Document of The Worid Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Public Disclosure Authorized ReportNo. 4873

PROJECT CO-MPLETION REPORT Public Disclosure Authorized

FEDERAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE

FIRST 141GHWAY PROJECT - (CREDIT 852-COM) Public Disclosure Authorized December 30, 1983

Transportation Division 1 Eastern Africa Projects Public Disclosure Authorized I This document bos a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfomance of their offielal duties. Ib contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorizntion. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

FEDERAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS First Highway Project - (Credit 852-CON)

Table of Contents

Page No.

Preface ...... * ...... i Basic Data Sheet...... 0.1a@z*.v0-...*v*0* ii Highlights ...... iv

I. Introduction ......

II. Project Preparation,Appraisal and Negotiations...... 2

- Identification and Preparation ...... 2 - Negotiations3...... *. *.. .O ... *.. *...... *. 3

III. Project Implemutation and Cost ...... 4

- General 4 - Changesin the Project ...... 4 - Road Construction ...... O 5 - Three-YearRoad Improvement and Maintenance Program 5 - Wquipment *...... 76...... - Workshops ...... 7 - Soils Laboratory 7 - Technical Assistance and Training , 7 -Fellowships 8 SFtudie s ...... 8 ost of the Project ...... - Disbursements ...... O...... 9 - Performance of Consultants and Contractors *...... 10

IV. Performance of the Government ...... 9 *9..* ...... 11

V. Institution Building ...... *...*.....*...... *....**.... 11

VI. Economic Re-evaluation*..* * * *** ** * * * 9999***9*99 ...... 12

- Construction of Nioumakele Road ...... 12 - Road Improvement Program . * * * * * ...... * . 12 - Maintenance Prograu of Paved Road ...... 13

VII. Role. of IDA ...... 13

VIII. Conclusions and Lessons Learned ...... O-...... 14 BESTCOPY AVAILABLE This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Table of Contents (cont'd)

Tables

Table 1 - Cost Estimates at Appraisal Table 2 - Financial Plan for the Project Table 3 - Estimated Project Costs Table 4 - Quantities and Costs per Type of Operation Table 5 - Disbursements by Category Table 6 - Schedule of Disbursements

oayB. i

Comoroe - First Highway Project (IBRD 13414) Comoros - First Highway Project (IBRD 13415) PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT

FEDERAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS

First Highway Project - (Credit 852-COM)

PREFACE

The First Highway Project was also the first Bank Group operation in the Comoros, a country which became independentin 1975, a member of ttie Bank in December 1976 and of 'DA a year later. The project was identified in March 1977 and appraised in October of that year after it was prepared under a PPF of US$80,000 which was made available to the Government. The US$5.0 million credit was approved by the Board on October 5, 1978 and became effective in January 1979. There was also a US$4.5 million parallel financing by the African DevelopmentFund (AfDF) for the construction component of the project and a US$1.0 million cofinancing from the OPEC Fund for procurement of equipment. Other sources, not part of the project cofinancing scheme, but with contributionsrelevant to the implementation of the three-year road improvement and maintenance program were the Kuwait Fund with US$2.0 million and European Development Fund with US$1.0 million, both for equipment procurement. This financing arrangement proved, however, less satisfactorythan expected and caused delay in starting project implementation(para. 3.06). In the course of project implementationthe European Economic Community approved US$0.7 million equivalent under Special Action Credit when the Kuwait Fund declined to finance management for the workshops and shop equipment (para. 2.08).

A US$6.3 million IDA Credit for a Second Highway Project was approved in October 1981; the Credit became effective in August 1982. The Project basically continues efforts started under the first one in improving road maintenanceoperations and in strengtheningthe country's roads organization. The Project CompletionReport (PCR) was prepared by the Eastern Africa Regional Office. In accordancewith the revised procedures for project performance audit reporting, the PCR was read by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) although it is not proposed to undertake an audit of the project by OED staff. The PCR was sent to the Borrower for comments;however, none were received. - ii -

CONOROS FIRST HIGHWAYPROJECT (Credit 852-COM)

PROJECT COV2LETION REPORT

Basic Data Sheet

Appraisal Actual as % estimate Actual of Appraisal Item Project Cost (US$ million) 11.061/ 11.801/ 106.7 Credit Amount 5.0 5.0 - Date Board Approval 10/5/78 10/5/78 Date of Effectiveness 1/15/79 1/29/79 Date Physical Completion 7/31/82 12/31/82 Closing Date 12/31/82 12/31/82 Economic Rate of Return (%) Construction Component 8-12 about same 100 Road Improvement/ Maintenance 12-34 n.a. rn.a. Institutional Performance mediocre

CUMULATIVEDISBURSEMENTS FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 Appraisal Estimate (US$ million) 1.55. 3.1 4.2 5.0 - Actual (US$ million) 1.18 3.5 4.6 4.9 5.0 Actual as % of Estimate 76 113 109 98 100 Date of Final Disbursement: February 1983

1/ Excluding Kuwait Fund and EDF contributions but including EEC Special Action Fund contributions.

MISSION DATA. Speciali- Perfor- No. of Man-days zations mance Types of Mission Date2 /Persons in Field Represented Rating Trend Problems

Preparation 3/77 Appraisal 10/77 Supervision 1 3/28/79 1 5 EC 1 2 Supervision 2 7/20/79 1 4 E 3 2 F Supervision 3 3/21/80 2 4 B 1 1 F Supervision 4 7/18/80 1 14 E 2 2 F Supervision 5 1/29/81 1 5 E 1 2 F,O Supervision 6 12/16/81 1 7 EC 2 2 F Supervision 7 12/23/82 1 8 E 2 2 F,N

2 Report dates of supervision missions. - iii -

Other Project Data:

Borrower: Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros

Executing Agency: Directorateof Equipment and Improvement of Territory, (DEIT)

Fiscal Year: January 1 - December 31

Name of Currency: (CF)

Currency Exchange Rates: at appraisal: US$1.0 = CF 240 at end 1979: US$1.0 = CF 210 1980: US$1.0 - CF 227 1981: US$1.0 - CF 287 Average used in consultants'Final Report: US$1.0 5 CF235 - iv -

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

FEDERALISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS

First Highway Project - (Credit 852-COM)

HIGHLIGHTS

The project consisted of three major components: (a) construction of a 20.4 km road on Anjouan island, financed in parallel by the AfDF; (b) the implementationof a three-year road improvement program; and (c) studies.

The constructionpart was satisfactorilycompleted by a French contractor within appraisal cost estimates but with about six months delay due to heavy rains and shortage of imported materials and fuel (para. 3.05).

Out of the four studies originally Included in the Project, three were not carried out: the pre-investmentstudy in the Nioumakele area was deleted when it was included in an IDA-financedagricultural project; a detailed engineering study of a road was deleted when the Saudi Fund decided to finance the subject road without waiting for the outcome of the study; and another detailed engineering study was deleted when the feasibility study, the only study carried out of the original four, showed the improvement of the subject road not to be economicallyjustified (para. 3.03).

