(ULC) Section 40.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Aboriginal Traditional Use Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

40.0 ABORIGINAL TRADITIONAL USE 1 Written intervenor evidence relating to TLRU was filed by the following Aboriginal groups:

2 · Enoch Cree Nation (Filing ID A4L5F0);

3 · Samson Cree Nation (Filing ID A70249);

4 · Montana First Nation (Filing ID A4Q8U3);

5 · Sunchild First Nation (Filing ID A70272);

6 · Michel First Nation (Filing ID A4L7Q9);

7 · Gunn Métis Local 55 (Filing ID A4L6Z6);

8 · Asini Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional Band (Filing ID A4Q3Q8);

9 · Métis Nation of (Filing ID A4Q2H2);

10 · Simpcw First Nation (Filing ID A70218);

11 · Neskonlith Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2J0);

12 · Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc (Filing IDs A4L6K5 to A4L6L0);

13 · Upper Nicola Band (Filing ID A4Q1R7);

14 · Lower Nicola Indian Band (Filing ID A70766);

15 · Coldwater Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q0W6);

16 · Cheam First Nation and Chawathil First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q2C6 to A4Q2C9 17 and A4Q2D0);

18 · Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation (Filing ID A4L9U9);

19 · Stó:lō Collective (Filing ID A4L7A2);

20 · Matsqui First Nation (Filing ID A70269);

21 · First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5H7 to A4L5H8);

22 · Kwantlen First Nation (Filing IDs A4L8J5 to A4L8K2, A4L8K3, A4L8K4, and 23 A4L8K5);

24 · (Filing ID A4L7T2);

25 · Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing ID A4L5Z3); and,

26 · (Filing ID A70245).

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1 In addition to these Aboriginal groups, Nooaitch Indian Band (Filing ID A4R4K1), Okanagan 2 Nation Alliance (Filing ID A71237), and Adams Lake Indian Band (Filing ID A71220) included 3 TLRU issues and concerns in their response to Natural Resources ’s (NRCan) IR.

40.1 General Responses 4 Sunchild First Nation (Filing ID A4L8L4), Samson Cree Nation (Filing ID A4L7H9), Montana 5 First Nation (Filing ID A4Q8U3), Asini Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional Band (Filing ID A4Q3Q8) , 6 Simpcw First Nation (Filing ID A4L6J0), Coldwater Indian Band (redacted; Filing ID A4Q0X1), 7 Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc (Filing IDs A4L6K4 to A4L6L0), Upper Nicola Band (Filing 8 ID A4Q1T2), Matsqui First Nation (redacted; Filing IDs A4L8I9 to A4L8J1), 9 (confidentially), Cheam First Nation and Chawathil First Nation (redacted; Filing ID A4Q2D1), 10 Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q1A3 and A4Q1A4 to A4Q1A6), Kwantlen First Nation 11 (redacted), Squamish Nation (redacted; Filing IDs A4L7E3 to A4L7E4), Tsawwassen First 12 Nation (Filing ID A4Q1W3), and Tsleil-Waututh Nation (redacted; Filing IDs A4L5Z4 to A4L5Z7) 13 submitted TLRU studies as part of their intervenor evidence. The information in the Simpcw 14 First Nation TLRU report was received previously and summarized in the Traditional Land and 15 Resource Use Supplemental Technical Report filed with the NEB on July 21, 2014 (Filing 16 ID A3Z4Z2). The information in the Montana First Nation TLRU report was received previously 17 and summarized in the Traditional Land and Resource Use Supplemental Technical Report 18 No. 3 filed with the NEB in February 2015 as part of Consultation Update No. 3 (Filing 19 ID A4K4W3). The information in the remaining studies has been reviewed and incorporated into 20 Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report Supplemental No. 4, included in 21 Appendix 40A. Responses to specific concerns regarding Project effects on TLRU raised by 22 these communities are also included in the Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical 23 Report Supplemental No. 4.

24 Trans Mountain has reviewed the findings of the supplemental TLRU studies in the context of 25 the ESA (Volume 5B), and has determined that the significance conclusions of the ESA with 26 regard to TLRU remain unchanged by the results of the supplemental TLRU information 27 received for both Project-related effects (Volume 5B, Section 7.10.2 [Filing ID A3S1S7]) and the 28 Project’s contribution to cumulative effects (Volume 5B, Section 8.2.3 [Filing ID A3S1T0]). Sites 29 identified within the proposed corridor will be included on alignment sheets and incorporated 30 into Project planning. 40.1.1 Project Effects 31 All Aboriginal groups explain in their written evidence that they continue to exercise their 32 Aboriginal rights to fish, harvest, and hunt throughout their respective traditional territories and 33 that the land, water, and resources within the TLRU RSA for the Project are important for their 34 ability to do so. Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance of the environment and the 35 resources within it to Aboriginal communities, and understands that the ability to participate in 36 TLRU activities is an important component of the exercise of these rights. Trans Mountain’s 37 assessment of potential adverse effects of the Project on VCs that support Aboriginal rights and 38 interests can be found in Volume 5A, Section 7.2 (Filing ID A3S1Q9), and Volume 5B, 39 Section 7.2 (Filing ID A3S1S7). VCs that support Aboriginal rights and interests include: 40 economy; employment; community services and infrastructure; individual, family, and 41 community well-being; human health; traditional culture; Section 35 rights to fish, hunt, and 42 gather; governance; visual and aesthetic resources; and species and habitats required to 43 maintain a traditional lifestyle. An explanation of the assessment of potential effects of the

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1 Project on TLRU is included in Section 6.2 and Table 6.3 of Technical Report 5D-1 Traditional 2 Land and Resource Technical Report of Volume 5D of the Application (Filing ID A3S2H1). A 3 summary of mitigation measures can be found in the Pipeline EPP (Volume 6B; Filing IDs 4 A3S2S3 and A3S2S4), Facilities EPP (Filing IDs A3S2S6 and A3S2S7), and Westridge Marine 5 Terminal EPP (Filing ID A3S2S9). The mitigation measures were principally developed in 6 accordance with Trans Mountain standards, industry and provincial regulatory guidelines, 7 current industry-accepted best practices, engagement with Aboriginal communities, experience 8 gained from other pipeline projects with similar environmental and socio-economic conditions, 9 and professional judgment. Trans Mountain considered the potential effects of spills on 10 elements of the environment that support Aboriginal rights and interests including TLRU as per 11 Volume 7 (Filing IDs A3S4V5 to A3S4V6) and Volume 8A, Section 5 (Filing IDs A3S4Y3 to 12 A3S4Z0) of the Application. 13 Aboriginal groups expressed concern in their written evidence and responses to NRCan’s IRs 14 that the Project may potentially damage the relationship to the land, plants, and animals in the 15 areas where pipeline activities occur. Additionally, opportunities to exercise their traditional 16 relationship with their land will be affected by the Project, which can alter the practice of their 17 cultural activities, resulting in changes to the unique cultural expressions that contribute to 18 cultural integrity. Trans Mountain acknowledges the intimate connection that Aboriginal groups 19 have with the lands and waters within their traditional territory and the importance of this to their 20 culture. The evidence provided by Aboriginal groups includes personal stories that demonstrate 21 the knowledge of the lands and waters within their traditional territories. TLRU activities allow 22 these Aboriginal groups to connect to their lands and waters. Aboriginal groups write about a 23 sacred duty to act as the stewards of their traditional territory (Tsleil-Waututh Nation), and their 24 duty to care for and manage resources in a sustainable way to ensure resources are available 25 for future generations (Cheam and Chawathil , Kwantlen First Nation, Adams Lake 26 Indian Band, Simpcw First Nation).

27 Trans Mountain has assessed the effects of the Project on TLRU in Volume 5B, Section 7.2.2 28 (Filing ID A3S1S7). Trans Mountain will: 29 · provide Aboriginal communities with the anticipated construction schedule and 30 PPC maps, a minimum of 2 weeks before the start of construction in the vicinity 31 of their respective communities;

32 · install signage notifying of construction activities in the area; and,

33 · work with Aboriginal communities to develop strategies to most effectively 34 communicate the construction schedule and work areas to its members.

35 In addition, in order to minimize disturbance and access to traditional lands, the Traffic and 36 Access Control Management Plan (Appendix C of Volume 6B [Filing ID A3S2S6]) addresses the 37 management of pipeline construction traffic and access along the construction right-of-way and 38 temporary access routes. This plan also addresses the activities during the pre-construction, 39 construction (pipe installation), and construction cleanup and reclamation phases of the Project. 40 It also provides guidelines for vehicular use on the construction right-of-way and associated 41 access roads, as well as blocking and/or controlling access to previously inaccessible portions 42 of the right-of-way following construction and throughout the operations phase of the Project. 43 The intent of the mitigation is to reduce disturbances caused by access, construction 44 equipment, and vehicle traffic, during and following pipeline construction.

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40.1.2 Mitigation 1 In their response to NRCan’s IRs, Aboriginal groups including Gunn Métis Local 55 (Filing 2 ID A70239), Adams Lake Indian Band (Filing ID A70365), Simpcw First Nation (Filing 3 ID A70218), Matsqui First Nation (Filing ID A70911), Coldwater Indian Band (Filing ID A70316), 4 Nooaitch Indian Band (Filing ID A70301), Stó:lō Collective (Filing ID A70240), Shxw’ōwhámel 5 First Nation (Filing IDs A70318 and A70294), Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc (Filing ID A4R4G7), 6 and Upper Nicola Band (Filing ID A4R4I4) stated concerns regarding mitigation measures 7 provided by Trans Mountain for the Project and a desire to participate in discussions regarding 8 mitigation measures. Aboriginal groups expressed concerns about reclamation plans, 9 specifically that culturally important plants would not be replaced, watercourse crossings and 10 cultural heritage sites, and requested involvement in development of mitigation measures and 11 management plans to ensure that post-construction conditions can support their TLU practices. 12 All communities request an active role in ensuring environmental effects are appropriately 13 avoided, and where they cannot be appropriately mitigated that reclamation is appropriately 14 carried out. 15 With respect to reclamation processes the following recommendations were specifically made:

16 · lands disturbed in Nlaka’pamux territory be reclaimed entirely with native seed 17 mixes and plants developed in consultation with Coldwater Indian Band and 18 other affected Aboriginal groups (Coldwater Indian Band);

19 · pesticides not be used (Simpcw First Nation, Upper Nicola Band, and 20 Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc);

21 · a Weed and Vegetation Management Plan be developed (Upper Nicola Band, 22 Okanagan Nation Alliance);

23 · replacement of lost habitat be completed at a 5:1 ratio (Katzie First Nation); 24 and,

25 · mitigation measures be developed specifically to address individual Aboriginal 26 group concerns.

27 Upper Nicola Band also provided specific recommendations for wildlife, ungulates, and birds, to 28 be further refined in consultation with Upper Nicola Band. Upper Nicola Band also requested 29 that they be involved in reseeding.

30 A Reclamation Management Plan (RMP) is included in Volume 6B, Section 7.0 of Appendix C of 31 the Pipeline EPP (Filing ID A3S2S3). The RMP includes construction reclamation measures to 32 be implemented before, during, and following pipeline installation in order to stabilize and 33 revegetate affected lands. The primary objective of the RMP is to reduce adverse effects of 34 pipeline construction and return the affected lands to a stable, non-erosive condition that will 35 promote the re-establishment of land productivity similar to adjacent areas. Reclamation 36 measures prior to construction include minimizing disturbance of sensitive areas, and topsoil 37 and root zone material salvage. During construction, the maintenance of topsoil/root zone 38 material piles and erosion control are primary activities. Following construction, affected lands 39 will be recontoured to match the adjacent area, pre-construction drainage patterns will be 40 re-established, subsoils will be conditioned if necessary, salvaged topsoil/root zone material will 41 be returned, and permanent erosion control structures will be installed where necessary. The

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1 disturbed soils will be seeded or planted according to the specifications in the detailed 2 reclamation plans and may include seeding a short-lived cover crop and either a native, or 3 native and short-lived non-native seed mix; and plantings of conifer plugs in extra TWS, or 4 shrub species adjacent to streams or in sensitive habitat areas. 5 Natural regeneration is the preferred reclamation method for wetlands that do not contain 6 invasive plants. Natural regeneration has been successful in restoring wetlands to their 7 pre-construction habitat, hydrological, and biogeochemical conditions. The re-establishment of 8 wetland function will be monitored during the post-construction monitoring program. Wetland 9 function PCM will be conducted during the growing season, and the condition of the disturbed 10 portion of the wetland will be compared to existing (i.e., pre-construction) condition data and the 11 condition of any wetlands located adjacent to the construction right-of-way. The results of this 12 comparison will be used to measure the effectiveness of mitigation measures and to determine 13 if there is an impediment or loss of wetland function. Information on the criteria assessed during 14 the PCM program is included in Sections 2.2 and 3.1.3 of the Application as well as in 15 Appendix B in the Preliminary Wetland Compensation Plan (Filing ID A3Z4V3).

16 Final reclamation measures, including opportunities to return culturally important plants to 17 certain areas, and the Weed and Vegetation Management Plan, will be presented for discussion 18 and input from Aboriginal groups at the EPP workshops.

40.1.3 Cumulative Effects 19 All Aboriginal groups discuss cumulative effects in their written evidence. These Aboriginal 20 groups report that their traditional territories have already been subject to change as the result 21 of development and, in turn, this has affected their ability to practice TLRU activities such as 22 hunting, plant gathering, fishing, and trapping. Aboriginal groups are concerned about the 23 effects of existing development on the health of the ecosystems and resources harvested, and 24 on their cultural and spiritual well-being, and the potential effects of the Project in addition to 25 these existing effects. Trans Mountain acknowledges that traditional territories have already 26 been subject to change as a result of development in the context of the cumulative effects 27 assessment, and has considered existing conditions which reflect past alterations to the 28 environment. Trans Mountain has conducted a cumulative effects assessment related to 29 construction and operations of the Project in Volume 5B, Section 8.2 (Filing ID A3S1T0). The 30 scope of the cumulative effects assessment is a Project-specific cumulative effects assessment. 31 Nevertheless, Trans Mountain did complete an assessment of total cumulative effects as part 32 of the responses to NEB IR No. 2.041 (Filing ID A3Z4T9) and NEB IR No. 3.025 (Filing 33 ID A65693). The Application notes that there will be no significant Project contribution to 34 adverse cumulative effects to the biophysical resources in the environment used for TLRU by 35 Aboriginal groups. Through the implementation of mitigation measures, Project construction and 36 operations would not result in significant adverse effects on the ability of Aboriginal groups to 37 continue to use lands, waters, or resources for traditional purposes.

40.1.3.1 Existing Baseline vs. Pre-industrial Baseline 38 Several Aboriginal groups, including Coldwater Indian Band (Filing ID A4R4H0), Matsqui First 39 Nation, Okanagan Nation Alliance, Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc (Filing ID A4R4G7), 40 Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation, Nooaitch Indian Band, and Upper Nicola Indian Band, raised 41 concerns that the cumulative effects assessment should have been conducted using 42 pre-industrial (i.e., pristine) conditions instead of existing conditions as the baseline. Current 43 accepted practice for NEB applications is to use current conditions as the baseline for pipeline

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1 cumulative effects assessment (Antoniuk 2000, URS Corporation 2002), an approach consistent 2 with guidance provided in the NEB Filing Manual, which defines the baseline that should be 3 considered in the cumulative effects assessment as “the existing environmental and 4 socio-economic setting within the study area” (NEB 2015). This baseline information provides a 5 backdrop against which a project's effects are assessed, including the cumulative effects of a 6 project.

7 The approach of using existing conditions of disturbance as baseline provides an effective 8 method for identifying, evaluating, and mitigating the Project’s contribution to cumulative effects. 9 This approach does not discount or overlook pre-industrial conditions, as the assessment is 10 framed within the context of existing cumulative impacts that have already occurred on the 11 landscape/watershed. An assessment of total cumulative effects was conducted for all 12 environmental and socio-economic elements considered in the assessment in the response to 13 NEB IR No. 2.041a (Filing ID A3Z4T9). Based on disturbance associated with existing 14 developments considered in the assessment of total cumulative effects, a number of potentially 15 significant adverse cumulative effects were identified on the topics of interest, which would 16 continue to occur with or without the Project.

40.1.3.2 Cumulative Effects Assessment Scope 17 Several Aboriginal groups, including Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc (Filing ID A4R4G7), Coldwater 18 Indian Band (Filing ID A4R4H0), Nooaitch Indian Band (Filing ID A4R4K1), Matsqui First Nation, 19 Okanagan Nation Alliance, Simpcw First Nation, Katzie First Nation, and Upper Nicola Band 20 (Filing ID A4R4I4) felt that a more specific cumulative effects assessment should have been 21 conducted specific to their areas of interest (e.g., traditional territories, prima facie areas of title).

22 Trans Mountain is of the view that separate regional significance evaluations are not required to 23 allow the NEB to reach conclusions on whether or not the Project is in the public interest, and 24 whether unjustified significant adverse effects would be likely to occur as a result of the Project. 25 As explained in more detail in the response to NEB IR No. 2.041c (Filing ID A3Z4T9), the 26 methodology applied in the ESA is appropriate for considering the variability in total cumulative 27 effects risk between regions/areas/segments, and how these differences should inform design 28 and selection of technically and economically feasible mitigation measures that avoid, mitigate, 29 or compensate for any residual Project contribution to cumulative effects. As listed in the 30 response, Trans Mountain applied a number of complementary approaches to balance the 31 influences of setting and project specifics when conducting the cumulative effects assessment. 32 For example, landscape- and watershed-scale analyses were provided to support the 33 cumulative effects assessment in Volume 5A, Section 8.0 (Filing IDs A3S1R1, A3S1R2, and 34 A3S1R3), as well as to evaluate regional total cumulative effect risk to aquatic and terrestrial 35 cumulative effects assessment indicators (refer to the responses to NEB IR No. 3.025a and 36 No. 3.025b [Filing ID A4H1V2]).

40.1.4 Alternative Assessment Methodology 37 Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing IDs A4L5Z9 to A4L6A5) conducted an effects assessment in their 38 written evidence according to the Tsleil-Waututh Stewardship Policy. The assessment 39 concluded that “the Project does not represent the best use of Tsleil-Waututh Nation territory 40 and its water, land, air and resources to satisfy the needs of our ancestors, and the needs of 41 present and future generations.” Tsleil-Waututh Nation concluded that the Project will add to 42 negative cumulative effects in ; undermine Tsleil-Waututh Nation’s ability to harvest

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1 and eat abundant, safe marine foods from Burrard Inlet; prevent recovery of the subsistence 2 economy; and undermine their ability to engage in cultural activities in clean water with visual 3 quality, privacy, and quiet (page 71 of the PDF). The majority of the effects identified are based 4 on the assumption that a spill will occur, but construction at the Westridge Marine Terminal is 5 also considered to result in negative effects to the environment. For example, Tsleil-Waututh 6 Nation expressed concerns about the visual effects of more tankers at Westridge Marine 7 Terminal and effects of increased tanker traffic on vessel movement within Burrard Inlet. Trans 8 Mountain has reviewed the assessment conducted by Tsleil-Waututh Nation and the baseline 9 information used to conduct the assessment. Trans Mountain conducted their assessment 10 according to the requirements of the NEB Filing Manual and the CEA Act, 2012. Trans Mountain 11 has reviewed the evidence provided by Tsleil-Waututh Nation and the assessment conducted 12 under the Tsleil-Waututh Stewardship Policy, and believes that the Application addresses the 13 Project interactions identified by Tsleil-Waututh Nation through the assessment of the likely 14 effects of the Project on the environment and TLRU, and has determined that the significance 15 conclusions remain unchanged.

40.1.5 The and Salmon 16 Aboriginal groups, including Cheam First Nation and Chawathil First Nation, Shxw’ōwhámel 17 First Nation, Stó:lō Collective, Matsqui First Nation, Katzie First Nation, Kwantlen First Nation, 18 , Tsawwassen First Nation, Tsleil-Waututh Nation, and Squamish Nation 19 identified fishing in the Fraser River (particularly for salmon) as a TLU practice central to their 20 cultural identity and ability to transfer traditional knowledge to the younger generation. Not only 21 do fish provide a substantial portion of their diets, but there are cultural traditions and 22 ceremonies associated with salmon. Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance of the 23 Fraser River and salmon to these Aboriginal groups. Trans Mountain has developed a 24 comprehensive suite of mitigation measures designed to protect the environment so that 25 Aboriginal groups will be able to continue with their cultural practices and subsistence lifestyle. 26 The entire suite of mitigation measures can be found in the Pipeline EPP (Filing IDs A3S2S3 27 and A3S2S4), Facilities EPP (Filing IDs A3S2S6 and A3S2S7), and Westridge Marine Terminal 28 EPP (Filing ID A3S2S9). Volume 5B, Section 7.2.2 provides details regarding the effects 29 assessment for TLRU (Filing ID A3S1S7). With the implementation of these mitigation 30 measures, the construction and operations of the proposed pipeline and facilities is not 31 expected to have a significant effect on fish and fish habitat. While there will be temporary 32 disruption to the ability of Aboriginal groups to access fishing locations during construction, the 33 effect on fishing is expected to be short-term and therefore not significant.

40.1.6 Effects of Spills 34 The written evidence filed by each Aboriginal group identified concerns about the potential for 35 an oil spill and the adequacy of spill response procedures and mechanisms. In particular, 36 Aboriginal groups expressed concerns that an oil spill would occur in the watercourses relied on 37 for fishing and would be difficult to contain if it were to occur. Aboriginal groups contend that a 38 spill would have a catastrophic effect on the resources that they traditionally harvest and that 39 the fact that the probability of a spill is small is not sufficient reason to determine the effects of a 40 spill as not significant. Volume 7 of the Application (Filing IDs A3S4V5 to A3S4V6) provides an 41 evaluation of potential effects of accidents and malfunctions for the Project.

42 Several Aboriginal groups, including Matsqui First Nation, Gunn Métis Local 55, Adams Lake 43 Indian Band, Simpcw First Nation, and Nooaitch Indian Band requested involvement in

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1 emergency response planning in their respective traditional territories. Aboriginal groups will be 2 invited to participate in regional workshops regarding emergency response planning.

40.1.7 Perception of Contamination and Traditional Land and Resource Use Patterns 3 In their written evidence, Kwantlen First Nation, Cheam First Nation, and Chawathil First Nation 4 state that TLRU patterns and location may change as a result of the perception of 5 contamination, not necessarily because the resource is contaminated. For traditional use 6 activities such as hunting, fishing, trapping, and plant gathering, Trans Mountain based the 7 assessment of effects on TLRU on biophysical and human environments, and concluded that 8 there would be no significant adverse effects on the biophysical resources or the ecosystems 9 that support them. Trans Mountain assessed the increased stress and anxiety related to 10 perceived contamination in Volume 5B, Section 7.6.8.3 (Filing ID A3S1S9). While Trans 11 Mountain understands that Aboriginal groups may perceive that resources have been 12 contaminated as a result of the Project, the assessment of effects on TLU patterns is based on 13 alterations to the biophysical resources that TLU practices are based on and, as such, the 14 conclusion that the effects of the Project on TLRU are not significant remains the same.

40.2 First Nation Specific Responses 40.2.1 Enoch Cree Nation 15 Enoch Cree Nation submitted evidence opposing the Project due to the potential effects on 16 wildlife and hunting activities, potential effects on wildlife and trapping activities, potential effects 17 on vegetation and plant gathering activities, disturbances to sacred areas, potential effects on 18 fish and fishing activities, and the potential effects of a spill on TLRU activities. The above 19 concerns have been addressed in the Application in the following sections. Detailed information 20 on wildlife and wildlife habitat was provided in Technical Report 5C-10 in Volume 5C, Wildlife 21 Technical Report (Filing ID A3S2Q3). Detailed information on vegetation was provided in the 22 Technical Report in 5C-9 of Volume 5C, Vegetation Technical Report (Filing ID A3S2I7). 23 Detailed information on fish, fish habitat, and aquatic species was provided in the Fisheries BC 24 Technical Report 5C-7 in Volume 5C, Fisheries B.C. Technical Report (Filing ID A3S1W6). 25 Detailed information on medicinal plants and sacred areas such as burial sites was provided in 26 the TLRU Technical Report 5D-1 in Volume 5D, TLRU Technical Report (Filing ID A56011). 27 Volume 5B, Section 7.2.2 of the Facilities Application provides details regarding the effects 28 assessment for TLRU (Filing ID A3S1S7). Trans Mountain considered the potential effects of 29 spills on elements of the environment that support Aboriginal rights and interests including 30 TLRU in Volume 7, Section 6.2 of the Application (Filing ID A3S4V6).

40.2.2 Samson Cree Nation 31 Samson Cree Nation submitted written evidence regarding their current use of land and 32 resources, and reported on their participant experiences during field studies. The results of the 33 TLRU report are included in Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report Supplemental 34 No. 4 (Appendix 40A). Trans Mountain and their consultant, CH2M HILL, appreciate Samson 35 Cree Nation’s participation in and feedback on the Aboriginal field program for the Project and 36 will use the information to enhance future program delivery where appropriate. A response to 37 intervenor evidence regarding the archaeology program for the Project can be found in 38 Section 39 Heritage Resources of this Reply Evidence.

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40.2.3 Montana First Nation 1 Montana First Nation submitted as evidence their TLRU report for the Project. The results of the 2 TLRU report were included in the Traditional Land and Resource Use Supplemental Technical 3 Report No. 3 filed with the NEB in February 2015, as part of Consultation Update No. 3 (Filing 4 ID A4K4W3).

40.2.4 Sunchild First Nation 5 Sunchild First Nation submitted written evidence regarding their historic and current TLRU of the 6 PPC. The results of the TLRU report are included in Traditional Land and Resource Use 7 Technical Report Supplemental No. 4 filed as part of Reply Evidence.

40.2.5 Michel First Nation 8 Michel First Nation submitted evidence regarding the loss of a portion of their traditional lands 9 as a result of the Project and submitted a “Lands Taken Up” report with their evidence. Trans 10 Mountain acknowledges the concern of Michel First Nation, and notes that the disruption of 11 these lands will be temporary and restricted to the timing of construction. Once construction is 12 complete, Michel First Nation will be able to use Crown lands along the PPC for traditional land 13 and resource activities as they did before construction.

40.2.6 Gunn Métis Local 55 14 Gunn Métis Local 55 submitted evidence consisting of two expert reports. The first report 15 responds to questions raised by the NEB during the August 27, 2014, hearing with respect to 16 ground-truthing methods and the blending of oral traditional evidence with scientific and 17 technical evidence. The second report contains archival and other documented evidence of the 18 central practices and traditions integral to the way of life of the historical Métis community in the 19 region. Trans Mountain has reviewed the evidence and agrees with Gunn Métis Local 55 20 descriptions of the difference between ground-truthing methods and oral traditional evidence, 21 and the need to recognize that traditional knowledge is its own system of knowledge, which 22 should be considered in assessment alongside data collected via western science.

23 Gunn Métis Local 55 also responded to NRCan’s IR with clarification of the regional scope of 24 their concerns with respect to cumulative effects on TLRU, reiteration of their concern about 25 heritage and burial sites along the Edmonton to Hinton segment of the PPC, desire for 26 engagement in mitigation discussions for TLRU sites identified by Gunn Métis Local 55, and 27 provided specific mitigation measures for consideration. Gunn Métis Local 55 requested 28 reclamation at particular sites that would help restore traditional resources in key areas 29 accessible to community members. Gunn Métis Local 55 want Trans Mountain to go beyond the 30 regulatory requirements when reclaiming the land by populating the right-of-way with indigenous 31 plants, traditional medicinal and food plants, and important wildlife habitat plants. The 32 reclamation phase could also present an opportunity for community youth to be involved. Final 33 reclamation measures, including opportunities to return food plants and important wildlife plants 34 to some areas will be presented for discussion and input at the EPP workshop.

40.2.7 Asini Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional Band 35 Trans Mountain acknowledges that Asini Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional Band filed evidence with 36 the NEB regarding TLRU. The evidence provided is from published literature sources and 37 concerns historic use of the PPC by Asini Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional Band. The results of the

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1 evidence provided by Asini Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional Band have been incorporated into 2 Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report Supplemental No. 4 (Appendix 40A).

3 Asini Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional Band provided evidence that community members have 4 historically used the pipeline corridor for TLRU purposes and contends that they have current 5 use, different to that identified by other Aboriginal groups in the Edmonton to Hinton segment of 6 the PPC. Trans Mountain has reviewed the evidence provided by Asini Wachi Nehiyawak 7 Traditional Band and did not identify any evidence in support of current use of the PPC by Asini 8 Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional Band community members. The baseline information used to 9 inform the assessment of potential adverse effects as a result of the Project was gathered 10 through the Aboriginal Engagement Program in Volume 3B (Filing ID A3S0U5) and a review of 11 publically available materials. A desktop review was conducted for Asini Wachi Nehiyawak 12 Traditional Band consisting of: publicly available harvest data, ATK and TLU reports; open 13 houses and community gatherings; meetings and conversations with Aboriginal community 14 representatives; environmental assessments for projects with a similar socio-cultural context or 15 regulatory context; published reports from regulatory authorities involved in administering or 16 regulating a specified area or resource (e.g., integrated resource plans, land and resource 17 management plans, etc.); and GIS tools to determine spatial relationships of source data to the 18 Project. Since April 2012, Trans Mountain has engaged with Aboriginal communities that may 19 be affected by the Project or that may have an interest in the Project based on the proximity of 20 their community, and their assertion of Aboriginal rights and title governing traditional and 21 cultural use of the land along the PPC to maintain a traditional lifestyle.

22 Asini Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional Band contended that they were excluded from the field 23 participation program for the Project. Trans Mountain collaborated with participating Aboriginal 24 communities and its consultant, CH2M HILL, to develop a field participation program with 25 interested Aboriginal groups to contribute TEK, share concerns, and review proposed mitigation 26 measures during the biophysical field studies for the Project. The methods used to determine 27 how participants were to be involved in Project field surveys were common to all Aboriginal 28 communities. However, since Asini Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional Band was not identified for 29 consultation for the Project in the beginning of 2011 by Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 30 Development Canada, the Major Projects Management Office, the NEB, or the Alberta Ministry 31 of Aboriginal Affairs, Trans Mountain did not engage with Asini Wachi Nehiyawak Traditional 32 Band for field or TLRU studies completed from 2012 to 2014.

33 Accordingly, Trans Mountain has facilitated TLRU studies, the collection of TEK and TMRU 34 studies with Aboriginal groups to assist in assessing the potential impacts of the Project on 35 Aboriginal interests and generally inform the ESA. The methodology used to assess potential 36 adverse effects of the Project on VCs supporting the exercise of Aboriginal rights and interests 37 can be found in Section 7.0 of Volumes 5A (Filing ID A3S1Q9) and 5B (Filing ID A3S1S7). This 38 assessment considers the potential environmental and socio-economic effects of the Project, 39 ways in which these effects can be minimized or avoided altogether, and key mitigation 40 strategies in place that will further reduce these effects. VCs that support Aboriginal rights and 41 interests include: economy; employment; community services and infrastructure; individual, 42 family, and community well-being; human health; traditional culture; rights to fish, hunt, and 43 gather; visual and aesthetic resources; and species and habitats required to maintain a 44 traditional lifestyle. Consideration of the information provided as evidence for Asini Wachi 45 Nehiyawak Traditional Band does not change the assessment conclusions presented in the 46 Application.

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40.2.8 Métis Nation British Columbia 1 Métis Nation British Columbia submitted evidence expressing concerns regarding the potential 2 effects of the Project on trails and travelways, habitation sites, wildlife and hunting activities, 3 wildlife and trapping activities, vegetation and plant gathering activities, fish and fishing 4 activities, gathering places, and sacred areas. Detailed information on wildlife and wildlife 5 habitat was provided in the Technical Report 5C-10 in Volume 5C, Wildlife Technical Report 6 (Filing ID A3S2Q3). Detailed information on vegetation was provided in the Technical Report in 7 5C-9 of Volume 5C, Vegetation Technical Report (Filing ID A3S2I7). Detailed information on 8 fish, fish habitat, and aquatic species was provided in the Fisheries BC Technical Report 5C-7 9 in Volume 5C, Fisheries B.C. Technical Report (Filing ID A3S1W6). Detailed information on 10 medicinal plants and sacred areas such as burial sites was provided in the TLRU Technical 11 Report 5D-1 in Volume 5D, TLRU Technical Report (Filing ID A56011). Volume 5B, 12 Section 7.2.2 of the Facilities Application provides details regarding the effects assessment for 13 TLRU.

40.2.9 Simpcw First Nation 14 Simpcw First Nation submitted as evidence their TLRU and Ecological Knowledge Project 15 Report. This report had been previously received and summarized in the Traditional Land and 16 Resource Use Supplemental Technical Report filed with the NEB on July 21, 2014 (Filing 17 ID A61882). The assessment conclusions were reviewed based on the information in the 18 supplemental report and a letter was filed with the NEB on August 11, 2014, with the updated 19 conclusions (Filing ID A62586).

40.2.10 Neskonlith Indian Band 20 Neskonlith Indian Band submitted evidence that outlines that they continue to use land within 21 their traditional territory for hunting; fishing; harvesting of plants, roots and medicines for food, 22 ceremonial and other purposes; and harvesting of timber and plants for shelter. Neskonlith 23 Indian Band view themselves as stewards of the land for future generations, and as such 24 expressed concern regarding the potential effects of the Project on the resources required for 25 TLRU. Trans Mountain conducted an effects assessment for TLRU in Volume 5B, Section 7.2.2 26 of the Facilities Application.

40.2.11 Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc 27 Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc submitted evidence that describes their connection to the lands, 28 waters, and resources in their traditional territory, and provides evidence of their current use of 29 land for hunting, planting, gathering, and fishing. Although fishing in the Fraser and Thompson 30 rivers is important to community members, other traditional use activities such as hunting, 31 trapping, and plant gathering are also important. Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc identify three 32 important traditional use locations and resources used. Jacko Lake, located approximately 33 700 m east of RK 858, is an important cultural, spiritual, and sacred area. The Lac du Bois 34 grasslands are important for plant gathering and hunting for wildlife. The sharp-tailed grouse is 35 also identified as an important species to community members. Further details regarding these 36 sites is provided in Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report Supplemental No. 4 as 37 part of this Reply Evidence. Trans Mountain has developed a comprehensive suite of mitigation 38 measures designed to protect the environment so that Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc and other 39 Aboriginal groups will be able to continue with their cultural practices and traditional harvesting. 40 The entire suite of mitigation measures can be found in the Pipeline EPP, Facilities EPP, and

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1 Westridge Marine Terminal EPP. Volume 5B, Section 7.2.2 of the Facilities Application provides 2 details regarding the effects assessment for TLRU (Filing ID A3S1S7).

3 Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc also raised concerns about the cumulative effects of the Project on 4 TLRU. Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc explain that existing development has altered TLU patterns 5 and are concerned that the Project will further contribute to the loss of lands for traditional use 6 activities. Trans Mountain acknowledges the concern of Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc, and notes 7 that the disruption to use of these lands will be temporary and restricted to the timing of 8 construction. Once construction is complete, Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc will be able to use 9 Crown lands along the PPC for traditional land and resource activities as they did before 10 construction.

40.2.12 Adams Lake Indian Band 11 Adams Lake Indian Band did not provide any written evidence related to TLRU to the NEB in its 12 intervenor evidence. However, Trans Mountain has reviewed Adams Lake Indian Band’s 13 responses to NRCan’s IRs and has provided mitigation to their identified concerns in the 14 cumulative effects and assessment sections of this evidence. Adams Lake Indian Band 15 confirmed concerns raised throughout the NEB process with respect to effects on their 16 traditional use and proposed mitigation measures.

40.2.13 Okanagan Nation Alliance 17 The Okanagan Nation Alliance did not provide any written evidence related to TLRU to the NEB 18 in its intervenor evidence. However, Trans Mountain has reviewed Okanagan Nation Alliance’s 19 responses to NRCan’s IRs, and has provided mitigation to their concerns in the cumulative 20 effects, mitigation, and assessment sections of this evidence. Okanagan Nation Alliance 21 confirmed concerns raised throughout the NEB process with respect to the Project effects on 22 their relationship to the land, cumulative effects, and mitigation measures. The Weed and 23 Vegetation Management Plan, and final reclamation measures will be presented for discussion 24 and input at the EPP workshop.

40.2.14 Upper Nicola Band 25 Upper Nicola Band submitted evidence that describes their connection to the lands, waters, and 26 resources in their traditional territory, and provides evidence of their current use of land for 27 hunting, planting, gathering, and fishing. Evidence was also provided indicating the cultural and 28 historical use of the lands by way of sacred burial sites. Additionally, Upper Nicola Band 29 submitted their Traditional Use Study (TUS) for the Kinder Morgan TMPL Expansion, which 30 details their traditional use of the lands. A summary of the information, and issues and concerns 31 from their TUS, as well as proposed mitigation measures, is provided in Traditional Land and 32 Resource Use Technical Report Supplemental No. 4 (Appendix 40A).

33 Upper Nicola Band’s evidence details their concerns regarding traditional use including potential 34 effects to burial sites, potential effects to fish and fish habitat, wildlife and wildlife habitat, use of 35 herbicides and pesticides, and increased access to their traditional lands. Detailed information 36 on wildlife and wildlife habitat was provided in Technical Report 5C-10 in Volume 5C, Wildlife 37 Technical Report (Filing ID A3S2Q3). Detailed information on vegetation was provided in the 38 Technical Report in 5C-9 of Volume 5C, Vegetation Technical Report (Filing ID A3S2I7). 39 Detailed information on fish, fish habitat, and aquatic species was provided in the Fisheries BC 40 Technical Report 5C-7 in Volume 5C, Fisheries B.C. Technical Report (Filing ID A3S1W6).

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1 Detailed information on medicinal plants and sacred areas such as burial sites was provided in 2 the TLRU Technical Report 5D-1 in Volume 5D, TLRU Technical Report (Filing ID A56011). 3 Volume 5B, Section 7.2.2 of the Facilities Application provides details regarding the effects 4 assessment for TLRU. The cumulative effects assessment can be found in Volume 5B, 5 Section 8.0 for TLRU (Filing ID A3S1S7). Lastly, Upper Nicola Indian Band expressed concern 6 over the potential impacts of an oil spill on land, animals, water, water crossings, and drinking 7 water. Volume 7 of the Application (Filing IDs A3S4V5 to A3S4V6) provides a risk assessment 8 and management of spills for the Project.

9 Upper Nicola Band also responded to NRCan’s IR with additional information pertaining to their 10 definitions of archaeological and cultural heritage sites, and the requirement that they be 11 involved in the management of effects of the Project on these resources. Upper Nicola Band 12 reiterate that areas of spiritual significance are essential for traditional cultural and spiritual 13 sustenance. Upper Nicola Band will be invited to participate in EPP workshops where mitigation 14 measures will be discussed.

40.2.15 Lower Nicola Indian Band 15 Lower Nicola Indian Band expressed concerns with the process used for gathering traditional 16 knowledge. As part of the written evidence, Lower Nicola Indian Band expressed concerns with 17 the methodology that was employed by Trans Mountain and its consultant CH2M HILL for 18 collecting traditional knowledge and the method for inclusion of this knowledge in the discipline 19 technical reports for the Black Pines to Hope Segment of the PPC. Extracts are included from 20 fish, wildlife, and vegetation technical reports.

21 Lower Nicola Indian Band contends that “using and assessing TEK as an add-on to field survey 22 work shows a lack of understanding of appropriate social science research design, methods and 23 ethical standard for consent as well as a lack of respect for TEK… Further the collection of TEK 24 through the participation in field studies likely represents only a very small portion of use and 25 occupancy in a Project area” (page 6, Filing ID A4Q7H4). Lower Nicola Indian Band also stated 26 that the “proper collection and consideration of TEK is critical to accurately assess the impacts 27 of the Project on Aboriginal interests” and requires rigorous in-depth research carried out by 28 trained researchers. Lower Nicola Indian Band states that the collection of TEK and traditional 29 use studies are normally community-based approaches; the objectives of which typically arise 30 from issues, concerns, and values of Aboriginal communities. Lower Nicola Indian Band states 31 that a complete understanding of the use and knowledge as was provided at the Lower Nicola 32 Indian Band’s oral presentation to the NEB on November 14, 2014, is required to adequately 33 assess the potential effects of the Project on Lower Nicola Indian Band use of land and 34 resources.

35 Trans Mountain agrees that the collection of TLU information is typically performed using a 36 community-based approach. Accordingly, Trans Mountain provided the opportunity to conduct 37 community-led and Trans Mountain-funded studies for the Project to interested Aboriginal 38 groups. Lower Nicola Indian Band has requested confidentiality with respect to their 39 engagement on the Project. The CH2M HILL-facilitated TLRU studies were all community 40 directed and focused on issues, concerns, and values important to each individual Aboriginal 41 community. The TLRU study completed by Lower Nicola Indian Band was used to inform the 42 baseline for assessing the effects of the Project on TLU patterns. Four supplemental TLRU 43 reports have been filed with the NEB and with each including a cover letter outlining the 44 implications of the new information for the assessment conclusions.

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1 Trans Mountain disagrees with Lower Nicola Indian Band’s assertion that the methods for 2 collecting TEK were improper. Aboriginal participation on the biophysical surveys for the Project 3 was intended to gather information on the natural environment by adding results that western 4 science might not have gathered or considered, confirming results that were collected through 5 scientific field studies and by identifying and confirming issues of concern for potentially affected 6 Aboriginal communities that would need to be addressed in the Application. CH2M HILL’s 7 methods for collecting TEK have been amended and adjusted over the years based on 8 discussions with participating Aboriginal groups with respect to cultural protocols, objectives of 9 participation on biophysical field studies, and sharing and collection of TEK. CH2M HILL tries to 10 ensure a “free, informed and ongoing process” that meets the Canadian ethical research 11 standards.

12 Trans Mountain invited potentially affected Aboriginal groups to contribute TEK during the 13 biophysical field studies for the Project. The field crews consisted of biophysical specialists, 14 Aboriginal participants, and a CH2M HILL facilitator. CH2M HILL facilitators accompanied 15 participants during the field surveys to document potential effects of the Project on 16 environmental resources, to explain potential construction techniques, to describe Project 17 specifications, to document TEK, and to ensure that proprietary information was kept in 18 confidence.

19 As site-specific or general VCs were identified by the Aboriginal participants in the field, issues 20 and concerns were raised with regards to potential effects on the valued component, and 21 potential mitigation measures were proposed, recommended, and discussed in the field. CH2M 22 HILL reviewed the shared and documented TEK, as well as the field discussions of potential 23 Project-related effects and mitigation strategies, directly with the participating community 24 representatives during the biophysical field studies. CH2M HILL also provided follow-up 25 opportunities for communities that participated in the biophysical field studies during meetings 26 and/or via email to review and validate the summary of issues raised by participating community 27 representatives during the biophysical field studies, review of mitigation measures in the context 28 of the issue, confirm accuracy, and seek approval for the inclusion and consideration of any 29 confidential and proprietary information in Project planning, where warranted. The approach 30 ensures that communities are aware of the TEK field survey results and that information that is 31 sensitive to the community is not publically disclosed.

32 In following the methodology outlined above, Trans Mountain believes that CH2M HILL utilized 33 the appropriate methodology to collect, record, and interpret TEK for the Project; and conducted 34 it ethically and in a credible manner that reflects best industry practices.

40.2.16 Coldwater Indian Band 35 Coldwater Indian Band submitted as evidence two redacted reports, an ethnographic and 36 historic account of their traditional use, and a TLRU study for Coldwater No. 1. 37 The publically available information in these reports, issues, and proposed mitigations are 38 included in Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report Supplemental No. 4 39 (Appendix 40A). Coldwater Indian Band notes that the existing pipeline right-of-way passes 40 through Coldwater Indian Reserve No. 1 and has had an effect on the water supply for the 41 community and TLRU. Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance that Coldwater Indian 42 Band places on the protection of the aquifer beneath their reserve lands and has mitigation 43 measures identified in Volume 5A, Section 7.0, and the Spill Contingency Plan in Section 7 of 44 Appendix B. Trans Mountain understands the importance of salmon to Coldwater Indian Band

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1 community members and their preference to fish in the Coldwater and Nicola rivers. Trans 2 Mountain also acknowledges that Coldwater Indian Band currently practice TLRU activities 3 throughout their traditional territory. Trans Mountain has reviewed the TLRU information filed as 4 written evidence with the NEB and determined that the conclusions with respect to the 5 assessment of potential effects on TLRU activities remain unchanged.

40.2.17 Nooaitch Indian Band 6 Nooaitch Indian Band did not provide any written evidence related to TLRU to the NEB in its 7 intervenor evidence. However, Trans Mountain has reviewed Nooaitch Indian Band’s responses 8 to NRCan’s IRs, and has provided mitigation to their identified concerns in the cumulative 9 effects, mitigation, and assessment sections of this evidence. Nooaitch Indian Band confirmed 10 concerns raised throughout the NEB process with respect to cumulative effects assessment 11 specific to Nooaitch Indian Band.

40.2.18 Cheam First Nation and Chawathil First Nation 12 Cheam First Nation and Chawathil First Nation jointly submitted evidence regarding their historic 13 and current use of land and resources in their respective traditional territories. A joint TLRU 14 report was filed confidentially with the NEB. A summary of TLRU information, issues, and 15 proposed mitigation measures provided in the TLRU report is included in the Confidential 16 Supplemental Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report. Trans Mountain has 17 reviewed the TLRU information filed confidentially with the NEB and the written evidence filed 18 with the NEB and determined that the conclusions with respect to the assessment of potential 19 effects on TLRU activities remain unchanged.

20 Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance that Cheam First Nation and Chawathil First 21 Nation place on the relationship with the land and their duty to act as stewards of the land to 22 ensure its health for future generations. Trans Mountain also acknowledges the importance of 23 the Fraser River and the ability to fish for salmon to Cheam First Nation and Chawathil First 24 Nation. Trans Mountain has developed a comprehensive suite of mitigation measures designed 25 to protect the environment so that Cheam First Nation and Chawathil First Nation, and other 26 Aboriginal groups will be able to continue with their cultural practices and subsistence lifestyle. 27 The entire suite of mitigation measures can be found in the EPPs for Pipelines, Facilities and 28 Westridge Marine Terminal. Volume 5B, Section 7.2.2 of the Facilities Application provides 29 details regarding the effects assessment for TLRU (Filing ID A3S1S7).

30 Cheam First Nation and Chawathil First Nation provide evidence of existing development in their 31 traditional territory and how this has already affected TLU patterns, and express concerns about 32 the cumulative effects of the proposed Project on TLRU activities. For example, community 33 members continue to hunt but find that with existing development they must travel further to do 34 so due to extensive development in the Fraser Valley. Similarly, the Fraser River, the location of 35 many important fishing sites, has been subject to change due to development along its banks. 36 Trans Mountain acknowledges these concerns and understands this as part of the baseline 37 context for the Project and context for the cumulative effects assessment. Trans Mountain has 38 conducted a cumulative effects assessment related to construction and operation of the Project 39 in Volume 5B, Section 8.2 (Filing ID A3S1T0). The scope of the cumulative effects assessment 40 is a Project-specific cumulative effects assessment. The Application notes that there will be no 41 significant adverse impacts to the biophysical resources in the environment used by Aboriginal 42 communities. As such, through the implementation of mitigation measures, the construction and

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1 operation of the Project would not result in significant adverse effects on the ability of Aboriginal 2 communities to continue to use lands, waters, or resources for traditional purposes.

3 Cheam First Nation and Chawathil First Nation also expressed concerns regarding the potential 4 for a substantial spill or series of smaller spills, particularly into or near the Fraser River. Cheam 5 First Nation and Chawathil First Nation contend that the possibility or threat of a spill would 6 cause an increased sense of anxiety that comes from living with risk, would damage community 7 members’ spiritual connection with the land, would violate Cheam First Nation and Chawathil 8 First Nation’s ability to manage lands in their traditional territory, and would exacerbate 9 cumulative effects. Section 43 of this Reply Evidence provides details regarding increased 10 anxiety that comes from living with risk. Trans Mountain understands that Cheam First Nation 11 and Chawathil First Nation are concerned about the effects of a spill on the lands, waters, and 12 resources within their traditional territory. Trans Mountain considered the potential effects of 13 spills on elements of the environment that support Aboriginal rights and interests including 14 TLRU as per Volume 7, Section 6.2 of the Application (Filing ID A3S4V6).

40.2.19 Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation 15 Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation submitted evidence regarding their current use of land and 16 resources in their traditional territory. The information in the TLRU report is included in 17 Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report Supplemental No. 4 (Appendix 40A).

18 Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation raised concerns with respect to the effects of construction on travel 19 routes and culturally important historic pithouses and other archaeological sites within the PPC. 20 Trans Mountain has proposed a pipeline re-alignment from AK 1057 to AK 1059, designed to 21 avoid the pithouses and archaeological sites identified by Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation.

22 Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation also expressed concerns regarding a pipeline leak or rupture on 23 groundwater aquifers, potential effects of spilled oil in both the Fraser River and the marine 24 environment on harvesting of key resources (TLRU and TMRU activities), and that habitat 25 contamination and resource damage would result in a fear of exercising Aboriginal harvesting 26 rights. Trans Mountain considered the potential effects of spills on elements of the environment 27 that support Aboriginal rights and interests including TLRU as per Volume 7, Section 6.2 of the 28 Application (Filing ID A3S4V6).

40.2.20 Stó:lō Collective 29 Stó:lō Collective provides evidence contending that the results of the ICA were not appropriately 30 incorporated into technical reporting by Trans Mountain and their consultant CH2M HILL. The 31 results of the ICA were reviewed and summarized in the Supplemental Traditional Land and 32 Resources Use Technical Report (Filing IDs A3Z4Z2, A3Z4Z3, A3Z4Z4, and A3Z4Z5), including 33 specific sites and Project concerns. The complete ICA, with the exception of confidential 34 information, was also filed with the NEB as Appendix B of the Supplemental Traditional Land 35 and Resource Use Technical Report, with all sites, concerns, and mitigation measures available 36 to the NEB for review.

37 While Trans Mountain did summarize the information for the Stó:lō cultural heritage sites 38 between KP 961 through to KP 1140 as identified within the ICA, the full report, with the 39 exception of confidential information, has also been filed with the NEB. Trans Mountain was 40 sensitive to confidentiality and did not present all of the information due to its nature; however, 41 this information was reviewed for Project planning purposes. Additionally, Trans Mountain did

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1 not include sites classified as archaeological or socio-economic in nature, as the Supplemental 2 Traditional Land and Resources Use Technical Report focuses on trails and travelways, 3 habitation sites, hunting sites, fishing sites, trapping sites, plant gathering sites, gathering areas, 4 and sacred sites; however this information was provided to the appropriate Trans Mountain 5 personnel to inform Project planning and design. Trans Mountain did not include all watercourse 6 crossings in the summary either, unless it was stated that community members used these for 7 TLRU purposes; however, this information was provided to the appropriate Trans Mountain 8 personnel to inform Project planning and design.

9 Furthermore, Trans Mountain planned to develop a series of technical learning sessions for 10 communities represented by the Stó:lō Collective to attend. These sessions were being 11 designed to facilitate open conversation between members of communities represented by the 12 Stó:lō Collective, and Trans Mountain representatives regarding the Project’s impacts on 13 communities represented by the Stó:lō Collective interests. These sessions were planned to 14 take place in Q1 of 2015. Trans Mountain acknowledges engagement with the Stó:lō Collective 15 regarding the opportunity to develop a series of technical learning sessions for communities 16 represented by the Stó:lō Collective to attend. The terms of the workshops are under 17 negotiation. Refer to Section 7 for additional information. In the Stó:lō Collective response to 18 NRCan’s intervenor IR, Stó:lō Collective expressed concern that they have seen no evidence 19 that technical knowledge and TEK pertaining to wetlands, watercourse crossings, and cultural 20 heritage sites has not been incorporated into Project plans. Further, they state that Stó:lō 21 Collective community members must be involved in the planning and monitoring of all 22 watercourse crossings within their traditional territory. Mitigation measures and monitoring plans 23 will be discussed at EPP workshops.

40.2.21 Matsqui First Nation 24 Matsqui First Nation submitted a redacted TLRU report as evidence. The publically available 25 information in this report is included in Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report 26 Supplemental No. 4 as part of this Reply Evidence. Matsqui First Nation also submitted an 27 assessment of the impacts from the Project on Matsqui First Nation based on the effects of an 28 oil spill. In these reports Matsqui First Nation explains the importance of salmon fishing and the 29 Fraser River to their culture, and notes that the effects of a spill in or near watercourses in the 30 area would have effects on their ability to fish. Trans Mountain considered the potential effects 31 of spills on elements of the environment that support Aboriginal rights and interests including 32 TLRU as per Volume 7, Section 6.2 of the Application (Filing ID A3S4V6).

40.2.22 Katzie First Nation 33 Katzie First Nation submitted a redacted TLRU report as evidence. The publically available 34 information in this report is included in Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report 35 Supplemental No. 4 as part of this Reply Evidence. Katzie First Nation also identified concerns 36 with the reporting of the information provided by community members during the oral testimony 37 at the NEB oral hearings on October 22, 2014. Trans Mountain has reviewed the hearing 38 transcripts and compared them to the issues identified in NEB IR No. 3.010a - Attachment 1 39 (Filing ID A4H1X1) and acknowledges that some concerns raised at the oral hearings were not 40 captured in the NEB IR response.

41 Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance of Parson’s Channel as fish habitat and 42 understands Katzie First Nation is concerned about the proximity of the PPC to this channel.

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1 Additional Trans Mountain acknowledges that Katzie First Nation’s concern regarding 2 downstream spills and potential fish closures. Mitigation for the protection of fish and fish habitat 3 and spills can be found in Table 3.2-2 of Volume 5A (Filing ID A3S1L3) and in the Fisheries BC 4 Technical Report in Volume 5C of the Application.

5 Trans Mountain also acknowledges the importance of fishing, hunting, vegetation gathering, and 6 the importance of protecting their traditional territory and resources for future generations in 7 order to retain the ability to teach Katzie traditions to future generations. Mitigation for the 8 protection of subsistence living can be found in Table 7.2.2-4 of Volume 5B (Filing ID A3S1S7). 9 Trans Mountain has developed a comprehensive suite of mitigation measures designed to 10 protect the environment so that Katzie First Nation and other Aboriginal groups will be able to 11 continue with their cultural practices and subsistence lifestyle, including the sharing of their food 12 and resources with other groups in their traditional territory. The entire suite of mitigation 13 measures can be found in the EPPs for Pipelines, Facilities and Westridge Marine Terminal. 14 Volume 5B, Section 7.2.2 of the Facilities Application provides details regarding the effects 15 assessment for TLRU (Filing ID A3S1S7).

40.2.23 Kwantlen First Nation 16 Kwantlen First Nation submitted evidence regarding their historic and current use of land and 17 resources in their respective traditional territories. A joint TLRU report was filed confidentially 18 with the NEB. A summary of TLRU information, issues, and proposed mitigation measures 19 provided in the TLRU report is included in the Confidential Supplemental Traditional Land and 20 Resource Use Technical Report. Trans Mountain has reviewed the TLRU information filed 21 confidentially with the NEB and the written evidence filed with the NEB, and determined that the 22 conclusions with respect to the assessment of potential effects on TLRU activities remain 23 unchanged.

24 Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance that Kwantlen First Nation place on the 25 relationship with the land and their duty to act as stewards of the land to ensure its health for 26 future generations. Trans Mountain also acknowledges the importance of the Fraser River and 27 the ability to fish for salmon to Kwantlen First Nation. Trans Mountain has developed a 28 comprehensive suite of mitigation measures designed to protect the environment so that 29 Kwantlen First Nation and other Aboriginal groups will be able to continue with their cultural 30 practices and subsistence lifestyle. The entire suite of mitigation measures can be found in the 31 EPPs for Pipelines, Facilities and Westridge Marine Terminal. Volume 5B, Section 7.2.2 of the 32 Facilities Application provides details regarding the effects assessment for TLRU (Filing 33 ID A3S1S7).

34 Kwantlen First Nation provide evidence of existing development in their traditional territory and 35 how this has already affected TLU patterns, and express concerns about the cumulative effects 36 of the proposed Project on TLRU activities. For example, community members continue to hunt, 37 but find that with existing development they must travel further to do so due to extensive 38 development in the Fraser Valley. Similarly the Fraser River, the location of many important 39 fishing sites, has been subject to change due to development along its banks. Trans Mountain 40 acknowledges these concerns and understands this as part of the baseline context for the 41 Project and context for the cumulative effects assessment. Trans Mountain has conducted a 42 cumulative effects assessment related to construction and operation of the proposed pipeline in 43 Volume 5B, Section 8.2 (Filing ID A3S1T0). The scope of the cumulative effects assessment is 44 a Project-specific cumulative effects assessment. The Application notes that there will be no

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1 significant adverse impacts to the land resources in the environment used by Aboriginal 2 communities. As such, through the implementation of mitigation measures, the construction and 3 operation of the proposed pipeline would not result in significant adverse effects on the ability of 4 Aboriginal communities to continue to use lands, waters, or resources for traditional purposes.

5 Kwantlen First Nation also expressed concerns regarding the potential for a substantial spill or 6 series of smaller spills, particularly into or near the Fraser River. Kwantlen First Nation contend 7 that the possibility or threat of a spill would cause an increased sense of anxiety that comes 8 from living with risk, would damage community members’ spiritual connection with the land, 9 would violate Kwantlen First Nation’s ability to manage lands in their traditional territory, and 10 would exacerbate cumulative effects. Section 43 provides details regarding increased anxiety 11 that comes from living with risk. Trans Mountain understands that Kwantlen First Nation are 12 concerned about the effects of a spill on the lands, waters, and resources within their traditional 13 territory. Trans Mountain considered the potential effects of spills on elements of the 14 environment that support Aboriginal rights and interests including TLRU as per Volume 7, 15 Section 6.2 of the Application (Filing ID A3S4V6).

40.2.24 Tsawwassen First Nation 16 Tsawwassen First Nation submitted evidence describing their rights according to the 17 Tsawwassen First Nation Final Agreement Act 2007 and historic and current TLRU information. 18 Tsawwassen First Nation has traditional use activities in both the marine and land 19 environments. The information provided in the traditional use report is included the Traditional 20 Land and Resource Use Technical Report Supplemental No. 4 (Appendix 40A) and the 21 Supplemental Traditional Marine Resource Use No. 3 (Appendix 40B). Trans Mountain has 22 reviewed the TLRU information filed with the NEB and the written evidence filed with the NEB, 23 and determined that the conclusions with respect to the assessment of potential effects on 24 TLRU activities remain unchanged.

