February 2020
Monthly Forecast
1 Overview Overview 1 In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2019 Belgium has the February presidency of the on the 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee. It 3 Status Update Since Security Council. It has decided to hold an open is also expected to adopt resolutions extending our January Forecast debate on transitional justice, and will also hold the mandates of the UN Integrated Peacebuild- 4 Libya a high-level briefing on Integrating“ child pro- ing Office (UNIOGBIS) in Guinea-Bissau, the tection into peace processes to resolve conflict Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanc- 6 Small Arms and sustain peace”. Belgian King Philippe and tions Committee as well as the measures related 7 OSCE Briefing Queen Mathilde are expected to be in atten- to the illicit export of crude oil from Libya, and 8 Counter-Terrorism dance, and King Philippe will most likely make the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan 9 Children and Armed a statement. Both the debate and the briefing Sanctions Committee. Conflict will be presided over by the country’s foreign On Yemen, there will be a briefing in consul- 11 Transitional Justice minister, Philippe Goffin. tations and the adoption of a resolution renew- There will be two other meetings, briefings ing financial and travel ban sanctions and the 12 Guinea-Bissau both, on thematic issues: on the threat posed by mandate of the Yemen Panel of Experts. There 14 Yemen the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the will be the three regular meetings on Syria: brief- 15 Syria Secretary-General’s tenth strategic-level report; ings followed by consultations on the political 17 Central African and on small arms, to consider the Secretary- and humanitarian situation and a meeting in Republic General’s sixth biennial report on the topic. consultations on chemical weapons. The regu- 18 Haiti Two meetings on European organisations are lar briefing and consultations on Israel/Palestine expected: the annual briefing by the Chairper- will also take place. 19 EU-UN Briefing son-in-Office of the Organization for Security and The Council will receive its first briefing, 20 Burundi Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the annual followed by consultations, on the new special 21 Somalia meeting on strengthening the partnership with political mission, the UN Integrated Office in 23 DPRK (North Korea) the EU, with a briefing by theEU High Repre- Haiti (BINUH). 24 Lead Roles within sentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Regarding Asia, a briefing in consultations is the Council in 2020: Several African issues will be addressed in expected on the work of the 1718 Democratic Penholders and Chairs February. The Council expects briefings, fol- People’s Republic of Korea Sanctions Committee. of Subsidiary Bodies lowed by consultations, on Central African Council members will most likely follow Republic, Guinea-Bissau and Somalia. It will closely developments in Myanmar and South hold an informal interactive dialogue on Burun- Sudan, although no meetings on these issues di. It will hold consultations to receive a briefing were scheduled at press time.
In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2019
In 2019, geopolitical tensions continued to be occupying slightly less time, too. reflected in Council action. Difficult and pro- In addition, more time was spent in sanctions tracted negotiations were a regular feature, with committees and working groups, which met 172 31 January 2020 pushback on previously agreed language from times in 2019, compared to 144 times in 2018. This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. past resolutions. This difficult dynamic among Informal formats—Arria-formula and informal Council members is apparent in the 2019 sta- interactive dialogue meetings—stood at about For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please tistics. Formal Council decisions were at their the same number. subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” lowest number since 1991. There were fewer for- Finding consensus on the most contentious series at whatsinblue.org or follow @SCRtweets on Twitter. mal meetings and consultations than in 2018, issues was difficult. Six draft resolutions failed to
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 1 In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2019 be adopted due to either vetoes or insufficient TRENDS IN 2019 Fewer Public Meetings, More votes—over ten percent of the 58 resolutions An Overall Decline in the Number of Consultations tabled. The three vetoes, the same number as Decisions There was a small drop in the number of in 2018, were on Syria (two) and Venezuela The Council adopted 67 decisions (resolu- formal public and private meetings and con- (one). Two Syria draft resolutions and one tions and presidential statements) in 2019, the sultations, from 396 in 2018 to 384 in 2019. Ukraine draft resolution were not adopted lowest in 18 years. The number of resolutions However, there appears to have been a shift because of insufficient votes. Eight resolu- has been falling since 2016, and although the in the trend of the last three years, which tions out of 52 adopted had fewer than 15 52 adopted in 2019 was only two fewer than favoured meeting in public rather than in votes: just over 15%, compared to just over in 2018, it was the lowest in six years. Most consultations, as Council members acknowl- 16% non-unanimous resolutions in 2018. resolutions continued to be mandate exten- edged the desire for better balance between These abstentions came on sanctions resolu- sions and sanctions renewals, but there were the transparency of public meetings and the tions (South Sudan and Somalia), peacekeep- also resolutions on thematic issues, including need for private discussion. Council mem- ing mandate renewals (Haiti and Western terrorism; protection of civilians; and women, bers met 135 times in consultations, com- Sahara), and for the first time on a women, peace and security. Presidential statements fell pared to 120 in 2018: a 12.5 percent increase. peace and security resolution. Members even more drastically, from 21 in 2018 to 15 Formal meetings dropped by 10.4 per- abstaining on the different drafts included last year. The low number may be attributed cent. After a record-high number of public China, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominican Republic, to greater difficulty in reaching consensus, meetings--275 in 2018 and 282 in 2017--the Equatorial Guinea, Russia, and South Africa. resulting in presidential statements either not Council held 243 public meetings in 2019. There were only two procedural votes, being adopted or Council members choosing Fifteen private meetings were held, slightly after four in 2018. They were on Ukraine not to use this format, particularly following more than in 2018. Unusually, this format, and Venezuela, both over an objection to a presidency’s signature event. The Coun- typically used for meetings with troop-con- the provisional agenda for the meeting. The cil was unable to reach agreement on a draft tributing countries, was used for a discussion lower number of procedural votes may signal text following the closure of the mission in about chemical weapons in Syria with the greater uncertainty, in 2019, that nine votes Haiti although it is customary for the Coun- head of the Organisation for the Prohibition would be available on some issues. As in 2018, cil to issue a presidential statement on such of Chemical Weapons, as the closed setting a meeting on the human rights situation in occasions. Presidential statements in 2019 allowed the Council to have a frank discus- the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea were largely used to urge implementation of sion with a briefer not from the Secretariat. (DPRK), which for four years had been held an agreement, or to show support for a new In May 2019, during the Secretary-Gen- following a procedural vote, was not request- agreement or the work of an organisation or eral’s retreat for Council members, the UK ed because of calculations that there would be a regional office. Presidential statements were suggested that a new informal format for insufficient votes to have the meeting. also adopted following meetings on peace- frank discussions among the permanent There were 22 Arria-formula meetings, keeping, the 70th anniversary of the Geneva representatives was needed. Indonesia, as surpassing the 21 in 2018, which had been the Conventions, Iraq-Kuwait and missing per- president for the month of May, hosted the highest since the start of this format in 1992. sons, and the League of Arab states. first meeting in this format, referred to as Members appear to be using this format for Press statements, which for some years “sofa talks”. issues that are likely to be blocked if brought had been the Council’s most common for- to the Council for a formal discussion. mat for responding to specific violent inci- A Council Divided One new issue, Venezuela, was added to dents, fell sharply from 88 in 2018 to 67 Strained relations among the permanent the formal agenda of the Council. Adding in 2019. One reason for this may be that members (P5) on the global stage continued it proved to be polarising, requiring a pro- Council members were more selective about to affect Council dynamics. For the last few cedural vote. For the first time since 1965, issuing press statements following attacks years, Russia and the US have been on oppos- the Council met on the issue of Jammu and by terrorists and against civilians, which ing sides in conflicts in the Middle East and Kashmir under the agenda item “The India- dropped from 54 percent of all press state- Europe. There are rising tensions with China, Pakistan Question”. ments in 2018 to 43.4 percent in 2019. which has become increasingly assertive glob- One new mission was established: the UN The fall in the number of formal outcomes ally and in the Council. At the same time, the Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement correlates to the difficulty in getting agree- US has retreated from active engagement in (UNMHA), and one follow-on mission, the ment. A number of outcomes were negotiated multilateral institutions and is increasingly UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), but not adopted, including draft presidential focused on domestic issues and on pursuing which succeeded a peacekeeping mission, the statements on mediation and mercenaries issues bilaterally. UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti. and a draft resolution on the financing of In the Council, Russia and the US remain African-led peacekeeping missions. Members deadlocked on Syria, on which Russia cast may also have been more reluctant to sug- its 14th veto in December 2019, and on gest outcomes in the face of potential vetoes Ukraine. The situation in Venezuela came in or tough negotiations that could result in as a new divisive issue. China has begun to watered-down consensus outcomes. take strong positions on issues that affect its
2 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 In Hindsight: The Security Council in 2019 wider domestic priorities. It has been par- appears more aligned with China and Rus- several issues has led regional sub-groups ticularly assertive on Afghanistan, threaten- sia than with France and the UK. to show Council support on divisive issues. ing to veto the renewal of the UNAMA’s The elected members (E10) have con- In 2019, the recently departed, present and mandate over language related to its Belt tinued to meet regularly among themselves future EU members of the Council pre- and Road Initiative, and on Jammu-Kash- as well as with the Secretary-General. They sented seven joint statements and appeared mir, on which it initiated a Council meeting have joined forces around working methods together at press stakeouts. The statements and proposed a draft text. and made their first statement as a group in were on the DPRK, Gaza, Georgia, the Mid- France, the UK and the US (P3), which a Council meeting during the working meth- dle East, Turkish military action in north- had been a united block for years, now have ods open debate in June. The E10 made a eastern Syria, and Ukraine, which was the differing positions on issues ranging from joint media statement in November 2019 on subject of two statements. For what appears the Sahel to Iran. The biggest change has Israeli settlement activity but have found it to be the first time, the African members come from the US, which on issues such more difficult to rally around Syria humani- (A3) made joint statements, including when as sexual and reproductive health rights in tarian issues than they have in the past. the Council failed to support the AU’s call conflict, the ICC, and climate and security Difficulty in reaching agreement on for a transition to civilian rule in Sudan.
Status Update Since our January Forecast
UNOWAS and security (S/PV.8699 and Resumption 1 Democratic Republic of the Congo On 8 January, the Security Council held a & 2). Viet Nam’s Deputy Prime Minister and On 13 January Security Council members briefing (S/PV.8698) on West Africa and the Foreign Minister, Pham Binh Minh, chaired held an informal interactive dialogue on the Sahel with Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Special the meeting while Secretary-General António situation in eastern DRC with representatives Representative and Head of the UN Office Guterres and Chair of the Elders Mary Rob- of countries of the region, Special Represen- for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), inson briefed. The list of speakers had 111 tative of the Secretary-General and head of who presented the Secretary-General’s latest member states, which led to the open debate MONUSCO Leila Zerrougui, and UN Spe- report on the region (S/2019/1005). Con- continuing over the following two days. A cial Envoy for the Great Lakes region Huang sultations followed the public session. The presidential statement was adopted during Xia. The US, who called for the meeting, mandate is traditionally renewed for a three- the meeting (S/PRST/2020/1). wanted to bring together various stakeholders year period through an exchange of letters to discuss how to support the DRC govern- with the Secretary-General. Colombia ment in its efforts to stabilise eastern DRC. On 13 January, the Security Council was On 20 January, Council members met Sudan (Darfur) briefed by Special Representative of the under “any other business” to discuss the On 8 January, Council members met under Secretary-General Carlos Ruiz Massieu on independent assessment report on the pro- “any other business” to discuss the situa- the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on the tection of civilians and neutralisation of tion in Darfur. Assistant Secretary-General UN Verification Mission in Colombia and the armed groups in Beni and Mabasa Territo- for Africa Bintou Keita briefed members most recent developments (S/PV.8702). On ries prepared by Lieutenant General Carlos on recent intercommunal violence in West 15 January, Council members issued a press Alberto dos Santos Cruz. The report made Darfur, which resulted in the death of sev- statement in which they reiterated “their full several recommendations on how the UN eral dozen civilians, as well as the looting of and unanimous support” for the peace pro- could improve its role in the protection of UNAMID’s former headquarters in South cess (SC/14081). Among other things, they civilians in those two territories. The UN Darfur. Following the meeting, the president expressed serious concern about grave secu- Department of Peace Operations will use of the Council, Ambassador Dang Dinh Quy rity conditions in various parts of the country the assessment’s recommendations to devel- (Viet Nam), delivered elements to the press as well as the continued targeting of commu- op an Action Plan for implementation. condemning these two incidents. nity and social leaders and former Revolu- tionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Jammu and Kashmir The UN Charter Army members. They welcomed progress by On 13 January, the Security Council was On 9 January, the Council held a ministerial- the three components of the Integral System briefed by Assistant Secretary-General level open debate on “Maintenance of inter- for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non- Mohamed Khaled Khiari and Brigadier Gen- national peace and security: upholding the repetition and stressed the critical role these eral El Hadji Babacar Faye, Officer in Charge UN Charter” as an opportunity for member components play in the peace process and of the Office of Military Affairs (OMA) on states to reflect on and reaffirm their commit- the need for them to be able to work inde- Jammu and Kashmir under “any other busi- ment to upholding Charter principles, par- pendently and autonomously. ness” at China’s request. This follows a 12 ticularly in the context of international peace December letter (S/2019/944) from the
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 3 Status Update Since our January Forecast foreign minister of Pakistan to the Presi- Cyprus UN Regional Centre for Preventive dent of the Security Council and a request On 20 January, Council members were briefed Diplomacy for Central Asia from China for a meeting in December 2019. in consultations by Elizabeth Spehar, Special On 22 January, Council members met in Most members reiterated their position that Representative and head of UNFICYP, on consultations for a briefing on UNRCCA by this was an issue that needed to be settled recent developments and the latest Secretary- Special Representative and head of UNRC- bilaterally between India and Pakistan. General’s report (S/2020/23). On 30 January, CA Natalia Gherman. She updated Council the Council unanimously adopted resolution members on the activities of UNRCCA since Mali S/RES/2506 which extended the mandate of her last briefing in July, addressing issues On 15 January, the Council held a brief- UNFICYP for another six months. such as terrorism, foreign terrorist fighters, ing, followed by consultations, on Mali (S/ regional cooperation, transboundary water PV.8703). Under-Secretary-General for Middle East (Israel/Palestine) management, and the role of women and Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix pre- On 21 January and 22 January, the Security youth in the region. sented the Secretary-General’s latest report Council held an open debate on the situa- (S/2019/983) on Mali and the UN Multidi- tion in the Middle East, including the Pales- Cooperation between the United mensional Integrated Stabilization Mission tinian question (S/PV.8706 and Resumption Nations and the Association of South- in Mali (MINUSMA) and a Secretary-Gen- 1). Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary- east Asian Nations (ASEAN) eral’s letter on security challenges, MINUS- General for Political and Peacebuilding On 30 January, the Security Council heard MA’s performance, and transition planning Affairs, and Ursula Mueller, Assistant Sec- a briefing (S/PV.8711) on the cooperation (S/2019/1004). On 17 January, Council mem- retary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, between the UN and the Association of bers issued a press statement (SC/14083), briefed. Both DiCarlo and Mueller spoke Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Secre- noting some progress in the implementation about the negative impact of the increase in tary-General António Guterres and ASE- of the 2015 Mali Peace and Reconciliation Israeli settlements and demolition of Pales- AN Secretary-General Dato Lim Jock Hoi Agreement but expressing serious concern tinian structures. Member states spoke on briefed the Council. This briefing, held under about the delays in the implementation of various topics, ranging from the need for the agenda item “Cooperation between the many of its substantive provisions. Among the Security Council to act in support of the United Nations and regional and subregion- other points, members welcomed the Secre- two-state solution to regional developments al organizations in maintaining international tary-General’s plan, reflected in his report, to such as protests in Iran. peace and security”, was the first Council adapt MINUSMA by increasing its protected meeting focused on cooperation with ASEAN. mobility, agility and flexibility.
