties instead “sacrifice political principle for short term electoral gain” (Habib Floor Crossing Results 2002 (Local & Taylor, 2002: 333). The ANC, possessing Government Level) : Movements to the ANC greater political leverage, is equally able to use Party No of this to its advantage. A recent controversy of Councillors this sort is the removal of the anti-defection Action Independent Peoples Party 1 clause from the Constitution. Legislation was African Christian Democratic 2 amended in 2002 to allow floor crossing at the Party local government level and in 2003 at the Alliance for the Community 1 national and provincial level. The floor Azanian People’s Organisation 1 crossing legislation is widely criticised as a Breedevallei Onafhanklik 1 Civic Alliansie/Alliance 1 deliberate ploy by the ANC to strengthen itself Democratic Alliance 51 as it allows councillors to cross the floor to Independents 6 another party without losing their seat, while Independent Civic Organisation of 1 also stipulating that councillors can only do so South Africa if at least 10 per cent of party members wish to Inkatha Freedom Party 7 cross. This has conveniently protected the Middelburg Residents 1 ANC from losing members to the opposition Organisation as there is unlikely to be as much as 10 per Pan Africanist Congress 10 People’s Forum 1 cent of the dominant party’s members wishing United Christian Democratic Party 3 to cross, while for smaller parties, the United Democratic Movement 16 legislation has “deprived [them] of a vital Verenigde Gemeenskap 1 shield” (Myburgh, 2003: 34). The enactment Organisasie of the floor-crossing legislation demonstrates Witzenberg Onafhanklike 1 how the ruling party is able to use its position Vereniging to consolidate further dominance. (See Ximoko Party 1 following tables) Zibambeleni Development 1 Organisation Total 107 At the same time, some opposition party Source: IEC, 2002 members have seen it as an opportunity for themselves as individuals to retain access to - 16 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004

Floor Crossing Results 2004 (National and able to hold government to account (Southall, Provincial Level): Movements to the ANC 2001). Given the present weakness of the Party No of Councillors opposition in South Africa, some would argue ACDP 4 that this cannot be readily envisaged. A key Alliance 2000+ 1 question in the current state of affairs will AZAPO 2 therefore be how we can safeguard Dabalorivhuwa Patriotic Front 1 DA 31 government accountability, as well a party’s Independents 6 accountability to its supporters more generally. IFP 25 What needs to be emphasised over the coming NNP 195 decade is that in a context in which the PAC 17 likelihood of displacing the dominant party is Simunye in Christ Organisation 1 so marginal, the equally crucial role of the Thembisa Concerned Residents 1 opposition of ensuring that the existing Association government remains accountable to the UCDP 7 UDM 45 electorate, becomes all the more important. Total 336 Unless the opposition changes its current Source: Table compiled from IEC, 2004 Floor strategies and works hard to regain credibility, Crossing Results however, its ability to fulfil this role could well be undermined. Under the dominant party system, this type of politics therefore presents certain challenges to The complex nature of South Africa’s political democracy in the longer-term. On the one development is such that any party failing to hand it has been argued that South Africa fulfil this role, inevitably lends further cannot afford a robust opposition due to its advantage and political weight to the dominant destabilising effects in such an ethnically and party. As discussed above, however, any racially fragmented society (Schrire, 2004: effective counterweight to party dominance is 144). Moreover, such a strategy coming from not going to come from parties opposing the parties still considered predominantly ‘white’ current government’s policies of affirmative has, and will, encourage the ruling party to action and black economic empowerment. increasingly play “the race card” (ibid), and Although the ANC’s macro-economic policy ”tempt the ANC into using its overwhelming of Growth Equity and Redistribution (GEAR) majority to dominate parliamentary politics” may continue to receive much criticism from (Nijzink, 2001: 67). On the other hand, the political left within the party’s own ranks, continuation of a feeble opposition – and the promotion of black economic indeed, ‘co-optive’ and ‘co-operative’ empowerment has afforded the ANC opposition (Schrire, 2004: 142), could result in significant influence amongst the African a dangerous amount of power in the hands of population. This will remain the case unless the ANC. The party’s increased parliamentary opposition parties also adopt policies that seek power risks a “shift of real authority away to redress South Africa’s racial inequalities. from the constitution (and constitutional Indeed, unlike other faltering democracies on structures) to the ruling party” (Myburgh, the continent, in which a growing educated 2003: 6); and its increased assurance of black middle classes has emerged as the main electoral dominance poses a significant threat source of opposition during the post- to government accountability and independence period, in South Africa, it is this responsiveness to the needs of its citizens. group that has been the prime beneficiary of government policy. For Giliomee and While it has been argued that “for a party to be Simkins, therefore, “a middle class which has termed opposition, it must envision and risen as a result of ruling party patronage does organise itself as an alternative governing not play any significant role in broadening and party” (Edigheji, 2004: 18), the role of strengthening democracy. It may, in fact, stifle opposition is not confined to being able to such a development” (1999: 3). realistically displace the ruling party. Rather, opposition must be a credible and legitimate voice in the polity whose views will be listened to (Friedman, 1999: 110) and which is