The main objective of the project was the implementationof the three-year road maintenance program; it was expected to improve substantially the condition of the road network and with technical assistaniceand training provided by expatriate consultants,it was expected to create necessary institutionbuilding as well. These goals were only partly achieved due to the following reasons:

(a) a delay of 18 months before the brigades which were to carry out the three-year program became fully operational,mainly due to setting up an adequate Government organization for roads (para. 3.07);

(b) Government's inability to collect taxes and duties which were supposed to feed a re-establishedRoad Fund; this in turn led to a continuous shortage of loc:alfunds for payments of the brigade crews (para. 3.09);

(c) even thioughIDA subsequentlyagreed to finance part of the local wages, the brigade operations came to a virtual standstill when the IDA Credit was committed about a year before the Closing Date, and when only 40% of equipment was operative; (paras. 3.09, 3.10); and -v-

(d) shortage of qualified local counterpartswith adequate education to be trained by the consultants (para. 3.16).

The above developments resulted in the three-year program being greatly reduced and the momentum gained during its implementationbeing partly lost before the brigades became operational again in January 1983 under the Second Highway Project.

Consequently,it could be concluded that except for the construction part, the project was only partially successful. As to the economic re-evaluationof the project components, sufficient data were not available to present a meaningful comparison between estimated and actual economic benefits for the road improvement and maintenance program (paras. 6.04 and 6.07).

A lesson to be learned from this project is that when its implementation is fully dependent on timely ordering and delivery of equipment to be financed from other sources, an appropriate co-financing agreement with such external aid agencies should be arranged prior to the effectivenessof the Credit (para. 7.02). Also it may be too optimiltic, in cases like the Comoros where project entities are being reorganisedand built up from scratch that this would be accomplished early enough for the road program to be successfully implemented in such a short period as three years. In retrospect either much more lead time should have been assumed for establishingDEIT (later GDPW) and training of its staff or that other arrangement --e.g., by contract-- should have been arranged for implementing the bulk of the road maintenance program while DEIT was being established. - 1-

PROJECTCOMPLETION REPORT

FEDERAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS

FIRST HIGHWAYPROJECT - (CREDIT 852-COM)

I.*ITDUCTION

1.01 The Comoros archipelago consists of four islands, three of which form the Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros, namely, , Anjouan and Moheli; the fourth islaad, , is still under French rule. At appraisal in 1977, the Republic's population was estimated to be about 370,000 but a more recent data for 1981 present a figure of 364,000.

1.02 The country became independent in 1975, a member of the Bank in December 1976 and of IDA a year later. A Bank mission surveyed the Comoros' economy in December 1976. It reviewed a 1978-82 Interim Investment Plan prepared by the Government and agreed that agriculture and improvement of transport infrastructurewere crucial to the country's development and should be given high priority.

1.03 The transportationsystem of Comoros is fairly simple. Two small ports accommodating400 ton and 500 ton coastal vessels on Grande Comore and Anjouan, one internationalairport on Grande Comore, two domestic airports on each of the other islands, and about 720 km of rosds form the basic transport infrastructure. At appraisal in 1977, it was estimated that there were some 1,650 vehicles1/ in the country, about 1,400 of them on Grande Comore where 410 km of roads were located. On Anjouan there was a 187-km road system accommodating some 210 vehicles, and on Moheli some 40 vehicles sharing a 120-km road system. The terrain being rugged and volcanic, more than half of the roads on Grande Comore and Anjouan were paved to protect them against heavy rains; on Moheii only 30 km were paved.

1.04 The mission initially identified a small road construction project, the scope of which was later expanded when co-financing possibilitiesemerged. IDA provided US$80,000 to the Government in the form of a Project Preparation Facility (PPF) to finar.ceproject preparation carried out by a French consulting firm, which worked out details for a three-year road improvement and maintenance project. In addition, UNDP was approached and agreed to finance the detailed engineeringstudy required for the constructioncomponent. The road project as developed was Lo become the first Bank Group operation in the country. It has been followed in August 1982 by a Second Highway Project (Credit 1188-COM, US$6.3 million). Whereas the country's needs are many, financial and administrative constraints will continue to exist for years to come. In view thereof, in the first road project much emphasis was made an initiating instituti.on building, which has continued and expanded under tne Second H-ighway Project.

1/ The consultants estimated the number to be 3,224 in 1981, or about double the 1977 appraisal estimate. -2-

II. PROJECT PREPARATION, APPRAISAL AND NEGOTIATIONS

Identificationand Preparation

2.01 The unclassifiedroad network supposed to be under scheduled maintenance comprised at appraisal 340 km of paved roads ane about 380 km of dry-weatherearth roads; the .-st were non-maintainedtracks. The task of an initial transport mission in March 1977 was to identify a road project which would include some constructionand upgrading, improvementof road maintenanceoperations and mechanical workshops and institution building through technical assistance, training and studies.

2.02 Because of the country's low per capita income and level of development,the project would have to be an IDA project. This, in turn, would have set limitationson the size of the project, if cofinancingwere not to be found. The search, however, was successfulwhen the AfDF and the OPEC Special Fund expressed willingness to participatein financing of a project identifiedand prepared by IDA through its PPW. This made it possible to prepare a project more than double the size of what would have been possible had IDA been the sole financing source.

2.03 The project as eventually developed had as its main objectives to assist in defining and strengtheningthe institutionsresponsible for the road network; to establish and implementa three-year road improvementand maintenance program, and to make a modest start in expanding the main road network. In addition, the project was to finance the preparation,through studies, of a subsequent highway project and an integrated rural development project.

2.04 To meet the above objectives,a project was prepared that included the components shown in detail in Table 1 and summarized below:

Cost in US million equivalent Local Foreign Total A. Road Construct.on including supervision 0.54 2.84 3.38

B. Road Improvement 0.26 0.74 1.00

C. Road Maintenance 0.17 2.20 2.37

D. Workshops 0.01 0.19 0.20

E. Soils Laboratory Equipment - 0.04 0.04 F. TechnicalAssistance includingUS$80,000 PPF 0.11 0.95 1.06

G. Fellowships - 0.02 0.02

H. Studies 0.09 0.46 0.55

Sub-totals A - H 1.18 7.44 8.62 Contingencies 0.34 2.10 2.44 Grand Total I 4S 9.54 11.06

The above project was appraised in COctober1977. -3-

Negotiations

2.05 After AfDB and the OPEC Fund had confirmed their intention to contribute to the project, the IDA credit was negotiated in August 1978 on the basis of the financing scheme shown in detail in Table 2 snd summarized below:

(US$ million) Local Foreign Total AfDF 0.72 3.78 4.50

OPEC Fund - 1.00 1.00

IDA 0.24 4.76 5.00

Government 0.56 - 0.56

Total 1.52 9.54 11.06 -_-M_O

Additional financingwere to be provided by the Kuwait Fund (US$2.0 million) for road maintenance equipment and workshop managers, and the European Development Fund (EDF) (US$1.0million) for equipment. However, procurement of this equipment was not part of the project and was not included in its cost estimates, even though it was necessary for the implementationof the IDA-financedproject.

2.06 During negotiations,agreements were reached on the following major points:

(a) a road classificationsystem would be introduced before the end of 1978, and annual traffic counts on major roads would be initiated in 1979;

(b) an 8-ton axle load limitation would be enforced;

(c) a vehicle registrationsystem would be re-establishedby the end of 1979;

(d) a Road Fund would be re-establishedby the end of 1978; and

(e) consultantswould be engaged for technical assistance, training and studies.