Libya
Expected Council Action head of the eastern-based militia known as countries”, and a “Libyan meeting of lead- In February, the Council is expected to the Libyan National Army (LNA), launched ing and influential personalities from all extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts an offensive towards Tripoli and against the over the country”. assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Commit- internationally recognised and UN-backed The proxy dimension of the Libyan con- tee and renew the measures related to the Libyan Government of National Accord flict keeps intensifying in breach of UN sanc- illicit export of crude oil from Libya ahead of (GNA) based there. Libya does not have pro- tions. Reportedly, Turkey and Qatar sup- their expiry on 15 February 2020. fessional security forces, and the GNA cur- port the GNA militarily while Egypt, Jordan, The mandate of the UN Support Mis- rently relies on armed groups for its security. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates sion in Libya (UNSMIL) expires on 15 Sep- In his 15 January report on UNSMIL, the provide military support to the LNA, and dif- tember 2020. Secretary-General described Libya as having ferent Chadian and Sudanese armed groups “endured a downward spiral of conflict”. support both sides. According to Libyan Key Recent Developments In July 2019, the Special Representative and US officials, mercenaries of the private Libya’s capital, Tripoli, has been the scene and head of UNSMIL, Ghassan Salamé, but reportedly Kremlin-affiliated Russian of fighting for over nine months, starting on proposed three steps to end the conflict: a military company Wagner Group are also 4 April 2019 when General Khalifa Haftar, truce, a high-level conference of “concerned involved on the ground in support of the
UN DOCUMENTS ON LIBYA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2491 (3 October 2019) renewed the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisa- tions, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they have reasonable grounds to suspect are being used for migrant smuggling or human trafficking.S/RES/2486 (12 September 2019) extended UNSMIL’s mandate until 15 September 2020. S/RES/2473 (10 June 2019) renewed the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya bound to or from the country that they have reasonable grounds to believe are violating the arms embargo. S/RES/2441 (5 November 2018) renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee as well as the measures related to the illicit export of crude oil from Libya until 20 February 2020; it was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). Secretary-General’s Report S/2020/41 (15 January 2020) was the latest report on UNSMIL. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV. 8710 (30 January 2020) was the latest meeting on UNSMIL and Libya sanctions. Sanctions Committee Document S/2019/914 (29 November 2019) was the latest final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee.
4 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Libya
LNA. On 2 January, the Turkish parliament unequivocally and fully respect and imple- Key Issues and Options approved the deployment of troops to Lib- ment the arms embargo” established by the An immediate issue for the Council is the ya. Following a request by the GNA, Turkey Council and called “on all international renewal of both the mandate of the Panel of started sending troops on 5 January. The actors to do the same”. The participants Experts assisting the 1970 Libya Sanctions latest report by the Secretary-General says further agreed to establish an International Committee and the measures related to the that “the dangers and direct consequences Follow-Up Committee (IFC) to coordinate illicit export of crude oil from Libya. Upon of foreign interference are increasingly evi- efforts to implement the conclusions. Sar- renewing the panel’s mandate, an option for dent. To increase the number of fighters, raj and Haftar were both in Berlin but not the Council would be to make sure that the there has been growing involvement of mer- formally a part of the conference. Shortly panel has the necessary gender expertise, as cenaries. The presence of such professional before the conference, forces allied with the requested in resolution 2441. Another option fighters has been linked to an escalation in LNA effectively shut down nearly all of Lib- would be to request the panel to increase its violence”. Speaking at a press stakeout fol- ya’s oil fields and terminals, leading to mas- written reporting to the Council to closely lowing Council consultations on Libya on sive revenue loss for the Libyan state. monitor the implementation of the Berlin 6 January, Salamé directed his remarks to UNSMIL began to work on the six bas- conference conclusions. the countries involved in Libya: “Take your kets before the conference. The six baskets An ongoing issue is the military conflict, hands out of Libya. The country is suffering are: political, economic and financial, secu- which threatens to deepen long-standing too much from foreign interference”. rity, arms embargo, international humanitar- political and economic divisions between On 8 January, Russian President Vladimir ian law and international human rights law. different parts of Libya, contributing to the Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Sarraj and Haftar have each nominated five overall instability of the country. At the time Erdoğan called for a ceasefire in Libya start- representatives for the military 5+5 commit- of writing, the Council was considering an ing on 12 January. An attempt to have both tee (part of the “security” basket). At the time endorsement of the Berlin conference con- the head of the GNA, Fayez Al-Sarraj, and of writing, a first meeting, initially anticipated clusions. Council members will continue fol- Haftar sign a ceasefire agreement in Moscow for 28 January, had not taken place. lowing closely the progress made by Salamé failed, with Haftar leaving Moscow without Council members met in consultations in his proposed three steps and in implement- signing. Briefing the Council on 30 January on Libya on 6 January and 21 January. They ing the six baskets of the Berlin conference on the latest developments in Libya, Salamé adopted press elements at both meetings. conclusions. Council members are eager to reported that “the truce holds only in name.” On 21 January, the Council was briefed by see a permanent ceasefire between the par- At the Berlin Conference on Libya, high- the Secretary-General on the Berlin confer- ties to enable further progress on the Berlin level representatives from Algeria, China, ence. Ambassador Dang Dinh Quy (Viet conference conclusions. Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Tur- Nam), president of the Council in January, In the longer term, a Council visiting mis- key, the Republic of the Congo, the United read out press elements, saying that Council sion to Libya or a full-fledged—covering the Arab Emirates, the UK, and the US, and members welcomed the conclusions, reiter- whole country—visit by the Libya Sanctions High Representatives of the United Nations, ated their support for Salamé’s work, and Committee could be considered. the African Union, the European Union, and urged the parties to the conflict to engage the League of Arab States, adopted conclu- in the 5+5 committee to conclude a cease- Council and Wider Dynamics sions on 19 January on six areas (“baskets”) fire agreement as soon as possible. He add- Libya has been a divisive issue within the related to the conflict in Libya. The confer- ed that the members of the Council would Council. Council resolutions and presidential ence represented the second of Salamé’s follow up on the conclusions in the coming statements routinely call upon UN member three steps. With these conclusions, the days. At a press stakeout following the con- states to cease support for parallel institu- participants committed to refraining from sultations, the Secretary-General empha- tions in Libya, but some countries, includ- “interference in the armed conflict or in the sised that “one of the parties of the conflict ing permanent members of the Council, fail internal affairs of Libya” and urged all inter- has not yet expressed publicly support to the to respect these calls. Now that the various national actors to do the same. They further conclusions”, referring to Haftar. countries, including Council members, that called upon the United Nations “to facilitate According to the Secretary-General’s support the conflicting parties have signed up ceasefire negotiations between the parties, latest report on UNSMIL, 140,000 people to the Berlin conference conclusions, there including through the immediate establish- have fled since Haftar’s assault on Tripoli, may be prospects for more unity in the Coun- ment of technical committees to monitor and 284 civilians have been killed, and 363 have cil’s approach to the Libya file. verify the implementation of the ceasefire”. been injured. The UK is the penholder on Libya, shar- They also called on the Council to The UN’s 2019 humanitarian response ing the pen with Germany on the sanctions impose “appropriate sanctions on those who plan for Libya of $201.6 million has been file. Jürgen Schulz, Germany’s Deputy Per- are found to be in violation of the ceasefire funded at less than 50 percent, with 50.2 per- manent Representative, chairs the 1970 Lib- arrangements and on Member States to cent or $101.3 million outstanding. ya Sanctions Committee. enforce these”. Regarding the arms embar- go, participants committed themselves “to
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 5 Small Arms
policies to include a gender dimension. By way Expected Council Action trust facility, the Saving Lives Entity fund, of example, he points out that because an insuf- In February, the Council will hold a briefing to to support country-level work on this issue. ficient number of women work in national- secu consider the Secretary-General’s sixth biennial The report also deals with how “small arms rity forces, together with traditional stereotyping, report on small arms, submitted in accordance issues can be constructively and effectively women and girls—out of choice or through force— with the presidential statement adopted on 29 mainstreamed into the work of the Security are employed as arms smugglers as they do not undergo security screenings similar to men. In June 2007, which requested a biennial report Council”. In this regard, it provides specific terms of member states’ engagement, the Secre- to the Council, beginning in 2008. recommendations for ensuring that matters tary-General suggests the synchronisation of the pertaining to small arms and light weapons women, peace and security national action plans Background and Recent Developments and ammunition are effectively integrated with the small arms and light weapons national As a thematic issue, small arms was first con- into several thematic areas, namely the pro- action plans. sidered by the Council in September 1999. tection of civilians, peace operations, arms Issues and Options However, the Council’s attention to this issue embargoes, women and peace and security, A key issue for the Council is the implemen- has been somewhat inconsistent. It adopted children and armed conflict, counter-terror- tation of previous outcomes on small arms, six presidential statements on small arms ism, and transnational organised crime. The most notably resolutions 2117 and 2220. between 1999 and 2007, but there were no report concludes that “[c]ompartmentalized Another key issue is considering the recom- discussions about the issue from 2008 to treatment of the small arms and light weap- mendations made in the Secretary-General’s 2013 with the exception of a briefing in a ons issue is not sufficient to address the seri- report to more effectively integrate small closed meeting on the Secretary-General’s ousness and magnitude of the challenges”. arms and light weapons considerations into 2011 report on small arms. On 18 December 2017, the High Rep- the Council’s work, both thematically and in The Council adopted its first thematic resentative for Disarmament Affairs, Izu- country-specific contexts. An option for the resolution on small arms, resolution 2117, mi Nakamitsu, briefed the Council on the Council would be to adopt a resolution or in September 2013. In it, the Council sought Secretary-General’s fifth biennial report on presidential statement that would welcome to strengthen its response to small arms- the spread of small arms, light weapons and the Secretary-General’s report and endorse related threats to international peace and their ammunition. some of its recommendations. Furthermore, security. In May 2015, the Council adopted the Council could request the Secretary- resolution 2220, which urged member states Women, Peace and Security General to consistently integrate small-arms to enhance their cooperation in curtailing The Secretary-General’s report on small arms and issues into all planning and review processes light weapons stresses that the women, peace illicit arms transfers and the accumulation for UN operations at the earliest possible and security agenda is most pertinent in integrat- and misuse of small weapons while focusing ing issues related to small arms and light weapons stage, address small-arms issues in all rele- on the effects of these activities on civilian among the Council’s overall agenda. The report vant reports, and provide further recommen- populations. It emphasised the role of UN further emphasises that the small arms and light dations to the Council as appropriate. peacekeeping operations relating to arms weapons agenda should be included in all four of the main pillars of the women, peace and security embargoes and capacity-building for host Council Dynamics agenda: protection, participation, prevention, and governments, encouraged information-shar- relief and recovery. As a possible starting point, Council dynamics on small arms tend to be ing and cooperation among relevant actors, the report suggests the inclusion of language complicated. This was particularly evident and called on states to support weapons col- about “how small arms and light weapons facili- during the Council’s negotiations on its two lection, disarmament, demobilisation, rein- tate acts of sexual and gender-based violence” most prominent outcomes on this issue, reso- and, in relation to the participation aspect of the tegration and stockpile management. lutions 2117 and 2220. In the first attempt agenda, how they may impede the political partici- The Secretary-General’s most recent pation of women in political processes. to pass a resolution on small arms, an ini- report underscores that the destabilising The Secretary-General also refers to resolu- tiative of then-Council member Argentina in accumulation, illicit transfer and misuse of tion 2242 on women, peace and security, which 2006, the Council failed to adopt it because small arms and light weapons continue to encourages the empowerment of women “to of strong objections by the US, which at the initiate, sustain and exacerbate armed con- participate in the design and implementation of time argued that the issue was best dealt with efforts related to the prevention, combating and flict and pervasive crime. The report pres- eradication of the illicit transfer, and the desta- in the General Assembly. When resolution ents an overview of recent trends and devel- bilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms 2117 was adopted in 2013 at the initiative opments, including the Secretary-General’s and light weapons”. The resolution further “calls of then-Council member Australia, Russia launch in May 2018 of a new disarmament upon Member States, United Nations entities, abstained, citing the omission of an amend- agenda, “Securing Our Common Future: intergovernmental, regional and subregional orga- ment it had proposed aimed at preventing nizations […] to mitigate the risk of women from An Agenda for Disarmament”, which among (sic) becoming active players in the illicit transfer the transfer of small arms to non-state actors. other things calls for deeper efforts at the of small arms and light weapons”. In that context, When resolution 2220 was adopted in national level and the establishment of a new the Secretary-General addresses the general 2015, Russia and China abstained, along need for effective small arms and light weapons
UN DOCUMENTS ON SMALL ARMS Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2220 (22 May 2015) was on small arms and contained new provisions aimed at strengthening UN coor- dination and action on small arms, promoting effective implementation of UN arms embargoes, and supporting the Arms Trade Treaty. S/RES/2117 (26 September 2013) was the first thematic resolution on small arms adopted by the Council. Security Council Presidential Statements S/PRST/2007/24 (29 June 2007) was on small arms and requested that the Secretary-General submit a biennial report to the Council, beginning in 2008. S/PRST/2001/21 (4 September 2001) requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Council a report on small arms. Secretary-General’s Reports S/2019/1011 (30 December 2019) was the sixth biennial report on small arms and light weapons. S/2017/1025 (6 December 2017) was the fifth biennial report on small arms and light weapons. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8140 (18 December 2017) was a briefing on the Secretary-General’s fifth biennial report on small arms and light weapons.
6 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Small Arms with then-Council members Angola, Chad, responsibility of the government concerned. At the briefing on 18 December 2017, Nigeria and Venezuela. Once again, the core Another issue that tends to be conten- Russia referred to the ATT as “a weak docu- issue during negotiations was the transfer of tious is any suggestion that the Council call ment that is not capable of fully enabling the small arms to non-state actors. Russia also on states to ratify or accede to the Arms Trade implementation of its own provisions”. The objected to certain provisions of the resolu- Treaty (ATT). Among the current Council US expressed some concerns about the Sec- tion regarding the expansion of the power members, six have not joined the ATT: China, retary-General’s report, including on issues of specialised committees and UN missions Indonesia, Russia, Tunisia, the US, and Viet related to domestic misuse of small arms in in controlling the transfers of small arms, Nam. (While the US is a signatory, it has not non-conflict settings and references to the which Russia believes should be the sole ratified or acceded to the ATT.) tracing of small-arms ammunition.