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Opposition From Within the struggle, the best prospects for healthy Dominant Party democracy and representative government now lie in a formal split within the Alliance It is clear that a recurring issue in the dominant itself (Habib & Taylor, 2001). They envisage party debate in South Africa is the the establishment of a labour-oriented party as safeguarding of democratic practice and presenting the only possibility for the accountability. Despite the ANC’s electoral formation of a significant opposition to the dominance, its supporters and contending ANC in South Africa (ibid). From their voices within the party itself have remained standpoint, “the alliance is undermining the divergent over party policies and the direction attempts of both COSATU and the SACP to frequently taken by a centralised leadership. achieve their [social-democratic] goals” The limitation of the benefits of government (Habib & Taylor, 2001: 221). The likelihood policies to a narrow stratum of the population of such a scenario coming to fruition, has generated resentment from the left. While however, is debatable. Suttner opposes Habib it is not the purpose of this article to detail the and Taylor’s suggestion, arguing that neither debate surrounding political-economy in South the SACP nor COSATU is likely to leave the Africa, it is a politically hot topic and brings to ANC, particularly given that numerous our attention a further issue of prominence in positions within the party have been filled by the debate over the future of South Africa’s individuals from the two organisations democracy - that ANC dominance presents (Suttner, 2004: 115). Moreover, in light of the equally impending challenges to those party’s composition, the ANC equally “fears members of the ANC and Tripartite Alliance the electoral consequences of a split” (ibid). who are in disagreement with the macro- economic policy direction of the Mbeki A further key issue is that the ANC’s move presidency. away from leftist policies toward the dominant neo-liberal orthodoxy advocated by the While the ruling party has an historical western liberal democracies, in fact, places alignment with labour, significant debate some self-inflicted constraints on the party. remains around the extent to which the While frequently interpreted as a reflection of political left actually retains meaningful the party’s weakening commitment to its influence within the alliance. This balance of liberation promises, the flip side is that in power is of concern as, given the weakness of terms of abuse of state power, the ANC is, to opposition parties in South Africa, internal an extent, kept in check (Schrire, 2001: 145- pluralism and debate within the alliance itself 146; Butler, 2003: 10). The government’s has come to be seen as having an extremely adoption of neo-liberalism has integrated crucial role to play in maintaining checks on South Africa into the world economy while government power and ensuring that seeking to reverse inequalities in wealth and democracy is not undermined by arbitrary and opportunity through affirmative action polices centralised decision-making. Government has (Habib & Nadvi, 2002: 336). As such, South received criticism for deploying the more Africa’s reliance on capital and foreign loyalist party members - known to be investment, as well as its leading role in the uncritical of decisions taken at the centre - to African Renaissance and as exemplar of the more prominent positions within state economic development and governance on the organs (Southall, 2001:17). Such actions have continent, places its democracy far too directly functioned as mechanisms to curb criticism in the global eye for government to risk from within. As a result, healthy debate within stepping out of line. the party is stifled, and critical voices have come to be portrayed by party leadership as Given the tenuous relationship that has ensued enemies of the movement (Southall, 2001: 17- as a result of economic policy between the 18). ANC and some of its followers, the party can neither afford to abuse the position and One opinion on the direction for South authority that has been conferred on it by the Africa’s democratic future, therefore, is that electorate, and hence fully risk losing their while the pact between labour and the ANC support; nor can it afford to deter investors and served its purpose during the years of political international actors by creating a climate of - 18 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 political instability – despite the fears representation and accountability within a generated by opposition parties about the competitive party system far greater. In light dangerous consequences of an ANC two-thirds of this, major challenges over the next decade majority. are likely to lie within the party and Tripartite Alliance. Proponents of left wing polices must Realistically, the chances of the left-wing retain sufficient influence to make their voices partners breaking from the ANC over the next heard; and rise above the temptation to choose decade appear unlikely. The pros of remaining the rewards offered in loyalty to the centre, with a party assured of electoral dominance over their commitment to the goals and somewhat out-weigh the opportunities implied principles of their organisation. For COSATU, in opposing it. Given both the SACP and Webster proposes that they adopt the role of “a COSATU’s long-standing ties with the ‘left pressure group’ inside the alliance organisation and the immensity of the pushing for redistributive policies” (2001: challenge of denting the hegemonic power of 271). The argument proposed earlier, the ruling party, the prospect of ‘going it regarding the vital importance of opposition alone’ is daunting. Rather, they “prefer access being regarded as a credible voice able to and influence to opposition and exclusion” ensure government accountability, without (Lodge, 2002: 155). A key factor is that the necessarily needing to be an electoral threat, COSATU leadership has suffered from ‘brain- should equally apply to internal voices, drain’, losing many of it strong leaders to the regardless of their alliance with the ANC. government during the transition to democracy Moreover, their value as a check on (Webster, 2001: 267). This has reduced the authoritarian tendencies and policy decisions more political orientation and strength that will, more that ever, be crucial. characterised the trade union movement during the 1980s (ibid). Afterthoughts

