DOCSLIB.ORG

Abstract Multimarket Contact on Tacit Collusion

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Abstract Multimarket Contact on Tacit Collusion ABSTRACT MULTIMARKET CONTACT ON TACIT COLLUSION: EVIDENCE FROM THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY by Christopher Granquist This paper examines the effect of multimarket contact on tacit collusion using empirical evidence from the airline industry. We replicate a model of multimarket contact applied to price and apply it to price dispersion, and address potential endogeneity in our measure of multimarket contact through fixed effects. We find three early results: (i) Increased concentration in the U.S. airline industry has reduced the effect of multimarket contact on prices, but the effect remains relatively strong and positive; (ii) The effect of multimarket contact on price dispersion may have either a positive or negative effect based on specification; (iii) First-stage regression results suggest that the percentage of gates owned by a carrier or their low-cost competition at the destination airport on a route is a strong instrumental variable for future extension. MULTIMARKET CONTACT ON TACIT COLLUSION: EVIDENCE FROM THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Miami University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Economics by Christopher Granquist Miami University Oxford, Ohio 2020 Advisor: Dr. Charles Moul Reader: Reader: c 2020 Christopher Granquist ii This thesis titled MULTIMARKET CONTACT ON TACIT COLLUSION: EVIDENCE FROM THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY by Christopher Granquist has been approved for publication by Farmer School of Business and Department of Economics iii Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Introduction . .1 2 Literature Review 2 2.1 Multimarket Contact . .2 2.2 Price Dispersion . .3 2.3 Contemporary Work . .3 2.4 Contribution . .4 3 Data 4 3.1 Data Sources . .4 3.2 Observations . .5 3.3 Dependent Variables . .6 3.4 Control Variables . .7 3.5 Multimarket Contact . .8 3.6 Instrumental Variables . 10 4 Results 11 4.1 Replication . 11 4.2 Price Dispersion Results . 12 5 First-Stage Regression Analysis 14 5.1 Instrumental Variables . 14 5.2 Results . 16 iv List of Figures 1 Summary Statistics Table .......................... 19 2 Contact Between Airline Pairs, Q1 2014 ................. 20 3 Comparison of Average Contact Summary Statistics ......... 20 4 Log Price Regression Results Table .................... 21 5 Comparison of Average Contact Results ................. 22 6 Gini Coefficient Regression Results Table ................ 23 7 Within-Obs Std. Deviation Regression Results Table ......... 24 8 First-Stage Regression Results Table ................... 25 List of Tables v Dedication vi Acknowledgments vii 1 Introduction 1.1 Introduction Unilateral market power is a well-established theoretical and empirical phenomenon. In the absence of unilateral power, however, it is possible for multiple firms to collude as a cartel to increase market power. The purest mechanism of collusion would be legally-binding collusive agreements, but the real world does not favor legal collusion in markets. Instead, firms may engage in tacit collusion by enacting a set of credible strategies that allow firms an avenue of punishment to those who break a tacitly collusive equilibrium. Mechanisms that allow tacit collusion amount to threats such as price wars. The determinants of tacit collusion is a relatively recent chapter in industrial organization literature, especially concerning firms operating in a single market. However, real world firms operate across many markets, and the resulting multimarket contact that arises allows for new avenues of punishment to enable tacit collusion. Generally speaking, market power creates market inefficiencies. The specific effect of multimarket contact creating market power through tacit collusion may create these inef- ficiencies through multiple routes. The literature finds empirical evidence for the effect of multimarket contact in allowing firms the power to raise prices in a market. Instead of statically increasing prices, tacit collusion may also enable firms to engage in price discrimi- nation. If price discrimination does not increase the quantity of goods sold in a market, then it creates market inefficiencies primarily in the terms of decreased welfare in the market, but also induces a shift of existing welfare from consumers to producers. If price discrimination does exist in a market, it would come in the form of price dispersion, which would indicate different prices being charged to different consumers in the market. The airline industry is a favored industry of industrial organization due to publicly avail- able data and well-defined markets. Evidence for the effect of multimarket contact and its role in facilitating collusion begins with Evans and Kessides (1994), who use airline data to find evidence of a positive effect of multimarket contact on prices. At the same time, Borenstein and Rose (1994) use the airline industry to investigate the effects of competi- tion on price dispersion. We believe it is a natural extension to use airline industry data to examine the effect of multimarket contact on price dispersion as a mechanism of tacit collusion, since strong empirical evidence exists connecting the effect of multimarket contact as a specific mechanism of competition on prices as an effect of tacit collusion, and empirical evidence exists connecting the effect of competition within a market on price dispersion as a mechanism of tacit collusion. We replicate models from the literature, and then apply the models to price dispersion as an independent variable. 