OSCE Briefing
Expected Council Action members to hear about developments in the holding of local elections in eastern Ukraine, In February, Albanian Prime Minister and implementation of the Minsk agreements. In each side has a different interpretation of Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, Edi late 2019, political negotiations led to incre- the conditions that should be met before Rama, the current Chairperson-in-Office for mental progress on some elements of the such elections can take place. At the Nor- the Organization for Security and Coopera- agreement, which in turn helped facilitate a mandy format summit, President Zelenskyy tion in Europe (OSCE), is expected to pro- gradual easing of tensions in eastern Ukraine. emphasised that elections cannot take place vide a briefing to the Security Council on the On 9 December 2019, a meeting of the in eastern Ukraine until all foreign military activities of the organisation. Normandy format—a group consisting of forces and equipment are withdrawn and France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine that Ukraine regains control of the border. How- Background was created in 2014 with the aim of resolv- ever, President Putin maintained that under The Council has received annual briefings by ing the conflict in Ukraine—took place in the Minsk agreements, Ukraine can regain the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office since 2004. Paris. The summit, which was the first gath- control of the border only after the holding The chairmanship of the OSCE rotates year- ering of the Normandy format in over three of the elections. If these disagreements are ly, and on 1 January, Albania succeeded Slo- years, also served as a platform for the first resolved and elections are held in eastern vakia in this function. February’s debate will meeting between Russian President Vladi- Ukraine, the OSCE will be responsible for give the Chairperson-in-Office an opportu- mir Putin and Ukrainian President Volody- facilitating the elections, in accordance with nity to inform the Council about Albania’s myr Zelenskyy. While the summit did not the terms outlined in the Minsk agreements. main priorities as chair and discuss possible facilitate major breakthroughs in the politi- According to OSCE figures, the past year avenues for cooperation. cal stalemate between Russia and Ukraine, has seen a decrease in the level of violence Albania announced that its agenda will agreements were made on several confidence- in eastern Ukraine, with civilian casualties include efforts to combat corruption, human building measures, such as prisoner exchang- in 2019 falling to the lowest level since the trafficking and the spread of hate speech es, creation of new disengagement areas, and beginning of the conflict in 2014. Violations across the region. Prime Minister Rama the opening of new crossing points along of the ceasefire agreement in eastern Ukraine further indicated that the conflict in east- the contact line. On 29 December 2019, the continued in 2020, despite the agreement ern Ukraine would be a top priority on his OSCE monitored and facilitated an exchange reached between the leaders of Ukraine and agenda in the upcoming year. The OSCE of 200 prisoners between Russia and Ukraine Russia at the Normandy format summit to is the leading organisation responsible for in line with the agreements made at the Nor- commit to full implementation of the cease- monitoring the implementation of the 2015 mandy format summit. fire. While the number of violations in Janu- Minsk agreements, which outline a roadmap The leaders of the Normandy format ary dropped sizeably compared to the fig- for resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine agreed to meet again within four months ures in late 2019, these violations continue and were endorsed by the Security Council after the December 2019 summit to dis- to destabilise the situation on the ground in in resolution 2202 (2015). The OSCE Spe- cuss such issues as control of the Ukraini- eastern Ukraine. Following incidents on 18 cial Monitoring Mission (SMM) gathers an-Russian border and the organisation of and 19 January, in which two Ukrainian sol- daily information related to ceasefire viola- local elections in eastern Ukraine. These diers were killed and ten wounded, Ukrainian tions and the withdrawal of heavy weapons issues, along with the question of the status Foreign Minister Vadym Prystaiko expressed in eastern Ukraine. of the rebel-held areas in eastern Ukraine, Kyiv’s intention to discuss the recent uptick Given the OSCE’s access to information remain the most contentious points of dis- in violence with Germany and France. on the ground, Rama’s briefing will serve agreement between Russia and Ukraine. In addition to the situation in Ukraine, as an important opportunity for Council While the Minsk agreements call for the the Chairperson-in-Office is likely to address
UN DOCUMENTS ON THE OSCE Security Council Resolution S/RES/2202 (17 February 2015) endorsed the “Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements” signed on 12 February 2015. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8479 (7 March 2019) was a briefing by Slovakian Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office. S/PV.4964 (7 May 2004) was the first public briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 7 OSCE Briefing other conflict situations in the OSCE’s Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdniestria. briefing to hear about the OSCE’s media- area of operations during February’s brief- Given that these conflicts are not regularly tion efforts in these situations. ing. The OSCE plays a role in international discussed by the Council, some members efforts regarding frozen conflicts in Georgia, might want to use the opportunity of the
Counter-Terrorism
Expected Council Action Al-Qaida-linked recruitment in Africa, of vulnerable targets such as places of worship, In February, Under-Secretary-General Vladi- according to the report. The “West Africa and a global capacity-building programme to mir Voronkov, the head of the UN Office of Province” is now one of the strongest ISIL counter the financing of terrorism. During Counter-Terrorism (OCT), and Michèle offshoots, with approximately 4,000 fight- his briefing, Voronkov furthermore presented Coninsx, the Executive Director of the ers. ISIL also presents an evolving threat in key principles developed by the UNOCT that Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Central Africa. In Europe, radicalisation in focus on screening, prosecution, rehabilita- Directorate (CTED), are expected to brief prisons and the risk presented by returnees tion and reintegration of suspected terrorists the Security Council on the Secretary-Gen- upon their release from prison remain sig- and their families, as well as the related prac- eral’s tenth strategic-level report on the threat nificant concerns, particularly given their tical implementation and customised support posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the direct input into home-grown terrorism and being provided by UNOCT, other United Levant (ISIL or Da’esh). In the past, Council domestically inspired attacks. Asia continues Nations entities, and various regional and members received these reports every four to experience the ISIL threat despite mili- field presences to the states that request it. months; however, several Council members tary pressure: the jihadist group is estimated During the same briefing on 27 August, felt that was excessive, and so the report has to have between 2,500 and 4,000 fighters Coninsx stressed that the international com- been submitted biannually since the adoption there, including FTFs. In Southeast Asia, munity must pay urgent attention to the of resolution 2368 in July 2017. the report notes two troubling developments large numbers of women and children who among ISIL affiliates: the role of women in are detained because of their association with Background and Key Recent planning and executing attacks and explicit ISIL. She was also adamant that any post- Developments targeting of places of worship. The report repatriation strategies include short-, medi- Under the terms of resolution 2368 of 20 warns that the decline in attacks directed by um- and long-term components, addressing July 2017, the Secretary-General submits a ISIL may only be temporary. prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegra- strategic-level report on ISIL to the Coun- Briefing the Council on the report on 27 tion of the returnees. She emphasised that cil biannually. The reports are intended to August 2019, Voronkov underscored that the CTED remains fully engaged with its part- reflect the gravity of the ISIL threat as well fall of Baghouz, ISIL’s last stronghold in Syr- ners and stands ready to assist member states as the range of UN efforts to support states ia, did not remove the threat posed by ISIL, in addressing these challenges. in countering that threat. In his July 2019 which continues to evolve into a covert net- In other ISIL-related developments, some report, the Secretary-General found that work and remains the international terrorist detainee camps in Syria serve as incubators despite its territorial defeat in Syria, ISIL group most likely to conduct a large-scale for possible ISIL resurgence, according to remains committed to the global relevance attack in the near future. He also emphasised Michael Stephens of the Royal United Ser- of its so-called caliphate. According to the that despite significant challenges concerning vices Institute, an independent think tank report, it continues to draw upon its affili- the repatriation of their nationals, especially in London focused on defence and security ates and inspires attacks, and possesses an women and children, from ISIL territories, research. After the fall of Baghouz in March estimated residual wealth of $300 million. several member states—including Azerbaijan, 2019, the al-Hawl camp admitted 64,000 The report also highlights acute concerns Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbeki- women and children, many of whom have about the challenges posed by foreign ter- stan—have repatriated women and children, links to ISIL, with the camp rapidly falling rorist fighters (FTFs), returnees and reloca- including orphans, from Iraq and Syria. He under the control of a group of radicalised tors, and the increasing number of attacks in also highlighted three new initiatives being women. While official numbers are not avail- areas controlled by the Syrian government. spearheaded by the UN Office of Coun- able, several prisoners fled when Turkey Beyond the Middle East, there has ter-Terrorism (UNOCT) that address law began its shelling offensive against the Kurd- been a noticeable increase in ISIL- and enforcement and border security, protection ish forces in the area in October 2019.
UN DOCUMENTS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2490 (20 September 2019) renewed the mandate of UNITAD until 21 September 2020. S/RES/2462 (28 March 2019) was on combatting the financing of terrorism.S/RES/2396 (21 December 2017) addressed the threat of foreign terrorist fighters.S/RES/2395 (21 December 2017) renewed the mandate of the CTED until 31 December 2021. S/RES/2379 (21 September 2017) established an investigative team to collect, store and preserve evidence of ISIL crimes in Iraq. S/RES/2368 (20 July 2017) renewed and updated the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime. Through an annex to the resolution, eight individuals or organisations were added to the sanctions list. Secretary-General’s Report S/2019/612 (31 July 2019) was the ninth strategic-level report on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh) to international peace and security. Security Council Letters S/2019/878 (13 November 2019) was from Karim Asad Ahmad Khan, the Special Adviser and head of UNITAD, transmitting the third report on the activities of UNITAD. S/2019/407 (17 May 2019) was the second report of the Special Adviser and head of UNITAD. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV. 8626 (25 September 2019) was a a ministerial-level debate on counter-terrorism cooperation in Central Asia. S/PV.8675 (26 November 2019) was Khan’s third Council briefing.S/PV. 8605 (27 August 2019) was a briefing on the ninth report on the threat posed by ISIL (Da’esh).
8 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Counter-Terrorism
In December 2019, ISIL claimed respon- Tikrit Air Academy (also known as Camp of the 1267/1989/2253 Al-Qaida/ISIL sanc- sibility for an attack in Nigeria’s north-east- Speicher). Khan elaborated on UNITAD’s tions regime as part of wider counter-terror- ern Borno state in which 11 people were two field-based missions conducting active ism efforts. However, it is important that states killed. A 56-second video released by the investigations in the Ninawa governorate, do not hinder humanitarian activities, as high- ISIL “news agency” Amaq said the attack where ISIL targeted judges, religious clergy, lighted in resolution 2462. was part of ISIL’s campaign to avenge Abu journalists and health-care officials. Through Council members may want to address Bakr al-Baghdadi’s targeted killing in Octo- these missions, UNITAD identified several the key principles developed by UNOCT ber 2019. On 9 January, ISIL assaulted a individual ISIL members as “primary tar- and presented by Voronkov during his brief- Niger military base, leaving 89 Nigerien sol- gets for further investigations” in relation to ing in August 2019 and hear about their diers and 77 ISIL militants dead. the three areas, which were discussed during practical impact. There have also been developments his previous briefing in July. On staff recruit- regarding the UN Investigative Team to Pro- ment, Khan said that his team had grown to Council Dynamics mote Accountability for Crimes Committed 107 members and represented all geographi- Counter-terrorism is one of the issues where by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD), established by cal groups at the UN. Women occupy half of there is a high degree of consensus among resolution 2379 of 21 September 2017 to the senior leadership positions. Council members, who are in overall agree- support Iraqi domestic efforts to hold ISIL In other counter-terrorism-related devel- ment about the importance of receiving stra- accountable for crimes it committed in Iraq. opments, the Council held a ministerial-level tegic analysis on ISIL, which can then feed On 20 September, the Council unani- debate on 25 September 2019 on counter- into other counter-terrorism efforts or serve mously renewed UNITAD’s mandate for terrorism cooperation in Central Asia. Sec- as background for the Council’s counter- another 12 months. On 26 November, Karim retary-General António Guterres empha- terrorism agenda, even if no specific course Asad Ahmad Khan, the Special Adviser and sised that efforts to counter terrorist ideology of action is foreseen. Council members dif- head of UNITAD, briefed the Council on his must be founded on respect for the dignity fer, however, in their approach to FTFs and third report and most recent developments. and human rights of all. Several speakers their families. For example, during nego- Kachi Amo Saloh, a Yazidi survivor who embraced that sentiment and, in their state- tiations over resolutions 2395 and 2396 in joined the discussion from Iraq via video tele- ments, focused on the need to fully respect December 2017, renewing the mandate of conference, spoke about losing family mem- international law, especially human rights law, the CTED and addressing the threat of FTFs, bers to ISIL crimes and his support for UNI- in the context of counter-terrorism opera- respectively, several Western states argued TAD and the implementation of its mandate. tions. Some stressed that success in counter- that screening processes need to reflect some (For more, please see our 25 November 2019 ing terrorism lies in respect for human rights discernment between FTFs and their fami- What’s In Blue story.) principles within the UN framework. lies rather than an automatic assumption that During the briefing, Khan discussed the families are complicit. However, Russia UNITAD’s evolution from “start-up to real Key Issues and Options argued that FTFs should be held criminally operations” over the previous six months. A key issue for the Council is to maintain the liable and that family members travelling with He also addressed significant progress in necessary flexibility and adaptability to address FTFs are complicit by default and should be collecting, gathering and analysing evidence the evolving global threat posed by ISIL as held accountable. of ISIL crimes in Mosul, Sinjar, and the well as ensuring the overall implementation
Children and Armed Conflict
Expected Council Action and King Philippe will most likely make a of armed conflict. A presidential statement As Council president in February and the statement. The anticipated briefers are Sec- is a possible outcome. chair of the Working Group on Children and retary-General António Guterres, AU Peace Armed Conflict, Belgium is planning a high- and Security Commissioner Smaïl Chergui Background and Recent Developments level briefing on “Integrating child protec- and Jo Becker, chair of the advisory board Since 1999, Council resolutions and presi- tion into peace processes to resolve conflict of the NGO network Watchlist on Children dential statements have included language on and sustain peace”, to be presided over by and Armed Conflict. On the same day as the the need for parties to integrate child pro- the country’s Foreign Minister, Philippe briefing, there will be a related high-level tection provisions into all peace negotiations, Goffin. Belgian King Philippe and Queen event to launch the practical guidance for ceasefire and peace agreements, and to take Mathilde are expected to be in attendance, mediators to protect children in situations into account children’s views where possible.