Having said this, the confrontation that has South Africa’s unique political history has arisen on occasion between the ANC and inevitably shaped its current politics and the adversarial voices within COSATU (Southall, formation of a dominant party system. Indeed, 2001: 281) has succeeded in keeping the it would not be overstating the case to argue government on their toes. Equally, the ANC that only a movement with the historic role, has, since coming to power, introduced an moral authority and hegemony possessed by array of labour legislation to protect workers. the ANC could hope to lead South Africa out While the party leadership’s intolerance of of the dire circumstances of pre 1994, to a new dissenting viewpoints is concerning, that democratic dispensation. The unifying effects sections of the alliance continue to openly of the ‘catch-all’ dominant party doubtlessly demonstrate their refusal to conform to the have helped to mediate conflicts and about turn in the party’s neo-liberal economic contributed to a peaceful and smooth policy since 1994, is a welcome indication of transition. While the consolidation of ANC the role that the left still has to play in domination has raised legitimate concerns over ensuring accountability. Additionally, much as the prospects of simultaneous democratic the argument has been put forward that South consolidation taking place successfully, there Africa cannot presently afford a robust and appear to be no serious threats to this at the adversarial opposition due to its political current stage. The argument that the dominant history and relative youth of its democracy, party system in South Africa is inherently ‘fragmentation’ of the ANC could also have undemocratic and is leading the nation into destabilising effects (Butler, 2003: 6). steady authoritarian decline requires reconsideration. Indeed, prospects for Nonetheless, these arguments do not perhaps democracy are far more positive. Emergence sufficiently make up for the political principles of a one party state in South Africa is a highly and goals being sacrificed by many on the unlikely scenario. Fear-mongering by some political left. The existence of a dominant opposition as to the ruling party’s desire to see party – let alone a dominant party with the a curbing of political freedom and a move extensive reach and hold boasted by the ANC towards a one-party state are merely tools to – renders the challenge of guaranteeing both win votes, and unsuccessfully at that. The - 19 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004 institutional checks and balances on the ruling electorate. Furthermore, tendencies toward party and its track record of recognition of political opportunism are equally undermining civil liberties; adherence to the terms of the their credibility. Given that opinion polls have constitution and the rule of law; existence of shown that many South Africans are open to an institutionalised political opposition; and alternatives, should they present themselves, the strengthening of institutions of democracy then the ANC’s electoral victory says more and governance since 1994 lend credence to about a feeble opposition and lack of credible this argument. alternatives than it does about undying support for the ANC. Moreover, the voter abstention These issues aside, however, there nonetheless and withdrawal amongst the electorate in remain significant challenges for those playing general, but by South Africa’s minority a prominent role in South Africa’s democracy. communities in particular - who do not feel Butler summarises the predicament fairly represented by the current government -reflect accurately when he states that “South Africa’s more than anything that an opposition able to fundamental political dilemma is that rejuvenate their participation is much needed. liberation movement domination is a necessary The co-optive and co-operative politics of condition for the entrenchment of democratic some parties have served only to fuel this practices and institutions, but it is also and at withdrawal. the same time a threat to them” (Butler, 2003: 12). One-party dominance becomes a threat to A key feature linked to this is that political democracy when the governing party is demography in South Africa continues to assured of electoral victory and as a result mirror racial divides. Efforts on the part of “sees less and less need to respond to public opposition parties are required to break away opinion” (Africa et al, 2003: 2). Issues of from narrow racial appeals and traditional government accountability hence reign strong constituencies, to begin appealing to a more in a dominant party system, and a key question “diverse set of constituencies” (Habib & is how such accountability can be ensured Taylor, 2001: 216). If the dominant party when the ruling party faces no threat of system is to be broken, then an opposition electoral defeat? The ability of the opposition party must emerge that, through policies to fulfil their role in holding government to appealing to the majority of South Africans, is account is undermined by its weak position able to split the loyalties of the black within the polity. This can partly be community to garner a proportion of the ANC understood as symptomatic of the dominant vote. A key challenge is therefore for South party system: the strength and leverage of Africans to be driven to vote on the basis of opposition is essentially limited by both the polices offered, rather than according to racial symbolic identity and the extensive political groups. Until political parties transcend this power of the dominant party. The ANC’s racial politics, then this will remain unlikely. control has most recently been demonstrated Moreover, neither will the effectiveness of the in effecting the controversial floor-crossing tendency exhibited by the ruling party to resort legislation, allowing the party to increase its to playing the race card in response to dominance in both Parliament and the opposition criticism, be thwarted. The ruling provincial legislatures. party must, however, also demonstrate greater tolerance of opposition. Racialised politics However, while the ruling party has frequently will equally only be overcome if the ANC is been able to use both its liberation heritage willing to let go of ‘race’ as a convenient and political hegemony to ‘delegitimate’ political tool to defend its actions and policies opposition parties, as Friedman has asserted, or to scapegoat a critical opposition. “conditions must exist in which the electorate is open to delegitimation” (1999: 101). There As the party of liberation, and only ten years currently exists no opposition presenting a in to South Africa’s democracy, the ability of viable alternative to the ANC, while the opposition parties to present themselves as a resignation of some parties to formulating viable alternative governing party to the ANC tactics that focus on criticism of government is perhaps restricted. The ANC has historically and, therefore, black majority policies, been a ‘catch-all’ party and commands a undermines their legitimacy in the eyes of the sustained hegemony which is difficult to rival. - 20 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004