2.07 Effectiveness of the IDA Credit was made conditionalupon notificationby the OPEC Special Fund that all conditions precedent to disbursementof their loan were fulfilled. This caused a delay of over three months before the VS$5 million IDA Credit 852-COM, approved by the Board on October 5, 1978, becameeffective. The Credit became effective on January 29, 1979. - 4-

2.08 However, shortly thereafter it became apparent that expected financing of workshop e.quipment and managers to reinforce the Government by the Kuwait Fund (outside the project) would not materialize, limiting the use of the US$2 million Kuwait Fund loan to the procurement of road maintenance equipment only. In view of this, the Government successfully approached the EEC for financing of technical assistance, equipment and materials for workshop improvements. In August 1979 it received a US$700,000 equivalent from the EEC Special Action Credit which was administeredby IDA.

2.09 The Ministry of Equipment, Improvementof Territory and Quality of Life (MEITQL) was renamed to Ministry of Equipment and Environment (MEE) shortly after the Credit became effective. ME was to be responsible for the overall project execution, through the Directorate of Equipment and Improvement of Territory (DEIT). The road maintenance division within DEIT would be responsible for execution of road improvement and maintenance by force account and for repair and maintenance of equipment. The technical assistance team, required to be retained as a condition of the Credit agreement, was to operate in an advisory capacity within DEIT; its team leader was to be responsible to DEIT for supervising the implementationof the three-year road maintenance and improvementprogram.

1II. PROJECT IPLEMNRT&TIONAND COST

General

3.01 The project was completed by December 31, 1981. However, shortage of local funds and serious delays in ordering and deliveries of equipment financed by others, outside the project, caused actual achievementsof the three-year road improvementand maintenance program to be only about half of what was expected at appraisal. The only project component completed as envisaged was the constructionof the 20.4 km Nioumakele road on Anjouan island which had parallel financing from AfDF, (para. 3.05). Given tlhedifficult manpower constraints the institution-buildingobjective of the project was reasonably well attained.

Changes in the Project

3.02 A major change in the project and its schedule of disbursements (Table 4) resulted from a subsequent IDA agreement to finance from the proceeds of the Credit part of the cost of wages for some 170 crew members of the four mechanized rvod upgrading and maintenance brigades (para. 3.09).

3.03 Another change resulted from the decision to delete three of the four studies initially intended to be financed from the Credit. One deletion was the pre-investmentstudy for an integrated rural development project in the Nioumakele peninsula area whichi was transferred to an IDA agricultural Droject. The second deletion waB the detailed engineering study of the K4iringoni-Nioumachauaroad on Moheli after tne feasibility study showed that this project was not justified. The third deletion was the detailed engineering of the -{oani-Miringoniroad, also on -5-

Moheli island, when the Saudi Fund decided to finance the constructionof that road without waiting for the outcome of the IDA-financedstudy.

3.04 The above project changes are reflected in Table 3, which compares appraisal estimates and actual cost of the project, and Table 5, which shows estimated, amended, and actual disbursementsby categories.

Road Construction

3.05 Constructionof the Nioumakele road (20.4 km) was financed in parallel by the AfDF. A French consultants was retained for supervision of the works, and AfDF sent its own supervisionmissions. After international competitive bidding, the contract was awarded to contractor SNTP (). Works started in September 1979 and were satisfactorilycompleted by April 1981, exceeding the agreed 12 months constructionperiod by about 6 months because of heavy rains and occasional shortages of imported materials and fuel. Final cost was US$4.22 million plus US$0.20 million for supervision by consultants,or US$4.42 million in total compared with the US4.5 million appraisal estimate (including contii'gencies).

Three-Year Road Improvement and Maintenance Program

3.06 The project provided for the upgrading to all-weather standards of some 120 km of tracks, the resealing of about 195 km of paved roads, and the routine maintenance of about 250 km per annum of the country's 400 km naved road network. This work was to be accomplishedin a three-year period by four force-accountmechanized brigades: one, for upgrading of existing tracks, two patching brigades for repairs, and one bitumen resealing brigade. The latter brigades would as part of the project be partly equipped by OPEC, and partly by IDA which in addition was to finance spare parts, fuel, imported materials and foreign expertise needed for operations. Unfortunately,since the equipment for the upgrading unit was to be financed outside the project by EDF and the Kuwait Fund, the implementationof the IDA project became dependent on the Government's arrangementswith these institutions. These proceeded too slow, causing serious delays in ordering and delivery of pieces of equipment which were crucial for the operations of the brigades. Moreover, deliveries were delayed by some two to six months, as a result of irregular and unreliable shipping to the Comoros, and the fact that shipments have to go first to or Reunion, before arriving in the Comoros. 3.07 Another cause of delay was a Government decision to decentralize certain road activities by delegating them to the Governors of each of the three islands; justificationfor this was the slow and unreliable communicationsbetween them. This decision required establishinga maintenance department on each island, and reallocatingequipment with loss of time and output. In addition, putting existing equipment in working order took longer than expected, and it was not before September 1980 that all brigades were fully operational, instead of January 1979 as optimisticallyexpected at appraisal. -6-

3.08 Consultants Final Report concludes that the cost of the three-year operation of all brigades on the three islands has amounted to CF 755.7 million, excluding depreciation of equipment, of which CF 73.5 million is for the earth road improvement brigade. This leaves CF 682.2 million (US$2.85 million equivalent) for routine and periodic maintenance of paved roads by the three brigades. Total cost and breakdown for the three islands is given in the table below (more detailed costs are presented in Table 4):

Cost in CF million Grande Comore Anjouan Moheli Comoros Routine Maintenance 47.7 62.9 8.7 119.3 Periodic Maintenance 265.1 262.6 35.2 562.9 Total Paved Road Maintenance 312.8 325.5 43.9 682.2

3.09 Although the Government had complied in principle with the covenant in section 4.03 of the Credit Agreement demanding the re-creation of a Road Fund, it was unable to collect the duties and taxes earmarked to feed this Fund, resulting in a lack of local funds for the project. Operations would have come to a standstill if IDA would not have agreed in November 1979 to finance from the Credit an amount of US$270,000 to pay for the larger part of nages and salaries of the brigades' staff. In doing so, it was hoped to keep the program going until it could be continued under the Second Highway Project (approved by the Board in October 1981). However, the Credit Funds were exhausted by September 1981.

3.10 By that time, the complete labor force including mechanics had been gradually laid off, and what was to be achieved during the three-year program was virtually reduced to about half. By the end of the program, no more than 60 km of earth roads had been upgraded -- compared to 120 km scheduled -- only about 45 km were resealed instead of the 195 km contetmplated at appraisal and routine and periodic maintenance operations were estimated to be about half of what should have been achieved2 /. In addition to shortage of local funds, impediments to the program were also caused by (i) the country's rugged geographicaland topographical conditions, causing heavier than average wear and tear of equipment; (ii) shortages of spare parts, imported materials and fuel; and (iii) shortage of crushed stone for the base course due to inadequate crushing plant. When operations came to a standstill in September 1981 because of lack of local funds, only about 40% of the equipment was operative due to lack of spare parts. Even as late as the end of 1982, essential crushing plant was not operational due to shortage of spares. Moreover, by that time there was need for some equipment replacement.

