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Why Do Firms Have Boards?

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Why Do Firms Have Boards? A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Bennedsen, Morten Working Paper Why do firms have boards? Working paper, No. 3-2002 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School (CBS) Suggested Citation: Bennedsen, Morten (2002) : Why do firms have boards?, Working paper, No. 3-2002, Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Department of Economics, Frederiksberg, http://hdl.handle.net/10398/7624 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/208452 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. 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