However, it is precisely under these on the current government’s deviation from its circumstances that the ability of opposition pledge to serve the majority. parties to keep a check on the governing party’s power and hold the party accountable Nonetheless, if we are to look out for warning becomes all the more crucial. When an signs of the undemocratic tendencies that have opposition lacks credibility amongst the been attached to dominant party systems, then electorate, its ability to fulfil its accountability the watchdog role will be a pivotal one. Those function is undermined. concerned to see the successful consolidation of democracy in South Africa over the next ten Within the ruling party itself, maintenance of years will heed well to be vigilant of ANC sufficient political weight of those sections intolerance – on the part of both the current positing a more critical stance of centralised President and his successor, whoever that may decisions will also be crucial. The central be. The overwhelming political power of leadership cracks the whip within the party South Africa’s dominant party and the risks and the Tripartite Alliance, and far too easily this poses to both the competitiveness of the reduces internal critics to self-seeking multi-party system and authority of the radicalists and disruptors of the national constitution should not be underestimated. A project. If the ANC’s left-wing partners key task for South Africa’s second decade of choose to remain in the alliance, then the democracy will therefore be careful and greatest challenge for them will be to continue ongoing monitoring of government actions by to pressure the government to hear their views all. In short, the institutionalised means by and act upon them. This of course requires a which power has been conferred on the ANC, co-operative and tolerant ANC leadership. It is should not lead to complacency as to the party business that posses greater leverage over the heeding unquestionably to democratic ruling party, rather than COSATU and the methods of rule. This being said, however, SACP. The left’s influence over government many problems also lie in the weakness of policies will therefore need to be significant, South Africa’s opposition, who will need to and they must prove themselves a force to be alter their strategies and present themselves as reckoned with. As has been argued, however, credible players within the polity, whether or the global environment and neo-liberal policy not they can realistically displace the ANC. direction which the ANC has chosen to embrace, does simultaneously place certain References limitations on state power which can be Africa, C., Mattes, R., Herzenberg, C. and beneficial to ward off the undemocratic Banda, L. 2003 ‘Political Party Support in South tendencies often associated with dominant Africa: Trends Since 1994’, Afrobarometer party systems. Briefing Paper, no.6