UN DOCUMENTS ON CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT Security Council Resolution S/RES/2427 (9 July 2018) provided a framework for integrating protection, rights, well-being and empowerment of children throughout the conflict cycle as well as in sustaining peace efforts.Secretary-General’s Reports S/2019/509 (20 June 2019) was the latest annual report on children and armed conflict. S/2019/727 (10 September 2019) was on children and armed conflict in Afghanistan. S/2019/453 (3 June 2019) was on children and armed conflict in Yemen. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8591 (2 August 2019) was an open debate on children and armed conflict.Other S/2019/981 (20 December 2019) was the annual report of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.S/AC.51/2019/2 (20 August 2019) contained the conclusions on Myanmar adopted by the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.S/AC.51/2019/1 (18 July 2019) contained the conclusions on Syria adopted by the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 9 Children and Armed Conflict
Of the 12 resolutions adopted on children Gamba visited Myanmar from 15 to 20 Negotiations are currently ongoing on the and armed conflict, ten have included lan- January and met with senior Myanmar offi- reports on Afghanistan, the Central African guage on integrating child protection provi- cials and a range of key stakeholders involved Republic and Yemen. The report on Colom- sions during peace negotiations, ceasefire and in child protection. Eight parties in Myan- bia was introduced in the Working Group at peace agreements. The most recent resolu- mar are listed in the annexes to the Secre- the end of January. tion, adopted in 2018, highlighted the need tary-General’s annual report, including the In 2019, the Working Group also held to consider child protection issues from the national army (Tatmadaw), which signed video teleconferences (VTCs) with the UN early stages of peace processes. an action plan in 2012. (The annual reports country task force on monitoring and report- The Council adopted a presidential state- contain annexes listing parties that have com- ing on Mali in February, the DRC in May, ment on 31 October 2017 that encouraged mitted grave violations against children: one Nigeria in July, Sudan in October, and the the Special Representative for Children and includes parties active in conflict situations Philippines in November. These briefings Armed Conflict, Virginia Gamba, to carry on the Council’s agenda, the other, in situ- provide an opportunity for the Working out “lessons learned initiatives in order to ations that are not on the list of issues the Group to monitor progress on protection of compile comprehensive best practices on Council is seized of). During the visit, Gamba children issues and to obtain information that the children and armed conflict mandate, highlighted how children have suffered from can be used in integrating these issues into including practical guidance on the inte- the hostilities in Myanmar, particularly in mandate renewal resolutions in situations gration of child protection issues in peace Rakhine, Shan and Kachin States, and also where there are peace operations. processes”. This guidance is expected to be acknowledged progress in the implementa- A new working method initiated by the launched ahead of the Council briefing. tion of the action plan on recruitment of chil- chair is a monthly briefing of the Working On 2 August 2019, the Council held an dren. She urged the Tatmadaw to commit to Group by the incoming president of the open debate on children and armed con- a joint action plan with the UN on ending Council on the programme of work, which flict, based on the Secretary-General’s 2019 and preventing killing, maiming and sexual allows working group members to plan ahead annual report on children and armed conflict. violence, violations for which it is also listed. for country-specific situations that may be of Polish Foreign Minister Jacek Czaputowicz interest in the context of the children and chaired the meeting. Gamba; Henrietta Fore, Developments in the Working Group on armed conflict agenda. the executive director of UNICEF; UNI- Children and Armed Conflict CEF Canada Ambassador, Mariatu Kamara, The Working Group on Children and Armed Key Issues and Options whose hands were amputated during Sierra Conflict visited Mali from 8 to 11 Decem- The overarching issue is what the Council Leone’s civil war; and Majok Peter Awan, a ber 2019. The delegation was made up of 11 can do to raise awareness of the importance former child soldier and currently a UN child members of the Security Council, who visit- of incorporating child protection consider- protection officer, briefed the Council. ed Bamako and Mopti. The objectives of the ations in peace processes. Beyond incorpo- On 26 November 2019, Council members visit included following up on the May 2018 rating appropriate language in its resolutions, held an Arria-formula meeting co-hosted by conclusions on children and armed conflict the Council could choose to more proac- Belgium, Peru, Poland and the UK on how in Mali, discussing challenges and oppor- tively raise this issue during regular briefings to better support children once they have tunities to advance the children and armed on UN peace operations in order to better been separated from armed forces and armed conflict agenda in Mali, assessing progress understand the challenges faced by media- groups. The meeting focused on how bridg- in the implementation of the action plan tors and others involved in peace processes. ing the “humanitarian-development-peace signed by Coordination des mouvements It could also request the Secretary-General to nexus” can lead to more sustainable and de l’Azawad in March 2017, and engag- include integration of child protection issues successful reintegration of children associ- ing with other armed groups. The Working in reporting on peace processes, as a discrete ated with armed forces and armed groups. It Group delegation met with senior UN and section in the annual report and in his peri- also looked at how incorporating children’s government officials, the UN country task odic reports on relevant peace operations. views can lead to more effective strategies for force on monitoring and reporting on grave A related issue is the lack of guidance for reintegration and post-conflict recovery. violations against children, the High Islamic those involved in peace processes. The Coun- In October 2019, Gamba visited Somalia. Council, local and international non-gov- cil could address this in a presidential state- She commended the government of Somalia ernmental organisations, representatives ment encouraging mediators to use the guid- for its commitment to speeding up the imple- of armed groups, and the local Group of ance. It could also include a commitment for mentation of action plans to end and prevent Friends on Children and Armed Conflict. this issue to be incorporated in resolutions on the recruitment and use, and the killing and They also met with a representative from all relevant peace operations. maiming, of children. She conveyed her con- the Group of Five for the Sahel. cern over the rising levels of grave violations In 2019, the Working Group held 12 for- Council Dynamics against children. Somalia has the highest mal meetings and met 27 times in informal Council members are generally supportive number of grave violations against children consultations. It adopted conclusions on of the children and armed conflict agenda. of all the situations listed in the annexes to the the Secretary-General’s reports on children However, the difficult dynamics among Secretary-General’s annual report. and armed conflict in Syria and Myanmar. Council members have had a direct impact
10 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Children and Armed Conflict on the Working Group’s ability to agree on the Secretary-General’s annexes; and nego- the positions of the new members although conclusions, particularly on the situations tiations and adoptions of conclusions. In early indications are that Tunisia is likely to that were the first to be addressed by the addition, there were regular VTCs and brief- be sensitive to counties in its region in nego- Working Group last year: Myanmar, Syria ings on the programme of work. Besides the tiations on the conclusions on the report of and Yemen. Although the Working Group chair, several other Working Group members children and armed conflict in Yemen and began to negotiate different conclusions in have shown a dedication to the issue, includ- Estonia is expected to be an active partici- parallel in the latter half of 2019, it was not ing in 2019 the Dominican Republic, France, pant. Negotiations on the anticipated draft possible to adopt as many conclusions as Germany and the UK. However, frequent presidential statement are likely to provide a had been anticipated. changes in personnel by the US may sug- clearer picture of the dynamics among Work- The Working Group met more times than gest a lack of commitment to the issue while ing Group members going forward. any other subsidiary body in 2019. Areas China appears to no longer have a dedicated Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve (Belgium) covered included the introduction of reports; children and armed conflict expert, choosing chairs the Working Group on Children and briefings on the Global Horizontal Note, instead to send its country-specific experts to Armed Conflict. which provides an update on situations in the meetings. It is too soon to get a sense of
Transitional Justice
Expected Council Action to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale UN system in this area, including assisting In February, the Council is expected to hold past abuses, in order to ensure accountabil- with developing standards and operational an open debate on transitional justice at the ity, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. tools and designing and implementing tran- initiative of Belgium. The open debate will be These may include both judicial and non- sitional justice mechanisms. held under the broader agenda item “peace- judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of On 19 November 2019, at the initiative of building and sustaining peace” and a concept international involvement (or none at all) and the UK, the Council held an open debate to note will be circulated ahead of the meeting. individual prosecutions, reparations, truth- discuss the role of reconciliation in maintain- Belgium’s Foreign Minister, Philippe Goffin, seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dis- ing international peace and security, at which is expected to preside. At press time, no out- missals, or a combination thereof”. In 2010, transitional justice was referred to. Secretary- come was anticipated. the Secretary-General issued a note provid- General António Guterres; Alpaslan Özer- ing the guiding principles and framework for dem, dean of the School for Conflict Analysis Background and Key Recent the UN’s approach to transitional justice pro- and Resolution at George Mason University; Developments cesses and mechanisms. It outlines key com- and Ilwad Elman, director of programs and While the Security Council has considered ponents of transitional justice and ways to development at the Elman Peace and Human transitional justice indirectly in various con- further strengthen these activities. Rights Centre, briefed. The Secretary-Gener- texts over the past several decades, the open Since 2005, the Council has used the term al referred to the effective use of transitional debate in February will be the first time the “transitional justice” in resolutions across sev- justice mechanisms, including truth and rec- Council holds a meeting on transitional jus- eral different country-specific issues on its onciliation commissions, in Guatemala, Sier- tice as a thematic issue. The open debate is agenda. These include Afghanistan, Burun- ra Leone, Timor-Leste and elsewhere. “Tran- expected to focus on how the Security Coun- di, Central African Republic, Democratic sitional justice must be transformative justice cil can better support transitional justice ini- Republic of the Congo and Yemen. that addresses gender imbalances, is rooted in tiatives in country-specific contexts. In this The Human Rights Council (HRC) local realities and is based on broad consul- regard, a central aim is for those member has been particularly engaged on the issue tation”, he said, adding that throughout the states with experience in dealing with tran- of transitional justice. In 2011, the HRC world, “the UN supports nationally led and sitional justice initiatives to share their views, adopted resolution 18/7 which decided to victim-centred transitional justice processes.” including lessons learned. appoint a special rapporteur on the promo- Member states discussed their own experi- A 2004 report of the Secretary-General on tion of truth, justice, reparation and guaran- ences with reconciliation mechanisms. There the rule of law and transitional justice in con- tees of non-recurrence. The position is cur- was also an emphasis on the need to adapt to flict and post-conflict societies defined that rently held by Fabian Salvioli (Argentina). increasingly complex situations and ensure term as a “full range of processes and mech- The Office of the High Commissioner for inclusivity at every stage. anisms associated with a society’s attempts Human Rights is a lead entity within the
UN DOCUMENTS ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE Security Council Presidential Statements S/PRST/2004/34 (6 October 2004) was on post-conflict national reconciliation and welcomed the Secretary General’s 23 August 2004 report and his decision to prioritise the strengthening of the UN’s work on the rule of law and transitional justice. S/PRST/2004/2 (26 January 2004) was on post-conflict national reconciliation and asked the Secretary-General to give consideration to the views expressed in the 26 January 2004 open debate, in the preparation of his report on the rule of law and transitional justice. Secretary-General’s Report S/2004/616 (23 August 2004) was a report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8668 (19 November 2019) was an open debate on the role of reconciliation in maintaining international peace and security. S/PV.4903 (26 January 2004) was an open debate on the role of the UN in post-conflict national reconciliation.Other Guidance note of the Secretary-General (March 2010): UN Approach to Transitional Justice (Available at: www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf)
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 11 Transitional Justice
Key Issues and Options chair’s summary that would reflect the foundations for peace”. It also emphasised Some key issues that may be considered at themes of the open debate. the need to engage and involve women and the open debate include the following: for the Council to monitor reconciliation pro- • how to increase the effectiveness of the Council Dynamics cesses. South Africa said transitional justice Council’s engagement on the issue, includ- It seems Council members are generally processes must respond to the specific con- ing lessons learned in various contexts; supportive of Belgium’s initiative and its text of the country concerned. It also under- • how best to support transitional justice approach, which seeks to facilitate a broad scored that “the whole spectrum of transi- initiatives in country-specific contexts, discussion of the issue. At the open debate tional justice needs to be explored, including including local initiatives; on reconciliation on 19 November 2019, sev- truth commissions and reparations for vic- • how to integrate effectively transitional eral members referred to transitional justice. tims”, as well as the need to take into account justice considerations into the Council’s Belgium highlighted the presidential state- community-based or traditional justice mech- work, both in relevant country-specific ment adopted on 6 October 2004 on post- anisms and ensure women and youth are rep- contexts and across thematic areas, such conflict national reconciliation and referred resented. Germany also stressed women’s as in relation to the women, peace and to the contribution of transitional justice to participation, and the Dominican Republic security agenda and the children and reconciliation efforts as well as the possibil- underscored the involvement of youth. While armed conflict agenda; and ity of conducting “a broader review in order not referring to transitional justice specifically, • how to support victims and civil society as to identify some key principles for guiding Russia expressed the view that the UN should active participants. the Security Council in its future decisions in focus on cooperation with governments, that An option for the Council is to invite civ- this area”. It added that “transitional justice “ready-made solutions from outside” should il society representatives involved in tran- is a tool that the Council should continue to not be imposed, and that the work of interna- sitional justice processes to brief. Another consider as part of its mandate to maintain tional criminal justice institutions in the con- option would be for the Council to adopt a international peace and security”. text of post-conflict reconciliation “should presidential statement on the issue, subse- Also, the UK noted at the November 2019 not be considered the last word”. quent to and informed by the open debate. debate how “transitional justice mechanisms Belgium could also choose to produce a can support persecuted people and lay the
Guinea-Bissau
Expected Council Action the action “illegal” in a ministerial commu- individual sanctions will apply”. ECOWAS In February, the Council is expected to renew niqué on 29 October. ECOWAS recalled its also threatened sanctions against those who the mandate of the UN Integrated Peace- decision from 29 June 2019, which said that used the army or security forces to impose building Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOG- although Vaz’s term had expired on 23 June, illegal actions or who undermined the elec- BIS), which expires on 28 February. Before he should remain president until the election toral process and political stability. It further this, the Council is expected to hear a brief- but that the Gomes administration should decided to reinforce the ECOWAS Mission ing by Special Representative and head of handle all government affairs. Chairperson in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), deploying a UNIOGBIS Rosine Sori-Coulibaly. of the AU Commission Moussa Faki issued a 140-member formed police unit from Togo. statement also expressing full support for the Imbali resigned that same day. Key Recent Developments government of Gomes. The presidential election was held on Developments in Guinea-Bissau have Sori-Coulibaly briefed Council members 24 November 2019, contested by 12 can- revolved around holding presidential elec- in consultations on the crisis on 31 October didates. The leader of The African Party tions following four years of political crisis. 2019. On 4 November, the Council adopt- for the Independence of Guinea and Cape On 28 October 2019, only weeks before ed a presidential statement expressing “full Verde (PAIGC), Domingos Simões Pereira, the 24 November election, President José support to the communiqués of ECOWAS won 40.13 percent of the vote. Placing sec- Mário Vaz dismissed Prime Minister Aristides and the AU” and stressing the “urgent need ond with 27.65 percent was Umaro Sissoco Gomes and his government. The following to hold the presidential elections on 24 Embaló of the Movement for Democratic day, Vaz appointed Faustino Fudut Imbali November as agreed”. Change (MADEM-G15), a party formed as the new prime minister, despite Gomes’ At an ECOWAS extraordinary summit in by PAIGC dissidents in 2018 that has fre- refusal to step down. The move risked delay- Niamey on 8 November 2019, West African quently allied with Vaz and the traditional ing the election. The Economic Community leaders demanded the immediate resignation opposition Party for Social Renewal. Vaz ran of West African States (ECOWAS) called of Imbali and his government, “failing which as an independent, having clashed with his
UN DOCUMENTS ON GUINEA-BISSAU Security Council Resolution S/RES/2458 (28 February 2019) renewed UNIOGBIS’ mandate. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2019/13 (4 November 2019) supported the ECOWAS and the AU communiqués on the dismissal of Prime Minister Aristides Gomes. Security Council Press Statement SC/13989 (16 October 2019) reiterated that the presidential election be held on 24 November 2019.