1 2 Literature Review 2.1 Multimarket Contact The microeconomic theory of multimarket contacted was formalized by Bernheim and Whin- ston (1990). Bernheim and Whinston produce an irrelevance result for multimarket contact; competition across markets would not affect firm strategy under assumptions of identical markets, identical firms, and constant returns to scale. In the absence of these assumptions, competition across markets may have an effect on firm strategies. Evans and Kessides (1994) find that the airline industry is an ideal industry to test for multimarket contact. Since city- pair markets are well-defined in the airline industry, there are no ad-hoc assumptions made by the researcher. The hub system for airlines encourages airport dominance, which differ- entiates production costs across markets. Firms also sort into national, regional, or low-cost carriers, with varying access to capital and production costs across markets. There is also significant discretized returns to scale as the cost to fly a plane faces only marginally increases fuel costs between flying a single passenger or flying at full capacity. Evans and Kessides (1994) then test the hypothesis that prices in the airline industry are affected by multimarket competition using panel data from 1984 to 1988. EK use an OLS regression on log prices on a suite of controls and a constructed variable to measure multimarket contact, controlling for fixed effects. The multimarket contacted variable con- structed in EK (1994), labeled AverageContact, is a monumental construction in future works addressing multimarket contact in the airline industry. The results conclude that empirical evidence upholds the BW theory of multimarket contact and tacit collusion, such that markets whose firms compete in a number of other markets find significantly higher prices overall as compared to markets whose firms face a low amount of multimarket con- tact. Evans and Kessides also find that market fixed-effects have a significant negative effect on the magnitude of multimarket contact. CW (2014) reexamine multimarket contact in the airline industry by revisiting EK (1994). Using updated data from 2004 to 2007 combined with survey data concerning gate leases, CW (2014) explore structural parameters of tacit collusion. The results find that firms with little multimarket contact do not collude and marginal changes in multimarket contact are only significant for firms at low levels of contact, as well as reinforcing the previous results that assuming Bertrand-Nash competition for firms will lead to biased results. Relevant to our paper, they replicate EK (1994) reduced-form analysis and Ciliberto and Williams suggest that the AverageContact variable as constructed by EK is itself endogenous at the beginning of their research. Ciliberto and Williams also explore a wider variety of control specifications as well as using number of gates leased by a firm and their competition at airports in the market as an instrumental variable for the AverageContact regressor. 2 2.2 Price Dispersion Concurrently to Evans and Kessides in 1994, Borenstein and Rose (1994) examine the airline industry. Instead of analyzing mutltimarket contact, however, Borenstein and Rose investi- gate price dispersion in the airline industry. BR (1994) uses the Gini coefficient (defined in Section 3.4) as a measure of price dispersion. The results find that price dispersion cannot be entirely explained by cost variation, and instead that price discrimination is driving a significant effect of price variation. BR further explain possible sources of price dispersion, emphasizing that price discrimination may increase in the face of increasing competition. Borenstein and Rose also use an OLS regression of Gini on a suite of controls as well as several variables to measure competition, and then instrument the competition variable. The result of BR is a finding of a positive association of competition within a market to price dispersion, of which a significant portion of the price dispersion is attributed to price discrimination. GS (2009) revisit Borenstein and
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Business & Commercial Aviation
    BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL AVIATION LEONARDO AW609 PERFORMANCE PLATEAUS OCEANIC APRIL 2020 $10.00 AviationWeek.com/BCA Business & Commercial Aviation AIRCRAFT UPDATE Leonardo AW609 Bringing tiltrotor technology to civil aviation FUEL PLANNING ALSO IN THIS ISSUE Part 91 Department Inspections Is It Airworthy? Oceanic Fuel Planning Who Says It’s Ready? APRIL 2020 VOL. 116 NO. 4 Performance Plateaus Digital Edition Copyright Notice The content contained in this digital edition (“Digital Material”), as well as its selection and arrangement, is owned by Informa. and its affiliated companies, licensors, and suppliers, and is protected by their respective copyright, trademark and other proprietary rights. Upon payment of the subscription price, if applicable, you are hereby authorized to view, download, copy, and print Digital Material solely for your own personal, non-commercial use, provided that by doing any of the foregoing, you acknowledge that (i) you do not and will not acquire any ownership rights of any kind in the Digital Material or any portion thereof, (ii) you must preserve all copyright and other proprietary notices included in any downloaded Digital Material, and (iii) you must comply in all respects with the use restrictions set forth below and in the Informa Privacy Policy and the Informa Terms of Use (the “Use Restrictions”), each of which is hereby incorporated by reference. Any use not in accordance with, and any failure to comply fully with, the Use Restrictions is expressly prohibited by law, and may result in severe civil and criminal penalties. Violators will be prosecuted to the maximum possible extent. You may not modify, publish, license, transmit (including by way of email, facsimile or other electronic means), transfer, sell, reproduce (including by copying or posting on any network computer), create derivative works from, display, store, or in any way exploit, broadcast, disseminate or distribute, in any format or media of any kind, any of the Digital Material, in whole or in part, without the express prior written consent of Informa.
