Key Dates in History of the Royal Observer Corps

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Key Dates in History of the Royal Observer Corps Key Dates in History of the Royal Observer Corps Please note the following details were originally taken from the Norfolk Aviation Museum website, which I felt was a good starting point... http://aviationmuseum.net/ROCDates.html These records were supplemented by extracts and information from the following... Attack Warning Red [Derek Wood]. Cold War Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946-1989 [W.D.Cocroft & R.C.Thomas], Forewarned is Forearmed [T.E.Winslow], Forewarned is Forearmed [H.Buckton], Protection From The Cold [S.Craine & N.Ryan], ROC Underground Monitoring Posts [M.Dalton] and Watchers over the Broad Acres [N.Spence] John Rimmington November 2016 Key Date information is shown in Bold... 1588 Royal Observer Corps has its roots in the Elizabethan Beacon Lighters who faced their first major test when the Spanish Armada arrived off of the coast in July 1588, which was decisively sunk at sea. Beacons were used for defensive and warning purposes from the early 1300s to the mid-1600’s. 1914-1918 In World War One there was a need in the Greater London Area to warn the military, government, transport etc. of approaching enemy aircraft and airships. Initially policemen telephoned reports of any aircraft seen or heard within 60 miles of London to the Admiralty who were then in charge of defence 1915 By this period, this area was increased to cover the South and East of England. 1916 The War Office took over defence in 1916. Coastal Plotting Posts were established and manned by Special Constables whose reports went to the London Air Defence Area (L.A.D.A) operations room in Horse Guards, London. Here there were plotting maps and communications to AA guns, aerodromes and telephones to the posts. The Organisation became known as the Metropolitan Observation Service. With the end of the Great War the service was stood down. 1914-1918 During the First World War there were 103 bombing raids with 1,413 people killed (607 in London alone) and 3,407 injured. 1925 After a number of Air Defence exercises using Police Observation Posts the Observer Corps was established with two groups of posts manned by Special Constables under Major General Ashmore (Army), the Home Office and the Royal Air Force. 1929 The Observer Corps taken over by the Air Ministry. Observers January 1st remained Special Constables Page 1 1929 The Beacon Lighter Badge and Motto “Forewarned is Forearmed” October 22nd was announced 1934 Start of a six year expansion programme as tensions and aerial technology within Europe began to grow. 1938 Observer Corps called out, and then released a number of times until September 26th 1st October because of the on-going “Munich Crisis”. 1939 The Observer Corps is mobilised on a war footing. For the next August 24th five and a half years no post or centre was unmanned. Observers ceased to be Special Constables and transferred to the Air Ministry. 1940 From April coastal area posts were put on ‘special watch’ and asked April to report: Gunfire, Explosions, Parachutes, Coastal Landings, Shipping and Convoys and Suspicious vehicles, people and lights. 1940 From May coastal and exposed posts issued with two rifles, bayonets May and ammunition. 1940 The Battle of Britain; Friend or foe were plotted giving essential July- information to the RAF Groups and Sectors. During this period the October Luftwaffe lost about 1,800 aircraft. At the same time as plotting and observing German aircraft formations, the posts would also plot loose Barrage Balloons, bombs, crashed aircraft and whether or not the crew had bailed out of the latter. Crews also helped with the capturing of German Aircrew, and came to the aid of British Pilots who had been shot down. 1940 Special OC posts in London took over air raid warnings for the House September of Commons and 400 departments of the government and military; later factories were added to this list 1941 Royal Observer Corps... In recognition of the Corps excellent work, April 9th King George VI granted the title Royal to be added to the Observer Corps official title. 1941 ROC crew correctly plotted the Messerschmitt Bf-110 which had May 10th been commandeered by Rudolf Hess as he tried to escape to negotiate peace with Britain against Hitler’s will. 1941 Authority given for women to join the Royal Observer Corps with July the same rights, status and on merit the same rank as male observers. 1941 Members of the Radio Security Service were allowed the wear ROC September uniform as ‘cover’ for their secret radio listening watch. 