Challenges for South Africa’s second decade Alence, R. 2004. ‘A Decade of South African of democracy therefore remain numerous. The Democracy’, paper presented at the Electoral immensity of these challenges is greater due to Institute of Southern Africa, Johannesburg, 6 the long-standing racial cleavages and skewed May 2004. distribution of wealth amongst the population. However, it is important to note that, unlike Arian, A. and Barnes, S.H. 1974, ‘The Dominant some African states, South African civil Party System: A Neglected Model of democratic society is active, well organised and Stability’, The Journal of Politics, 36 (3) pp. historically a politically charged society. 592-614

Unions and civic-based organisations have not Baregu, M. 2004 ‘From liberation movements to failed to stand up and make their voices heard ruling parties in southern Africa’ in Landsberg, – indeed, given the weakness of the political C and Mackay, S. (eds), Southern Africa Post- opposition in South Africa, the role of civil Apartheid? The Search for Democratic society in holding government to account is all Governance, IDASA, Cape Town the more important. Of equal significance is that the ANC’s traditional support base is a Booysen, S. 2004. ‘Unfolding Trends in group with high expectations. The promises of Opposition Politics Over the Last Ten Years in both social and economic equality implicit in South Africa’, presentation given as part of the freedom from apartheid rule place limitations - 21 - EISA OCCASIONAL PAPER NUMBER 25, OCTOBER 2004

Democracy Seminar Series at the Electoral Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Institute of Southern Africa, April 1st 2004 Provincial Election Results 2004, KwaZulu Natal, www.elections.org.za Butler, A. 2003. ‘South Africa’s Political Futures’, University of Cape Town (mimeo) Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Media Release: Floor Crossing Period for Municipal Daniel, J. 2004. ‘The South African Elections of Councillors, 17 September, 2004. 1994, 1999 and 2004: The (Non) Issues Then and Now’, Election Synopsis 1 (1), Centre for IDASA (Institute for Democracy in South Policy Studies, Johannesburg Africa), 1999, post-election survey conducted by Market and Opinion Surveys (Ltd) of a random Edigheji, O. 2004. ‘Fear versus freedom: sample during August and September 1994. cited minority parties and the ANC’, Election in Lanegran, K. 1999. ‘South Africa’s 1999 Synopsis, 1 (2) Election: Consolidating a Dominant Party System’, Africa Today, p.85. EISA, South African National Election Results 1994, 1999, www.eisa.org.za Kotze, D. 2004. ‘Post-Election Phase: Election Results and Post-Election Review’, Election Faull, J. 2004. ‘What is a manifesto and what Update 2004 South Africa no 8, 3 May 2004, does it mean?’ Election Synopsis 1 (3), Centre EISA, Johannesburg for Policy Studies, Johannesburg Landsberg, C. 2004. Presentation given as part of Friedman, S. 1999. ‘No Easy Stroll to EISA Seminar ‘Americanization of the Political Dominance: Party Dominance, Opposition and Campaign in South Africa’ Democracy Seminar, Civil Society in South Africa’ in Giliomee, H 18th March 2004, EISA, Johannesburg and Simkins, C. (eds), The Awkward Embrace; One Party-Domination and Democracy, Lanegran, K. 2000. ‘South Africa’s 1999 Tafelberg, Cape Town Election: Consolidating a Dominant Party System’, Africa Today, 48 (2) pp.81-102 Giliomee, H and Simkins, C. (eds), 1999. The Awkward Embrace; One Party-Domination and Lodge, T. 2002. Politics in South Africa: From Democracy, Tafelberg, Cape Town Mandela to Mbeki. David Philip, Cape Town.