25 A response to marine issues raised in the Tsawwassen First Nation traditional use evidence is 26 provided in Section 57 Aboriginal Traditional Marine Use of this Reply Evidence.

40.2.25 Tsleil-Waututh Nation 27 Tsleil-Waututh Nation submitted evidence of their traditional use, primarily focused on Burrard 28 Inlet, and provided an alternative assessment based on their Marine Stewardship Law. The 29 information provided in the traditional use report is included the Traditional Land and Resource 30 Use Technical Report Supplemental No. 4 (Appendix 40A) and the Supplemental Traditional 31 Marine Resource Use No. 3 (Appendix 40B). Trans Mountain has reviewed the TLRU 32 information filed confidentially with the NEB and the written evidence filed with the NEB, and 33 determined that the conclusions with respect to the assessment of potential effects on TLRU 34 activities remain unchanged.

35 A response to marine issues raised in the Tsleil-Waututh Nation traditional use evidence is 36 provided in Section 57 Aboriginal Traditional Marine Use of this Reply Evidence.

40.2.26 Squamish Nation 37 Squamish Nation submitted evidence related to their TLRU, primarily focused on Burrard Inlet, 38 and identified concerns with the assessment methodology. The information provided in the 39 traditional use report is included the Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report

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1 Supplemental No. 4 (Appendix 40A) and the Supplemental Traditional Marine Resource Use 2 No. 3 (Appendix 40B) as part of this Reply Evidence. Trans Mountain has reviewed the TLRU 3 information filed confidentially with the NEB and the written evidence filed with the NEB, and 4 determined that the conclusions with respect to the assessment of potential effects on TLRU 5 activities remain unchanged.

6 The response to Squamish First Nation concerns regarding the assessment approach is 7 provided in Section 57 Aboriginal Traditional Marine Use of this Reply Evidence.

40.3 References 8 Antoniuk, T. 2000. Cumulative effects assessment of pipeline projects. Pp. 143-161 in 9 Cumulative Environmental Effects Management Tools and Approaches, Alan J. Kennedy 10 (Ed). Papers from a symposium held by the Alberta Society of Professional Biologists. 11 Calgary, AB.

12 National Energy Board. 2015. Filing Manual. Inclusive of Release 2015-01 (June 2015). 13 Calgary, AB.

14 URS Corporation. 2002. Topical Report: Cumulative Effects Assessment for Gas Pipeline 15 Projects. Prepared for GRI, Des Plaines, Illinois. GRI Report No. GRI-02-0104.

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41.0 SOCIAL AND CULTURAL WELL-BEING 41.1 Effects on Aboriginal Cultural Transmission 1 Several Aboriginal communities expressed concern that the Project would negatively impact 2 opportunities for cultural transmission. In written evidence, the Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing 3 IDs A4L6A4, A4L6A5) noted that certain effects of marine shipping related to the Project 4 (i.e., perceived contamination, physical obstruction [in Burrard Inlet], loss of quiet and privacy, 5 disturbance to views) may disturb the conditions necessary for “cultural work,” potentially hinder 6 “cultural work,” which may have consequences with respect to reduced or eliminated 7 opportunities for cultural transmission and loss of language skills. Squamish First Nation 8 (Filing ID A4L7E6) notes concern about effects on land and water leading to foreclosing of 9 opportunities to exercise cultural practices and effects on knowledge transmission. From a 10 marine perspective, in their written evidence, (Filing ID A4L9Y9), Ditidaht First 11 Nation (Filing ID A4L5D3), Esquimalt Nation (Filing ID A4L5L4), Lyackson First Nation 12 (Filing ID A4Q0H8), Scia’new First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1L0), 13 (Filing ID A4Q0K0), Stz’uminus First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0E6), and 14 (Filing ID A4Q1D4) explain the importance of the ability to practice traditional activities such as 15 marine harvesting within their traditional territory for their cultural integrity and the 16 intergenerational transfer of knowledge to younger generations. Other Aboriginal communities 17 expressing concern in written evidence about effects of the proposed pipeline and facilities on 18 cultural transmission include Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc (Filing IDs A4L6K5, A4L6J7, A4L6J8, 19 A4L6J9), Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation (Filing IDs A4L9U9, A4Q1A3), and Katzie First Nation 20 (Filing IDs A4L5H8, A4L5I5).

21 Trans Mountain acknowledges these additional sources of information about traditional resource 22 use and cultural practices from intervenors. Trans Mountain understands and acknowledges the 23 important role of traditional activities in passing along traditional culture to younger generations 24 and to the practice of Aboriginal language. Several Aboriginal communities explained the 25 importance of the ability to practice traditional activities such as fishing, hunting, marine 26 harvesting, and ceremonies within their traditional territory (land and marine based) for their 27 cultural integrity and the intergenerational transfer of knowledge to younger generations, noting 28 that it is out on the land or water where the stories are told to younger generations whilst 29 undertaking these activities.

30 Trans Mountain discusses and characterizes potential effects of the Project on traditional 31 Aboriginal resource use and Aboriginal culture in various parts of the Application.

32 Pipeline and Facilities (Including Land-based part of Westridge Marine Terminal)

33 In Volume 5B, Section 7.2.3 (Social and Cultural Well-Being; Filing ID A3S1S7, PDF page 57 of 34 245), Trans Mountain discusses that one of the pathways through which the Project has the 35 potential to affect Aboriginal culture is via effects on traditional harvesting practices and cultural 36 sites. Trans Mountain notes that the Project may have potential adverse effects on opportunities 37 to participate in traditional harvesting associated with direct Project effects on the land and wild 38 food supplies (i.e., wildlife, fish, plants), and that participation in these activities helps Aboriginal 39 communities sustain their culture. The Application notes that subsistence activities may be 40 disrupted by construction or operations of the Project and the interruption could mean that the 41 traditional resource user misses the harvest opportunity or that their participation [in the 42 traditional activity] is curtailed.

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1 Potential impacts on the valued environmental resources that underlie these important 2 traditional activities are addressed in the Application in Volume 5A, ESA – Biophysical 3 (Filing IDs A3S1L2 to A3S1R3). The Application notes that there will be no significant adverse 4 impacts to the biophysical resources used by Aboriginal communities during construction and 5 routine operations of the proposed pipeline and facilities (including land-based portion of 6 Westridge Marine Terminal).

7 Trans Mountain also understands that factors related to sensory disturbance may influence 8 decisions about traditional use activities, which are discussed in Volume 5B, Section 7.2.3 9 (Human Occupancy and Resource Use), where it is noted that there may be sensory 10 disturbances experienced by traditional land users related to construction-related equipment 11 and traffic (Filing ID A3S1S7, PDF page 57 of 245). Sensory disturbance effects during 12 construction and site-specific maintenance would be short-term in nature, typically of low 13 magnitude, and not significant.

14 Overall, the construction and routine operations of the proposed pipeline and facilities (including 15 land-based portion of Westridge Marine Terminal) would not result in significant adverse effects 16 on the ability of Aboriginal communities to continue to use lands, waters or resources for 17 traditional purposes, and thus the Project’s contribution to potential broader cultural impacts 18 related to access to and use of natural resources is also considered not significant.

19 Westridge Marine Terminal - Marine

20 In Volume 5B, Section 7.6 (Filing ID A3S1S9), Trans Mountain discusses unique marine use 21 effects associated with the proposed expansion of the Westridge Marine Terminal.

22 In Section 7.6.2 (Traditional Marine Resource Use; Filing ID A3S1S9), Trans Mountain notes 23 there is a potential residual effect of alteration of subsistence resources. The Application notes 24 that based on the results of effects assessments for marine mammals, marine birds and marine 25 fish and fish habitat, alteration of subsistence resources is a potential residual effect of 26 interactions between traditional marine resources and the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion 27 due to loss of marine shoreline, marine riparian habitat, intertidal habitat, and subtidal habitat, 28 sensory disturbance, injury or mortality. The potential residual effect of alteration to subsistence 29 resources is concluded to be long-term in duration, medium-term to permanent in reversibility, 30 low to medium in magnitude, and not significant.

31 In Volume 5B, Section 7.6.4 (Human Occupancy and Resource Use; Filing ID A3S1S9), Trans 32 Mountain also notes the potential residual effect of disruption of marine access and use patterns 33 related to the use of Indian Reserves and asserted traditional territories (Filing ID A3S1S9, PDF 34 page 23 of 109). The Application notes that there are anticipated effects on use of traditional 35 territories related to changes in marine access and sensory disturbance for Aboriginal users 36 accessing IRs and traditional use areas via Burrard Inlet, and notes that the Tsleil-Waututh 37 Nation and Squamish First Nation are Aboriginal communities having interests potentially 38 affected by the expansion of the Westridge Marine Terminal; it notes that sensory and marine 39 use effects related to operations are low in magnitude and not significant. The Application 40 concluded that the combined effect of the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion on the use of 41 IRs and asserted traditional territories will be primarily related to construction activities (short- 42 term); the expanded dock complex will be a permanent feature of Burrard Inlet in an area of 43 current industrial use and with an established compatible mix of traditional, commercial, tourism 44 and recreational marine uses and long-term marine use patterns will likely adapt over time (refer

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1 to Volume 5B, Table 7.6.4-3; Filing ID A3S1S9). Given the new written evidence by Aboriginal 2 intervenors with asserted traditional territory in Burrard Inlet which was not available at the time 3 of the Application, Trans Mountain acknowledges that the combined effect of the Westridge 4 Marine Terminal expansion on the use of IRs and asserted traditional territories may extend into 5 the long-term (reversible in long-term) as certain traditional marine users may avoid the area, or 6 otherwise change use patterns, around Westridge Marine Terminal into operations. The 7 magnitude of the combined effect is considered medium, acknowledging that its cultural 8 implications are more than a nuisance or inconvenience for some Aboriginal communities. The 9 combined effects of the Westridge Marine Terminal on the use of IRs, Métis Settlements and 10 Asserted Traditional Territories, considering long-term reversibility, is still concluded to be not 11 significant.

12 Overall, the construction and routine operations of the expanded Westridge Marine Terminal will 13 not result in significant adverse effects on the marine resources used for subsistence or 14 traditional purposes, on marine access and use patterns, or on aesthetic attributes. Given this, 15 the contribution of the construction and routine operations of the expanded Westridge Marine 16 Terminal to potential broader cultural impacts related to access to and use of marine resources 17 is also considered not significant.

18 Marine Transportation

19 With respect to marine transportation activities (i.e., Project-related marine vessels moving to 20 and from Westridge Marine Terminal), Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance of 21 traditional marine use in Burrard Inlet and along the shipping lanes. In Volume 8A, 22 Section 4.3.10 (Filing ID A3S4Y3), Trans Mountain discusses that coastal Aboriginal 23 community’s connection to the marine environment is profound. The Application notes that 24 traditional use of the marine environment includes the subsistence practices of hunting, fishing 25 and plant gathering, movement by travelways, and cultural traditions and customs practiced at 26 gathering places and sacred areas. The Application notes that there will be no significant 27 adverse impacts resulting from marine transportation to the marine resources used by 28 Aboriginal communities for traditional purposes (the exception being the significant adverse 29 biophysical effects of sensory disturbance of southern resident killer whales due to underwater 30 noise). Further, Trans Mountain discusses that disruption to traditional marine movement 31 patterns could occur. Trans Mountain identifies the potential residual effect alteration of 32 traditional marine resource users’ vessel movement patterns (Filing ID A3S4Y3, PDF page 139 33 of 294); this effect is concluded to be periodic in frequency, reversible in the short- to long-term, 34 low to medium in magnitude, and not significant. Given this, the Project’s contribution to broader 35 Aboriginal cultural effects related to change in traditional marine use patterns is also considered 36 not significant.

37 Summary

38 Trans Mountain acknowledges the high importance of traditional land and marine resource use 39 in areas impacted by the Project, and the connection between traditional resource use and the 40 practice and transmission of Aboriginal culture. Trans Mountain understands there are unique 41 individual and cultural perspectives regarding the land disturbance, incremental sensory 42 disturbance and larger marine footprint associated with the expanded dock complex at 43 Westridge Marine Terminal, and the movement of Project-related marine vessels, and that 44 certain users may avoid certain areas. But, as the Application notes (refer to Technical 45 Report 5D-2, Socio-Economic Technical Report, Section 6.0 (Vista Strategy Corp. and TERA

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1 2013; Filing ID A3S2I2, page 121 of 199), the sense of social and cultural well-being of a 2 community or region is dynamic and influenced by multiple factors and may be experienced 3 differently by different people. While the Project will create some physical disturbance, sensory 4 disturbance, and access disruption in specific areas and at certain times, the Project will not, on 5 its own, prevent the experience of traditional practices at a community level nor result in 6 significant adverse effects on the ability of Aboriginal people to continue to use lands, waters or 7 resources for traditional purposes. The overall effect of the Project on Aboriginal culture and 8 cultural transmission – also considering feedback from Aboriginal communities about the 9 importance of economic opportunities related to the Project (e.g., employment, contracting) and 10 Project-related support for traditional studies and MBAs that may be used by Aboriginal 11 communities to support broader cultural objectives – is considered to be low to medium in 12 magnitude and not significant.

13 Trans Mountain is committed to ongoing engagement with Aboriginal communities along the 14 pipeline and marine corridors. As noted in the Application, Trans Mountain is committed to 15 working with Aboriginal communities to develop strategies to most effectively communicate the 16 construction schedule and work areas (refer to Volume 5B, Section 7.2.2, Table 7.2.2-4; 17 Filing ID A3S1S7, PDF page 21 of 245). With regards to marine shipping, Trans Mountain will 18 continue to provide information about Project-related shipping to other marine users. Specifically 19 (refer to Volume 8A, Table 4.3.10.3; Filing ID A3S4Y3, PDF page 136 of 294):

20 · provide regular updated information on Project-related marine vessel traffic to 21 fishing industry organizations, Aboriginal communities, and other affected 22 stakeholders, where possible, through the Chamber of Shipping of BC 23 (COSBC);

24 · initiate a public outreach program before Project operations phase (refer also to 25 the response to NEB IR No. 3.007, Filing ID A4H1V2); and

26 · Communicate any applicable information on Project-related timing and 27 scheduling with fishing industry organizations, Aboriginal communities, and 28 other affected stakeholders.

29 Trans Mountain anticipates it will continue to provide updates on its extensive Aboriginal 30 Engagement Program through the NEB as part of condition compliance post-CPCN filings.

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42.0 HUMAN OCCUPANCY AND RESOURCE USE 42.1 Sensory Disturbance 1 In written evidence, the Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing IDs A4L6A4, A4L6A3) noted that certain 2 direct effects of activity at the Westridge Marine Terminal related to the Project may have 3 consequences of loss of quiet and privacy. Tsleil-Waututh Nation describes how loss of quiet 4 and privacy could result in negative effects on “cultural work” and community health. Refer to 5 Section 41: Social and Cultural Well-Being of this Reply Evidence for a discussion regarding 6 indirect effects on Aboriginal cultural transmission; Section 43 regarding effects on community 7 health; and Section 58: Marine Commercial, Recreation and Tourism Use regarding sensory 8 disturbance from transiting and anchored tankers.

9 Trans Mountain understands and acknowledges the importance to Aboriginal communities of 10 engaging in traditional activities in quiet, undeveloped locations. In Volume 5B, Section 7.6.4 11 (Filing ID A3S1S9), Trans Mountain discusses that one of the pathways through which the 12 Westridge Marine Terminal has the potential to affect Aboriginal users via the effect of Sensory 13 Disturbance (from Noise, Air emissions, Lighting, Visual), as well as Decrease in quality of the 14 experience of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal marine commercial, recreation and tourism users 15 (during both construction and operations). The Application notes that nuisance air emissions, 16 noise, and lighting will occur during the construction and operation of the Project, which may 17 affect Aboriginal local residents and marine users around the Westridge Marine Terminal. 18 Further, the Application describes how the overall quality of the experience of Aboriginal marine 19 commercial, recreation, and tourism users may be affected by aesthetic disturbances during 20 operations of the Westridge Marine Terminal, due to the more frequent loading of tankers at the 21 docks and within boomed areas. The effect of Sensory Disturbance (from Noise, Air emissions, 22 Lighting, Visual) from Westridge Marine Terminal during construction is concluded to be isolated 23 in frequency, reversible in the short-term, low in magnitude and not significant. The effect of 24 Sensory Disturbance (from Noise, Air emissions, Lighting, Visual) from Westridge Marine 25 Terminal during operations is concluded to be isolated to periodic in frequency, reversible in the 26 long-term, low in magnitude and not significant. The potential residual effects of Decrease in 27 quality of the experience of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal marine commercial, recreation and 28 tourism users during both construction and operations are also concluded to be not significant 29 (Volume 5B, Table 7.6.4-3; Filing ID A3S1S9, pages 18-19 of 109).

30 Trans Mountain understands there are unique cultural perspectives regarding the incremental 31 sensory disturbance associated with the expanded dock complex and certain users may avoid 32 that area. But given the terminal is an existing industrial use area in the context of a busy 33 operating port with an established mix of traditional, commercial, tourism, and recreational uses, 34 Trans Mountain does not think consideration of all evidence supports a conclusion that terminal 35 expansion will cause a loss of quiet and privacy. Trans Mountain has taken steps to minimize its 36 direct effects related to sensory disturbance and quality of users’ experiences. For example, 37 Trans Mountain will design lighting requirements at the Westridge Marine Terminal to meet the 38 Canada Labour Code and Transport Canada - International Ship and Port Requirements, and 39 will use low level and low intensity lighting, and reduce night lighting, when feasible. Trans 40 Mountain will also communicate with marine and local fishing industry organizations, Aboriginal 41 groups, marine recreation organizations, and other affected stakeholders to provide Project 42 information related to Project activities affecting marine use areas. Vessel operators will also 43 avoid rapid acceleration to control noise (Volume 5B, Table 7.6.4-2; Filing ID A3S1S9,

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1 pages 15-17). The conclusion that sensory disturbance effects associated with Westridge 2 Marine Terminal are not significant remains unchanged.

3 Upper Nicola Band stated concern about sensory disturbance during pipeline construction in its 4 response to the IR from the Government of Canada (Filing ID A4R4I4). In Section 7.2.4, Volume 5 5B (Filing ID A3S1S7), Trans Mountain acknowledges and addresses the potential residual 6 effect of Sensory Disturbance for Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Local Residents and Land 7 Users (From Nuisance Air Emissions, Noise and Construction-related Visual Effects) During 8 Construction and Site-specific Maintenance. Trans Mountain will have a range of mitigation 9 measures in place to reduce and manage noise and air effects, and to reduce the short-term 10 visual effects of construction, which are discussed in Section 7.2.4 of Volume 5B (Filing ID 11 A3S1S7). Sensory disturbance effects associated with pipeline and facilities construction and 12 site-specific maintenance are concluded to be short-term in duration, reversible in the short- 13 term, low in magnitude, and not significant.

42.2 Alteration of Viewsheds, Westridge Marine Terminal 14 In written evidence, the Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing IDs A4L6A4, A4L6A3) noted that certain 15 direct effects of activity at the Westridge Marine Terminal related to the Project would result in 16 impaired views, which are necessary for “cultural work.” Refer to Section 58: Social and Cultural 17 Well-Being of this Reply Evidence for a discussion related to indirect effects on Aboriginal 18 cultural transmission and to Section 58: Marine Commercial, Recreation and Tourism Use 19 regarding impaired views associated with transiting and anchored tankers.

20 Trans Mountain understands and acknowledges the importance of engaging in traditional 21 activities in remote, undeveloped locations. In Volume 5B, Section 7.6.4 (Filing ID A3S1S9), 22 Trans Mountain discusses that one of the pathways through which the Project has the potential 23 to affect Aboriginal users is as a result of the alteration of viewsheds due to the expanded 24 Westridge Marine Terminal. The new dock, berths, and moored tankers will be visible from 25 multiple viewpoints; however the expansion is taking place in an area of current industrial use in 26 a busy operating port, with an established compatible mix of commercial, tourism, recreational 27 and traditional marine uses. The proposed new dock design at Westridge Marine Terminal was 28 modelled both with and without tankers at berth, to represent the visual effects of the range of 29 expected activity at this location (Technical Report 5D-5, Viewshed Modelling Analysis 30 Technical Report; TERA 2013; Filing IDs A3S2K2, A3S2K4, A3S2K6). The overall effect of the 31 terminal expansion on viewsheds is considered to be reversible in the long-term, low in 32 magnitude, and not significant.

42.3 Effects on Property Values due to Sensory Disturbance/Change in Viewsheds 33 In written evidence, the Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing IDs A4L6A4, A4L6A3) noted that impaired 34 views associated with marine shipping and activity at the Westridge Marine Terminal related to 35 the Project could have consequences of a loss of revenue for contemporary businesses, 36 particularly their market housing development. Written evidence from NS NOPE/J. Edmunds 37 (Filing ID A4L5V1) notes that the Project will negatively affect neighbourhoods opposite the 38 Westridge Marine Terminal by increasing light pollution, noise, and creating the perception of 39 exposure to risk from Project emissions and oil spills, and that this could depress property 40 values. Please refer to Section 10: Landowner & Other Compensation of this Reply Evidence for

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1 Trans Mountain’s response to concerns about property value effects related to aesthetic 2 disturbances and perceived risk.

42.4 Access 3 Upper Nicola Band and Okanagan First Nation stated concerns about access to traditional lands 4 during pipeline construction in their response to the IR from the Government of Canada (Filing 5 IDs A4R4I4 and A4R4H6). In Section 7.2.4, Volume 5B (Filing ID A3S1S7), Trans Mountain 6 acknowledges and addresses the potential residual effect of Change in Land Use Patterns in 7 relation to the indian reserves, Métis settlements and asserted traditional territories indicator, 8 noting that a disruption of access to indian reserves and asserted traditional territories could 9 affect the practice of traditional activities by Aboriginal users. Residual effects of disruption to 10 access and use patterns during construction and site-specific maintenance are concluded to be 11 reversible in the short-term, periodic in frequency, medium in magnitude, and not significant.

12 Trans Mountain has committed to numerous mitigation measures to reduce access related 13 effects. Mitigation measures to reduce Project-related traffic (such as using multi-passenger 14 vehicles and obeying traffic, road-use, and safety laws), as well as low-impact road crossing 15 construction methods will be implemented during Project construction activities, and will also 16 minimize access and use disruption. The objectives of the Traffic and Access Control 17 Management Plan will be accomplished by minimizing the development of access routes, 18 controlling public access along the construction right-of-way, selecting appropriate access 19 routes that cause the least disturbance to high quality, sensitive wildlife habitat, managing traffic 20 on these routes, and determining appropriate construction reclamation. Trans Mountain will 21 work with applicable resource managers, traditional land and resource users to define locations 22 where access control is necessary, and what type(s) of access control will be implemented. 23 Aboriginal groups will also be invited to participate in EPP workshops where mitigation 24 measures will be discussed.

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43.0 COMMUNITY HEALTH 1 The evidence submitted by several intervenors noted concerns about a range of potential 2 pathways through which the Project could impact community health. These are described 3 below. For the most part, the concerns centre around the potential for Project-related changes 4 to aspects of the biophysical environment (e.g., air quality, wildlife resources, fish, etc.), with the 5 potential for subsequent impacts on community health outcomes. The potential for these 6 changes to aspects of the biophysical environment are already addressed in the Application 7 through identified potential residual effects, and the Application concluded that there would be 8 no significant effects on any of these indicators. Consequently, it is concluded that the potential 9 for residual effects on community health is also low.

43.1 Potential for Oil Spills and Subsequent Impacts on Health 10 Several Aboriginal groups have expressed concern in their written evidence that an oil spill, if 11 one were to occur, could affect community health, either indirectly through impacts on cultural 12 activities, sensitive sites, or food resources; or through increasing stress, anxiety, and the 13 perception of contamination. These issues have been raised in the written evidence by the 14 Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing ID A4L5Z9), the Katzie First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5H8 and 15 A4L5I5), the Chawathil First Nation, (Filing ID A4Q2C6), the Coldwater Indian Band (Filing 16 ID A4Q0W6), and the Lower Nicola Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q7H4).

17 The potential for oil spills to occur is addressed in the Application, and also in Section 28 18 (Environmental Assessment Methods) of this Reply Evidence. Trans Mountain acknowledges 19 the high level of First Nation, government, and public concern about spills, and the Application 20 confirmed that evidence from past spills demonstrates that Aboriginal peoples who rely on 21 subsistence foods and natural resources are at greatest risk of adverse effects. However, as 22 stated in Section 28, Trans Mountain remains confident that accidents and malfunctions related 23 to the pipeline and facilities, and increases in Project-related marine shipping activities have a 24 low probability of occurrence, and that its assessment of accidents and malfunctions follows the 25 NEB guidance on this issue and meets the requirements of the CEA Act, 2012.

26 Trans Mountain acknowledges that if a spill were to occur, community health has the potential to 27 be adversely impacted in the ways described in the filings listed above. However, because there 28 is a low probability of occurrence of an oil spill, Trans Mountain believes that impacts on 29 community health are similarly unlikely to occur.

43.2 Change in Availability of, Access to or Contamination of Traditional Food and Medicines 30 Written evidence relating to traditional resource use was received from a number of Aboriginal 31 groups, including: Asini Wache Nehiyawak Traditional Band (Filing ID A4Q3Q8), Cheam First 32 Nation and Chawathil First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q2C6 to A4Q2C9), Coldwater Indian Band 33 (Filing ID A4Q0W6), Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4L9Y9), Ditidaht First Nation (Filing 34 ID A4L5D3), Enoch Cree Nation (Filing ID A4L5F0), Esquimalt Nation (Filing ID A4L5L4), Métis 35 Nation of Alberta Gunn Métis Local 55 (Filing ID A4L6Z6), Hwiltsum First Nation (Filing 36 ID A4Q1H5), Katzie First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5H8 and A4L5I5), Kwantlen First Nation (Filing 37 IDs A4L8J5 to A4L8K2, A4L8K3, A4L8K4, and A4L8K5), Lower Nicola Indian Band (Filing 38 ID A4Q7H4), Lyackson First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0H9), Maa-nulth Treaty Society (Filing 39 ID A4L6D5), Matsqui First Nation (Filing IDs A4L8J2 and A4L8J3), Métis Nation British 40 Columbia (Filing ID A4Q2H2), Michel First Nation (Filing IDs A4L7R0, A4L7R1, A4L7R2,

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1 A4L7R3, A4L7R4, and A4L7R5), Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9), Neskonlith Indian 2 Band (Filing ID A4Q2J0), Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5F3 and A4L5K2), 3 Pauquachin Nation (Filing ID A4L6I4), Samson Cree Nation (Filing ID A4L7H9), Scia’new First 4 Nation (Filing ID A4Q1L0), Shxw’δwhámel First Nation (Filing IDs A4L9U9 and A4Q1A3), 5 Simpcw First Nation (Filing ID A4L6J0), (Filing ID A4Q2R7), 6 Squamish Nation (Filing ID A4L7E6), Stk’emlúps te Secwépemc (Filing IDs A4L6K5, A4L6J7, 7 A4L6J8, and A4L6J9), Stz’uminus First Nation (Filing ID A4Q0E6), Sunchild First Nation (Filing 8 IDs A4L8L3 and A4L8L4), T’Sou-ke First Nation (Filing ID A4L5T0), Tsartlip First Nation (Filing 9 ID A4Q0K0), Tsawout First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q1D4, A4Q1F0, A4Q1F1, and A4Q1F2), 10 Tsawwassen First Nation (Filing IDs A4L7T1 and A4L7T2), Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing 11 IDs A4L6A4, A4L6A5 and A4L5Z3), and the Upper Nicola Band (Filing ID A4Q1T3).

12 Concerns included changes in land use, habitat, wildlife, fish, and other marine resources and 13 vegetation; and over subsequent effects on cultural activities, knowledge transmission, 14 economic benefits, food, medicines, and health.

15 Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance of the environment and the resources within it to 16 Aboriginal groups and understands that the ability to participate in TLRU activities is important. 17 Sections 56 and 57 of this Reply Evidence discusses the written evidence submitted by these 18 groups and presents Trans Mountain’s responses with regard to the underlying issue of 19 availability of, access to, or contamination of natural resources used for traditional food or 20 medicinal purposes.

21 Volume 5B, Section 7.2.8.5 of the Application (Filing ID A3S1S7, PDF page 229 of 245) 22 describes the anticipated residual effects of the Project on traditional food sources as it relates 23 to diet and nutritional outcomes (Aboriginal health indicator). Though no significant adverse 24 effects are anticipated on the natural resources potentially used as traditional foods, despite 25 mitigation measures the availability of some subsistence food sources will be affected by Project 26 activities (short-term), and fears around potential contamination may lead some community 27 members to avoid eating subsistence foods or plants used for traditional medicines. The 28 residual effect, however, is characterized as not significant, as the magnitude of changes to 29 traditional food sources is negligible to low, and the effect across the socio-economic RSA is 30 negligible to low.

31 With respect to marine transportation activities (i.e., Project-related marine vessels moving to 32 and from Westridge Marine Terminal), Trans Mountain acknowledges the importance of 33 traditional marine use in Burrard Inlet and along the shipping lanes (Section 57 [Aboriginal 34 Traditional Marine Use] of this Reply Evidence). Volume 8A of the Application notes that there 35 will be no significant adverse impacts resulting from marine transportation to the marine 36 resources used by Aboriginal communities for traditional purposes (the exception being the 37 significant adverse biophysical effects of sensory disturbance of southern resident killer whales 38 due to underwater noise). Further, Trans Mountain discusses that disruption to traditional 39 marine movement patterns could occur. Trans Mountain identifies the potential residual effect 40 alteration of traditional marine resource users’ vessel movement patterns (Filing ID A3S4Y3, 41 PDF page 139 of 294); this effect is concluded to be periodic in frequency, reversible in the 42 short- to long-term, low to medium in magnitude, and not significant. Given this, the Project’s 43 contribution to change in availability of, or access to, traditional food sources in the marine 44 environment is also considered not significant.

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43.3 Risk Perception and Psychological/Emotional Well-being 1 A number of Aboriginal groups raised issues in their written evidence around how the perception 2 of risk affects psychological or emotional health. The Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing IDs A4L6A4 3 and A4L6A5) described feelings of annoyance or stress caused by the degradation of remote 4 and quiet spaces. The Chawathil First Nation (Filing ID A4Q2C6) described an increased level 5 of anxiety among the Chawathil First Nation members that comes with living with risk and threat 6 of a spill; and the Matsqui First Nation (Filing IDs A4L8J2 and A4L8J3) felt that the Project 7 would result in impacts to their psychological/emotional health. Many of these impacts were 8 linked back to the cumulative effects of development. In addition, the Katzie First Nation (Filing 9 IDs A4L5H8 and A4L5I5) stated that impacts to the health of the Katzie First Nation community 10 were arising from the feeling of powerlessness, and the Lower Nicola Indian Band (Filing 11 ID A4Q7H4) described the contribution of the Project to a lack of ‘agency,’ or meaningful 12 inclusion in the decision-making process.

13 Trans Mountain recognizes that Aboriginal groups have been affected by changes that have 14 taken place in their traditional territories over time, and that some people in these communities 15 feel distress, anxiety, or feelings of powerlessness over these changes. Trans Mountain notes 16 that individuals and communities may have a range of perspectives with respect to any 17 development situation that involves environmental changes, and that individual perspectives are 18 dynamic and beyond the management control of the Project. To help minimize any adverse 19 effects, Trans Mountain has put in place an extensive suite of mitigation measures to manage 20 direct Project impacts. Trans Mountain is also committed to ongoing communication and 21 engagement with Aboriginal communities along the pipeline route.

22 In its written evidence, the Lower Nicola Indian Band also disagreed with the Application’s 23 characterization of the significance of risk perception, stating that assessing significance for the 24 population at large (the aggregate population along the entire pipeline) effectively dilutes the 25 perspectives of First Nations and also does not adequately take into consideration the holistic 26 basis of First Nations environmental values and perceptions of risk that affect all aspects of their 27 definition of health and well-being. Trans Mountain recognizes that effects of the Project will 28 differ across different locations and among different populations. However, the definition of 29 significance used in the Application, described in Volume 5B, Table 7.1-2, necessarily looks at 30 the Project as a whole. The Application also recognizes that ‘non significant’ effects can still be 31 important; as stated in Volume 5B, Section 7.1.7, “It should be noted that the determination of a 32 ‘not significant residual effect’ is based on a pre-defined approach that incorporates magnitude, 33 probability, reversibility and extent but a ‘not significant residual effect’ determination does not 34 mean that the potential residual effect is not important to one or more Aboriginal communities, 35 landowners, regulatory authorities or stakeholders.” (Filing ID A3S1S7, PDF page 8 of 245).

43.4 Marine Transport Safety 36 The Tsleil-Waututh Nation (Filing ID A4L5Z9) raised concerns that additional tankers and tugs 37 pose safety risks for Tsleil-Waututh Nation members using marine waters for cultural work and 38 for business enterprises. Volume 8A, Section 4.3.11.6.1 (ESA) addresses this issue. That 39 assessment concludes that loss or damage to marine vessels (and potential injury) as a result 40 of the increased Project-related marine vessels could occur during the operational life of the 41 Project. Such events have a low probability of occurrence; in 2012, there were only six collisions 42 between vessels reported across Canada. However, the Transportation Safety Board has 43 identified the safety of fishing vessels as an area of high concern since 45% of all vessels 44 involved in shipping accidents are fishing vessels. Mitigation measures that will be used to

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1 reduce risk include standard operating procedures such as the widespread use of ship’s radar; 2 the compulsory use of CCG Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) for most 3 vessels to facilitate communications with ports and other vessels; the use of loudhailers on 4 bridges to communicate with smaller vessels that are not registered with CCG MCTS; the 5 compulsory use of pilots in coastal BC waters; the use of escort tugs in and Burrard 6 Inlet; and other standard navigational measures.

43.5 Drinking Water Quality 7 Several Aboriginal communities have expressed concerns in written evidence that changes in 8 surface water quality could occur that would reduce the availability or quality of drinking water. 9 This issue has been raised by the Coldwater Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q0W6) and the Sunchild 10 First Nation (Filing IDs A4L8L3 and A4L8L4).

11 Effects of water quality and quantity are addressed in Volume 5A of the Application. As stated in 12 Volume 5A, Section 7.2.3.6, the Project is unlikely to have a significant adverse effect on 13 drinking water quality. Planned mitigation measures include: prohibiting the use of herbicides 14 within 30 m of a watercourse or water body; monitoring water quality during construction and 15 post-construction; grading away from watercourses to reduce the risk of introduction of soil and 16 organic debris; reducing potential for soil erosion; and other mitigation measures as described in 17 the EPPs.

18 As a result of the planned mitigation and monitoring measures, Trans Mountain believes that it 19 will not have a significant adverse residual effect on drinking water quality.

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44.0 INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICES 44.1 Increased Traffic During Construction 1 In their responses to Government of Canada’s IRs, Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation raised concern 2 regarding increased traffic as a result of construction (Filing ID A4R4K5). In Volume 5B, 3 Section 7.2.5 (Filing ID A3S1S7), Trans Mountain acknowledges and addresses the potential 4 residual effect of increase in traffic on highways and access roads during construction, and 5 discusses a range of mitigation measures to address traffic effects. For example, Trans 6 Mountain will employ a number of measures to reduce Project-related vehicles and limit the 7 effects associated with construction-related traffic, including providing daily shuttle bus services 8 from staging areas to work sites and for local workers from predetermined regional staging 9 areas. It is anticipated that many major equipment deliveries will come to the region via rail or 10 ship to temporary stockpile sites along the PPC, which will limit the distances travelled by heavy 11 loads on regional highways. Trans Mountain will also develop a Traffic and Access Control 12 Management Plan for the Project, and TCPs for specific municipalities and regions. The effect 13 of increase in traffic on highways and access roads during construction is concluded to be 14 isolated in frequency, reversible in the short-term, low to medium in magnitude, and not 15 significant (refer to Table 7.2.5-3 in Volume 5B [Filing ID A3S1S7, PDF page 127 of 245]).

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45.0 HUMAN HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT 1 Evidence submitted by several intervenors expressed concerns surrounding the potential effects 2 of the chemicals emitted, discharged and/or released from the Project and/or Project-related 3 marine vessel traffic on human health. These concerns are addressed in the sections that 4 follow, segregated according to routine operations and accidents and malfunctions.

45.1 Routine Operations 5 A number of intervenors expressed general concerns relating to the potential effects of the 6 chemicals emitted from the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (referred to as TMEP or the 7 Project) and Project-related marine vessel traffic on human health under routine operating 8 conditions, including BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), District of North Vancouver (Filing ID 9 A4Q0E9), Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0), Metro Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7Y3), 10 Miller B (Filing ID A4L8L6), Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9) and Senichenko G 11 (Filing ID A4L6Q9). In order to assess the potential human health risks, Trans Mountain 12 conducted a series of HHRAs, including:

13 · Screening Level Human Health Risk Assessment of Pipeline and Facilities 14 Technical Report (Intrinsik December 2013) (Filing IDs A3S2L1, A3S2L2, 15 A3S2L5 and A3S2L7);

16 · Screening Level Human Health Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation 17 Technical Report (Intrinsik December 2013) (Filing ID A3S4R1);

18 · Human Health Risk Assessment of Westridge Marine Terminal Technical 19 Report (Intrinsik June 2014) (Filing IDs A3Y1F4 and A3Y1F5); and

20 · Human Health Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation Technical Report 21 (Intrinsik June 2014) (Filing IDs A3Y1F7 and A3Y1F8).

22 Complete details surrounding the manner by which the HHRAs were performed, the results that 23 emerged, and the conclusions that were reached were presented in the HHRAs listed above. 24 Highlights surrounding the methods, findings, and conclusions are provided below.

25 The overall approach followed to assess the potential human health risks associated with the 26 Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic proceeded step-wise, beginning with an initial 27 SLHHRA. The SLHHRAs represented a preliminary examination of the potential health effects 28 that might be experienced under the routine operation of the Project and Project-related marine 29 vessel traffic by members of the general public. The assessment was conducted as a 30 screening-level exercise to understand the overall likelihood, nature and extent to which 31 people’s health might be affected, with the findings used to determine if elevated health risks 32 exist, and if so, the need for further, more detailed investigation of these risks. 5

5 For the purposes of the reply evidence presented herein, the term “elevated health risks” refers to risk estimates in excess of the applicable benchmark (or target risk estimate) established by regulatory health authorities responsible for the protection of public health such as Alberta Health, BC MOE and Health Canada. As described in Section 3.2.4 (Risk Characterization) of the HHRAs, the applicable benchmark (or target risk estimate) will depend on the pathway of exposure (i.e., primary inhalation pathway or secondary pathways such as dermal contact, food ingestion, and water ingestion) and the chemical’s mode of action or mechanism of toxicity (i.e., threshold or non-threshold) under consideration.

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1 The SLHHRAs, by convention, embraced a high degree of conservatism through the use of 2 assumptions intentionally selected to represent worst-case or near worst-case conditions. For 3 example, people were assumed to be found on both a short-term and long-term basis at the 4 location within the LSA corresponding to the maximum point of impingement (MPOI).6 The 5 MPOI refers to the location at which the highest air concentrations of each of the chemicals 6 emitted from the Project or Project-related marine vessel traffic would be expected to occur, and 7 at which the chemical exposures received by the people within the LSA would be greatest. The 8 decision to use the MPOI to represent the location at which people would be found was made 9 by default; that is, consideration was not given as to whether or not it was reasonable to 10 expected people to be found at the location on either a short-term or long-term basis. Using this 11 approach, the potential health risks predicted in the SLHHRAs were unlikely to be understated, 12 but conversely may have been exaggerated. As such, it was necessary that the significance of 13 any elevated health risks identified in the SLHHRAs be balanced against the degree of 14 conservatism incorporated in the assessment. This required that the conservative assumptions 15 used in the SLHHRAs be reviewed to determine to what extent the elevated health risks may 16 have been over-stated.

17 In order to permit fuller understanding of any elevated health risks identified in the SLHHRAs, 18 detailed HHRAs were completed based on a more refined and balanced set of assumptions 19 having a higher likelihood of occurrence, rather than defaulting to the worst-case or near worst- 20 case conditions described in the SLHHRAs. One of the major refinements captured in the 21 detailed HHRAs was the evaluation of the potential health risks at discrete (or fixed) locations 22 corresponding to actual households, schools, assisted-living complexes, communities, and 23 parks found within the LSA, including discrete locations found in close proximity to the Project 24 and Project-related marine vessel traffic.

25 Apart from the above, the methods followed in the detailed HHRAs closely matched those of the 26 SLHHRAs. Each of the HHRAs was performed step-wise, following a conventional risk 27 assessment paradigm that is well established and widely accepted by leading scientific and 28 regulatory authorities world-wide. The paradigm consists of several steps, highlights of which 29 are outlined below.

30 · Problem Formulation – This step was concerned with defining the scope and nature of 31 the assessment, and setting practical boundaries on the work such that it is directed at 32 the principal areas of concern. As part of this step, consideration was given to:

33 o The area potentially affected by the chemical emissions from the Project or 34 Project-related marine vessel traffic;

35 o The chemicals of potential concern (COPC) associated with the Project or 36 Project-related marine vessel traffic that might contribute to potential health 37 risks;

6 The LSAs for the Edmonton, Sumas, and Burnaby terminals as well as the Westridge Marine Terminal were defined as the area within a 5-km radius of the terminal. For marine transportation, the LSA was defined as the area within a 5-km buffer of the marine shipping lanes for the Project-related marine vessel traffic, extending from the Westridge Marine Terminal in Burnaby, through Burrard Inlet, south through the southern part of the , the Gulf Islands and Haro Strait, then westward past Victoria and through the Juan de Fuca Strait out to the 12 nautical mile limit of Canada’s territorial sea.

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1 o The people who might be exposed to the COPC, with special attention 2 directed at individuals who might show heightened sensitivity to chemical 3 exposures such as infants and children, the elderly, and individuals with 4 compromised health; and,

5 o The potential exposure pathways by which people might be exposed to the 6 COPC.

7 · Exposure Assessment – This step was concerned with estimating the level of exposure 8 to the COPC that might be received via the various exposure pathways. The step relied 9 on both ambient measurements and predictive modelling to arrive at the exposure 10 estimates, with specific reliance on ambient air quality measurements and air dispersion 11 modelling in the case of chemical emissions to air. Distinction was made between 12 exposures of a short-term nature extending over a few minutes to several hours and 13 long-term exposures lasting for several months or years, possibly up to a lifetime.

14 · Toxicity Assessment – This step was concerned with identifying and understanding the 15 potential health effects that can be caused by each of the COPC (acting either singly or 16 in combination), and the conditions under which the effects can occur. A principal 17 outcome of this step was the determination of the exposure limits for the COPC, which 18 refer to the levels of exposure that would not be expected to cause adverse health 19 effects. The limits are typically based on guidelines, objectives, or standards established 20 by leading scientific and/or regulatory authorities responsible for the protection of public 21 health, and incorporate a high degree of protection to accommodate vulnerable 22 members of the population such as infants and children, the elderly, and individuals with 23 compromised health.

24 · Risk Characterization – This step was concerned with quantifying the potential health 25 risks that could be presented to the local residents and the general public who might 26 frequent the area by comparing the exposure estimates determined as part of the 27 Exposure Assessment to the corresponding exposure limits identified as part of the 28 Toxicity Assessment. The risk estimates were calculated as shown below.

= 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 29 Interpretation of the risk estimate varied according𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 𝐿𝐿to𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿: i) the exposure pathway being 30 assessed, with a different convention followed for inhalation exposures versus exposures 31 through secondary pathways such as dermal contact, food ingestion and water ingestion; 32 and ii) the COPC’s mode of action or mechanism of toxicity, with the convention differing 33 between threshold and non-threshold COPC.7 A benchmark (or target risk estimate) of 1.0 34 represents a level of risk that would typically be deemed acceptable by the provincial and 35 federal regulatory health authorities for non-carcinogenic COPC (Alberta Health and 36 Wellness 2011, BC MOE 2009, Health Canada 2010a). However, for comparison to a 37 benchmark (or target risk estimate) of 1.0, the regulatory authorities require that the risk

7 With few exceptions, the inherent toxicity of a chemical (i.e., the capacity to produce a harmful effect or physiological injury) is only expressed if the exposure exceeds a critical threshold level. Below this threshold dose, injury does not occur and health effects are not observed. A possible exception to this principle involves the actions of certain chemical carcinogens that act via genetically mediated mechanisms to produce certain forms of cancer.

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1 estimate account for background exposures and exposure from multiple media (if 2 applicable). When unable to account for these types of exposures, Health Canada 3 recommends that a target risk estimate of 0.2 (i.e., five possible exposure pathways, each 4 accounting for 20% of exposure) be employed to ensure that the potential health risks not 5 be understated (Health Canada 2010a).

6 For carcinogenic COPC, regulatory health authorities assume that any level of long-term 7 exposure is associated with some hypothetical cancer risk. On this basis, the provincial and 8 federal regulatory health authorities have specified an incremental (i.e., over and above 9 background) lifetime cancer risk of 1 in 100,000, which these regulatory health authorities 10 consider acceptable, tolerable or essentially negligible (Alberta Health and Wellness 2011, 11 BC MOE 2009, Health Canada 2010a). Because this assumed acceptable cancer risk level 12 was specifically developed to address cancer risks over and above background cancer 13 incidence, a portion of which includes background exposure to environmental pollutants, 14 background exposures were not included in the assessment of potential health risks for the 15 carcinogenic COPC.

16 The principal objective of the HHRAs was to identify and permit understanding of the potential 17 health risks that might be presented to people from exposure to the COPC emitted from the 18 Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic on both a short-term and long-term basis. 19 Accordingly, each of the HHRAs included:

20 · Assessment of both short-term and long-term exposure scenarios;

21 · Assessment of potential exposures relating to both the primary pathway (i.e., 22 inhalation) and secondary pathways (i.e., inhalation of dust, water ingestion, 23 food ingestion, and dermal contact);

24 · Assessment of potential exposures on both a cumulative basis (i.e., Base 25 Case, Application Case, and Cumulative Case) and Project-specific basis;8

26 · Assessment of the potential effects of the chemical emissions on the health of 27 people living in the area, and people who might visit or frequent the area for 28 recreation or other purposes and theoretically could be found anywhere within 29 the LSA at any given time;

30 · Assessment of the different lifestyle characteristics, such as dietary patterns, of 31 the area residents that could influence potential exposure to the chemical 32 emissions;

33 · Assessment of both potential non-cancer and cancer health risks; and,

34 · Assessment of the potential health risks associated with the COPC acting 35 either singly or in combination (i.e., chemical mixtures). 9

8 The assessment cases such as the Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative Case, and the incremental scenarios associated with the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic are described in Section 3.2.2 (Assessment Cases) of each of the HHRAs. 9 In accordance with Health Canada (2010a,b) guidance, the risk estimates for the COPC acting through a similar mechanism of toxicity and/or affecting the same target tissues/organs (i.e., sharing a so-called “commonality of effect”) were combined and assumed to act in an additive fashion.

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1 The SLHHRA of the pipeline and associated facilities was specifically aimed at identifying and 2 understanding the potential human health risks associated with short-term and long-term 3 exposures to the COPC emitted from the additional tanks to be installed at the Edmonton, 4 Sumas, and Burnaby terminals and the expansion of the Westridge Marine Terminal. The 5 chemical emissions from the additional tanks to be installed at the tank terminals included the 6 fugitive emissions associated with the working and standing losses from the additional storage 7 tanks. The fugitive emissions consisted principally of lighter-end, volatile and semi-volatile 8 hydrocarbons (C1 to C12), including both aliphatic and aromatic constituents. The latter 9 constituents included BTEX, as well as lighter-end PAHs. Trace amounts of sulphur-containing 10 compounds made up the remainder of the chemical emissions associated with the tank 11 terminals. The chemical emissions associated with the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion 12 included combustion-type emissions from the VCU, and from the boilers and engines of the 13 Project-related marine vessels while docked at the Westridge Marine Terminal. In addition, the 14 expanded terminal will be a source of uncontrolled vapours, including the uncombusted vapours 15 from the VCU and non-recovered vapours from the VRUs during loading operations. The 16 chemical emissions inventory for the expanded Westridge Marine Terminal consisted of more 17 than 100 chemicals, including criteria air contaminants (CACs), metals and metalloids, 18 petroleum hydrocarbon (PHC) compounds, PAHs, sulphur-containing compounds, and VOCs.

19 Examination of the findings revealed that, despite the conservative assumptions employed, the 20 maximum predicted short-term (or acute) and long-term (or chronic) health risks for the COPC 21 emitted from the tanks at the Edmonton, Sumas, and Burnaby terminals (acting singly or in 22 combination) were below the applicable benchmark (or target risk estimate) under each of the 23 assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative Case), signifying that 24 adverse health effects would not be expected among people exposed to the COPC emitted from 25 the Edmonton, Sumas, and Burnaby terminals. Elevated health risks were predicted in the 26 SLHHRA for certain COPC associated with the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion (acting 27 either singly or in combination). To better understand the potential health risks associated with 28 the expanded Westridge Marine Terminal, the detailed HHRA for the Westridge Marine 29 Terminal was completed.

30 With few exceptions, the detailed HHRA revealed that the maximum predicted acute and 31 chronic health risks for the COPC emitted from the expanded Westridge Marine Terminal were 32 below the applicable benchmarks (or target risk estimates). The exceptions pertained to the 33 predicted health risks for the respiratory irritants mixture at the MPOI on a short-term basis only. 34 Exceedances for the respiratory irritants mixture were determined to be few in number, low in 35 frequency, and modest in magnitude. Interpretation of the predicted exceedances took the 36 following evidence into consideration:

37 · the highly localized nature of the exceedances (i.e., MPOI only), within an area 38 where public access would be limited;

39 · the low likelihood of an exceedance occurring (i.e., less than 1% of the time);

40 · the assumption that the peak predicted hourly concentration of each of the 41 respiratory irritants would occur simultaneously;

42 · the peak (1st highest) predicted hourly concentrations for each of the 43 respiratory irritants at the MPOI are considerably lower than the levels at which 44 responses have been observed in most individuals;

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1 · the assumption of additivity in the assessment of the respiratory irritants 2 mixture, particularly the effects of nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and SO2 at the peak 3 predicted hourly concentrations, is likely conservative; and,

4 · any health effects that might be experienced by people at the MPOI would 5 likely be mild and transient in nature.

6 Further, the incremental change in predicted health risks for the respiratory irritants mixture 7 associated with the Project will have very little, if any, effect on the Base Case health risks for 8 respiratory irritants mixture in the Burrard Inlet area. Detailed discussions of the potential health 9 risks associated with exposure to NO2, SO2, and the respiratory irritants mixture are provided 10 below in Sections 45.1.1.5, 45.1.1.7, and 45.1.1.9 of this evidence, respectively.

11 The SLHHRA of marine transportation was aimed at identifying and understanding the potential 12 human health risks associated with short-term and long-term exposures to the COPC emitted 13 from Project-related marine vessel traffic, including tankers and tugs. The chemical emissions 14 from the Project-related marine vessel traffic included combustion-type emissions from the 15 engines, as well as fugitive emissions from the tanker holds of the outbound laden tankers. The 16 chemical emissions inventory for the Project-related marine vessel traffic consisted of more than 17 100 chemicals, including CACs, metals and metalloids, PHCs, PAHs, sulphur-containing 18 compounds, and VOCs. The SLHHRA evaluated the potential health risks along the marine 19 shipping route for the Project-related marine vessel traffic, which extends from the Westridge 20 Marine Terminal in Burnaby, through Burrard Inlet, south through the southern part of the Strait 21 of Georgia, the Gulf Islands and Haro Strait, then westward past Victoria and through the Juan 22 de Fuca Strait out to the 12 nautical mile limit of Canada’s territorial sea. For the purposes of the 23 SLHHRA, the shipping lanes were divided into four distinct regions on the basis of marine use 24 patterns, population density and population characteristics:

25 · Region 1: Burrard Inlet – west from the marine area around the Westridge Marine Terminal 26 to the entrance to Vancouver’s Outer Harbour.

27 · Region 2: Strait of Georgia – southwest from the entrance to Vancouver Outer Harbour in 28 the Strait of Georgia to (near East Point on Saturna Island).

29 · Region 3: Boundary Passage and Haro Strait – south from Boundary Pass through Haro 30 Strait, past Turn Point on Stuart Island and continuing past Victoria to the Victoria Pilot 31 Boarding Station.

32 · Region 4: Juan de Fuca Strait – southwest from the Pilot Boarding Station at Brotchie Ledge 33 near Victoria, then west through the Juan de Fuca Strait, with the western boundary being 34 the 12 nautical mile limit northwest of Cape Flattery, Washington.

35 The results of the SLHHRA revealed that for the regions outside Burrard Inlet (i.e., Regions 2, 3, 36 and 4), despite the conservative assumptions employed, the maximum predicted acute and 37 chronic health risks for the COPC emitted by the Project-related marine vessel traffic (acting 38 singly or in combination) were below the applicable benchmarks (or target risk estimates), 39 signifying that adverse health effects would not be expected among people exposed to the 40 COPC associated with the Project-related marine vessel traffic within any of these three 41 regions. For Burrard Inlet (i.e., Region 1), the results of the SLHHRA revealed elevated health 42 risks for certain of the COPC (acting singly or in combination). To better understand the

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1 potential health risks, the detailed HHRA of marine transportation was completed for the Burrard 2 Inlet area.

3 The detailed HHRA revealed that the maximum predicted acute and chronic health risks for the 4 COPC emitted from the Project-related marine vessel traffic were below the applicable 5 benchmarks (or target risk estimates), with the exceptions of acute health risks predicted for 6 NO2 and the respiratory irritants mixture. Exceedances for both NO2 and the respiratory irritants 7 mixture were determined to be few in number, low in frequency, and modest in magnitude. 8 Interpretation of the predicted NO2 exceedances took the following evidence into consideration:

9 · the highly localized nature of the exceedances (i.e., MPOI only), within an area 10 where public access would be limited;

11 · the low likelihood of an exceedance occurring (i.e., less than 1% of the time);

st 12 · the peak (1 highest) predicted hourly concentration for NO2 at the MPOI 13 (i.e., 260 µg/m³) is considerably lower than the levels at which responses have 14 been observed in most individuals, including asthmatics (i.e., 1,100 µg/m³; 15 Goodman et al. 2009); and

16 · any health effects that might be experienced by people at the MPOI would 17 likely be mild and transient in nature.

18 Further, the incremental change in potential health risks associated with the NO2 emissions from 19 the Project-related marine vessel traffic will have very little, if any, effect on the Base Case 20 health risks associated with short-term exposure to NO2 in the Burrard Inlet area. Detailed 21 discussion of the potential health risks associated with exposure to NO2 is provided below in 22 Section 45.1.1.5.

23 For the respiratory irritants mixture, exceedances were predicted at the MPOIs over water and 24 land, as well as within a Squamish First Nation community (i.e., Capilano 5) and the District of 25 North Vancouver. Interpretation of the predicted exceedances took the following evidence into 26 consideration:

27 · the localized nature of the exceedances;

28 · the low likelihood of the exceedances occurring within the communities 29 (i.e., 0.01% of the time), albeit at the MPOI, the exceedances were predicted to 30 be more frequent (i.e., less than 4% of the time);

31 · the assumption that the peak predicted hourly concentration of each of the 32 respiratory irritants would occur simultaneously;

33 · the peak (1st highest) predicted hourly concentrations for each of the 34 respiratory irritants at the MPOI are considerably lower than the levels at which 35 responses have been observed in most individuals;

36 · the assumption of additivity in the assessment of respiratory irritants mixture, 37 particularly the effects of NO2 and SO2 at the peak predicted hourly 38 concentrations, is likely conservative; and

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1 · any health effects that might be experienced by people at the MPOI would 2 likely be mild and transient in nature.

3 Moreover, the incremental change in potential health risks associated with the Project-related 4 marine vessel traffic will have very little, if any, effect on the Base Case health risks associated 5 with short-term exposure to NO2 in the Burrard Inlet area. Detailed discussions of the potential 6 health risks associated with exposure to NO2, SO2, and the respiratory irritants mixture are 7 provided below in Sections 45.1.1.5, 45.1.1.7, and 45.1.1.9, respectively.

8 The overall findings of the HHRAs for the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic 9 demonstrate that the likelihood of adverse health effects is low. The major findings of the 10 HHRAs were:

11 · The contribution of the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic to the cumulative 12 exposures was negligible to low. In the majority of instances, the potential health risks 13 remained unchanged between the assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, 14 and Cumulative Case), signifying that the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic 15 will have very little, if any, effect on the Base Case health risks.

16 · With very few exceptions, the predicted acute health risks for the COPC emitted from the 17 Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic were below the applicable benchmarks (or 18 target risk estimates), indicating that adverse health effects would not be expected.

19 - In all cases, the maximum predicted acute health risks for the chemicals emitted from 20 the Edmonton, Sumas, and Burnaby terminals (acting either singly or in combination) 21 were below the applicable benchmarks (or target risk estimates), indicating that adverse 22 health effects would not be expected.

23 - In all cases, the maximum predicted acute health risks for the chemicals emitted from 24 the Project-related marine vessel traffic along the marine shipping route outside Burrard 25 Inlet (acting either singly or in combination) were below the applicable benchmarks (or 26 target risk estimates), indicating that adverse health effects would not be expected.

27 - With the exception of the predicted health risks for the respiratory irritants mixture, the 28 maximum predicted acute health risks for the chemicals emitted from the Westridge 29 Marine Terminal (acting either singly or in combination) were below the applicable 30 benchmarks (or target risk estimates), indicating that adverse health effects would not be 31 expected. Exceedances were predicted at the MPOI for the respiratory irritants mixture 32 under each of the assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative 33 Case). No exceedances were predicted at any of the discrete (or fixed) locations 34 corresponding to actual households, schools, assisted-living complexes, communities, 35 parks, and recreation areas found within the LSA. The exceedances for the respiratory 36 irritants mixture were determined to be few in number, low in frequency, and modest in 37 magnitude. Further examination of the predicted exceedances indicates that the health 38 risks are considered low, and that adverse health effects would not be anticipated.