12 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Guinea-Bissau
party (the PAIGC) during the past four years, consider taking appropriate measures against particularly drug trafficking, remain a key and received only 12 percent of the vote. As those who undermined Guinea-Bissau’s stability issue, and there are concerns that terrorist no candidate won a majority, a run-off elec- in accordance with its previous resolutions. groups in the region could also potentially tion was scheduled for 29 December 2019 exploit Guinea-Bissau’s political instability. Developments in the Peacebuilding Com- between Simões Pereira and Sissoco Embaló. mission (PBC) One option for the Council is to renew On 4 December 2019, third-place fin- The PBC’s country configuration chair, Ambassa- UNIOGBIS’ mandate until 31 December isher Nuno Gomes Nabiam, leader of the dor Mauro Vieira (Brazil), visited Guinea-Bissau 2020 while requesting the Secretary-General United People’s Assembly-Democratic Party from 22 to 24 October 2019 to encourage a to provide an update later this year on prog- of Guinea-Bissau (APU-PDGB), signed a timely and peaceful election. On 13 November, ress in handing over UNIOGBIS’ tasks to the configuration met to consider developments political pact with Sissoco Embaló in Dakar, and electoral preparations. A 15 November press the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel Senegal, to support the latter’s candidacy. statement by the configuration called on stake- (UNOWAS), the UN country team and other The move created an internal dispute within holders to hold elections as scheduled and reaf- entities. The update could also identify capac- APU-PDGB, which is part of the PAIGC-led firmed the PBC’s commitment to support political ity or financial gaps that may exist following coalition government of Aristides Gomes. and institutional reforms, as outlined in the Octo- UNIOGBIS’ closure. Another option is hold- ber 2016 Conakry Agreement and the govern- In the run-off election held on 29 Decem- ment’s strategic development plan for 2015-2025. ing an informal interactive dialogue with the ber, Sissoco Embaló won 53.55 percent of PBC and relevant stakeholders on transition the vote, compared to Simões Pereira’s 46.45 Key Issues and Options preparations and requirements. percent. International observer missions, The UNIOGBIS mandate renewal is a key A related issue is ending the sanctions including from ECOWAS and the AU, said issue, particularly assessing whether condi- regime, which members may consider when the election was fair. Simões Pereira, however, tions on the ground and with transition plan- renewing UNIOGBIS’ mandate or waiting alleged fraud, saying that at some polling sta- ning for a follow-up UN presence are right until UNIOGBIS’ new mandate concludes. tions, votes exceeded the number of enrolled for closure of the mission by the end of 2020. The Council could encourage, in the upcom- voters. The PAIGC challenged the results in When the Council renewed UNIOGBIS’ ing mandate renewal, holding of the national the Supreme Court of Justice. On 24 Janu- mandate last year, it endorsed the Secretary- conference for reconciliation, another pend- ary, the court ordered a new count of voter General’s recommendations in his December ing process important for addressing past tally documents, which the election commis- 2018 special report for UNIOGBIS’ recon- crimes and violence, and, potentially, the sion agreed to do on 28 January following figuration and prospective completion by links between organised crime and politics. civil society mediation. ECOWAS and several December 31, 2020. Regarding transition other international partners, meanwhile, have planning, this requires close consultation with Council and Wider Dynamics recognised Sissoco as the incoming president. national authorities, but it is not clear if the The Council closely followed developments Guinea-Bissau recorded its largest drug PAIGC can maintain its governing coalition, ahead of the first round of the presidential interdiction on 1 September 2019, seizing which risks renewing gridlock over forming a election, holding three meetings in consulta- 1.8 tonnes of cocaine and arresting seven government and complicating such planning. tions during October and November 2019, Bissau-Guineans, three Colombians, one Uncertainty remains over the outcome of issuing one press statement, and adopting a Malian and one Mexican. This surpassed its the presidential election. Important upcom- presidential statement. On Guinea-Bissau, the previous largest interdiction of nearly 800 ing national processes include the consti- Council has tended to follow ECOWAS’ lead, kilos in March 2019. Investigations into the tutional review—particularly to clarify or seeking to support its decisions, often prompt- shipment compounded tensions in the lead- amend the division of powers between the ed by the West African Council member. up to the presidential election. president and prime minister. ECOWAS Members appear to agree on the goal heads of state and government have charged of ending UNIOGBIS. The mission and Sanctions-Related Developments the ECOWAS Commission with providing its predecessor mission have been present The chair of the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Sanctions technical support to accelerate implemen- since 1999, and members have noted the Committee for 2018–2019, Ambassador Ana- tation of constitutional reforms after the absence of violence and ECOWAS’ leading tolio Ndong Mba (Equatorial Guinea), visited Guinea-Bissau from 27 to 30 October 2019 election and called for a referendum on the role in recent years. During last year’s man- to encourage the timely holding of the elec- constitutional reform during 2020. Com- date negotiations, some members stressed tion, dates which coincided with Vaz’s decision pleting the electoral cycle, constitutional the importance of assessing the situation to dismiss Gomes. The Council’s 4 November review, and security sector reforms were the on the ground when determining to end presidential statement recalled that its pos- key components of the Conakry Agreement UNIOGBIS, with a key benchmark being sible consideration of ending the sanctions regime (established following the April 2012 that ECOWAS brokered in 2016 to resolve the presidential election. coup d’état) would depend on orderly conduct the political crisis and address root causes of Niger is the penholder on Guinea-Bissau. by the defence and security forces and political Guinea-Bissau’s instability. Ambassador Moncef Baati (Tunisia) is the actors. It also recalled that the Council would Transnational criminal activities, new chair of the 2048 Committee.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 13 Yemen
in February, highlights the belligerents’ use of Expected Council Action and Marib governorates where airstrikes, economic warfare and corruption by Houthi and In February, the Council is expected to adopt missiles and ground attacks reportedly took government officials. It raises concerns about a resolution renewing Yemen financial and place”, noting with particular concern the the transfer of commercially available compo- travel ban sanctions, which expire on 26 Feb- attack on the base in Marib. Intense fight- nents to Yemen that are assembled to construct ruary, and the mandate of the Yemen Panel of ing has continued, with the Houthis appear- unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and water-borne improvised explosive devices, both of which the Experts, which expires on 26 March. (The ing to gain ground in Nihm. On 28 January, Houthis have used to carry out attacks. The panel targeted arms embargo established by reso- Council members held consultations to dis- echoed the findings of the Secretary-General’s lution 2216 from April 2015 is open-ended). cuss with Griffiths (via VTC) the ongoing December 2019 report on the implementation The Council is also expected to hold its escalation. In a 30 January press statement, of the Iran nuclear deal, saying that despite their monthly briefing on Yemen in consultations members “called for an immediate cessa- claims to the contrary, the Houthis were unlikely to have conducted the 14 September missile with Special Envoy Martin Griffiths and a tion of these hostilities”. and drone attacks on the Aramco oil facilities representative of OCHA. General Abhijit Implementation of the Riyadh Agree- in Abqaiq and Khurays, Saudi Arabia. The panel Guha, the head of the UN Mission to sup- ment between the government and the did not draw conclusions about responsibility, port the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA), is separatist Southern Transitional Council which European countries, Saudi Arabia and the also likely to brief. Resolution 2505, adopted (STC) has been slow, and by early Janu- US attributed to Iran. Violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights on 13 January, renewed UNMHA’s mandate ary appeared in jeopardy because of fighting law continue to be widely committed by all parties until 15 July 2020. in Shabwa governorate. Following efforts in Yemen with impunity, according to the report. by Saudi Arabia, which leads a committee Among its recommendations, the panel pro- Key Recent Developments overseeing the accord’s implementation, the posed that the Council’s monthly Yemen meetings Efforts continue to restart peace talks and parties reportedly recommitted to plans to include a discussion of the challenges faced by women and the extent to which they have partici- implement the December 2018 Stockholm redeploy their forces. During the 16 Janu- pated in political negotiations. Its report describes Agreement and November 2019 Riyadh ary briefing, Griffiths said that he was “fairly a Houthi network involved in repressing women Agreement. The de-escalation in military confident that the implementation is mov- critical of the Houthis, including through sexual hostilities since September 2019 appeared to ing” in the right direction. violence. be severely tested, however, by a deadly mis- At the Council’s 16 January briefing, sile attack against Yemeni government forces, OCHA Director of Coordination Ramesh Key Issues and Options likely conducted by Houthi rebels, and the Rajasingham highlighted the continued How the Council can support efforts to outbreak of other fighting in mid-January. impact of violence—despite the de-escala- restart negotiations for a political settle- Briefing the Council on 16 January, tion—on civilians and on humanitarian efforts. ment to the conflict as well as implementa- Griffiths said that Yemen had avoided being Shelling hit the Red Sea Mills in Hodeidah tion of the Stockholm Agreement—which drawn into the crisis between the US and Iran on 26 December 2019, forcing the World included a deal to demilitarise Hodeidah, a earlier in the month, which had risked setting Food Programme to temporarily suspend prisoner exchange mechanism, and a state- back gains since the de-escalation in fighting milling, and in late December attacks against ment of understanding on the city of Taiz— between the Houthis and the Saudi Arabia- the premises of international humanitarian and the Riyadh Agreement are key issues. led coalition that supports the government. organisations in Al Dhale governorate led 14 The renewed fighting is a major threat to According to news reports, the US tried organisations to suspend operations affecting the political process. Restarting peace talks unsuccessfully to kill Abdul Reza Shahlai, a over 200,000 people. The Al-Raqw market in will be contingent on consensus by the gov- deputy commander in Iran’s Quds Force in Sa’dah governorate came under attack on 25 ernment and the STC on a joint delegation, Sana’a, on the same day a US strike killed December for the third time since November, as the Riyadh Agreement specified that the Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. During resulting in 17 deaths and bringing total casu- government delegation to future negotiations his briefing, Griffiths said that despite some alties at the market in a month to 89. include the STC. Peace talks also appear active front lines, “[w]e are surely witnessing On 17 January, a Houthi ban on the use dependent on ongoing Houthi-Saudi discus- one of the quietest periods of the conflict”. of Yemeni riyal bills printed after 2016 went sions and their possible conclusion of a de- On 18 January, ballistic missiles struck into effect. The plan, announced in Decem- escalation agreement. a mosque at a military camp in Marib city, ber 2019, had already led the Yemeni gov- The humanitarian crisis—the largest in about 70 kilometres east of Sana’a, kill- ernment to announce that it would stop the world, with 24 million people requiring ing at least 116 government troops. Yemeni payments to civil servants and retirees in assistance—remains severe. OCHA usually authorities blamed the Houthis for the attack. the north and was creating discrepancies briefs on five key priorities to mitigate the The day before, government forces report- between the north and the south in the situation: the protection of civilians, human- edly launched a large-scale operation against exchange rate, according to Rajasingham. itarian access, a fully funded aid operation, Houthi positions in Nihm, just northeast of support for Yemen’s economy, and the need Sana’a city. In a statement on 19 January, the Sanctions-Related Developments for a political solution. The UN has report- Special Envoy said he “condemns the escala- On 10 January, the 2140 Sanctions Commit- ed an increasingly constrained operating tee met to discuss the Yemen Panel of Experts’ tion of military activities in Sana’a, Sa’dah environment for humanitarian actors in the final report. The report, likely to be made public
UN DOCUMENTS ON YEMEN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2505 (13 January 2020) renewed the mandate of UNMHA until 15 July 2020. S/RES/2456 (26 February 2019) renewed the Yemen sanctions regime. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8704 (16 January 2020) was a briefing on Yemen.
14 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Yemen
Houthi-controlled north. Another issue of recommendations, such as establishing a concurrently with efforts to implement the concern is the Houthi authorities’ failure to list of commercial components used by Stockholm Agreement. Tunisia replaced permit a UN inspection mission of the SAF- Houthi forces to assemble UAVs and other Kuwait in January as the Arab member on the ER oil tanker anchored in the Red Sea near weapons systems, and request that member Council that traditionally champions coali- Hodeidah, which, because of its lack of main- states instruct their export control authori- tion positions. The issue of Iranian support tenance since 2015, risks causing a major ties about the threats from the proliferation to the Houthis has sometimes divided the environmental disaster. of such components. Council, including during its consideration The Council is likely to extend the assets of the sanctions renewal. The UK is the pen- freeze and travel ban for 12 months. It Council Dynamics holder on Yemen. Ambassador Inga Rhon- could consider including in the upcoming On Yemen, Council members appear da King of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines resolution several of the Panel of Experts’ quite united, calling for new peace talks chairs the 2140 Committee.
Syria
Expected Council Action for Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock of December and into early January, with In February, the Council expects to receive and Under-Secretary-General for Political differences persisting over the number of the monthly Syria briefings on the humani- Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo briefed. Many authorised border crossings and the dura- tarian situation, political developments, and Council members referred to the deteriorat- tion of the mandate. the use of chemical weapons. ing humanitarian situation in Idlib to illus- On 10 January, Belgium and Germany By the end of February, the Council also trate the urgent need to find a compromise (without Kuwait, which had been a co-pen- expects to receive from the Secretary-General on the resolution to renew the cross-border holder but finished its Council term at the a report on the feasibility of using alternative aid mechanism in Syria before its 10 January end of 2019) revised their draft to allow for modalities for the Al Yarubiyah border cross- expiration. It seems that Lowcock underlined the re-authorisation of two of the four border ing, as requested by resolution 2504. that if the mechanism were not re-authorised crossings (Bab al-Salam and Bab al-Hawa) by then, the UN would not be able to deliver for a period of six months. The draft was Key Recent Developments food and life-saving aid to those in need. adopted as resolution 2504 by a vote of 11 During the month of December 2019, there On 20 December 2019, the Security in favour, none against, and four abstentions was an upsurge in aerial bombardment Council voted on two draft resolutions that (China, Russian Federation, United King- and ground fighting between government would have renewed the authorisation for dom, United States). The resolution does not and Syrian opposition forces in southern cross-border and cross-line humanitarian re-authorise use of the Al-Ramtha and the Al Idlib province. According to OCHA, since access. Neither draft was adopted. The first, Yarubiyah crossings. This departed from the 1 December 2019, approximately 389,000 which was produced by Belgium, Germany co-penholder draft resolution put in blue on people- the majority of whom are women and Kuwait, received 13 affirmative votes but 9 January, which included the latter crossing; and children- have been displaced. Many of was vetoed by China and Russia. It would the Al Yarubiyah crossing was removed on the the displaced fled from Ma’arrat An-Nu’man, have re-authorised use for one year of three of day of the vote to secure adoption. a city in southern Idlib that experienced the four border crossings (Bab al-Salam and The resolution further requests the Secre- aerial bombardment in the recent assault, Bab al-Hawa on the Turkey/Syria border and tary-General to report to the Security Coun- and moved north within the governorate or Al Yarubiyah on the Iraq/Syria border) that cil by the end of February 2020 on the fea- to areas in the northern Aleppo governor- had been mandated by previous resolutions. sibility of using alternative modalities for Al ate. The violence has continued into 2020. The second draft, produced by Russia, failed Yarubiyah. During the vote, Russia proposed According to media reports, an attack on a to be adopted because of an insufficient num- an oral amendment to the co-penholder school in the town of Sarmin in northern ber of affirmative votes, as only five members draft that referenced the “guiding princi- Idlib on 1 January killed nine civilians, five of (China, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, ples of humanitarian emergency assistance”, whom were children. Local sources believed Russia, and South Africa) supported it. (A as contained in General Assembly resolu- that the school had been used to shelter dis- resolution requires nine or more affirma- tion 46/182. (One of the guiding principles placed families from southern Idlib. tive votes to be adopted.) The Russian draft adopted by that resolution is that “humani- On 3 January, Council members held called for a re-authorisation of two of the four tarian assistance should be provided with the consultations on the situation in Idlib. existing border crossings (Bab al-Salam and consent of the affected country and in prin- France and the UK requested the meet- Bab al-Hawa) for six months. ciple on the basis of an appeal by the affected ing in light of the escalation of hostilities in Difficult negotiations aimed at renew- country”.) The oral amendment failed to be north-west Syria. Under-Secretary-General ing the mandate continued through the end adopted because of insufficient votes, as only
UN DOCUMENTS ON SYRIA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2504 (10 January 2020) renewed the authorisation of cross-border humanitarian aid through two border crossings (Bab al-Salam and Bab al-Hawa) for six months. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8700 (10 January 2020) was the meeting at which resolution 2504 was adopted.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 15 Syria three Council members (China, Russia and Human Rights-Related Developments organisations such as the ICRC. Viet Nam) voted in favour. On 16 January, the Commission of Inquiry on Syria Another significant challenge is the dif- In consultations on chemical weapons published a report on children’s rights, covering ficult humanitarian situation amidst the September 2011 to October 2019 (A/HRC/43/ in Syria on 6 January, Russia announced its CRP.6). The report details violations of children’s ongoing fighting in Syria. In reviewing the intention to convene an Arria-formula meet- rights by the warring parties, including killing and Secretary General’s report on the feasibility ing on the final report of the Fact-Finding injuring of children, the recruitment and use of of alternative modalities for the Al Yarubi- Mission (FFM) of the Organisation for the children in hostilities, attacks on education, chil- yah border crossing, members might con- Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) dren in detention, and sexual violence against sider holding an informal meeting, such as a children. It states that the “unprecedented and on the reported use of chemical weapons on recurrent nature of these violations has affected closed Arria-formula meeting, to allow for a 7 April 2018 in Douma, which was published generations to come”. The devastating situation frank discussion with UN officials and rele- on 1 March 2019. The report concluded that of education in Syria is highlighted as an area of vant humanitarian aid organisations on these the evaluation and analysis of all the infor- concern, with thousands of schools having been potential modalities. mation gathered by the FFM “provide rea- destroyed or used for military purposes and more than 2.1 million children not regularly attending sonable grounds” to conclude that a toxic classes of any form. “Eight years of conflict has Council Dynamics chemical weapon was used and that “the not only left an enormous trauma on the physi- The Council remains intensely divided on toxic chemical was likely molecular chlo- cal and mental well-being of an entire generation Syria, as reflected by the negotiations lead- rine”. According to media reports, at least 40 of Syrian girls and boys, but also destroyed the ing up to the adoption of resolution 2504 and people died as a result of the use of chemi- social, economic and cultural fabric required for the four abstentions registered on the vote. Syrian communities to start healing”, the report cal weapons in Douma. Although the FFM Russia and China have reservations about the says. is not mandated to assign responsibility, the cross-border aid delivery mechanism, main- report established that it is possible that two Key Issues and Options taining the importance of cooperation with yellow industrial cylinders “were the source A key issue is creating an environment in Syr- the Syrian government in the delivery of aid of the substances containing reactive chlo- ia that is conducive to advancing the political and believing that authorisations of the Al rine” that caused structural damage in two process. The Constitutional Committee has Yarubiya and Al-Ramtha crossings are no lon- locations. According to the report, one of the not met since its 25-29 November 2019 ses- ger necessary. Several other members regret cylinders was found on a rooftop terrace and sion, when no progress was made, as the co- that these crossings are no longer authorised the other passed through the ceiling of a dif- chairs from the government and opposition and that the renewal of the Bab al-Salam and ferent building and hit the floor. sides were unable to agree on an agenda for Bab al-Hawa crossings will only be for six Featured speakers at the Arria-formula the meeting. The government side wanted to months rather than one year. There is espe- meeting included Ambassador Alexander discuss “national constants” such as terror- cially strong concern about the closing of the Shulgin, Permanent Representative of Russia ism and sanctions relief prior to engaging on Al Yarubiya crossing, given that OCHA has to the OPCW; Maxim Grigoriev, director of constitutional matters; the opposition main- estimated that 1.3 million people in northeast the Foundation for the Study of Democracy; tained that these issues could be addressed Syria receive aid such as medicine and medi- Ian Henderson, a former OPCW official; and but not outside the context of the constitution. cal equipment through this crossing. Bashar Jaafari, Permanent Representative of Members could emphasise the impor- The Council’s divisions were also clearly Syria to the UN. These speakers strongly tance of confidence-building measures to exhibited in the Arria-formula meeting. Sev- questioned the accuracy of the FFM’s report, accompany the work of the Constitution- eral members—Belgium, Estonia, the P3 and with Grigoriev maintaining that the chemical al Committee, such as large-scale releases others—supported the FFM’s conclusions on weapons attack in Douma had been falsified. of detainees and abductees and informa- Douma, while Russia strongly contested its At press time, the Council was expected tion about missing persons. Other poten- findings. Others called for depoliticization of to receive briefings, followed by consultations, tial confidence-building measures, as pro- the OPCW’s work and issued a broad con- on the political and humanitarian situations posed by the International Crisis Group, demnation of the use of chemical weapons. in Syria on 29 January. could include amnesty for deserters from Belgium and Germany are the penholders the armed forces or access to prisons for on the Syria humanitarian file.