Giliomee, H., Myburgh, J. and Schlemmer, L. Louw, P. E. 2000. ‘South Africa’s Second Post- 2001. ‘Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties Apartheid Elections: A Reaffirmation of Racial and Minorities in South Africa’, in Southall, R. Politics but a Loosening of Ethnic Bonds’, (ed) Democratization, Special Issue: Opposition Australian Journal of International Affairs, 54 and Democracy in South Africa, 8 (1) (2), pp. 217-238

Habib, A. and Taylor, R. 2001. ‘Political Matlosa, K. and Karume, S. 2004. ‘Ten years of Alliances and Parliamentary Opposition in Post- Democracy and the Dominant Party System in Apartheid South Africa’ in Southall, R. (ed) South Africa’, Election Update 2004: South Democratization, Special Issue: Opposition and Africa, no 5, 30 March, EISA Democracy in South Africa, 8 (1) Myburgh, J. 2003. ‘Floor crossing adds new Habib, A. and Nadvi, L. 2002. ‘Party muscle to ANC’, Focus 30, June 2003, Helen Disintegration Re-alignments in Post-Apartheid Suzman Foundation, Johannesburg. South Africa’, Review of African Political Economy, 92, pp. 331-338 Myburgh, J. 2004. ‘Ideological battle over meaning of democracy’, Focus 34, June 2004, Herzenberg, C. 2004. ‘Party support in South Helen Suzman Foundation, Johannesburg. Africa’s third democratic election: set in stone or up for grabs’, Election Synopsis 1 (3) Nijzink, L. 2001. ‘Opposition in the New South African Parliament’ in Southall, R. (ed) Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), Democratization, Special Issue: Opposition and National Election Results 2004, Democracy in South Africa, 8 (1) www.elections.org.za Rapoo, T. 2004. ‘Election 2004: party campaign strategies and tactics’, Election Synopsis 1 (3)

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Reddy, T. ‘The Dominant Party and Democratic Democratization, Special Issue: Opposition and Consolidation: South Africa’s ANC and India’s Democracy in South Africa, 8 (1) Congress Party’ Compared’, Seminar paper presented at the University of Cape Town, 23rd Southall, R. 1999. ‘South Africa 1999: The ANC April, 2002. and Democratic Consolidation’, Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 27 (2) pp.9-16 Schlemmer, L. 1999. ‘Democracy or Democratic Hegemony: The Future of Political Pluralism in Southall, R. 2001. ‘Opposition in South Africa: South Africa’ in Giliomee, H and Simkins, C. Issues and Problems’ in Southall, R. (ed) (eds), The Awkward Embrace; One Party- Democratization, Special Issue: Opposition and Domination and Democracy, Tafelberg, Cape Democracy in South Africa, 8 (1)

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Schlemmer. L. 2004b. ‘Whatever happened to Governance, IDASA, Cape Town the opposition?’ Focus 34, June 2004, Helen Webster, E. 2001. ‘the Alliance under Stress: Suzman Foundation, Johannesburg. Governing in a Globalizing World’ in Southall, R. (ed) Democratization, Special Issue: Schrire, R. 2001. ‘The Realities of Opposition in Opposition and Democracy in South Africa, 8 (1) South Africa: Legitimacy, Strategies and Consequences’ in Southall, R. (ed)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Heidi Brooks is a Research Assistant in the Research Publications and Information Department at EISA.