Equipment

3.11 Procurement oi maintenance equipment and spare parts, workshop equipment and tools and soils laboratory equipment financed under the project did not experience any particular problems. Because of the small number of items, the need for standardization with Kuwait and EDF financed equipment, and the lack of response to international competitive bidding

2/ According to the Consultants' final report. -7- for EDF-financed items, IDA had agreed to negotiated procurement following international shopping. Consultants assisted in the procurement procedure, which was delayed because of the delay in Credit effectiveness; by September 1979 deliveries were completed, well ahead of soms Kuwait Fund and EDF financed equipment (para. 3.06).

Workshops

3.12 Improvement of two regional workshops in Moroni (G|ande Comore) and Mutsamadu (Anjouan) was carried out by force ac3unt and were satisfactorily completed in December 1980. The shop in Fomboni (Moheli) was improved by a local contractor and completed in February 1981. Equipment and tools were already delivered in 1979 and have been installed. There was some delay ir completion of the 'buildings, however, which was due to shortages of cement, qualified workers, and local funds.

Soils Laboratory

3.13 Improvements and extensions to an existing building was carried out by force account. Equipment was delivered in August 1979 but it was not until June 1981 that it was installed, following completion of the building in late 1980. Lack of a laboratory chief, qualified technicians, and of budget funds to operate the laboratory, caused the laboratory to become operative only under the Second Highway Project when the chief trained in France became available.

Technical Assistance and Training

3.14 Together with the implementation of the three-year road improvement and maintenance program technical assistance was the most important project component. The main functions o' technical assistance were: (a) reorganization of the road administratio ; (b) assistance to DEIT in establishment and operation of adequate procurement procedures; (c) improvement in the management of workshops for maintenance of equipment; (d) training of domestic staff and workers at all levels; (e) assistance in the implementation of the three-year road improvement and maintenance program and (f) assistance in the preparation of a Second Highway Project.

3.15 A French consultant was selected under the PPF to carry out the technical assistance and training program. They had a three-man team in the field by the end of 1978, before the Credit became effective. The team was extended gradually, and at maximum it consisted of eight expatriates with long-term contracts (one to three years), and two with short term contract (three months). In addition, there were four experts in headquarters who occasionally visited the field team (14 man-months aggregate). By the end of 1981, the Consultant had provided 244 man-months of technical assistance, including vacations, compared with 126 estimated at appraisal to be needed in the field, excluding vacations. The 244 also includes 80 man-months for three workshop managers who initially were supposed to be financed by the Kuwait FLind. When this arrangement did not materialize, 48 of these 80 man-months were decided to be financed from the US$700,000 European Special Action Credit arranged in August 1979 (para. 2.08), while the remaining 32 man-months were financed by the IDA Credit. -8-

3.16 Performance of the technical assistance team was a qualified success. A continuous problem has been the shortage of adequate counterparts with sufficient technical education and managerial skill to be trained to eventually take over the positioxus filled by the consultants. Although this problem had not been specifically stated in the appraisal report as a project risk, it had been raised as an issue during the Decision Meeting and the meeting had agreed that it was a calculated risk which had to be taken. As a result, institution building associated with the transfer of know-how through technical assistance and on-the-job training was reduced and has not been as successful as expected. Nevertheless, the framework for a highway administration has been established and its strengthening is being continued as part of the Second Highway project. It should be noted, in this regard, that Comoros will have to rely on expatriate expertise for several years, before a sufficient number of properly trained nationals can manage and carry out their own operations.

3.17 Some 140 local staff were trained, ranging from supervisors to mechanics, electricians, equipment operators, road technicians, administrative clerks, etc. Also, labor intensive methods were introduced for maintenance gangs working separately from the brigades. By and large, workshops have been performing reasonably well.

3.18 Under clause 3.03 (c) of the Credit Agreement, the Borrower was to prepare a Completion Report upon completion of the project. This task was actually carried out by the Consultant on the Government's behalf. A "Final Report" was produced in February 1983 with many tables and naps, describing in great detail the recommendations, services and accomplishments of the consultants team. However, some basic data, such as the list of roads where improvement/maintenance works were carried out is missing (para. 6.04 and 6.07). Furthermore, since the Consultant was not involved in the AfDB-financed Nioumakele road construction, this component is not even mention-d in their Final Report. On the other hand, the Kuwait Fund and EDF financed equipment has been included indiscriminately. The report had also not attempted to recalculate an economic rate of return.

Fellowships

3.19 Two laboratory technicians and three workshop managers have been trained in France for three months and one year respectively under OPEC and FED financing.

Studies

3.20 After deleting the three studies included in the original project (para. 3.03), only the study for the - road on Moheli island was left in the project. The feasibility study carried out by the Consultant concluded that the project as designed was not economically justified. Since Government was not agreable to a lower, more economical design, no detailed engineeriiig was carried out. -9-

Cost of the Project

3.21 The appraisal cost estimates as presented in para. 2.04 and Table I are misleading to the extent that the Kuwait Fund and EDF financing of equipment, without which the project could not be implemented, are not included in the project cost estimates. Moreover, when the Kuwait Fund decided not to finance the workshop managers and workshop equipment, part of these costs were financed by an additional US$0.7 million EEC Special Action Credit (SAC), administered by IDA (para. 2.08). If all these costs are taken into consideration the actual project costs amount to US$14.70 million as shown below:

Actual Appraisall/ Project Financing MFC million US$ million US$ million

AfDB (Nioumakele Road) 1,103.6 4.50 4.50 IDA Cred'.t 1,129.9 5.00 5.00 OPEC FunG 282.6 1.00 1.00 Government 146.5 0.60 0.56

2,662.6 11.10 11.06

Other Financing Relevant to the Project

SAC 161.7 0.72 2/ _ EDF 225.0 0.96 1.00 Kuwait Fund 450.0 1.92 2.00

Total Cost 3,499.3 14.70 14.06

I/ Exchange rates varied from US$1 - CF 240 used at appraisal to US$1 - CF 235 used in the Final Report; in the interim the rate went as low as 210 and as high as 287. 2/ Slight overrun of about US$23,000 due to varying exchange rates.

3.22 In view of the above, the cost overrun of the project as appraised would be only US$0.74 million or 6.7% (including SAC). On the other hand, studies with an estimated cost of about US$0.57 million were deleted from the project; if that is taken into account, the cost overrun would be US$1.31 million or about 12%.

Disbursements

3.23 Comparison between estimated and actual disbursements by category is shown in Table 5 and timing of actual disbursements compared with appraisal estimates in Table 6. It should be noted that (a) improvements to buildings were more elaborate than envisaged at appraisal, and thus their cost was also hig.her than estimated (category (3)); and (b) ID)A's - 10 - disbursements for consultants'services for parts C and D of the project (category (5)) amounted to US$1.72 million, or more than three times the US$0.54 million original allocation.

3.24 The amended schedule of November 1979 is virtually the same as the original one, except that category 11, unallocated,was reduced by US$300,000, largely to allow for the introducion of two new categories consisting of US$270,000 for IDA financing of local wages (category 9) and a contributionto a US$50,000 revolving fund (category 10) (para. 3.09).