16 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Central African Republic
Expected Council Action civilians from the CAR will seek refuge in elections in the CAR. In that regard, the In February, the Council will meet to dis- Sudan in the coming weeks. Furthermore, statement appealed to the international com- cuss the latest Secretary-General’s report clashes between armed groups in the east- munity to mobilise around funding and sup- on the UN Multidimensional Integrated ern city of Bria on 25 January resulted in at port for the electoral process. Stabilization Mission in the Central Afri- least 50 deaths, according to media reports. can Republic (MINUSCA), which is due by The humanitarian situation in the CAR Sanctions-Related Developments 15 February. The Council will be briefed by remains dire, with OCHA estimating that In resolution 2488 of 12 September 2019, the Council amended the arms embargo on the Special Representative for the Central Afri- approximately 2.6 million people—over half CAR government. The resolution exempts, after can Republic (CAR) and Head of MINUS- of the population—will need humanitarian notifying the committee, supplies of non-lethal CA Mankeur Ndiaye. Representatives from assistance in 2020. military equipment intended for humanitarian or the AU and the European External Action In December 2020 and early 2021, the protective use and supplies to the CAR secu- Service may also brief. CAR is set to hold presidential, legislative and rity forces of weapons with a calibre of 14.5mm or less that are intended solely for the support The mandate of MINUSCA expires on 15 local elections. Regional and international of or use in the CAR process of security sector November 2020. The mandate of the Central partners view these elections as a crucial junc- reform. The resolution also requested that the African Republic (CAR) sanctions regime ture in the CAR’s political development. The Secretary-General update the Security Council expires on 31 July 2020. Security Council therefore decided last year on the progress achieved by the CAR authorities in resolution 2499 renewing MINUSCA’s on the key benchmarks established in its presi- dential statement of 9 April 2019, such as the Key Recent Developments mandate until 15 November, to authorise a effective implementation of the National Program The Political Peace Agreement in the CAR role for MINUSCA in supporting the CAR for Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration was signed in Bangui by the CAR govern- authorities in preparations for the elections. and Repatriation. ment and 14 armed groups on 6 February The return of former presidents Fran- In his report of 31 December 2019, the Sec- 2019. Since then, there has been a notable çois Bozizé and Michel Djotodia to the retary-General determined that the government decrease, compared to the previous year, CAR on 15 December 2019 and 10 January, of CAR made “some progress” on the arms embargo benchmarks while emphasising the in military confrontations between armed respectively, has raised concerns about their need for continued support by the Council and groups, CAR security forces and MINUSCA possible destabilising effect on the already international and regional partners. Progress was and in human rights violations linked to the fragile political climate in the CAR. Bozizé, made between June and December 2019 in the conflict. However, the final report of the Pan- who was listed under Security Council sanc- disarmament and demobilisation of 1,094 combat- el of Experts assisting the 2127 CAR Sanc- tions for “engaging in or providing support ants in the western CAR. The Secretary-General reported that notwithstanding these develop- tions Committee, which was presented to the for acts that undermine the peace, stability ments, disarmament and demobilisation timelines committee on 2 December 2019, determined or security of CAR” in 2014, stated during are not being met since several groups have yet that the implementation of the peace agree- a press conference on 27 January that he to demonstrate their commitment to disarm. ment “remained limited”. The report said sees no reason that would prevent him from On 31 January, the Security Council adopted that many civilians continue to experience becoming a candidate in the upcoming elec- resolution 2507 which renewed the mandate of the CAR sanctions regime for a period of six general insecurity as armed groups violate tions. Such a dynamic can serve to increase months, until 31 July 2020. The resolution incor- the agreement in large numbers, including political tensions and undermine the author- porates the provisions of resolution 2488 (2019) through violence against civilians, illegal taxa- ity of incumbent President Faustin-Arch- and provides for a further easing of the arms tion, and obstruction of the deployment of ange Touadéra, further complicating the embargo on the CAR government. The resolu- state institutions and security forces. implementation of the peace agreement. tion exempts, after notifying the CAR sanctions committee, supplies to the CAR security forces In recent incidents, clashes that broke On 21 January, Touadéra met with Bozizé of unarmed ground military vehicles and ground out on 24 December 2019 in the PK5 and Djotodia, along with former heads of military vehicles mounted with weapons with a neighbourhood in Bangui between local state Catherine Samba-Panza and Alexan- calibre of 14.5 mm or less that are intended solely traders and armed gangs resulted in at least dre-Ferdinand Nguendet. In a joint press for the support of or use in the CAR security sec- 40 deaths, according to media reports. On release issued after the meeting, the AU, the tor reform process. 9 January, clashes between members of an Economic Community of Central African Key Issues and Options armed group associated with the ex-Séléka States (ECCAS) and the UN welcomed the Monitoring the implementation of the CAR coalition and CAR armed forces in the city exchanges between Touadéra and the four peace agreement and ensuring that credible of Alindao led to the death of two service- former heads of states and stated that these and transparent elections are held remain men from the CAR armed forces and the exchanges will contribute to the peace and vital priorities for the Council. Monitoring displacement of 400 civilians. Inter-tribal reconciliation process in the CAR. They fur- the process leading up to the elections will clashes were reported on 20 January in the ther urged the acceleration of the implemen- also be a priority. Members might consider north-eastern town of Birao near the CAR- tation of the peace agreement, and called for adopting a statement urging the parties to Sudan border, raising concerns that more the holding of free, credible and transparent fully implement the peace agreement. Such
UN DOCUMENTS ON THE CAR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2499 (15 November 2019) extended the mandate of MINUSCA until 15 November 2020. S/RES/2488 (12 September 2019) amended the CAR sanctions regime for CAR security forces. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2019/3 (9 April 2019) established benchmarks for lifting arms embargo measures on the CAR government. Security Council Letters S/2019/1008 (31 December 2019) contained the Secretary-General’s assessment of progress achieved on the benchmarks established by the Security Council on arms embargo measures in the CAR. S/2019/930 (6 December 2019) contained the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the CAR Sanctions Committee.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 17 Central African Republic a product might also seek to demonstrate the serve to pressure the parties to implement the correspond with current realties in the coun- Council’s unified support for MINUSCA peace agreement. The difficult negotiation on try, particularly given the conclusions of the and its work to facilitate the electoral process. the resolution renewing the mandate of the latest Secretary-General’s benchmarkstatus CAR sanctions regime ahead of its 31 January report. Such a dynamic might make it dif- Council and Wider Dynamics expiry demonstrated that opinions continue ficult for the Security Council to maintain All Council members share the hope that to diverge regarding the further lifting of the unity on issues relating to the CAR portfolio. the peace agreement will improve the situ- arms embargo on the CAR authorities. While France is the penholder on the CAR, and ation and restore peace and security in the Russia and China hold the view that more Ambassador Abdou Abarry (Niger) chairs the CAR. Several Council members are of the progress should be made towards the com- 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee. view that the sanctions regime continues to plete lifting of the embargo, other members promote security in the CAR and can also feel that easing the arms embargo does not
Haiti
Expected Council Action and deadly. Opposition groups continue to reconstruction progress. According to the In February, the Security Council is expect- call for Moïse’s resignation and see the dis- International Organisation for Migration, ed to hold its first meeting on the UN Inte- solution of Parliament as another example of around 35,000 people remain in camps a grated Office in Haiti (BINUH), a special his undemocratic actions. Additionally, some decade after the earthquake. political mission (SPM) established after Haitian senators—through a different inter- BINUH was established through reso- the UN Mission for Justice Support in pretation of the Haitian constitution—argue lution 2476, adopted on 25 June 2019, for Haiti (MINUJUSTH) closed on 15 Octo- that their terms have not ended yet and say an initial period of 12 months. Its mandate ber 2019. Special Representative Helen La they will continue to serve. includes advising the government on issues Lime is expected to brief, and a civil society This is not a new situation for Haiti. related to promoting and strengthening polit- briefer may also participate. When the Haitian Parliament was dissolved ical stability and good governance, the rule of BINUH’s mandate expires on 16 Octo- in January 2015, also due to a lack of timely law, an inclusive inter-Haitian national dia- ber 2020. elections, then-President Michel Martelly logue, and protecting and promoting human ruled by decree until the end of his term in rights. In his October 2019 report on Haiti, Key Recent Developments February 2016. the Secretary-General laid out six bench- On 13 January, Haitian President Jovenel The political crisis is likely to continue marks and 25 indicators that were to be used Moïse began, in effect, to govern Haiti alone. to exacerbate Haiti’s severe economic and to measure progress towards sustainable sta- Earlier that day, he announced that Parlia- humanitarian challenges. The 2019-2020 bility after BINUH’s deployment. ment’s mandate, which was set to expire in humanitarian response plan for Haiti, which Council members issued a press statement January 2020, had ended because of the fail- called for $126.2 million, was 32.1 percent on Haiti on 8 January, expressing concern at ure to hold legislative and local elections in funded on 16 December 2019. Food insecu- Haiti’s continuing political impasse and reit- October 2019. In 2019, Parliament failed to rity continues to be a grave problem. Accord- erating the need for inclusive and open dia- pass an electoral law and approve an election ing to the World Food Programme, a third logue to form a government. budget that would have been the first steps of the Haitian population of 10.9 million is for organising these elections, that were con- facing hunger conditions and around one Human Rights-Related Developments stitutionally mandated to be held in October million Haitians suffer from severe hunger. On 1 November 2019, a spokesperson for the High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed 2019; nor was there political agreement on the The situation was made worse by the protests concern over the situation in Haiti and its impact new composition of the Provisional Electoral last year, which at times cut off parts of Haiti on the ability of Haitians to access their basic Council. Moïse said he sees this development from deliveries of food and medical supplies. rights to health care, food, education and other as an opportunity for Haiti to undergo what he The twelfth of January marked ten years needs. The spokesperson urged all parties to believes is much needed constitutional reform. since Haiti’s deadly 7.0 magnitude earth- avoid hampering the functioning of hospitals and to facilitate access to health care, as well as the Moïse does not enjoy much popular sup- quake, which, according to reports, killed delivery, including through humanitarian channels, port, however, and this could complicate his 316,000 people, injured 1.5 million, and of food and medicine for individuals in prisons and ability to rule by decree. He has been the left 1.5 million homeless. Many in Haiti’s orphanages and other vulnerable groups such as subject of months of protests, some violent civil society have reflected on the scant people living with disabilities.
UN DOCUMENTS ON HAITI Security Council Resolution S/RES/2476 (25 June 2019) established BINUH, an SPM that will continue the UN presence in Haiti following the conclusion of MINUJUSTH. Secretary-General’s Report S/2019/805 (9 October 2019) was the last Secretary-General’s report covering the activities of MINUJUSTH, which closed its offices on 15 October 2019. This report also contained benchmarks for BINUH. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8641 (15 October 2019) was the last debate on MINUJUSTH, with a briefing from Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix. S/PV.8559 (25 June 2019) was the adoption of resolution 2476 establishing BINUH. Security Council Press Statement SC/14070 (8 January 2020) expressed concern regarding Haiti’s continuing political impasse and reiterated the need for inclusive and open dialogue to form a government. Security Council members also emphasised the urgent need to address deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Haiti.
18 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Haiti
Key Issues and Options Council members may also use the meet- and led more by Haiti itself. The establishment of BINUH in October ing as an opportunity to reflect on the tenth Council members are likely to be careful 2019 marked the first time since 2004 with- anniversary of the 2010 earthquake. not to appear to take sides between President out a UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti. Moïse and the opposition during this uncer- This will be seen as a test for the UN, and Council Dynamics tain period. This appears to have given some the Security Council, for transitioning from Recently, there has been some difficulty in impetus to the January press statement, with a long peacekeeping presence to a smaller achieving Council products on Haiti. For some member states wanting it to be pub- special political mission. The UN, Haitian example, the press statement issued on 8 lished before the expiration of Parliament’s institutions and the wider international com- January was the first press statement on term on 13 January so as not to appear to be munity have been developing a new working Haiti since July 2018. Previous attempts in endorsing Moïse’s governing by decree. relationship. Council members are likely to late 2019 were unsuccessful because of one Additionally, the Council now has two want to hear more about this process as well Council member’s belief that a statement was Caribbean member states serving–Domini- as the main challenges BINUH has faced. not timely or useful. Council members were can Republic and Saint Vincent and the The lack of a legislative government will also unable to agree on the customary presi- Grenadines—which could provide a unique be a topic for this meeting and a concern dential statement that is adopted when a mis- point of view. Since joining the Council in for Council members. They will want to sion closes; in this case, MINUJUSTH. 2019, the Dominican Republic has repeatedly hear more about how the current politi- Council members’ differences seem to expressed its concerns about the withdrawal cal impasse may be addressed, whether stem from differing views on how much out- of MINUJUSTH, believing the process was through elections or reforms. Council mem- side influence there should be on the future rushed and did not adequately respond to the bers could issue a press statement calling of Haiti. Some approve of having detailed situation on the ground. for inclusive and timely dialogue to bring benchmarks while others would prefer The US is the penholder on Haiti. Haitian parties together. It is likely some BINUH’s mandate to be less prescriptive
EU-UN Briefing
Expected Council Action international peace and security and in the Representative for Foreign Affairs and Secu- In February, the Council will hold its annual implementation of Council-mandated tasks. rity Policy serves as the coordinator of the meeting on strengthening the partnership Since 2013, Council members have also met Joint Commission, a body composed of the with the EU under its agenda item on cooper- annually with members of the EU Political parties to the agreement. The agreement, ation between the UN and regional and sub- and Security Committee. which the Council endorsed in 2015 in res- regional organisations in maintaining inter- This will be the first time Borrell briefs olution 2231, has faced a precarious future national peace and security. Josep Borrell, the the Council on EU-UN cooperation. He since the US withdrew from it in May 2018. EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs assumed the position of EU High Represen- Iran has since gradually started to abandon and Security Policy, will brief the Council. tative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy its commitments under the agreement. On on 1 December 2019, succeeding Federica 5 January, it announced that it will no longer Background Mogherini, who had been in office since 2014. be bound by the uranium enrichment limits The relationship between the UN and the The briefings on EU-UN cooperation set out in the JCPOA, while emphasising that EU has evolved over the years and has con- generally follow a consistent format. Borrell it would return to compliance if other parties tinued to grow in importance. Recognising is likely to focus his briefing on the areas of fulfil their obligations under the agreement. this, the Council has maintained the practice, cooperation between the two organisations, On 14 January, France, Germany and the starting in 2010, of holding regular, usually present the EU’s main foreign policy priori- UK formally referred Iran’s non-compliance annual, briefings on cooperation between the ties and objectives, and address some of the to the Joint Commission’s Dispute Resolu- two organisations. (These briefings were not ongoing crises that overlap on the EU and tion Mechanism (DRM), setting in motion held in 2012 and 2018). The Council formal- the Council agendas. a process that could result in reinstating UN ly endorsed this relationship in 2014 when it The EU has been engaged heavily in sanctions that were in place prior to the adop- adopted a presidential statement on EU-UN efforts to preserve the Joint Comprehensive tion of resolution 2231. While the agreement cooperation. Among other things, the state- Plan of Action (JCPOA), an agreement that sets specific time limits for the resolution of ment welcomed the EU’s cooperation with places limits on Iran’s nuclear programme the disputes, that period could be extend- the UN and its role in the maintenance of and provides sanctions relief. The EU High ed almost indefinitely if all parties agree.