39 - With few exceptions, the maximum predicted acute health risks for the chemicals 40 emitted from the Project-related marine vessel traffic along the marine shipping route 41 within Burrard Inlet (acting either singly or in combination) were below the applicable 42 benchmarks (or target risk estimates), indicating that adverse health effects would not be

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1 expected. Exceedances were predicted for NO2 and the respiratory irritants mixture 2 under each of the assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative 3 Case). The NO2 exceedances were determined to be very few in number, low in 4 frequency, and modest in magnitude. For the respiratory irritants mixture, the 5 exceedances were determined to be very few in number, very low in frequency, and 6 modest in magnitude within the communities; albeit, at the MPOI, the exceedances were 7 determined to be more frequent. Further examination of the predicted exceedances 8 indicates that the health risks are considered low, and that adverse health effects are not 9 predicted to occur.

10 · In all cases, the predicted chronic health risks associated with exposure to the COPC via 11 inhalation and the various secondary pathways of exposure (i.e., inhalation of dust, food 12 ingestion, and dermal contact) were below the benchmark (or target risk estimate) for the 13 non-carcinogenic chemicals emitted from the Project and Project-related marine vessel 14 traffic, indicating that adverse health effects would not be expected.

15 · In all cases, the predicted cancer risks associated with the Project and Project-related 16 marine vessel traffic were predicted to be less than 1 in 100,000 (i.e., less than one extra 17 cancer case in a population of 100,000 people), indicating that the incremental cancer risks 18 from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic are deemed to be “essentially 19 negligible.”

45.1.1 Human Health Effects Associated with Emissions to Air 20 45.1.1.1 1,3-Butadiene 21 Concern was expressed by BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H6), City 22 of Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7V8 and A4L7K9), and NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L5V1 and A4L9R1) 23 over the potential human health effects associated with short-term and long-term exposure to 24 1,3-butadiene emitted from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic. As part of its 25 evidence, BROKE and NS NOPE included a report entitled “Major Human Health Impacts of the 26 Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion” prepared by T. Takaro et al., which 27 expressed concern over the potential health effects associated with short-term and long-term 28 exposure to 1,3-butadiene on an individual basis and as part of a mixture, particularly as part of 29 a leukemogens mixture with benzene. A report prepared by J. Edmonds entitled “What are the 30 Health Effects of Pipelines and Oil Spills” also was included as part NS NOPE’s evidence. Ms. 31 Edmond’s report contains a general statement regarding the potential cancer risks associated 32 with long-term exposure to the chemicals, notably 1,3-butadiene, emitted from the Westridge 33 Marine Terminal.

34 As part of its evidence, the City of Burnaby and City of Vancouver included a report prepared by 35 Fraser Health and Vancouver Coastal Health entitled “Guidance to Metro Vancouver and Fraser 36 Valley Municipalities to Assist in Reviewing the Trans Mountain Pipeline Project from a Public 37 Health Perspective.” The City of Vancouver expressed concern in its written evidence that 1,3- 38 butadiene was omitted as a COPC from the HHRAs, citing a statement taken from the report 39 prepared by Fraser Health and Vancouver Coastal Health. The Fraser Health and Vancouver 40 Coastal Health report was submitted previously as an attachment to FVRD IR No. 2.01. A 41 complete response to the report was presented in Trans Mountain’s response to FVRD IR No. 42 2.01 (Filing ID A4H8R9).

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1 The concern regarding the potential health effects associated with exposure to 1,3-butadiene 2 emitted from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic on an individual basis is 3 addressed here, while the concern over 1,3-butadiene acting as part of a leukemogenic mixture 4 is addressed in Section 45.1.1.10.

5 As discussed in Trans Mountain’s response to FVRD IR No. 2.01 (Filing ID A4H8R9), the 6 association between Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic emissions and 1,3- 7 butadiene remains uncertain. 1,3-Butadiene was not identified in the air emissions inventories 8 for the Project or Project-related marine vessel traffic because:

9 · 1,3-Butadiene was not detected in either the bulk liquid analysis of CLWB (Filing ID 10 A3S4W9), nor the vapours above CLWB (Filing ID A3Y2D4), which served as the basis for 11 the fugitive or uncontrolled emissions inventory for the Project and Project-related marine 12 vessel traffic; and

13 · 1,3-Butadiene was not listed on Environment Canada’s National Marine Emissions Inventory 14 for Canada (SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. 2012), which served as the basis of the air emissions 15 inventory for the Project-related marine vessel engines.

16 Although a number of authorities such as the California Air Resources Board (CARB), the 17 International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), and the U.S. EPA have associated 1,3- 18 butadiene with diesel exhaust (CARB 2006; IARC 2014; U.S. EPA 2002a,b; U.S. EPA 2009), 19 the association appears to relate to emissions from land-based diesel engines, and not marine 20 diesel engines (Genesis Engineering Ltd. [Genesis] and Levelton Engineering Ltd. [Levelton] 21 2003).

22 Despite the above, the potential health risks for 1,3-butadiene were presented and described in 23 response to FVRD IR No. 2.01 (Filing ID A4H8R9), and NS NOPE and BROKE IR No. 2.4a 24 (Filing ID A4H8W0). For the purposes of the screening-level exercise, people were assumed to 25 be found on both a short-term and long-term basis at the locations within Burrard Inlet 26 corresponding to the MPOI. As previously discussed, the MPOI refers to the location at which 27 the highest air concentration of 1,3-butadiene would be expected to occur, and at which the 28 exposures received by the people within the Burrard Inlet would be greatest. Use of the MPOI 29 location ensures that any potential health effects that could result from exposure to the 30 1,3-butadiene emissions associated with the Project-related marine vessel traffic would not be 31 underestimated, regardless of where people might be exposed.

32 Reliance was placed on air dispersion modelling performed by RWDI and described in Marine 33 Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Technical Report – Supplemental No. 2 (Filing IDs A4F5H7, 34 A4F5H8, A4F5H9, A4F5I0, A4F5I1, and A4F5I2). Maximum predicted 1,3-butadiene air 35 concentrations were derived by RWDI from the maximum predicted air concentrations of total 36 VOC using a speciation factor of 0.002 for land-based diesel engines (Genesis and Levelton 37 2003). Maximum predicted air concentrations were provided for different averaging periods (i.e., 38 24-hour and annual) to allow for the assessment of both acute and chronic health risks. 39 Consistent with the previous assessments, maximum predicted air concentrations were 40 provided for the three assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative 41 Case), as well as for the potential increase in marine vessel traffic associated with the Project 42 (i.e., Project).

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1 On a short-term basis, peak (1st highest) predicted 24-hour air concentrations for the three 2 assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative Case) were compared 3 with the acute (24-hour) exposure limit or Reference Concentration (RfC) of 15 µg/m³, which 4 was developed by the U.S. EPA (2002a) for the protection of the human population (including 5 sensitive individuals) against the potential reproductive and developmental effects associated 6 with short-term inhalation of 1,3-butadiene.10 Chronic health risks were assessed by comparing 7 the maximum predicted annual air concentrations for the three assessment cases (i.e., Base 8 Case, Application Case, and Cumulative Case) to the U.S. EPA’s chronic RfC of 2 µg/m³ for the 9 potential reproductive and developmental effects associated with long-term inhalation of 10 1,3-butadiene (U.S. EPA 2002a). The potential cancer risks, specifically the risk of developing 11 leukemia, also were assessed. The incremental lifetime cancer risks for 1,3-butadiene were 12 determined by comparing the maximum incremental increase in predicted annual average air 13 concentrations associated with the Project-related marine vessel traffic against the U.S. EPA’s 14 Risk-specific Concentration (RsC) of 0.3 µg/m³.11 Complete details surrounding the manner by 15 which the assessment was performed, the results that emerged, and the conclusions that were 16 reached were presented in the response to FVRD IR No. 2.01 (Filing ID A4H8R9) and NS 17 NOPE and BROKE IR No. 2.4a (Filing ID A4H8W0).

18 Overall, the weight-of-evidence indicates a low risk of adverse health effects associated with 19 short-term and long-term exposure to 1,3-butadiene in the Burrard Inlet area. The weight-of- 20 evidence includes:

21 · In all cases, the maximum predicted short-term and long-term exposures to 1,3-butadiene 22 were below the corresponding exposure limits, indicating that adverse health effects would 23 not be anticipated.

24 · In all instances, cancer risks for 1,3-butadiene were predicted to be less than 1 in 100,000 25 (i.e., less than one extra cancer case in a population of 100,000 people), indicating that the 26 incremental cancer risks from the Project-related increase in marine vessel traffic are 27 deemed to be “essentially negligible.”

28 Moreover, the contribution from the Project-related marine vessel traffic to the cumulative 29 1,3-butadiene exposures was negligible. In all instances, the potential health risks remained 30 unchanged between the Base Case and Application Case, signifying that the Project-related 31 marine vessel traffic will have very little, if any, effect on the Base Case health risks associated 32 with 1,3-butadiene exposure.

33 45.1.1.2 Benzene 34 As discussed earlier, BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5) and NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L9R1) submitted a 35 report prepared by T. Takaro et al. Consistent with the 1,3-butadiene-related concern addressed 36 above, the report expressed concern over the potential human health effects associated with 37 short-term and long-term exposure to benzene on an individual basis and as part of a mixture, 38 particularly as part of a leukemogens mixture with 1,3-butadiene. The report prepared by 39 J. Edmonds for NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L5V1) also contained a general statement regarding the

10 RfC refers to level of an airborne chemical at which adverse health effects would not be expected. It is expressed as a concentration of the chemical in air (i.e., µg/m³) and applies only to threshold chemicals. 11 RsC refers to the level of an airborne carcinogen that results in a regulatory acceptable incremental increase in cancer (typically 1 in 100,000). It is expressed as a concentration of the chemical in air (i.e., µg/m³) and applies only to carcinogens.

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1 potential cancer risks associated with long-term exposure to the chemicals, notably benzene, 2 emitted from the Westridge Marine Terminal. Again, concern regarding 1,3-butadiene and 3 benzene acting in combination as leukemogens is addressed in Section 45.1.1.10.

4 In addition to BROKE and NS NOPE, Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0) submitted, as 5 part of its evidence, a report entitled “Review of Kinder Morgan Pipeline Expansion Project 6 Application – Human Health Impact Assessment: Expert Report” prepared by Dr. S. Batterman, 7 which expressed concern that the maximum predicted ground-level air concentrations of 8 benzene in Burrard Inlet area would exceed Alberta’s one-hour Ambient Air Quality Objective 9 (AAQO) of 30 µg/m³ for benzene. Similar concern was expressed in Metro Vancouver’s written 10 evidence (Filing ID A4L7Y3) and in Health Canada’s letter of comment (Filing ID A4S0Z6), with 11 the exception that Health Canada’s concern related specifically to the Edmonton Terminal.

12 Benzene was identified in the air emissions inventories for the additional tanks to be installed at 13 the Edmonton, Sumas and Burnaby terminals, the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion and 14 the Project-related marine vessel traffic. It was on this basis that benzene was identified as a 15 COPC in each of the aforementioned HHRAs and assessed on both a short-term and long-term 16 basis. On a short-term basis, the potential acute health risks associated with benzene were 17 evaluated through the comparison of the predicted peak (1st highest) hourly ground-level 18 concentrations for the three assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and 19 Cumulative Case) against the acute health-based exposure limit or Reference Value (ReV) of 20 580 µg/m³ developed by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) for benzene 21 based on a study by Rozen et al. (1984) in which mild hematologically-mediated immunological 22 effects of questionable clinical relevance were observed among male mice (known to be 23 especially sensitive to benzene exposure) following exposure to benzene vapours at a 24 concentration of approximately 31,000 µg/m³ for 6 hours per day for 6 days (TCEQ 2007). After 25 adjusting this concentration to an equivalent one-hour human dose and applying uncertainty 26 factors to allow, in part, for the possible greater sensitivity of humans to benzene compared to 27 mice, the TCEQ arrived at its acute ReV of 580 µg/m³. By virtue of the manner in which it was 28 derived, the ReV confers a very high degree of protection. It should be noted that Alberta’s one- 29 hour AAQO for benzene of 30 µg/m³ was not selected for use in the HHRAs as it does not 30 satisfy the pre-defined criteria outlined in Section 3.2.3 (Toxicity Assessment) of the HHRAs for 31 the selection of exposure limits; specifically, the requirement for adequate supporting 32 documentation. As a result, Trans Mountain was unable to comment on the scientific merit of 33 this limit, and can make no assertions as to the adequacy of the study upon which it may be 34 based. Nonetheless, Trans Mountain has committed to meeting the lowest applicable AAQO 35 established in BC or Alberta at each terminal, including Alberta’s one-hour AAQO for benzene. 36 As noted in the response to NEB IR No. 3.019 (Filing ID A4H1V1), Trans Mountain is in the 37 process of evolving and refining the vapour control designs of its terminals with the goal of 38 ensuring sufficient recovery and destruction efficiencies to meet these objectives.

39 On a long-term basis, the potential chronic health risks associated with benzene were assessed 40 on both a non-carcinogenic and carcinogenic basis. The potential chronic health risks 41 associated with benzene were evaluated by comparing the maximum predicted annual air 42 concentrations for the three assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and 43 Cumulative Case) to the chronic exposure limit or Minimal Risk Level (MRL) of 9.8 µg/m³ 44 established by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) based on a 45 cross-sectional human study by Lan et al. (2004) involving 250 benzene-exposed workers at 46 two shoe manufacturing factories in China (ATSDR 2007). Adverse effects on platelets and

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1 certain white blood cell parameters were reported in workers exposed to less than 1 part-per- 2 million (ppm) of benzene (<3,200 μg/m³). After benchmark dose modelling was completed and a 3 point of departure of 0.1 ppm (320 μg/m³) of benzene was identified, the ATSDR adjusted the 4 occupational exposure of eight hours per day, five days per week to a continuous exposure that 5 might be received by the public. Finally, the ATSDR applied an uncertainty factor to account for 6 the possible greater sensitivity of individuals in the general public, such as infants and children, 7 relative to workers. The potential cancer risks associated with long-term exposure to benzene 8 were determined by comparing the maximum incremental increase in predicted annual average 9 air concentrations associated with the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic against 10 the U.S. EPA’s RsC of 1.3 µg/m³ based studies by Rinsky et al. (1987, 1981) in which the 11 incidence of leukemia was examined in exposed male workers in the rubber hydrochloride 12 department of a pliofilm plant (U.S. EPA 2000). Inhalation unit risks of were extrapolated by the 13 U.S. EPA based on a low-dose linear model using maximum likelihood estimates for leukemia in 14 humans. Further details regarding the development of the health-based exposure limits for 15 benzene and the rationale for their selection can be found in Section 14.0 of Appendix C of the 16 Screening-Level Human Health Risk Assessment of Pipeline and Facilities Technical Report.

17 The findings of the HHRAs indicate that adverse health effects from short-term and long-term 18 exposure to benzene are not anticipated as a result of the Project or the Project-related marine 19 vessel traffic. In all cases, the potential health risks associated with short-term and long-term 20 inhalation of benzene were below the benchmark (or target risk estimate) of 1.0, indicating that 21 the predicted peak hourly and annual average air concentrations of benzene were below the 22 corresponding exposure limits. Similarly, incremental lifetime cancer risks associated with the 23 Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic were predicted to be less than 1 in 100,000 24 (i.e., less than one extra cancer case in a population of 100,000 people). This indicates that the 25 incremental cancer risks from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic are deemed 26 to be “essentially negligible.”

27 Recognizing that chemical exposures rarely occur in isolation, the potential health risks 28 associated with benzene were combined with the other COPC emitted from the Project and 29 Project-related marine vessel traffic which act through a common or similar toxicological 30 mechanism and/or affect the same target tissues and/or organs in the body (i.e., share 31 commonality in effect). The critical endpoints of the acute and chronic exposure limits used in 32 the HHRAs provided the basis for an individual chemical’s inclusion in a chemical mixture. For 33 example, the acute inhalation exposure limit for benzene is based on its ability to cause 34 immunological effects; therefore, benzene was included in the acute immunotoxicants mixtures. 35 On a chronic basis, benzene was included in both the immunotoxicants and hematotoxicants 36 mixtures. The constituents of the chemical mixtures are listed in Table 3.13 of the HHRAs. The 37 potential health risks for each of the mixtures was predicted to be below the benchmark (or 38 target risk estimate) of 1.0, indicating that adverse health effects from short-term and long-term 39 exposure to the immunotoxicants and hematotoxicants mixtures, of which benzene is a 40 constituent, would not be anticipated.

41 Overall, the absence of adverse health effects associated with the Project and Project-related 42 marine vessel traffic applied whether benzene was assessed on an individual basis or as part of 43 a mixture.

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1 45.1.1.3 Diesel Particulate Matter 2 The City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H6), City of Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7V8 and A4L7K9), 3 FVRD (Filing ID A4L8W6), Metro Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7Y3) and Miller B (Filing ID A4L8L6) 4 expressed concern regarding the potential health risks associated with exposure to DPM 5 emitted from the Westridge Marine Terminal and Project-related marine vessel traffic. Particular 6 concern was expressed by FVRD, Metro Vancouver and B. Miller regarding the potential cancer 7 risks.

8 As part of its evidence, the City of Burnaby and the City of Vancouver included a report 9 prepared by Fraser Health and Vancouver Coastal Health entitled “Guidance to Metro 10 Vancouver and Fraser Valley Municipalities to Assist in Reviewing the Trans Mountain Pipeline 11 Project from a Public Health Perspective.” The City of Vancouver expressed concern in its 12 written evidence that DPM was omitted as a COPC from the HHRAs, citing a statement taken 13 from the report prepared by Fraser Health and Vancouver Coastal Health. The Fraser Health 14 and Vancouver Coastal Health report was submitted previously as an attachment to FVRD IR 15 No. 2.01. A complete response to the report was presented in Trans Mountain’s response to 16 FVRD IR No. 2.01 (Filing ID A4H8R9).

17 In its written evidence (Filing ID A4L7Y3), Metro Vancouver stated the following with respect to 18 the risks associated with DPM:

19 “Metro Vancouver requests that the NEB reject Trans Mountain’s flawed analysis 20 and conclusions regarding DPM cancer risk presented in both the Responses to 21 Lower Fraser Valley Air Quality Coordinating Committee Informal Information 22 Requests and Response to Fraser Valley Regional District IR No. 2. The only 23 way to credibly assess cancer risks associated with Project-related DPM is to use 24 maximum over-land DPM concentrations from Marine Air Quality dispersion 25 modeling, together with the OEHHA cancer unit risk for DPM. As demonstrated 26 above, DPM cancer risks associated with the Project exceed Health Canada 27 screening thresholds, so it is vital that further dispersion modeling and associated 28 human health risk assessment be performed to clarify the validity of the 29 assumptions underpinning the existing analyses.” [Section 3.10.2, page 48, 1st 30 paragraph]

31 Metro Vancouver supports its position by suggesting that:

32 1. Based on the results of two toxic air pollutant risk assessments prepared for the Lower 33 Fraser Valley (i.e., Exhibits 17 and 18 in the Metro Vancouver submission [Filing IDs 34 A4L8A3 and A4L8A4, respectively]), Trans Mountain inaccurately characterized the 35 “evidence supporting DPM cancer risks, and the relative level of DPM health risks posed 36 by the Project” [Section 3.10, page 44, 3rd paragraph];

37 2. In its assessment of the DPM-related health risks, Trans Mountain “dismissed” the 38 California Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) cancer unit risk 39 value for DPM;

40 3. An appropriate way to assess the DPM-related health risks would be to adopt a 41 conservative risk assessment approach by applying the OEHHA unit risk value for lung 42 cancer;

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1 4. Trans Mountain inappropriately characterized the cancer risks by using DPM 2 concentrations averaged over the air quality local study area to present a “population- 3 level risk”;

4 5. Existing background DPM levels in the areas surrounding Burrard Inlet result in 5 background DPM cancer risks that are well in excess of Health Canada’s 1 in 100,000 6 (equivalent to 10 per million) screening level (i.e., 372 per million) [Section 3.10.1, 7 page 47]; and,

8 6. The incremental emissions associated with the Application Case result in maximum 9 DPM concentrations and associated cancer risks that exceed the 10 per million 10 screening level by a considerable margin.

11 In their submission, FVRD states that:

12 “The information provided by Trans Mountain suggests that under the project 13 case, excess cancer cases due to diesel particulate matter could be 630 per 14 1,000,000 people over a lifetime of exposure, which is more the [sic] sixty times 15 higher the [sic] Health Canada threshold. It is acknowledged that this value 16 includes previous base case or background levels, which would be above the 10 17 in 1,000,000 threshold as well. However, the situation underscores that the 18 existing risk posed by diesel emissions in the Lower Fraser Valley is 19 unacceptably high, and that any increase in diesel emissions, including from the 20 proposed TMEP, must be mitigated to avoid increasing the health risk for 21 developing cancer.” [Section 23 of Rebecca Abernathy Affidavit]

22 This statement is similar to the argument made by Metro Vancouver with respect to the 23 calculated DPM-related excess cancer risks (see point 5 above).

24 Each of the concerns raised by Metro Vancouver and FVRD is addressed in Trans Mountain’s 25 response below. In doing so, Trans Mountain will provide evidence that its assessment of the 26 potential health risks associated with DPM in the area remains appropriate and that the 27 conclusions with respect to the Project-related cancer risks remain valid.

28 Trans Mountain provided a comprehensive assessment of the potential carcinogenicity of DPM 29 in its response to FVRD IR No. 2.12 (Filing ID A4H8S0). This response described how the 30 weight-of-evidence currently does not support the use of a cancer-based exposure limit for 31 assessing the health risks associated with DPM. However, in order to explicitly address FVRD’s 32 concern, the response to FVRD IR No. 2.12 presented the cancer risks using the same OEHHA 33 unit risk value that was used to characterize the DPM cancer risks in Exhibits 17 and 18 of the 34 Metro Vancouver submission (Filing ID A4L8A3 and Filing ID A4L8A4, respectively).

35 Trans Mountain fully recognizes that there is general consensus among regulatory agencies 36 that diesel exhaust, including DPM, is carcinogenic (IARC 2014, National Toxicology Program 37 2014, OEHHA 2001). However, considerable uncertainty exists with respect to the actual dose- 38 response relationship of DPM, thereby limiting regulators’ ability to develop a proper cancer- 39 based exposure limit (U.S. EPA 2009). In light of this uncertainty, neither Health Canada nor the 40 U.S. EPA has developed a cancer-based exposure limit (or unit risk value) for DPM. In Section 41 3.10.1 of its evidence (Filing ID A4L7Y3), Metro Vancouver contends that “an appropriately 42 conservative risk assessment approach would be to use the OEHHA’s cancer unit risk in the 43 Trans Mountain assessment, while acknowledging the inherent uncertainty raised by the

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1 US EPA and others.” The fact is that Trans Mountain used the OEHHA cancer unit risk in its 2 assessment of DPM and in doing so described in detail the “inherent uncertainty raised by the 3 US EPA” in its response to FVRD IR No. 2.12. Trans Mountain maintains that the low 4 confidence of the OEHHA cancer unit risk essentially limits its usefulness when attempting to 5 assess the potential risks to health associated with DPM exposure.

6 The basis of the OEHHA cancer unit risk is a retrospective case-control investigation published 7 in a series of papers from a research team that evaluated diesel particulate exposure and lung 8 cancer mortality in railway workers during the 1980s (Garshick et al. 1987, 1988; Woskie et al. 9 1988a,b). However, the U.S. EPA argues that use of a cancer-based exposure limit is not 10 supported by the current state of science. The key factors that substantiate the U.S. EPA 11 conclusion were described in detail in Trans Mountain’s response to FVRD IR No. 2.12.

12 The U.S. EPA’s (2009) Integrated Science Assessment document for PM includes a 13 comprehensive review of the epidemiological literature on DPM that was available at the time of 14 their assessment. The U.S. EPA (2009) acknowledged that there is considerable evidence from 15 human and animal studies that strongly supports classification of DPM as a carcinogen, but 16 concluded that a confident dose-response relationship (and corresponding cancer-based 17 exposure limit) could not be established due to the existing data gaps and uncertainties. The 18 sources of uncertainty highlighted by the U.S. EPA also were described in Trans Mountain’s 19 response to FVRD IR No. 2.12. For ease of reference, the sources of uncertainty identified by 20 the U.S. EPA are restated here:

21 · absence of DPM exposure data for workers in the available occupational 22 studies;

23 · absence of DPM exposure data for controls in the available occupational 24 studies owing to the presence of diesel engine exhaust in ambient air for 25 controls in a non-occupational setting;

26 · possible confounders such as smoking or asbestos exposure that could 27 contribute to cancer risks observed in the occupational studies;

28 · the representativeness of occupational workers for the general population, 29 including sensitive subpopulations;

30 · use of supporting animal data from rats with lung tumor responses to direct 31 inhalation exposure given that the mode of action in high exposure rat 32 responses is not suitable for human dose response analysis at environmental 33 levels of exposure; and,

34 · use of health effects data that were derived from engine technologies and fuels 35 that existed in the past and may no longer be representative of health effects 36 from DPM emissions of modern engines and fuel.

37 Contrary to Metro Vancouver’s assertion, Trans Mountain did not inaccurately characterize the 38 evidence supporting DPM cancer risks. In fact, Trans Mountain’s position with respect to the 39 use of a cancer-based exposure limit is well supported by the U.S. EPA. Further support of this 40 position can be found in Health Canada’s letter of comment (Filing ID A4S0Z6), which states 41 that “there is much uncertainty about the unit risk factor for DPM, therefore, the calculated ILCR

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1 should be interpreted with much caution.” Metro Vancouver further suggested that Trans 2 Mountain “dismissed” the OEHHA cancer unit risk value for DPM. However, the fact is that 3 Trans Mountain carefully reviewed and weighed the basis of the OEHHA value. Coupled with 4 the rationale provided in the U.S. EPA assessment of DPM, Trans Mountain determined that 5 there was greater certainty in assessing the potential health risks for DPM using the U.S. EPA 6 chronic non-cancer exposure limit. As such, its initial assessment of DPM was based on the 7 U.S. EPA non-cancer inhalation exposure limit of 5 µg/m3 (Filing ID A4F5C9). Trans Mountain’s 8 interpretation of the DPM exposure limits appears to be supported by the 2015 Sonoma 9 Technology “Toxic Air Pollutants Risk Assessment” for Metro Vancouver (Filing ID A4L8A4), 10 which indicated that the dose-response certainty for lifetime excess cancer risk for DPM is low 11 (see Figure 2-2 in Filing ID A4L8A4). The same report further classifies the dose-response 12 certainty for non-cancer risk for DPM as high (see Figure 2-3 in Filing ID A4L8A4).

13 Metro Vancouver argues that Trans Mountain inappropriately characterized cancer risks when it 14 used DPM air concentrations averaged over the air quality LSAs in its response to FVRD IR No. 15 2.12. Metro Vancouver suggests that Trans Mountain’s approach underestimates the risks at 16 certain over-land locations and is “out of step” with the approach used for the rest of the 17 HHRAs. As described in the response to FVRD IR No. 2.12, Trans Mountain elected to use 18 predicted DPM air concentrations averaged over a 5 km radius centred on the Westridge Marine 19 Terminal in order to remain consistent with the approach presented in the Levelton 2007 “Air 20 Toxics Emission Inventory and Health Risk Assessment” (Filing IDs A4L8A3 and A4L8X8). Like 21 the 2015 Sonoma Technology assessment (Filing IDs A4L8A4), the Levelton 2007 report 22 presented single DPM air concentrations and carcinogenic risk estimates for the entire GVRD 23 and FVRD region. As opposed to presenting risks at discrete receptor locations, this allows for a 24 more reasonable estimate of population-level risks.

25 Health Canada and the BC MOE assume that any level of long-term exposure to carcinogenic 26 chemicals is associated with some hypothetical risk of cancer. On this basis, Health Canada 27 and BC MOE have specified an incremental or excess (i.e., over and above background) 28 lifetime cancer risk of 1 in 100,000, which these regulatory health authorities consider 29 acceptable, tolerable or essentially negligible (BC MOE 2009, Health Canada 2010). The 1 in 30 100,000 excess cancer risk level is equivalent to the 10 in 1,000,000 screening level that Metro 31 Vancouver and FVRD refer to in their submissions. Because the assumed acceptable cancer 32 risk level of 1 in 100,000 was specifically developed to address cancer risks over and above 33 background cancer incidence, background exposures typically are not included in the 34 assessment of potential health risks for non-threshold compounds like DPM. In its response to 35 FVRD IR No. 2.12, Trans Mountain calculated an incremental lifetime cancer risk (ILCR) for 36 DPM by comparing the predicted incremental level of exposure associated with the Project- 37 related marine vessel traffic to the OEHHA unit risk value. The calculated ILCR for the Project- 38 related marine vessel traffic was then compared to the acceptable cancer risk level of 1 in 39 100,000. As shown in Table 2.12A-3, in the response to FVRD IR No. 2.12, the predicted 40 Project-related excess cancer risks for the DPM concentrations averaged over the air quality 41 LSA were less than 1 in 100,000 (i.e., 0.8 in 100,000).

42 Trans Mountain does acknowledge that, when using the OEHHA unit risk value for DPM, the 43 calculated excess cancer risks will exceed 1 in 100,000 at certain locations along the shores of 44 the Burrard Inlet. The predicted DPM concentrations for the Project-related marine vessel traffic 45 are shown as a series of contours in Figure 45.1.1. The DPM concentrations are presented for 46 the following concentration ranges (or contours): 0.033 µg/m³ to 0.066 µg/m³; 0.066 µg/m³ to

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1 0.132 µg/m³; and, 0.132 µg/m³ to 0.18 µg/m³. The last concentration range “ends” at 0.18 µg/m³ 2 because this equates to the maximum DPM concentration predicted for the Project-related 3 marine vessel traffic. The concentrations in Figure 45.1.1 are based on the assumptions that all 4 emitted PM2.5 is in the form of DPM and that marine vessels at berth include boilers.

5 The OEHHA provides an inhalation unit risk of 0.0003 per µg/m³ (OEHHA 2001). Based on this, 6 1 µg/m³ of DPM theoretically equates to an excess lung cancer risk of 30 in 100,000. Another 7 way to put this is that a DPM air concentration of 0.033 μg/m³ equates to a lung cancer risk of 1 8 in 100,000, which is the incremental or excess cancer risk level considered negligible by Health 9 Canada and BC MOE. Therefore, the concentration ranges presented in Figure 45.1.1 would 10 equate to Project-related cancer (lung) risk levels of: 1.0 in 100,000 to 2.0 in 100,000; 2.0 in 11 100,000 to 4.0 in 100,000; and, 4.0 in 100,000 to 5.4 in 100,000.

12 These risk estimates should be interpreted with some degree of caution. This is perhaps best 13 illustrated by exploring the estimates of cancer risk presented in the 2007 Levelton and 2015 14 Sonoma Technology reports (i.e., Filing IDs A4L8X8, A4L8A3 and A4L8A3), all of which are 15 based on the OEHHA unit risk value for lung cancer (i.e., 0.0003 per µg/m3). In their 16 submissions to the NEB, both FVRD and Metro Vancouver relied heavily on the Levelton (2007) 17 and Sonoma Technology (2015) reports. In its “Air Toxics Emission Inventory and Health Risk 18 Assessment,” Levelton (2007) estimated a single lung cancer risk of 35 in 100,000 (or 350 in 19 1,000,000) for the Regional District and the FVRD (page 6, Filing 20 IDs A4L8X8 and A4L8A3). In a more recent analysis, Sonoma Technology (2015) calculated a 21 single lung cancer risk of 22.4 in 100,000 (or 224 in 1,000,000) for the entire LFV (page 2-10, 22 Filing ID A4L8A3). In presenting this risk, Sonoma Technology (2015) acknowledges that the 23 “diesel PM risk estimate should be considered highly uncertain as a quantitative value.” These 24 calculated risk estimates suggest that existing DPM concentrations in Metro Vancouver and 25 FVRD may be responsible for 22.4 to 35.0 cases of lung cancer per 100,000 people.

26 However, the cancer risk estimates presented in the Levelton and Sonoma reports are not 27 borne out by the actual number of cases of lung cancer in the LFV. In fact, the lung cancer risk 28 estimates presented by Metro Vancouver and FVRD appear to significantly overstate the actual 29 risk of DPM-related lung cancer in the region.

30

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5450000 5460000 5470000 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 45.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Human Health Risk Assessment Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 In their BC 2011 Regional Cancer Report, the BC Cancer Agency presents the following age- 2 standardized incidence rates of lung cancer per 100,000 for the Fraser Health and Vancouver 3 Coastal Health regions12:

4 · Fraser Health = 46.82 per 100,000

5 · Vancouver Coastal Health = 41.64 per 100,000

6 According to the Canadian Cancer Society13, the primary risk factors for lung cancer, listed in 7 order from most significant to least significant, are:

8 · smoking tobacco;

9 · second-hand smoke;

10 · radon;

11 · asbestos;

12 · outdoor air pollution;

13 · occupational exposure to chemical carcinogens;

14 · personal or family history of lung cancer;

15 · arsenic;

16 · previous lung disease;

17 · exposure to radiation;

18 · indoor burning of coal;

19 · weakened immune system; and

20 · lupus.

21 The risk factor that appears to overwhelm all others is exposure to tobacco smoke. In fact, the 22 BC Lung Association indicates that more than 90% of lung cancers in men and at least 70% in 23 women are directly caused by cigarette smoking14. This is supported by the BC Cancer 24 Agency15, which suggests that “about 85-90% of lung cancer patients are smokers, former 25 smokers or people exposed long-term to second-hand smoke.” Similarly, the Canadian Cancer 26 Society suggests that smoking is related to more than 85% of lung cancer cases in Canada,

12 http://www.bccancer.bc.ca/statistics-and-reports- site/Documents/Section8IncidenceMortalitySurvivalandPrevalencePar%20(2).pdf 13 http://www.cancer.ca/en/cancer-information/cancer-type/lung/risks/?region=on 14 http://www.lung.ca/lung-health/lung-disease/lung-cancer/causes 15 http://www.bccancer.bc.ca/health-info/types-of-cancer/lung/lung

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1 while the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention16 links smoking to about 90% of lung 2 cancers in the United States.

3 Using the Fraser Health statistic as an example, between 39.8 and 42.1 cases of lung cancer 4 per 100,000 are likely due to smoking (i.e., between 85% and 90% of the overall rate of 46.8 per 5 100,000). This suggests that the other risk factors may be responsible for approximately 4.7 to 6 7.0 cases of lung cancer per 100,000 (i.e., 10-15% of the overall rate in the Fraser Health 7 region). However, these numbers are in stark contrast to the cancer risks presented in the 8 Levelton and Sonoma reports. For example, in the Sonoma Technology (2015) report, the risk 9 for lung cancer associated with DPM was presented as 22.4 per 100,000. In its submission, 10 Metro Vancouver uses the OEHHA unit risk value to suggest that existing (“background”) DPM 11 levels in the areas surrounding Burrard Inlet could result in DPM cancer risks that are even 12 higher (i.e., 37.2 per 100,000, see Section 3.10.1, page 47]. When based on the OEHHA unit 13 risk value, the calculated risk estimates would suggest that DPM is the dominant risk factor for 14 lung cancer in the region (i.e., it would erroneously exceed the risks associated with tobacco 15 smoking). In all likelihood, use of the OEHHA unit risk value results in an exaggeration of the 16 actual risks to the DPM-related cancer risks in the region.

17 In response to the concerns raised by FVRD and Metro Vancouver with respect to DPM, Trans 18 Mountain offers that:

19 · It used a scientifically defensible approach for assessing the potential health risks for DPM 20 in both the responses to the LFVAQCC and to FVRD IR No. 2.12.

21 · There is low confidence in the OEHHA unit risk value that FVRD and Metro Vancouver used 22 to characterize the potential carcinogenic risks associated with DPM.

23 · The incremental emissions associated with the Project-related marine vessel traffic will not 24 exceed the 1 in 100,000 screening level by a considerable margin.

25 · The excess lung cancer risks presented in the FVRD and Metro Vancouver submissions are 26 unrealistic estimates of what the actual DPM-related risks are for lung cancer in the region.

27 Finally, Trans Mountain stands by its original conclusion that the Project-related marine vessel 28 traffic is not expected to adversely affect health in the region.

29 45.1.1.4 Lead 30 In its written evidence, the City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7V8) suggests that the potential 31 health effects of long-term inhalation exposure to lead be assessed using information presented 32 in BC Ministry of Environment’s “Technical Guidance on Contaminated Sites: Supplemental 33 Guidance for Risk Assessment” (Filing ID A4L7K7), notably the OEHHA’s inhalation unit risk 34 estimate of 0.000012 per μg/m³ (which equates to an air concentration of 0.8 μg/m³ based on a 35 1 in 100,000 cancer risk level) (Filing ID A4L7K8). This cancer-based exposure limit is based on 36 an oral rat study, where significant incidences of kidney tumors were observed in test animals 37 exposed to lead acetate in their diet. The OEHHA limit was not used in the HHRAs as the 38 weight-of-evidence suggests that other toxicological endpoints such as neurological impairment 39 are more relevant when characterizing the potential health effects for lead. Further details

16 http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/lung/basic_info/risk_factors.htm

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1 regarding the limit’s development were provided in Appendix C of the Screening Level Human 2 Health Risk Assessment Technical Report (Filing ID A3S2L7).

3 As discussed in Trans Mountain’s response to NEB IR No. 3.015b (Filing ID A4H1V2), in spite 4 of lack of a defensible chronic exposure limit, long-term exposure to lead was assessed in the 5 HHRAs using an alternative method of evaluation. As suggested by Wilson and Richardson 6 (2013), toxicokinetic approaches or physiologically based pharmacokinetic (PBPK) models can 7 be used to predict the blood lead level (BLL) of children due to lead exposures from multiple 8 exposure pathways (i.e., air, soil, water and food). PBPK models provide a scientifically sound 9 means to predict the target tissue dose of chemicals in humans who are exposed to 10 environmental levels (ATSDR 2007). The Integrated Exposure Uptake Biokinetic (IEUBK) model 11 for lead in children (U.S. EPA 2010a) was used to predict the incremental changes in BLL 12 associated with the Project. Furthermore, the IEUBK model was assumed to address inhalation 13 exposures because the IEUBK model incorporates both inhalation and oral exposures to lead, 14 and addresses the most sensitive endpoint (i.e., neurological impairment in children). The 15 approach for assessing lead was described in Section 5.3 of the HHRAs.

16 The results of the HHRAs show that the predicted BLLs are lower than the expected 17 background levels in children and that the probability of exceeding the point of ReVs of 1 μg/dL 18 and 2 μg/dL is very low, suggesting that the risk of adverse effects from lead exposures in air, 19 soil and diet due to the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic is also low.

20 45.1.1.5 Nitrogen Dioxide 21 In evidence submitted by Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0) and B. Miller (Filing 22 ID A4L8L6), concern was expressed regarding the potential health effects associated with 23 exposure to routine NO2 emissions from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic. 24 Living Oceans Society also expressed concern over the combined effects of simultaneous 25 exposure to SO2 and NO2 on human health. Section 45.1.1.9 of the reply evidence addresses 26 the concerns regarding the combined effects of SO2 and NO2 acting as potential respiratory 27 irritants, while the concerns specifically regarding NO2 are discussed below.

28 As discussed in the HHRAs, notably the Human Health Risk Assessment of Westridge Marine 29 Terminal Technical Report and Human Health Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation 30 Technical Report, NO2 was identified as a constituent of the combustion-type emissions from 31 the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion and Project-related marine vessels. On this basis, 32 NO2 was examined as a COPC in the aforementioned HHRAs. For the purposes of the HHRAs, 33 reliance was placed on air dispersion modelling performed by RWDI and described in the Air 34 Quality and Greenhouse Gas Marine Transportation Technical Report (Filing IDs A3S1U0, 35 A3S1U1, A3S1U2, A3S1U3, A3S1U4, A3S1U5, A3S1U6, and A3S1U7) and Marine Air Quality 36 and Greenhouse Gas Marine Transportation Technical Report – Supplemental Report (Filing 37 IDs A3Y1G0, A3Y1G1, and A3Y1G2). Subsequent to the filing of the Application, the air 38 dispersion modelling relating to the COPC emissions originating from the Westridge Marine 39 Terminal and marine vessel traffic was updated to reflect the more refined engineering and 40 marine transportation logistics proposed by Trans Mountain. The most noteworthy updates 41 regarding the air dispersion modelling for NO2 were made to:

42 · the VOC flow rate to and collection efficiencies of the VCU;

43 · the fuel type for the main engines of the marine vessel traffic;

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1 · the number of dedicated tug escorts used by laden tankers along the outbound 2 shipping lane and refined marine vessel speeds;

3 · the reasonably foreseeable increase in all non-Project-related marine vessel 4 traffic; and

5 · the anticipated changes in future marine fuel regulations and more stringent 6 NOx emission requirements.

7 Predicted ground-level air concentrations of NO2 were evaluated in the HHRAs in association 8 with different averaging periods (i.e., one-hour and annual) to allow for the assessment of both 9 acute and chronic health risks. On a short-term basis, the potential acute health risks associated 10 with NO2 were evaluated through the comparison of:

st 11 · The peak (1 highest) one-hour ground-level NO2 concentrations against Metro 12 Vancouver’s (2011) one-hour AAQO of 200 µg/m³; and

13 · The three-year average of the 98th percentile (8th highest) of the yearly 14 distribution of one-hour daily maximum NO2 concentrations against the U.S. 15 EPA’s (2010b) one-hour National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) of 16 188 µg/m³, whenever possible.

17 Chronic health risks were evaluated by comparing the maximum predicted annual ground-level 18 air concentrations for NO2 with Metro Vancouver’s (2011) annual AAQO of 40 µg/m³.

19 In the HHRA of Westridge Marine Terminal, although the predicted acute health risks for NO2 20 did not exceed the benchmark of 1.0, the predicted peak and 98th percentile hourly air 21 concentrations of NO2 slightly exceeded the one-hour Metro Vancouver AAQO and the U.S. 22 EPA NAAQS, respectively, under each of the assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application 23 Case, and Cumulative Case). On a chronic basis, the maximum predicted annual average air 24 concentration for NO2 within the LSA for the Westridge Marine Terminal (i.e., 5-km radius of the 25 terminal) was below Metro Vancouver’s (2011) annual AAQO, suggesting that adverse health 26 effects associated with long-term exposure to NO2 are not expected.

27 The high degree of conservatism incorporated in the predicted acute health risks for NO2 must 28 necessarily be respected as part of the interpretation of the findings.

29 · Exceedances were predicted at the MPOI only. The location of the MPOI for the 30 predicted acute health risks for NO2 under the Application Case is shown in 31 Figure 45.1.2. As shown in the figure, the MPOI is predicted to occur within the 32 perimeter of another industrial facility, where public access would be restricted. In other 33 words, it is very unlikely that the general public would ever encounter this peak 34 concentration of NO2 not only because it represents a rare phenomenon (see below), but 35 also it would occur at a location where people would not be expected to be found. No 36 exceedances were predicted at any of the 52 discrete (or fixed) locations corresponding 37 to actual households, schools, assisted-living complexes, communities, parks, and 38 recreation areas found within the LSA, nor were exceedances predicted at any of the 39 other 3,683 gridded locations for which air dispersion modelling was completed within 40 the LSA.

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1 · The incremental contribution of the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic to 2 the NO2 concentrations predicted to occur at the MPOI was negligible, as evidenced by 3 the fact that the predicted peak concentrations of NO2 for the Base and Application 4 cases were 209 µg/m³ and 210 µg/m³, respectively. This suggests that the Project and 5 Project-related marine vessel traffic will have very little, if any, effect on the Base Case 6 health risks for NO2 within the LSA.

7 · In order to assess the likelihood that people might encounter NO2 concentrations 8 exceeding the one-hour Metro Vancouver AAQO at the MPOI, frequency analysis 9 capturing one full year of predicted hourly NO2 concentrations was completed 10 (i.e., 8,760 hours). The analysis revealed that the AAQO for NO2 could be exceeded at 11 the MPOI 0.05% of the time (i.e., 4 hours per year), signalling that the peak or near peak 12 NO2 concentrations would occur only very rarely.

13 · The peak hourly NO2 concentrations predicted to occur at the MPOI are below the 14 concentrations at which adverse health effects have been observed among humans, 15 including asthmatics who are known to show heightened sensitivity to NO2 exposures. In 16 this regard, a meta-analysis of studies involving the controlled short-term exposure of 17 human volunteer subjects, including asthmatics, to graded concentrations of NO2 18 provided no evidence that NO2 causes clinically-relevant effects in asthmatics at 19 concentrations up to 1,100 µg/m³ (Goodman et al. 2009). The peak predicted one-hour 20 NO2 concentration at the MPOI was 209 µg/m³ under the Base Case, and 210 µg/m³ 21 under the Application and Cumulative cases. The results of the meta-analysis are telling 22 not only because the peak predicted one-hour NO2 concentrations at the MPOI are well 23 below the health effects “threshold” concentration of 1,100 µg/m³, but also because they 24 demonstrate the high level of protection incorporated into the Metro Vancouver AAQO 25 and U.S. EPA NAAQS, indicating that a modest exceedance of the objective/guideline 26 does not necessarily signal an imminent health risk.

27 · The results of additional air dispersion modelling for the Base Case, Application Case, 28 and Cumulative Case were provided in response to the LFVAQCC (Filing ID A4H6E1). 29 Table 1.1-1 of the response presents a peak predicted one-hour concentration for NO2 of 30 162 µg/m³ for the Base and Application cases, which is below the one-hour Metro 31 Vancouver AAQO. A summary of the changes to the air dispersion modelling that would 32 have influenced NO2 predictions for the Westside Marine Terminal were provided in 33 Trans Mountain’s response to Metro Vancouver IR No. 2.1.03a – Attachment 1 (Filing ID 34 A4I0A7). The most notable change was to the NOX to NO2 conversion methodology as 35 described in Section 1.5.2 of the Marine Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Marine 36 Transportation Technical Report – Supplemental Report No. 2 (RWDI November 2014) 37 (Filing ID A4F5H8).

38 For the reasons outlined above, the risk of people experiencing adverse health effects within the 39 LSA for Westridge Marine Terminal from the short-term inhalation of NO2 is low.

40 Moreover, as stated in response to NEB IR No. 3.019b (Filing ID A4H1V2), Trans Mountain has 41 committed to meeting the BC and Alberta AAQOs at each terminal, including the Metro 42 Vancouver AAQOs for NO2 at Westridge Marine Terminal. Trans Mountain has also committed, 43 in response to PMV IR No. 2.25 (Filing ID A4H8W5), to update its assessment of air quality as 44 the Project’s engineering design nears or reaches completion. If this air quality assessment 45 reveals increases in the concentrations of Project-related air pollutants such as NO2 over

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1 populated areas under the Base Case, Application Case, or Cumulative Case, Trans Mountain 2 has committed to update the HHRA (GoC F-IR No. 2.01) (Filing ID A4L0A5). Trans Mountain 3 has also agreed to conduct ambient air quality monitoring and reporting at a new station to be 4 installed at the Westridge Marine Terminal to ensure that the applicable AAQOs are met.

5

August 2015 Page 45-25 1202006_TMEP_TR_AQ_AllCases_BWRM_NO2_1H_Plots_For_Intrinsik_v2.mxd Trans ExpansionMountainProject - Alberta and Columbia,BritishCanada Application Case Application NO 1-Hour Maximum Predicted Westridge Marine Terminals µg/m³) (in Marine Westridge and Burnaby the for Transportation and Marine All Background / " ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ / " ! ! ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Cottage Kensington-Cedar Lonsdale Lower Woodlands Grandview- North Lonsdale North ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ^ 2 0 Concentration Including Ambient Including Concentration Hastings-Sunrise 0.25 / " 0.5 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! Collingwood Renfrew Lynnmour West Lynn / " Lynn Creek 0.75 ￿￿￿￿ km ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ! ! Seymour River Willingdon Cascade Heights ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Heights ! Maplewood ! ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ "/ "/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "/ Burnaby Burnaby Heights ￿￿￿￿ ! ! ! ! ! ! Seymour Heights "/ ￿￿￿￿ ! ! ! ! Blueridge Park Brentwood ^ "/ Capitol Hill ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "/ ! ! ! ! ￿￿￿￿ Park Windsor "/ "/ "/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿ "/ "/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "/ Lake Deer ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ Vancouver ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ OP Harbour "/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ "/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "/ "/ ￿￿￿￿ "/ "/ ￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ !. "/ "/ "/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ !. "/ "/ "/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "/ "/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ !. ￿￿￿￿ ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! "/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Deep Cove Westridge Dollarton "/ ￿￿ "/ ￿￿ !. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ Burnaby "/ Lake "/ ￿￿￿￿ Burrard ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Inlet !. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ Indian Arm !. "/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "/ "/ "/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "/ ! ! ! ! ! ! Barnet Coombe Woodlands !. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ OP "/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "/ !. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ! ! ! ! Heights Sullivan Woodhaven Sasamat 0 "/ !. "/ ￿￿￿￿ Lake ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 0.5 ! ! ! ! Burquitlam Cariboo Cariboo ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1 !. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 1.5 km ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ utnHeights Austin Project Project #1202006 ! ! ! ! !. ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ TrueNorth BC FLNRO, 2008 & ESRI, 2005; World Imagery: ESRI, 2014. ESRI, Imagery: World 2005; ESRI, & 2008 FLNRO, BC 2013, Canada, Resources Natural Areas: Protected and Parks 2010; Canada, Resouces Natural 2000, Agency, Mapping and Imagery National States United 2004, Inc., IHS Hydrology: 2011; Inc., IHS & 2013 Canada, of Government Lands: Nation First 2012; Canada, Resources Natural 2013, ESRI, & 2005, ESRI, 2007, FLNRO, BC 2011, Inc., IHS Boundaries: Geopolitical 2005; & ESRI, 2012 Operations, Resource Natural and Lands Forests, BC Transportation: 2012; KMC, by Provided Facilities: 2014.; 19, March UPI, by provided V9 Corridor Study 2012; May KMC, by provided TMPL Baseline Routing: 10N. UTM 1983 NAD Projection: Notes: Map [ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ^ ( ! "/ "/ "/ "/ "/ "/ ￿￿ !. !( !. Approx. Scale: Approx. Drawn DateRevised: !. Protected Area Protected / Park Provincial / Park National Settlement /Métis Reserve Indian Municipality District / / Town City Terminal Boundary Buffer) km (5 Area Study Local HHRA Terminal Marine Westridge Corridor Pipeline Proposed Expansion Mountain Trans Road Highway Pipeline Mountain Trans Existing / Community /Hamlet Village (KP) Post Kilometre Maximum Concentration Maximum Residence Area Recreational School Elementary Community Facility Living Assisted Community Aboriginal !. 100 - 150 - 100 200 - 150 200 > by:

NBN !. !. Figure: 45.1.2 !. 1:50,000 Jun. 4, 2014 Jun. 4, Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 45.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Human Health Risk Assessment Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 Similarly, the results of the HHRA of marine transportation revealed exceedances of the one- 2 hour Metro Vancouver AAQO for NO2 under each of the assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, 3 Application Case, and Cumulative Case). However, the maximum predicted annual average air 4 concentration for NO2 within the LSA for marine transportation (i.e., 5-km buffer extending from 5 the outermost edge of each shipping lane within Burrard Inlet) was below Metro Vancouver’s 6 (2011) annual AAQO, suggesting that adverse health effects associated with long-term 7 exposure to NO2 are not expected.

8 Again, the high degree of conservatism incorporated in the predicted acute health risks for NO2 9 must necessarily be respected as part of the interpretation of the findings.

10 · Exceedances were predicted at the MPOI only. The location of the MPOI for the predicted 11 acute health risks for NO2 under the Application Case is shown in Figure 5.2 of the Human 12 Health Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation Technical Report. As shown in the figure, 13 the MPOI is predicted to occur within another industrial facility, where public access would 14 be restricted. Exceedances could extend beyond the facility boundary into a forested area 15 located to the south. No exceedances were predicted at any of the 22 discrete (or fixed) 16 locations corresponding to actual communities, parks, and recreation areas found within the 17 LSA for marine transportation, nor were exceedances predicted at any of the other 18 approximately 400 gridded locations for which air dispersion modelling was completed within 19 the LSA. This suggests that the predicted exceedances are highly localized.

20 · The incremental contribution of the Project-related marine vessel traffic to the NO2 21 concentrations predicted to occur at the MPOI was negligible, as evidenced by the fact that 22 the predicted peak concentrations of NO2 for the Base and Application cases were 260 23 µg/m³. This suggests that the Project-related marine vessel traffic will have very little, if any, 24 effect on the Base Case health risks for NO2 within the LSA.

25 · In order to assess the likelihood that people might encounter NO2 concentrations exceeding 26 the one-hour Metro Vancouver AAQO at the MPOI, frequency analysis of one full year of 27 predicted hourly NO2 concentrations was completed (i.e., 8,760 hours). The analysis 28 revealed that the one-hour Metro Vancouver AAQO for NO2 could be exceeded at the MPOI 29 0.37% of the time (i.e., 32 hours per year) under the Application Case, suggesting that the 30 likelihood of an exceedance occurring at the MPOI is low.

31 · The peak predicted one-hour NO2 concentration at the MPOI was 260 µg/m³ across the 32 assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative Case). This peak 33 concentration is below the concentrations at which adverse health effects have been 34 observed among humans, including asthmatics who are known to show heightened 35 sensitivity to NO2 exposures (i.e., 1,100 µg/m³; Goodman et al. 2009).

36 · The results of additional air dispersion modelling presented in Marine Air Quality and 37 Greenhouse Gas Marine Transportation Technical Report – Supplemental Report No. 2 38 show a peak predicted one-hour concentration for NO2 of 186 µg/m³ for the Base Case, 39 Application Case, and Cumulative Case. As previously discussed, this peak predicted hourly 40 concentration for NO2 is below the one-hour Metro Vancouver AAQO. The most notable 41 change in the air dispersion modelling of NO2 was the NOx to NO2 conversion methodology 42 update as described in Section 1.5.2 of the Marine Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Marine 43 Transportation Technical Report – Supplemental Report No. 2.

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1 For the reasons outlined above, the risk of people experiencing adverse health effects within the 2 LSA for marine transportation from the short-term inhalation of NO2 is low.

3 45.1.1.6 Ozone 4 FVRD (Filing ID A4L8W6) expressed concern regarding the potential health effects that might 5 be experienced as a result of exposure to ground-level ozone associated with the Project and 6 Project-related marine vessel traffic.

7 As discussed in response to FVRD IR No. 1.22a (Filing ID A3Y2K7), ozone was not assessed in 8 the HHRAs, but was evaluated as part of the air quality assessments, including Air Quality and 9 Greenhouse Gas Technical Report (Filing ID A3S1U1) and Marine Air Quality and Greenhouse 10 Gas Marine Transportation Technical Report (Filing ID A3S4J7). As described in Air Quality and 11 Greenhouse Gas Technical Report (Filing ID A3S1U1), observed ozone concentrations at the 12 Burnaby-Kensington Park, Port Moody, Coquitlam, North Vancouver Mahon Park and Burnaby 13 South monitoring stations in Metro Vancouver were below the Metro Vancouver one-hour 14 AAQO of 82 ppb and the 8-hour Canadian Ambient Air Quality Standard (CAAQS) of 65 ppb in 15 2011. As shown in Figure 4.51 of Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Technical Report (Filing ID 16 A3S1U1), the maximum hourly and 8-hour ozone concentration observed at these stations was 17 45 ppb in 2011. In the Marine Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Marine Transportation Technical 18 Report (Filing ID A3S4J7), reliance was placed on ozone concentrations observed at the 19 Vancouver-Kitsilano monitoring station in 2011. Figure 4.14 of the marine air quality assessment 20 shows maximum observed hourly and 8-hour ozone concentrations at the Vancouver-Kitsilano 21 monitoring station in 2011 of 90 ppb and 92 ppb, respectively. At this station, the Metro 22 Vancouver one-hour AAQO was exceeded 3.4% of the time and the 8-hour CAAQS was 23 exceeded 32.9% of the time.

24 In response to FVRD IR No. 2.10a (Filing ID A4H8S0), Trans Mountain has conducted an 25 updated assessment of secondary ozone formation using the CMAQ model. The key 26 differences between the 2013 CMAQ modelling discussed above and the revised CMAQ 27 modelling are:

28 · Evaluation of the meteorological model output;

29 · Modelling of four historical episodes that cover all four meso-scale 30 meteorological patterns that have been demonstrated to be conducive to 31 photochemical smog formation in the LFV (Ainslie and Steyn 2007);

32 · Use of the MEIT;

33 · Use of the most recent, available emissions from the Westridge Marine 34 Terminal and Project-related marine traffic;

35 · Inclusion of additional emissions information for larger announced projects, 36 where available; and

37 · The addition of an inner modelling domain with 1 km grid size.

38 The findings of the revised CMAQ modelling indicate that the net positive changes are less than 39 those predicted in the 2013 CMAQ modelling for TMEP, which likely reflects the anticipated 40 reduction in marine NOX emissions due to the IMO NOX Tier III initiative. The net effect of this

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1 reduction in NOX emissions is the removal of some of the chemical pre-cursors required for 2 ozone formation in the atmosphere. According to the revised CMAQ modelling, the area that 3 consistently saw the highest increases in ozone was in the northern portion of the 1 km domain. 4 The net effect of the Project is a maximum predicted increase for ozone of less than 1 ppb in 5 this area, which is within the uncertainty of the CMAQ model. These findings are consistent with 6 those reported by Ainslie et al. (Environment Canada 2015) in that, despite the use of the 7 AURAMS model with different TMEP emission scenarios and fewer meteorological periods, the 8 predicted Project-related net effects for ozone also were determined to be within the uncertainty 9 in the AURAMS model. Details regarding the manner by which the CMAQ modelling was 10 performed, the results that emerged, and the conclusions that were reached are presented in 11 Updated Community Multi-scale Air Quality (CMAQ) Photochemical Modelling for the Trans 12 Mountain Expansion Pipeline Project (RWDI August 2015).