3.25 IDA's actual dis1ursements for consultants'services under category 5, amounted to US$t.72 million compared with US$0.54 million in both the original and amendid disbursementschedules. This means that most of the US$820,000 unallocated (category 10), plus US$450,000 in savings resulting from the deletion of studies (category 6) were used to pay for additional cost of consultants' services. In addition to the consultants cost financed by IDA another US$342,000 were used for workshop managers financed from the EEC Special Action Credit, and US$488,000 financed from the OPEC Fund (Table 5). Allowing US$100,000 for preparation of bidding documents, office equipment and furniture, this brings the total amountdisbursedfor technical assistance purposes to US$2.44 million for a total of 244 maa-months,or about US$10,000 per man-month average including travel of staff and families, purchase of cars, etc., and all local cost for subsistence,local travel and car operations since the Government did not have the funds to pay for these expenses. As explained in para. 3.15 above, the increase in man-months was mostly due to the additional 80 man-months absorbed by the project when the arrangements for their funding by the Kuwait Fund did not materialise. 3.26 As to disbursementsfrom the IDA administeredSpecial Action Credit and the OPEC Fund, these are also shown in Table 5.

Performanceof Consultants and Contractors

3.27 By and large performance of the Consultant has been reasonably satisfactoryconsidering the difficult working conditions including shortage of suitable local counterparts,lack of local funds and delays in arranging total project financing. In particular, the shortage of domestic counterpartswith adequate educationalbackground considerablyincreased the burden carried by the consultantswho, in practice, were acting in a managerial rather than advisory capacity as originally envisaged.

3.28 Performance of the consulting firm which was selected by the Borrower for the supervision of the constructionof the Nioumakele road was reported by AfDB to be satisfactory,as was the performance of the contractor SNTP (France).

3.29 Use of contractors for IDA-financedproject components was negligible being restricted to a few building works such as expansion of workshops and the soils laboratory;contractors' work was generally satisfactory. - 11 -

IV. PERFORMANCEOF THE GOVERNMENT

4.01 By and large, performance of the Government has not been satisfactory. However, given the acute constraints in financial and human resources in the country and the inexperience of the Borrower with IDA procedures, it would have been difficult to expect a considerablybetter performance. The Directorate of Equipment and Improvementof Territory (DEIT), later renamed General Directorate of Public Works (GDPW), which was responsible for the implementationof the project, made efforts to accommodate the consultants who, in practice, did most of the work. There was, however, a continuous shortage of adequate counterparts,which has been a problem inherent to the country as a whole, after the departure of most French officials following independenceand before domestic staff were ready to take over.

4.02 The Government tried to comply with the covenants of the Credit Agreement, the most important of which are listed in para. 2.06. Specifically,the Road Fund was re-establishedin accordance with section 4.03 of the Credit Agreement but a serious problem arose when in practice the Government was unable to collect the duties and taxes earmarked for feeding it, in particular those due by other Government agencies such as the electricity company. The root of the problem, however, is that the country is still too poor to meet all its local expenditure obligations without ouside help. In addition, newly established vehicle weight legislationhas not yet been enforced.

4.03 Although the Kuwait Fund and the EDF had committed themselves before appraisal of the IDA project to finance part of the equipment needed for the maintenance brigades, it took the Government much too long due to its lack of experience to finalize the arrangementswith these institutions and to purchase the equipment (para. 3.06); this resulted in some 18 months' delay before the brigades became fully operational. In this respect, the performance of the Governmenthas been unsatisfactory,since that delay greatly reduced the usefulness of the IDA-financed project. 4.04 With substantial help of the consultants,progress reporting has been satisfactory.

V. INSTITUTION BUILDING

5.01 The project no doubt has helped to achieve part of its main purpose, namely, to first create and thereafter strengthen the country's road administration. This was an important part of the task of the technical assistance team which had to start virtually from scratch. The consultants proposed the establishmentof a General Directorateof Public Works within the Ministry of Equipment and Environment, with the following services: Federal Directorate for Studies and Programming; Federal Service for Equipment; Laboratory for Civil Works and Buildings; Federal Service for Mines and Ports; and three Regional Directoratesfor Public Works, one in each of the three islands. The recomnmeed organizatlonwas accepted and established by a Government Decree, dated June 20, 1980. - 12 -

5.02 However, the fact that physical accomplishmentsexpected from the three year maintenance program were reduced to about half has adversely affected the institution building which was expected to result partly from on-the-job training during the project implementation(para. 3.10). However, markable progress warsmade, paving the way for further institution building now being continued under the Second Highway Project.

VI. ICONOMIC RE-EVALUATION

Constructionof Nioumakele Road 3/

6.01 At appraisal the calculationof the economic rate of return (ERR) was based solely on value added benefits from anticipated agricultural production. In the SAR the ERR for the Nioumakele Road (20.4 km) was estimated at 12%, it was also recognized,however, that the actual figure would be dependent on the success of agriculturaldevelopment in the areas served by this AfDF-financed road constructioncomponent. With more conservativeestimates of benefits the ERR was estimated at 8%. Constructionwas completed within the cost estimates including contingencies,but no monitored data are available to judge whether agricultural production has increased in accordance with expectationsat appraisal.

6.02 Since the relevant agriculturaldata are not available, a different approach has been taken by using savings in vehicle operating costs. At appraisal it was assumed that traffic would increase from 30 vpd (1978) on the existing earth road to 100 vpd on the n; paved road. A traffic count was carried out in June 1983 which yielded 94 vehicles of which 60 light vehicles and 34 trucks. Using data on vehicle operating cost savings collected for the appraisal of the Second Highway Project (to match the timing of the road construction)to the estimated traffic on the project road, annual vehicle operating cost savings in the first year after completion (1982) would be in the order of about US$321,000 or 7% of the US$4.42 million, the actual road investment. This would yield an ERR ranging from 9% to 12%, depending on the assumption on annual traffic growth rate, between 4% and 7% over the 20 year life of the road. The recalculatedERRs are therefore in line with the ones estimated in the SAR.

Road ImprovementProgram

6.03 At appraisal it was assumed that during the three-year program the road improvementbrigade would upgrade 120 km of earth roads to all- weather gravel standards, and that this would produce an economic rate of return of 12% over a 10-year life based on: (a) a cost of US$15,000 per km; (b) an average number of vehicles per day of 30 in the opening year which would grow .hereafter by 15% per annum; and (c) vehicle operating cost savings in the order of US$0.14 per average vehicle/km. According to the Final PReport,only about about 60 km or about 50% of the intended program was upgraded in the three years at an average cost of CF 1,230 million or

3/ This project component is not covered in Consultants Final Report. - 13 - about US$5,000 per km, excluding cost of equipment, or about US$6,300 per km, includingdepreciation of equipment (estimatedto amount to about one quarter of the total cost per km).

6.04 The consultant':,however, did not keep records on which specific roads the works were carr.ted out. Furthermore, traffic counts were not carried out on earth/gravelroads. Consequently,there is no viable basis for calculatingactual vehicle operating cost savings and ultimately the ERR. Accepting, however, the appraisal assumption of 30 vpd, a rough approximationwould be that the economic return on the portion of the program carried out would likely meet the original ERR of 12%, since the actual cost per km was less than half the appraisal estimate and would thus offset the shortfall in achieving the target set at appraisal. Maintenance Program of Paved Roads

6.05 At appraisal the ERR for the two patching brigades and one resealing brigade was estimated to be 34%; it assumed that 250 km were patched and about 70 km of bitumen roads were resealed per annum during the project period. An average of 100 vpd on the paved roads was assumed bv 1980, and a growth of 5% thereafter.

