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Phenomenal Consciousness As Scientific Phenomenon? a Critical Investigation of the New Science of Consciousness

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Phenomenal Consciousness As Scientific Phenomenon? a Critical Investigation of the New Science of Consciousness View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by D-Scholarship@Pitt PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENON? A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS by Justin M. Sytsma BS in Computer Science, University of Minnesota, 2003 BS in Neuroscience, University of Minnesota, 1999 MA in Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 2008 MA in History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 2008 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of School of Arts & Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2010 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF ARTS & SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Justin M. Sytsma It was defended on August 5, 2010 and approved by Peter Machamer, PhD, Professor, History and Philosophy of Science Anil Gupta, PhD, Distinguished Professor, Philosophy Jesse Prinz, PhD, Distinguished Professor, City University of New York Graduate Center Dissertation Co-Director: Edouard Machery, PhD, Associate Professor, History and Philosophy of Science Dissertation Co-Director: Kenneth Schaffner, PhD, Distinguished University Professor, History and Philosophy of Science ii Copyright © by Justin Sytsma 2010 iii PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENON? A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS Justin Sytsma, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2010 Phenomenal consciousness poses something of a puzzle for philosophy of science. This puzzle arises from two facts: It is common for philosophers (and some scientists) to take its existence to be phenomenologically obvious and yet modern science arguably has little (if anything) to tell us about it. And, this is despite over 20 years of work targeting phenomenal consciousness in what I call the new science of consciousness. What is it about this supposedly evident phenomenon that has kept it beyond the reach of our scientific understanding? I argue that phenomenal consciousness has resisted scientific explanation because there is no such phenomenon: What is in fact phenomenologically obvious has not resisted scientific explanation, exposing phenomenal consciousness as an unneeded and unwarranted theoretical construct that is not supported by the scientific evidence. I show this through an investigation of the new science. I detail how these researchers understand “phenomenal consciousness,” tie this understanding to the recent philosophical debates, and critically assess the reasons given for believing that such a scientific phenomenon exists. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION: IGNORANCE AND OBVIOUSNESS ...................................................... 1 1.0 THE NEW SCIENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS....................................................... 11 1.1 THE NEW IN THE NEW SCIENCE .............................................................. 13 1.2 THE METHODOLOGICAL DIRECTION OF OPPOSITION................... 16 1.3 THE PHILOSOPHICAL DIRECTION OF OPPOSITION ......................... 20 1.3.1 The Hard Problem as Setting the Agenda for the New Science ............. 25 1.4 THE CENTER OF THE NEW SCIENCE...................................................... 29 1.4.1 Francis Crick............................................................................................... 29 1.4.2 Gerald Edelman .......................................................................................... 32 1.4.3 V. S. Ramachandran................................................................................... 34 1.5 THE FRINGE OF THE NEW SCIENCE....................................................... 36 1.5.1 John Eccles .................................................................................................. 36 1.5.2 Physicists...................................................................................................... 38 1.6 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 40 2.0 QUALIA IN THE NEW SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY .................................... 42 2.1 THE STANDARD UNDERSTANDING IN THE NEW SCIENCE ............. 43 2.1.1 Locating the Standard Understanding in the New Science..................... 48 2.2 THE STANDARD UNDERSTNADING IN PHILOSOPHY ........................ 52 v 2.3 CONFUSION CONCERNING “QUALIA”.................................................... 56 2.3.1 The Standard Understanding and the Knowledge Argument................ 57 2.3.2 Disputing what is Beyond Dispute............................................................. 59 2.4 LISTING OFF EXAMPLES ............................................................................ 64 2.5 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 68 3.0 FIRST-PERSON DATA AND SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENA............................... 70 3.1 PRIVATE DATA AND SCIENTIFIC DATA................................................. 72 3.1.1 The Publicity Principle............................................................................... 75 3.2 THE CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO FIRST-PERSON DATA...................... 78 3.3 INFERRING THE SCIENTIFIC PHENOMENON ...................................... 83 3.4 TWO TYPES OF FIRST-PERSON DATA .................................................... 86 3.5 A DILEMMA FOR THE NEW SCIENCE..................................................... 88 3.6 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................. 90 4.0 PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT OBVIOUS.................................... 91 4.1 DISPUTING STRONG FIRST-PERSON DATA CLAIMS.......................... 92 4.2 ANECDOTAL SUPPORT ................................................................................ 94 4.3 PHENOMENOLOGICAL SUPPORT ............................................................ 98 4.4 HISTORICAL SUPPORT .............................................................................. 101 4.5 EXPERIMENTAL SUPPORT....................................................................... 103 4.5.1 Experiments on the Folk Psychology of Perception............................... 107 4.5.2 Study 1: Questions about Colors ............................................................. 109 4.5.3 Study 2: Questions about Colors and Pains ........................................... 111 4.5.4 Studies 3 and 4: Unfelt Pains ................................................................... 116 vi 4.5.5 Studies 5 and 6: Shared Pains.................................................................. 118 4.6 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 121 5.0 FROM SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY .................................................................. 123 5.1 WEAK FIRST-PERSON DATA CLAIMS ARE INSUFFICIENT............ 124 5.1.1 Uncontroversial Weak First-Person Data Claims ................................. 125 5.1.2 Controversial Weak First-Person Data Claims ..................................... 126 5.1.3 Eliminative Disjunctivism ........................................................................ 129 5.2 BAD FAITH ..................................................................................................... 130 5.3 OTHER ARGUMENTS.................................................................................. 131 5.4 THE ARGUMENTS ARE INCONCLUSIVE .............................................. 133 5.5 THE ARGUMENT FROM THEORY........................................................... 134 5.5.1 Disputing Premise 2 .................................................................................. 137 5.5.2 Disputing Premise 1 .................................................................................. 138 5.6 THE ARGUMENT FROM OBSERVATION .............................................. 141 5.6.1 Disputing the Observation Step............................................................... 143 5.6.2 Hallucinations............................................................................................ 155 5.6.3 Dreams ....................................................................................................... 156 5.6.4 Resisting the Generalization Step............................................................ 163 5.7 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 166 6.0 NEURAL CORRELATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS............................................. 167 6.1 SEARCHING FOR EVIDENCE OF QUALIA............................................ 169 6.2 THE NEW SCIENCE AND NCC RESEARCH........................................... 173 6.3 THE SCIENTIFIC DATA .............................................................................. 175 vii 6.4 THE ELIMINATIVIST TAKE ON NCC EXPERIMENTS....................... 179 6.5 FURTHER SUPPORT .................................................................................... 181 6.6 THE NAÏVE REALIST TAKE ...................................................................... 185 6.7 FURTHER, FURTHER SUPPORT............................................................... 187 6.8 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 188 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................... 190 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 4.1. Study 1 results……………………………………………………………………...111 Figure 4.2. Study 2 results……………………………………………………………………...115
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