13 Health Canada cautions in its letter of comment that there is no clear threshold for health effects 14 associated with exposure to ozone (Filing ID A4S0Z6). Similarly, in the U.S. EPA’s Integrated 15 Science Assessment document for ozone, it concludes that, based on the weight-of-evidence, 16 there is no clear health effects threshold for ozone (U.S. EPA 2013). The U.S. EPA, however, 17 acknowledges that there is some uncertainty in the lower end of the concentration-response 18 evaluations for ozone (i.e., below 20 ppb) due to data limitations. Because the observed ozone 19 concentrations in Metro Vancouver already exceed this level, any increase in regional ozone 20 concentrations could be associated with adverse health effects. In accordance with current 21 provincial and federal guidance, and in the case of the Project, the management of ozone in 22 relation to potential human health effects will be focused on the monitoring of precursor 23 emissions, such as NOx and VOCs. An emissions management plan for the precursor 24 compounds will help mitigate potential ozone-related health risks in the area. Mitigation of air 25 emissions was described in Section 9 in Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Technical Report 26 (RWDI 2013) (Filing ID A3S1U1).

27 45.1.1.7 Particulate Matter 28 Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0), Metro Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7Y3) and Miller B 29 (Filing ID A4L8L6) expressed concerns regarding the potential health effects associated with 30 exposure to routine emissions of PM associated with the Project and Project-related marine 31 vessel traffic.

32 PM, specifically PM2.5 and PM10, were evaluated on a short-term and long-term basis via in the 33 inhalation pathway in the HHRAs of Westridge Marine Terminal and marine transportation. As 34 discussed in the HHRAs, PM2.5 and PM10 were identified as constituents of the combustion-type 35 emissions from the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion and Project-related marine vessels. 36 On this basis, PM2.5 and PM10 were examined as COPC in the aforementioned HHRAs.

37 For the purposes of the HHRAs, reliance was placed on air dispersion modelling performed by 38 RWDI and described in the Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Marine Transportation Technical 39 Report and Marine Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Marine Transportation Technical Report – 40 Supplemental Report. Subsequent to the filing of the Application, the air dispersion modelling 41 relating to the COPC emissions originating from the Westridge Marine Terminal and marine 42 vessel traffic was updated to reflect the more refined engineering and marine transportation 43 logistics proposed by Trans Mountain. The most noteworthy updates regarding the air 44 dispersion modelling for PM were made to:

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1 · the VOC flow rate to and collection efficiencies of the VCU;

2 · the fuel type for the main engines of the marine vessel traffic;

3 · the number of dedicated tug escorts used by laden tankers along the outbound 4 shipping lane and refined marine vessel speeds;

5 · the reasonably foreseeable increase in all non-Project-related marine vessel 6 traffic; and

7 · the anticipated changes in future marine fuel regulations and more stringent 8 NOx emission requirements.

9 Potential human health risks associated with short-term exposure to PM2.5 and PM10 were 10 determined by comparing the peak (1st highest) predicted 24-hour concentrations to the BC 11 MOE’s and Metro Vancouver’s 24-hour AAQOs of 25 µg/m³ and 50 µg/m³ for PM2.5 and PM10, 12 respectively. On a long-term basis, the potential chronic health risks were evaluated through the 13 comparison of the maximum predicted annual average air concentrations against the BC MOE’s 14 and Metro Vancouver’s annual AAQOs of 8 µg/m³ for PM2.5 and 20 µg/m³ for PM10.

15 In all cases, the potential health risks associated with short-term and long-term exposure to 16 PM2.5 and PM10 were below the benchmark (or target risk estimate) of 1.0, indicating that the 17 maximum predicted exposures were less than the corresponding exposure limits. As well, the 18 contribution of the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic to the cumulative PM2.5 and 19 PM10 exposures was negligible. In the majority of instances, the potential health risks remained 20 unchanged between the assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative 21 Case), signifying that the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic will have very little, if 22 any, effect on the Base Case health risks for PM. Overall, the findings of the HHRAs suggest a 23 low potential for adverse health effects as a result of PM associated with the expansion of the 24 Westridge Marine Terminal and Project-related marine vessel traffic.

25 Additional air dispersion modelling was completed for the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion 26 in response to the LFVAQCC (Filing ID A4H6E1). Table 1.1-1 of the response presents 27 predicted peak 24-hour and maximum annual concentrations for PM2.5 and PM10 under the Base 28 and Application cases that are lower than those assessed in the HHRA of Westridge Marine 29 Terminal. A summary of the changes to the air dispersion modelling that would have influenced 30 PM predictions for the Westside Marine Terminal was provided in Trans Mountain’s response to 31 Metro Vancouver IR No. 2.1.03a – Attachment 1 (Filing ID A4I0A7).

32 Similarly, the results of additional air dispersion modelling for marine transportation were 33 presented in the Marine Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Marine Transportation Technical 34 Report – Supplemental Report No. 2. Tables 4.7, 5.4, and 7.2 of the report present the 35 predicted peak 24-hour and maximum annual concentrations for PM2.5 and PM10 under the Base 36 Case, Application Case and Cumulative Case, respectively. The revised results are lower than 37 those assessed in the HHRA of marine transportation.

38 The results of the additional air dispersion modelling for PM do not affect the conclusions of the 39 HHRAs in that they continued to show a low potential for adverse health effects as a result of 40 the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic.

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1 Health Canada cautions in its letter of comment that there is no clear threshold for health effects 2 associated with exposure to PM2.5; as such, that “any increase in PM2.5 concentrations, however 3 small, will have an adverse health effect” (Filing ID A4S0Z6). Trans Mountain agrees that the 4 current scientific weight-of-evidence suggests that there is no clear threshold for PM2.5; 5 however, according to the U.S. EPA (2009), there is uncertainty in predicting the nature of the 6 concentration-response curve for PM2.5 at air concentrations below the lowest measured levels 7 (LMLs; as annual averages) reported in such studies by Krewski et al. (2009; i.e., 5.8 µg/m³) 8 and Laden et al. (2006; i.e., 10 µg/m³) because the concentration-response curve below these 9 levels is extrapolated beyond the observed data. As the maximum predicted annual average 10 concentration for PM2.5 within the Burrard Inlet area (i.e., 5.5 µg/m³, refer to Table 5.4 of Marine 11 Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Marine Transportation Technical Report – Supplemental 12 Report No. 2) is below the LMLs, considerable uncertainty is introduced into the interpretation of 13 the potential health risks that could be presented to people in the area. As such, contrary to 14 Health Canada’s assertion that “any increase in PM2.5 concentration, however small, will have 15 an adverse health effect,” Trans Mountain maintains the position that the results do not provide 16 any indication that people’s health will be adversely affected by exposure to the PM2.5 emissions 17 associated with the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic.

18 45.1.1.8 Sulphur Dioxide 19 Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0) submitted evidence expressing concerns regarding 20 the potential health effects associated with exposure to routine SO2 emissions from the Project 21 and Project-related marine vessel traffic. Living Oceans Society also expressed concerns about 22 the potential risk to human health from simultaneous exposure to SO2 and NO2. Section 23 45.1.1.9 addresses the concerns regarding SO2 and NO2 acting in combination as potential 24 respiratory irritants, while the concerns specific to SO2 are discussed below.

25 As discussed in the HHRAs, notably the Human Health Risk Assessment of Westridge Marine 26 Terminal Technical Report and Human Health Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation 27 Technical Report, SO2 was identified as a constituent of the combustion-type emissions from 28 the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion and Project-related marine vessels. On this basis, 29 SO2 was examined as a COPC in the aforementioned HHRAs.

30 For the purposes of the HHRAs, reliance was placed on air dispersion modelling performed by 31 RWDI and described in the Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Marine Transportation Technical 32 Report and Marine Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Marine Transportation Technical Report – 33 Supplemental Report. Subsequent to the filing of the Application, the air dispersion modelling 34 relating to the COPC emissions originating from the Westridge Marine Terminal and marine 35 vessel traffic was updated to reflect the more refined engineering and marine transportation 36 logistics proposed by Trans Mountain. The most noteworthy updates regarding the air 37 dispersion modelling for SO2 were made to:

38 · the VOC flow rate to and collection efficiencies of the VCU;

39 · the fuel type for the main engines of the marine vessel traffic;

40 · the number of dedicated tug escorts used by laden tankers along the outbound 41 shipping lane and refined marine vessel speeds; and

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1 · the reasonably foreseeable increase in all non-Project-related marine vessel 2 traffic.

3 SO2 was assessed on a short-term basis through the comparison of:

st 4 · the predicted peak (1 highest) 10-minute ground-level SO2 concentrations 5 against the World Health Organization’s (2000) 10-minute Air Quality Objective 6 (AQO) of 500 µg/m³;

st 7 · the predicted peak (1 highest) one-hour ground-level SO2 concentrations 8 against Metro Vancouver’s (2011) one-hour AAQO of 450 µg/m³; and,

9 · the predicted three-year average of the 99th percentile (4th highest) of the yearly 10 distribution of one-hour daily maximum SO2 concentrations against the U.S. 11 EPA’s (2010c) one-hour NAAQS of 196 µg/m³, whenever possible.

12 As discussed in response to NEB IR No. 3.015a (Filing ID A4H1V2), 24-hour and annual 13 exposure limits were not used in the HHRAs to assess the potential health risks associated with 14 short-term and long-term exposure to SO2 since observed responses to SO2 exposure from 15 controlled human studies occur rapidly, with a maximum effect being reached after a few 16 minutes of exposure (typically up to 10-15 minutes of exposure). As well, the effects are 17 generally short-lived, and continued exposure does not increase the magnitude of the response. 18 In fact, lung function gradually improves in those affected within minutes to hours (WHO 2006).

19 The findings of the HHRAs indicate that adverse health effects from SO2 exposure 20 associated with the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic are not anticipated. The 21 weight-of-evidence is:

22 · In all assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative Case), the 23 predicted health risks associated with short-term exposure to SO2 were below the 24 benchmark (or target risk estimate) of 1.0, indicating that peak predicted 10-minute and 25 one-hour air concentrations for SO2 were less than the corresponding exposure limits.

26 · The peak predicted 10-minute and hourly SO2 air concentrations under the assessment 27 cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative Case) at the MPOI for the 28 Westridge Marine Terminal LSA were 109 µg/m³ and 66 µg/m³, respectively. At the 29 MPOI within Burrard Inlet for marine transportation, the predicted peak SO2 air 30 concentrations were 126 µg/m³ and 76.4 µg/m³ on a 10-minute and hourly basis, 31 respectively. These peak concentrations are well below the range of concentrations at 32 which adverse effects have been observed in asthmatics or other sensitive individuals 33 following exposure to SO2 (i.e., 530 to 1,300 µg/m³). Additional information regarding the 34 dose-response characteristics of inhaled SO2 on a short-term basis is presented in Table 35 5.7 of the Human Health Risk Assessment of Westridge Marine Terminal Technical 36 Report and Table 5.12 of the Human Health Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation 37 Technical Report.

38 · The air dispersion modelling that formed the basis of the HHRAs did not take into 39 account the more stringent fuel sulphur regulations that were introduced in January 40 2015. Under these regulations, the maximum sulphur content in fuel oils within ECAs is 41 0.1%. Inclusion of the lower sulphur fuel content into air dispersion modelling would

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1 serve to reduce the SO2 emissions from marine vessels and subsequently the predicted 2 air concentrations of SO2 in the Burrard Inlet area.

3 Although Metro Vancouver recently adopted a more stringent (i.e., lower) one-hour AAQO for 4 SO2 of 196 µg/m³ on an interim basis, the peak predicted hourly SO2 concentrations at the 5 MPOIs within the Burrard Inlet area (i.e., 66 µg/m³ within the Westridge Marine Terminal LSA 6 and 76.4 µg/m³ within the Burrard Inlet LSA of marine transportation) remain below the interim 7 AAQO. As well, Trans Mountain has committed, in the response to SFU IR No. 2.5.10.1 (Filing 8 ID A4H9C9), to meeting the applicable AAQOs at each terminal, including the interim Metro 9 Vancouver one-hour AAQO of 196 µg/m³ at the Westridge Marine Terminal. Meeting the 10 applicable AAQOs is Trans Mountain’s primary criterion for determining tank design and vapour 11 control configurations. In addition, Trans Mountain has committed to update its assessment of 12 air quality as the Project’s engineering design nears or reaches completion. If this air quality 13 assessment reveals increases in the COPC concentrations over populated areas under the 14 Base, Application or Cumulative cases, Trans Mountain will update the HHRA for Westridge 15 Marine Terminal (Government of Canada F-IR No. 2.01) (Filing ID A4J5C1).

16 45.1.1.9 Respiratory Irritants 17 Living Oceans Society submitted evidence (Filing ID A4L9S0) expressing concerns over the 18 combined effects of simultaneous exposure to NO2 and SO2 on human health; specifically, 19 noting concerns over the Project’s and Project-related marine vessel traffic’s contribution. 20 Similarly, in its letter of comment, Health Canada expressed concern that “individuals could 21 experience irritation and difficulty with their breathing if exposed to the Proponent’s predicted 22 levels of respiratory irritants in the vicinity of the marine terminal.”

23 Recognizing that chemical exposures rarely occur in isolation, the potential health risks 24 associated with the chemicals emitted from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic 25 acting in combination were assessed in each of the HHRAs, notably the Human Health Risk 26 Assessment of Westridge Marine Terminal Technical Report and Human Health Risk 27 Assessment of Marine Transportation Technical Report. The assessment of the potential health 28 risks of chemical mixtures is challenging by virtue of the infinite number of chemical 29 combinations that are possible. Recent efforts have been taken by several leading scientific and 30 regulatory authorities to better understand the types of interactions involved and to develop 31 methods for assessing mixtures (Boobis et al. 2011; European Commission 2012; Meek et al. 32 2011; Price et al. 2009; Price and Han 2011). These efforts have led to the following 33 observations:

34 · Under certain conditions, chemicals can act in combination as a mixture in a manner that 35 affects the overall level of toxicity.

36 · Chemicals with common modes of action can act jointly to produce combined effects 37 that may be greater than the effects of each of the constituents alone. These effects are 38 additive in nature.

39 · For chemicals having different modes of action, there is no robust evidence available to 40 indicate that mixtures of such substances are of health or environmental concern 41 provided the individual chemicals are present in amounts at or below their threshold 42 dose levels.

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1 · Interactions (including antagonism, potentiation, and synergism) usually occur only at 2 moderate to high dose levels (relative to the lowest effect levels), and are either unlikely 3 to occur or to be of any toxicological significance at low or “environmentally relevant” 4 exposure levels.

5 · If information is lacking on the mode(s) of action of chemicals in a mixture, it should be 6 assumed by default that they will act in an additive fashion, with the manner and extent 7 to which they may interact determined on a case-by-case basis using professional 8 judgment.

9 Based on these observations and in accordance with guidance from Health Canada (2010a,b), 10 one approach to assessing chemical mixtures is to combine those chemicals which act through 11 a common or similar toxicological mechanism and/or affect the same target tissues and/or 12 organs in the body (i.e., share commonality in effect), and assume that the overall toxicity of the 13 mixture is equivalent to the sum of the toxicities of the individual chemicals comprising the 14 mixture. In other words, the chemicals are assumed to interact in an additive fashion (Health 15 Canada 2010a,b). The critical effect of the exposure limits employed in the HHRAs provided the 16 basis for a chemical’s inclusion in a chemical mixture. As the critical effect for NO2 and SO2 is 17 respiratory irritation, the predicted health risks for these two chemicals were combined along 18 with 10 other chemicals emitted from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic in the 19 assessment of the combined risks associated with exposure to the respiratory irritants mixture 20 on a short-term basis. Specifically, the acute respiratory irritants mixture was composed of:

21 · acetaldehyde;

22 · acrolein;

23 · cadmium;

24 · chromium III;

25 · copper;

26 · NO2;

27 · propionaldehyde;

28 · SO2;

29 · ethanethiol group17;

30 · vanadium;

31 · xylenes; and

32 · zinc.

33 The results of the HHRAs of the Westridge Marine Terminal and marine transportation revealed 34 elevated health risks for the acute respiratory irritants mixture in the Burrard Inlet area. No

17 Ethanethiol group includes n-butanethiol, sec-butanethiol, ethanethiol, n-hexanethiol, iso-propanethiol and thiophene.

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1 exceedances of the benchmark (or target risk estimate) of 1.0 were predicted for the respiratory 2 irritants mixture on a chronic basis.

3 In the HHRA of Westridge Marine Terminal, exceedances of the benchmark (or target risk 4 estimate) of 1.0 were predicted at the MPOI under each of the assessment cases (i.e., Base 5 Case, Application Case, and Cumulative Case). No exceedances were predicted at any of the 6 52 discrete (or fixed) locations corresponding to actual households, schools, assisted-living 7 complexes, communities, parks and recreation areas found within the LSA. The location of the 8 MPOI for the respiratory irritants mixture was shown in Figure 5.2 of Appendix A of the HHRA 9 for Westridge Marine Terminal. As shown in the figure, the MPOI is predicted to occur within the 10 perimeter of another industrial facility, where public access would be restricted. Frequency 11 analysis of one full year of predicted hourly air concentrations (i.e., 8,760 hours) of the chemical 12 constituents at the MPOI suggests that the respiratory irritants mixture could exceed the 13 applicable benchmark as much as 0.9% of the time (i.e., 79 hours per year), and be below 14 99.1% of the time.

15 NO2 was found to contribute about 73% of the combined risks for the mixture in the Base, 16 Application, and Cumulative cases. SO2 was the next largest contributor to the respiratory 17 irritants mixture risks (22% of the combined risks). The relative contribution of the other 18 respiratory irritants was minor (approximately 5%). Although the critical effect for short-term 19 exposure to NO2 and SO2 is respiratory irritation, depending on the concentrations of NO2 and 20 SO2 to which an individual is exposed, the modes of action within the respiratory tract can differ, 21 which may result in the combined risks for the respiratory irritants mixture being over-stated. For 22 example, NO2 is relatively insoluble in water and can be inhaled deeply into the lungs, acting as 23 a deep-lung irritant; whereas, SO2 is readily soluble in water and, at low concentrations, would 24 be readily absorbed by the moist mucous membranes lining the upper respiratory tract, 25 effectively removing it from the airstream such that it would not penetrate deep into the lungs 26 and alveolar spaces (Calabrese 1991). Clinical studies where both healthy and asthmatic 27 subjects were exposed to both NO2 and SO2 in controlled environments have not found 28 evidence that the combination increased respiratory symptoms relative to exposure to either gas 29 on its own (Linn 1980; Rubinstein 1990; Sandstrom 1995). However, if SO2 concentrations are 30 sufficiently high for it to overwhelm the moist mucous membranes lining the upper respiratory 31 tract, allowing it to penetrate to the lungs and alveolar spaces, then the potential effects of co- 32 exposure to NO2 and SO2 on the respiratory tract may be additive. Potential bronchoconstriction 33 has been reported in asthmatic or sensitive individuals engaged in moderate exercise at SO2 34 concentrations as low as 530 μg/m³. As such, co-exposure to NO2 and SO2 may have additive 35 effects at SO2 concentrations above this level. The peak predicted 10-minute SO2 concentration 36 within the LSA was 109 μg/m³, which is well below the concentration above which additive 37 effects would be expected (i.e., > 530 μg/m³).

38 As stated previously, the maximum predicted NO2 and SO2 concentrations within the LSA are 39 below levels or thresholds above which adverse health effects have been reported in the 40 scientific literature. A recent review of mixture toxicity by the European Commission (2012) 41 notes that the potential and type of the interactions between chemicals may vary according to 42 the magnitude of the exposure:

43 “Interactions … usually occur at medium or high dose levels (relative to the 44 lowest effect levels). At low exposure levels they are either unlikely to occur or 45 toxicologically insignificant. According to Boobis et al. (2011), “low dose” is 46 defined as at or near or below doses that do not cause statistically significant

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1 effects in experimental studies, such as NOALs, NOECs or benchmark dose 2 levels.”

3 As a result, the assumption of additivity in the assessment of the potential health risks for the 4 respiratory irritants mixture, particularly the combined effects of NO2 and SO2, is likely 5 conservative.

6 For the reasons outlined above, it is Trans Mountain’s position that the risk of people 7 experiencing adverse health effects such as respiratory irritation and difficulty breathing within 8 the LSA for the Westridge Marine Terminal from the combined exposure to NO2 and SO2 is low.

9 Exceedances also were predicted for the respiratory irritants mixture in the HHRA of marine 10 transportation over water and along the shoreline of the Burrard Inlet at the MPOI, the 11 Squamish Nation (Capilano 3), and the District of North Vancouver. The location of the MPOI for 12 the respiratory irritants mixture is consistent with that of the MPOI for NO2 shown in Figure 5.2 13 of Appendix A of the HHRA for Westridge Marine Terminal. As shown in the figure, the MPOI is 14 predicted to occur within the fenceline of another industrial facility along the Burrard Inlet. 15 Frequency analysis of one full year of predicted hourly air concentrations (i.e., 8,760 hours) for 16 the chemical constituents at the MPOI suggests that the respiratory irritants mixture could 17 exceed the applicable benchmark as much as 3.7% of the time (i.e., 325 hours per year), and 18 be below 96.3% of the time.

19 For the communities of the Squamish Nation (Capilano 5) and the District of North Vancouver, 20 the potential health risks were evaluated at the location within the community in closest 21 proximity to the marine shipping lanes, where the maximum potential health risks associated 22 with the Project-related marine vessel traffic would be expected to occur. As such, the discrete 23 (or fixed) locations were selected along the shoreline of the Burrard Inlet. The potential health 24 risks would be expected to decrease with increasing distance inland and away from the source 25 (i.e., the marine vessel traffic). Frequency analysis of one full year of predicted hourly air 26 concentrations (i.e., 8,760 hours) for the chemical constituents at these communities suggests 27 that the respiratory irritants mixture could exceed the applicable benchmark 0.01% of the time 28 (i.e., 1 hour per year), and be below 99.99% of the time.

29 Again, NO2 was predicted to contribute about 74% to 84% of the combined risks in the Base, 30 Application, and Cumulative cases. SO2 was predicted to be the next largest contributor to the 31 respiratory irritants mixture risk at 11% to 22%. All other chemical constituents contributed less 32 than 5% to the combined risk. As discussed earlier, depending on the concentrations of NO2 33 and SO2 to which an individual is exposed, the modes of action within the respiratory tract can 34 differ, which may result in the combined risks for the respiratory irritants mixture being over- 35 stated. Co-exposure to NO2 and SO2 may have additive effects at SO2 concentrations above 36 530 μg/m³. The peak predicted 10-minute SO2 concentration within the LSA was 126 μg/m³, 37 which is well below the concentration above which additive effects would be expected (i.e., > 38 530 μg/m³).

39 For the reasons outlined above, the risk of people experiencing respiratory irritation within the 40 LSA for the marine transportation from the combined exposure to NO2 and SO2 is low.

41 Furthermore, the contribution of the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic to the 42 cumulative risks was negligible to low. In the majority of instances, the potential health risks 43 remained unchanged between the assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and

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1 Cumulative Case), signifying that the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic will have 2 very little, if any, effect on the Base Case health risks for the respiratory irritants mixture. The 3 primary contributors to the Base Case health risks for respiratory irritants mixture are the 4 combustion-type emissions from the existing tugs, and to a lesser extent the emissions from the 5 main engines of the existing tankers.

6 45.1.1.10 Carcinogens 7 BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5) and NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L5V1) have expressed concerns 8 regarding the potential cancer risks associated with the chemicals emitted from the Project and 9 Project-related marine vessel traffic.

10 An evaluation of the potential cancer risks presented to people as a result of exposures to the 11 carcinogenic COPC emitted from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic was 12 completed as part of the HHRAs, notably the Human Health Risk Assessment of Westridge 13 Marine Terminal Technical Report and Human Health Risk Assessment of Marine 14 Transportation Technical Report. Risk estimates were calculated for the carcinogenic COPC, 15 expressed as ILCRs, by comparing the maximum predicted incremental increases in annual 16 average air concentrations associated with the Project and the Project-related marine vessel 17 traffic against their respective exposure limits.

18 Recognizing that chemical exposures rarely occur in isolation, the potential cancer risks were 19 combined for those COPC emitted from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic 20 which act through a common or similar toxicological mechanism and/or affect the same target 21 tissues and/or organs in the body (i.e., share commonality in effect). The critical endpoints of the 22 chronic exposure limits used in the HHRAs provided the basis for an individual chemical’s 23 inclusion in a carcinogenic mixture. For example, the chronic inhalation exposure limit for 24 arsenic is based on its ability to cause lung cancer; therefore, arsenic was included in the lung 25 carcinogens mixtures associated with chronic inhalation. The constituents of the carcinogenic 26 mixtures are listed in Table 3.13 of the HHRAs.

27 In all cases, ILCRs for the carcinogens (acting either singly or in combination) were predicted to 28 be less than 1 in 100,000 (i.e., less than one extra cancer case in a population of 29 100,000 people), indicating that the incremental cancer risks associated with the Project and 30 Project-related marine vessel traffic are deemed to be “essentially negligible.”

31 In addition to the general concerns surrounding cancer, BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5) and NS 32 NOPE (Filing IDs A4L5V1 and A4L9R1) also expressed concerns regarding the potential risks 33 of childhood leukemia from co-exposure to 1,3-butadiene and benzene as a result of the Project 34 and Project-related marine vessel traffic emissions.

35 As discussed in Section 45.1.1.1, as well as in response to NS NOPE and BROKE IR No. 2.4a 36 (Filing ID A4H8W0), the association between Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic 37 emissions and 1,3-butadiene remains tenuous. Nevertheless, the potential cancer risks that 38 could be presented to people from the long-term inhalation of 1,3-butadiene were calculated on 39 an incremental basis for the Project-related marine vessel traffic in isolation (i.e., Project alone), 40 and in combination with the anticipated increase in all other marine vessel traffic (i.e., Future). 41 Table 2.4A-4 of the response to NS NOPE and BROKE IR No. 2.4a (Filing ID A4H8W0) shows 42 the ILCRs for 1,3-butadiene at the MPOI to be 0.0024 per 100,000 in both cases, indicating that

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1 the incremental cancer risks from the Project-related marine vessel traffic (alone and in 2 combination with other future sources) are deemed to be “essentially negligible.”

3 The ILCRs predicted for benzene as a result of the Project and Project-related marine vessel 4 traffic in isolation (i.e., Project alone), and in combination with the anticipated increase in all 5 other marine vessel traffic (i.e., Future) at the MPOI are 0.46 (per 100,000) in both cases. This 6 signifies that the incremental cancer risks from the Project and Project-related marine vessel 7 traffic (alone and in combination with other future sources) are deemed to be “essentially 8 negligible” and within acceptable limits.

9 For the purposes of this reply, the potential cancer risks were combined for 1,3-butadiene and 10 benzene as both the cancer-based exposure limits are based on the incidence of leukemia as 11 the critical effect. As discussed previously, the chemicals were assumed to interact in an 12 additive fashion (Health Canada 2010a,b). As such, the ILCRs presented above for 13 1,3-butadiene and benzene were summed, resulting in an ILCR for the leukemogens mixture of 14 0.46 per 100,000 associated with the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic in 15 isolation (i.e., Project alone), and in combination with the anticipated increase in all other marine 16 vessel traffic (i.e., Future). This indicates that the incremental cancer risks from the Project and 17 Project-related marine vessel traffic are deemed to be “essentially negligible” and within 18 acceptable limits. It should be noted that benzene, which was assessed in the HHRAs, is the 19 primary contributor (99%) to the ILCRs for the leukemogens mixture. The contribution of 20 1,3-butadiene to the incremental cancer risks is negligible (1%). The findings of the above 21 assessment are consistent with those of the HHRAs insofar as they continue to show that the 22 incremental cancer risks from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic are deemed 23 to be “essentially negligible.”

24 45.1.1.11 Synergistic Effects of Mixtures 25 BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5) and NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L9R1 and A4L9R2) expressed 26 concerns about the possibility of synergistic effects between the chemicals emitted from the 27 Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic. Synergism refers to a type of interaction 28 between chemical mixtures such that the toxicity of a chemical is altered, becoming enhanced.

29 As discussed in Section 45.1.1.9 (Respiratory Irritants), the chemicals emitted from the Project 30 and Project-related marine vessel traffic which act through a common or similar toxicological 31 mechanism and/or affect the same target tissues and/or organs as a group were assumed to 32 interact in an additive fashion. The basis of the assumption is summarized below.

33 Recent efforts by several leading scientific and regulatory authorities to better understand the 34 types of interactions involved and to develop methods for assessing mixtures have led to the 35 following observations (Boobis et al. 2011; European Commission 2012; Meek et al. 2011; Price 36 et al. 2009; Price and Han 2011):

37 · Under certain conditions, chemicals can act in combination as a mixture in a manner that 38 affects the overall level of toxicity.

39 · Chemicals with common modes of action can act jointly to produce combined effects that 40 may be greater than the effects of each of the constituents alone. These effects are additive 41 in nature.

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1 · For chemicals having different modes of action, there is no robust evidence available to 2 indicate that mixtures of such substances are of health or environmental concern provided 3 the individual chemicals are present in amounts at or below their threshold dose levels.

4 · Interactions (including antagonism, potentiation, and synergism) usually occur only at 5 moderate to high dose levels (relative to the lowest effect levels), and are either unlikely to 6 occur or to be of any toxicological significance at low or “environmentally relevant” exposure 7 levels.

8 · If information is lacking on the mode(s) of action of chemicals in a mixture, it should be 9 assumed by default that they will act in an additive fashion, with the manner and extent to 10 which they may interact determined on a case-by-case basis using professional judgment.

11 Based on these observations, one approach to assessing chemical mixtures is to combine 12 those chemicals which act through a common or similar toxicological mechanism and/or affect 13 the same target tissues and/or organs in the body (i.e., share commonality in effect), and 14 assume that the overall toxicity of the mixture is equivalent to the sum of the toxicities of the 15 individual chemicals comprising the mixture. In other words, the chemicals are assumed to 16 interact in an additive fashion.

17 This approach is consistent with guidance from Health Canada (2010a,b), which states “in most 18 cases, the risks should be summed for chemicals with similar modes of action and/or the same 19 target organ tissue. Otherwise, toxicity and risk should be assessed on a chemical-by-chemical 20 basis.” Similarly, the U.S. EPA (2000) indicates that the assessment of chemical mixtures 21 involves substantial uncertainty and that, in most cases, toxicological information on the 22 combined effects from multiple chemicals is unavailable. The U.S. EPA (2000) also 23 recommends that the assumption of additivity be made for environmentally relevant (i.e., low) 24 exposure levels when no interaction information is available since the likelihood of significant 25 interaction at these exposure levels is considered low.

45.1.2 Human Health Effects Associated with Discharges to Water 26 Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0) submitted evidence expressing concern over the 27 potential effects of routine discharges of stormwater at the Edmonton, Sumas and Burnaby 28 terminals on human health.

29 As stated in Section 3.2.1.1 (Identification of Project Components of Interest) of the SLHHRA of 30 pipeline and associated facilities, water discharge volumes are not expected to increase as a 31 result of the installation of the additional tanks at the Edmonton Terminal, and may increase at 32 the Sumas Terminal, albeit negligibly (Filing ID A3S2L1). At the Burnaby Terminal, an increase 33 in the discharge volume of water as a result of the 14 additional storage tanks to be installed at 34 the terminal was predicted. Stormwater is discharged from the Burnaby Terminal into the Eagle 35 Creek watershed. The potential contamination from stormwater discharge during the routine 36 operation of the Burnaby Terminal was not, however, determined to have an effect on surface 37 water quality in the area due to the implementation of the mitigation measures that follow.

38 · The stormwater management system will be expanded to accommodate additional tanks, as 39 applicable (Section 7.0, Volume 5A [Filing ID A3S1Q9]).

40 · Storage tanks and stormwater management systems will be constructed and operated in 41 accordance with provincial and federal requirements, including the CCME Environmental

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1 Code of Practice for Aboveground and Underground Storage Tank Systems Containing 2 Petroleum and Allied Petroleum Products.

3 · All stormwater quality sampling and monitoring will be conducted in compliance with 4 existing, amended or new provincial discharge permit conditions.

5 Based on the above, the SLHHRA did not identify stormwater releases as a potential pathway of 6 exposure by which the chemicals might “travel” from the Project to the people living in the area 7 or those who might frequent the area (Health Canada 1995; U.S. EPA 2002).

8 Additional information regarding the potential effects of Project activities at tank terminals on 9 surface water quality and quantity are discussed in Section 7.5.3 of Volume 5A of the 10 Application.

45.1.3 Human Health Effects at Residential Locations 11 Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0) has expressed concern that the assessment of the 12 potential health risks presented to people from exposure to the chemicals originating from the 13 Edmonton, Sumas, and Burnaby terminals as well as Westridge Marine Terminal, focused 14 solely on the MPOI and did not consider discrete (or fixed) locations in the immediate vicinity of 15 the terminals. In the written evidence submitted by Senichenko G (Filing ID A4L6Q9), concern 16 was specifically expressed regarding the potential health risks presented to children attending 17 the Forest Grove Elementary School from exposure to the chemicals emitted from the Burnaby 18 Terminal, as well as the potential health risks at the playgrounds and residences located in the 19 neighbourhood of Forest Grove.

20 For the purposes of the SLHHRA of pipeline and facilities, it was assumed that people would be 21 found on both a short-term and long-term basis at the location within the LSA corresponding to 22 the MPOI (Filing IDs A3S2L1, A3S2L2, A3S2L5, and A3S2L7). The MPOI refers to the location 23 at which the highest air concentrations of each of the COPC would be expected to occur, and at 24 which the COPC exposures received by the people within the LSA would be greatest. The 25 decision to use the MPOI to represent the location at which people would be found was made 26 by default; that is, consideration was not given as to whether or not it would be reasonable for 27 people to be found at the location on either a short-term or long-term basis. Using this 28 approach, the potential health risks predicted in the SLHHRA were unlikely to be understated, 29 but conversely may have been exaggerated. For the tank terminals, the results of the SLHHRA 30 revealed that, despite the conservative assumptions employed, the maximum predicted levels of 31 exposure to the COPC (acting either singly or in combination) remained below the 32 corresponding health-based exposure limits. Adverse health effects would therefore not be 33 anticipated among people within the LSA from exposure to the COPC emitted from the 34 additional tanks at the Edmonton, Sumas and Burnaby terminals.

35 The results of the SLHHRA for the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion revealed that, with 36 very few exceptions, the maximum predicted levels of exposure to the COPC (acting either 37 singly or in combination) at the MPOI remained below their health-based exposure limits. The 38 exceedances revealed in the SLHHRA for the Westridge Marine Terminal expansion were few 39 in number and in virtually all cases were modest in magnitude. The high degree of conservatism 40 incorporated into both the exposure estimates and the exposure limits must be considered in 41 the interpretation of the exceedances. To expand on the findings and conclusions of the 42 SLHHRA, the detailed HHRA of Westridge Marine Terminal was completed. One of the major

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1 refinements made in the HHRA included the assessment of the potential health risks at discrete 2 (or fixed) locations corresponding to actual households, schools, assisted-living complexes, 3 communities, parks and recreation areas found within the LSA for the Westridge Marine 4 Terminal. No exceedances were predicted for any of the 52 discrete locations identified and 5 assessed within the LSA.

6 The major findings for the discrete locations were:

7 · The contribution of the Project to the cumulative exposures was negligible to low. In the 8 majority of instances, the potential health risks remained unchanged between the 9 assessment cases (i.e., Base Case, Application Case, and Cumulative Case), signifying that 10 the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic will have very little, if any, effect on the 11 Base Case health risks.

12 · The predicted acute health risks for the COPC emitted from the Project and Project-related 13 marine vessel traffic were below the applicable benchmarks (or target risk estimates), 14 indicating that adverse health effects would not be expected.

15 · The predicted chronic health risks associated with exposure to the COPC via inhalation and 16 the various secondary pathways of exposure (i.e., inhalation of dust, food ingestion, and 17 dermal contact) were below the benchmark (or target risk estimate) for the non-carcinogenic 18 COPC emitted from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic, indicating that 19 adverse health effects would not be anticipated as a result of potential long-term exposures.

20 · The predicted cancer health risks associated with the Project and Project-related marine 21 vessel traffic were predicted to be less than 1 in 100,000 (i.e., less than one extra cancer 22 case in a population of 100,000 people), indicating that the incremental cancer risks from 23 the Project are deemed to be “essentially negligible.”

24 Appendix C of the HHRA contains inhalation results for the COPC at each of the discrete 25 locations evaluated in the HHRA, including Forest Grove Elementary School (Location ID 26 No. 24) (Filing ID A3Y1F5).

45.1.4 Human Health Effects in Sensitive Individuals 27 BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0), Senichenko G (Filing ID 28 A4L6Q9), NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L9R1), and SFU (Filing ID A4Q0X8) have expressed concern 29 regarding the potential health risks to sensitive individuals in the population from exposure to 30 chemical emissions associated with the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic. 31 Specifically, concern was expressed by Living Oceans Society with respect to individuals with 32 compromised health, Senichenko G expressed concern regarding children’s health, and 33 BROKE and NS NOPE raised concern over the sensitivities of children, women of child-bearing 34 age, the elderly, and individuals with compromised health.

35 For the purposes of the HHRAs, reliance was placed on health-based exposure limits 36 developed or recommended by leading scientific or regulatory authorities as objectives, 37 guidelines or standards for the protection of human health. The use of regulatory limits is a 38 common practice among practitioners of risk assessment. These limits typically embrace a high 39 degree of conservatism, in direct recognition of the mandate of most of the authorities to protect 40 public health, including the health of infants and children, the elderly, and individuals who might 41 be especially vulnerable to chemical exposures.

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1 The development of exposure limits typically follows a standard protocol wherein the level of 2 exposure that causes either no effects or minimal effects only on the most sensitive health 3 endpoint in the most sensitive species is identified (i.e., the no-observed-adverse-effect level 4 [NOAEL] or lowest-observed-adverse-effect level [LOAEL]), and then the NOAEL or LOAEL is 5 adjusted to a lower value using uncertainty factors to accommodate possible differences in 6 responsiveness to the chemical that may exist within and between species to arrive at the 7 exposure limit. Additional uncertainty factors may be applied to allow for limitations in the extent 8 to which health effects information exists for the chemical. Examples of the use of uncertainty 9 factors are provided in Table 45-1. Typically, the use of uncertainty factors results in at least a 10 100-fold downward adjustment of the NOAEL or LOAEL. The net result is that the exposure limit 11 is often set at a level well below the levels at which adverse health effects have been observed. 12 As such, the potential health effects in sensitive individuals were accounted for in the HHRAs of 13 the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic.

14 In a letter report submitted by SFU entitled “Trans Mountain Expansion Project – Review of 15 Human Health Risk Assessments, Evidence Report” (Pottinger Gaherty Environmental 16 Consultants Ltd.) (Filing ID A4Q0X8) concerns were raised regarding the absence of an 17 assessment of the potential health effects in people engaged in high intensity activities 18 (e.g., people with higher inhalation rates than the general public, such as construction workers, 19 athletes, and people participating in recreational activities). However, this issue is addressed 20 through the application of health-based exposure limits that also account for higher than usual 21 exposure intensities. In addition, the exposure limits for a number of the respiratory irritants 22 such as SO2 are based on data that include exposure and subsequent health effects for 23 exercising asthmatics, which would represent an intense exposure scenario for sensitive 24 individuals.

25 TABLE 45-1 26 27 EXAMPLES OF COMMONLY-USED UNCERTAINTY FACTORS

Nature of Uncertainty Magnitude of Factor Comments Differences in sensitivity 3 to 10-fold Used to accommodate the uncertainty surrounding the use of between species laboratory animal data to predict potential human responses. For example, an uncertainty factor of 10 assumes that humans are 10 times more sensitive to the chemical than the laboratory animal species studied. Differences in sensitivity 3 to 10-fold Used to account for individuals within the human population that within a species may be more sensitive to a chemical than the average person. For example, an uncertainty factor of 10 assumes that the sensitive individual is 10 times more responsive than the average person. LOAEL to a NOAEL 3 to 10-fold Used to account for the uncertainty surrounding the use of a LOAEL when a NOAEL is not available for the critical health endpoint in the most sensitive test species. For example, an uncertainty factor of 10 assumes that, at a dose 10 times lower than the lowest dose used in the most definitive toxicity study, no responses would be observed in the test species. Duration of exposure 3 to 10-fold Used to account for the uncertainty surrounding the use of data involving shorter exposure periods to predict the responses that might occur over longer periods of exposure. Adequacy of database 3 to 10-fold Used to account for a lack of toxicological information for one or more endpoints. 28

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1 45.1.5 Uncertainties in the Human Health Risk Assessments 2 45.1.5.1 Primary Pathway of Exposure (Inhalation) 3 Health Canada expressed concern in its letter of comment (Filing ID A4S0Z6) over the 4 uncertainties in the predicted ground-level air concentrations of the COPC that served as the 5 basis of the predicted health risks. Although Trans Mountain acknowledges that uncertainty can 6 surround any predictions, regardless of whether the predictions relate to air quality or health 7 risks, it is Trans Mountain’s position that these uncertainties were accommodated through the 8 use of assumptions that were both reasonable and conservative.

9 Furthermore, Trans Mountain committed in response to NEB IR No. 3.019b (Filing ID A4H1V2) 10 to design each terminal such that the ground-level air concentrations of the COPC, including 11 those chemicals identified to be of particular concern by intervenors and Health Canada (e.g., 12 benzene, NO2, and PM2.5), are below the lowest applicable AAQOs established in BC or Alberta. 13 To ensure that these objectives are met, Trans Mountain has also agreed to update its 14 assessment of air quality as the Project’s engineering design nears or reaches completion, and 15 to conduct ambient air quality monitoring and reporting at a new station to be installed at the 16 Westridge Marine Terminal (refer to Trans Mountain’s response to PMV IR No. 2.25 for further 17 details; Filing ID A4H8W5). It is Trans Mountain’s opinion that the findings and conclusions of 18 the HHRAs remain valid and accurately reflect the manner and extent to which people’s health 19 could be affected by exposure to the chemical emissions associated with the Project and 20 Project-related marine vessel traffic. Based on the weight-of-evidence, it is Trans Mountain’s 21 position that the potential health risks that could be presented to the general public from 22 exposure to the emissions would be negligible and no adverse health effects would be 23 anticipated. Nonetheless, in response to GoC F-IR No. 2.01 (Filing ID A4L0A5), Trans Mountain 24 has committed to update its HHRA of the Westridge Marine Terminal should the updated air 25 quality assessment reveal increases in the predicted ground-level air concentrations of the 26 COPC under the Base, Application, or Cumulative cases.

27 45.1.5.2 Secondary Pathways of Exposure 28 As part of the Problem Formulation step of each of the HHRAs, close attention was given to 29 identifying the pathways by which exposure to the chemical emissions from the Project and 30 Project-related marine vessel traffic could occur. Since the chemicals will be emitted directly into 31 the air, the primary pathway by which people could be exposed is via inhalation (i.e., breathing 32 in chemicals). Exposure through less obvious secondary pathways also could occur and were 33 evaluated as part of the current assessment. For example, the chemicals might fall-out or 34 deposit from the air onto the ground and enter the food chain (i.e., deposition of the chemicals 35 directly onto the leafy surfaces of local vegetation and/or deposition onto soils, with subsequent 36 uptake by plants through the root system). The affected foods could then be eaten by people 37 (i.e., a secondary pathway). As such, the exposure pathways examined in the HHRAs included 38 not only the primary inhalation pathway, but also secondary pathways such as the inhalation of 39 dust; the ingestion of soil (inadvertent), water, and locally-grown and/or harvested foodstuffs; 40 and dermal contact with soil and water. Allowance was made for the fact that the people might 41 practice different lifestyles within the LSA that could affect their opportunities for exposure to the 42 chemical emissions. In this regard, the HHRAs examined the potential health risks that could be 43 presented to residents of local Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal communities, with allowance for 44 the possibility that these Aboriginal peoples may practice a traditional lifestyle.

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1 In its letter of comment (Filing ID A4S0Z6), Health Canada highlights certain uncertainties that 2 reduce the confidence in the prediction of the potential health risks associated with the 3 secondary pathways of exposure to the COPC. Specifically:

4 · Uncertainties associated with the prediction of the COPC concentrations in fish 5 and shellfish using freshwater, not marine, surface water quality; and,

6 · Uncertainties due to the exclusion of recreational exposures such as 7 swimming, boating, paddling and fishing in the marine environment.

8 First, Trans Mountain acknowledges that uncertainty can surround the prediction of any health 9 risks; however, it is Trans Mountain’s position that these uncertainties were accommodated in 10 the HHRAs through the use of assumptions that were both reasonable and conservative.

11 Second, Trans Mountain believes that clarification is required regarding Health Canada’s 12 suggestion that the COPC concentrations in shellfish were predicted using freshwater COPC 13 concentrations. In fact, concentrations of the COPC in beachfood, including shellfish, were 14 predicted in the HHRAs using predicted COPC sediment concentrations at relevant locations 15 along the shoreline of the Burrard Inlet.

16 Lastly, the predicted health risks associated with the secondary pathways of exposure in the 17 HHRAs did not include background exposures; therefore, in accordance with Health Canada 18 guidance, a benchmark (or target risk estimate) of 0.2 (i.e., five possible exposure pathways, 19 each accounting for 20% of exposure) was used in the interpretation of the potential health risks 20 associated with the secondary pathways of exposure. As background exposures were not 21 incorporated, the exposures (and the corresponding health risks) were determined based on the 22 deposition of the COPC emitted to air from the Project and Project-related marine vessel traffic 23 to the surface of a local water body. Deposition of the COPC to surface water in Burrard Inlet 24 would be expected to have little, if any, influence on surface water quality due to the high 25 degree of lateral and vertical mixing that would occur in the marine environment. However, due 26 to the reduced mixing that is characteristic of a lentic system, it would be reasonable to assume 27 that deposition of the COPC could have an effect on the surface water quality in Burnaby Lake. 28 Therefore, exposures associated with fish consumption and recreational activities such as 29 swimming and boating were conservatively predicted in Trans Mountain’s response to NEB IR 30 No. 3.011a (Filing ID A4H1V2) using COPC concentrations predicted for a lentic system such 31 as Burnaby Lake.

32 Health Canada also suggests in its letter that the uncertainty associated with the prediction of 33 the potential health risks for Aboriginal peoples associated with the secondary pathways of 34 exposure, such as the consumption of locally-grown and/or harvested foodstuffs, could be 35 reduced through the use of consumption patterns specific to Aboriginal peoples living in the 36 LSA. Health Canada cites the evidence submitted by the Tsleil-Waututh First Nation 37 (Filing ID A4L6C4) in which the consumption patterns vis-à-vis the types of foods traditionally 38 consumed by the Nation are described.

39 Trans Mountain agrees with this suggestion. Based on review of the Tsleil-Waututh First 40 Nation’s evidence (Filing ID A4L6C4), Trans Mountain believes that the consumption patterns 41 assumed in the HHRAs were suitably representative of the Aboriginal peoples living within the 42 LSA. For the purposes of the HHRAs, reliance was placed on the First Nations Food Nutrition 43 and Environment Survey for BC (Chan et al. 2011) to describe the consumption patterns of the

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1 Aboriginal peoples within the LSA. In the survey, food consumption patterns were obtained by 2 24-hour food recall surveys and a food frequency questionnaire. More than 1,100 interviews of 3 First Nations people were completed province-wide. It was assumed that the consumption 4 patterns of the Aboriginal communities located within the LSAs would be most similar to those 5 described for the “high consumers” of Ecozone/Cultural Area 6 (Pacific Maritime/Subarctic/ 6 Northwest Coast) of the survey, including:

7 · beachfoods, such as crab, clams, oysters, scallops, shrimp, prawns and 8 mussels;

9 · birds, such as ducks, geese and grouse;

10 · mammals, such as deer, elk, moose, caribou, bears, sheep, rabbits and 11 beaver;

12 · fish, such as salmon, trout, cod, rockfish, halibut, herring, whitefish and fish 13 roe; and,

14 · plants, such as Labrador tea leaves, rose hips, balsam tree inner bark, rat root, 15 berries and seaweed.

16 Aboriginal peoples were assumed in the HHRAs to obtain 100% of these foodstuffs from the 17 LSA. Health Canada acknowledges that this is likely a conservative assumption given that the 18 Aboriginal communities are located in an urban setting.

19 In its evidence, the Tsleil-Waututh First Nation describes the natural resources it asserts the 20 right to access and harvest or use for cultural, ceremonial, spiritual, subsistence, and economic 21 purposes:

22 · shellfish, such as crabs, clams, oysters, shrimp, mussels, and sea urchins;

23 · birds, such as ducks, grebes, grouse, and their eggs;

24 · mammals, such as deer, elk, bears, rabbits, squirrels, and seals;

25 · fish, such as salmon, trout, cod, flounder, sole, rockfish, and herring; and their 26 eggs; and,

27 · kelp, drift logs, and a variety of other plants and seaweeds.

28 Comparison of the types of foods assessed in the HHRAs and those presented in the Tsleil- 29 Waututh First Nation’s evidence suggests that the consumption patterns of the Aboriginal 30 peoples living in the LSA were adequately characterized in the HHRAs. Therefore, Trans 31 Mountain remains confident that the results and conclusions of the HHRAs accurately reflect the 32 potential health risks that could be presented to residents of the local Aboriginal and 33 non-Aboriginal communities within the LSA via the secondary pathways of exposure.

45.2 Accidents and Malfunctions 34 General concern regarding the potential effects of an oil spill associated with the Project and 35 Project-related marine vessel traffic on human health were raised in evidence submitted by

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1 BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), City of Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L6U5 and A4L7V8), District of 2 North Vancouver (Filing ID A4Q0E9), Doherty D (Filing ID A4L8U3), Living Oceans Society 3 (Filing IDs A4L9R6 and A4L9S0), LNIB (Filing ID A4Q7H4), Maa-Nulth Nation (Filing ID 4 A4L6D5), Metro Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7Y3, A4L7Y8 and A4L7Y9), Musqueam Indian Band 5 (Filing ID A4Q2F9), NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L5V1, A4L9R1 and A4L9R2), PIPEUP (Filing 6 ID A4Q0Q5), Senichenko G (Filing ID A4L6Q9), SFU (Filing ID A4Q0X8), Shxw’ōwhámel (Filing 7 IDs A4L9U9 and A4Q1A2), Tsleil-Waututh First Nation (Filing ID A4L6C4), and Upper Nicola 8 Band (Filing ID A4R4I4).

9 Additionally, several Aboriginal communities expressed concerns that an oil spill would have 10 long-term to permanent effects on their resource-based economy, commercial and traditional 11 harvest activities, culture, and community well-being. These concerns are addressed in 12 Section 58.0 (Social and Cultural Well-Being), Section 67.0 (Costs of an Oil Spill) and 13 Section 75.0 (Community Health), while potential effects of chemical exposures relating to an oil 14 spill are discussed herein.

15 A series of HHRAs were conducted by Trans Mountain with the aim of identifying and 16 understanding the potential health effects that might be experienced by people in the unlikely 17 event of an oil spill, including:

18 · Qualitative Human Health Risk Assessment of Westridge Marine Terminal 19 Spills Technical Report (Filing ID A3S4X2);

20 · Qualitative Human Health Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation Spills 21 Technical Report (Filing ID A3S4R2);

22 · Human Health Risk Assessment of Pipeline Spill Scenarios Technical Report 23 (Filing ID A3X6U1); and

24 · Human Health Risk Assessment of Facility and Marine Spill Scenarios 25 Technical Report (Filing IDs A3Y1E9, A3Y1F0, A3Y1F1 and A3Y1F2).

26 Complete details surrounding the manner by which the HHRAs were performed, the results that 27 emerged, and the conclusions that were reached were presented in the HHRAs listed above. 28 Highlights surrounding the methods, findings, and conclusions are provided below to provide 29 context and background for the responses to intervenor evidence that follow.

30 The overall approach followed to assess the potential health effects that could occur among 31 people present in the area of an oil spill associated with the Project and Project-related marine 32 vessel traffic proceeded step-wise, beginning with a preliminary qualitative human health risk 33 assessment (QHHRA). The results of the preliminary QHHRAs were then used to determine the 34 need for a more comprehensive assessment to better determine the prospect for people’s 35 health to be affected and to better define the nature and extent of any health effects that they 36 might experience.

37 The approach followed for the QHHRAs of the various spill scenarios differed from that routinely 38 adopted for the assessment of the potential health risks associated with chemical exposures, 39 including the HHRAs of the routine operations. Unlike routine operations, which consist of 40 planned activities for which chemical exposures and any associated health risks can be 41 anticipated and assessed on the basis of known or reasonably well-defined exposure scenarios,

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1 spills represent low probability, unpredictable events for which the exposures and risks must 2 necessarily be forecast on the basis of strictly hypothetical scenarios. Accordingly, rather than 3 following a conventional HHRA paradigm with an emphasis on quantifying the potential risks 4 involved, the QHHRAs of the various spill scenarios were designed to provide an indication of 5 the prospect for people’s health to be affected under different hypothetical spill scenarios, 6 together with an indication of the types of health effects, if any, that might be experienced, with 7 both elements addressed from a qualitative perspective.

8 The overall approach followed for the QHHRAs included consideration of the following:

9 · the type and volume of oil spilled;

10 · the types of chemicals contained in the spilled oil to which people could be 11 exposed;

12 · the extent to which people could be exposed based on predictions of how the 13 spilled oil and the chemicals would likely behave in the environment;

14 · the manner and pathways by which people might be exposed to the chemicals;

15 · the types of health effects known to be caused by the chemicals as a function 16 of the amount and duration of exposure;

17 · the responsiveness and sensitivity of the people who potentially could be 18 exposed to the chemicals; and

19 · the emergency response measures that will be taken by Trans Mountain and 20 other spill response authorities to limit people’s exposure to the chemicals in 21 the event of a spill.

22 Consistent with the NEB’s letter entitled Filing Requirements Related to the Potential 23 Environmental and Socio-Economic Effects of Increased Marine Shipping Activities, Trans 24 Mountain Expansion Project (NEB 2013), each of the assessments examined a set of simulated 25 and unmitigated spill scenarios involving different-sized spills under conditions corresponding to 26 credible worst-case (CWC) circumstances and a similar, but smaller-sized spill. Descriptions of 27 each of the simulated oil spill scenarios are presented below.

28 The QHHRA of the Westridge Marine Terminal involved the spillage of oil while loading a tanker 29 vessel at berth at the Westridge Marine Terminal. The CWC spill scenario assumed the spillage 30 of 160 m³ of CLWB dilbit. At 160 m³, this spill is substantially smaller than the over 1,500 m³ 31 capacity of the precautionary boom that will be deployed around each berth while any cargo 32 transfer activities are taking place, and it is reasonable to expect that the spill would be 33 contained within the pre-deployed boom. However, as a conservative approach to this scenario, 34 it was deemed that, for oil spill modelling and health effects assessment purposes, 20% of the 35 oil released (i.e., 32 m³) would escape the containment boom. This condition was chosen to 36 ensure a conservative approach to spill response requirements at the site and does not reflect 37 Trans Mountain’s expectation for performance of the precautionary boom, which will be in place 38 to fully contain such a release at the Westridge Marine Terminal. A smaller release of 10 m³ of 39 CLWB dilbit also was evaluated. This smaller release was assumed to result from a loading arm 40 leak and be totally contained within the boom placed around all tankers during loading.

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1 The QHHRA of marine transportation involved a second set of simulated and unmitigated spill 2 scenarios of different sized spills resulting from the grounding of a laden tanker on Arachne 3 Reef. The CWC oil spill scenario and the similar but smaller spill scenario that were assessed 4 involve the spillage of 16,500 m³ and 8,250 m³, respectively, of CLWB dilbit into the northern 5 portion of the Haro Strait from the powered grounding of a laden tanker on Arachne Reef. Both 6 scenarios shared a number of common features with respect to the various criteria that 7 governed their selection in terms of the spill location, including:

8 · The northern entrance to the Haro Strait has the greatest level of navigation complexity for 9 the entire passage that would be taken by the tanker, due in part to the numerous vessels 10 that transit the Strait.

11 · The tanker was assumed to strike the reef while under its own power; whereas, it has been 12 proposed that the tanker be tethered to a tug through this part of the passage.

13 · The spill location has a very high environmental and socio-economic value, with several 14 distinct areas and habitats present including , the Gulf Islands, the San Juan 15 Islands, the , and the Juan de Fuca Strait.

16 The findings of the QHHRAs suggested that people’s health could be affected by acute 17 inhalation exposure to the chemical vapours released during the early stages of an oil spill 18 under each of the simulated oil spill scenarios examined. Although the health effects would 19 likely be confined to mild, transient sensory and/or non-sensory effects, attributable largely to 20 the irritant and central nervous system (CNS) depressant properties of the chemicals, the 21 findings of the QHHRAs signalled the need for further analysis to more fully define the nature 22 and extent of any health effects that people might experience. On this basis, the HHRA of 23 facility and marine spill scenarios was completed, which presents a more in-depth analysis of 24 the potential health effects that could be experienced by people under the different simulated 25 spill scenarios compared to the earlier QHHRAs, providing better definition of the types of 26 effects that could occur, the time course of these effects, and the populations that might be 27 affected.

28 In addition, in Trans Mountain’s response to Surrey Teachers IR No. 1.5a (Filing ID A3X6U0), 29 an HHRA aimed at identifying and understanding the potential health effects that might be 30 experienced by people under a set of simulated and unmitigated pipeline oil spill scenarios was 31 completed (Surrey Teachers IR No. 1.5a – Attachment 1, Filing ID A3X6U1). The oil spill 32 scenarios examined involved the spillage of oil to land in Metro Vancouver as a result of third- 33 party damage to the pipeline during the summer season. The selection of the spill location was 34 based, in part, on the fact that more people could be potentially affected by a spill occurring 35 near an urban centre compared to a spill in a remote, largely uninhabited area along the 36 pipeline corridor because of the higher population size and density involved. Moreover, the large 37 population size found in urban centres better allows for the possibility that individuals showing 38 heightened sensitivity to chemical exposures could be part of the exposed cohort compared to 39 the sparser populations found in remote areas. In addition, stakeholders at various community 40 meetings and the Fraser Health and Vancouver Coastal Health expressed an interest in 41 understanding the potential human health effects that could result from an oil spill in an urban 42 area.