THE EISA M ISSION STATEM ENT To strengthen electoral processes, democratic governance, human rights and democratic values through research, capacity building, advocacy and other strategically targeted interventions.

ABOUT EISA EISA is a not-for-profit and non-partisan non-governmental organisation which was established in 1996. Its core business is to provide technical assistance for capacity building of relevant government departments, electoral management bodies, political parties and civil society organisations operating in the democracy and governance field throughout the SADC region and beyond. Inspired by the various positive developments towards democratic governance in Africa as a whole and the SADC region in particular since the early 1990s, EISA aims to advance democratic values, practices and enhance the credibility of electoral processes. The ultimate goal is to assist countries in Africa and the SADC region to nurture and consolidate democratic governance. SADC countries have received enormous technical assistance and advice from EISA in building solid institutional foundations for democracy. This includes electoral system reforms; election monitoring and observation; constructive conflict management; strengthening of parliament and other democratic institutions; strengthening of political parties; capacity building for civil society organisations; deepening democratic local governance; and enhancing the institutional capacity of the election management bodies. EISA is currently the secretariat of the Electoral Commissions Forum (ECF) composed of electoral commissions in the SADC region and established in 1998. EISA is also the secretariat of the SADC Election Support Network (ESN) comprising election-related civil society organisations established in 1997.

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EISA OCCASIONAL PAPERS CODE TITLE OP 1 M unicipal Elections in 1999, P. Roome, 1999 OP 2 An Overview of Local Government: M unicipal Demarcation Act 27 of 1998, R. Cameron, 1999 OP 3 An Analysis of the Legal Framework for Elections, Lisa Thornton, 1998 OP 4 Voter Registration & Demarcation in Local Government, B. Gerber , 1998 OP 5 South African Electoral Commission: The Old and the New, Glenda Fick, 1998 OP 6 An Analysis of the Constitutional and Legal Framework For Elections in the Local Government Sphere, D. Craythorne OP 7 Developmental Local Government and Local Economic Development, F. Khan, 1998 OP 8 Techniques of Public Participation in Local Government, Doreen Atkinson, 1997 OP 9 Issues of Representation in Local Government, Doreen Atkinson, 1997 OP 10 Local Government: A Review of Selected Legislation, Glenda Fick, 2001 OP 11 Conflict M anagement Programme Report: South Africa Local Government Election, August-December 2000, EISA AND IEC OP 12 Survey of Electoral Systems and Reform Imperatives in the SADC Region, Khabele M atlosa, 2003 OP 13 Impact of Democracy on Public Participation in the SADC Region, Claude Kabemba, 2003 OP 14 The OAU, NEPAD and the Promotion of Good Governance in Africa, John Akopari, 2003 OP 15 Democratic Consolidation and Political Parties in Lesotho, W ole Olaleye ,ibid) 2003 OP 16 Party Systems in the SADC Region: In Defence of the Dominant Party System, Shumbana Karume, 2004 OP 17 Interrogating Challenges for Intra-Party Democracy in Southern Africa, Khabele M atlosa, 2004 OP 18 Political Parties and Governance in Zimbabwe, W ole Olaleye, 2004

OP 19 Ethnic Conflict in the Horn of Africa, Victor Shale, 2004 OP 20 Impact of HIV/AIDS on Electoral Processes in Southern Africa, Kondwani Chirambo, 2004 OP 21 Decentralisation, Development and Conflict: Challenges Awaiting Local Authorities in Lesotho, Victor Reatile Shale, 2004 OP 22 Democratisation, Dominant Parties, and W eak Opposition: The Southern AfricanProject, Chris Landsberg, 2004 OP 23 Election M onitoring and Observation in Nigeria and South Africa: A Decade Review, Adewale Banjo, 2004 OP 24 Mauritius Electoral Reform Process, L. Amédée Darga, 2004 To order or for a full list of list publications contact publications@ eisa.org.za

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