    [Show full text]
  • Airline Competition Plan Final Report
    Final Report Airline Competition Plan Philadelphia International Airport Prepared for Federal Aviation Administration in compliance with requirements of AIR21 Prepared by City of Philadelphia Division of Aviation Philadelphia, Pennsylvania August 31, 2000 Final Report Airline Competition Plan Philadelphia International Airport Prepared for Federal Aviation Administration in compliance with requirements of AIR21 Prepared by City of Philadelphia Division of Aviation Philadelphia, Pennsylvania August 31, 2000 SUMMARY S-1 Summary AIRLINE COMPETITION PLAN Philadelphia International Airport The City of Philadelphia, owner and operator of Philadelphia International Airport, is required to submit annually to the Federal Aviation Administration an airline competition plan. The City’s plan for 2000, as documented in the accompanying report, provides information regarding the availability of passenger terminal facilities, the use of passenger facility charge (PFC) revenues to fund terminal facilities, airline leasing arrangements, patterns of airline service, and average airfares for passengers originating their journeys at the Airport. The plan also sets forth the City’s current and planned initiatives to encourage competitive airline service at the Airport, construct terminal facilities needed to accommodate additional airline service, and ensure that access is provided to airlines wishing to serve the Airport on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms. These initiatives are summarized in the following paragraphs. Encourage New Airline Service Airlines that have recently started scheduled domestic service at Philadelphia International Airport include AirTran Airways, America West Airlines, American Trans Air, Midway Airlines, Midwest Express Airlines, and National Airlines. Airlines that have recently started scheduled international service at the Airport include Air France and Lufthansa. The City intends to continue its programs to encourage airlines to begin or increase service at the Airport.
    [Show full text]
  • 21 December 2020 Case No.: 2018-AIR-00041 in the Matter Of
    U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges 2 Executive Campus, Suite 450 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 (856) 486-3800 (856) 486-3806 (FAX) Issue Date: 21 December 2020 Case No.: 2018-AIR-00041 In the Matter of KARLENE PETITT Complainant v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC. Respondent DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING RELIEF This matter arises under the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR 21”), which was signed into law on April 5, 2000. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121. The Act includes a whistleblower protection provision, with a Department of Labor complaint procedure. Implementing regulations are at 29 C.F.R. Part 1979, published at 68 Fed. Reg. 14,100 (Mar. 21, 2003). The Decision and Order that follows is based on an analysis of the record, including items not specifically addressed the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Complainant filed an AIR 21 complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) on June 6, 2016. In its July 13, 2018 letter, OSHA, acting on behalf of the Secretary, found that the parties are covered under the Act, but there was insufficient evidence to establish reasonable cause that a violation occurred. Accordingly, OSHA dismissed the complaint. On August 1, 2018, Complainant objected to OSHA’s findings and requested a formal hearing before the Office of Administrative Law Judges. Subsequently, on August 27, 2018, this matter was assigned to the undersigned. On August 28, 2018, this Tribunal issued the Notice of Assignment and Conference Call. Complainant responded to the Notice of Assignment by letter dated September 6, 2018, and attached her statement, which was originally transmitted as part of her Complaint to OSHA.