UN DOCUMENTS ON EU-UN COOPERATION Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2491 (3 October 2019) renewed the authorisation for member states, acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya that they have reasonable grounds to suspect are being used for migrant smuggling or human traffick- ing. S/RES/2231 (20 July 2015) endorsed the JCPOA. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2014/4 (14 February 2014) was on cooperation between the UN and the EU, highlighting the EU’s comprehensive approach to maintenance of international peace and security. Security Council Meetings S/PV.8482 (12 March 2019) was a briefing on cooperation between the UN and the EU. S/PV.7935 (9 May 2017) was a briefing on cooperation between the UN and the EU.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 19 EU-UN Briefing
Eventually, if the dispute is not settled by the the largest collective contributor to the UN Another practice that has emerged over Joint Commission, the Council would have to peacekeeping budget, providing over 30 per- the past several years has been for the EU vote on a resolution that would continue the cent of total contributions. members of the Council (including incom- lifting of sanctions. Borrell is also likely to discuss the Middle ing and recent former members) to make In the context of peacekeeping, the coop- East peace process, the situation in Libya, the joint statements at the Council media stake- eration between the EU and the UN is most humanitarian situation in Iraq, cooperation out, presenting the EU position on specific evident in Africa, where the two organisa- with other regional organisations, transna- Security Council issues. tions work alongside one another in sever- tional crime, climate change, and sustainable Currently, four Council members—Bel- al countries. The EU provides training for development, among other issues. gium, Estonia, Germany, and France—are security forces and assists in security sec- The EU members of the Council have EU members. The UK stopped being a mem- tor reform in the Central African Republic, made a concerted effort to coordinate their ber of this group on 31 January when it for- Mali and Somalia. The EU also provides positions and present a unified front on mally left the EU. salaries for the UN-authorised AU Mission some issues on the Council’s agenda, such in Somalia. Member states of the EU are as Kosovo, Syria, Ukraine and Venezuela.
Burundi
Expected Council Action Burundi found that the suppression of civil 2019. An additional 103,352 people were In February, Council members will recieve a liberties is intensifying ahead of the election. internally displaced by November 2019, briefing in informal interactive dialogue on The commission further found that viola- while 20,916 refugees returned to Burundi the situation in Burundi. tions of the right to life, arbitrary arrest and with the assistance of UNHCR during 2019. detention, torture and other forms of ill- The Council’s last resolution on Burundi, Key Recent Developments treatment, sexual violence, and violations of resolution 2303, requested the Secretary- The political and security situations in economic and social rights, some of which General to report to the Council on a quar- Burundi have remained unsettled since April may constitute crimes against humanity, are terly basis and “to provide written reports 2015 when President Pierre Nkurunziza conducted in a general climate of impunity. immediately to the Security Council, as nec- announced that he would run for a contro- It identified the youth league of the CNDD- essary, on grave security incidents, violations versial third term later that year, leading to FDD, the Imbonerakure, and government of international humanitarian law and viola- mass demonstrations and a sharp increase security forces as the main perpetrators. On tions or abuses of human rights”. There was in violence and repression against his oppo- 16 January, the European Parliament adopt- one written report in 2019. The last Coun- nents. Nkurunziza won the third term and, ed a resolution strongly condemning “the cil briefing on Burundi took place on 30 according to a subsequent amendment current restrictions on freedom of expres- October 2019. During that meeting, then- to the constitution, would be able to run sion in Burundi, including the broader sets Special Envoy to Burundi Michel Kafando again and remain in power up until 2034. of limitations to public freedoms, as well as announced his intention to leave his post. He He has said that he does not plan to run in the large-scale violations of human rights, further noted that the situation in Burundi the May 2020 election and will accept the intimidation and arbitrary arrests of jour- remained tense because of “an increase in the result of the election. However, his party, the nalists and the broadcast bans that have level of political intolerance and a growing National Council for the Defense of Democ- reinforced the climate of fear for Burundi’s threat to civil and political freedoms”. The racy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy media, increased the constraints on report- security situation had nonetheless improved, (CNDD-FDD), has not yet announced a ing and prevented proper coverage, in par- according to Kafando. He further referred candidate for the election. ticular in the run-up to the 2020 elections”. to the deteriorating socioeconomic situa- Hundreds of civilians have been killed A December 2019 report by Human Rights tion. Seventy percent of the population lives since April 2015 in clashes with security Watch said that the Imbonerakure continue below the poverty line of less than $1.90 a forces, and about half a million people have to forcibly collect funding for the presiden- day. Ambassador Jürg Lauber (Switzer- fled the country as a result. While the govern- tial election from the population. land), the chair of the Burundi configura- ment maintains that the security situation is According to UNHCR, there were tion of the Peacebuilding Commission, also stable throughout the country, the 4 Sep- 332,840 Burundian refugees, mostly in Tan- briefed the Council on 30 October. In their tember 2019 report of the Human Rights zania, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of statements after the briefings, a majority of Council’s (HRC) Commission of Inquiry on the Congo and Uganda, on 31 December Council members echoed concerns over the
UN DOCUMENTS ON BURUNDI Security Council Resolution S/RES/2303 (29 July 2016), adopted with four abstentions (Angola, China, Egypt and Venezuela), requested the Secretary- General to establish a UN police component in Burundi of 228 officers for an initial period of one year.Secretary-General’s Reports S/2019/837 (24 October 2019) was on the situation in Burundi. S/2019/783 (1 October 2019) was a report on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes Region. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8652 (30 October 2019) was a briefing on the situation in Burundi by then-Special Envoy Michel Kafando and Ambassador Jürg Lauber (Switzerland), the chair of the Burundi configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission.
20 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Burundi
human rights situation. The representative of the 2020 presidential and legislative elections members concerned about the human rights Burundi reiterated the country’s regular call and calls for close monitoring of the situation. It situation in the country ahead of the elec- “for Burundi to be removed from the Coun- recommends that the Security Council ensure tion could organise an Arria-formula meet- the effective implementation of resolution 2303, cil agenda”, a position again supported by refer to the International Criminal Court any ing with the HRC’s Commission of Inquiry China and Russia. international crime that might be committed, and on Burundi to discuss its recommendations Relations between Burundi and the East impose individual sanctions against the principal to the Council. African Community (EAC) continue to be alleged perpetrators of gross human rights vio- strained. The EAC-led inter-Burundian dia- lations and international crimes in Burundi. (The Council and Wider Dynamics HRC renewed the mandate of the Commission logue—envisioned as a mediated consultative for another year in resolution 42/26, adopted on Council members agree that the continued process among the government and the oppo- 27 September 2019.) viability of the Arusha Peace and Reconcili- sition, civil society organisations, including ation Agreements—which ended the Burun- women, young people and members of the Key Issues and Options dian civil war in 2000—is important as a basis media; and religious groups—has not mate- The intensified suppression of civil liberties for stability in the country. Burundi, for its rialised in four years. In his 30 October brief- ahead of the presidential election and the part, remains entrenched in its opposition to ing, Kafando said that this was “undoubtedly stalled EAC-led mediation remain serious what it considers interference by the interna- due to a lack of political will on the part of concerns that the Council will need to moni- tional community in its internal affairs. This the parties” as well as a lack of “firm commit- tor closely. An option would be to adopt a may affect the way forward for the office of ment by States of the subregion”. presidential statement ahead of the election, the Special Envoy. By the end of 2019, the UN’s 2019 noting Nkurunziza’s commitment not to run To date, the Council has been unable to humanitarian response plan for Burundi of for president and not to contest the election find a fresh avenue to re-engage with Burundi. $106.3 million has been funded at 64.7 per- results, urging the EAC to intensify efforts The continued improvement in the security cent, with $37.5 million outstanding. to revive the inter-Burundian dialogue, and situation led some members to argue that— calling on Burundi to take steps towards an notwithstanding political, human rights and Human Rights-Related Developments inclusive electoral process, including respect humanitarian concerns—there is no need to On 23 October, the HRC’s Commission of Inqui- for civil liberties. keep Burundi on the Council’s agenda, view- ry on Burundi gave an oral briefing to the Third Another major issue is the continued lack ing such concerns as internal issues lacking Committee of the General Assembly on their 4 September report (A/HRC/42/49). The report, of accountability for human rights violations an international peace and security dimen- which was presented to the HRC during its over the last several years, magnified by the sion. During the meeting in February, some 42nd session on 17 September 2019, concludes closure in February 2019 of the UN Human Council members may question the need for that serious human rights violations have contin- Rights Office in the country at the insistence the quarterly briefing on Burundi to contin- ued to be committed in Burundi since the Com- of the government after a 23-year presence. ue. Difficulties around the quarterly briefing mission’s last report, which covered 2017-2018. It identifies several risk factors in the run-up to The Council may encourage Burundi to have arisen in the past. cooperate fully with all UN bodies. Council
Somalia
Expected Council Action region. The mandate of UNSOM expires on Somalia Sanctions Committee, the terrorist In February, the Security Council will have 31 March and the authorisation of the AU group Al-Shabaab remains a potent threat to a briefing and consultations on the Secre- Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) expires on regional peace and security and is responsible tary-General’s most recent report on the UN 31 May. The Security Council Somalia sanc- for many attacks against civilians. The report Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) tions regime expires on 15 November 2020. said that Al-Shabaab has forcibly recruited and the situation in Somalia. It will also and abducted hundreds of children; targeted receive a briefing in consultations from Key Recent Developments government officials, parliamentarians and Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve The security situation in Somalia is fragile. humanitarian workers during the reporting (Belgium), chair of the 751 Somalia Sanc- According to the 1 November 2019 final period; and employed improvised explosive tions Committee, on his recent visit to the report of the Panel of Experts of the 751 devices to kill and injure civilians in internally
UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2498 (15 November 2019) extended various elements of the Somalia sanctions regime until 15 November 2020. S/RES/2472 (31 May 2019) renewed the authorisation of AMISOM until 31 May 2020 and authorised reductions to achieve a maximum level of 19,626 uniformed AMISOM personnel by 28 February 2020. S/RES/2461 (27 March 2019) renewed the mandate of UNSOM until 31 March 2020. Secretary-General’s Report S/2019/884 (15 November 2019) was the most recent Secretary-General’s report on Somalia and UNSOM. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8671 (21 November 2019) was the briefing by Special Representative and head of UNSOM James Swan. S/PV.8665 (15 November 2019) was the meeting at which resolution 2498 was adopted. S/PV.8647 (25 October 2019) was a briefing by the Chair of the 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve (Belgium). Security Council Press Statements SC/14067 (29 December 2019) condemned the deadly terrorist attack of 28 December 2019 at the Ex-control Afgooye Junction in Mogadishu. SC/14034 (25 November 2019) noted the 21 November Council meeting about Somalia and called on all key actors and institutions in Somalia to set aside their differences and engage constructively in discussions about upcoming elections. Sanctions Committee Document S/2019/858 (1 November 2019) was the final report of the Panel of Experts on Somalia.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 21 Somalia displaced persons camps, restaurants, mar- Ex-control Afgooye Junction in Mogadishu. how that is proceeding, and member states ketplaces, shopping centres, government At the February meeting, the Council will are likely to ask for more information. With offices and hotels. The Secretary-General’s consider the Secretary-General’s latest report, mandate renewals coming up in the next six 15 November 2019 report on UNSOM due by 9 February, which should include months, member states will begin to assess reached similar conclusions. updates on UNSOM’s progress towards the situation on the ground and want infor- The Council was last briefed on Somalia achieving key political benchmarks and ongo- mation on how the Council should proceed. on 21 November 2019. James Swan, Spe- ing efforts to increase the capability of the cial Representative of the Secretary-General Somali security forces. Council and Wider Dynamics and head of UNSOM; Francisco Caetano While the issue of Somalia has enjoyed gen- José Madeira, Special Representative of the Sanctions-Related Developments eral agreement from all Council members, Chairperson of the African Union Commis- The 751 Somalia Sanctions regime was renewed there are some divisions on the best way to on 15 November 2019. It consolidated all the ele- sion for Somalia and head of AMISOM; encourage change. In particular, differences ments of the arms embargo and its partial lifting Halima Ismail Ibrahim, chair of the Nation- for Somali security forces, including exceptions remain about the arms embargo. Somalia al Independent Electoral Commission of and applicable humanitarian exemptions, into one maintains that the arms embargo should be Somalia; and Osman Moallim, executive text. Previously, elements had been spread across amended to allow it to import heavy weap- director of Somalia Youth Development several resolutions. While 2019 was characterised ons without authorisation from the sanc- by a tense relationship between Somalia and the Network, briefed. tions committee, and it takes issue with the UN—during its last mandate period, the Panel of The meeting focused largely on the elec- Experts was unable to gain permission to make composition of the Panel of Experts and tions that may be held in late 2020 or early a formal visit to Somalia—the appointment of a some of its findings. France, Germany, the 2021. If successful, these would be Somalia’s new coordinator of the panel may help foster a UK and the US criticised Somalia during a first free and fair elections since 1969. Swan new relationship. Ambassador Marc Pecsteen 25 October 2019 briefing for not allowing de Buytswerve (Belgium), chair of the sanctions emphasised the “critical importance of Parlia- the panel’s visit. Others have taken a more committee, visited Somalia in that capacity at the ment passing the electoral code and adopting end of January. conciliatory tone in the past and emphasised amendments to the law on political parties the need to respect Somali sovereignty. before the end of December” and that “[a]ny Key Issues and Options Council members also differ on the pace delay in that timeline puts the 2020 electoral Council members’ immediate concern is of troop withdrawal. The three African mem- calendar at risk”. Council members issued a likely to centre around the possible elections bers of the Council in 2019 supported the AU press statement on 25 November calling on in late 2020 or early 2021 and preparatory position that an AMISOM drawdown was all stakeholders in Somalia to engage con- efforts that have been made. The Coun- premature and that Somalia was not ready to structively to ensure that elections take place. cil has been urging Somalia to act swiftly. take on greater security responsibilities. Their On 28 December 2019, Somalia’s lower Council members could decide to issue position was supported by China and Russia. house of parliament passed the long-await- another press statement on the subject after Meanwhile, France, the UK and the US sup- ed electoral law. However, it will not go into the meeting, as was done in November 2019. ported reductions by the end of 2019. Mem- effect until it has also been passed by the Additionally, given the ongoing difficulties bers are likely to reiterate their positions in upper chamber and signed by the president. with the Somalia sanctions regime, Council this meeting, especially given the upcoming At press time, neither had occurred. Only members could decide during the meeting to troop withdrawal deadline. after the law goes into effect can parties and reiterate previous calls for Somalia and other The UK is the penholder on Somalia. candidates register for the elections. member states to meet their obligations in Ambassador Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve In December 2019, the Council unani- implementing the sanctions regime, particu- (Belgium) is Chair of the Sanctions Com- mously adopted resolution 2500 renewing larly with respect to the arms embargo and mittee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) the counter-piracy measures off the coast of charcoal ban. Another ongoing development concerning Somalia. Somalia. On 29 December, Council mem- is the withdrawal, reached through a compro- bers issued a press statement condemning a mise in resolution 2472, of 1,000 AMISOM deadly terrorist attack on 28 December at the troops by the end of February. It is unclear