43 That said, the outcomes of the assessment of the specific spill scenarios and location examined 44 were judged to be representative of the types of health effects that might be experienced by

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1 people living in smaller communities, including Aboriginal communities, located along the 2 pipeline route in the event that an oil spill was to occur in such neighbourhoods.

3 Again, the choice of spill volumes was guided, in part, by the NEB’s letter entitled Filing 4 Requirements Related to the Potential Environmental and Socio-Economic Effects of Increased 5 Marine Shipping Activities, Trans Mountain Expansion Project (NEB 2013), notably the need to 6 examine the effects for both a CWC spill scenario and a smaller spill scenario. In this regard, 7 the guidance provided by the NEB was extended to the HHRA of pipeline spill scenarios, with 8 the above two spill volumes assessed: one representing the volume of oil that potentially could 9 be spilled under CWC conditions; and the second involving the spillage of a smaller amount of 10 oil. For the purposes of the HHRA of the pipeline spill scenarios, the volume of oil spilled under 11 the CWC spill scenario was assumed to be 1,558 m³. For the smaller release scenario, it was 12 assumed that the volume of oil spilled was 1,012 m³. The potential spill volumes were estimated 13 taking into consideration the expected response time for initiation and completion of valve 14 closure upon detecting a leak, the distance between valve locations, and include both the 15 volume of oil that would be released under pressure before the valves close as well as the 16 drain-down volume for the pipeline between valve locations.

17 Each of the HHRAs followed a paradigm adapted from that used for conventional HHRAs to 18 reflect the emphasis on identifying the potential health consequences that could occur under the 19 different simulated oil spill scenarios based on the premise that the spills had taken place. 20 Similar to the HHRA paradigm discussed under the routine operations, the adapted paradigm 21 followed a series of steps in which consideration is given to both the toxicological properties of 22 the chemicals of interest as well as the opportunities for exposure to these chemicals that might 23 exist to arrive at an understanding of the types of health effects that people might experience. 24 A brief description of the various steps is provided below.

25 · Problem Formulation – This step was concerned with defining the overall scope and 26 boundaries of the assessment, and was meant to focus the work on the areas of principal 27 interest and concern. It focused on five major areas:

28 o Identification of the Project components to be examined, with a specific focus on 29 identifying components that might reasonably be anticipated to contribute to 30 chemical exposures through the release of chemicals into the environment.

31 o Identification of the exposure scenarios under which people might reasonably be 32 anticipated to be exposed to the chemicals released from the various Project 33 components.

34 o Identification of the COPC found in the releases to which people could be 35 exposed.

36 o Identification and characterization of the people that could potentially be exposed 37 to the COPC.

38 o Identification of the exposure routes and pathways by which people might be 39 exposed to the COPC.

40 · Exposure Assessment – This step involved estimating the level of exposure to the COPC 41 that might be received by people via different exposure pathways. Reliance was placed on 42 air dispersion modelling of the chemical vapours emitted from the spilled oil to arrive at

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1 estimates of the chemical exposures that people in the area could potentially experience. A 2 sub-part of this step involved defining the areal extent or size of the area that might be 3 affected by the chemical vapours emitted from the spilled oil under each of the oil spill 4 scenarios examined, with an aim to focus the assessment on those areas where exposure 5 to the COPC might be expected to be greatest and/or where particularly sensitive individuals 6 may be located. For the purposes of the HHRA of the Westridge Marine Terminal and 7 marine transportation spill scenarios, reliance was placed on the results of spill modelling 8 simulations of the fate and behaviour of the spilled oil under each of the simulated spill 9 scenarios. Consideration was given to the manner in which the components of the spilled oil 10 would partition between the water column and the air in order to develop estimates of the 11 airborne concentrations that could occur as a function of elapsed time. The model outputs 12 were ultimately used to derive hour-by-hour estimates of the one-hour average vapour 13 concentrations of the COPC at progressively increasing distances from the site of the oil spill 14 for each spill scenario. In the HHRA of the pipeline spill scenarios, reliance was placed on 15 the results of air dispersion modelling for each of the simulated and unmitigated spill 16 scenarios. The model outputs represented the maximum one-hour average vapour 17 concentrations of the COPC at progressively increasing distances from the site of the oil spill 18 for each spill scenario. These hourly estimates were used to determine the extent to which 19 people in the area could be exposed to the vapours during the early stages of the oil spill.

20 · Toxicity Assessment – This step involved identifying and understanding the potential health 21 effects that can be caused by each of the COPC (acting either singly or in combination), and 22 the exposure conditions under which the effects can occur. The step revolved around the 23 principle that the dose of a chemical largely dictates the nature and extent of any health 24 effects that might be observed. Consideration was given to understanding the influence of 25 the amount, duration, and frequency of exposure on the types and severity of the health 26 effects. The principal outcomes of this step were:

27 o The determination of exposure limits for the COPC, which refer to the levels of 28 exposure that would not be expected to cause adverse health outcomes. The 29 exposure limits are often based on guidelines, objectives, or standards 30 established by leading scientific and regulatory authorities charged with the 31 protection of public health, with the level of protection afforded by the limits set so 32 as to be protective of even sub-populations who may show heightened 33 responsiveness to chemical exposures. For the purposes of HHRAs, emphasis 34 was placed on exposure limits intended to be protective against health effects 35 resulting from short-term exposures (referred to as acute exposure limits) since 36 the focus of the work was on determining the nature and extent of health effects 37 that could occur among people from short-term inhalation exposure to the COPC 38 vapours released from the surface of the oil slick during the early stages of the oil 39 spill before the arrival of first responders and the implementation of emergency 40 and spill response measures.

41 o The identification of benchmarks other than conventional exposure limits, which 42 were considered better suited for health effects assessment purposes because of 43 the particular exposure circumstances involved. For example, situations in which 44 there can be rare, atypical accidental exposure of the general public to a 45 chemical(s), such as during spills, fires, or explosions, may be better addressed 46 using benchmarks such as the Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs)

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1 developed by the U.S.EPA or the Emergency Response Planning Guidelines 2 (ERPGs) developed by the American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA). 3 These guidelines are specifically intended for use in determining the potential 4 risks to the health of the general public from rare exposures to high 5 concentrations of airborne chemicals for short durations. For the purposes of the 6 HHRAs, the one-hour AEGLs and ERPGs developed for the COPC provide 7 added perspective vis-à-vis the prospect for people’s health to be adversely 8 affected from exposure to the chemical vapours released from the surface of the 9 oil during the early stages of the spill.

10 o The determination of the relevant chemical mixtures given the fact that people 11 are rarely exposed to chemicals in isolation, but rather exposure most commonly 12 occurs to mixtures of chemicals. The latter situation applies to the oil spill 13 scenarios in that the vapours released during the spill will consist of a mix of 14 hydrocarbons and other chemicals emitted simultaneously from the surface of 15 the oil slick. Accordingly, it was necessary that the assessment consider the 16 health effects that might be experienced by people in the area at the time of the 17 spill not only from exposure to the COPC acting singly, but also in combination.

18 An appreciable amount of conservatism was incorporated into the assessment to avoid any 19 health effects being overlooked or understated. The high degree of conservatism involved is 20 reflected, in part, by the use of the predicted maximum one-hour average airborne 21 concentrations of the COPC as proxies for the acute inhalation exposures that might be 22 received by people. Conservatism also was introduced by the use of the exposure limits as 23 comparison benchmarks, with the understanding that the exposure limits correspond to levels of 24 the COPC well below those at which adverse health effects are known to occur.

25 The major conclusions that emerged from the HHRAs were:

26 · Based on the weight-of-evidence, there was no obvious indication that people’s health 27 would be seriously adversely affected by acute inhalation exposure to the chemical vapours 28 released during the early stages of a spill under any of the simulated oil spill scenarios 29 examined.

30 · The evidence suggests that the health effects that could be experienced by people in the 31 area would likely be confined to mild, transient sensory and/or non-sensory effects, 32 attributable largely to the irritant and CNS depressant properties of the chemicals. Odours 33 also might be noticed, which could contribute to added discomfort and irritability.

34 · The evidence indicates that these mild, transient health effects could be experienced under 35 all of the simulated oil spill scenarios examined; however, the intensity of the effects would 36 be greatest for the larger spill sizes because of the higher concentrations of the chemical 37 vapours that could be encountered and the longer durations of exposure.

38 · Although mild and transient, the effects would still be annoying and discomforting, indicating 39 the need for and importance of the spill prevention programs described in Volumes 7 and 8A 40 of the Application. Planning and preparedness around emergency and spill response also 41 are critical to ensure timely and adequate response to any spill events in order to limit 42 opportunities for chemical exposures such that public health is not threatened or

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1 compromised, again highlighting the need for and importance of the emergency and spill 2 response programs described in Volumes 7 and 8A.

3 · The absence of any serious adverse health effects from exposure to the chemical vapours 4 released from the surface of the oil slick during the early stages of the spill scenarios applies 5 to people in general, including the general public as well as first responders arriving on 6 scene. However, because the first responders could remain on scene for some time while 7 working to isolate, contain, and recover the spilled oil, and could face the prospect of direct 8 physical contact with the oil and/or more prolonged exposure to the vapours, it is important 9 that they be trained in emergency and spill response procedures, be equipped with PPE, 10 and be alert to potential exposure opportunities so as to minimize any exposures they might 11 receive.

45.2.1 Approach to Assess Human Health Effects 12 Concern was expressed by the City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7V8) over the “qualitative” 13 approach used in the HHRAs to assess the potential health effects that might be experienced by 14 people as a result of an oil spill associated with the Project or Project-related marine vessel 15 traffic.

16 As discussed in Weaver A IR No. 2.06b (Filing ID A4H9J8), the HHRAs were qualitative only 17 insofar as:

18 · The assessments did not incorporate the very low probability of occurrence of the various 19 simulated oil spill scenarios that were examined, but rather conservatively assumed that the 20 spill incidents had occurred. Consideration was not given to the spill prevention programs 21 described in Volumes 7 and 8A of the Application that will be in place to avoid such 22 incidents.

23 · The assessments did not include numerical risk estimates per se in the form of risk 24 estimates calculated by dividing the estimated exposures by the health-based exposure 25 limits, or more specifically in this case, dividing the predicted maximum one-hour average 26 concentrations of the COPC vapours that people in the area might encounter during the 27 early stages of the incident by the corresponding exposure limits, AEGLs and/or ERPGs that 28 served as comparison benchmarks for assessing the nature and extent to which people’s 29 health could be affected by acute inhalation exposure to the vapours.

30 Information respecting the probability of occurrence of oil spill events was documented in 31 Volumes 7 and 8A of the Application. The rationale for not incorporating spill probability 32 functions into the HHRAs was provided in Section 3.1 (Overall Approach) of the reports, and 33 Trans Mountain has no additional information to provide.

34 The absence of risk estimates does not detract from the interpretation of the findings of the 35 HHRAs. One of the primary objectives of the HHRAs was to understand the nature and extent 36 to which people’s health could be affected from exposure to the hydrocarbon and other 37 chemical vapours released from the surface of the spilled oil. From visual inspection of 38 Tables 5.1 to 5.4 (Filing ID A3Y1E9), pertaining to the pipeline spill scenarios and comparison of 39 the predicted concentrations of the COPC against the corresponding exposure limits, AEGLs 40 and/or ERPGs, it can quickly be discerned that people would not be expected to experience 41 health effects from exposure to the vapours other than minor, transient sensory and/or non-

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1 sensory effects under these spill scenarios. It is obvious from the tables that the predicted 2 concentrations of the COPC are either lower than the corresponding exposure limits or lower 3 than the corresponding AEGL-1 and/or ERPG-1 guidelines.

4 The same can be said for the Westridge Marine Terminal and marine spill scenarios, with the 5 relevant information found in Tables 5.1 to 5.8 (Filing ID A3Y1E9). The calculation of risk 6 estimates would not contribute further to understanding how people’s health might be affected 7 from the exposures. It would simply convert the information into a series of numerical risk 8 estimates, the interpretation of which would ultimately lead to the same conclusions as the 9 visual examination and comparison of the numbers presented in the tables. In this regard, it is 10 not that Trans Mountain does not have the necessary information to complete a quantitative 11 assessment; it is simply that such an assessment is not needed to meet the objectives of the 12 work. The evidence provided by the HHRAs is sufficient to permit understanding of the types of 13 health effects that people in the area could potentially experience from acute inhalation 14 exposure to the chemical vapours released from the surface of the spilled oil during the early 15 stages of the incident under each of the simulated oil spill scenarios that were examined.

45.2.1.1 Pipeline Spill Scenarios 45.2.1.1.1 Spill Location 16 LNIB (Filing ID A4Q7H4), Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9), and Living Oceans 17 Society (Filing ID A4L9S0) have expressed concern regarding the location selected for the 18 assessment of potential human health effects associated with a pipeline oil spill (i.e., within 19 Metro Vancouver). Additionally, LNIB and Musqueam Indian Band noted that the potential 20 human health effects were evaluated for a pipeline spill occurring to land rather than to water. 21 Each of these concerns is addressed below.

22 The primary objective of the HHRA of the pipeline spill scenarios was to assess the potential 23 health effects that could result from short-term inhalation exposure to chemical vapours 24 released from the surface of the spilled oil during the early stages of the oil spill incident, when 25 people could be unaware of its occurrence and before the arrival of first responders and the 26 implementation of emergency and spill response measures. On-land locations were determined 27 to be of principal interest since short-term inhalation exposure would most likely be realized 28 when a spill occurs from a segment of the pipeline crossing land where residences are located 29 nearby. The selection of the spill location was based, in part, on the fact that more people could 30 be potentially affected by a spill occurring near an urban centre (i.e., on land in Metro 31 Vancouver) compared to a spill in a remote, largely uninhabited area (e.g., over water) along the 32 pipeline corridor because of the higher population size and density involved. Moreover, the large 33 population size found in urban centres better allows for the possibility that individuals showing 34 heightened sensitivity to chemical exposures could be part of the exposed cohort compared to 35 the sparser populations found in remote areas.

36 As discussed in the Trans Mountain’s response to Living Oceans Society IR No. 1.42a 37 (Filing ID A3Y2T4), LNIB IR No. 2.14.1 (Filing ID A4H8T9), and Matsqui First Nation IR 38 No. 1.06c (Filing ID A3Y3X2), although the location of the pipeline spill scenarios was set in an 39 urban area, the outcomes of the assessment are considered representative of the types of 40 health effects that might be experienced by people living in smaller communities, including 41 Aboriginal and rural communities, located along the pipeline route. The simulated oil spill 42 scenarios considered in the HHRA were generic in nature vis-à-vis spill volume, terrain features

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1 and meteorological conditions such that the scenarios were not tied to a specific location along 2 the pipeline and the conclusions can be applied to other locations along the pipeline.

3 It is worth noting that the area within which these health effects could be experienced was 4 relatively limited, and not predicted to extend beyond approximately 1 km from the damaged 5 pipeline segment. It also is worth noting that the above findings and conclusions are consistent 6 with those of an independent literature review recently completed for Vancouver Coastal Health. 7 This literature review focused on historical oil spills and found that the short-term health effects 8 witnessed among people living in the area consisted of mild, transient sensory and/or non- 9 sensory effects, including headache, nausea, sore eyes, sore throat, nasal irritation, and other 10 symptoms similar to those mentioned in the HHRA (Eykelbosh 2014).

45.2.1.1.2 Spill Volumes 11 Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0) and SFU (Filing ID A4Q0X8) have expressed concern 12 regarding the spill volumes selected for the assessment of potential human health effects 13 associated with a pipeline oil spill.

14 The basis of the selection of the spill volumes assessed in the HHRA of pipeline spill scenarios, 15 together with the assumptions that formed part of the spill scenarios examined were outlined in 16 Section 4.0 (Specific Methods) of the Human Health Risk Assessment of Pipeline Spill 17 Scenarios Technical Report (Filing ID A3X6U1). Two spill volumes were assessed: i) a spill of 18 1,558 m³ CLWB dilbit that was examined as part of a CWC pipeline spill scenario; and ii) a spill 19 of 1,012 m³ CLWB that was examined as part of a smaller-sized spill scenario. The choice of 20 spill scenarios was guided, in part, by the NEB’s letter entitled Filing Requirements Related to 21 the Potential Environmental and Socio-Economic Effects of Increased Marine Shipping 22 Activities, Trans Mountain Expansion Project (NEB 2013), notably the need to examine the 23 effects for both CWC spill scenarios and smaller spill scenarios. In this regard, the guidance 24 provided by the NEB was extended to the HHRA of pipeline spill scenarios, with the above two 25 spill volumes assessed.

26 Trans Mountain’s position remains that the spill volume of 1,558 m³ is consistent with a CWC 27 spill scenario. As explained in the HHRA, it corresponds to a reasonable upper bound estimate 28 (95th percentile) of the volume of oil that might be spilled on land in the unlikely event of third- 29 party damage to the segment of the proposed pipeline running through Metro Vancouver. Its 30 selection was based on the development and analysis of estimates of potential spill volumes 31 that could occur at more than 2,000 locations along this pipeline segment, taking into the 32 consideration the distance between emergency shut-down valves, valve closure times, and 33 drain-down volumes between valve locations, as outlined in the HHRA and discussed in greater 34 detail in Volume 7, Section 3.1 of the Application.

35 Trans Mountain considers the choice of spill volumes examined in the HHRA of pipeline spill 36 scenarios to be not only in keeping with the guidance provided by the NEB, but also to be 37 meaningful and practical as well as respectful of the need for conservatism. The conservatism 38 incorporated into the CWC spill volume is apparent from the spill history compiled by Trans 39 Mountain for its existing pipeline system, publically available on the Trans Mountain website18 40 and submitted in response to Eliesen M IR No. 1.10a (Filing ID A3X6D1). The pipeline crude oil 41 spills are summarized in Table 45.2-1.

18 http://www.transmountain.com/spill-history

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1 TABLE 45.2-1 2 3 PIPELINE CRUDE OIL RELEASES REPORTED BY TRANS MOUNTAIN (1961-2014)

Incident No. Detected Location Substance Spill Volume (m3) 1961-011 7-Aug-61 B.C. @ MP 647.9 Mainline Crude Oil Unknown 1962-013 23-Aug-62 B.C. @ MP 520.1 Mainline Crude Oil 1.6 1963-002 19-Feb-63 loop line MP 182.3 Crude Oil Unknown 1965-007 27-May-65 MP 292.51 Crude Oil 44 1966-016 29-Apr-66 Mile 239 Crude Oil 1110 1971-002 26-Apr-71 Mile 581.3, Downstream from Brodie Valve Crude Oil 475 1973-016 24-Jun-73 MP 205, Alberta Crude Oil 125 1977-016 21-Jun-77 MP 39.7 Mainline Crude Oil 1031.7 1984-004 25-Mar-84 Line Valve Crude Oil N/A 1984-016 4-Jul-84 Main Line Valve KP 525.3 Crude Oil <0.001 1987-008 9-Mar-87 Km 116.47 Pembina River Crossing west of Edmonton, AB Crude Oil 0.6 4

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1 TABLE 45.2-1 2 3 PIPELINE CRUDE OIL RELEASES REPORTED BY TRANS MOUNTAIN (1961-2014) 4 (continued)

Incident No. Detected Location Substance Spill Volume (m3) 1988-012 19-May-88 TMPL - Chiliwack KP 1017 Crude Oil N/A 1990-029 6-Sep-90 TMPL to Burnaby Line Crude Oil - Sweet 1 1991-093 24-Jun-91 TMPL Kamloops to Burnaby Line Crude Oil - Sweet 1 1998-026 15-May-98 TMPL - Mainline Crude Oil - Sweet 0.5 1999-005 21-Jan-99 TMPL - Blue River Scraper Trap Crude Oil - Sweet 0.16 2007-065 24-Jul-07 TMPL - Westridge Line Crude Oil - Synthetic 232 2011-065 22-Apr-11 TMPL - Mainline @ KP 150 near Chip Lake, AB Oil 1.6 No NEB # 12-Jun-13 TMPL - Mainline Kingsvale North Crude Oil 0.8 No NEB # 26-Jun-13 TMPL - Mainline @ KP 966 Crude Oil 17.8 5

6 As shown in Table 45.2-1, the spill volumes are consistently less than the CWC spill volume 7 examined in the HHRA of pipeline spill scenarios, with most values being not only well below 8 the CWC volume, but also the smaller-sized spill volume. These data serve to demonstrate that 9 the choice of spill volumes examined in the HHRA was entirely appropriate.

45.2.1.2 Facility Spill Scenarios 45.2.1.2.1 Spill Location 10 Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0), Senichenko G (Filing ID A4L6Q9), and SFU 11 (Filing ID A4Q0X8) have expressed concern regarding the location selected for assessment in 12 the simulated and unmitigated facility oil spill scenarios presented in the HHRA of facility and 13 marine spill scenarios. The rationale surrounding the selection of the facility spill scenarios vis- 14 à-vis spill location, spill circumstances, and spill volumes was presented in Volume 7, 15 Section 8.0 of the Application (Filing ID A3S4V6). The oil spill scenarios associated with the 16 Westridge Marine Terminal were developed per the requirements set out in the NEB’s letter 17 entitled Filing Requirements Related to the Potential Environmental and Socio-Economic Effects 18 of Increased Marine Shipping Activities, Trans Mountain Expansion Project (NEB 2013). Trans 19 Mountain is confident that the spill scenarios examined in the HHRA met these requirements.

20 With respect to on-land oil spills at the Burnaby, Edmonton, and Sumas terminals, Trans 21 Mountain believes that the simulated oil spill scenarios that were examined in the HHRA of 22 pipeline spill scenarios can be considered representative of a tank terminal spill scenario and 23 illustrative of the manner and extent to which people’s health might potentially be affected from 24 exposure to the hydrocarbon vapours emitted from the spilled oil in the event of an oil spill at 25 any of the terminals. As outlined in the HHRA, the scenarios examined included a CWC spill 26 scenario and a smaller-sized spill scenario involving the spillage of 1,558 m³ and 1,012 m³ of oil, 27 respectively, in which the entire volume of spilled oil was allowed to escape from beneath the 28 ground and pool, without mitigation and with no containment. Trans Mountain believes these 29 pipeline spill scenarios can be extrapolated to the tank terminals based on two lines of 30 evidence, the first of which relates principally to the spill scenarios themselves, and the second 31 of which relates to the factors governing the hydrocarbon vapour exposures and any associated 32 health effects that people might experience in the unlikely event of an oil spill. Examination of

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1 both lines of evidence reveals that the spill circumstances that would apply to a tank terminal 2 spill, even under CWC conditions, were sufficiently well-captured by the HHRA so as to allow 3 the conclusions of the assessment to be extrapolated to the tank terminals with reasonable 4 confidence, in part, because of the high degree of conservatism built into the HHRA.

5 With respect to the first line of evidence, the following apply:

6 · Although the pipeline spill scenarios examined involved the spillage of oil from a pipeline to 7 land within Metro Vancouver as a result of third-party damage to the line, the findings and 8 conclusions of the HHRA would apply to urban settings in general, including any urban 9 developments neighbouring the Edmonton, Sumas, and Burnaby terminals, regardless of 10 whether or not the spill was to originate from a pipeline or a tank terminal.

11 · Based on the spill history records compiled and submitted by Trans Mountain in response to 12 Eliesen M IR No. 1.10a, the CWC and smaller spill volumes assessed in the pipeline spill 13 scenarios would be applicable to a tank terminal spill for the purposes of assessing the 14 potential health effect that people might experience in the unlikely event of a spill occurring. 15 These records show that between 1961 and 2014, the average and 95th percentile volume of 16 crude oil spilled at Trans Mountain’s terminals or tank farms was 87 m³ and 223 m³, 17 respectively, with the largest spill of 1,587 m³ having occurred at the Edmonton terminal in 18 1985 (refer to Table 45.2-2). Since 1985, there have been no crude oil spills exceeding 19 250 m³ at any of the Trans Mountain terminals. The 1985 Edmonton terminal spill volume is 20 comparable to the volume of oil spilled under the CWC pipeline oil spill scenario (1,558 m³) 21 assessed in the HHRA of pipeline spill scenarios. Further discussion of the spill volumes is 22 provided below.

23 · The HHRA did not allow for the emergency and spill response actions that would quickly be 24 taken by Trans Mountain and other spill response authorities to isolate, contain, and recover 25 the spilled oil if a pipeline spill was to occur. Rather, as part of the conservatism 26 incorporated into the assessment, the spilled oil was assumed to spread quickly and freely 27 and pool without any containment such that people in the area could be exposed to the 28 maximum vapour concentrations emitted from the spilled oil, which were predicted to occur 29 along the edge of the pooled oil and decline with increasing distance downwind from this 30 point. As outlined in the response to SFU IR No. 2.3.11 (Filing ID A4H9C9), Trans Mountain 31 has a statutory obligation to comply with CSA Standard Z662, which requires that the tank 32 terminals be equipped with secondary containment with a capacity of 110% of the volume of 33 the largest tank within the tank farm. As such, any oil spilled at any of the tank terminals 34 would be captured within containment areas, and would not be allowed to escape and pool 35 offsite, thereby reducing any prospect for people in the area to be exposed to vapours 36 emitted from the spilled oil.

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1 TABLE 45.2-2 2 3 TERMINAL AND TANK FARM CRUDE OIL RELEASES REPORTED BY TRANS MOUNTAIN 4 (1961-2014)

Incident No. Detected Location Substance Spill Volume (m3) 1978-019 15-Jun-78 Tank # 51 Oil 6.4 1980-003 3-Jan-80 Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil 2 1981-022 20-Aug-81 Tank Line Crude Oil 150 1982-006 22-Apr-82 Westridge Loading Line Crude Oil 0.045 1982-028 28-Oct-82 TMPL Burnaby Terminal Crude Oil 7 1983-012 1-May-83 TMPL Burnaby Tank Farm # 82l Crude Oil 6 1984-018 26-Jul-84 Station Yard Crude Oil 2.6 1985-001 14-Jan-85 TMPL Edmonton Tank Farm Crude Oil 1587 1985-012 7-Apr-85 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil 0.08 1985-021 26-Aug-85 TMPL Kamloops, B.C. Terminal Crude Oil 3.2 1986-001 16-Jan-86 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil 6.4 1986-005 4-Mar-86 TMPL Kamloops, B.C. Terminal Crude Oil 67.1 1986-019 25-Oct-86 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil 38 1986-020 19-Oct-86 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil 4.8 1986-021 29-Oct-86 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil 195 1986-024 4-Nov-86 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil 2 1987-027 10-Aug-87 TMPL Burnaby Terminal Crude Oil 12 1988-008 20-Apr-88 TMPL Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil N/A 1989-003 1-Feb-89 TMPL - Burnaby Terminal Crude Oil 0.01 1989-016 21-Apr-89 TMPL - Edmonton Tank Farm Crude Oil Unknown 1989-017 25-Apr-89 TMPL - Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil 7.9 1990-003 13-Mar-90 TMPL - Westridge Terminal Crude Oil - Sweet 0.005 1990-015 6-Jun-90 TMPL - Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil 0.8 1990-017 11-Jun-90 TMPL - Kamloops Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet 3 1991-095 4-Jul-91 TMPL - Kamloops Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet 1 1991-196 3-Dec-91 TMPL - Edmonton Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet 2.8 1993-013 31-Jan-93 TMPL - Kamloops Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet 1.5 1993-088 25-Jun-93 TMPL - Edmonton Terminal Crude Oil - Sweet 25 1998-017 13-Mar-98 TMPL - Westridge Terminal Crude Oil - Sweet 0.04 2005-039 15-Jul-05 TMPL-Sumas Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet 246.4 2009-040 6-May-09 TMPL - Burnaby Terminal Crude Oil - Sweet 200 2012-016 24-Jan-12 TMPL - Sumas Tank Farm Crude Oil - Sweet 110 No NEB # 1-Dec-13 TMPL - Edmonton Terminal - Tank 31 Crude Oil 12.1

5 Note: Reproduced from the spill history compiled by Trans Mountain, publically available on the Trans Mountain website 6 (http://www.transmountain.com/spill-history) and submitted in response to Eliesen M IR No. 1.10a. 7 The second line of evidence concerns the principal factors governing the potential chemical 8 vapour exposures and any associated health effects that people in the area might experience in 9 the unlikely event of an oil spill occurring, regardless of location, with these factors being: i) spill 10 volume; ii) spill circumstances, including the time of year and meteorological conditions in effect 11 at the time; iii) people’s whereabouts in relation to the spill, including their distance from the pool 12 of spilled oil and orientation to the pooled oil in terms of wind direction; and iv) the timeliness of 13 spill response measures taken to isolate, contain, and recover the spilled oil. Examination of 14 these factors reveals the following:

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1 · Spill Volume: Based on the historical spill volume records for Trans Mountain’s tank 2 terminals (see above), the spill volumes assessed under the simulated pipeline oil spill 3 scenarios examined in the HHRA can be applied with reasonable confidence to the 4 terminals. In fact, with the exception of the largest historical spill recorded for the terminals 5 (1,587 m³), both the CWC (1,558 m³) and smaller-sized spill (1,012 m³) volumes assessed 6 under the pipeline spill scenarios were consistently and appreciably greater than the 7 historical terminal spill volumes, meaning that the chemical vapour exposures that people 8 were assumed to have experienced under the pipeline oil spill scenarios were likely much 9 greater than those that would ever occur in the event of an oil spill at any of the tank 10 terminals.

11 · Spill Circumstances: A number of conservative assumptions surrounding the spill 12 circumstances were incorporated into the HHRA in order to avoid overlooking or 13 understating the chemical vapour exposures and any associated health effects that people 14 in the area could experience under the pipeline oil spill scenarios, including: i) the spills were 15 assumed to have occurred during the summer months when higher temperatures favouring 16 the volatilization of lighter-end hydrocarbons from the surface of the pooled oil would be in 17 effect; and ii) stable meteorological conditions not conducive to the dispersion and dilution of 18 the chemical vapours emitted from the pool of spilled oil were assumed to be in effect.

19 · People’s Whereabouts: It was conservatively assumed that people would be located directly 20 downwind of the pool of spilled oil along the centreline of the dispersing vapour plume, 21 where they would encounter the maximum concentrations of the chemical vapours emitted 22 from the pooled oil.

23 · Spill Response: As stated earlier, the HHRA did not allow for the emergency and spill 24 response measures that would quickly be taken by Trans Mountain and other spill response 25 agencies and personnel to isolate, contain, and recover the spilled oil in the event of a 26 pipeline oil spill as part of a coordinated action to protect human health and the 27 environment. Many of these measures would be directed at minimizing people’s exposure to 28 the spilled oil itself and to the chemical vapours emitted from the pooled oil. No allowance 29 was made for any containment of the spilled oil, rather it was assumed to have flowed 30 unimpeded from the damaged pipeline, pooling in an area to which the public could have 31 access. As indicated above, this situation is unlike conditions at the tank terminals which are 32 manned, allowing for quick response, and where secondary containment exists to capture 33 any spilled oil in the unlikely event an oil spill was to occur.

34 Each of these factors alone would have contributed to conservative estimates of the potential 35 exposures and any associated health effects that people could experience under the pipeline oil 36 spill scenarios that were examined in the HHRA. When combined, they would very likely have 37 resulted in exaggeration of the manner and extent to which people’s health might actually be 38 affected by exposure to the chemical vapours in the unlikely event a pipeline oil spill was to 39 occur. Yet, despite the conservatism, the results of the HHRA indicated that people would not 40 experience health effects other than minor, transient sensory and/or non-sensory effects from 41 exposure to the chemicals vapours, with the vapour concentrations being well below emergency 42 exposure guidelines, even the AEGL-1 and/or ERPG-1 guidelines.

43 Having examined the results of the HHRA and having considered the spill volumes, spill 44 circumstances, and conservative assumptions that formed the basis of the HHRA, Trans 45 Mountain is confident that the conclusions of the assessment can be extrapolated to the TMEP

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1 tank terminals. Based on the lines of evidence discussed above, especially when combined, 2 there is sufficient allowance in the spill scenarios examined and the conservatism incorporated 3 into the HHRA to accommodate any nuances that might exist between a pipeline oil spill and an 4 oil spill at the tank terminals without changing the overall conclusions of the HHRA.

45.2.1.2.2 Spill Volumes 5 Concern has been expressed by the City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H5), City of Vancouver 6 (Filing IDs A4L7L1, A4L7V8 and A4L7L0), Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0), Metro 7 Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7Y3, A4L7Y8 and A4L7Y9), Senichenko G (Filing ID A4L6Q9), SFU 8 (Filing ID A4Q0X8) and Tsleil-Waututh First Nation (Filing ID A4L6C4) regarding the spill 9 volumes selected for the assessment of potential human health effects associated with the 10 Westridge Marine Terminal oil spill scenarios. This concern was also expressed in Health 11 Canada’s letter of comment (Filing ID A4S0Z6).

12 As discussed in Volume 7, Section 8.0 of the Application (Filing ID A3S4V6), the Westridge 13 Marine Terminal simulated spill scenarios included two different-sized spills: one representing 14 the volume of oil that potentially could be spilled under CWC conditions, and the second 15 involving the spillage of a smaller amount of oil. DNV undertook a quantitative risk assessment 16 that included a comprehensive review of the entire shipping route, together with forecasted 17 traffic increases to 2018 and 2028. As part of the assessment, DNV calculated an oil spill 18 volume of 103 m³ associated with a CWC spillage during cargo handling at the Westridge 19 Marine Terminal; deemed to be a low probability event with likelihood of occurring once every 20 1,655 years to 234 years. Despite this, the CWC simulated spill scenario resulting from an 21 incident during loading of a tanker at the terminal was assessed assuming a volume of 160 m³. 22 At 160 m³, this spill is larger than the CWC spill resulting from a rupture of a loading arm. It is 23 also substantially smaller than the over 1,500 m³ capacity of the precautionary boom that will be 24 deployed around each berth while any cargo transfer activities are taking place and it is 25 reasonable to expect that the spill would be entirely contained within the boom. In addition, 26 observed weak currents at the terminal support the full containment of the oil within the pre- 27 deployed boom. However, as a conservative approach to this scenario, it was deemed that, for 28 oil spill modelling purposes, 20% of the oil released would escape the containment boom (i.e., 29 32 m³). This condition was chosen to ensure a conservative approach to spill response 30 requirements at the site and does not reflect Trans Mountain’s expectation for performance of 31 the precautionary boom which will be in place to fully contain such a release at the terminal.

45.2.1.3 Marine Transportation Spill Scenarios 45.2.1.3.1 Spill Location 32 BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), City of Burnaby (Filing IDs A4L8H5 and A4L8H6), City of 33 Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7K9, A4L7L0, A4L7L1 and A4L7V8), Metro Vancouver (Filing IDs 34 A4L7Y3, A4L7Y8 and A4L7Y9), Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9), and Tsleil-Waututh 35 First Nation (Filing ID A4L6C4) have expressed concern regarding the potential health effects 36 that might be experienced by people in the event of a tanker spill within Burrard Inlet or English 37 Bay. Concern was also expressed in the letter of comment submitted by Health Canada that 38 “the magnitude of the air quality impacts of spills in the marine environment may be greater than 39 was presented in the Proponent’s HHRA” (Filing ID A4S0Z6). Much of these concerns originate 40 from a report entitled the “Air Quality Impacts from Simulated Oil Spills in Burrard Inlet and 41 English Bay” that was prepared by Levelton Consultants Ltd. (Levelton) to characterize air

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1 contaminant emissions and conduct air dispersion modelling for four hypothetical spills of 2 diluted bitumen from a carrier departing from the Westridge Marine Terminal.

3 Identification of the exact location to be carried forward in the HHRA of the marine 4 transportation spill scenarios (i.e., Arachne Reef) was established based on an overlap of very 5 high environmental and socio-economic value as well as greatest navigational complexity. As 6 such, selection of the hypothetical spill location was risk-informed, taking into consideration both 7 spill probability and potential consequences in terms of ecological, human, and socio-economic 8 sensitivities. As discussed in Trans Mountain’s response to Metro Vancouver IR No. 1.6.52a 9 (Filing ID A3Y2V0):

10 “Whereas several potential oil spill locations were modeled stochastically, the 11 selection of a deterministic oil spill scenario focused on potential spills at Arachne 12 Reef, in the Gulf Islands. This location is near the main shipping channel, and 13 represents a location of greater than average navigational difficulty. It is also near 14 the boundary between Canadian and U.S. territories, and this location provides 15 proximity to sensitive shoreline and other ecologically sensitive areas associated 16 with the Gulf/San Juan Islands. As indicated by the stochastic spill analysis, a 17 spill at this location also has the potential to affect several distinct areas and 18 habitats, including but not limited to Boundary Pass / Semiahmoo Bay, the 19 Gulf/San Juan Islands, the Strait of Georgia, Juan de Fuca Strait and Puget 20 Sound.”

21 It is Trans Mountain’s position that the spill scenarios chosen for assessment met the filing 22 requirements set forth by the NEB. Additional information supporting Trans Mountain’s position 23 is provided in “Reply to City of Vancouver, Tsleil-Waututh Nation, Metro Vancouver: Air Quality 24 Impacts from Simulated Oil Spills in Burrard Inlet and English Bay.”

45.2.1.3.2 Spill Volumes 25 Similar to the above, BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H5), City of 26 Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7L0, A4L7L1 and A4L7V8), Health Canada (Filing ID A4S0Z6), Metro 27 Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7Y3, A4L7Y8 and A4L7Y9), Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID 28 A4Q2F9), and Tsleil-Waututh First Nation (Filing ID A4L6C4) have expressed concern regarding 29 the potential human health effects that might be experienced as a result of large spill in Burrard 30 Inlet or English Bay.

31 For the purpose of the HHRA of marine transportation, the CWC and smaller spill volumes were 32 assumed to be 16,500 m³ and 8,250 m³, respectively, due to a vessel grounding or collision that 33 results in complete loss of either one or two cargo tanks in an Aframax tanker. It is important to 34 note that a large oil spill such as the CWC spill volume is not a credible scenario within Burrard 35 Inlet or English Bay. As described in Trans Mountain’s response to PMV IR No. 1.8.1 (Filing 36 ID A3X6V4), DNV found that the likelihood for a spill of this size (i.e., 16,000 m³) occurring in the 37 Burrard Inlet is very low and not probable due to the strong set of risk reducing measures in 38 place as well as the slow speed of tankers and other vessels in this area. These risk reducing 39 measures are listed in Volume 8C, Section 6 (Filing ID A3S5F6), and include:

40 · using only modern double hull tankers, which meet conditions of the Tanker 41 Acceptance Standards;

42 · speed limitations in the harbour;

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1 · Clear Narrows at Second Narrows and First Narrows with a harbour master’s 2 launch escorting to ensure this condition is met by other vessels;

3 · only daylight departure are permitted;

4 · under direction of two BC Coast Pilots carrying independent Global Positioning 5 System based navigation computers (Personal Pilotage Units) who have been 6 trained at directing the movement of the tanker;

7 · travelling through known shipping fairways within the harbour;

8 · tethered to multiple tugs; and

9 · developing a shipping channel in the Central Harbour for passing vessels in the 10 Westridge area that will improve berth and anchorage safety.

11 DNV’s detailed analysis showed that in Burrard Inlet the large majority of plausible collisions 12 would not have the energy to break the cargo hull and that only small hole sizes would be 13 plausible. Therefore, in the rare event of a collision in Burrard Inlet, only potential for smaller oil 14 spills than the estimated CWC spill volume would be expected to occur. As well, the detailed 15 analysis showed that the probability for a collision causing an oil spill of any size is 1 in 19,286 16 years.

45.2.1.4 Other Products 17 City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H6), City of Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7K9 and A4L7V8), Living 18 Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0), SFU (Filing IDs A4Q0X8 and A4Q0Z3) and Shxw’ōwhámel 19 First Nation (Filing ID A4L9U9) have expressed concern regarding the potential health effects 20 associated with the spillage of products other than CLWB dilbit, including light and synthetic 21 crudes as well as refined products such as gasoline or jet fuel.

22 As discussed in Trans Mountain’s response to City of Vancouver IR No. 2.08.04b (Filing 23 ID A4H8I9), although the TMPL system (existing Line 1) currently transports a variety of crude 24 oil and refined products such as gasoline or jet fuel, the expansion (Line 2) has been proposed 25 in response to requests for service from Western Canadian oil producers and West Coast 26 refiners for increased pipeline capacity in support of growing oil production and access to 27 growing West Coast and offshore markets. The expanded TMPL system will have the capability 28 to transport a variety of crude oil products, including both light and heavy crude oil. Those crude 29 oils often referred to as dilbit will be the primary crude oil transported in Line 2, and refined 30 products such as gasoline will continue to be transported in existing Line 1. Assessment of 31 products carried in existing Line 1 is outside the scope of the Application.

32 Based on the rationale provided in response to Living Oceans Society IR No. 1.33c (Filing 33 ID A3Y2T4) and summarized below, CLWB dilbit was selected as the representative crude oil 34 for the identification of the COPC in the HHRAs. The rationale for the selection of CLWB, and 35 thereby the COPC, was:

36 · Dilbit is expected to comprise a large percentage of the oil transported by Line 2 (refer to 37 Volume 7, Section 5.1.1.1; Filing ID A3S4V5).

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1 · CLWB is currently transported by Trans Mountain, and it will continue to represent a large 2 percentage of the total products transported by Line 2. Accordingly, in the unlikely event of a 3 spill occurring, there is a strong possibility that the spilled product will be CLWB.

4 · The diluent in CLWB is liquid condensate that is rich in light-end hydrocarbons that are 5 volatile or semi-volatile in nature. These hydrocarbon components could potentially be 6 released as vapours from the surface of the spilled oil, which would then disperse in a 7 downwind direction, possibly reaching people who could inhale them.

8 · A sample of CLWB was tested by an accredited third-party laboratory to provide information 9 on its physical and chemical characteristics. A full list of trace elements and organic 10 compounds analyzed in CLWB, including the concentration of individual chemical 11 compounds, was provided in Table 6.2 of the Qualitative Ecological Risk Assessment of 12 Pipeline Spills Technical Report (Filing ID A3S4W9). Copies of the original laboratory 13 certificates are provided in Appendix A of the report.

14 · A study characterizing the emissions from the surface of the CLWB in terms of the types and 15 amounts of chemicals present was conducted. The study was provided as BROKE IR No 16 1.9a – Attachment 1 – Flux Chamber Sampling Program in Support of Spill Modelling for the 17 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Final Report (Filing ID A3Y2D4).

18 Additional information on the physico-chemical characteristics of CLWB was provided in 19 Appendix I of A Comparison of the Properties of Diluted Bitumen Crudes with Other Oils 20 Technical Report (Filing ID A3S5G7).

21 It remains Trans Mountain’s position that CLWB dilbit is a representative product for the 22 assessment of the potential health effects that might be experienced by people in the event of 23 an oil spill.

45.2.2 Human Health Effects Associated with Exposure to Chemical Vapours 45.2.2.1 1,3-Butadiene 24 Concern has been expressed in evidence submitted by BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), City of 25 Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H6), City of Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7K9 and A4L7V8), and NS NOPE 26 (Filing IDs A4L5V1 and A4L9R1) over the potential health effects that might be experienced by 27 people as a result of exposure to 1,3-butadiene vapours from the surface of an oil spill.

28 As discussed in response to Metro Vancouver IR No. 2.5.2 (Filing ID A4H8U8), in the unlikely 29 event of an oil spill, 1,3-butadiene is not expected to be a constituent of the vapours emitted 30 from the surface of the spilled oil. For the purposes of the HHRAs of the different spill scenarios, 31 CLWB diluted bitumen was selected as the representative crude oil for the identification of the 32 COPC vapours that could be emitted from the surface of the spilled oil. The rationale for the 33 selection of CLWB, and thereby the list of COPC, has been provided above in Section 62.2.1.4 34 (Other Products). 1,3-Butadiene was not measured in the bulk liquid analysis of CLWB provided 35 in Appendix A of the Qualitative Ecological Risk Assessment of Pipeline Spills Technical Report 36 (Filing ID A3S4W9), nor was it measured in the vapours above the surface of the CLWB (Filing 37 ID A3Y2D4). As a result, 1,3-butadiene was not identified as a COPC in the HHRAs.

38 Furthermore, 1,3-butadiene is a product of incomplete fossil fuel combustion (Environment 39 Canada and Health Canada 2000; U.S. EPA 2002a). As a result, regardless of the product

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1 under consideration, it is reasonable to expect that 1,3-butadiene would not be emitted in the 2 vapours emitted from the surface of the spilled oil in the unlikely event of a pipeline release, an 3 incident while loading a tanker at the Westridge Marine Terminal, or a grounding of a laden 4 tanker.

45.2.2.2 Benzene 5 BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7V8), Dorothy D (Filing 6 ID A4L8U3), NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L9R2 and A4L5V1), Living Oceans Society (Filing 7 ID A4L9S0), and Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation (Filing IDs A4Q1A1 and A4Q1A2) have expressed 8 concern regarding the potential health effects that could result from inhalation exposure to 9 benzene vapours released from the surface of spilled oil. Many of these intervenors provided a 10 discussion of the potential health effects that could result from exposure to benzene, including 11 cancer and certain other types of health effects that are associated with chronic exposure. 12 However, no attempt was made to correlate the specific health effects to the durations or 13 concentrations involved, as described in the HHRAs. Instead, the information provided in the 14 submitted evidence was limited to a listing of the health effects that can potentially result from 15 exposure to benzene, without regard to the durations and concentrations necessary to produce 16 such effects. The dose of a chemical (i.e., as a function of the amount, frequency and duration 17 of exposure) largely dictates the nature and extent of any health effects that might be observed.

18 First, opportunity for long-term exposure of the general public via the inhalation pathway would 19 be limited, in part, because of the emergency and spill response measures outlined in Volumes 20 7 and 8A of the Application that would be taken by Trans Mountain, the WCMRC, Coast Guard 21 authorities and/or other spill response agencies and personnel to quickly contain and recover 22 the spilled oil. The actual resources involved would depend on the nature and location of the 23 spill. In addition, notification of and consultation with appropriate municipal, provincial and 24 federal authorities as well as local, regional, provincial and/or federal public health authorities 25 would quickly occur as part of a coordinated response directed, in part, at determining the need 26 for and type of actions required to protect people if public health or safety were threatened. 27 These timely, coordinated spill response actions will serve to reduce the prospect for people to 28 be exposed to the spilled oil itself and/or chemicals released from the oil on both a short-term 29 and longer-term basis.

30 As part of the overall emergency and spill response and environmental monitoring programs, air 31 quality monitoring surveys would be initiated to measure hydrocarbon and other chemical 32 vapour levels in the air, and the information used, in part, to help guide decision-making with 33 respect to public health and safety, including the need for continued environmental surveillance 34 and management of public access to the area. Access would only be allowed if public health 35 and safety was not threatened; otherwise, access would be restricted until monitoring revealed 36 vapour levels to be within acceptable limits based on comparison against baseline and/or other 37 appropriate reference levels and/or AQOs/guidelines developed for the protection of public 38 health. If vapour levels in the area were such that public health and/or safety were threatened, 39 evacuation of the area could be ordered by the appropriate authorities.

40 Some possibility would exist for people in the area to be exposed to chemical vapours released 41 from the surface of the spilled oil during the early stages of the incident, before the arrival of first 42 responders and the implementation of emergency and spill response measures. Depending on 43 conditions, these vapours could first appear and be released from the surface of the oil slick and 44 disperse into the area soon after the spill, before people are made aware of the incident. The

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1 prospect for and/or extent to which people might be exposed to the vapours would quickly 2 decline as the emergency and spill response measures are put into place. Additionally, the rate 3 and extent to which hydrocarbon and other chemical vapours would be released from the 4 surface of the spilled oil would diminish over time with weathering, which, combined with the 5 recovery and removal of the oil, would reduce opportunity for long-term exposure to the 6 vapours. The air quality monitoring programs that would be in place would act to ensure that 7 vapour levels are within acceptable limits, further reducing any prospect for the general public to 8 experience long-term exposure to the vapours at elevated levels, such that chronic health 9 effects, including cancer, would not be anticipated. For these reasons, long-term exposure to 10 the chemicals contained in the spilled oil via the inhalation pathway was not examined in detail 11 in the HHRAs conducted by Trans Mountain. Instead, the HHRAs focused on identifying and 12 understanding the nature and extent to which the health of people in the area could be affected 13 by short-term inhalation exposure to the chemical vapours released from the surface of the 14 spilled oil during the early stages of the incident, before the arrival of first responders and the 15 implementation of emergency and spill response measures described in Volumes 7 and 8A of 16 the Application.

17 Second, the findings of the HHRAs for the different pipeline, terminal and marine spill scenarios 18 provided no indication that people’s health would be seriously adversely affected by short-term 19 inhalation exposure to benzene vapours emitted from the surface of spilled oil during the early 20 stages of a crude oil spill. Certainly, there is no evidence to indicate that they would suffer 21 serious, irreversible and/or life-threatening health effects or symptoms that might impair their 22 ability to safely leave the area as implied by the submitted evidence. In fact, the weight-of- 23 evidence suggests that the health effects associated with short-term exposure to benzene that 24 could be experienced by people in the area would likely be confined to mild, transient health 25 effects, attributable largely to the CNS depressant properties of benzene. Symptoms consistent 26 with nominal CNS involvement could include mild headache, light headedness, minor vertigo, 27 dizziness, and/or nausea. These effects would likely resolve quickly upon cessation of exposure 28 without lingering after-effects. Odours described as sweet also might be noticed, which could 29 contribute to added discomfort and irritability.

30 The evidence indicates that these mild, transient health effects could be experienced under all 31 of the simulated oil spill scenarios examined; however, the intensity of the effects would be 32 greatest for the larger spill sizes because of the higher concentrations of the chemical vapours 33 that could be encountered and the longer durations of exposure, albeit still short-term in nature.

34 Although mild and transient, the effects would still be annoying and discomforting, indicating the 35 need for and importance of the spill prevention programs described in Volumes 7 and 8A of the 36 Application. Planning and preparedness around emergency and spill response also are critical 37 to ensure timely and adequate response to any spill events in order to limit opportunities for 38 chemical exposures such that public health is not threatened or compromised, again 39 highlighting the need for and importance of the emergency and spill response programs 40 described in Volumes 7 and 8A.

45.2.2.3 Carcinogens 41 BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), Taplay C (Filing ID A4L9H5), and NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L9R2 42 and A4L5V1) have expressed concern regarding the carcinogenic effects, including childhood 43 leukemia, associated with inhalation exposure to chemical vapours released from the surface of 44 spilled oil.

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1 As discussed in Section 45.2.2.2 (Benzene), the prospect for people to be exposed to the 2 vapours would quickly decline as the emergency and spill response measures are put into 3 place. Additionally, the rate and extent to which hydrocarbon and other chemical vapours would 4 be released from the surface of the spilled oil would diminish over time with weathering, which, 5 combined with the recovery and removal of the oil, would reduce opportunity for long-term 6 exposure to the vapours. The air quality monitoring programs that would be in place would act 7 to ensure that vapour levels are within acceptable limits, further reducing any prospect for the 8 general public to experience long-term exposure to the vapours at elevated levels, such that 9 adverse health effects, including cancer, would not be anticipated as a result of an oil spill.

10 Further details regarding long-term health effects and the measures that would limit long-term 11 exposure in the unlikely event of a spill (as described in the HHRAs) were presented in 12 response to Weaver IR No. 2.01a (Filing ID A4H9J8).

45.2.2.4 Developmental Toxicants 13 As part of its evidence, NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L5V1) expressed concern over the possible 14 effects of an oil spill on fetal development, citing statements taken from a report entitled 15 “Assessing the Effects of the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill on Human Health: A Summary of the June 16 2010 Workshop” discussing the effects of chemicals in general on fetal development, including 17 developmental effects possibly related to paternal exposures (Filing ID A4L5W7). A report 18 prepared by J. Edmonds entitled “What are the Health Effects of Pipelines and Oil Spills” also 19 was included as part NS NOPE’s evidence. The report contains a general statement alleging 20 that exposure to the chemical constituents found in crude oil can cause harm to children and 21 problems during pregnancy. The report references a small number of papers in support of 22 claims that exposure to certain of these constituents, notably ethyl benzene, can cause 23 congenital defects. Two papers discussing possible associations between paternal exposure to 24 chemicals in general and reproductive problems and birth defects are also referenced. The 25 BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5) and NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L9R1) evidence also included a report 26 entitled “Major Human Health Impacts of the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain Pipeline 27 Expansion” prepared by T. Takaro et al., which includes a brief discussion of the reproductive 28 and developmental toxicity of benzene.

29 Trans Mountain has reviewed the evidence and finds it to be not especially informative and of 30 questionable relevance in the context of understanding the manner and extent to which people’s 31 health (including the health of pregnant women, prospective fathers or the developing fetus) 32 could be affected by exposure to either the spilled oil itself and/or chemicals released from the 33 spilled oil. Much of the evidence relates to chemicals in general, without specific reference to 34 either the chemicals found in crude oil and/or exposure scenarios involving oil spills. Reference 35 is made to benzene and ethyl benzene, both of which are found in crude oil, but the information 36 provided is generic in nature, with either: i) no exposure-related information provided on which 37 to understand the dose-response relationships that apply to the various 38 reproductive/developmental effects mentioned; or ii) without any reference to how the 39 exposures causing the effects relate to the exposures that could be experienced by pregnant 40 woman, prospective fathers or infants and young children as a result of an oil spill. In the 41 absence of proper exposure characterization, including toxicological information respecting the 42 amount, frequency and duration of exposure involved in causing the reproductive and 43 developmental effects cited, it is impossible to interpret the evidence from a health risk 44 perspective for virtually any exposure scenario, whether scenarios involving routine operations 45 or scenarios focused on accidents and malfunctions, such as an oil spill. The evidence consists

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1 entirely of scattered information gathered from a few select papers that does nothing to 2 contribute to or advance understanding of whether and to what extent the health of expectant 3 mothers, prospective fathers, the developing fetus, or infants and young children could be 4 affected by chemical exposures associated with an oil spill.

5 As part of the Application, Trans Mountain submitted a series of technical reports detailing the 6 findings and conclusions of HHRAs of various simulated oil spill scenarios, including pipeline 7 spill scenarios (Filing ID A3X6U1) and facility and marine transportation spill scenarios. Each of 8 the HHRAs examined the types of health effects that could potentially be experienced by people 9 in the area from acute inhalation exposure to the chemical vapours emitted from the spilled oil 10 under each scenario.

11 As outlined in the responses to the City of North Vancouver IR No. 2.2.5a (City of Vancouver IR 12 No. 2.08.08a, exposure pathways other than acute inhalation exposure were determined to be 13 of no obvious concern since exposure potential was negligible and health effects would not be 14 anticipated from these pathways. The HHRAs relied on comparison of the predicted maximum 15 one-hour average concentrations of the chemicals vapours that people in the area might 16 encounter during the early stages of the incident, before the arrival of first responders and 17 before the implementation of emergency and spill response measures, against a series of 18 corresponding exposure guidelines developed by leading scientific and regulatory authorities for 19 the protection of human health, specifically protection against the occurrence of adverse health 20 effects from exposure to the chemicals.

21 The guidelines used for comparison included acute inhalation exposure limits as well as AEGLs, 22 both of which are deliberately set to be protective of the health of the general public, including 23 sub-populations who might show heightened sensitivity to chemical exposures, such as infants, 24 young children, the elderly and people with compromised health or with medical conditions that 25 might place them at increased risk, including pregnancy. The rationale surrounding the choice of 26 exposure guidelines used as the comparison benchmarks, and the exact manner in which the 27 comparisons were performed were described in the HHRAs. The results of the HHRAs 28 consistently showed that people would not be expected to experience health effects from 29 exposure to the chemical vapours other than mild, transient sensory and/or non-sensory effects, 30 with these latter effects being attributable to the irritant and CNS depressant properties of the 31 vapours and presenting as discomfort, irritability, mild irritation of the eyes, nose and/or throat, 32 mild cough, headache, light headedness, dizziness, and nausea. For each of the simulated oil 33 spill scenarios examined, the predicted maximum vapour concentrations that people might 34 encounter were well below either the exposure limits or the AEGLs. By virtue of the fact that the 35 protection afforded by the exposure limits and AEGLs extends to sub-populations potentially at 36 risk for reproductive and developmental effects, such as pregnant women and infants, the 37 results of the HHRAs, unlike the NS NOPE evidence, provide meaningful and relevant 38 perspective opposite whether and to what extent the health of these individuals might be 39 affected by chemical exposures associated with an oil spill. As already stated, for each of the oil 40 spill scenarios examined, the results indicated that, apart from the mild, transient symptoms 41 discussed above, these people’s health would not be expected to be adversely affected from 42 exposure to the chemical vapours emitted from the spilled oil in the unlikely event that an oil spill 43 was to occur.

44 With respect to NS NOPE’s concern over the possible linkage between paternal exposures to 45 chemicals and birth defects, specifically in relation to chemical exposures that might be 46 experienced by workers involved in oil spill cleanup, emergency and spill response personnel

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1 will be trained in emergency preparedness and response, will be equipped with appropriate 2 PPE, and will take appropriate precautions to avoid physical contact with the spilled oil itself as 3 well as to limit exposure to any chemical vapours that might be present (refer to the HHRAs and 4 Trans Mountain’s response to the City of North Vancouver IR No. 2.2.5a [Filing ID A4H8G1] and 5 City of Vancouver IR No. 2.08.06a [Filing ID A4H8I9]). These and other measures that would 6 form part of the emergency and spill response programs of Trans Mountain and other spill 7 response agencies to protect the health of workers would act to limit any chemical exposures 8 and corresponding health effects, including any paternal exposures, that might be experienced 9 by first responders and other response personnel.

10 Trans Mountain acknowledges the concern expressed by NS NOPE over the potential 11 reproductive and developmental effects that can occur from chemical exposures, and fully 12 respects the need to protect people’s health, including the health of pregnant women and 13 infants and young children, from chemical exposures in the unlikely event of an oil spill 14 occurring. The HHRAs included as part of the Application provide an understanding of the 15 manner and extent to which people’s health, including the health of individuals who may show 16 heightened sensitivity to chemical exposures such as pregnant women and children, could 17 potentially be affected from the chemical exposures resulting from an oil spill under each of the 18 oil spill scenarios examined. Although the results of the HHRAs indicated that people’s health 19 would not be seriously adversely affected from the exposures, the findings revealed that they 20 could experience minor, transient sensory and/or non-sensory effects that could be 21 discomforting and annoying. Trans Mountain fully respects the need for its emergency and spill 22 response programs to include measures aimed at minimizing any such effects.