    [Show full text]
  • Garmin Reveals Autoland Feature Rotorcraft Industry Slams Possible by Matt Thurber NYC Helo Ban Page 45
    PUBLICATIONS Vol.50 | No.12 $9.00 DECEMBER 2019 | ainonline.com Flying Short-field landings in the Falcon 8X page 24 Regulations UK Labour calls for bizjet ban page 14 Industry Forecast sees deliveries rise in 2020 page 36 Gratitude for Service Honor flight brings vets to D.C. page 41 Air Transport Lion Air report cites multiple failures page 51 Rotorcraft Garmin reveals Autoland feature Industry slams possible by Matt Thurber NYC helo ban page 45 For the past eight years, Garmin has secretly Mode. The Autoland system is designed to Autoland and how it works, I visited been working on a fascinating new capabil- safely fly an airplane from cruising altitude Garmin’s Olathe, Kansas, headquarters for ity, an autoland function that can rescue an to a suitable runway, then land the airplane, a briefing and demo flight in the M600 with airplane with an incapacitated pilot or save apply brakes, and stop the engine. Autoland flight test pilot and engineer Eric Sargent. a pilot when weather conditions present can even switch on anti-/deicing systems if The project began in 2011 with a Garmin no other safe option. Autoland should soon necessary. engineer testing some algorithms that could receive its first FAA approval, with certifi- Autoland is available for aircraft manu- make an autolanding possible, and in 2014 cation expected shortly in the Piper M600, facturers to incorporate in their airplanes Garmin accomplished a first autolanding in followed by the Cirrus Vision Jet. equipped with Garmin G3000 avionics and a Columbia 400 piston single. In September The Garmin Autoland system is part of autothrottle.
    [Show full text]
  • Flying Under the Radar: Multimarket Contact and Tacit Collusion in the U.S
    Flying Under the Radar: Multimarket Contact and Tacit Collusion in the U.S. Airline Industry A SENIOR THESIS Submitted to the Faculty in the Department of Economics at Miami University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of Departmental Honors By Henry Jameson Shaneyfelt* Miami University Spring 2021 ABSTRACT This paper serves to identify the effects of multimarket contact on tacit collusion through the measures of average price and price dispersion. Implementing methods used in Evans and Kessides (1994) and Ciliberto and Williams (2014), I employ gate-use data to instrument for the average multimarket contact variable and address any potential bias from endogeneity. Additionally, squared gate-use instruments, which are novel to the existing literature, are included in the analysis. When using the novel instruments, a significant positive relationship is found between average multimarket contact and both prices and price dispersion. Advisor: Dr. Charles Moul *I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Moul for all the help he has provided me throughout this process. I would also like to thank the Miami University Economics Department for giving me the opportunity to complete this research project. 1 Introduction The majority of classical microeconomic theory is based in the analysis of market behavior that does not extend beyond the market’s scope. External markets and their effects on firm behavior are typically not studied at length. However, the modern-day economy is seeing an increasing number of firms competing with rival firms in numerous differing markets at a given time. An intriguing attribute of this newly structured economy is the ability for firms to interact with rivals across markets.
    [Show full text]
  • The Air Carrier Access Act: It Is Time for an Overhaul
    The Air Carrier Access Act: It Is Time for an Overhaul by Stuart A. Hindman∗ It is axiomatic that flying in today’s post-September 11th world is a hassle. Between airlines suggesting that passengers arrive at the airport anywhere from 60 minutes to 120 minutes before flight time1 and security checkpoints that can be anything but user-friendly, flying today is turning author Greg Anderson’s idea, “[f]ocus on the journey, not the destination,”2 into something of a misnomer. Imagine then, in addition to check-in counters, long lines at security checkpoints, great distances between terminals and boarding gates, crowded airports, and less than favorable flying conditions, having to navigate the world of air travel with a disability. Depending on the nature and extent of the disability, accommodations needed to help the disabled passenger could be as simple as extra time on the jet bridge or a wheelchair through the airport. But, as will be discussed in this paper, these small requests might subject a disabled individual to discrimination, mental and potential physical injury, not to mention precious lost time, lengthy delays, unnecessary costs, and other unpleasantness that come with embarking into today’s world of transportation by air. As former Chief Justice Rehnquist put it, “[d]elays may be particularly costly in [air travel], as a flight missed by only a few minutes can result in hours worth of subsequent inconvenience.”3 This paper will focus on the statutory protections for travelers with disabling conditions, specifically the Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA),4 as well as the remedies, or lack thereof, which are afforded to passengers when incidents of discrimination occur.