22 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action steps toward denuclearisation. talks on denuclearisation. In February, the chair of the 1718 Democrat- On 16 December, China and Russia cir- An ongoing issue for the Council is find- ic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanc- culated to Council members a draft resolu- ing the right balance between applying pres- tions Committee, Ambassador Christoph tion that called for a partial lifting of sanctions sure through sanctions and simultaneously Heusgen (Germany), is expected to brief on the DPRK. Subsequently, two rounds of encouraging the diplomatic track. An option Council members in consultations on the expert-level negotiations were held on the is to explore ways to modify the sanctions 90-day report about the committee’s work. draft in December, but it did not advance in on the DPRK to encourage further diplo- The mandate of the Panel of Experts light of the widespread view that any easing matic engagement. expires on 24 April 2020. of sanctions would be premature. Some Council members are concerned In other developments, the DPRK’s about the impact of sanctions on the human- Key Recent Developments foreign minister, Ri Yong Ho, was relieved itarian situation in the DPRK. The Coun- During the second half of 2019, the DPRK of his responsibilities, according to media cil could seek more regular interaction with gradually resumed testing ballistic missiles reports. Ri played a notable role during the OCHA to obtain detailed information for its and associated technologies. Since May 2019, latest diplomatic outreach between the US consideration of humanitarian exemptions. the DPRK has conducted over a dozen ballis- and the DPRK as well as during the inter- The ongoing dire human rights situation tic missile tests in violation of Security Coun- Korean talks in 2018. in the DPRK remains an issue. Given that, as cil resolutions. However, for more than two Every December from 2014 to 2017, noted previously, the December briefing on years, since it first started talks with the US, the Council held an annual meeting on the this subject has not been held for two years in the DPRK has refrained from testing inter- human rights situation in the DPRK. Each a row, the Council could continue to explore continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The time, the proposed agenda item “the situa- the possibility of holding such a meeting. DPRK indicated that it would give the US tion in the DPRK” required a procedural vote until the end of 2019 to make concessions in order to be included in the programme of Council Dynamics in negotiations; otherwise, it would resume work. For the second year in a row, the pro- The Council dynamics are shaped in large ICBM tests and ditch further diplomatic ponents of this meeting could not gather nine part by diverging views on the role of sanc- engagement with the US. members in 2019 to sign the letter request- tions in addressing the nuclear threat posed On 1 January, DPRK leader Kim Jong-un ing the meeting. (The veto does not apply by the DPRK. The US has been a strong delivered his traditional New Year’s address. to Council decisions of a procedural nature.) proponent of maintaining the policy of max- In it, he announced that the DPRK would imum pressure until the DPRK takes con- no longer be constrained by the self-imposed Human Rights-Related Developments crete steps toward denuclearisation. The EU moratorium on testing ICBMs and nuclear The special rapporteur on the situation of human members of the Council are generally sup- rights in the DPRK, Tomás Ojea Quintana, visited weapons. He said the DPRK would soon portive of this approach. On the other hand, Japan from 2 to 4 December 2019. During the visit, unveil a new “strategic weapon”. Kim did not he exchanged views on human rights issues in China and Russia have shown more interest completely abandon the diplomatic track but the DPRK with government officials, families of in considering some form of sanctions relief, said that any future engagement will depend abduction victims, persons who went to the DPRK as was evident during the 11 December 2019 on the US approach to the DPRK. He did as part of a resettlement programme between the meeting on non-proliferation and when they 1950s and 1984 and later returned to Japan, and not provide further specifics. circulated a draft resolution on partial sanc- members of civil society and the academic com- Following a US request, the Council held munity. He will report his findings and recommen- tions relief for the DPRK. It appears that the a meeting on 11 December 2019 to address dations to the Human Rights Council during its proposal does not have sufficient support non-proliferation issues on the Korean pen- 43rd session in March. from other Council members. insula in light of the recent series of ballistic When the DPRK resumed testing bal- missile tests. Council members were united Key Issues and Options listic missiles in the second half of 2019 in their support for the resumption of the Over the past 14 years, the Council has main- after a self-imposed moratorium that lasted US-DPRK diplomatic talks and the need tained and gradually increased sanctions over a year, Germany, France, and the UK for the DPRK to halt missile tests. China pressure on the DPRK. While there was a brought the issue to the Council’s attention, and Russia, however, expressed criticism of period of eased tensions, especially in 2018, initiating several meetings under “any oth- the Council’s approach towards sanctions the country has not significantly changed its er business” to address the DPRK’s missile on the DPRK. They emphasised the need to behaviour: it has continued to test ballistic tests. Given its focus on diplomatic efforts, adjust the sanctions regime in order to facil- missiles and to violate the sanctions regime. the US administration has generally down- itate diplomatic efforts. Most other Coun- The Council is primarily concerned about played recent missile tests. cil members stressed the need to preserve the recent proliferation of ballistic missile In December 2019, an interesting dynam- sanctions until the DPRK takes concrete tests by the DPRK and the stalled diplomatic ic emerged over the issue of the human rights
UN DOCUMENTS ON THE DPRK Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2464 (10 April 2019) extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee until 24 April 2020. S/RES/2397 (22 December 2017) tightened sanctions on the DPRK. Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2017/16 (29 August 2017) condemned the launch of a missile over the territory of Japan and urged the DPRK to comply with previous Council resolutions and presidential statements. Security Council Meeting Records S/PV.8682 (11 December 2019) was an open briefing on non-proliferation focused on the DPRK. S/PV.8507 (10 April 2019) was the meeting to adopt a resolution renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee until 24 April 2020. S/PV.8363 (27 September 2018) was a ministerial-level meeting on efforts to denuclearise the DPRK.S/PV.8362 (26 September 2018) was a high-level meeting on countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Sanctions Committee Documents S/2019/971 (20 December 2019) was the annual report of the 1718 Sanctions Committee. S/2019/691 (30 August 2019) was a midterm report of the Panel of Experts.
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 23 DPRK (North Korea) situation in the DPRK. The US, which held vote threshold, and the idea was abandoned. the DPRK—including responding to posi- the December presidency and initially had Council members are more consistent in their tive developments through Council outcomes signalled its plans to hold the human rights support for the US-DPRK and inter-Korean and other means of showing support for a briefing, decided to drop the initiative. It diplomatic efforts. There is a shared concern serious dialogue about the denuclearisation appeared that eight members had signed a among members that the resumption of bal- of the Korean peninsula—but there has been letter requesting the meeting, anticipating listic missile tests and heightened rhetoric has little movement in this direction. that the US would also lend its support to the potential to disrupt the diplomatic efforts. The US is the penholder on the DPRK, the initiative. Without US support, howev- Some members have shown interest in a new and Germany chairs the 1718 DPRK Sanc- er, the issue would not pass the procedural approach to the Council’s relationship with tions Committee.
Lead Roles within the Council in 2020: Penholders and Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies
The tables below reflect the Security Council they are willing to take up the pen. common practice that had never before been penholders and chairs of subsidiary bodies In contrast to the penholder system, the articulated in writing in which a draft is cir- as of January 2020. The tables do not cover many subsidiary bodies established by the culated with a deadline for raising objections. all the agenda items of which the Council is Council have, in recent years, been chaired Should there be none, the draft becomes final, currently seized but focus on items with regu- exclusively by non-permanent members. The recognising “that any Council member may lar outcomes or those for which a subsidiary process by which chairs are appointed was request extension of and/or break silence if body has been established. For the full names until recently controlled by the permanent further consideration is required”. The 2017 of agenda items, please refer to the summary members, and opaque. This, and the unequal Note 507 also restated the 2016 agreements statement by the Secretary-General of mat- distribution of penholder roles among elected concerning subsidiary bodies. ters of which the Security Council is seized members, helped make the issue of burden- In 2019, there were developments con- (S/2020/10) issued on 2 January. The list of sharing a frequent point of discussion when cerning both the penholdership and chairing chairs of subsidiary bodies is contained in addressing working methods. In 2016, a of subsidiary bodies. In an effort to achieve a note by the Council president (S/2020/2), change in the date of electing new Council better burden-sharing, Germany, which also of 2 January. members—from October to June—created took on the 1970 Libya Sanctions Commit- The penholder system and the process of an opportunity for addressing the chairs’ tee, joined the UK as co-penholder on issues appointing chairs of subsidiary bodies are selection process as part of discussions within concerning Libya sanctions in early 2019. In frequent topics of discussion among Council the Informal Working Group on Documenta- addition, Germany decided to appoint its members. The penholder role refers to the tion and Other Procedural Questions (IWG), deputy permanent representative, rather than member of the Council that leads the nego- led at the time by Japan. Several changes in its permanent representative, as chair of the tiation and drafting of resolutions on a par- the selection process were instituted that fall. 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee. Historical- ticular Council agenda item. While leadership They included a more transparent and collab- ly, permanent representatives have held the within the Council in drafting resolutions orative appointment process, facilitated by a position of chairs of subsidiary bodies; how- has been regular practice since its inception, permanent and an elected member. ever, this has been Council practice rather the penholder system itself is a fairly recent In August 2017, under Japan’s leadership, than the result of Council decisions. Early in development. It was not until 2006—with the IWG reached agreement on a new ver- 2019, Germany furthermore joined the UK France, the UK and the US (known as the sion of the compendium of its working meth- as co-penholder on Sudan. In mid-2019, Bel- P3) leading in the drafting and negotiating ods, commonly referred to as “Note 507”. In gium joined Côte d’Ivoire as co-penholder on of outcomes regarding nuclear threats by the this update, attention was specifically paid to West Africa and the Sahel. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the penholder system and the appointment The process of appointing chairs of the Iran—that the penholder “system” began to of chairs of subsidiary bodies. The updated Council subsidiary bodies in 2019 was emerge as a distinct practice. While any mem- Note 507 provided guidelines regarding the smoother than in previous years. The incom- ber of the Council can be a penholder—it is processes leading to the adoption of Council ing five members discussed their “wish lists” an informal system, with nothing preventing outcomes under the current penholder sys- for chairmanships among themselves before other Council members from “grabbing the tem, including an emphasis on at least one submitting a list as a group to China and pen” and drafting outcomes on any issue— round of discussions with all members of Kuwait, who were the facilitators in 2019. the P3 continue to dominate the penholder the Council on all drafts. It underscored the The list passed silence on 11 October and list, as is clear from the tables below. At times, need to provide sufficient time for consider- became formal in January 2020. elected members have demonstrated that ation, referring to the “silence procedure”, a Some of the new Council
24 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Lead Roles within the Council in 2020: Penholders and Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies members–Estonia, Niger, Saint Vincent Committee; Niger, the 2127 Central Afri- Operations; and Viet Nam, the 1636 Leba- and the Grenadines, Tunisia and Viet Nam– can Republic (CAR) Sanctions Committee, non Sanctions Committee, the 2206 South have assumed the role of penholders or co- the 1533 Democratic Republic of the Congo Sudan Sanctions Committee, and the Infor- penholders for 2020. Niger joined Belgium (DRC) Sanctions Committee, and the 1566 mal Working Group on International Tribu- as co-penholder for West Africa and the Working Group; Saint Vincent and the Gren- nals. The Dominican Republic has replaced Sahel; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines adines, the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Commit- Peru as the co-chair with Germany of the became penholder on working methods; and tee and the Informal Working Group on Doc- 2242 Informal Expert Group on Women, Viet Nam, penholder on the International umentation and Other Procedural Questions; Peace and Security as well as continuing to Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribu- Tunisia, the 2048 Guinea-Bissau Commit- chair the 2374 Mali Sanctions Committee. nals. Estonia chairs the 1518 Iraq Sanctions tee, the 1373 Counterterrorism Committee, Committee and the 1591 Sudan Sanctions and the Working Group on Peacekeeping
COUNTRY-SITUATION CURRENT PENHOLDER IN THE COUNCIL Afghanistan Germany and Indonesia Bosnia and Herzegovina Rotating on a monthly basis among members of the Contact and Drafting Group Burundi France Central Africa (UNOCA/LRA) UK Central African Republic France Central Asia (UNRCCA) Russia Colombia UK Côte d’Ivoire France Cyprus UK Democratic Republic of the Congo France DPRK (Non-proliferation) US Golan Heights (UNDOF) Russia and the US Guinea-Bissau Niger Haiti US in consultation with the Group of Friends of Haiti Iran (Non-proliferation) US Iraq US on Iraq; UK on Iraq/Kuwait Lake Chad Basin UK Lebanon France Liberia US Libya UK; UK and Germany on Libya sanctions Mali France Middle East (Israel/Palestine) The US is often seen as the lead, but various other Council members have drafted recent proposals on the issue. Somalia UK; US on piracy Sudan/South Sudan US Sudan (Darfur) Germany and the UK Syria Belgium and Germany lead on humanitarian issues Ukraine There is no clear penholder for Ukraine. Both Russia and the US have drafted texts, and other members have been active in calling for meetings on the issue. Yemen UK West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) Belgium and Niger Western Sahara US
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 25 Lead Roles within the Council in 2020: Penholders and Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies
COUNTY-SITUATION CHAIR OF THE RELEVANT COUNCIL SUBSIDIARY BODY
Afghanistan Dian Triansyah Djani (Indonesia) 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee
Bosnia and Herzegovina N/A
Burundi N/A
Central Africa (UNOCA/LRA) N/A
Central African Republic Abdou Abarry (Niger) 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee
Central Asia (UNRCCA) N/A
Colombia N/A
Côte d’Ivoire N/A (The 1572 Côte d’Ivoire Sanctions Committee was dissolved on 28 April 2016.)
Cyprus N/A
Democratic Republic of the Congo Abdou Abarry (Niger) 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee
DPRK (Non-proliferation) Christoph Heusgen (Germany) 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee
Golan Heights (UNDOF) N/A
Guinea-Bissau Moncef Baati (Tunisia) 2048 Guinea-Bissau Committee
Haiti N/A
Iran (Non-proliferation) N/A
Iraq Sven Jürgenson (Estonia) 1518 Iraq Sanctions Committee
Lebanon Dang Dinh Quy (Viet Nam) 1636 Lebanon Sanctions Committee
Liberia N/A (The 1521 Liberia Sanctions Committee was dissolved on 25 May 2016.)
Libya Jürgen Schulz (Germany) 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee
Mali José Singer Weisinger (Dominican Republic) 2374 Mali Sanctions Committee
Middle East (Israel/Palestine) N/A
Somalia Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve (Belgium) 751 Somalia Sanctions Committee
South Sudan Dang Dinh Quy (Viet Nam) 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee
Sudan Sven Jürgenson (Estonia) 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee
Syria N/A
Ukraine N/A
Yemen Inga Rhonda King (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee
West Africa, including the Sahel N/A
Western Sahara N/A
26 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 Lead Roles within the Council in 2020: Penholders and Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies
THEMATIC ISSUE CURRENT PENHOLDER IN THE COUNCIL
Children and Armed Conflict Belgium
Counterterrorism (1276/1989/2253) US
Counterterrorism (1373) US
Counterterrorism (1566) US
International Residual Mechanism Viet Nam for Criminal Tribunals
Non-proliferation of Weapons of Indonesia Mass Destruction (1540)
Peace and Security in Africa N/A
Peacekeeping UK
Protection of Civilians in Armed UK Conflict
Women, Peace and Security UK on women’s participation and protection (1325); US on sexual violence in conflict (1820)
Working Methods Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
THEMATIC ISSUES CHAIR OF THE RELEVANT COUNCIL SUBSIDIARY BODY
Children and Armed Conflict Marc Pecsteen de Buytswerve (Belgium) Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict
Counterterrorism (1267/1989/2253) Dian Triansyah Djani (Indonesia) 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da’esh)/Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee
Counterterrorism (1373) Moncef Baati (Tunisia) 1373 Counterterrorism Committee
Counterterrorism (1566) Abdou Abarry (Niger) 1566 Working Group
International Residual Mechanism for Dang Dinh Quy (Viet Nam) Criminal Tribunals Informal Working Group on International Tribunals
Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Dian Triansyah Djani (Indonesia) Destructions (1540) 1540 Committee
Peace and Security in Africa Jerry Matthews Matjila (South Africa) Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa
Peacekeeping Moncef Baati (Tunisia) Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict UK Protection of Civilians Informal Expert Group
Women, Peace and Security Germany and the Dominican Republic 2242 Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace and Security
Working Methods Inga Rhonda King (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions
Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020 securitycouncilreport.org 27 Security Council Report Staff
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28 whatsinblue.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2020