45.2.2.5 Endocrine Disruptors and Immunotoxicants 23 NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L5V1) expressed concern over the possible effects of an oil spill on the 24 endocrine and immune systems of people who could potentially be exposed to the spilled oil, 25 citing evidence contained in a report prepared by J. Edmonds entitled “What are the Health 26 Effects of Pipelines and Oil Spills,” included as Appendix 12 (Filing ID A4L5W5) to NS NOPE’s 27 evidence. The report references two papers describing alterations in certain endocrine and 28 immune system parameters observed among people involved in the cleanup of spilled oil along 29 the coastal shoreline following the wreckage of the oil tanker Prestige that sustained serious 30 storm damage off the coast of Spain in 2002 (Laffon et al. 2013; Perez-Cadahia et al. 2008). NS 31 NOPE admits that the alterations “do not pinpoint specific adverse health effects caused by the 32 oil spill,” but rather represent changes that are not well understood, a position consistent with 33 that taken by others (Rodriguez-Trigo et al. 2007) who, after reviewing the results, concluded 34 that the changes are of unknown significance and should be interpreted with caution. The 35 difficultly in interpreting and assigning any significance to the alterations is due, in part, to the 36 following:

37 · Virtually no information was presented in the papers concerning the exposures to the spilled 38 oil that the people may have experienced. The people were simply described as having 39 participated in the cleanup activities for varying times, either as volunteers or hired workers, 40 with the latter individuals involved with either manually removing the spilled oil or using high 41 pressure sprayers to wash the oil off of oil-stained surfaces for several hours per day for 42 periods up to several months. The volunteers were engaged in cleanup activities for a 43 limited time only, manually removing the spilled oil for a few hours per day for less than one 44 week. Apart from these descriptions, no exposure-related information was provided making 45 it virtually impossible to assess the reported changes in the endocrine and immune system

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1 parameters from a dose-response perspective, which is critical for assigning causality and 2 interpreting the biological and/or toxicological significance of the findings.

3 · The majority of the alterations occurred in a random, mixed fashion, unrelated to exposure. 4 Assuming higher exposures would have been received by the hired workers compared to 5 the volunteers because of the time spent removing the spilled oil, it would reasonably be 6 expected that the alterations would be most pronounced among the former individuals if, in 7 fact, exposure to the oil was responsible for the changes. However, the alterations showed 8 no consistent exposure-related pattern, with the changes being equally or more or less 9 pronounced among the volunteers compared to the paid workers depending on the 10 parameter measured. The lack of any consistent dose-related pattern to the alterations 11 makes interpretation of the results difficult and assignment of cause and significance 12 tenuous.

13 · In some instances, the findings were conflicting between studies. For example, plasma 14 cortisol levels used as an indicator of endocrine function were reported to be decreased 15 among the exposed workers in one paper, yet increased in the second paper. Interestingly, 16 in both papers, the plasma cortisol levels across all of the exposed groups were well within 17 referent values for healthy human subjects reported in the literature. Moreover, even the 18 study authors admitted that cortisol levels are influenced by many factors, including diet, 19 sleep patterns, diurnal rhythms, caffeine ingestion, exercise level, laughter and relaxation. 20 Thus, assigning the cause of the alterations in the cortisol levels to exposure to the spilled 21 oil is fraught with uncertainty.

22 · A number of the measured parameters were demonstrated to be affected by the age, sex 23 and/or smoking history of the workers, confounding the interpretation of the results and 24 weakening any association between the alterations and exposure to the spilled oil.

25 · Apart from the lack of any clear dose-response relationship between the level of exposure 26 that may have been received by the different groups of workers and the incidence and 27 severity of the alterations in the endocrine and immunological system parameters, the 28 papers also reported no obvious or clear-cut correlation between the use of PPE by the 29 workers and the nature and extent of the alterations. This lack of correlation is unexpected 30 since other papers describing the health effects among workers involved in the cleanup of 31 the same oil spill reported that training and the use of PPE were quite effective in reducing 32 the incidence of symptoms (Carrasco et al. 2006; Suarez et al. 2005), raising suspicion as to 33 whether the alterations were in fact related to exposure to the spilled oil and introducing 34 further uncertainty regarding the interpretation of the findings. Alternatively, the lack of 35 correlation could signal that the type of PPE used may have been inappropriate and/or 36 improperly employed by the former groups of workers.

37 · Although certain of the alterations were shown to be statistically significantly different 38 between the exposed workers and the control population chosen for comparison, the 39 biological, toxicological and/or clinical significance of the changes is uncertain. All of the 40 alterations represent sub-clinical changes, oftentimes with values well within referent levels 41 for healthy subjects and/or well below toxicity threshold limits, introducing the possibility that 42 the changes represent nothing more than variants or study artefacts as opposed to any 43 effects attributable to exposure to spilled oil. As indicated above, other investigators have 44 questioned the relevance of the changes, and even NS NOPE admits that the alterations do 45 not represent adverse health effects per se.

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1 As part of the same evidence, NS NOPE expresses concern over possible genetic damage from 2 exposure to spilled oil, citing results from one of the same two papers discussed above (Perez- 3 Cadahia et al. 2008) in which tests for genetic alterations among the exposed workers also were 4 performed as a possible predictor of an increased risk of developing cancer, with interest in this 5 health endpoint stemming from the presence of aromatic and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons 6 in the spilled oil, certain of which are regarded as being known or probable human carcinogens. 7 The genotoxicity of the spilled oil has also been addressed in other papers (Perez-Cadahia et 8 al. 2007; Rodriguez-Trigo et al. 2007) through a combination of different genetic tests. Although 9 evidence of genetic alterations among some groups of workers exposed to the spilled oil was 10 revealed by certain of the genetic tests in some of the papers, interpretation of the significance 11 of the findings again was hindered for many of the same reasons discussed above for the 12 endocrine and immunological alterations, including: i) lack of exposure characterization; ii) 13 conflicting findings; and, iii) confounding by variables such as age, sex, smoking history as well 14 as genetic polymorphisms.

15 Apart from the significance of the above endocrine, immunological and genetic alterations 16 reportedly witnessed among the Prestige oil spill cleanup workers being unknown and NS 17 NOPE’s acknowledgement that the alterations do not represent adverse health effects, the 18 relevance of the findings to the TMEP is questionable given the mitigation programs described 19 above in Section 45.2.2.2 (Benzene).

45.2.2.6 Synergistic Effects of Mixtures 20 In evidence submitted by BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5) and NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L9R1 and 21 A4L9R2), concern has been expressed about the possibility of synergistic effects between the 22 chemical vapours released from the surface of the oil slick. As previously discussed, synergism 23 refers to a type of interaction between chemical mixtures such that the toxicity is altered, 24 becoming enhanced. Particular concern was expressed by BROKE and NS NOPE regarding 25 the potential for development of childhood leukemia from co-exposure to 1,3-butadiene and 26 benzene. As discussed in Section 45.2.2.1 (1,3-Butadiene), in the unlikely event of an oil spill, 27 1,3-butadiene is not expected to be a constituent of the vapours emitted from the surface of the 28 spilled oil.

29 In the HHRAs of the different spill scenarios, the chemical vapours released from the surface of 30 the oil slick which act through a common or similar toxicological mechanism and/or affect the 31 same target tissues and/or organs as a group were assumed to interact in an additive fashion. 32 As discussed previously, this approach is consistent with guidance from Health Canada 33 (2010a,b), which states “in most cases, the risks should be summed for chemicals with similar 34 modes of action and/or the same target organ tissue. Otherwise, toxicity and risk should be 35 assessed on a chemical-by-chemical basis.”

45.2.3 Human Health Effects Associated with Multiple Pathway Exposures 45.2.3.1 Pipeline and Facilities 36 Adams Lake Indian Band (ALIB) (Filing A4R4D0), City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H6), City of 37 Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7K9 and A4L7V8), Coldwater Indian Band (CIB) (Filing ID A4R4H0), 38 Health Canada (Filing ID A4S0Z6), Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0), LNIB (Filing ID 39 A4Q7H4), NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L9R2), Shxw’ōwhámel (Filing IDs A4L9U9 and A4Q1A2), and 40 Upper Nicola Band (Filing ID A4R4I4) have expressed concerns over the possible effects that a

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1 pipeline or facility oil spill might have on human health via exposures other than inhalation. In 2 most cases, the concerns raised were associated with a pipeline spill.

3 The prospect for and extent to which the general public might be exposed to either the spilled oil 4 itself and/or chemicals originating from the spilled oil through exposure pathways other than 5 inhalation were determined to be low to very low, and adverse health effects would not be 6 anticipated. Opportunity for exposure of the general public by these other pathways would be 7 limited, in part, because of the emergency and spill response measures outlined in Volumes 7 8 and 8A of the Application that would be taken by Trans Mountain, the WCMRC, Coast Guard 9 authorities and/or other spill response agencies and personnel, as applicable, to quickly contain 10 and recover the spilled oil. The actual resources involved would depend on the nature and 11 location of the spill. In addition, notification of and consultation with appropriate municipal, 12 provincial and federal authorities as well as local, regional, provincial and/or federal public 13 health authorities would quickly occur as part of a coordinated response directed, in part, at 14 determining the need for and type of actions required to protect people if public health or safety 15 were threatened. These timely, coordinated spill response actions will serve to reduce the 16 prospect for people to be exposed to the spilled oil itself and/or chemicals released from the oil 17 via all exposure pathways on both a short-term and longer-term basis.

18 A number of considerations were offered by Health Canada in its letter of comment in relation to 19 the development of mitigation measures and spill management plans aimed at minimizing 20 potential exposure opportunities and any associated health effects that people could experience 21 in the event of an oil spill, including the importance of: (i) monitoring of environmental media, 22 with allowance for lag times for the possible appearance of contaminants in drinking water 23 sources and/or foodstuffs, including country foods; (ii) identification of people and communities 24 potentially at risk, including Aboriginal communities; and (iii) consultation with health authorities 25 and potentially-affected communities in the development of communication plans and health 26 advisories. Trans Mountain welcomes these considerations and has embraced them as part of 27 its emergency and spill response programs, as evidenced, in part, by the emergency and spill 28 response plans described in Volumes 7 and 8A of the Application, on-going dialogue and a 29 continued commitment to engage and inform the local health authorities and local communities 30 of emergency and spill response programs, and commitment to incorporate a list of potential 31 drinking water sources for Aboriginal communities into its updated Emergency Management 32 Program (see Government of Canada F-IR No. 2.03) (Filing IDs A4L0A5, A4L0A6 and A4L0A7).

33 Further discussion of the pathways of exposure in the event of an oil spill was provided in Trans 34 Mountain’s responses to City of North Vancouver IR No. 2.2.5a (Filing ID A4H8G1) and City of 35 Vancouver IR No. 2.08.06a (Filing ID A4H8I9), as well as Trans Mountain’s response to the 36 motion (Filing ID A4J5D2) related to City of Vancouver IR No. 2.08.08a (Filing ID A4H8I9) 37 compelling Trans Mountain to examine exposure pathways in addition to inhalation. This motion 38 was denied by the NEB (Filing ID A4K8G4).

39 In addition to the general concerns regarding possible exposures other than inhalation, specific 40 concern was raised regarding dermal contact, food ingestion and drinking water ingestion. 41 These concerns are addressed in the sections that follow.

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45.2.3.1.1 Dermal Contact 1 City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H6), City of Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7K9 and A4L7V8), Living 2 Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0) and LNIB (Filing ID A4Q7H4) expressed particular concern 3 with direct dermal contact with the spilled oil.

4 As previously discussed, in the unlikely event of a spill, Trans Mountain would quickly 5 implement its ERP based on the UC structure described in Volume 7 of the Application (Filing 6 ID A3S4V6). This would involve notification of appropriate municipal, provincial and federal 7 regulatory agencies as well as local public health authorities of the spill such that coordinated 8 action would be taken to determine the need for and types of measures required to protect 9 people’s health if public health and/or safety were threatened. This may include measures to 10 reduce the prospect for or extent to which people might be directly exposed to the spilled oil 11 itself and/or chemicals released from the oil, such as notifying the public, including Aboriginal 12 communities, of the spill, advising the people to avoid the area, securing perimeters and 13 restricting access to the area. If public health and/or safety were threatened, people would be 14 asked or could be ordered to evacuate the area. Additionally, environmental monitoring and 15 surveillance programs would be initiated in the unlikely event of a spill in order to track the 16 movement of spilled oil as well as monitor cleanup progress. These monitoring and surveillance 17 programs would extend to impacted media such surface water, soil, and sediment in the area 18 that could be frequented by the public. Information collected as part of these programs would be 19 used to help guide decision-making with respect to public access to and use of nearby lands, 20 public waterways, beaches and/or shorelines. If conditions were such that people might be 21 exposed to the oil through direct skin contact (for example, if land, beach or shoreline oiling was 22 to occur), Trans Mountain would consult with the appropriate authorities on measures to be 23 taken beyond oil recovery and cleanup, such as notifying the public of the potential hazard 24 and/or posting of warnings, until such time that environmental monitoring and surveillance 25 revealed conditions to be safe for the public. Closure of public waterways, beaches, and/or 26 shorelines could be ordered by the appropriate authorities if public health and/or safety were 27 threatened.

28 The emergency and spill response measures discussed above would act to reduce any 29 opportunity for exposure to the spilled oil via direct skin contact in both the short-term and long- 30 term. Public notices would advise people to avoid contact with the spilled oil and to wash any 31 areas of the body that might become soiled with the oil with soap and water. If a person were to 32 be in the area of a spill whether it be on land or while swimming or wading in water, and was to 33 encounter the spilled oil and get it on their skin, it is reasonable to expect that they would take 34 measures to wash it off, thereby reducing and/or interrupting any exposure. Given the measures 35 that would be taken to limit any direct exposure to the spilled oil via skin contact, the likelihood 36 and extent to which the general public would be exposed by the pathway was considered to be 37 very low and adverse health effects would not be anticipated.

45.2.3.1.2 Food Ingestion 38 Particular concern was expressed by ALIB (Filing A4R4D0), City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H6), 39 City of Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7K9 and A4L7V8), Health Canada (Filing ID A4S0Z6), LNIB 40 (Filing ID A4Q7H4), and Upper Nicola Band (Filing ID A4R4I4) over the ingestion of foods 41 containing chemical residues originating from the spilled oil. Most of the concerns related to 42 contamination of fish, shellfish and/or other seafood.

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1 As already indicated, environmental monitoring and surveillance programs would be initiated, in 2 part, to determine the partitioning of the spilled oil into different environmental media, including 3 the water column, submerged sediment, and shoreline soils, and extending to local foodstuffs, if 4 warranted. In this regard, once a spill has occurred regulatory agencies, such as DFO, 5 Environment Canada, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, as appropriate, working in 6 consultation with other appropriate network resources would assess the spill and, based on its 7 location, size and the potential opportunities for people, including Aboriginal communities, to be 8 exposed to the spilled oil through different exposure pathways, would determine if additional 9 spill response measures may be needed to protect public health. This determination would 10 extend to measures required to ensure the safety of the public food supply, and if warranted, 11 could include controls such as the closure of commercial and recreational fisheries and the 12 issuance of fish, shellfish and/or other seafood consumption advisories.

13 Due to the various emergency and spill response measures that would be taken in the unlikely 14 event of a spill, including measures, if warranted, aimed at ensuring the safety of the public food 15 supply, the prospect for and/or extent to which people might be exposed to the spilled oil and/or 16 chemicals originating from the oil on a short-term or long-term basis was considered to be very 17 low. The public would be quickly notified of the spill, and if there was reason to suspect that the 18 safety of the food supply was threatened, the public would be informed and cautioned to avoid 19 foods that might be tainted. By avoiding these foods, exposure to the chemicals via the food 20 consumption pathway would be prevented. Based on the above, the likelihood and extent to 21 which the general public, including Aboriginal communities, would be exposed by the pathway 22 was considered to be very low and adverse health effects would not be anticipated.

45.2.3.1.3 Drinking Water Ingestion 23 ALIB (Filing A4R4D0), CIB (Filing ID A4R4H0), Health Canada (Filing ID A4S0Z6), and 24 Shxw’ōwhámel (Filing IDs A4L9U9 and A4Q1A2) expressed concern that a pipeline oil spill 25 could result in contamination of drinking water.

26 In addition to the above mentioned emergency and spill response measures and environmental 27 monitoring and surveillance programs that would be initiated in the unlikely event of a spill, as 28 discussed in Government of Canada F-IR No. 2.03 (Filing IDs A4L0A5, A4L0A6 and A4L0A7), 29 Trans Mountain has committed to incorporating a list of potential drinking water sources for 30 Aboriginal communities into its updated EMP. The list of potential drinking water sources would 31 be used to issue an immediate drinking water advisory in the event of a spill contaminating a 32 watercourse or aquifer used for drinking water purposes. While the drinking water advisory 33 would likely reach more people and communities than could be affected, by taking a broader 34 approach in its initial advisory Trans Mountain would have the added assurance that all 35 potentially affected communities, landowners, and Aboriginal communities would be notified of a 36 drinking water advisory. At the same time, Trans Mountain would proceed to ground-truth the 37 exact sources of drinking water affected by the oil spill by attempting to meet with Aboriginal 38 communities, landowners, municipalities, etc. and then refining the drinking water advisory with 39 the results of the ground-truthing activities.

40 If a drinking water advisory were to be issued as a result of a spill, Trans Mountain will commit 41 to working with the leadership of the Aboriginal community to identify surplus capacity from 42 other drinking water sources in the area, while suitable replacement alternatives are established 43 and implemented.

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45.2.3.2 Marine Transportation 1 City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7V8) and NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L9R2) has expressed concern 2 over the human health effects associated with ingestion of contaminated seafood resulting from 3 the spillage of oil from a laden tanker vessel.

4 In the unlikely event of a marine spill, the vessel owner would immediately notify the WCMRC, 5 and consultation with appropriate emergency and spill response personnel and agencies, such 6 as the Coast Guard authorities, would occur and coordinated action would quickly be taken to 7 contain and recover the spilled oil, as outlined in Volume 8A, Section 5.5 of the Application 8 (Filing IDs A3S4Y6 and A3S5Q3). In conjunction with these actions, appropriate municipal, 9 provincial and federal government authorities as well as local, regional, provincial and/or federal 10 public health authorities would be notified of the spill, and coordinated action would be taken to 11 determine the need for and types of measures required to protect people’s health if public health 12 and/or safety were threatened. This determination would extend to measures required to ensure 13 the safety of the public food supply, and if warranted, could include controls such as the closure 14 of commercial and recreational fisheries and the issuance of fish, shellfish and/or other seafood 15 consumption advisories. Environmental monitoring and surveillance programs that would be 16 initiated in the event of a spill would track the movement of the oil slick as well as monitor 17 cleanup progress.

18 Due to the various emergency and spill response measures that would be taken in the unlikely 19 event of a marine spill, including measures, if warranted, aimed at ensuring the safety of the 20 public food supply, the prospect for and/or extent to which people might be exposed to the 21 spilled oil and/or chemicals originating from the oil via this pathway on a short-term or long-term 22 basis was considered to be very low. The public would be quickly notified of the spill, and if 23 there was reason to suspect that the safety of the food supply could be compromised, the public 24 would be informed and cautioned to avoid foods that might be tainted. By avoiding these foods, 25 exposure to the chemicals via the food consumption pathway would be prevented. Based on the 26 above, the likelihood and extent to which the general public would be exposed by the pathway 27 was considered to be low to very low, and health effects would not be anticipated.

28 Further discussion of the pathways of exposure in the event of a marine oil spill was provided in 29 Trans Mountain’s responses to City of North Vancouver IR No. 2.2.5a (Filing ID A4H8G1) and 30 City of Vancouver IR No. 2.08.06a (Filing ID A4H8I9), as well as Trans Mountain’s response to 31 the motion (Filing ID A4J5D2) related to City of Vancouver IR No. 2.08.08a (Filing ID A4H8I9) 32 compelling Trans Mountain to examine exposure pathways in addition to inhalation. This motion 33 was denied by the NEB (Filing ID A4K8G4).

45.2.4 Human Health Effects in Sensitive Individuals 34 BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9S0), NS NOPE (Filing IDs 35 A4L9R1 and A4L9R2) and SFU (Filing ID A4Q0X8) have expressed concern regarding the 36 potential health risks to sensitive individuals from exposure to chemical vapours released from 37 the surface of spilled oil.

38 In the HHRAs of pipeline, facility and marine spill scenarios, the maximum one-hour average 39 concentrations of the COPC vapours to which people in the area might be exposed were 40 compared against the corresponding AEGLs developed by the U.S. EPA. AEGLs are 41 considered particularly well-suited for use as health-based comparison benchmarks as they 42 correspond to guideline levels for used in situations where rare, unintended exposure of the

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1 general public to hazardous chemicals may occur for short durations, such as accidents 2 involving chemical spills, industrial explosions or fires. Furthermore, the protection afforded by 3 AEGLs extends to sub-populations that may be especially sensitive to chemical exposures, 4 such as infants, young children, the elderly, and the infirm (U.S. EPA 2012). Complete details 5 concerning the AEGLs, including their meaning, derivation and use can be found elsewhere 6 (U.S. EPA 2012).

7 AEGLs are constructed around three tiers distinguished by varying degrees of severity of health 8 effects, with each tier representing a short-term exposure value corresponding to a threshold 9 concentration below which specific categories or types of effects would not be expected to occur 10 among members of the general public. With progressively increasing airborne concentrations 11 above each tier, the prospect for occurrence of the particular effects becomes greater.

12 The findings of the HHRAs suggest that people, including the aforementioned sub-populations, 13 in the area would not be expected to experience health effects from acute inhalation exposure 14 to the vapours other than minor, transient sensory and/or non-sensory effects. Examples of 15 these effects could include: discomfort, irritability, mild irritation of the eyes, nose and/or throat, 16 mild cough, and symptoms consistent with nominal CNS involvement such as mild headache, 17 light headedness, minor vertigo, dizziness, and/or nausea. These effects would likely resolve 18 quickly upon cessation of exposure, with no lingering after-effects. Odours could be apparent to 19 some individuals, especially those with a keen sense of smell, and could contribute to added 20 discomfort and irritability among these people.

45.2.5 Human Health Effects in First Responders 21 City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H6), City of Vancouver (Filing IDs A4L7V8 and A4L7K9), District 22 of North Vancouver (Filing ID A4Q0I1) and NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L5V1 and A4L9R2) have 23 expressed concern over potential health effects that may be experienced by first responders 24 and spill response personnel in the event of an oil spill into Burrard Inlet. This concern has been 25 previously addressed as part of Trans Mountain’s responses to City of Port Moody IR No. 26 2.3.07a (Filing ID A4H8G7) and City of North Vancouver IR No. 2.2.5a (Filing ID A4H8G1).

27 The HHRA of facility and marine spill scenarios evaluated a set of simulated and unmitigated 28 spill scenarios resulting from an incident while loading a tanker at berth at the Westridge Marine 29 Terminal and a second set resulting from the grounding of a laden tanker on Arachne Reef. The 30 focus of this HHRA was on determining the nature and extent of the potential health effects that 31 could occur among people from short-term inhalation exposure to the chemical vapours 32 released from the surface of the spilled oil during the early stages of the oil spill and before the 33 arrival of first responders and the implementation of emergency and spill response measures. 34 That is to say, allowance for the emergency and spill response measures that would be taken to 35 mitigate any potential impacts on human health, including the use of PPE was not included in 36 the HHRA. Instead, it was assumed that people would remain in the area with the maximum 37 predicted vapour concentration of each COPC serving as a proxy for the exposures that people 38 in the area might receive. Therefore, the findings of the HHRA apply not only to the general 39 public but also to first responders arriving on scene.

40 Examination of the findings of the HHRA indicate that in each of the simulated spill scenarios, 41 exposure to the maximum predicted chemical vapour concentrations would not be expected to 42 result in health effects other than mild, transient sensory and/or non-sensory effects. Examples 43 of these effects could include: discomfort, irritability, mild irritation of the eyes, nose and/or

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1 throat, mild cough, and symptoms consistent with nominal CNS involvement such as mild 2 headache, light headedness, minor vertigo, dizziness, and/or nausea. These effects would likely 3 resolve quickly upon cessation of exposure, with no lingering after-effects. Odours could be 4 apparent to some individuals, especially those with a keen sense of smell, and could contribute 5 to added discomfort and irritability among these people.

6 It is important to note that first responders could remain on scene for some time while 7 implementing emergency and spill response measures. The expectation is that these personnel 8 would be trained in emergency preparedness and response, would be equipped with 9 appropriate PPE, would be aware of the chemical hazards involved, and would take precautions 10 to avoid physical contact with the spilled oil itself and any oil-tainted media as well as to limit 11 exposure to any chemical vapours that might be present. Notwithstanding the above, if the 12 criteria listed were not satisfied, distinct opportunity would exist for these personnel to be 13 exposed via certain pathways, such as direct skin contact with the spilled oil itself or oil-tainted 14 media and/or inhalation of vapours, on a short-term and longer-term basis, thus introducing 15 some prospect for health effects to occur such as headache, dizziness, nausea, and eye, skin, 16 nose and throat irritation, with the likelihood and severity of effects becoming more pronounced 17 with increasing exposure. This points out the need for and importance of worker training and 18 awareness of the potential hazards involved in spill response and cleanup, the proper use of 19 PPE, and precautions to take to avoid or reduce exposures.

20 As the operator of the TMPL, KMC has developed and maintains ERPs for the pipeline and 21 associated terminals that is shared, tested and regularly exercised with federal, provincial and 22 local agencies. The ERPs meet regulatory requirements. KMC works with emergency planners 23 and emergency responders to maintain relationships and ensure their mutual awareness of joint 24 exercises and programs. KMC has an ongoing program to provide information to responders 25 who may be called upon to respond in the event of a pipeline emergency. In addition to direct 26 mail outs every three years, CAER sessions are delivered to first responders along the pipeline 27 system. These CAER sessions provide information about the TMPL system, the type and 28 properties of petroleum transported, and how to respond safely in the event of an emergency 29 such as the need to stay upwind of the area until air monitoring is in place and to wear 30 appropriate PPE. In the unlikely event of a release, KMC provides material safety data sheets 31 (MSDS) and the product name to incoming first responders and communities as soon as 32 possible.

33 Additional information regarding emergency management training and the ERPs is provided in 34 Section 63 (Emergency Management Program).

45.2.6 Human Health Effects Associated with Delayed Response 35 District of North Vancouver (Filing IDs A4Q0E9 and A4Q0I1), Dorothy D (Filing ID A4L8U3), 36 Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9), NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L5V1) and Shxw’ōwhámel 37 First Nation (Filing IDs A4L9U9 and A4Q1A2) have expressed concern over the human health 38 effects associated with delayed emergency response times in the event of an oil spill from either 39 a pipeline, facility, or marine tanker vessel.

40 For the purposes of the HHRAs of pipeline, facility and marine spill scenarios, the highest one- 41 hour average concentration predicted by the air dispersion modelling for each COPC was used 42 as a proxy for the exposures that people in the area might receive, irrespective of the location 43 within the area and regardless of the time at which this highest concentration was predicted to

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1 occur following the hypothetical spill. That is to say, allowance for the emergency and spill 2 response measures that would quickly be taken to contain and recover the spilled oil and to 3 mitigate any potential impacts on health and the environment was not included in the HHRAs. 4 Instead, it was assumed that people would remain in the area without awareness or notice of 5 the spill and without any, let alone delayed, involvement of first responders and/or other spill 6 response personnel, with the net result being that the exposure estimates used in the HHRAs 7 almost certainly represent exaggerations of the exposures that people would receive under the 8 different spill scenarios. Further details are provided in response to Weaver IR No. 2.06a (Filing 9 ID A4H9J8).

10 The findings and conclusions summarized in Section 7.0 (Summary and Conclusions) of the 11 HHRAs demonstrated that, even with the high degree of conservatism incorporated into the 12 assessments, based on the weight-of-evidence, people in the area would not be expected to 13 experience health effects from acute inhalation exposure to the vapours other than minor, 14 transient sensory and/or non-sensory effects. Such effects are attributable to the irritant and 15 CNS depressant properties of the hydrocarbon and other chemical constituents comprising the 16 vapours, with possible added discomfort and exacerbation of the minor symptoms caused by 17 the presence of odours. With the arrival of first responders and the implementation of 18 emergency and spill response measures, the likelihood that people would experience even 19 these minor, transient effects would be reduced.

45.2.7 Human Health Effects Associated with Dispersants 20 NS NOPE (Filing IDs A4L5V1 and A4L9R2) and Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9) 21 have expressed concern over potential human health effects resulting from exposure of the 22 public and spill response personnel to dispersants used in the event of a marine oil spill.

23 Discussion surrounding the use of dispersants has been presented in numerous IR responses, 24 including, but not limited to: City Burnaby F-IR 1.26.07 (Filing ID A4D3G2), Pacheedaht First 25 Nation F-IR No. 1.12.3 (Filing ID A4D3G2), Squamish Nation F-IR No. 1.8b (Filing ID A4D3G2), 26 Stz’uminus First Nation F-IR No. 1.8c (Filing ID A4D3G2), City of North Vancouver IR No. 27 2.3.07 (Filing ID A4H8G1), District of North Vancouver IR No. 2.02.2d (Filing ID A4H8L7), and 28 District of North Vancouver TERMPOL IR No. 2.2e (Filing ID A4J7S2).

29 As described in Section 5.5.1.4 of Volume 8A of the Application (Filing ID A3S4Y6), the use of 30 dispersants is not permitted under current legislation in Canada unless approval is granted by 31 the relevant regulatory agency. In the event of a spill response, strategies for the use of 32 dispersants could be proposed within the Incident Command System (ICS) structure and 33 approved by the UC. This structure is expected to include Environment Canada and the BC 34 MOE who would provide advice on environmental considerations and human health risks. The 35 use of alternate spill mitigation techniques, including dispersants, are only authorized on a case- 36 by-case basis, subject to NEBA, and would need approval of the appropriate regulatory 37 authorities.

38 As applied to an oil spill incident, NEBA is a formal process to evaluate the risks and benefits of 39 certain proposed cleanup techniques and strategies. NEBA is a stakeholder’s performance 40 metric that weighs many factors against the cleanup endpoints established by the UC. This 41 analysis will consider the specific treatment options appropriate to the response; the potential 42 for successfully implementing those discrete options; the environmental trade-off attached to

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1 each technique; and, lastly, the types of treatments that can be authorized within the existing 2 regulatory framework.

3 It is noteworthy that a number of conditions need to be met before using dispersants and it is 4 unlikely that Burrard Inlet would be a candidate for dispersant use. It is generally accepted 5 practice that dispersants are precluded from use in the following conditions, which are present 6 in areas of Burrard Inlet:

7 · dispersants are not used in shallow water (depth less than 10 to 20 m) to avoid 8 the dispersed oil from contacting the seabed;

9 · dispersants are not used in the presence of filter feeding organisms that could 10 ingest the dispersed oil; and

11 · dispersants are unlikely to be used in fish spawning habitats or within the area 12 of shallow water fisheries.

13 As such, subject to a NEBA, Trans Mountain believes dispersants would not be used in the 14 waters of Burrard Inlet. A general discussion of the effects that Trans Mountain anticipates 15 would be considered in the NEBA has been attached as City Burnaby F-IR No. 1.26.07a - 16 Attachment 1 (Filing ID A4D3G6). Furthermore, results of the Gainford Study (refer to 17 Volume 8C, TR8C-12, S7) indicated that dispersants tested were only marginally effective on 18 free-floating dilbit for up to six hours. The dispersants tested were not effective on dilbit that had 19 weathered for over one day.

20 Should the use of dispersants be allowed, spill response personnel would consult dispersant 21 MSDS and follow the manufacturers’ recommendations intended to protect human health and 22 safety. Based on that information, these workers would be required to take appropriate health 23 and safety precautions including the use of PPE. Dispersants would not be applied in areas 24 where the public would be exposed to the spray application and sufficient distances from the 25 shoreline would be maintained to allow for dilution of oil concentrations such that they would not 26 pose a risk to human health.

27 Additional information regarding the use of dispersants is provided in Section 63 (Emergency 28 Management Program).

45.2.8 Human Health Effects Associated with In Situ Burning 29 NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L9R2) has expressed concern over potential health effects the general 30 public might experience as a result of the use of in situ burning (ISB) as a response tactic in the 31 event of a marine spill.

32 The use of ISB has been previously discussed in response to Metro Vancouver IR No. 1.6.56a 33 (Filing ID A3Y2V0), Living Oceans F-IR No. 1.04 (Filing ID A4D3G2), and District of North 34 Vancouver TERMPOL IR No. 2.2e (Filing ID A4J7S2).

35 Although ISB is generally considered to be a proven alternative oil spill response tactic, it can 36 only be carried out after a special application to the CCG through the UC under the ICS. As 37 described in Volume 8A, Section 5.5.1.4 of the Application (Filing ID A3S4Y6), ISB is not one of 38 the methods pre-approved by Transport Canada for oil spill response tactic and would only be 39 considered on a case-by-case basis through consultation with federal and local authorities and

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1 experts. Similar to the use of dispersants, discussed above in Section 45.2.7, the authorization 2 of alternate spill mitigation techniques, including ISB, would be subject to a NEBA. A general 3 discussion of the effects that Trans Mountain anticipates would be considered in the NEBA 4 relating to ISB has been attached as Living Oceans F-IR No. 1.04c - Attachment 1 (Filing ID 5 A4D3H3).

6 The potential concerns over ISB are primarily related to maintenance of public health. Like all 7 combustion events, ISB creates a smoke plume containing PM, organic compounds, gases, and 8 unburned fuel. The burn proximity to human, and sometimes animal, populations is one of many 9 factors to be assessed in considering ISB as a countermeasure. Given these considerations, 10 ISB is considered an unlikely response tactic in the case of mobile oil near or at shore due to: i) 11 the difficulties associated with maintaining ignition; ii) smoke-related issues; and iii) the 12 challenges associated with the cleanup of any near or at shore residues. Near shore response 13 with booms, skimmers, pumps, and sorbents is therefore viewed as a more practical, fast, and 14 effective response tactic.

45.2.9 Human Health Effects Associated with a Fire 45.2.9.1 Pipeline 15 Dorothy D (Filing ID A4L8U3), Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1A2), and SFU (Filing 16 IDs A4Q0X8 and A4Q0Z3) have expressed concern regarding the potential effects of smoke 17 associated with a fire originating from a pipeline spill on human health.

18 The response to City of Vancouver IR No. 2.09.7a (Filing ID A4H8I9) referenced Section 8.1 of 19 Volume 4C of the Application (Filing ID A3S1L1), which describes how the safety of the 20 expanded TMPL pipeline system will be assured through the enhancement and application of 21 the existing KMC Pipeline Integrity Management Program (IMP). The focus of the IMP is on the 22 prevention of releases through the identification, assessment and management of hazards.

23 ERPs have been developed for the existing TMPL system and will be enhanced and 24 implemented on the expanded TMPL system. These plans detail prescriptive procedures, 25 activities, and checklists to ensure consistent response to incidents with the common objective 26 of protecting company personnel and contractors, the public and public property, and the 27 environment. All ERPs address general requirements for non-spill incidents such as explosions 28 and fires.

29 With respect to the potential for ignition of released product, it is important to bear in mind that 30 the product being transported in the proposed pipeline infrastructure is crude oil. Industry 31 experience has shown that crude oil does not readily ignite during a pipeline release, even in 32 contemplation of a worst-case scenario full-bore rupture. By way of illustration, in a report by Dr. 33 Franci Jeglic, of the NEB, it was concluded that no ignition of spilled product had occurred in 34 any of the pipeline ruptures involving low vapour pressure products, including crude oil, over the 35 20-year period from 1984 to 2004 covered by the review. This was discussed in further detail, 36 and the report was provided as an attachment (Filing ID A3X6W6) to the response to Wright K 37 IR No. 1.2.4 (Filing ID A3X6W5). Since the review and analysis indicates that the likelihood that 38 spilled product would ignite is remote, the HHRA of the pipeline spill scenarios did not assess 39 the potential human health effects of combustion products. It is for this reason that the risk 40 assessment supporting the risk-based design of Line 2 and new delivery lines focuses on 41 environmental and socio-economic consequences associated with an oil spill, rather than those 42 that are associated with thermal radiation and fire hazards.

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1 In the very unlikely event that a fire does occur following a pipeline release, KMC will work with 2 the local emergency responders to provide an effective and rapid response through its existing 3 emergency management system.

4 According to the US National Institutes of Health, the burning of crude oil can result in the 5 emission of such chemicals as CO2, CO, lead, nitrogen oxides, PM (e.g., PM10 and PM2.5), 6 PAHs, and VOCs. Fires are known to result in high levels of PM. As a result, people exposed to 7 smoke from a fire may experience the health effects commonly associated with PM. The 8 potential for exposure depends on the magnitude and nature of the fire, the location of the fire, 9 the meteorological conditions at the time of the fire, and the time it will take to respond to that 10 fire. According to the Minnesota Department of Health (MDOH) (2007), individuals who are not 11 directly involved with fighting an oil fire or who are not in the immediate vicinity of the fire are 12 unlikely to experience exposures that are medically significant. Rather, such individuals may 13 experience mild, transitory effects, including symptoms such as irritation of the eyes and nose, 14 nasal secretions, tearing, hoarseness and shortness of breath. The MDOH (2007) goes on to 15 state that “any initial or early signs and symptoms should resolve in a few days and complete 16 recovery after a limited period of discomfort is expected.”

17 Nevertheless, spill prevention, preparedness, and effective response activities will continue to 18 be Trans Mountain’s primary focus in order to reduce the probability of a spill, and to have 19 adequate ERPs and procedures in place that have proven capability to reduce the magnitude 20 and extent of actual effects on people and the environment.

45.2.9.2 Facilities 21 BROKE (Filing ID A4L6U5), Doherty D (Filing ID A4L8U3), Living Oceans Society (Filing ID 22 A4L9S0), Senichenko G (Filing IDs A4L6Q9 and A4L6R5), SFU (Filing IDs A4Q0X8 and 23 A4Q0Z3) and Taplay C (Filing ID A4L9H5) have expressed concern regarding the potential risks 24 to human health from exposure to smoke associated with the unlikely event of a fire originating 25 from Burnaby Terminal. NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L5V1) has expressed similar concern related to 26 the Westridge Marine Terminal. Several intervenors, including BROKE, Doherty D, Senichenko 27 G, SFU and Taplay C, also have concern that a fire at Burnaby Terminal may obstruct roads 28 and limit the ability of first responders to carry out the appropriate emergency response 29 procedures.

30 As stated in the response to City of Port Moody IR No. 2.3.30b (Filing ID A4H8G7) and SFU IR 31 No. 2.5.04.1 (Filing ID A4H9C9), Trans Mountain commissioned risk assessments of the 32 Burnaby Terminal, the Westridge Marine Terminal and the Westridge Marine Terminal Ship 33 Loading expansion which were filed as Attachment 3 (Filing ID A3W9S5), Attachment 4 (Filing 34 ID A3W9S6) and Attachment 5 (Filing IDs A3W9S7 and A3W9S8), respectively, in response to 35 NEB IR No. 1.98a (Filing ID A3W9H9). The risk assessments identified the possible accidents 36 or upset events (including fire related to a major tank spill and fire related to a spill in the 37 boomed area around vessels while loading) for the terminals and the associated consequences. 38 The risk assessments evaluated the potential impact on the nearby areas of a number of “worst- 39 case” scenarios (i.e., hazards) and the probabilities of their occurrence. These assessments 40 and findings will be used to inform the planned enhancements to Trans Mountain’s EMP and 41 response plan. The assessments were conducted without consideration of mitigation measures, 42 such as the effective implementation of Trans Mountain’s ERP. According to the findings of the 43 risk assessments, the overall risks to the public beyond the Burnaby Terminal and Westridge

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1 Marine Terminal property lines posed by the worst-case scenarios at both terminals are deemed 2 to be within the acceptable level of risk criteria as set out by the MIACC.

3 Trans Mountain (or KMC) has procedures in place to ensure that fires will not occur. As 4 described in Volume 4C, Section 8.2 of the Application (Filing ID A3S1L1), the safety of the 5 facilities in the expanded TMPL system will be assured through the enhancement and 6 application of the existing KMC FIMP. The FIMP will be administered by the KMC Technical 7 Services Department and will be implemented with the assistance of the KMC field operations 8 team.

9 Like the KMC Pipeline Integrity Program, the FIMP has processes for the identification of all 10 integrity hazards that could affect the safe operation of facilities, the assessment for these 11 hazards, and the management of the hazards to prevent and mitigate the impact from releases 12 of petroleum and from petroleum fires. The FIMP includes a continual assessment process that 13 will ensure the completion of all maintenance and testing activities required for the effective 14 operation of all preventive and consequence reduction systems.

15 Given the many variables and uncertainties surrounding any particular incident, there is no 16 credible way of defining potential community health and social impacts. Adverse effects could 17 include: effects on property; physical health effects; effects on local infrastructure; effects on 18 businesses; effects on emergency, protective and social services; real and perceived effects on 19 biological resources used by residents for subsistence, cultural, commercial and recreational 20 purposes; effects on tourism and recreation; effects on commercial harvest; and effects on 21 mental health and community well-being. KMC’s ICS for emergency response is designed to 22 enable effective, efficient incident management through integration of facilities, equipment, 23 personnel, procedures, and communications within a common organizational structure. The ICS 24 enables KMC’s incident managers to identify the key concerns associated with the incident, 25 often under urgent conditions, without sacrificing attention to any component of the response. 26 The use of ICS represents organizational best practices and aligns KMC with the world-wide 27 standard for emergency management.

28 The ICS was also designed to be flexible in application to the size of an incident, to enable rapid 29 integration of agencies and personnel into a common management structure, and to minimize 30 duplication of effort. The ICS structure outlines clear roles and responsibilities with respect to 31 emergency response and includes a UC structure for co-ordination with the multiple levels of 32 government; federal, provincial, municipal, and Aboriginal communities, along the TMPL 33 system. This allows communities to put forth their objectives and priorities along with other 34 members of UC, and to receive real time updates through the course of the emergency. This 35 participation allows communities to identify locally-appropriate measures to mitigate potential 36 social effects, including community health.

37 The KMC Emergency Response Program and response organization is based on a three-tiered 38 response structure that was presented in Table 10.2.1, Volume 4C of the Application (Filing ID 39 A3S1L1) (presented below as Table 45-5 for ease of reference). This system relies on a 40 categorization of incidents, wherein each tier is managed by an escalating level of management 41 seniority and authority, with assistance from outside the initial response organization sought on 42 an as-needed basis. KMC’s emergency response procedures provide the flexibility to tailor the 43 nature and size of the response to the specifics of the incident, which allows for rapid 44 adjustments as an incident evolves. Where appropriate, the KMC incident commander will invite 45 the participation of federal, provincial, and local agencies to form a UC.

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1 TABLE 45-5 2 3 THREE-TIERED RESPONSE STRUCTURE

Level Definition Examples I The Company has the · oil spills confined to company property (pipeline pump station, terminal, or capability to manage and ancillary facility) control a Level I · public, contractor, or employee safety not endangered emergency using · public property not endangered company resources · local response handled by District personnel available within the area. · notification may not be required to regulatory authorities The District Supervisor · little or no media interest will assume the Incident Command position. II The Company has the · oil has migrated beyond company property, but not into a waterway capability to manage and · emergency services may be required (e.g., fire, police, ambulance) control a Level II · public, contractor, or employee safety and/or property may be endangered emergency using · notification required to regulatory authorities company resources and · may use a UC organizational structure in the emergency expertise, with some · local media interest assistance from local contractors. The Region Director or designate may assume the Incident Commander position. III The Company may · major emergency condition such as: request assistance from - uncontrolled leak other Industry, Municipal, - spill on a watercourse or Provincial Agency - large fire at an operating facility or office building personnel to support the - fatality or serious injury to an employee, contractor, or the public response to the incident. - spill of hazardous substances The Region Director will · major off-site environmental impact has occurred assume the Incident · public, contractor, or employee safety and/ or property is endangered Commander position. · emergency services are required (e.g., police, fire, ambulance) · notification required to regulatory authorities · use of a UC organizational structure in the emergency, as required, to facilitate coordination of company, government and other agency response to the emergency · local, provincial, and/or national media interest 4

5 ERPs have been developed for the existing TMPL system and will be enhanced and 6 implemented on the expanded TMPL system. These plans detail prescriptive procedures, 7 activities, and checklists to ensure consistent response to incidents with the common objective 8 of protecting company personnel and contractors, the public and public property, and the 9 environment.

10 The overall ERP provides a generic response to an incident at any location along the TMPL 11 system, whereas the ERPs for terminals are location-specific. All plans have a common 12 structure and format, and address key elements, including:

13 · responder health and safety;

14 · internal and external notifications;

15 · spill/site assessments;

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1 · spill containment and recovery;

2 · protection of sensitive areas; and

3 · multiple hazards.

4 Each of the plans also includes detailed information on the ICS, legislative background, and 5 documents the approach to training and exercises. The plans provide comprehensive 6 information and are a ready resource for a safe, consistent, and timely response to an 7 emergency or spill. All ERPs also address general requirements for non-spill incidents such as 8 explosions and fires, and include a detailed air monitoring plan that is applied in the event of a 9 spill.

10 Volumes 7 and 8A of the Application further described the emergency and spill response 11 measures that will be taken as part of a coordinated action to contain and recover the spilled oil 12 and to mitigate potential health and environmental impacts. These measures will further prevent 13 fires from occurring. The coordinated action will extend to consultation among spill response 14 network resources, including Trans Mountain, the WCMRC, Coast Guard authorities and other 15 spill response personnel as well as appropriate municipal, provincial and federal regulatory 16 agencies and local public health authorities to determine the need for and types of measures 17 required to protect people’s health if public health and/or safety were threatened. These timely, 18 coordinated spill response actions will serve, in part, to reduce the prospect for people to be 19 exposed to the spilled oil itself and/or chemicals released from an oil fire.

20 KMC has systems in place to ensure a fire will not occur. However, in the unlikely event that a 21 fire does occur, KMC will provide an effective and rapid response through its existing 22 emergency management systems.

45.2.10 Notification Protocols for the Local Health Authorities 23 As part of its evidence, the City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7V8) expressed the need for the 24 health authorities to be included in the spill notification protocols, citing statements taken from a 25 letter from Fraser Health and Vancouver Coastal Health to the City of Burnaby and City of 26 Vancouver entitled “Health Impacts from a Major Spill of Diluted Bitumen in the Burrard Inlet,” 27 which was submitted as evidence by the City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H5) and City of 28 Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7L0).

29 As discussed in Trans Mountain’s response to City of Vancouver IR No. 2.04.04 (Filing ID 30 A4H8I9), in the event of a spill, the Liaison Officer will notify the health authorities of the 31 incident, if they have not already been contacted. Additional information regarding the EMP 32 communication and notification protocols is provided in Section 63 (Emergency Management 33 Program).

45.2.11 Air Monitoring Plans for the Protection of Human Health 34 As stated above, evidence submitted by the City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H5) and City of 35 Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7L0) included a letter prepared by Fraser Health and Vancouver 36 Coastal Health, which expressed concern that, in the event of a spill in Burrard Inlet, the 37 capacity to quickly identify and track the chemical vapours emitted from the surface of the 38 spilled oil might not be adequate to protect public health.

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1 In the event of a spill, Trans Mountain’s first priority is safety of the public, our employees and 2 contractors, and the environment. As discussed earlier, Trans Mountain uses the ICS to 3 respond to emergencies. The ICS provides for seamless coordinated action with government 4 agencies. Trans Mountain would work together with the local Authority to determine the best 5 course of action to protect the public, including securing the area and commencing air 6 monitoring. Trans Mountain recognizes the importance of a timely response, particularly in 7 relation to air quality, and maintains calibrated air monitoring instruments onsite at the Sumas 8 and Burnaby terminals as well as the Westridge Marine Terminal that can be deployed 9 immediately to monitor the specific chemicals that would be expected to present the greatest 10 risk to human health in the event of a spill such as H2S, benzene, and VOCs. Trans Mountain 11 also maintains continuous ambient air monitoring stations at the fence line of the Sumas and 12 Burnaby terminals as well as the Westridge Marine Terminal with real-time data available on a 13 secured website. Trans Mountain will readily share all air quality data, in the event of an 14 emergency, from both the ambient fence line monitoring stations and the air monitoring plan 15 with local agencies, including the local health authorities, to assist with the implementation of 16 their recommendations to protect the public.

17 In addition, Trans Mountain has contractual relationships with contractors able to promptly 18 supply additional equipment and personnel during a spill. Trans Mountain has not disclosed the 19 names of contractors or service providers for privacy reasons. The selected contractors that 20 would assist Trans Mountain, in responding to an spill by executing the air monitoring plan, have 21 the capabilities to develop a timely emergency air quality dispersion model of the actual event to 22 assist in the extent of air monitoring using the best available software such as SAFER 23 Combustion Analysis Model™ or Complex Hazardous Air Release Model. This practice has 24 been demonstrated in emergency response exercises that simulate worse-case events.

45.2.12 Development of Remediation Targets Protective of Human Health 25 In the letter prepared by Fraser Health and Vancouver Coastal Health, which was submitted as 26 evidence by the City of Burnaby (Filing ID A4L8H5) and City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7L0), 27 concern was expressed over “the need for human activities and habitat baseline data to 28 facilitate remediation decisions.” The letter specifies the baseline information of particular 29 interest to Fraser Health and Vancouver Coastal Health. These include:

30 · the levels and types of First Nations and non-First Nations cultural and 31 recreational use of Burrard Inlet beaches and water;

32 · the recreational, commercial, and First Nations fishery in the area; and

33 · the levels of COPC in soil, soil vapour, sediment, surface/ground water, 34 drinking water and ambient/indoor air.

35 Similar concern was expressed by NS NOPE (Filing ID A4L5V1) with respect to the need for 36 human activities data and by the District of North Vancouver (Filing ID A4Q0E9) and 37 Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1A1) regarding the need for baseline environmental 38 data for the characterization of the current environmental conditions and the development of 39 remediation targets in the event of a spill in Burrard Inlet.

40 Information regarding baseline First Nations and non-First Nations activities within Burrard Inlet 41 and surrounding area were presented in the following materials:

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1 · Evidence submitted by the Tsleil-Waututh First Nation (Filing IDs A4L5Z4, 2 A4L5Z9, A4L6A0, A4L6A1, A4L6A2, A4L6A3, A4L6A4 and A4L6A5);

3 · Evidence submitted by the Squamish First Nation (Filing IDs A4L7E5, A4L7E6 4 and A4L7E3);

5 · Evidence submitted by the Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9);

6 · Traditional Land and Resource Use Technical Report in Volume 5D of the 7 Application (Filing IDs A3S2G8, A3S2G9, A3S2H0 and A3S2H1);

8 · Marine Traditional Land and Resource Use – Marine Transportation Technical 9 Report in Volume 8B of the Application (Filing IDs A3S4K3, A3S4K4, A3S4K5 10 and A3S4K6); and

11 · Marine Commercial, Recreational and Tourism Use – Marine Transportation 12 Technical Report presented in Volume 8B of the Application (Filing 13 IDs A3S4K4, A3S4K5 and A3S4K6).

14 Baseline environmental data for the Burrard Inlet area have been collected as part of ambient 15 monitoring programs conducted by leading scientific and regulatory authorities such as BC 16 Ministry of the Environment, BC Ministry of Water, Land and Air Protection, and North Pacific 17 Marine Science Organization. In addition, multimedia investigations have been completed as 18 part of remediation programs in the Burrard Inlet. For example, sediment, groundwater/pore 19 water, surface water, ambient air, and seafood have been collected from the foreshore areas 20 adjacent to the Chevron Refinery in the Central Harbour of Burrard Inlet (Chevron 2011a,b). 21 Similarly, characterization of water, sediment, mussel, and crab tissue was an integral 22 component of the remediation program for the 2007 spill at the Westridge Marine Terminal 23 (Stantec 2012a,b, 2014).

24 As discussed in Trans Mountain’s City of Vancouver IR No. 2.08.10 (Filing ID A4H8I9), in the 25 event of a spill, remediation of spill impacts is linked to monitoring plans agreed upon between 26 participating entities in the spill response, including government authorities, Aboriginal groups, 27 and scientific advisors. Monitoring of any spill-related chemical residues in different 28 environmental media, including surface water, air, soils and/or sediment, groundwater, and 29 foodstuffs will continue as necessary to protect public health and will confirm concentrations 30 relative to pre-defined standards or objectives. Those situation-specific remediation plans are 31 developed after emergency actions have been completed and take into account post- 32 emergency conditions, documented cleanup effectiveness, remaining areas affected, 33 environmental and seasonal sensitivities, NEBA of remediation efforts, and numerous other 34 considerations. As the emergency phase concludes, the NEBA could specify the need for 35 remediation, followed by long-term monitoring. Each spill situation is unique in this respect. For 36 any affected shorelines, response end-points are arrived at by conducting a Shoreline Clean-up 37 Assessment Technique (SCAT). This standard and proven assessment methodology 38 subscribed to by Environment Canada, guides the process of shoreline cleanup along inland 39 rivers and lakes and marine coastlines. The SCAT process offers an objective means of data 40 collection that is used to estimate the degree of oiling present in shoreline environments. SCAT 41 data are then used to establish shoreline cleanup endpoints where further cleanup efforts will 42 cease to provide environmental benefit. A NEBA systematically evaluates the advantages and

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1 disadvantages of different cleanup options and endpoints. In some cases under NEBA, natural 2 attenuation might emerge as the best cleanup option.

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8 Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. 2007. Toxicological Profile for Lead. US 9 Department of Health and Human Services. Public Health Service. Agency for Toxic 10 Substances and Disease Registry. Atlanta, GA.

11 Boobis A.R., R. Budinsky, S. Collie, K. Crofton, M. Embry, S. Felter, R. Hertzberg, D. Kopp, G. 12 Mihlan, M. Mumtaz, P. Price, K. Solomon, L. Teuschler, R. Yang, and R. Zaleski. 2011. 13 Critical analysis of literature on low-dose synergy for use in screening chemical mixtures 14 for risk assessment. Critical Reviews in Toxicology. 41:369-83.

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16 British Columbia Ministry of Environment. 2009. Technical Guidance on Contaminated Sites. 17 Environmental Quality Standards.

18 Calabrese, E.J. 1991. Multiple Chemical Interactions. Toxicology and Environmental Health 19 Series. Chelsea, MI.

20 California Air Resources Board. 2006. Health Effects of Diesel Exhaust Particulate Matter. 21 California Air Resources Board, California Environmental Protection Agency.

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27 Carrasco, J., V. Lope, B. Perez-Gomez, N. Aragones, B. Suarez, G. Lopez-Abente, F. 28 Rodriguez-Artalego, and M. Pollan. 2006. Association between health information, use 29 of protective devices and occurrence of acute health problems in the Prestige oil spill 30 clean-up in Asturias and Cantabria (Spain): a cross-sectional study. BMC Public 31 Health 6:1-9.

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35 Environment Canada and Health Canada. 2000. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999. 36 Priority Substances List Assessment Report: 1,3-Butadiene. Ottawa, ON.

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1 European Commission. 2012. Scientific Committee on Health and Environmental Risks 2 (SCHER), Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks 3 (SCENIHR), and Scientific Committee on Consumer Safety (SCCS): Toxicity and 4 Assessment of Chemical Mixtures. Brussels, BE. 50 pp.

5 Eykelbosh, A. 2014. Short- and long-term health impacts of marine and terrestrial oil spills. A 6 literature review prepared for the Regional Health Protection Program, Office of the 7 Chief Medical Office, Vancouver Coastal Health by Institute for Resources, Environment 8 and Environmental Sustainability. Vancouver, BC. August 2014.

9 Garshick, E., M.B. Schenker, A. Munoz, M. Segal, T.J. Smith, S.R. Woskie, S.K. Hammond and 10 F.E. Speizer. 1987. A case-control study of lung cancer and diesel exhaust exposure in 11 railroad workers. American Review of Respiratory Disease 135:1242-1248.

12 Garshick, E., M.B. Schenker, A. Munoz, M. Segal, T.J. Smith, S.R. Woskie, S.K. Hammond and 13 F.E. Speizer. 1988. A retrospective cohort study of lung cancer and diesel exhaust 14 exposure in railroad workers. American Review of Respiratory Disease 127:820-825.

15 Genesis Engineering Ltd. and Levelton Engineering Ltd. 2003. Non-Road Diesel Emission 16 Reduction Study. Prepared for Puget Sound Clean Air Agency, Oregon Department of 17 Environmental Quality and United States Environmental Protection Agency.

18 Goodman, J.E., J.K. Chandalia, S. Thakali, and M. Seeley. 2009. Meta-analysis of nitrogen 19 dioxide exposure and airway hyper-responsiveness in asthmatics. Critical Reviews in 20 Toxicology 39(9):719-742.

21 Health Canada. 1995. Investigating Human Exposure to Contaminants in the Environment: A 22 Handbook for Exposure Calculations. Volume 1-3. Published by the Minister of National 23 Health and Welfare.

24 Health Canada. 2010a. Federal Contaminated Site Risk Assessment in Canada, Part I: 25 Guidance on Human Health Preliminary Quantitative Risk Assessment (PQRA), 26 Version 2.0. Contaminated Sites Division, Safe Environments Directorate. Ottawa, 27 Ontario. September 2010.

28 Health Canada. 2010b. Federal Contaminated Site Risk Assessment in Canada, Part V: 29 Guidance on Human Health Detailed Quantitative Risk Assessment for Chemicals 30 (DQRAchem). Contaminated Sites Division, Safe Environments Directorate. Ottawa, 31 Ontario. September 2010.

32 International Agency for Research on Cancer. 2014. Diesel and Gasoline Exhausts and Some 33 Nitroarenes. Volume 105. IARC Monographs on the Evaluation of Carcinogenic Risks to 34 Humans. Lyon, FR.

35 Laffon, B., F. Aguilera, J. Rios-Vazquez, J. Garcia-Leston, D. Fuchs, V. Valdiglesias, and E. 36 Pasaro. 2013. Endocrine and immunological parameters in individuals involved in 37 Prestige spill cleanup tasks seven years after the exposure. Environment International 38 59:103-111.