6.06 Consultant estimates that only 45 km of roads were resealed in the three-year period, which is only 23% of the 195 km goal. The goal of the two patching units which repaired shoulders and potholes was to repair about 250 km, or one third of the main road system, per annum. Consultant estimates that about 75% of that goal was achieved. Taken these two accomplishmentstogether, it could be concluded that overall about half of the expected targetswere accomplishedover the three years at a total cost of US$2.85 million. This averages out at about US$2,500 per km per year, excluding depreciationof equipment. After adding an estimated allowance of US$600 per km for equipment cost, the total actual cost were US$3,100 per km per year which is too high for routine and periodic maintenance of a road system with an average traffic density of about 100 vehicles per day. In view of the above it may be concluded that the 34% rate of return has not been achieved and that the actual return would be substantially lower.

6.07 A meaningful recalculationof ERR for the maintenanceprogram could not, however, be carried out for the followingreasons: (a) traffic counts carried out in 1980 and 1981 covered only a small part of the paved road network, with huge differences ranging from over 500 vpd (around the capital Moroni) to less than 50 vpd on the island of Moheli; and (b) the specific roads where routine and periodic maintenancewere carried out were not presented in the consultants'Final Report.

VII. TUE ROLE OF IDA

7.01 Credit 852-COM for the First Highway Project was the Bank Group's first operatton in Comoros. The project choice was sound, since roads are important infrastructure for agricultural production which is the country's major economic resource. Also, the country's financial resources being extremely limited and the IDA contributionbeing restricted,Lt was a sound - 14 - idea to look for co-financing and/or parallel financing from other lending institutions so as to arrive at an adequate project size.

7.02 In retrospect, it would have been preferable if the construction component had been left ouside the project, making the IDA project a time-slice of a continuous road improvement and maintenance prograrm in the financing of which not only the OPEC Fund, but also the Kuwait Fund and EDF could have participated as co-financers, rather than independent partners. By making the effectiveness of the IDA credit conditional upon the confirmation not only of the OPEC Fund participation but also all the other project relevant financing partners, the delay in starting up of the brigade operavions could have been reduced.4/

7.03 IDA tried to accommodate the Government's chronic shortage of local funds by agreeing to finance from the Credit an amount of US$270,000 for local wages. This was a positive step. However, less than half of these funds were actually disbursed before a shortage of funds brought the operations of the brigades to a virtual standstill. Increases in consultants' costs, and cost of workshop buildings and equipment consumed more funds than originally anticipated.

VIII. CONCLUSIONSAND LESSONS LEARNED

8.01 The project was successful to the extent that the road construction component, making up about 40% of the project cost and parallel financed by the AfDB was constructed on time and within the appraisal cost estimate. The remainder of the project was Less successful. Due to delays in start-up of the program and shortage of local funds, achievements during the three-year road improvement and maintenance program were at best only about half of what was expected (para. 3.10).

8.02 The three-year road improvement and maintenance program had a too optimistic schedule. Namely, at appraisal, it was assumed that the works would start immediately after the Credit becamue effective, i.e., in January 1979; consequently, the program was originally designed to cover the 1979-81 period. However, under prevailing conditions in Comoros -- absence of institutional organization in roads, severe shortage of qualified personnel at all levels-- it was simply not feasible to start the physical implementation of the road works in 1979. Moreover, under those conditions it could have been assumed that it would take about two years just to set-up necessary foundations -- roads' organization on the three islands, workshops, necessary training of operators and mechanics, before the road maintenance output could really start.

8.03 Generally very low-level of economic development with extremely limited Government revenues exacerbated the diffictlties of project implementation. Government funding was not sufficient to cover the cost of local labor. A more realistic approach of the financial support which the

4/ The lesson learned was applied in preparing the Second Highway Project, which became effective only after all financing sources were securely committed. - 15 -

Government could have provided to the project was missing. Therefore, in the follow-up project (Second Highway, Cr.1188-COM) IDA is participatingin financing part of local wages (at declining rate so that the Government will take over gradually).

8.04 Overall, it could be ascertained that institutionbuilding resulting from technical assistance and training by expatriate consultants, although less than expected (para. 5.02), was still reasonably satisfactory given the difficult financial and manpower situation in the country.

8.05 Rather than separate financing for a component which was essential to the proper functioning of the rest of the project (para. 2.05); co-financing for all equipment needed for the improvement and maintenance brigades would have been a better solution. The delay in financial and operationalarrangements between the Government and both the Kuwait Fund and EDF, independent as they were from the IDA Credit, adversely affected implementationof the IDA project (para. 3.06). - 16 - Table 1

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT

FEDERALISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS

FIRST HIGHWAYPROJECT (Credit 852-COM)

Cost Estimates at Appraisal

CF killtntis _iJ9 t 15lIonu Foretmn _____ 15retRn TOL oL foran-t1 Tota;± £tct.*#nR!

A, Fond C ,structiOn and SuPcr'vtston (S) Construction, 20.4 km in Nioutnakele 126.3 662.6 788.9 0.52 2.70 3.22 64 (Li) Supervisuon of (1) _.3.8 14,6 is.. 002 02.4 0.16 90 130.1 697.2 827.3 0.-44.38 2.84

3. RondM'Ssovembnt (i) Ropair 700O Hutxtiudu-Sit.a road 8.6 25.7 34.3 0.03 0.11 0.14 75 (Li) :meeovemoeytUnitt Spares, material, fucl * 153.0 135.0 * 0.63 0.63 100 Salariega 56.1 * 56.1 0.23 I C.a3 0 64.7 180.7 245.4 0.26 -. 74 1.00

C. Ro4nd H-dnteneneC

I Resealing and 2 Patching Unita.i Equirment - 123.0 123.0 * 0.50 0.50 100 Spares, matetial, fuel * 343.0 343.0 * 1.40 1.40 100 Sparc part stock * 73.5 73.5 * 0.30 0.30 1i00 Saleriee 42.6 * 42.6 0.17 - 0. 7 0 42,b 539.5 582.1 0.li 0 2.37

el) uLldting repairs 2.4 9.6 12.0 0.01 0.04 0.05 so (it)} Eqoipnat 0t36.8 ^ 0 2.15 .S5 lOt :.4- 46.4 48.S 0.01 *. 9 0.20

E. Sor t:boratorv V.quztcnt - 9.8 9.8 * 0.04 0.04 100

F. Tc.hinltatAsutvitanc_2/ 27.0 232.7 259.7 0.11 0.95 1.0$ 90

0. Ve11o'.e'.ion - 4.8 *.6 * 0.02 0.02 100 n. Studi1s. (i) FeRs ibilityand Detailed Znginrering 45 km or road section on Mubeli 12.0 60.0 72.0 . 0.05 0.25 0.30 83 (Lif) Preinvescmetet study for Niounakele integrated rural development 10.0 50.0 60.0 0.04 0.21 0.25 63 22.0 110.0 132.0 U.09 0.46 0.55 Sub-total A-lI 218.8 1821.1 2109.9 1.18 7.44 8.b2 S. Convntetngcfaess (t) Physical, 15Z on A. 10% oan - E 35.3 214.6 249.9 0.14 0.98 1.02 (ii) Price (overall 162) 3 / 49.0 298.9 347.9 0.20 1.22 1.42 -84.3 513.5 . 0.34 2.10 2.64 Grand Total 373.1 2 _3346 ',707.7 1.52 9-54 11.06 86