1941 Agreed that RAF two-piece blue battle-dress to be issued to all male December and female observers. Page 2 1942 Satellite posts established near the coast to give better coverage August/September against Fock-Wulf Fw-190 hit and run raids. They also gave air raid warnings to coastal towns. Coastal ports were also issued with ‘Totter’ rocket projectiles to alert AA gun crews and any nearby fighters as well as local residents that a German attack was approaching the area.1942-October- 45 ROC posts (London locally) were equipped with TR9D high-frequency short-range radio sets, with a range of about ten miles. Under the code word “Darkie”, damaged or lost aircraft could call up on the TR9 and the post would give them the bearing and distance to fly to the nearest diversion airfield; in the case of London it was RAF Coltishall who would turn on a canopy of searchlights to guide the aircraft to them. Other posts were equipped with searchlights to point towards the diversion airfield closest 1942 Ten posts equipped with gun laying (GL) radar sets (Locally: November 15th Brundall, Docking, Melton Constable, Halesworth and Orford Posts) to enable ROC to pick out enemy aircraft in returning bomber formations, aiding RAF night fighters. 1943 Coastal posts were to report any carrier pigeons heading out to sea July that may have been released by enemy agents 1943 ROC posts requested to report any dangerous low flying RAF pilots November and include unit markings and the time of the incident 1943 The first Master Test was held. Observers had to score 180 out of December 12th 200 in aircraft recognition tests to pass 1944 ROC took over all Red, Purple and White air raid warning in the UK. April 22nd The Corps were not allowed to sound the air raid warning for single aircraft because the government considered it better to suffer slight damage than disruption in factories, offices etc. 1944 ROC ‘Seaborne’ Observers, with the naval rank of Petty Officer, May/June/July served on board some ships taking part in the D-Day invasion. These 796 men controlled the AA guns, their ages ranging from 17 to 70 years old. US and Royal Navy personnel relied on the observer’s knowledge of aircraft recognition. Two observers were Killed In Action 1944 Under the codeword ‘Diver’ the first V-1 flying bomb was June 13th correctly identified and plotted. Thousands more V-1s were to follow the first. Some coastal ROC posts were equipped with “Snowflake” rockets to show the track of the V-1s within two miles of their posts to help patrolling fighters. Further inland, towards London, other ROC posts were equipped with Red Star rockets to warn fighters chasing V-1s that they were approaching the Balloon Barrage 1944 The first V2 rocket impacted at Chiswick. About 1054 were to September 8th follow until 27th March 1945. The ROC were unable to give any warning to the public, but if post members saw the trail of the rocket as it took off from the continent, the post was required to give its bearing and angle; with other posts doing likewise the launch-site could be pinpointed and attacked where possible. Page 3 1945 Final Luftwaffe air raid. 20th March 1945 VE-Day. The ROC was stood down for four days later at 17:00 8th May hours. Between 1943 and the end of the war, the ROC played their part in saving over 7,000 aircraft and crew using the ‘Darkie’ TR9D radio, along with 340 ROC posts equipped with ‘Granite’ flares; these warned pilots that they were approaching high ground and if they kept heading in that direction they would crash To help further 15 high ground posts were equipped with ‘Augmented Granite’ being a special radio on 6,440 KHZ which gave an audible warning to the pilot. It was known as the ‘Mountain Warning’ beacon. 1947 The Royal Observer Corps was officially reformed, to become January 1st part of Britain’s Air Defences. Training started afresh as did visits to RAF stations. 1947 No’s 1 and 2 Groups, Maidstone and Horsham, were put on an September operational footing with all their posts and centres operational within four hours. Jewish Terrorists of the Stern gang threatened to drop explosives from light aircraft onto London. The ROC proceeded to track all aircraft, in co-operation with No II Group Fighter Command and their standing patrols of fighters. The emergency came to an end within a day when the Terrorists were captured in Paris 1948 Annual Summer Training Camps established. First Camp at RAF Thorney Island 1949 Trials held with the ROC being equipped with AMES TYPE 6 MK 8 radar sets, and the American AN/TPS2 mobile radar sets. Both were rejected as the MkI eyeball was better! It was several years before the RAF had decent radar coverage, in fact during the 1948 air defence exercises, Chain Home Extra Low (CHEL) radar stations only detected 2 out of 19 low-level raids.
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