    [Show full text]
  • Predation, Competition and Antitrust Law: Turbulence in the Airline Industry Paul Stephen Dempsey
    Journal of Air Law and Commerce Volume 67 | Issue 3 Article 4 2002 Predation, Competition and Antitrust Law: Turbulence in the Airline Industry Paul Stephen Dempsey Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc Recommended Citation Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predation, Competition and Antitrust Law: Turbulence in the Airline Industry, 67 J. Air L. & Com. 685 (2002) https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol67/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. PREDATION, COMPETITION & ANTITRUST LAW: TURBULENCE IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY* PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY** TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 688 II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF PREDATION ......... 692 A. HUB CONCENTRATION .......................... 692 B. MEGACARRIER ALLIANCES ....................... 700 C. EXAMPLES OF PREDATORY PRICING By MAJOR AIRLINES ........................................ 702 1. Major Network Airline Competitive Response To Entry By Another Major Network Airline ...... 715 a. Denver-Philadelphia: United vs. U SA ir .................................. 716 b. Minneapolis/St. Paul - Cleveland: Northwest vs. Continental ............. 717 2. Major Network Airline Competitive Response To Entry By Southwest Airlines .................. 718 a. St. Louis-Cleveland: TWA vs. Southwest .............................. 719 * Copyright © 2002 by the author. The author would like to thank Professor Robert Hardaway for his contribution to the portion of this essay addressing the essential facility doctrine. The author would also like to thank Sam Addoms and Bob Schulman, CEO and Vice President, respectively, of Frontier Airlines for their invaluable assistance in reviewing and commenting on the case study contained herein involving monopolization of Denver.
    [Show full text]
  • RCED-97-4 Airline Deregulation
    United States General Accounting Office Report to the Chairman, Committee on GAO Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate October 1996 AIRLINE DEREGULATION Barriers to Entry Continue to Limit Competition in Several Key Domestic Markets GOA years 1921 - 1996 GAO/RCED-97-4 United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division B-272128 October 18, 1996 The Honorable Larry Pressler Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation United States Senate Dear Mr. Chairman: Earlier this year, in a report prepared at your request, we reported that, overall, airfares have decreased and service has improved since the deregulation of the airline industry in 1978.1 A key factor contributing to this trend has been the increased competition spurred by the entry of (1) new airlines into the industry and (2) established airlines into new markets. Nevertheless, we also found that a number of airports, primarily in the Southeast and upper Midwest, have not experienced such entry and therefore have not experienced the lower fares and improved service that deregulation has brought to the rest of the nation. Our April 1996 report was the latest in a series of studies over the past decade in which we have examined competition in the deregulated airline industry.2 In August 1990, we reported that several operating and marketing practices, such as incumbent airlines leasing airport gates under long-term, exclusive-use terms, had begun to restrict entry to an extent not fully anticipated by the Congress when it deregulated the industry.3 In 1991, we reported that many of these barriers to entry contributed to higher fares.4 Concerned about our finding earlier this year that some communities have not shared in the economic benefits of deregulation, you asked us to update our work on barriers to entry.