Technical Assistance incli,,pri under Section F to this Table. 2/ IncIud.s US$80,00D provided under FJ'F. V lPrLc.continic.ncies. which provide for nticixpated inflationover the iMlenentation seriod. vere derived as follows: 1978 1979 1980 1981 Civil lWorks 8 7.5 7.0 7.0 Equipment 7 6.5 6.0 6.0 , , COPY PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT FEDERAL ISLAIT1C REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (Credit 852-COM) Financing Plan for Project (US$ million) 1D)A *(01 o,icOPECrus co'zu,esr_AEDE _ local famroa Tot-al Local Fore2gn Total local Foreign TotEAl tec Foreign Total tocdl rorequn Total

A. Road Constnrctlon and Suwervieton

Mi) Conar-tic.. 20. 4- to Mouakel - - - 0.52 2.70 3.22 - - - 0.52 2.70 3.22 (it) Supervisalon of t1) Q0.02 14 016 - - D- 002 0.14. 0lb 0.54 2.8U 3.38 0 2.U4 3.38 2. Road 1arrotr~nt

(1) Repetr 700u :lutsmrdu-$sJa road 0.03 0.ll 0.14 - - - - 0.03 0.11 01?U (iS) Ioprovaoenc UoLt Spares. matewial. fuel - 0.63 0.63 - -- 0.63 0463 salaries _ - * - * - _ *-t23 L22 021 _ 0.21 0.237{§;7 0.23 0.26 0.74 .00 C. tead lisirerae-e

(I) I gesecllrg and 2 ?accbtog UItas 0 . Eqlips.nt ------0.50 0.50 - - -- O.So 0 Spares. materils. fuel - 14.0 1.40 ------1.40 1.40 Spore Vert stack - 0.30 0.30 - - 2- - - 0.10 0.10 ScIence . - -. ------t.L - 0.11 0.11OT - T 1.70 1.70 0.50 0.50o 0.1 0.17 0.17 2 20 2.37 V. Ioirthiops

(S) Building repair. 0.01 0.04 0.05 001 0.04 0.05 (ti) Equipment - A0. 15 O S - ' 0.15 0.IS 0.1SD eo o.u 0.20 0.01 0.19 0.20

L Soils Laboratory Enuri,saenr - 0.04 0.04 ------0.4 e.o F. rT__b 2 Aatr nce 0.07 O.53 0.62 - - - 0.40 0.40 0.04 0.0 0.11 O. 1.0

C. FellovsIti-s . . - 0.02 0.02 - - - 0.02 0.02

IF. StodLc.

(1.) Rerisibility and Detallev E=ginaaria 43 So of toad section on thobli 0.05 0.2 0.30 - . - - 0.0S 0.2S 0.30 (Ii) ?rtn.aav,eoct szudy for Niooskel. Iregrated rural developwct 0.0 0.21 0.25 - . . - - 0.04 0 21 o.23 0.09 0.46 0.55 0.09 0.6 0. 55

Sob-total * 0.20 3.68 3.85 0.54 2.84 3.38 - .1 0.2 .4 - Sub-torsl .8-h Q2O Y.6i3 S.es 3 X _ ~~~~~~~~~~092 0 92 a u o .-e6 044 .6 7. 8.62 *. Concigencles ' 0.04 i.08 1.12 0.18 0.94 1.12 0.08 O.0 0.12 0.12 0_34 2.10 2.44

Crod totel _t2 4.76 5.00 0.72 3.78 4.50 1.00 1.60 0.56 - 0.56 I.5z 9-54 11.06

11 Tec-nical Assistac.cu iclauded under F. Cnrludco US$80OW provided udAert ef.

Auzuit 1978

BESTCOPY ALE - 18 - Table 3 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

FEDERAL ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS

FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (Credit 852-COM)

Estimated Prolect Cost1/ (US$ million)

As of 2/ Appraisal January 1 9 8 2-j Foreign Total Foreign Foreign Total A. Road Construction and Supervision (i) Constructionof Nioumakele Road 3.63 4.33 84 3.58 4.22 (li) Supervision of (i) 0.18 0.20 90 0.18 0.20 B. Road Improvement (i) Repair Road 0.14 0.17 82 0.11 0.16 (ii) ImprovementUnit (a) Spares, Material, Fuel 0.79 0.79- 100 0.65 0.65-±: (b) Salaries - 0.28 - - 0.23 C. Road Maintenance 1 Resealing and 2 Patching Units (a) Equipment 0.63 0.63 100 0.65 0.65 (b) Spares, Material, Fuel 1.76 1.76 100 1.17 1.17 (c) Spare Pari Stock 0.38 0.38 100 0.38 0.38 *d) Salaries - 0.21 - 0.20 0.20 D. Workshops (i) Building Repairs 0.05 0.06 83 0.32 0.37 (ii) Equipment 0.19 0.19 100 0.65 0.65 E. SoUls LTboratory Equipment 0.05 0.05 100 0.10 0.10 F. Technical assistance 1.15 1.29 89 2.50 2.70 G. Fellowships 0.02 0.02 100 0.02 0.02 H. Studies (i) Feasibility Study and Detailed Engineering Miringoni-Nioumachoua Road_' 0.31 0.38 82 0.09 0.10 (ii) PreinvestmientStudy Nioumakele Integrated Rural Development 0.26 0.32 81 - - 9.54 11.06 10.60 11.80

1/ Including contingencies. 2/ Including US$0.70 million EEC Special Action Credit. 3/ Assuming operations until June 30, 1982. 4/ Actual operations until June 30, 1981. 5I/ Detailed engineering deleted. Prjet Cc,etn Reor

FEDEAL I&NC REMUNCaF BE Om"

FIRT HIQJ 1FDJEC'(Oredit 852,1)

Qntitiesand (bsts per ypeof Operatioi

Qnti CD6stsin CFMlion uLit Gr. Ca2vre Anjan he1t OmDros Or. Camne A-ja MDlel Cairos

A. Earth RPadlmuement km 25.3 15.4 19.1 59.8 31.1 18.9 23.5 73.5

B. Foutiw ?31ntenane Paed Roads

1. Shoulder Clearing m2 292,000 467,000 70,000 829,000 5.8 9.3 1.4 16.5 2. Drainag m - 259,000 24,500 283,500 - 12.9 1.2 14.1 3. Gradirg of Slopes m3 - 6,100 3,000 9,100 - 12.9 1.2 14.1 4. Patching m2 8,400 10,600 500 19,700 14.5 18.5 0.8 33.8 5. Local Edg Repair m2 15,700 7,400 410 23,500 27.4 13.0 0.7 41.1

Sub-total B 1-5 47.7 62.9 8.7 119.3

C. eariodicMaintenance Paved Poads

1. Uprading of shutders m2 30,400 83,80) 3,500 117,7W 32.5 89.7 3.7 125.9 2. Penetration amcadam on sholdexs m2 54,600 30,300 1,900 86,800 15.8 8.8 0.6 25.2 3. Roadwidenig m2 17,200 13,900 4,600 35,700 93.9 75.6 25.1 1914.6 4. SurfacigW m2 67,000 50,800 - 117,800 42.9 32.5 - 75.4 5. Retaining wlls m3 4,100 2,200 200 6,500 62.1 33.4 3.7 99.2 6. Crete structeres m3 210 270 30 510 17.9 22.6 2.1 42.6