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1 Lan, Q., L. Zhang, G. Li, R. Vermeulen, R. Weinberg, M. Dosemeci, S. Rappaport, M. Shen, B. 2 Alter, Y. Wu, W. Kopp, S. Waidyanatha, C. Rabkin, W. Guo, S. Chanock, R. Hayes, M. 3 Linet, S. Kim, S. Yin, N. Rothman, and M. Smith. 2004. Hematotoxicity in workers 4 exposed to low levels of benzene. Science 306:1774 1776.

5 Linn, W.S., M.P. Jones, R.M. Bailey, M.T. Kleinman, C.E. Spier, D.A. Fischer, and J.D. 6 Hackney. 1980. Respiratory effects of mixed nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide in 7 human volunteers under simulated ambient exposure conditions. Environmental 8 Research 22(2):431-8.

9 Meek, M.E., A.R. Boobis, K.M. Crofton, G. Heinemeyer, M. Van Raaij, and C. Vickers. 2011. 10 Risk assessment of combined exposure to multiple chemicals: A WHO/IPCS framework. 11 Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 60:S1-S14.

12 Metro Vancouver. 2011. Integrated Air Quality and Greenhouse Gas Management Plan.

13 Minnesota Department of Health. 2007. Health Concerns Associated with Oil Fires. St. Paul, 14 MN.

15 National Energy Board. 2013. Filing Requirements Related to the Potential Environmental and 16 Socio-Economic Effects of Increased Marine Shipping Activities, Trans Mountain 17 Expansion Project. Accessed: September 2013. Website: https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/ll- 18 eng/livelink.exe?func=ll&objId=1035381&objAction=browse.

19 National Toxicology Program. 2014. Diesel Exhaust Particulates. Report on Carcinogens, 20 Thirteenth Edition. National Toxicology Program, US Department of Health and Human 21 Services.

22 Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment. 2001. Particulate Emission from Diesel 23 Fueled Engines. Prioritization of Toxic Air Contaminants – Children’s Environmental 24 Health Protection Act.

25 Perez-Cadahia, B., A. Lafuente, T. Cabaleiro, E. Pasaro, J. Mendez, and B. Laffon. 2007. Initial 26 study on the effects of Prestige oil on human health. Environment International 27 33(2):176-185.

28 Perez-Cadahia, B., J. Mendez, E. Pasaro, A. Lafuente, T. Cabaleiro, and B. Laffon. 2008. 29 Biomonitoring of human exposure to Prestige oil: Effects on DNA and endocrine 30 parameters. Environmental Health Insights 2:83-92.

31 Price, P.S. and X. Han. 2011. Maximum cumulative ratio (MCR) as a tool for assessing the 32 value of performing a cumulative risk assessment. International Journal of 33 Environmental Research and Public Health 8:2212-2225.

34 Price, P.S., H.M. Hollnagel, and J.M. Zabik. 2009. Characterizing the noncancer toxicity of 35 mixtures using concepts from the TTC and quantitative models of uncertainty in mixture 36 toxicity. Risk Analysis 29(11):1534-1548.

37 Rodriguez-Trigo, G., J.P. Zock, and I.I. Montes. 2007. Health effects of exposure to oil spills. 38 Archivos de Bronconeumologia 43(11):628-635.

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1 Rozen, M.G., C. Snyder, and R. Albert. 1984. Depressions in B and T lymphocyte mitogen 2 induced blastogenesis in mice exposed to low concentrations of benzene. Toxicology 3 Letter 20: 343 349.

4 Rubinstein, I., B.G. Bigby, T.F. Reiss, and H.A. Boushey JR. 1990. Short-term exposure to 0.3 5 ppm nitrogen dioxide does not potentiate airway responsiveness to sulfur dioxide in 6 asthmatic subjects. American Review of Respiratory Disease 141:381-385.

7 Sandstrom, T. 1995. Respiratory effects of air pollution: experimental studies in humans. 8 European Respiratory Journal 8:976-995.

9 SNC-Lavalin Environment. 2012. National Marine Emissions Inventory Tool (v4.1). Prepared for 10 Environment Canada Marine Analysis Section. 58 pp.

11 Suarez, B., V. Lope, B. Perez-Gomez, N. Aragones, F. Rodriguez-Artalego, F. Marques, A. 12 Guzman, L.J. Viloria, J.M. Carrasco, J.M. Martin-Moreno, G. Lopez-Abente, and M. 13 Pollan. 2005. Acute health problems among subjects involved in the cleanup operation 14 following the Prestige oil spill in Asturias and Cantabria (Spain). Environmental 15 Research 99(3):413-424.

16 Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. 2007. Benzene (CAS Registry Number: 71 43 2). 17 Developmental Support Document, Final, October 2007. Prepared by: Haney, Joseph T. 18 Jr. Toxicology Section, Chief Engineer’s Office, Texas Commission on Environmental 19 Quality.

20 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2000a. Benzene (CASRN 71-43-2). 21 Quantitative Estimate of Carcinogenic Risk from Inhalation Exposure: Summary of Risk 22 Estimates. Website: http://www.epa.gov/iris/subst/0276.htm. Accessed: August 2015.

23 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2000b. Supplementary Guidance 24 for Conducting Health Risk Assessment of Chemical Mixtures. Washington, DC. 143 pp.

25 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2002a. Health Assessment of 1,3- 26 Butadiene. EPA/600/P-98/001F. National Center for Environmental Assessment, Office 27 of Research and Development. Washington, D.C. October 2002. 28 http://www.epa.gov/iris/supdocs/butasup.pdf

29 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2002b. Health Assessment for 30 Diesel Engine Exhaust. National Center for Environmental Assessment, Office of 31 Research and Development, United States Environmental Protection Agency. 32 Washington, DC.

33 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2002c. A Review of the Reference 34 Dose and Reference Concentration Process: Risk Assessment Forum. December 2002. 35 Washington, DC.

36 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2009a. Regulatory Impact Analysis: 37 Control of Emissions of Air Pollution from Category 3 Marine Diesel Engines. 38 Assessment and Standards Division, Office of Transportation and Air Quality, United 39 States Environmental Protection Agency.

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1 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2009b. Integrated Science 2 Assessment for Particulate Matter. National Center for Environmental Assessment – 3 RTP Division. Office of Research and Development. Research Triangle Park, NC.

4 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2010a. Integrated Exposure 5 Uptake Biokinetic Model for Lead in Children, Windows® version (IEUBKwin v1.1 build 6 11). February 2010 32-bit version.

7 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2010b. 40 CFR Parts 50 and 58. 8 Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide.

9 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2010c. 40 CFR Parts 50, 53, and 10 58. Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Dioxide.

11 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2012. Acute Exposure Guideline 12 Levels (AEGLs): Definitions. Website: http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/pubs/define.htm. 13 Accessed: August 2015.

14 United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). 2013. EPA Integrated Science 15 Assessment for Ozone and Related Photochemical Oxidants. Research Triangle Park, 16 NC.

17 Wilson, R. and G.M. Richardson. 2013. Lead (Pb) is now a non-threshold substance: How does 18 this affect soil quality guidelines? Human and Ecological Risk Assessment: An 19 International Journal, Doi:10.1080/10807039.2013.771534

20 World Health Organization. 2000. Air Quality Guidelines for Europe, Second Edition. 21 Copenhagen, DK.

22 World Health Organization. 2006. Air Quality Guidelines: Global Update 2005. Particulate 23 Matter, Ozone, Nitrogen Dioxide and Sulphur Dioxide. Copenhagen, DK.

24 Woskie S.R., T.J. Smith, S.K. Hammond, M.B. Schenker, E. Garshick, F.E. Speizer. 1988a. 25 Estimation of the diesel exhaust exposures of railroad workers: I. Current 26 exposures. American Journal of Industrial Medicine 13(3):381–394.

27 Woskie S.R., T.J. Smith, S.K. Hammond, M.B. Schenker, E. Garshick, F.E. Speizer. 1988b. 28 Estimation of the diesel exhaust exposures of railroad workers: II. National and historical 29 exposures. American Journal of Industrial Medicine 13(3):395–404.

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46.0 ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1 This response replies to intervener evidence that has been filed with the NEB in relation to ERA 2 studies completed on behalf of Trans Mountain, to evaluate the environmental effects of 3 hypothetical crude oil spills as a result of accidents and malfunctions arising from the pipeline, 4 the Westridge Marine Terminal, or from tanker accidents during marine transportation. This 5 response was prepared by Stantec on behalf of the TMEP or the Project).

6 Trans Mountain has filed four ERA reports, which examine the potential effects of accidents and 7 malfunctions as follows:

8 · Technical Report 7-1, Qualitative Ecological Risk Assessment of Pipeline Spills (Pipeline 9 ERA) (Filing IDs A3S4W9 and A3S4X0). The Pipeline ERA evaluates the potential for 10 ecological receptors (e.g., fish, fish eggs, invertebrates, amphibians, reptiles, birds, 11 mammals, and plants) to experience negative environmental effects as a result of pipeline 12 spills of crude oil released to representative river systems along the pipeline route. The 13 Pipeline ERA provides a qualitative assessment of the fate and effects for CWC and smaller 14 spills under a range of seasonal flow conditions based on the measured effects from various 15 oil spill case studies. This ERA also employed quantitative oil spill fate and transport 16 modelling and assessment of effects arising from a hypothetical spill location near the Port 17 Mann Bridge on the lower Fraser River including potential effects to biological resources in 18 the Fraser River Delta.

19 · Technical Report 7-2, Ecological Risk Assessment of Westridge Marine Terminal Spills 20 (Westridge ERA) (Filing ID A3S4X1). The primary focus of the Westridge ERA is the 21 evaluation of the potential negative environmental effects to marine ecological receptors and 22 supporting habitats resulting from hypothetical crude oil spills during marine vessel loading 23 at the Westridge Marine Terminal. The Westridge ERA is based on 2-dimensional (2D) 24 stochastic oil spill modelling and considered CWC and smaller spills including spill 25 behaviour, trajectories, and fate under seasonally varying weather conditions.

26 · Technical Report 8B-7, Ecological Risk Assessment of Marine Transportation Spills (Marine 27 ERA) (Filing IDs A3S4K7, A3S4K8, A3S4K9, A3S4L0, A3S4L1, A3S4L2, A3S4L3, A3S4L4, 28 A3S4L5, A3S4L6, A3S4L7, A3S4L8, A3S4L9, A3S4Q0, A3S4Q1, A3S4Q2, A3S4Q3, 29 A3S4Q4, A3S4Q5, A3S4Q6, A3S4Q7, A3S4Q8, A3S4Q9, and A3S4R0). The primary focus 30 of the Marine ERA was the evaluation of the potential negative environmental effects to 31 marine ecological receptors and supporting habitats that could result from a hypothetical 32 crude oil spills during marine transportation between the Port of Vancouver and international 33 waters west of Juan de Fuca Strait. The Marine ERA is based on 2D stochastic oil spill 34 modelling and considered CWC and smaller spills at three locations along the marine 35 transpiration route including spill behaviour, trajectories, and fate under seasonally varying 36 weather conditions.

37 · DQERA for Loading Accidents and Marine Spills (NEB IR No. 1.62d, Filing IDs A3W9K1, 38 A3W9K2, A3W9K3, A3W9K4, A3W9K5, A3W9K6, A3W9K7, A3W9K8, and A3W9K9). The 39 DQERA evaluates the toxicologically-induced changes in health of ecological receptors that 40 might be exposed to COPC from hypothetical spill scenarios at two locations including the 41 Westridge Marine Terminal in Burrard Inlet and Arachne Reef, located in the Gulf Islands of 42 the Strait of Georgia. The DQERA is based on 3-dimensional deterministic oil spill 43 modelling, and in addition considers the effects of both direct exposure to spilled oil, and

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1 chronic exposure to COPC, with explicit evaluation of exposure pathways, dose, and 2 mechanisms of toxicity.

3 The terms Pipeline ERA, Westridge ERA, Marine ERA, and DQERA are used throughout this 4 reply to describe the above noted documents. To assist in ease of reading, filing IDs for these 5 reports are generally not provided in the body of this response, but are noted above.

6 The potential environmental effects of hypothetical pipeline spills, and spills to the marine 7 environment resulting from marine terminal operations (e.g., an accident during vessel loading 8 at the Westridge Terminal) are also summarized in Volume 7 of the Trans Mountain Application. 9 The potential environmental effects resulting from hypothetical spills to the marine environment 10 caused by accidents during marine transportation (e.g., a vessel collision, or grounding incident) 11 are summarized in Volume 8A. The DQERA was filed with the NEB as a supplementary study in 12 May, 2014 (NEB IR No. 1.62d [Filing ID A3W9H8]).

13 The scope and methods used in the Marine ERA were based on additional application filing 14 requirements as outlined in correspondence from the NEB to Trans Mountain in a letter dated 15 September 10, 2013, as presented below:

16 “The assessment of accidents and malfunctions related to the increase in marine shipping 17 activities must include an assessment of potential accidents and malfunctions at the Terminal 18 and at representative locations along the marine shipping routes. Selection of locations should 19 be risk-informed, considering both probability and consequence. The assessment must include 20 a description of:

21 · measures to reduce the potential for accidents and malfunctions to occur, 22 including an overview of relevant regulatory regimes;

23 · CWC spill scenarios and smaller spill scenarios;

24 · the fate and behaviour of any hydrocarbons that may be spilled;

25 · potential environmental and socio-economic effects of CWC spill scenarios and 26 of smaller spill scenarios, taking into account the season-specific behaviour, 27 trajectory, and fate of hydrocarbons spilled, as well as the range of weather 28 and marine conditions that could prevail during the spill event;

29 · ecological and human health risk assessments for CWC spill scenarios and 30 smaller spill scenarios, including justification of the methodologies used; and

31 · preparedness and response planning and measures, including an overview of 32 the relevant regulatory regimes.”

33 Trans Mountain’s response to intervener evidence related to the ERA studies is presented in the 34 following sections. This reply is divided into Section 46.1 for evidence relating to issues that are 35 common to the Pipeline ERA, Westridge ERA, and Marine ERA (e.g., toxicity of dilbit). Trans 36 Mountain’s response to other intervener evidence on the potential effects of spills to the marine 37 environment is presented in Section 46.2.

38 Several interveners (e.g., Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation [Filing ID A4Q1A1], City of Vancouver 39 [Filing ID A4L7W1], Raincoast Conservation Foundation [Filing ID A4L9F4], Squamish Nation

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1 [Filing ID A4L7E7], Metro Vancouver [Filing ID A4Q9L9], Cowichan Tribes [Filing ID A4Q0U9], 2 Musqueam Indian Band [Filing ID A4Q2F9], and Living Oceans Society [Filing ID A4L9R8]) 3 have provided literature reviews on various topics related to the effects of oil spills including the 4 physical and chemical properties of oil (including both dilbit and conventional crude oil), fate and 5 transport properties (including submergence and sinking), the toxic effects of crude oil to a 6 range of ecological receptor groups, the combined effects from the use of dispersants, the 7 potential for cumulative effects, and the effects of spills on commercial and traditional harvesting 8 and treaty rights. Where these aspects are addressed throughout the various ERA documents, 9 and Trans Mountain generally does not disagree with the information provided, a detailed 10 response is not provided.

11 While the potential effects of oil spills include this wide range of discussion topics, only evidence 12 related to the environmental effects of crude oil spills are discussed in the following sections. 13 Evidence related to effects of oil spills on treaty rights (Trans Mountain’s responses to 14 Tsawwassen FN IR No. 2.4a and 2.4b [Filing ID A4H9H9], and Pacheedaht FN IR No. 1.11.03a 15 [Filing ID A3Y3X4]), commercial and traditional harvesting (Trans Mountain’s response to 16 Nations IR No. 1.3 1n [Filing ID A3Y3S1]), cumulative effects, chronic oil exposure from bilge 17 water releases, aquatic invasive species, as well as and fate, weathering and transport of oil are 18 addressed in Section 28 of this Reply Evidence, which discusses assessment methods. 19 Whereas the ERA reports did not evaluate effects of the use of dispersants (Trans Mountain’s 20 response to City of North Vancouver IR No. 2.03.07e.1 [Filing ID A4H8G1]), evidence related to 21 dispersant use has not been discussed in this ERA section, but is addressed in Section 62 of 22 this Reply Evidence. One exception is the evidence relating to the fate and transport issue of 23 potential submergence and sinking of dilbit, as this discussion is integral to the appropriate 24 evaluation of exposure pathways in the ERAs.

25 Some Aboriginal intervenors (Tsawwassen FN IR No. 2.4a [Filing ID A4H9H9], Squamish 26 Nation IR No. 2.03a and F-IR No. 2.08b (Filing IDs A4H9D0 and A4J5H8), Nooaitch IB 27 response to GoC IR No. 40 [Filing ID A4R4K1]) have also used to the results of the ERA studies 28 to complete risk assessments specific their respective traditional territories. Whereas the 29 purpose of the ERA studies was to comply with the NEB filing requirements and to evaluate the 30 potential effects within the context of the applicable RSA, the consideration of such territory- 31 specific evaluations is beyond the scope of the ERA, and therefore has not been discussed in 32 the ERA section of this Reply Evidence. Please refer to Section 28 for a more detailed 33 response.

34 To prepare this response, intervenor evidence related to the ERA studies was reviewed by the 35 ERA team, and the identified issues were compiled and categorized based on the nature and 36 topic of the evidence. Issues were subsequently separated based on their relation either to 37 common topics (e.g., pipeline and facility releases), or topics related to marine spills. For 38 example, questions related to the toxic effects of oil exposure and the potential for dilbit to sink 39 are common to all of the ERA studies and are considered in Section 46.1.

46.1 General Comments on the Effects of Spills 40 Numerous intervenors (e.g., G. Senichenko [Filing ID A4L6Q9]; Cheam and Chawathil First 41 Nations [Filing ID A4Q2C6]; Unifor [Filing ID A4L6C6]; Tsawwassen [Filing ID A4L7T2]; 42 Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation [Filing ID A4L9U9], A. Olsen [Filing ID A4L6V3], Musqueam Indian 43 Band [Filing ID A4Q2F9]; and Unifor [Filing ID A4L6C6]) provided opinions on the effects of 44 terrestrial, freshwater and marine spills to cause negative effects to ecological receptors (fish,

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1 invertebrates, marine birds, wildlife, aquatic vegetation, marine mammals, etc.), that would 2 result in damage to commercial and traditional harvesting, including cultural and economic 3 losses. These statements were general in nature and without specific reference to the 4 scenarios, or the predicted effects summarized in the ERA reports. As such a generic response 5 has been provided.

6 Trans Mountain acknowledges that a wide range of ecological receptors (e.g., shoreline and 7 nearshore habitats, fish, birds, marine and terrestrial mammals and their supporting habitats) 8 could be affected from exposure to oil and could die in the unlikely event of a crude oil spill 9 resulting from the Project. It is Trans Mountain’s view that any mortality of birds and/or other 10 marine organisms caused by a crude oil spill would be a significant adverse environmental 11 effect, and no such mortality is acceptable under any circumstances. What is important is to 12 ensure that oil spill prevention programs and processes are such that any crude oil spill is a 13 highly unlikely event, and that oil spill preparedness is maintained so that in the unlikely event of 14 such a spill, response and recovery actions are both prompt and effective (Neskonlith IB IR 15 No. 1.III.h [Filing ID A3X6S2]; GoC EC IR No. 2.048 [Filing ID A4H6A5]; and Squamish Nation 16 IR No. 2.19a [Filing ID A4H9D0]).

46.1.1 Effects of Spills to the Fraser River Estuary 17 A number of intervenors and technical reports (e.g., Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation [Filing 18 IDs A4L9U9 and A4Q1A1], Tsawwassen First Nation [Filing ID A4L7T2], Cheam and Chawathil 19 First Nations [Filing ID A4Q2C6], Musqueam Indian Band [Filing ID A4Q2F9], Raincoast 20 Conservation Foundation [Filing ID A4L9F4], and Adams Lake Indian Band response to GoC 21 [Filing ID A4R4D0]) provide opinions and predictions for oil spills affecting the lower Fraser 22 River, including severe damage (including fish kills and a variety of other effects) to salmon, 23 eulachon, sturgeon, and other important fish species; long-term negative effects to Dungeness 24 crab, bivalve, and benthic invertebrates; smothering of vegetation and wildlife; and effects from 25 dispersed oil in the water column, and effects to juvenile salmon from sunken oil.

26 Trans Mountain recognizes the biological importance and significant diversity of the Fraser 27 River and estuary. It is clear that a crude oil spill into the Fraser River could have substantial 28 negative effects that could be long-lasting if prompt and effective measures are not taken to 29 mitigate the immediate effects by containment and recovery.

30 In terms of effects to aquatic organisms, the entire fish community was considered, with 31 salmonid fish selected as a sensitive indicator species, in each of the ERAs. This was done in 32 recognition of the importance of salmon, as well as many other fish and invertebrate species to 33 Aboriginal and/or recreational fisheries, their importance in the freshwater, coastal, and marine 34 ecosystems, and/or their cultural importance for BC residents. Seasonal exposures and effects 35 to aquatic vegetation, invertebrates, fish and fish eggs, in water amphibians were assessed in 36 the Pipeline ERA. The predicted effects resulting from a pipeline spill in the lower Fraser River 37 are presented in Section 6.4.4 of the Pipeline ERA.

38 The Pipeline ERA concluded that CWC spills could have medium to high magnitude effects, but 39 that these effects would be reversible. While these effects could contribute to negative effects 40 on Aboriginal and recreational fisheries, evidence from actual case studies showed that 41 freshwater ecosystems recover from oil spills, often within relatively short periods of time. A 42 smaller spill confined to land would be unlikely to result in negative effects on Aboriginal and 43 recreational fisheries.

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1 Trans Mountain believes that spill prevention, preparedness, and effective response activities 2 must always be a primary focus to reduce the probability of an oil spill; and that adequate oil 3 spill response plans and procedures with proven capability to reduce the magnitude and extent 4 of actual effects on Aboriginal communities, the environment, landowners, and other land and 5 resource users must be in place (Neskonlith IB IR No. 1.III.h [Filing ID A3X6S2]).

46.1.2 Physical and Chemical Properties of Dilbit and Case Studies 6 A number of intervenors (e.g., Squamish Nation [Filing ID A4L7E7]; Living Oceans Society 7 [Filing ID A4L9R8], Musqueam Indian Band [Filing ID A4Q2F9], Cowichan Tribes [Filing 8 ID A4Q0V0], and Raincoast Conservation Foundation [Filing ID A4L9F4]) have presented 9 evidence with respect to the similarities and differences in the physical and chemical properties 10 of dilbit, conventional oil and refined heavy oil (e.g., HFO or Bunker C), which affect fate, 11 transport and toxicity. The various statements and opinions provided include: properties of dilbit 12 are qualitatively different from crude oil and thus behaviour will be different; the Application 13 should discuss potential differences between dilbit and conventional crude oil; HFO is not a 14 good model for effects of dilbit behaviour, or toxicity; HFO is a good indicator of the effects of 15 dilbit; and that no information has been presented on the effects of exposure of fish to dilbit. 16 Further evidence suggested that the estimates of effect and recovery in ERAs relies excessively 17 on the findings after of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (EVOS) and ignores relevant findings 18 following the Gulf (Deepwater Horizon) Oil Spill, Arrow and Nestucca spills (both involving spills 19 of Bunker C) and the Kalamazoo River Spill.

20 In response to similar concerns about the fate and effects of dilbit, Zhou et al. (2015) recently 21 compared the environmental fate and effects of dilbit products to those of conventional crude 22 oils originating from Alberta, through a comparison of physical and chemical properties, wave 23 tank weathering tests with CLWB and MSB, and toxicity testing on zebrafish embryos. It is the 24 physical properties such as density and viscosity, and chemical composition including BTEX 25 and PAH concentrations which influence the fate, behaviour and toxic effects of the oil when 26 released to the environment. Zhou et al. (2015) report that the physical and chemical properties 27 of dilbit are similar to those of heavy conventional crude oils, although both dilbit and heavy 28 conventional crude oils differ from light conventional crude oils. Dilbits contain lower 29 concentrations of BTEX (the fraction most associated with potential for acute toxicity to fish) 30 than light and medium conventional crude oils, and similar concentrations to heavy conventional 31 crude oils. The freshwater wave tank study (conducted with suspended sediment concentrations 32 of 2,000 mg/L) showed that MSB, a light conventional crude oil, submerged and sank in 33 conjunction with suspended sediment, whereas the CLWB dilbit remained on the surface of the 34 water for up to 10 days, without significantly interacting with the suspended sediment, or 35 sinking. This supports the assertion that higher viscosity oils such as dilbits do not so readily 36 disperse as fine droplets into the water column, and are less likely to form OMAs than light 37 conventional crude oils, a difference that could facilitate rather than hinder oil recovery. Toxicity 38 testing was conducted using water accommodated fractions (WAF) of the CLWB and Mixed 39 Sweet crude, and zebrafish embryos (using pericardial and yolk sac edema, indicators of Blue 40 Sac Disease as endpoints). The results indicated that low concentration WAF had no 41 measureable effect. High concentration WAF of the MSB was more toxic than high 42 concentration WAF of the CLWB, indicating that the risks to sensitive life stages of fish 43 associated with CLWB are lower, or no different than those of the light conventional crude oil.

44 Trans Mountain believes that there is much to be gained by studying the environmental effects 45 of past accidents (i.e., case studies), and has placed considerable reliance upon the EVOS in

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1 particular with respect to marine oil spills, and the Kalamazoo River oil spill with respect to 2 pipeline spills. However, Trans Mountain also believes that it is important to screen case studies 3 to be sure that key factors are considered before extrapolating from one spill to another.

4 1. Are the types of oil that were spilled comparable? The evidence presented by City of 5 Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7W1) presents several examples based on spills of HFO (e.g., the 6 Nestucca and Arrow oil spills), but HFO has an initial density that may be very close to that 7 of fresh water (in contrast to conventional crude oils and dilbit, for which the maximum 8 permitted initial density is less than 0.94). The total PAH content of HFO (typically around 9 6% by weight) is also much higher than the PAH content of conventional crude oils and dilbit 10 (typically around 1% by weight, or even lower for dilbit). Therefore, HFO differs in important 11 ways from dilbit and heavy conventional crude oils.

12 2. Are the environments in which the oil spill occurred comparable? City of Vancouver’s 13 evidence presents information based upon the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of 14 Mexico, yet the environments of the Gulf of Mexico and the Georgia Strait are substantially 15 different. In addition the manner in which oil entered the Gulf of Mexico was completely 16 different from a tanker spill scenario, and the fate of spilled crude oil in the Gulf of Mexico 17 was further modified by the introduction of huge quantities of dispersants, both at depth, and 18 on the surface of the water.

19 3. Other Factors. There are many other factors to consider. For example, the transportation of 20 crude oil for the Trans Mountain Project will exclusively involve a thoroughly vetted fleet of 21 double hulled tankers, in conjunction with other mitigation measures including but not limited 22 to the accompaniment of loaded tankers by tethered tug until they reach a clear sailing area, 23 and a host of other enhancements to navigational and other aspects of safety. These 24 measures were not in place at the time of the EVOS, or for that matter at the time of most of 25 the other marine oil tanker disasters. The safety of marine tanker traffic has improved 26 dramatically over the past two decades, and continues to improve. As a result, the fact of 27 the EVOS does not extrapolate to a conclusion that a comparable oil spill is inevitable in the 28 Georgia Strait.

29 Furthermore, the EVOS was, until the Gulf oil spill of 2010, the most comprehensively studied 30 large oil spill in history. In addition, the environment and valued ecological components of Prince 31 William Sound are very similar and representative of components present in the Strait of 32 Georgia and Juan de Fuca Strait. Therefore, the lessons from the EVOS are supported by a 33 level of detail and direct relevance not associated with most other oil spill events. Discussion on 34 the effects to the Fraser River and comparisons to the Kalamazoo River oil spill are provided in 35 the following sections.

46.1.3 Oil-Mineral Aggregation 36 Numerous intervenors (e.g., City of Vancouver [Filing ID A4L7W1], Raincoast Conservation 37 Foundation [Filing ID A4L9F4], City of [Filing ID A4Q0L5], Squamish Nation 38 [Filing ID A4L7E7], Metro Vancouver [Filing ID A4Q9L9], Musqueam Indian Band [Filing 39 ID A4Q2F9], and District of North Vancouver [Filing ID A4Q0E9]) have submitted evidence 40 related to the weathering, fate and potential for dilbit to rapidly submerge and sink through the 41 interaction with sediments (OMA) in both the freshwater and marine environments. Particular 42 concern has been expressed for the long-term effects to salmon and other commercial and 43 culturally sensitive fish species and supporting habitats in the Fraser River and Burrard Inlet.

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1 Trans Mountain asserts that some portion of any crude oil can sink, given appropriate 2 conditions. A detailed discussion of OMA formation is provided in Section 6.2.1.1 of the Pipeline 3 ERA. Some of the factors that affect sinking potential of crude oil include the salinity and density 4 of the ambient water (fresh, brackish, or salt), temperature, the initial density of the crude oil, the 5 physical/chemical characteristics of the crude oil that affect weathering (and change in density 6 and viscosity of the weathering crude oil), and the turbulence of the aquatic environment, which 7 interacts with the viscosity of the oil and affects the potential for small droplets of oil to be 8 formed and carried in the water column. Small oil droplets may or may not interact with 9 suspended sediments (depending upon their type and concentration, as well as salinity) to form 10 OMA, which can have a greater density than the oil alone. While OMA formation can increase 11 the rate of oil sinking, it has also been identified as a beneficial process that helps to naturally 12 disperse oil, and enhances the rate of natural degradation. In addition, sand can become 13 admixed with crude oil droplets resulting in sinking. Subsequent gravity separation of the sand 14 and crude oil can also result in re-surfacing of some of this oil. As a result of these many factors, 15 it is an oversimplification and incorrect to state that heavier oils are by definition susceptible to 16 sinking and stranding (NEB IR No. 1.62c [Filing ID A3W9H8]; Tsawout FN IR No. 1.22d [Filing 17 ID A3Y3T9]; Upper Nicola Band IR No. 1.22d [Filing ID A3Y3V1], and Tofino-Long Beach CoC 18 IR No. 2.2.2.1a [Filing ID A4H9G8]).

19 A recent report released by the United States Department of the Interior and USGS (2015) 20 states that formation of OMA happens naturally when oil and suspended particles mix in 21 turbulent water. Major factors affecting the formation of OMA are (1) the quantity and viscosity 22 of the oil, interfacial tension of oil-water (more or less a constant in the absence of dispersants), 23 and chemical composition of the oil; (2) quantity, type and surface properties of the suspended 24 particles; (3) magnitude and variability in physical energy of the aquatic environment; (4) 25 temperature; and (5) salinity. The first step to forming OMAs lies with the initial breakup of the 26 slick into oil droplets. Oil viscosity is a key factor in this process, as it can vary by three orders of 27 magnitude when comparting light to heavy crudes. The range can be even greater once 28 weathering is taken into account. Smaller droplets are generated when the oil viscosity is low. 29 Droplets are difficult to generate when the oil viscosity is high.

30 Oil viscosity is a key factor in promoting interactions between crude oil and suspended 31 sediments, as the oil must first become dispersed into the water column, and there must be a 32 sufficient concentration of suspended sediment (typically greater than 100 mg/L) already in the 33 water in order for these interactions to take place. The relatively high viscosity of dilbit, and the 34 tendency for the viscosity of spilled dilbit to rapidly increase after release (Fingas 2015, 35 Appendix 46A), mitigate against the formation and dispersion of small droplets into the water 36 column and make interactions between dilbit and suspended sediment less likely to occur than 37 may be the case for conventional crude oils (Zhou et al. 2015, Appendix 46C).

38 Trans Mountain’s position is also supported by a growing body of evidence and opinion 39 regarding the environmental behaviour and fate of dilbit.

40 In addition to laboratory (SL Ross 2010) and meso-scale testing of dilbit (Technical Report 8C- 41 12-S7; Witt O’Brien’s et al. 2013), and more recent studies (Zhou et al. 2015; Fingas 2015) 42 emphasize the following key points with respect to the effect of weathering of crude oil on 43 density:

44 · Weathering alone is not likely to cause bitumen diluted with condensate to 45 achieve a density greater than that of fresh water in less than 8 to 10 days, and

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1 it is unlikely that dilbit would achieve a density greater than that of brackish or 2 salt water even after extended weathering.

3 · Other forms of dilbit (e.g., bitumen diluted with another light oil or synthetic oil) 4 will have slower initial weathering than bitumen diluted with condensate, and 5 are even less likely to achieve a density greater than that of fresh water in a 6 short time.

7 Trans Mountain recognizes that this growing body of evidence has identified dilbit containing 8 condensate as a diluent as having evaporation properties that reflect a rapid initial loss of 9 volatile constituents, followed by a transition to a slower weathering phase. In this respect, such 10 dilbits could be said to weather “like a light oil” during the first 24 hour period of weathering, and 11 to transition to weathering “like a heavy oil” thereafter. This weathering behaviour was 12 recognized by Trans Mountain, and appropriate algorithms were implemented in the oil spill 13 modelling to properly reflect this behaviour (Stronach and Hospital 2014, Appendix 46B). 14 However, the scenario advanced by various intervenors (e.g., of dilbit achieving a density 15 greater than that of ambient water within 24 hours is not supported by Trans Mountain, as the 16 shift over to the “secondary” phase of weathering precludes this outcome.

17 Rather than the rapid weathering scenario advanced by the intervenors, more recent literature 18 (Zhou et al. 2015) points to the important role of viscosity in the environmental behaviour of 19 dilbit. In tank tests using natural river sediment as a source of suspended sediment, dilbit was 20 observed to be too viscous to form small droplets in the water column, and to resist both 21 entrainment as droplets, and interactions with suspended sediment. In contrast, a conventional 22 light crude underwent dispersion in to the water column, and interacted with suspended 23 sediments, so that it sank to the bottom of the tank. Zhou et al. (2015) concluded that dilbit 24 would remain afloat in fresh water for 10 days, a conclusion that was corroborated by Fingas 25 (2015). As a relatively viscous oil (and as demonstrated by Zhou et al. 2015), dilbit may actually 26 be less likely to disperse into the water column than conventional crude oils.

27 Lastly, any spilled crude oil may wash ashore in weathered form and interact with coarse 28 sediments on beaches resulting in an aggregate that may sink if washed back out into deeper 29 water. In this respect, dilbit is no different from any other crude oil. Zhou et al. (2015) also 30 concluded that dilbit is likely to pose less risk to aquatic life, or risk that is no different from 31 conventional crude oils.

32 Taken together these points indicate that dilbit should be considered no more prone to sinking 33 behaviour than other crude oils. Based on these results, Trans Mountain maintains a position 34 that the fate and effects modelling, the assessment of potential toxic effects, and recovery from 35 potential accidents and malfunctions as presented in the various ERA studies, meets the 36 requirements of the NEB and the Application.

46.1.4 Effects from Exposure to Submerged and Sunken Oil 37 Numerous intervenors (e.g., Musqueam Indian Band [Filing ID A4Q2F9], Raincoast 38 Conservation Society [Filing ID A4L9F4], City of New Westminster [Filing ID A4Q0L5]; Metro 39 Vancouver [Filing ID A4Q9L9], Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation [Filing ID A4Q1A1], District of North 40 Vancouver [Filing ID A4Q0I1], BC Nature and Nature Canada [Filing ID A4L8K8], City of 41 Vancouver [Filing ID A4L7W1], and Squamish Nation [Filing ID A4L7E7]) have presented 42 opinions on the fate and effects of dilbit and its potential to sink and create long-term effects to a

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1 range of aquatic organisms. Opinions expressed suggest that dilbit will submerge and sink 2 through the interaction with sediments to form OMA in both the freshwater and marine 3 environments, sinking oil can occur rapidly causing acute toxic effects (fish kills), and will result 4 in long-term exposure to fish and fish habitat, toxic effects can extend for decades, all aquatic 5 organisms have not been considered in the Application (i.e., City of New Westminster; Filing 6 ID A4Q0L5) has suggested that Trans Mountain has not evaluated effects from oil spills to the 7 invertebrate community. Others Intervenors state the ERA failed to consider effects from 8 submerged oil at all, and that the ERA failed to assess wildlife and habitats exposed to 9 submerged oil. Particular concern has been expressed for the long-term effects to salmon and 10 other commercial and culturally sensitive fish species in the Fraser River estuary and other 11 smaller tributaries. Virtually all submission draw their conclusions based on comparisons to 12 sinking oil which occurred during the Kalamazoo River oil spill.

13 Section 46.1.4 provides Trans Mountain’s reply with respect to the factors involved in the 14 formation of OMA. With respect to the predicted effects specifically to the Fraser River estuary, 15 Trans Mountain does not believe this scenario to be a likely outcome of a pipeline spill, or as a 16 result of a tanker spill originating near the Fraser River estuary.

17 The experience in the Kalamazoo River is discussed in Section 6.2.2.1 of the Pipeline ERA. It 18 was found that crude oil deposition to sediments occurred primarily in quiescent, soft-bottom 19 areas of the river (particularly within impoundments) and not in net-erosional areas of the river 20 bed such as gravel or cobble bed sections.

21 As explained in previous IR responses, the Fraser River has a less turbulent flow regime than 22 the Kalamazoo River, and there is lower potential for spilled crude oil to be dispersed into small 23 droplets which also limits the potential for OMA formation, although oil that contacts sediments 24 along the river banks may incorporate mineral particles resulting in increasing density for the 25 combined product (NEB IR No. 1.62c [Filing ID A3W9H8], Tsawout FN IR No. 1.22d [Filing 26 ID A3Y3T9], and Matsqui FN IR No. 2.07a and 2.08c [Filing ID A4H8U3]).

27 The bed of the lower Fraser River is generally gravel upstream of Mission, BC. Near Mission the 28 river undergoes a transition from a wandering gravel-bedded river to a single-thread, sand- 29 bedded channel (Attard 2012). This transition also marks the upstream extent of tidal influence, 30 although salt water intrusion does not extend past the head of the Delta at New Westminster 31 (Attard 2012). The Fraser River is known to carry a high sediment load consisting mainly of fine 32 quaternary glacial deposits eroded directly from river banks and terraces (Attard 2012). Total 33 suspended sediment concentrations were measured at Mission, BC by Attard (2012) where the 34 river channel is almost 500 m wide and 7 to 8 m deep with a sand bottom. Most observed total 35 suspended solids concentrations were less than 100 mg/L, although the total range of values 36 was from < 10 mg/L to about 350 mg/L, the higher values being found close to the riverbed. 37 Concentrations of total suspended solids in the upper 5 m of the water column were low (around 38 20 mg/L) in April 2010, but increased with the freshet to values in the range of 100 mg/L near 39 the surface of the river in May and June 2010 (Attard 2012). The total suspended solids is 40 dominated by fine sediment (fine silt and clay) during low flows, with increasing transport of 41 coarser sediment (sand) during high flows. The coarser sediment, however, shows increasing 42 concentrations towards the riverbed, whereas the finer silt and clay particles are relatively 43 uniformly distributed throughout the water column (Attard 2012).

44 As a result of these factors, it is unlikely that a large proportion of spilled crude oil in the lower 45 Fraser River would be deposited to sediment. Such oil as might be deposited to sediment would

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1 not find a quiescent environment where it could be trapped, as it did in the Morrow Lake head 2 pond in the Kalamazoo River, but having relatively low density in relation to gravel and sand 3 river bed materials would continue to be dispersed and moved down-river by natural process in 4 the river bed. These processes would tend to break the oil up and further admix it with sand and 5 silt particles, which would also help to facilitate biodegradation of the oil.

6 In response to similar concerns about the fate and effects of dilbit, Zhou et al. 2015 recently 7 compared the environmental fate and effects of dilbit products to those of conventional crude 8 oils originating from Alberta, through a comparison of physical and chemical properties, wave 9 tank weathering tests with CLWB and MSB, and toxicity testing on zebrafish embryos. It is the 10 physical properties such as density and viscosity, and chemical composition including BTEX 11 and PAH concentrations which influence the fate, behaviour and toxic effects of the oil when 12 released to the environment. Zhou et al. (2015) report that the physical and chemical properties 13 of dilbit are similar to those of heavy conventional crude oils, although both dilbit and heavy 14 conventional crude oils differ from light conventional crude oils. Dilbits contain lower 15 concentrations of BTEX (the fraction most associated with potential for acute toxicity to fish) 16 than light and medium conventional crude oils, and similar concentrations to heavy conventional 17 crude oils. The freshwater wave tank study (conducted with suspended sediment concentrations 18 of 2,000 mg/L) showed that MSB, a light conventional crude oil, submerged and sank in 19 conjunction with suspended sediment, whereas the CLWB dilbit remained on the surface of the 20 water for up to 10 days, without significantly interacting with the suspended sediment, or 21 sinking. This supports the assertion that higher viscosity oils such as dilbits do not so readily 22 disperse as fine droplets into the water column, and are less likely to form OMAs than light 23 conventional crude oils, a difference that could facilitate rather than hinder oil recovery. Toxicity 24 testing was conducted using WAF of the CLWB and Mixed Sweet Crude, and zebrafish 25 embryos (using pericardial and yolk sac edema, indicators of Blue Sac Disease as endpoints). 26 The results indicated that low concentration WAF had no measureable effect. High 27 concentration WAF of the MSB was more toxic than high concentration WAF of the CLWB, 28 indicating that the risks to sensitive life stages of fish associated with CLWB are lower, or no 29 different than those of the light conventional crude oil.

30 With respect to the exposure pathways that the intervenors suggest were not evaluated 31 (including “sinking” oil), Trans Mountain responds that such exposure pathways were evaluated 32 implicitly in the Marine ERA, and explicitly in the DQERA.

33 The ecological effects of spilled oil including toxic effects to freshwater aquatic biota (aquatic 34 plants, benthic invertebrates, fish, fish eggs and aquatic life stages of amphibians) are 35 discussed in Section 6.3.1.1 of the Pipeline ERA. Potential effects to marine fish and supporting 36 habitat are also discussed in Section 5.3.2 of the Marine ERA.

37 Section 3.4.1 of the DQERA provides a detailed discussion of the methods and benchmarks for 38 the assessment of potential effects from exposure of marine fish to hydrocarbons (including 39 PAH compounds) in the water column. Section 3.4.1.2 of the DQERA provides specific 40 discussion of potential effects to fish eggs. Additional detail on the effects to fish eggs is 41 provided in the following section.

42 Effects of lingering oil are discussed in Section 3.4.4.4 of the DQERA.

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46.1.5 Toxic Effects from PAH Exposure in the Water Column 1 Various Intervenors have prepared detailed literature reviews on the toxic effects of exposure to 2 dispersed hydrocarbons and PAH compounds to various aquatic receptors in the water column 3 including fish, fish eggs, invertebrates and other aquatic organisms.

4 Comments from intervenors include the following. Stochastic modelling considered 5 concentrations of benzene but did not consider the effects of PAH, which are more toxic (Metro 6 Vancouver (Filing ID A4Q9L9). North Vancouver (Filing ID A4Q0I1) states “There is a lack of 7 understanding of the toxicity of dilbit.” City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7W1) suggests that the 8 ERA fails to consider toxicological effects to range of receptors. City of New Westminster (Filing 9 ID A4Q0L5) states the assumptions in the ERA are poorly validated and effects could result at 10 much lower [PAH] concentrations than those considered. Raincoast Conservation Foundation 11 (Filing ID A4L9F4) states “Adult salmon may not be able to avoid oil spills in freshwater and be 12 exposed to PAH in the water column.”

13 Trans Mountain submits that the literature review information provided by these intervenors 14 regarding the range of toxic effects of PAH compounds in the water column is presented and 15 has been assessed in detail in the DQERA.

16 Specifically, two assessments were carried out for hydrocarbons in the water column, the first 17 considering THC concentrations and using a non-polar narcosis endpoint to evaluate the 18 potential for mortality of marine biota (including algae, invertebrates and fish), and the second 19 evaluating the potential for exposure to PAHs to induce deformities or cause mortality of 20 developing fish eggs and embryos (the Blue Sac Disease endpoint).

21 A full discussion of the benchmarks for toxic effects of hydrocarbon mixtures including total and 22 individual PAH is provided in Section 3.4.1.2 of the DQERA. Potential toxic effects resulting 23 from a loading accident at the Westridge Marine Terminal are discussed in Sections 4.3.2 and 24 4.4.2 of the DQERA. Potential toxic effects resulting from a tanker spill at Arachne Reef in the 25 Gulf Islands are discussed in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.4.2 of the DQERA.

46.1.6 Effects of PAH Exposure to Fish Eggs in Spawning Gravels 26 Some intervenors (City of New Westminster [Filing ID A4Q0L5], Squamish Nation [Filing 27 ID A4L7E7], and Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation [Filing ID A4Q1A1, page 18]) have presented 28 evidence that sunken dilbit deposited to sediment will be retained in spawning gravels and 29 cause ongoing toxic effects for extended periods of time. Also, that the weathering of dilbit 30 increases the concentration of PAH compounds and the potential for increased toxicity to 31 salmon embryos (Raincoast Conservation Foundation (Filing ID A4L9F4). Shxw’ōwhámel First 32 Nation (Filing ID A4Q1A1) states “Spilled oil can interact with sediment and hyporheic flow 33 which can affect fish eggs embryos and larvae, and other long-term effects to lamprey eels.”

34 Trans Mountain disagrees with this evidence. In the event that some crude oil were to be 35 entrained into hyporheic flow or spawning shoals, it is not correct to suggest that with 36 weathering, the residual heavy components of oil, 3- to 6-ringed PAH compounds, waxes, 37 resins, and asphaltenes become progressively enriched as the total volume of oil decreases 38 and that this can cause an increase in chronic toxicity to early life stages of fish, even though 39 the total amount of toxic material decreases. While it would be correct to argue that the relative 40 composition of the hydrocarbon mixture changes, with the higher alklylated PAH homologues 41 coming to represent a larger fraction of the total mixture over time, the absolute concentrations

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1 of all hydrocarbon species would still decrease over time due to weathering (Tsawout FN IR 2 No. 2.25a; Filing ID A4H9H1).

3 In fact, one of the standard ways to study the effects of crude oil on developing fish eggs and 4 embryos is to generate a dilute solution of hydrocarbons including PAHs by placing oil-coated 5 gravel in a cylinder, and flowing water through the gravel prior to exposing the eggs. The 6 literature shows that the total PAH concentration in water produced by such columns decreases 7 steadily over time. As a result, the toxicity of the water also decreases steadily throughout the 8 exposure period, and the columns typically become ineffective (i.e., the hydrocarbon 9 concentration in the water falls below a toxic concentration) within a few weeks to months. While 10 it is correct that the composition and relative concentrations of the individual PAH compounds 11 change over time as a result of weathering and biodegradation, the absolute concentrations 12 decrease as the initial finite quantity of crude oil decreases, and the toxicity of the mixture also 13 decreases. These processes are explained in detail by Di Toro et al. (2007).

46.1.7 Effects from Phototoxicity 14 Raincoast Conservation Foundation (Filing ID A4L9F4) identifies photodegradation of PAH 15 compounds as an additional mode of toxicity. City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7W1) states that 16 “The Trans Mountain Application fails to consider any consequences that may result from photo- 17 enhanced toxicity.” This conclusion is not correct.

18 As explained in the Pipeline ERA

19 “phototoxicity occurs when PAHs present in biological tissues are exposed to 20 natural light including ultraviolet (UV) light, and a resulting reaction enhances the 21 toxicity of PAHs in the tissues, potentially causing mortality or other harm to fish 22 and other aquatic organisms (Logan 2007). The PAHs known to be involved with 23 phototoxic responses are the three- to five-ring PAHs and similar heterocyclic 24 compounds. Hodson et al. (2011) noted that UV photomodification of PAHs can 25 create oxygenated derivatives such as quinones and anthroquinones, which are 26 more water soluble but also more reactive and more toxic than the parent 27 compounds. Hodson et al. (2011) identified anthracene, fluoranthene and pyrene 28 as substances of particular concern. For most benthic species, exposure to light 29 may be minimal, and therefore this mode of action is not a major source of 30 concern. Likewise, for the toxicity benchmarks used here to evaluate negative 31 effects on fish eggs, the damage to developing embryos occurs relatively early in 32 the incubation period, while eggs (particularly salmonid eggs) are buried in 33 spawning gravels and not exposed to light. Barron et al. (2003) tested juvenile 34 pink salmon using weathered Alaska North Slope crude oil (a rich source of 35 PAHs) to determine if it would be phototoxic under conditions of short-term 36 exposure to high levels of oil that may occur during a spill. However, the 37 responses observed were typical of the acute narcotic toxicity of petroleum, and 38 there was no indication of photo-enhanced toxicity. It was concluded that pink 39 salmon are at less risk from photo-enhanced toxicity than early life stages of 40 several other (marine) species. Therefore, although the potential for photo- 41 enhancement of PAH toxicity exists and has been demonstrated in laboratory 42 studies, it is not considered to be of sufficient importance in the natural 43 environment to merit special consideration. This conclusion is similar to that of 44 McDonald and Chapman (2002) who questioned the ecological relevance of PAH

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1 phototoxicity, suggesting that it should not be used for environmental 2 management decisions unless its ecological relevance is firmly established, and 3 then only as part of a weight of evidence determination.”

4 In addition, the DQERA acknowledges that

5 “non-polar narcosis does not address the issue of chemicals that may have a 6 specific mode of action, while also potentially possessing a narcotic effect of 7 lower potency. Examples of this include phototoxicity, where exposure to 8 ultraviolet light can cause certain PAH compounds or their metabolites to exert 9 much higher toxicity than the parent compound as a narcotic substance; and 10 effects of certain PAH compounds on developing eggs resulting in a constellation 11 of effects such as yolk sac edemas, pericardial edemas, craniofacial 12 malformations, and haemorrhaging, collectively referred to as ‘blue sac disease.’”

13 The example of phototoxicity cited by intervenors in this evidence and in previous IRs is that of 14 the 2009 Cosco Busan oil spill in San Francisco Bay. This oil spill involved a HFO (or Bunker C 15 fuel), not a crude oil. The PAH content of the HFO spilled by the Cosco Busan was markedly 16 higher than the PAH content of conventional crude oils and dilbit. Whereas CLWB was analyzed 17 by Trans Mountain and found to have a total PAH (TPAH) content of less than 1% by weight, 18 the TPAH content of the HFO would be much higher, typically 6% or greater. Therefore it is not 19 appropriate to extrapolate from the Cosco Busan spill to estimate potential environmental 20 effects of dilbit, particularly with respect to mechanisms of toxicity that are driven by exposure to 21 PAHs.

22 A recent re-assessment of the potential for phototoxic effects on Pacific herring following the 23 EVOS (Sellin Jeffries et al. 2013) concluded that that <1% of the young herring population in 24 Prince William Sound would have been present at depths associated with significant risk of PAH 25 phototoxicity in 1989. The study also recognized considerable uncertainty with respect to 26 several important factors including tissue concentrations of relevant PAH molecules, vertical 27 movements of the juvenile herring, and UV light intensity profiles in the water column.

28 Phototoxicity remains an incompletely understood mechanism of hydrocarbon toxicity, 29 particularly with respect to the phototoxic activity of individual PAH molecules and exposure to 30 both the PAHs and relevant wavelengths of UV light.

31 Trans Mountain agrees with the intervenors that it is a recognized mechanism of hydrocarbon 32 toxicity to juvenile fish. Beyond this however, Trans Mountain believes that phototoxicity is not 33 the primary mechanism of toxicity likely to be responsible for environmental effects in the event 34 of a crude oil spill, and endorses the position of McDonald and Chapman (2002) that the 35 ecological relevance of PAH phototoxicity remains questionable, and that it should not be used 36 for environmental management decisions unless its ecological relevance is firmly established.

46.1.8 Toxicity of Total Hydrocarbons 37 Various intervenors (Metro Vancouver; Filing ID A4Q9L9) have expressed concerns over Trans 38 Mountains assessment of the toxicity of dilbit stating “considering subcomponents separately, 39 and predicting them to add up to an overall effect misses key interactions that may make dilbit 40 toxicity greater than the sum of its parts.” Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4Q0V0) stated the 41 Application did not present the toxicity levels for aquatic or shoreline plants exposed to oil and 42 that toxicological studies of oil on marine vegetation should be included in the literature review.

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1 The report further states “The application should include a taxonomic review of the potential 2 impacts of hydrocarbon toxicity to marine fish” and “The Marine Spill ERA provides no 3 information on the sensitivity of different taxonomic groups of marine invertebrates to 4 hydrocarbon toxicity.”

5 Trans Mountain submits that this information is already provided in the DQERA.

6 Two assessments were carried out for hydrocarbons in the water column, the first considering 7 THC concentrations and using a non-polar narcosis endpoint to evaluate the potential for 8 mortality of marine biota (including algae, invertebrates and fish), and the second evaluating the 9 potential for exposure to PAHs to induce deformities or cause mortality of developing fish eggs 10 and embryos (the Blue Sac Disease endpoint).

11 Non-polar narcosis is the mechanism most relevant to oil spills, as it includes the BTEX group 12 (BTEX, also known as mono-aromatic hydrocarbons or MAH), PAHs, and the balance of the 13 aliphatic and aromatic chemical groups comprising PHC (petroleum hydrocarbons) generally. 14 A discussion of methods used to evaluate toxicity benchmarks to the full range of aquatic 15 receptors is provided in Section 3.4.1.1 of the DQERA. Toxicity benchmarks for hydrocarbons in 16 sediment are discussed in Section 3.4.5 of the DQERA.

17 Effects of oiling to shoreline and aquatic vegetation along with effects thresholds for thickness of 18 oiling are discussed in Section 6.3.1.3 of the Pipeline ERA

46.1.9 Psuedocomponent Approach 19 The City of New Westminster (Filing ID A4Q0L5) requested that Trans Mountain provide 20 validation that the toxic effects of pseudocomponents are additive.

21 Trans Mountain provides this information in Section 3.4.1 of the DQERA.

46.1.10 Potential Effects from Exposure to Napthenic Acids 22 Musqueam Indian Band (Filing ID A4Q2F9) expressed concern over potential effects from 23 exposure to napthenic acids in dilbit and provided several references related to the occurrence 24 and fate, and analytical methods.

25 Trans Mountain submits that while naphthenic acids may occur naturally in crude oils and in oil 26 sands bitumens, they are generally associated with tailing pond wastewater and are not a 27 significant component of dilbit as they are extracted during processing. The reference Clement 28 and Fedorak 2005 provided by Musqueam states “They are toxic components in refinery 29 wastewaters and in oil sands extraction waters.” “Extraction of bitumen from the vast Athabasca 30 oil sands deposit in northeastern Alberta, Canada releases naphthenic acids into tailings pond 31 waters. This is a unique process in which surface mining methods are used to obtain oil sands 32 ore that contains approximately 9% to 12% bitumen in average grade ores (Strausz and Lown 33 2003). In the most commonly used extraction method, the ore is slurred with hot water, caustic 34 soda and naphtha. Bitumen is recovered from the slurry, and naphthenic acids are readily 35 dissolved into the slightly alkaline extraction water.”

36 Naphthenic acids are therefore not likely to be important constituents of crude oil or dilbit in the 37 context of the toxicity of the THC mixture.

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46.1.11 Assessment of Species at Risk 1 Several intervenors (G. Senichenko [Filing ID A4L6Q9] and City of New Westminster [Filing 2 ID A4Q0L5]) have submitted evidence that oil spills could have long-term effects to salmon 3 stocks, and species at risk including painted turtle and Nooksack dace, and that pipeline spill 4 scenarios did not adequately address these potential effects.

5 The Pipeline ERA evaluated potential acute and chronic environmental effects to various 6 aquatic organisms and wildlife over the range of watercourses and flow conditions traversed by 7 the Project. The ERA focused on different groups of ecological receptors that might be exposed 8 to spilled oil as a result of their habitats and life cycles, as it is neither practical nor necessary to 9 individually assess every receptor that may potentially be affected by a hypothetical spill. For 10 the purposes of the Pipeline ERA, fish were addressed as an assemblage and represented by a 11 generic salmonid species. This approach is reasonable because salmonids are among the more 12 sensitive species to hydrocarbon exposure, and critical portions of their life cycle occur in fresh 13 water. They are also among the species of highest management concern in both Alberta and 14 BC. Reptiles and air-breathing amphibians were represented by the western painted turtle.

15 The environmental effects of a spill at the scenario locations are representative of the 16 environmental effects that could result from a large oil spill at almost any location along the 17 PPC. In that context, the ecological receptors considered in the ERA are treated generically. 18 They are not intended to be an exact representation of the species present at the hypothetical 19 spill location; rather, they are representative of species that could be affected by an accidental 20 oil spill affecting a watercourse or watercourses in Alberta or BC (Volume 7, Section 7.1.1.1.1, 21 Ecological Receptors, Filing ID A3S4V6).

22 ERA methods and the selection of representative receptors including species at risk (i.e., great 23 blue heron, Nootsack dace, western painted turtle, and others), are described in detail in 24 Section 6.1.3 of the Pipeline ERA.

46.1.12 Pipeline ERA Methodology 25 Metro Vancouver (Filing ID A4Q9L9) states “The qualitative risk assessment is largely 26 subjective and poorly validated, and it assumed an optimistically continuous window within 27 which clean up and remediation was possible,” and that all pathways and toxicity mechanisms 28 not considered… "These results also rest heavily on the thresholds used for evaluation of lethal 29 effect, and have failed to consider many additional lethal and sub-lethal pathways that may lead 30 to impacts", and “The ERAs lacks full consideration of interrelated effects such as these that 31 may occur in the ecosystem as a whole.”

32 Trans Mountain does not agree with this assessment. The Pipeline ERA is a qualitative 33 (screening level) risk assessment and is not intended to provide quantitative estimates of risk or 34 uncertainty. Section 6.0 of the Pipeline ERA provides detailed chemical characterization of a 35 representative dilbit product; develops a rationale for the selection of representative hypothetical 36 spill locations and scenarios, with descriptions of those locations including information on 37 seasonal variability; describes a wide range of potential ecological receptors and resources that 38 could be at risk in the event of an oil spill; identifies credible exposure pathways and a 39 conceptual site model for exposure of ecological receptors to spilled crude oil; reviews the fate 40 and behaviour of spilled oil in freshwater environments, including the potential for OMA 41 formation; describes nine individual case studies of actual crude oil spills into relevant 42 freshwater environments; and describes the fate of spilled crude oils, including dilbit and

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1 synthetic oil from Alberta sources, and modelling studies carried out for the Enbridge Northern 2 Gateway Project.