    [Show full text]
  • National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) (2009-2013)
    Cover Photographs (from top to bottom) Chicago O’Hare International Airport, August 11, 2007. Photo courtesy of Marcin Sordyl. Boeing 737-900ER, the newest member of the Next-Generation 737 airplane family. Photo courtesy of Boeing. NPIAS 2009 – 2013 Illustrated by GRA, Incorporated Federal Aviation Administration U.S. Department of Transportation National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems (NPIAS) (2009-2013) Report of the Secretary of Transportation to the United States Congress Pursuant to Section 47103 of Title 49, United States Code The NPIAS 2009-2013 report will be available online at http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraffic/airports/planning_capacity/ Table of Contents FORWARD .........................................................................................................................................V EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................VII Status of the Industry .............................................................................................................. vii Development Estimates ......................................................................................................... viii Estimates by Airport Type........................................................................................... ix Estimates by Type of Development............................................................................. xi CHAPTER 1: SYSTEM COMPOSITION.......................................................................................1
    [Show full text]
  • Before the Department of Transportation Office of the Secretary Washington, D.C
    BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C. Complaint of Spirit Airlines, Inc. For Investigation of the Joint Venture Agreements announced by American Airlines and JetBlue Airways Docket DOT-OST-2021-0001 Under 49 U.S.C. §§ 41712 as an Unfair Method of Competition SUPPLEMENT TO COMPLAINT BASED ON MARKET IMPLEMENTATION OF AMERICAN’S STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS Communications with respect to this document should be sent to: Joanne W. Young David M. Kirstein Kirstein & Young, PLLC 1750 K Street N.W. Suite 700 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 331-3348 [email protected] [email protected] Counsel for Spirit Airlines, Inc. May 12, 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Ninety-six percent (96%) of NEA codeshares overlap at airports with American-Alaska codeshares, enabling marketing advantages and facilitating anticompetitive conduct throughout the country ........................ 4 a. American has secured unique and never-reviewed unfair competitive advantages by linking its two Strategic Partnerships throughout the largest domestic air travel markets ....................................................................................... 5 b. Market activity suggests anticompetitive price-signaling is already occurring in markets covered by the Strategic Partnerships’ codeshares ................................ 8 c. American has expressly identified its plans to leverage its Strategic Partnerships to dominate markets nationwide ....................................................... 10 II. Nearly 50% of all FAA slots are being
    [Show full text]
  • Stmt of Financial Affairs,. Filed by Superior Air Charter, LLC
    Case 20-11007-CSS Doc 92 Filed 06/04/20 Page 1 of 43 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF DELAWARE In re Chapter 11 SUPERIOR AIR CHARTER, LLC,1 Case No. 20-11007 (CSS) Debtor. GLOBAL NOTES, METHODOLOGY AND SPECIFIC DISCLOSURES REGARDING THE DEBTOR’S SCHEDULES OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES AND STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS Introduction Superior Air Charter, LLC, the debtor and debtor in possession (the “Debtor”) in the above- captioned chapter 11 case (the “Case”) submit its Schedules of Assets and Liabilities (the “Schedules”) and Statement of Financial Affairs (the “Statement”, and together with the Schedules, the “Schedules and Statement”) pursuant to section 521 of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) and Rule 1007 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”). These Global Notes, Methodology, and Specific Disclosures Regarding the Debtor’s Schedules and Statement (the “Global Notes”) pertain to, are incorporated by reference in, and comprise an integral part of the Schedules and Statement. The Global Notes should be referred to, considered, and reviewed in connection with any review of the Schedules and Statement. In preparing the Schedules and Statement, the Debtor relied upon information derived from its books and records that were available at the time of such preparation. Although the Debtor has made reasonable efforts to ensure the accuracy and completeness of such financial information, inadvertent errors or omissions, as well as the discovery of conflicting, revised, or subsequent information, may cause a material change to the Schedules and Statement. Accordingly, the Debtor reserves all of its rights to amend, supplement, or otherwise modify the Schedules and Statement as is necessary and appropriate.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Department of Labor Issue Date: 21 December 2020 Case No.: 2018
    U.S. Department of Labor Office of Administrative Law Judges 2 Executive Campus, Suite 450 Cherry Hill, NJ 08002 (856) 486-3800 (856) 486-3806 (FAX) Issue Date: 21 December 2020 Case No.: 2018-AIR-00041 In the Matter of KARLENE PETITT Complainant v. DELTA AIR LINES, INC. Respondent DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING RELIEF This matter arises under the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR 21”), which was signed into law on April 5, 2000. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121. The Act includes a whistleblower protection provision, with a Department of Labor complaint procedure. Implementing regulations are at 29 C.F.R. Part 1979, published at 68 Fed. Reg. 14,100 (Mar. 21, 2003). The Decision and Order that follows is based on an analysis of the record, including items not specifically addressed the arguments of the parties, and the applicable law. I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Complainant filed an AIR 21 complaint with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) on June 6, 2016. In its July 13, 2018 letter, OSHA, acting on behalf of the Secretary, found that the parties are covered under the Act, but there was insufficient evidence to establish reasonable cause that a violation occurred. Accordingly, OSHA dismissed the complaint. On August 1, 2018, Complainant objected to OSHA’s findings and requested a formal hearing before the Office of Administrative Law Judges. Subsequently, on August 27, 2018, this matter was assigned to the undersigned. On August 28, 2018, this Tribunal issued the Notice of Assignment and Conference Call. Complainant responded to the Notice of Assignment by letter dated September 6, 2018, and attached her statement, which was originally transmitted as part of her Complaint to OSHA.
    [Show full text]