&&-total C 1-6 265.1 262.6 35.2 562.9

TWL A, B, C 343.9 344.4 67.4 755.7

Source:Cmsultants Final Report, February 1983. - 20 - Table 5

P1LUc CZME=ON REM

FEUMALISIAIC REPJLIC C' MhECa0S

FR HlUGIWAYPRJEJr (Credit 852-CM) Df.sbursemts by Categoryv (-$1 ,000)

muet of the Credit Allocatsd Actual SM4ecIl OPC Or4analA d IkLsburseiLnts Actlim Fund Categry as of (Ot. 1978 as of Nov. 1979 as of Feb. 1983 Credit Ccedit

(1) Road lanrovents, 140 140 156 Part B of th Project

(2) Spare parts, radio 2,330 2,320 Z,176 487 equpment, amterlals and fuel, Part C of the Project

(3) kdi4ing repairs 200 190 505 381 (i4frg salaries orkshp equiment & toDls, Part D of tte Project

(4) Soils laboratory equApment 40 40 83 Part E of the Project

(5) Serlms of coalt- 540 540 1,718 342 488 anlts & experts, parts C & D of the Project

(6) Ccsuatants' services 550 550 101 - Part F of the Project

(7) Refunding of Project 80 80 80 - preparatio adw

(8) Fellawships - - - 24

(9) remntalh wages of - 270 131 - laborers, Part C of the Project

(10) Advance udr Secti 50 50 - 2.02 (d) to prefinance iteas referred to under Categories (2) arnt (3)

(11) Unallocated l,142 820 0 -

TIVAL 5,_0) 5,000 5,000 723 1,000 - 21 -

Table 6

PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT FEDERALISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF THE COMOROS FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT (Credit 852-COM) Schedule of Disbursementsas of September 1982

Acumulated Disbursementin Thousands Disbursementsas a of U.S. Dollas Equivalent Percentage of Apprai- IBRD/IDA New sal Estimate: Up to Fiscal Actual Disburse- Latest Quarter or Year and Disburse- Appraisal ment New Estimate for Quarterments Estimate Estimate Future Quarter

1978/79

3rd 564 1,100 51 4th 1,175 1,550 76

1979/80

1st 1,400 1,950 72 2nd 2,500 2,350 106 3rd 2,800 2,750 4th 3,500 3,100 113

1980/81

1st 3,700 3,350 2nd 3,900 3,700 100 3rd 4,300 3,900 110 4th 4,600 4,200 110

1981/82 1st 4,800 4,400 109 2nd 4,850 4,700 103 3rd 4,900 4,950 99 4th - 5,000 5,000 100

Closing Date: December 31, 1982

Last Disbursement:February 1983 44- 15' 44-20' 44- 2

COMORO ISLANDS ANJO I JAN FIRST HIGHWAY PROJECT 12'05' Principal city

() Other towns andvilloges

Paved roads:

Comple ted

Project roads

Earth roads

* Thermoelectric ond hydroelectric power plants -public ond privote ouc Port

+ Airport

Rivers

400 Elevation contours, meters

MUTSAMUDU r2*10' ' ''

'Fourrbani f r '\ _~~~~~~~~~~i

T2Ih.a -Po hat be.s ~nassd hYthe ou -25 W.,nd &anh Ita Osnisaf ters lhb ofoosvssife the -tdo-t sF 5revs,,aP°wahich so Asis onthld. r.d-5,05,at551 -sd and 100 bo_de-sA.- shownosthis .. PO do not 'soot oat he oarsc5 rOe Wwsd Sanknd us ashivtass.Sty anydpn,,r fe^tonslryw srhrwagty atny,dora.nOOJOf Xsc on socaccwaneof sochtsnss,ndssi.n 44-15Y Pomo

f r, TANZANIA rn o e on J )_-t--\, o._.) A./ Moroni.,GrandeCoore ANJ CUAN Maoheli Mayotte COMORO ) ALAWI ISLANDS

jMOZAMBIQUE e~ j !lj

. MADAGASCAR

o 2 4 6 ,

KIlOMETERS 20 I loOIn,clna5,ss LsssndroOscl 20- O ,4 0 103 200 300 K,l-norsl 2tE ______~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~MILES O tOO 200 M.Iss

304' 404 4/ 5p' 44'205 4425' IBRD 13414 44v25' 44.30' JUNE 1978

12105

Ouani~

MUTSAMUDU 12'10'

Chiro'mb n - " j Bamboo

Djndi r beo' '

Dzindri< ,,,pi-jodjo b

Vouani*. .

9uziri i Ajohe Pomoni

* i,10' AM'Rernoni Moyao . . , ~~~~~~~onsoujbu

to -1,.,, 12-20-

Choouer, 6 Ch Ni bmo' Roanicii 0 2 4 tS 8 ~~~~~~~~10 ' Yntsahe KILOMETERS Bandamagi

o ?2 , 4 6 MILES

20' 44'25' 4A30' 43340 43145

-12015' Detailed Engineering

>f, ,_, ) ,,01 51 QjJ {(y^\3O,rS,tO M B OI

~~VQY?i~~~ / Th~~ 'Bo~ngorna

Miringoni r, "y }_ >nC X

OU011 'U' 0% 1 ((J~~~~~~~~~Wn

12'20' Oulll .I,)1>,

-j FeasibilitySuy 'v,< ,-' a andD)etailed f'-)ySjt <>a o VA Engineering '. \ :t S 1 w t g' (if justified) -- - .' ' - ) " 83

Ni uachou '.'

Forol.;. \ Mea1. M- BOU .,

MagnuniI.1, Bougol1..

. \ l ! <\ ~~~Quenefoul. Chandzil1. r

CanzonianDetlhiedhop, 0th_ (if justified) Wrr kstft eI'l for -12'25'1 th:Mloudmealomh replort tovhichonsse ith dandolteched. the3 12'25'-r C 43zo40' 4hrth3'45~e /doenotimkon the pagr/tfeuofth C Wtorld enk and ofr3ufiliots77its an ;-, LA r QuenefouI, C loacpne f 3 IBRD13415 43050 JUNE 1978

COMORO ISLANDS MOHELI FIRSTHIGHWAY PROJECT

% Principal city 12015 b Othertowns and villages Pavedroads: Completed

- Project road Earth roads m4±~ Port + Airport Rivers '-600 Elevation contours, meters Djoiezi

O 2 4 6 8 10 KILOMETERS 0 2 4 6 MILES

4/\JT-' / < 4' g 2')a.,,%12*20'-

WD an/VDRO ann D J A N DR 0 anani 3 g \ p

ItsamiaD M'Chaco1. Sambia o M'Bouzi1. _) , ~~~~~~Boundiouni Gnondza1.

43'50' 43155' N.X A 36 io~A440 480 ;/ T A N Z A N I A

> | /Nib r)-*'<,_.r . M Grande N' Moroni* Cormore

MOZAMB(QUE MOHELI Anjouan 12 t t \i \ MO ZA MBE3IQUE . CSAOMOR Mayotte j - 8IALA\/4I> ISLAN; r f 8 ,>LAV 5'I'>,~\ ---- International boundaries [ 9o,Q 2,0030 0 Kilomelers MADAGASCAR 3e6 0 1 00 Miles200 440 ,4,8