3 Within the Pipeline ERA, case studies based upon actual crude oil spills to rivers and lakes are 4 described, and are used as part of the basis for forecasting the environmental effects of spilled 5 crude oil, including but not limited to dilbit. The case studies provide an objective link to the 6 actual effects of crude oil spills on aquatic and riparian ecosystems, and render groundless the 7 opinions of the intervenors regarding the effects of spilled crude oil on ecological receptors at 8 both organismal and ecosystem levels.

9 Trans Mountain notes that the conclusions of the Pipeline ERA state clearly that a crude oil spill 10 into a freshwater environment could have substantial negative environmental effects that could 11 be long-lasting if not effectively remediated. This confirms that the primary focus of spill 12 prevention and response activities must always be to reduce the probability of an oil spill to be 13 as low as reasonably practical (ALARP), and to have adequate oil spill response plans and 14 procedures in place.

15 Based on the above, Trans Mountain asserts that the analysis of the effects of crude oil spills to 16 fresh water including potential effects to salmon is detailed and complete.

46.1.13 Certainty and Confidence in the Pipeline ERA 17 Intervenor evidence related to uncertainty and confidence in the ERA with respect to the 18 potential effects of crude oil spills to salmon comes primarily from Squamish Nation (Filing 19 ID A4L7E7). The Squamish Nation evidence suggests the there is significant uncertainty around 20 both the environmental fate and toxic effects of dilbit, that current knowledge is not sufficient to 21 characterize risk to salmon, and that any conclusions about the effects of dilbit made in the 22 Application must be considered unreliable. "The high number of unknowns and influencing 23 factors involved in a dilbit release imply a wider range of possible effects".

24 Much of the Squamish argument relies on their assessment of knowledge gaps and uncertainty 25 including the potential for dilbit to sink, physical and chemical differences between dilbit and 26 conventional oil, and resulting toxic effects to fish and other aquatic biota.

27 Trans Mountain disagrees with the Squamish assessment of the effects of spills to salmon and 28 other aquatic biota. As noted above, the conclusions of the Pipeline ERA state clearly that a 29 crude oil spill into a freshwater environment could have substantial negative environmental 30 effects that could be long-lasting if not effectively remediated.

31 Trans Mountain has addressed the expressed uncertainty about the physical and chemical 32 properties of dilbit including the toxic effects as compared to other conventional crude oils in 33 Section 46.1.3, and the potential to submerge and sink in Sections 46.1.4 and 46.1.5 above.

34 The conclusions of the Pipeline ERA states as follows:

35 “For each river, season and ecological receptor type, the expected spatial extent, 36 magnitude, duration and reversibility of negative environmental effects was 37 evaluated, again with reference to case studies. The spatial extent of 38 environmental effects was found to vary, depending upon the season and river 39 characteristics, and both the spatial extent and magnitude of environmental 40 effects was often rated as ‘high’. However, effect durations were typically less

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1 than 5 years, and often 12 to 24 months, and all rated negative environmental 2 effects were considered to be ‘reversible’. Evidence from the case studies 3 showed overwhelmingly that freshwater ecosystems can recover from oil spills, 4 often within relatively short periods of time.”

5 Certainty and confidence in the findings of Pipeline ERA including potential effects to fish are 6 discussed in Section 6.5.

7 Based on the above, Trans Mountain asserts that the analysis of the effects of crude oil spills to 8 fresh water including the assessment of potential effects to salmon is detailed and complete for 9 the purposes of the Application.

46.2 Marine ERA Issues and Concerns 10 As noted at the beginning of this section of the reply, Trans Mountain completed a total of four 11 complementary ERA reports. However, there are few direct references to specific ERA reports 12 in the intervenor evidence. As such, Trans Mountain has had to infer to which studies the 13 intervenor evidence may apply in this response. The following sections provide Trans 14 Mountain’s response to issues raised with specific ERA reports.

46.2.1 Marine ERA and DQERA Methodology 15 Criticism of the methodology used by Trans Mountain in the Marine ERAs comes primarily from 16 three intervenor groups. Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing ID A4L7D1) suggest that the Trans 17 Mountain ERAs deviate from Standard Risk Assessment practice to support Environmental 18 Impact Assessment and has proposed alternate methodology used in Australia.

19 Section 28 (Environmental Assessment Methods) of this Reply Evidence provides Trans 20 Mountain’s reply with respect to the selection and use of alternate ERA methodologies as 21 suggested by the Pacheedaht submission.

22 City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7W1) suggests “There are fundamental deficiencies with the 23 ERA and it should not be relied on to assess potential effects of spills.” These deficiencies 24 include 1) it fails to integrate oil exposure risk-based on representative locations within 25 ecologically distinct sub-regions along the marine shipping routes, including at or near 26 ecologically-sensitive areas; 2) it fails to assess hazard independently of exposure; 3) it fails to 27 assess the possibility of organisms being exposed to submerged oil; and 4) it fails to consider all 28 the ways that oil can harm organisms.

29 Trans Mountain’s full reply to Dr. Short’s report submitted as evidence by the City of Vancouver 30 (Filing ID A4L7W1) is detailed and as such, is provided under separate cover. Refer to 31 Attachment 1.09 of Trans Mountain’s Reply Evidence.

32 BC Nature and Nature Canada have criticized the ERA methods and results with respect to the 33 effects of crude oil spills to marine birds as submitted by Trans Mountain in its Application.

34 The current submission of evidence by BC Nature and Nature Canada (Filing ID A4L8K8) is 35 similar to critical comments embodied in IRs, and many of the same issues have been restated. 36 The BC Nature and Nature Canada evidence states, “This [habitat-focused] approach … 37 suffered from serious limitations, the consequences of which include the potential to 38 inaccurately estimate potential ecological consequences on marine birds and habitats.

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1 Limitations of the habitat-focused approach includes... the proponent failed to provide estimates 2 of bird mortalities, failed to assess marine bird indicator species, failed to evaluate potential 3 worst-case scenarios to marine birds and habitats, failed to account for birds that occupy both 4 shoreline and surface water habitats, and failed to describe the range of likely effects of an oil 5 spill on marine birds.” As such, there is the suggestion that the ERAs do not meet the filing 6 requirements of the NEB.

7 Trans Mountain does not agree with these criticisms of the Marine ERA (primarily stochastic 8 assessment methods), and as noted has responded to similar suggestions throughout the 9 IR and IR motion process.

10 Trans Mountain has not made numerical predictions of the number or percentage of birds likely 11 to die in the unlikely event of a crude oil spill. Such predictions would be subject to considerable 12 uncertainty, and are not required in order to reach a determination that birds would likely die in 13 the event of a large crude oil spill, and that that effect magnitude would be High.

14 The methodology and approach used by Trans Mountain for the Marine ERA component of the 15 effects assessment and the assignment of biological sensitivity factors (BSF) values was 16 explained previously in BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.07a.1 (Filing ID A4H7Y8).

17 The stochastic approach to modelling the fate and transport of spilled oil, as well as ecological 18 consequences of spilled oil (i.e., the methodology underlying the Westridge and Marine ERAs), 19 was adopted in consideration of evidence provided by Environment Canada (2011) during the 20 Enbridge Northern Gateway Hearings process. Environment Canada (2011) recommended at 21 that time that previous and ongoing spill modelling and risk assessment studies for similar 22 project types be considered, naming the example of the AIRA project.

23 Stochastic oil spill modelling was subsequently completed following an approach based on that 24 of the AIRA, so that probability contours for oiling of the water surface and shorelines could be 25 superimposed onto biological resource layers. However, the AIRA did not attempt to overlay oil 26 spill probability contours onto quantitative estimates of the abundance, distribution or mortality 27 of individual species, and neither did the Westridge or Marine ERAs.

28 The rationale supporting recovery time estimates can be found in Section 9 of the Marine ERA. 29 The consideration of CWC as required by the NEB, versus worst-case spill scenarios as 30 suggested by BC Nature is discussed in Section 28 of this Reply Evidence.

31 Other relevant responses to previous second round BC Nature and Nature Canada IRs related 32 to the stochastic habitat assessment methods used in the Westridge and Marine ERAs include 33 the following (Filing ID A4H7Y8 [Trans Mountain’s response to Round 2 IRs] and Filing 34 ID A4J5C4 [Trans Mountain’s response to Round 2 IR Motions]):

35 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.18a.5 (effects to marine bird populations)

36 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.18b.1 (effects to marine bird populations)

37 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.06a. (indicator species - red-necked 38 phalarope)

39 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.07a.2 (sensitivity ranking of shorebirds)

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1 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.07b.1 (sensitivity ranking of shorebirds)

2 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.07c.1 (bird mortality from other exposure 3 pathways)

4 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.07d.1 (Mortality estimates and recovery for 5 shorebirds)

6 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.07d.2 (abundance counts, mortality estimates, 7 aggregation)

8 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.07e (sensitivity ranking and mortality)

9 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.12d (assessment of species at risk)

10 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.12e (assessment of specific bird species)

11 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.12g (assessment of specific bird species)

12 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.13e (habitat effects versus toxic effects, 13 benchmarks for effects)

14 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.35b (species using both shorelines and 15 surface water)

16 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.35c.2 (habitat effects versus toxic effects 17 [DQERA])

18 As noted in several of the above IR responses, the BSF rankings consider primarily the potential 19 for harm or mortality to birds as a result of direct exposure to crude oil. Chronic effects of 20 exposure to crude oil constituents are evaluated in the DQERA as discussed below. Effects of 21 lingering oil, disturbance from cleanup activities or increased predation (should this be a factor) 22 are empirically represented through estimates of recovery time.

23 Trans Mountain also subsequently completed the DQERA to evaluate the full range of potential 24 effects from exposure of birds, fish and other wildlife to oil in surface water, air above the slick, 25 water column, shorelines, and sediment.

26 Section 3.3.3 of the DQERA states “Selection of wildlife species for this assessment therefore 27 considers a number of factors, in addition to the primary consideration of whether receptors may 28 be highly exposed to COPCs by virtue of their preferred habitats and dietary requirements.” 29 These other factors include but are not limited to considerations of traditional use by Aboriginal 30 people, commercial and/or recreational harvest, and protections that may be extended to 31 various species under provincial or federal legislation. Section 3.3.3.4 of the DQERA provides 32 descriptions of receptor species selected for the evaluation of chronic effects taking into 33 consideration the factors identified above.

34 Sections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 of the DQERA describe not only the approach taken to evaluate 35 potential for harm to marine birds exposed to spilled crude oil, but also the range of effects (and 36 subsequent population recovery from such effects) that were observed following the EVOS in 37 Prince William Sound. For the purposes of the DQERA, a surface water slick thickness of 10 μm

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1 was assumed as a threshold thickness for oiling mortality. Those birds exposed to a slick having 2 a thickness of greater than 10 µm at any time during the oil spill simulation are assumed to die, 3 given the low probability for timely capture, treatment and rehabilitation. Maps showing the 4 areas affected by slicks having a thickness of greater than 10 µm at any time during the oil spill 5 simulation can be found in the DQERA, as Figure 5.6 (for the smaller oil spill [Filing 6 ID A3W9K4]) and Figure 5.13 (for the CWC oil spill [Filing ID A3W9K6]). This conservative 7 assumption renders concern about other acute exposure pathways (e.g., oral ingestion through 8 preening) groundless, as the birds are assumed to have previously succumbed to hypothermia.

9 Other relevant responses to previous second round BC Nature and Nature Canada IRs related 10 to the DQERA methods include the following (Filing ID A4H7Y8 [Trans Mountain’s response to 11 Round 2 IRs] and Filing ID A4J5C4 [Trans Mountain’s response to Round 2 IR Motions]):

12 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.19b.2 (DQERA, bird species indicators, effects 13 to declining populations)

14 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.19b.3 (recovery estimates, declining 15 populations)

16 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.19c.1 (mortality of threatened species)

17 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.19c.3 (marine bird abundance, density, 18 mortality)

19 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.19c.5 (marine bird abundance, mortality 20 estimates)

21 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.20c.2 (bird mortality, quantitative estimates, 22 recovery)

23 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22a.2 (acute versus chronic effects)

24 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22b.5 (oil exposure benchmarks, mortality)

25 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22c.1 (other effects to birds, hypothermia)

26 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22c.2 (potential causes of bird mortality)

27 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.31a.1 (other effects to birds, plumage 28 preening, buoyancy)

29 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.31a.2 (effects from chronic discharges, bildge 30 water)

31 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.31a.3 (effects from chronic discharges, bildge 32 water)

33 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.31a.4 (effects from chronic discharges, bildge 34 water)

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1 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.31a.5 (methods and approach, size of the 2 RSA)

3 It should be noted that the NEB determined that all IRs from the second round had been 4 adequately answered by Trans Mountain, and no motions to compel further evidence were 5 granted to BC Nature and Nature Canada.

6 Both the Marine ERA and the DQERA identified high magnitude effects to marine birds in the 7 unlikely event of spill during marine transportation.

8 Trans Mountain concluded that a comprehensive approach combining stochastic and 9 deterministic modelling (DQERA), qualitative effects assessment, and quantitative ecological 10 and human health risk assessments was most appropriate for the Project because this 11 approach is based on a recent Canadian precedent for a similar project. Based on the risk 12 assessment programs completed by Trans Mountain and as described in their response to 13 Weaver A F-IR No. 1.09 (Filing ID A3Z2F1), it is Trans Mountain’s opinion that the TMEP 14 approach not only meets industry standards for stochastic oil spill risk assessments, but leads 15 the industry when both the stochastic and deterministic assessments are considered together.

46.2.2 Exposure Assessment and Biological Sensitivity Factors – Shorelines 16 Section 7.2.2 of the Pacheedaht First Nation evidence (Filing ID A4L7D1) states the assignment 17 of BSF rankings for shorelines underestimate the sensitivity of the Pacheedaht shoreline. City of 18 New Westminster (Filing ID A4Q0L5) suggest that residual oil in the form of tar balls (from water 19 in oil emulsions) remaining on shorelines after clean up could be an ongoing source of 20 contamination and will effect various fish species. Raincoast Conservation Foundation (Filing 21 ID A4L9F4) suggests the potential for large volumes of stranded oil was not considered in the 22 qualitative ERA. City of Vancouver (Filing ID A4L7W1) identifies deficiencies in the ERA and 23 states the ERA should have assessed hazards independent of probability (Arbitrary BSF 24 rankings, assignments based on probability of oiling). Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9R8) 25 states "Shoreline oiling following a major oil spill would inflict serious injuries to biological 26 communities inhabiting them in the short term, and lingering effects could persist for decades to 27 a century on porous beaches (gravel, sand and mud) and in intertidal marshes if oil becomes 28 associated with hypoxic sediments or accumulations of organic matter. These lingering 29 reservoirs of oil pose long-term threats to intertidal organisms, predators that consume them, 30 and to marsh-dwelling birds and mammals."

31 The Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4Q0V0) raises a number of concerns including: 32 “Inconsistencies raise serious technical concerns about the validity of BSF values used to 33 categorize shoreline habitats in the marine spills ERA.” “No reference is provided for the 34 diversity and productivity of different shoreline types and the assignment of BSF values.” “The 35 Application did not consider the effects of spills on marine aquatic vegetation.” “Effects resulting 36 from residual hydrocarbons remaining after a spill are not discussed in the Application.”

37 In response to Pacheedaht concerns Trans Mountain notes in the introduction that the 38 assessment of such territory-specific evaluations is beyond the scope of the ERA. Please refer 39 to Section 28 of this Reply Evidence for a more detailed response to territory-specific 40 assessments.

41 In response to concerns associated with the potential effects of lingering oil, Trans Mountain 42 does not dispute that small amounts of crude oil can became sequestered and remain in deep,

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1 porous beach deposits, or brackish marshes following an oil spill, and that such oil could remain 2 following a Net Environmental Benefits Assessment. However, the potential for crude oil to 3 penetrate and persist on beaches within the RSA was evaluated based on a report prepared by 4 Coastal and Ocean Resources (2013), which takes the thickness of gravel layers and depth to 5 the impermeable layer into account.

6 The scenarios and potential effects described in the Marine ERA do not directly consider 7 exposure to lingering oil, the ways that emergency response and recovery techniques could 8 reduce the extent and duration of potential effects, nor do they directly consider the effects that 9 may be attributable to cleanup activities. However, effects have been implicitly incorporated into 10 estimates of recovery, which is discussed in Section 9.0 of the report. In addition, the DQERA 11 provides risk estimates for chronic exposure to such lingering oil.

12 The effects of crude oil impinging on shorelines were based upon effects observed following the 13 EVOS. Section 3.4.4 of the DQERA provides a detailed description of those effects. As 14 sequestered oil, and as indicated by the Exxon Valdez experience, this material can persist in a 15 relatively fresh state due to its isolation from the biosphere. However, small amounts of this oil 16 do get released, and organisms present in the vicinity do have some level of exposure to crude 17 oil constituents, as evidenced by increased levels of Cytochrome P450 (CYP1A) activity. 18 However, no direct link has been established between such low levels of exposure and 19 biological effects at the individual or population level. The isolated nature and low levels of such 20 exposures render the likelihood of population-level effects low. Refer to Trans Mountain’s 21 response to Tsawwassen FN IR No. 2.4b (Filing ID A4H9H9).

22 The effects assessment in the DQERA also focused on effects observed within Prince William 23 Sound, where the spilled oil was relatively fresh. It is not necessary to repeat the assessment 24 for more highly-weathered oil, as the effects would fall within the envelope already described.

25 In response to issues related to diversity and the assignment of BSF values, Section 5.3.1 of the 26 Marine ERA provides a qualitative assignment of BSF values described as follows:

27 “The 14 shoreline habitat types were assigned to one of four BSF classes, 28 ranked on a scale of 1 (low sensitivity) to 4 (high sensitivity). While these BSF 29 are somewhat correlated with the tendency for shoreline types to absorb or retain 30 spilled crude oil, they are based primarily on a consideration of habitat complexity 31 and the ability of the different habitat types to sustain biodiversity and 32 productivity. In this sense, exposed bedrock or sand substrates are considered to 33 be subject to high levels of natural disturbance and have relatively low levels of 34 biodiversity and productivity, whereas sheltered rocky substrates, marsh, and 35 eelgrass beds have high biodiversity and productivity.”

36 Further detailed assessment of crude oil retention and benchmarks for effects on the intertidal 37 zone is provided in Section 3.4.4.5 of the DQERA.

38 Regarding the effects on marine aquatic vegetation, a description of the intertidal habitats within 39 the RSA, including the importance of seaweeds, rockweed, eelgrass, etc. is provided in 40 Section 4.7.1 of the Marine ERA. Table 5.3 provides the BSF classifications for shoreline and 41 nearshore habitats receptor group. Salt marshes, eelgrass beds and other sensitive habitats are 42 assigned the highest BSF of 4. Although the Marine ERA does not specifically provide an 43 overlay of intertidal seaweed species with the probability of shoreline oiling, seaweeds in

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1 general are considered implicitly through the shoreline and nearshore habitats. Further, effects 2 of hydrocarbons to marine vegetation are generally not a major concern from a toxicological 3 standpoint (Maki 2013). Oiled seaweeds would certainly not be suitable for human consumption, 4 and it is usual for consumption advisories to be issued in the event of an oil spill that affects 5 areas that provide food for humans. This would affect traditional harvest of seaweeds and other 6 foods of marine origin until the safety of resumed consumption could be demonstrated. Typically 7 this process can take weeks to months to complete, depending upon the nature of the affected 8 resource, and the degree of oil exposure. Also refer to Trans Mountain’s response to 9 Pacheedaht FN IR No. 1.11.03a (Filing ID A61185).

46.2.3 Exposure Assessment and Biological Sensitivity Factors - Marine Fish etc. 10 Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4Q0V0) raise a number of issues with respect to the assessment of 11 effects to fish and fish habitat in the Marine ERA including: “Clams and mussels are assigned to 12 the near shore and shoreline habitat resource category… It is unclear whether the fish and fish 13 habitat includes marine invertebrates.”

14 Trans Mountain notes that the supporting habitat for clams, mussels and Dungeness crab etc., 15 is described in Section 4.7.2. Subtidal Habitats. It is further noted that Table 9.1 of the Marine 16 ERA (Marine Oil Spill Recovery), aligns clams and mussel in the category of shoreline habitat 17 as assessed by the EVOS Trustee Council. However, for the purposes of the Marine ERA, the 18 marine fish community is defined as including marine fish, as well as marine invertebrates (e.g., 19 mollusks and crustaceans), as stated in Section 5.3.2. It should be noted that fish habitat for 20 these organisms is defined as areas with water depths less than 10 m, which overlaps with 21 intertidal areas assessed as shoreline habitat.

22 The Cowichan Tribes evidence also suggests the assignment of BSF values for fish based on 23 water depth does not consider that marine invertebrates and fish larvae occur close to the 24 surface even in very deep water and suggests a qualitative ecological effects assessment for 25 marine invertebrates should be included in the Application.

26 Trans Mountain submits that the potential for negative effects to the marine fish community is 27 generally low, due to the low potential for dissolved hydrocarbon concentrations in water to 28 reach thresholds that would cause mortality of fish or other aquatic life. The potential for 29 dissolved hydrocarbon concentrations to reach toxic levels would be greatest in shallow water 30 areas, under weather conditions that caused spilled oil to be driven into shallow areas with wave 31 action, leading to localized high concentrations of dissolved hydrocarbons in the water. This 32 could potentially result in the death of fish and invertebrates as a result of narcosis, or could 33 cause abnormalities in developing embryos if spawn was present. While effects of this type 34 have been seen locally following the EVOS and other crude oil spills, large-scale effects at the 35 population level were not observed. Refer to Trans Mountain’s response to Squamish Nation IR 36 No. 1.7i (Filing ID A61164).

37 Furthermore, generation times for phytoplankton and zooplankton tend to be short, which will 38 contribute to rapid recovery, and in contrast to sessile organisms, the natural movements of 39 water within the Strait of Georgia and Juan de Fuca Strait would tend to restore populations of 40 phytoplankton or zooplankton that might be reduced as a result of exposure to crude oil 41 constituents (regardless of the mechanism of toxicity). Therefore, effects on phytoplankton and 42 zooplankton are not likely to be readily discernible, or long-lasting. Refer to Trans Mountain’s 43 response to Pacheedaht FN IR No. 1.11.04 (Filing ID A61185).

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1 In addition, two toxicological assessments were carried out for hydrocarbons in the water 2 column in the DQERA, the first considering THC concentrations and using a non-polar narcosis 3 endpoint to evaluate the potential for mortality of marine biota (including algae, invertebrates 4 and fish), and the second evaluating the potential for exposure to PAHs to induce deformities or 5 cause mortality of developing fish eggs and embryos (the Blue Sac Disease endpoint). The 6 narcosis endpoint is the primary cause of acute toxicity for a broad range marine receptor 7 organisms (e.g., algae, invertebrates and fish) when exposed to high concentrations of 8 dissolved hydrocarbon compounds, including those originating from crude and refined oils 9 (Di Toro et al. 2000, French McCay 2009).

10 Methods for the evaluation of exposure to hydrocarbons in the water column are described in 11 Section 3.4.1 of the DQERA. Results for hypothetical spills from a loading accident at the 12 Westridge Maine Terminal are described in Section 4.3.1 and 4.4.1. Results for hypothetical 13 spills resulting from a tanker accident at Arachne Reef are described in Section 5.3.1 and 5.4.1.

14 The Cowichan Tribes evidence further states that “the BSF factors for fish and supporting 15 habitat are problematic in that effects to bull kelp were not adequately assessed and further that 16 kelp beds should receive special consideration in the ERA.”

17 Trans Mountain acknowledges the cultural significance of bull kelp to first nations. Various 18 responses have been prepared for similar concerns related to the assessment of Kelp in the 19 Marine ERA. Trans Mountain’s response to Squamish Nation IR No. 1.07.c (Filing ID A3Y3R1 20 [Trans Mountain’s response to Round 1 IRs] and Filing ID A3Z2D3 [Trans Mountains Response 21 to Round 1 Motions]) and follow-up motion provides a specific detailed response related to the 22 potential effects of oil spills to kelp.

23 Kelps are seaweeds belonging to the group known as brown algae (Phaeophyceae), and tend 24 to be found in the lower intertidal and subtidal zones of the coastal environment, where they can 25 form dense stands (kelp forests) that support diverse and highly productive marine 26 communities. Kelps were considered in Section 4.7 (Seasonal Distribution and Variability of 27 Biological Resources in the RSA) of the Marine ERA, and specifically as part of the Shoreline 28 and Near Shore Habitats (Section 4.7.1), and as part of the Subtidal Habitat (Section 4.7.2). 29 Section 4.8 (Aboriginal Traditional Use) also acknowledges the gathering and traditional use of 30 marine and freshwater plants, including kelp, marine flowering plants, benthic and detached 31 algae, brown algae, red algae, green algae and phytoplankton.

32 The near shore habitats where kelp would be found are described in Section 5.3.1 of the Marine 33 ERA. Results of the assessments for shoreline and near shore habitats can be found in 34 Sections 6.2, 7.2, and 8.2 for the Strait of Georgia, Arachne Reef and Race Rocks oil spill 35 scenarios respectively.

36 Empirical information on the effects of crude oil spills on kelps is scarce, but this may be due in 37 part to the relatively low sensitivity of kelps to hydrocarbon contaminants, as well as their 38 moderate exposure in the event of crude oil spills. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council 39 (EVOSTC; 2010) retrospectively evaluated the recovery status of injured resources following the 40 oil spill of 1989. They considered both intertidal communities and subtidal communities (from 41 the lower intertidal zone to a depth of about 20 m). Initial effects to the intertidal zone occurred 42 at all tidal levels and in all types of habitats throughout the spill area. Much of the damage to 43 seaweed species, however, was caused by oil spill cleanup methods that were found in 44 retrospect to exacerbate damage caused by the oil spill, and are no longer used (e.g., hot water

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1 pressure washing). The Fucus canopy was initially eliminated in most of the areas that 2 underwent aggressive cleaning (EVOSTC 2010), thereby removing the protection provided by 3 this alga to intertidal organisms from predation, desiccation and abrasion. As a result of natural 4 processes (e.g., storms) and oil spill cleanup activities (e.g., beach washing), some of the 5 weathered oil that initially stranded in the intertidal zone was transported down into the subtidal 6 zone. However, oil spills rarely cause significant damage to subtidal kelp beds, in part because 7 they appear not to be particularly sensitive to damage, and in part because they are not highly 8 exposed to fresh oil. Peterson (2001) reviewed the acute, indirect and chronic effects of the 9 EVOS on a variety of marine communities including kelps. Sampling in summer 1990 (one year 10 after the spill) revealed no dramatic difference between oiled and control kelp beds. Minor 11 differences between beds were identified, but it was unclear whether these differences (e.g., a 12 greater number of small plants in the exposed population) were related to toxic effects of oil, or 13 physical effects associated with boat traffic during the shoreline assessment and treatment 14 programs.

46.2.4 Exposure Assessment and Biological Sensitivity Factors – Marine Birds 15 As noted in Section 46.2.1, BC Nature and Nature Canada (Filing ID A4L8K8) has provided 16 extensive comments and criticisms of Trans Mountain’s assessment methods for both the 17 Marine ERA and the DQERA.

18 BC Nature and Nature Canada evidence is critical of Trans Mountains methods through 19 comparison to the Aleutian Islands Risk Assessment as follows: Approach used in Marine ERA 20 is inconsistent with AIRA … "unlike the four BSF categories used by the proponent … the AIRA 21 relied on five categories of "sensitivity factors" … with the highest risk assigned to marine bird 22 species listed at risk …"

23 Trans Mountain’s response to BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.20a (Filing ID A4H7Y8 [Trans 24 Mountain’s response to Round 2 IRs] and Filing ID A4J5C4 [Trans Mountains Response to 25 Round 2 Motions]) provides a detailed comparison to the AIRA including comparisons to the 26 assignment of BSF values for marine birds as follows:

27 “For seabirds, the AIRA established four levels of biological sensitivity to oil 28 exposure, representing (in ascending order of sensitivity) an unspecified group of 29 low sensitivity birds; gulls and terns; ducks and waterfowl; and auks and divers. A 30 fifth sensitivity class was also established to represent listed endangered 31 species. Trans Mountain followed a similar approach by establishing four BSF 32 classes for birds, representing waders and shorebirds; gulls and terns; ducks and 33 cormorants; and auks and divers. Trans Mountain felt that there was no evidence 34 to show that endangered species would have greater intrinsic sensitivity to crude 35 oil exposure than other members of their guilds, and therefore, special status 36 such as provincial or federal listings were treated as an additional management 37 factor to consider, outside of the sensitivity framework.”

38 BC Nature and Nature Canada evidence Section 3.1 stated that the case studies considered in 39 the Application may underestimate bird mortality and recovery after inland pipeline oil spills, 40 including that effects from lingering oil were not evaluated.

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1 It is Trans Mountain’s view that any mortality of birds caused by a crude oil spill would be a 2 significant adverse environmental effect, and no such mortality of birds is acceptable under any 3 circumstances.

4 The assessment methods undertaken by Trans Mountain for the Pipeline ERA did not include 5 an estimation of bird mortality by species. Trans Mountain recognizes that assessment 6 practitioners and intervenors may favour alternate methodologies, but is confident that its 7 assessment of pipeline accidents and malfunctions follows the NEB’s guidance on this issue 8 and meets the requirements of CEA Act, 2012.

9 The assessment results for each river, season and ecological receptor type, the expected 10 spatial extent, magnitude, duration and reversibility of negative environmental effects was 11 evaluated. The spatial extent of environmental effects was found to vary, depending upon the 12 season and river characteristics, and both the spatial extent and magnitude of environmental 13 effects was often rated as “high.” However, effect durations were typically less than five years, 14 and often 12 to 24 months, and all rated negative environmental effects were considered to be 15 “reversible.” Evidence from the case studies showed overwhelmingly that freshwater 16 ecosystems can recover from oil spills, often within relatively short periods of time.

17 The scenarios and potential effects described in the Pipeline ERA do not directly consider 18 exposure to lingering oil. However, such effects would be implicitly incorporated into estimates 19 of recovery, which is discussed in Appendix C of the Pipeline ERA. In addition, the DQERA 20 provides risk estimates for chronic exposure to such lingering oil as noted in the previous 21 section. Refer to Trans Mountain’s response to BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.08g.1 (Filing 22 ID A4H7Y8).

23 BC Nature and Nature Canada further state: In the Marine ERA, the selections of marine bird 24 indicator species to represent marine birds in general were unsubstantiated, lacked clarity, and 25 the relationships between indicator species and the guilds they were intended to represent were 26 not quantitatively assessed. “The Application relied on limited information regarding the 27 diversity, distribution, abundance and spatiotemporal dynamics of marine birds in the project 28 areas, particularly for marine birds at sea.” And Marine bird species at risk were not granted due 29 consideration. Section 2.5.1 suggests unsubstantiated assumption regarding distribution … this 30 approach failed to account for aggregations of birds within the Marine RSA.

31 The risk-based approach adopted by Trans Mountain to evaluate potential effect of CWC and 32 smaller spills was systematic and thorough, designed to meet requirements of the CEA Act, 33 2012, and to be consistent with guidance received from the NEB and Environment Canada. The 34 ERA reports which have been prepared in support of the Application to describe potential 35 environmental effects (i.e., consequences) provide an established, accepted and transparent 36 method to evaluate potential acute and chronic toxicity and effects of hypothetical spill scenarios 37 for a suite of ecological receptors. While the predicted effects are based on the scenarios 38 evaluated, they are representative of the range of potential effects which could occur in the 39 unlikely event of a crude oil spill along the marine transportation route. Variance in the effects 40 and recovery are qualified based on the specific location, volume, seasonal conditions affecting 41 fate and transport and the exposed species.

42 BC Nature and Nature Canada have questioned the ranking of avian guilds according to general 43 sensitivity to exposure to spilled crude oil, as expressed using BSF rankings of 1 (low) to 4 (very 44 high). Trans Mountain has defended this approach, and the assignment of shorebirds to the

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1 lowest sensitivity class (BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.07a.1; Filing ID A4H7Y8 [Trans 2 Mountain’s response to Round 2 IRs] and Filing ID A4J5C4 [Trans Mountains Response to 3 Round 2 Motions]). The rankings are intended to provide perspective (in a qualitative manner) 4 as to the potential for serious adverse effects to marine birds in the unlikely event of a crude oil 5 spill.

6 The habitat-based approach that considers the entire water surface within the RSA and all 7 shoreline within the RSA provides an assessment of all areas that could be affected by spilled 8 crude oil. All birds using such habitat are therefore addressed in the assessment, including any 9 federally or provincially-listed species of concern. Refer to Trans Mountain’s response to BC 10 Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.08f.1 (Filing ID A4H7Y8).

11 Please refer to Trans Mountain’s response to GoC EC IR No. 2.048 (Filing ID A4H6A5) and BC 12 Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.09a.1 (Filing ID A4H7Y8 [Trans Mountain’s response to Round 2 13 IRs] and Filing ID A4J5C4 [Trans Mountains Response to Round 2 Motions]) regarding bird 14 species with aggregative behaviours such as sea ducks.

15 The conclusions of the Marine ERA with respect to effect to marine birds and marine bird habitat 16 are as follows: “There is high potential for oiling of marine bird habitat following an accidental 17 spill of crude oil along the marine transportation route. The extent to which this potential could 18 be realized would depend upon the size of the oil spill, the efficacy of measures intended to 19 promptly contain and recover spilled oil, the ability of oil spill responders to capture and treat 20 oiled animals, and the intrinsic sensitivity of the animals to exposure. Shorebirds have generally 21 low sensitivity to oiling, and it is noteworthy that the Fraser River Delta is not predicted to be 22 highly exposed to spilled crude oil in the event of a marine transportation accident. It is likely, 23 however, that some shorebirds would be sufficiently oiled to result in mortality of adult or 24 juvenile birds, or that eggs would become oiled as a result of oil in the feathers of the parent 25 birds during the breeding season, resulting in embryo mortality.

26 There is also a high probability of exposure for other seabirds (including but not limited to gulls 27 and terns, ducks and cormorants, and auks and divers) in the unlikely event of a crude oil spill. 28 Some level of negative effect would be expected for birds exposed to crude oil, up to and 29 including death as a result of hypothermia, loss of buoyancy, and/or oil ingestion. While the 30 actual effects would depend upon the season, as well as other factors related to the oil spill and 31 response activities, an effect magnitude rating of High would result under most if not all 32 combinations of exposure scenarios and seabird guilds or sensitivity classes for the CWC and 33 smaller spills.

34 Oil exposure could also extend to affect a large number of known breeding or colony sites for 35 seabirds, as well as a large number of Important Bird Areas (IBAs) in the Strait of Georgia, Gulf 36 Islands, and Juan de Fuca Strait region. This exposure is also considered likely to result in 37 mortality of seabirds associated with the nesting sites during the spring and summer, and the 38 IBAs at any time of the year. Again, an effect magnitude rating of High would result.”

39 Given that the effect magnitudes for essentially all crude oil spill scenarios result in the 40 conclusion that birds could die as a result, and that such an outcome would merit an effect 41 magnitude of High, the alternative assessment methodology endorsed by BC Nature and Nature 42 Canada (analysis by spatial abundance and individual species mortality) is not required as it 43 would not result in any different conclusion.

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1 Section 2.9 of the BC Nature and Nature Canada evidence also contains arguments that the 2 DQERA contained errors regarding the determination of slick thickness threshold for wildlife 3 mortality and estimates of marine bird mortality. “…the proponent’s derivation and subsequent 4 application of the 10 μm oil slick thickness as a threshold for mortality is not supported.” …. and 5 “Unsubstantiated determinations of these threshold amounts or threshold slick thicknesses may 6 act to underestimate potential project-related effects.”

7 Section 3.3.2.2 of the DQERA acknowledges that “Birds and mammals exposed to crude oil on 8 the surface of the water, leading to harmful effects on these species as a result of either 9 hypothermia (caused by loss of insulative characteristics of fur or feathers) or ingestion of crude 10 oil as a result of grooming or other behaviours following such exposure.”

11 Trans Mountain has responded to numerous previous IRs from BC Nature and Nature Canada 12 on the topic of benchmarks of slick thickness for bird mortality including the following (Filing 13 ID A4H7Y8 [Trans Mountain’s response to Round 2 IRs] and Filing ID A4J5C4 [Trans 14 Mountain’s response to Round 2 Motions]):

15 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22b.1

16 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22b.2

17 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22b.3

18 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22b.4

19 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22b.5

20 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22b.6

21 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22b.7

22 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22b.8

23 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22c.1

24 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22c.2

25 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22c.3

26 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22c.4

27 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22c.5

28 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22c.6

29 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22d.1

30 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22d.2

31 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22e.1

32 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22e.2

August 2015 Page 46-28 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 46.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Ecological Risk Assessment Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22e.3

2 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22e.4

3 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22e.5

4 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22e.6

5 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22e.7

6 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22f.1

7 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22f.2

8 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22f.3

9 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22g.1

10 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22g.2

11 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22h.1

12 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22h.2

13 · BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22i.1

14 The primary response to this line of questioning is provided in Trans Mountain’s response to BC 15 Nature Nature Cda IR No. 2.22b.1 (Filing ID A4H7Y8 [Trans Mountain’s response to Round 2 16 IRs] and Filing ID A4J5C4 [Trans Mountain’s response to Round 2 Motions]), which states “The 17 analysis and thresholds provided are consistent with French McCay (2009) and the 18 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Type A 19 Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environments (United 20 States Department of the Interior 1997), which states: “If the volume of the spillet is less than 21 20 ml, no effects are assumed. If the diameter of the spillet is less than 230 m, a thickness of 22 100 μm is assumed as a threshold thickness for oiling mortality. If the spillet is larger than 230 m 23 in diameter, 10 μm is assumed as a threshold thickness for oiling mortality.” Since the DQERA 24 deals with the CWC and smaller spill volumes, both of which are expected to result in large 25 slicks, the threshold slick thickness of 10 µm was the only consideration.

26 Adverse effects (i.e., death due to oiling followed by hypothermia) are assumed to occur to 27 marine birds and fur-bearing semi-aquatic mammals (e.g., mink, otters, sea otters) if the 28 estimated slick thickness equals or exceeds 10 µm in any model grid square, at any time step, 29 in the oil spill fate and transport simulation. The time step used in the modelling for the DQERA 30 typically ranged from 10 to 30 seconds, so this exposure period could theoretically be very brief. 31 For spills in Burrard Inlet, the grid size was approximately 125 m square; for spills at Arachne 32 Reef, the grid size was approximately 1 km square.”

46.2.5 Exposure Assessment and Biological Sensitivity Factors – Marine Mammals 33 Pacheedaht First Nation (Filing ID A4L7D1) states “Assignment of sensitivity ranking to 34 southern resident killer whale are inappropriate.” Cowichan Tribes (Filing ID A4Q0V0) states 35 “Accidents and malfunctions that could negatively affect marine mammals includes spills,

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1 release of bilge water and collisions with ships.” Raincoast Conservation Foundation (Filing 2 ID A4L9F4) confirms that “killer whales are vulnerable to an oil spill” and cited effects to killer 3 whale after the EVOS.

4 Trans Mountain does not disagree with many of the statements regarding potential risk to 5 southern resident killer whale as presented by the intervenor evidence.

6 With regards to Pacheedaht concerns about the sensitivity ranking of southern resident killer 7 whale in the Maine ERA, Trans Mountain submits the following:

8 The sensitivity ranking of marine mammals including the southern resident killer whale is 9 presented in Section 5.3.4 and summarized in Table 5.7 of the Marine ERA. The report 10 acknowledges the status of southern resident killer whale under SARA. For the purposes of the 11 ERA, sensitivity of marine mammals is assigned for whales as a receptor group, and is based 12 on potential mechanisms of exposure through external oiling, ingestion of oiled prey, inhalation 13 and fouling of plates for baleen whales. The sensitivity factor is intended to address the intrinsic 14 biological/toxicological sensitivity of a species group, for the purpose of anticipating and 15 describing likely or potential environmental effects. Status under legislation such as the Species 16 at Risk Act is another factor to consider with respect to determining the significance of potential 17 environmental effects (Trans Mountain’s response to Pacheedaht FN IR No. 1.05.09 (Filing 18 ID A61185) and Kwantlen FN IR No. 1.27 (Filing ID A61140).

19 With regards to effects to killer whale after the EVOS Trans Mountain refer to the response to 20 Raincoast IR No. 1.25a (Filing ID A3Y3C0) which states “Killer whales show little or no tendency 21 to avoid oil spills. During the EVOS members of the transient AT1 population and the Resident 22 AB pod were seen surfacing in oil slicks immediately following the spill in 1989. As reported by 23 the EVOSTC (2010) and Matkin et al. (2008), both groups experienced mortality in the months 24 following oil exposure. Deaths were potentially due to the inhalation of petroleum vapours, or 25 from feeding on oiled seals or contaminated fish (EVOSTC 2010). Mortality continued in the 26 following year because mothers died leaving orphaned calves that subsequently died (EVOSTC 27 2010). The mortality rate for the AB pod was reported to be 19% in 1989 and 21% in 1990, 28 compared to an expected natural mortality rate of about 2.5% (EVOSTC 2010, Matkin et al. 29 2008). However, the AB pod was in conflict with the commercial longline fishery of Prince 30 William Sound prior to the EVOS. Matkin et al. (1999) documented bullet wounds on ten whales 31 in the pod, 5 of which subsequently died. Between 1985 and 1986, 6 whales were lost from AB 32 pod. The mortality rate in the AB pod was therefore higher than normal even before the oil spill. 33 Matkin et al. (1999) described the social structure of the matriarchal pods, noting that the loss of 34 an important matriarch can affect a pod for some years thereafter. Thus, the loss of key 35 matriarchs from the 1986 shootings, and from the 1989 EVOS event, may have resulted in a 36 continuing of AB pod members (Harwell and Gentile 2006). Harwell and Gentile (2006) 37 concluded that the population reduction of the AB pod in the immediate aftermath of the EVOS 38 was ecologically significant, and was most likely caused by exposure to crude oil, which 39 exacerbated ongoing effects on that pod as a result of recent conflict with fishermen. However, 40 not all resident or transient killer whales in Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska were 41 affected in the way that the AB pod was, indicating that not all of the whales had the same, or 42 critical exposure. Harwell and Gentile (2006) report that the larger Prince William Sound 43 population of killer whale pods, both resident and transient, shows no signs of short- or long- 44 term effects from EVOS; to the contrary, the resident populations continue the general trend of a 45 gradual increase seen in the rest of the Gulf of Alaska.”

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1 Metro Vancouver (Filing ID A4Q9L9) states: “Some species are susceptible to the toxic effects 2 of inhaled oil vapours, which will be strongest near concentrated surface and stranded oils.”

3 Effects from inhalation exposure of hydrocarbon vapours in air to marine mammals following 4 hypothetical crude oil spills were evaluated specifically in the DQERA. Section 4.3.3 and 4.4.3 5 describe potential effects from hypothetical spills originating from a loading accident at the 6 Westridge Marine Terminal. Section 5.3.3 and 5.4.3 describe potential effects from hypothetical 7 spills resulting from a tanker spill at Arachne Reef in the Gulf Islands.

46.2.6 Recovery Assessment 8 Living Oceans Society (Filing ID A4L9R8) states that “Trans Mountain has not provided a 9 definition of recovery,” estimates of shoreline recovery are optimistic based “the example, 10 following the 1989 EVOS, only about 15% of the oil that stranded on beaches was recovered by 11 these techniques, despite intensive effort and great expense.” “Estimates of biological recovery 12 of intertidal communities in the ERA within 5 years are contradicted by Table 5.6.1.2 in the 13 Application, which states shorelines are still recovering after 20 years” and that recovery from 14 smaller spills can take decades.

15 Trans Mountain submits that Section 3.4.4 of the DQERA provides a discussion of recovery and 16 definitions of recovery as they applied to the EVOS. Definitions of recovery may also vary 17 depending upon the particular environmental resource (living or non-living) is under 18 consideration. However, a common element in most definitions is a return of the environmental 19 component or ecosystem to some desirable state following a disturbance. Refer to Trans 20 Mountain’s response to BC Nature Nature Cda IR No. 1.07a (Filing ID A4H7Y8 [Trans 21 Mountain’s response to Round 2 IRs] and Filing ID A4J5C4 [Trans Mountains Response to 22 Round 2 Motions]).

23 Additional information regarding the effects of oiling, and the recovery process for oiled 24 shorelines following the EVOS including effects from lingering oil, can be found in 25 Section 3.4.4.1 to 3.4.4.4 of the DQERA.

26 Shxw’ōwhámel First Nation (Filing ID A4Q1A1) states “A large oil spill combined with other 27 natural and anthroprogenic stressors can reduce overall fisheries productivity in the Fraser 28 River from years to decades and can cause local extirpation.”

29 Trans Mountain’s reply with respect to the assessment of cumulative effects is discussed in 30 Section 28 of this Reply Evidence.

31 With regards to effects to fish reproduction and effects from oil spills to multiple year classes of 32 salmon, Trans Mountain offers the following:

33 With the exception of pink salmon, which return to spawn at two years of age, most Pacific 34 salmon species spawn at ages ranging from 2 to 9 years (although typically 3 to 5 years). For 35 most species, this variability in time spent maturing or at sea would spread the risk associated 36 with harm to a portion of a year class of eggs or fry in spawning gravels. Many other factors in 37 the natal rivers, and at sea, also affect the numbers of returning adults each year, so it can be 38 very difficult to predict in advance whether a particular year class will be relatively smaller or 39 larger. Therefore, for most species it is unlikely that effects to a portion of a year class would be 40 evident or persistent. This was the case during the EVOS, where tidal reaches of coastal 41 streams were used as spawning habitat by pink salmon. By virtue of their more rigid two-year

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1 life cycle, and the separation of odd- and even-year sub-populations, pink salmon would appear 2 to be most vulnerable to showing effects caused by an oil spill. However, although there were 3 documented effects on pink salmon eggs and embryos in some streams, these effects did not 4 translate into population-level effects on returning adult fish (Brannon et al. 1995, Maki 5 et al. 1995). Refer to Trans Mountain’s response to Matsqui FN IR No. 1.09 (Filing ID A3Y3X2).

46.3 Recommendations Made by Intervenors 6 Numerous intervenors have provided suggestions or recommendations for the use of alternate 7 methodologies and/or additional spill scenarios to support the analysis of spills and malfunctions 8 for the purposes of the Application. Trans Mountain’s response to the use of alternate 9 assessment methods is provided in Section 28 of this Reply Evidence. Furthermore, Trans 10 Mountain disagrees that the evaluation of additional spill scenarios is necessary. The spill 11 scenarios considered in the Application are risk-informed, and the results provide sufficient 12 detail to assess the potential environmental effects of CWC and smaller oil spills as required by 13 the NEB. Additional individual spill scenario modelling is not needed to confirm that the total 14 effect of a spill is negative and that spill prevention, preparedness, and effective response 15 activities must always be a primary focus to reduce the probability of an oil spill, and to have 16 adequate oil spill response plans and procedures in place that have proven capability to reduce 17 the magnitude and extent of actual effects on people and the environment.

46.4 References 18 Attard M.E. 2012. Evaluation of aDcps for Suspended Sediment Transport Monitoring, Fraser 19 River, British Columbia. M.Sc. Thesis submitted to Simon Fraser University, Summer, 20 2012. 118 pp.

21 Barron M.G., Carls M., Short J., Rice S., Heintz R., Rau M. and R. Di Guilio. 2003. Assessment 22 of the phototoxicity of weathered Alaska North Slope crude oil to juvenile pink salmon. 23 Report prepared for Prince William Sound Regional Citizen‟s Advisory Council. 24 December 2, 2003.

25 Brannon E.L., Moulton L.L., Gilbertson L.G., Maki A.W. and J.R. Skalski. 1995. An assessment 26 of oil-spill effects on pink salmon populations following the Exxon Valdez oil spill – 27 Part 1: early life history. Pages 548-584 in: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: Fate and Effects in 28 Alaskan Waters. P.G. Well, J.N. Butler and J.S. Hughes (eds.). American Society for 29 Testing and Materials, Philadelphia. ASTM STP 1219.

30 Coastal & Ocean Resources. 2013. Methods for Estimating Shoreline Oil Retention. Prepared 31 for EBA Engineering, Vancouver, BC, by John R. Harper, Coastal & Ocean Resources, 32 Victoria, BC. May 2013.

33 Di Toro D.M., McGrath J.A. and W.A. Stubblefield. 2007. Predicting the toxicity of neat and 34 weathered crude oil: toxic potential and the toxicity of saturated mixtures. Environmental 35 Toxicology and Chemistry 26: 24-36.

36 Di Toro D.M., McGrath J.A. and D.J. Hansen. 2000. Technical basis for narcotic chemicals and 37 polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon criteria. I. Water and tissue. Environmental Toxicology 38 and Chemistry 19: 1951-1970.

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1 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council (EVOSTC). 2010. Exxon Valdez oil spill restoration plan. 2 2010 update injured resources and services. May 14, 2010. www.evostc.state.ak.us.

3 Fingas M.F. 2015. Review of the Properties and Behaviour of Diluted Bitumens. Proceedings of 4 the 38’th AMOP Technical Seminar. Environment Canada, Ottawa, ON. pp. 470-484.

5 French McCay D.P. 2009. State-of-the-Art and Research Needs for Oil Spill Impact Assessment 6 Modeling. In Proceedings of the 32nd AMOP Technical Seminar on Environmental 7 Contamination and Response, Emergencies Science Division, Environment Canada, 8 Ottawa, ON, Canada, pp. 601-653.

9 Harwell M.A. and J.H. Gentile. 2006. Ecological significance of residual exposures and effects 10 from the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Integrated Environmental Assessment and Management 11 2: 204-246.

12 Hodson P.V., Collier T.K. and J.D. Martin. 2011. Technical Data Report: Toxicity to Fish – 13 Potential Effects of an Oil Spill into the Kitimat River from a Northern gateway Pipeline 14 Rupture. Enbridge Northern Gateway Project. Report + Appendices, 113 p.

15 Logan D.T. 2007. Perspective on ecotoxicology of PAHs to fish. Human and Ecological Risk 16 Assessment. 13: 302-316.

17 Maki A. 2013. Hearing Order OH-4-2011 for the Northern Gateway Pipelines Inc. Enbridge 18 Northern Gateway Project. February 7, 2013. Text from: International Reporting Inc. 19 Paragraph Nos. 5137 to 5140. Website: https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll- 20 eng/llisapi.dll/fetch/2000/90464/90552/384192/620327/628981/916478/International 21 Reporting Inc. - 13-02-07 - Volume 136 - A3F3C0.pdf?nodeid=916279&vernum=-2. 22 Accessed. May 2014.

23 McDonald B.G. and P.M. Chapman. 2002. PM. PAH phototoxicity--an ecologically irrelevant 24 phenomenon? Marine Pollution Bulletin 44:1321-1326.

25 Peterson C.H. 2001. The “Exxon Valdez” oil spill in Alaska: acute, indirect and chronic effects 26 on the ecosystem. Advances in Marine Biology 39: 1-103.

27 Sellin Jeffries M.K., Claytor C., Stubblefield W., Pearson W.H. and J.T. Oris. 2013. Quantitative 28 risk model for polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon photoinduced toxicity in Pacific herring 29 following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Environmental Science and Technology 30 47:5450-5458.

31 SL Ross. 2010. Properties and Fate of Hydrocarbons Associated With Hypothetical Spills at the 32 Marine Terminal and in the Confined Channel Assessment Area. Technical Data Report 33 prepared for the Enbridge Northern Gateway Pipeline Project.

34 Strausz O.P. and E.M. Lown. 2003. The Chemistry of Alberta Oil Sands, Bitumens and Heavy 35 Oils. Alberta Energy Research Institute, Calgary.

36 Stronach J.A. and A. Hospital. 2014. The Implementation of Molecular Diffusion to Simulate the 37 Fate and Behaviour of a Diluted Bitumen Oil Spill and its Application to Stochastic 38 Modelling. Proceedings of the 37’th AMOP Technical Seminar. Environment Canada, 39 Ottawa, ON. pp. 353-373.

August 2015 Page 46-33 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 46.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Ecological Risk Assessment Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

1 United States Department of the Interior. 1997. The CERCLA Type A Natural Resource 2 Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environments (NRDAM/CME) 3 Technical Documentation Volume I - Part 1 Model Description. April 1996, Revision I, 4 dated October 1997.

5 United States Department of the Interior, United States Geological Survey (USGS). 2015. Oil- 6 Particle Interactions and Submergence from Crude Oil Spills in Marine and Freshwater 7 Environments – Review of the Science and Future Science Needs. Open-File Report 8 2015-1076. 35 pp.

9 Zhou J., Dettman H. and M. Bundred. 2015. A comparative analysis of environmental behaviour 10 of diluted bitumen and conventional crudes. Proceedings of the 38’th AMOP Technical 11 Seminar, Environment Canada, Ottawa, ON, pp. 495-516.

12

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47.0 ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 1 PIPEUP Network submitted evidence with concerns regarding environmental compliance (Filing 2 ID A4Q0Q5).

3 Trans Mountain will apply the Environmental Compliance Program, as described in Volume 6A 4 (Filing ID A3S2S1) to implement the EPP for each component of the TMEP, which includes the 5 Pipeline EPP (Volume 6B; Filing ID A3S2S3), the Westridge Marine Terminal EPP (Volume 6D; 6 Filing ID A3S2S9), and the Facilities EPP (Volume 6C; Filing ID A3S2S6). Trans Mountain will 7 engage qualified personnel to fill the roles and responsibilities described in Volume 6A, 8 Section 3.0. Trans Mountain’s Construction Management Team will ensure the measures of the 9 EPP are communicated, understood by personnel, and applied to all construction activities. 10 Environmental inspectors and activity inspectors will monitor the prime contractor and sub- 11 contractors in the implementation of the EPP, and will document construction activities in written 12 daily reports and complete photographic record. Environmental inspector daily reports will be 13 submitted directly to the supervisor of environmental inspection and to the construction 14 manager. The supervisor of environmental inspection will summarize environmental inspector 15 daily reports and submit the summary to the environmental compliance manager, the 16 environmental manager, and the construction manager who are responsible to ensure 17 management oversight and QA (Volume 6A, Section 4.0; Filing ID A3S2S1).

18 The environmental compliance process is open to inspection by the NEB. As noted by the NEB 19 in the Draft Conditions and regulatory oversight for the Trans Mountain Expansion Project 20 document (16 April 2014; Filing ID A3V8Z8):

21 “Prior to construction, the Board may review key company program manuals and 22 may order a company to modify these manuals if necessary for safety or 23 environmental reasons, or if it is in the public interest to do so. These manuals 24 could include pressure testing, construction safety, environmental protection, and 25 emergency procedures manuals. During construction, the Board requires 26 companies to have qualified inspectors onsite to oversee construction activities. 27 The Board also conducts its own inspections to verify that construction activities 28 meet the conditions of the project approval and other applicable regulatory 29 requirements, and to observe whether the company is implementing its own 30 commitments.”

31 Trans Mountain is committed to achieving environmental compliance through team work and 32 joint problem solving. This environmental management process was used on Trans Mountain’s 33 TMX Anchor Loop Project and proved successful for environmental protection, and issue 34 communication and resolutions.

August 2015 Page 47-1 Trans Mountain Pipeline (ULC) Section 48.0 Trans Mountain Expansion Project Environmental Protection Planning Reply Evidence OH-001-2014

48.0 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLANNING 48.1 Spills During Construction 1 Yarrow Ecovillage (Filing ID A4Q1L3) and the BCWF (Filing ID A4Q0W2) submitted evidence 2 regarding spills during construction. Yarrow raises concerns in Section 2.3 regarding 3 contingency planning for spills, accidents, or malfunctions during construction and operation of 4 the Project, and in Section 2.4 regarding safety and security during construction of the proposed 5 Project and operation of the Project, including emergency response planning and third-party 6 damage prevention. BCWF raises concerns for the protection of habitat from spills during 7 construction in Section 8.0: Impact of Spills on Fish and Wildlife Habitat.

8 Trans Mountain will implement management systems and industry best practices to protect and 9 mitigate environmental impacts from spills and foreign material contamination throughout 10 construction. These measures are described in Volume 6B, Sections 1.0, 7.0, and 8.0 (Pipeline 11 EPP; Filing ID A3S2S3); Volume 6B, Appendix B, Section 1.0: Contamination Discovery 12 Contingency Plan, Section 3.0: Drilling Mud Release Contingency Plan, and Section 11.0: Spill 13 Contingency Plan (Pipeline EPP; Filing ID A3S2S3); Volume 6B, Appendix C, Section 3.0: 14 Horizontal Directional Drilling/Trenchless Planning and Procedures, and Section 4.0: Hydrovac 15 Cutting Handling and Disposal Management Plan (Pipeline EPP; Filing ID A3S2S3); and Trans 16 Mountain’s Waste Management Standards and Emergency Management Planning. Spill 17 protection measures can be found specific to Westridge Marine Terminal in Volume 6D (Filing 18 ID A3S2S9) and specific to facilities in Volume 6C (Filing ID A3S2S6).

19 General and site-specific protection measures of the EPP will be implemented by Trans 20 Mountain during construction. These measures include the provision of emergency spill kits, 21 appropriate for site conditions and activities to be available at all times. Temporary berms, silt 22 fencing, and other erosion control measures will be installed to prevent materials entering 23 watercourses, wetlands, and lakes. Construction equipment will be required to arrive onsite in a 24 clean and well maintained condition. Equipment is to be cleaned after construction to ensure it 25 does not transfer soil, debris, invasive plants, or aquatic pests to other locations. Please refer to 26 the EPP, Sections 7 and 8 (Volume 6B; Filing ID A3S2S3).

27 Regarding the Yarrow’s specific concern for the collection of construction waste material, EPP 28 measures will be implemented by Trans Mountain, which include EPP Section 7: General 29 Pipeline Construction Mitigation Measures; points 146 to 170 (Volume 6B, Filing ID A3S2S3). 30 All spill incidents, including minor and spot spills not reportable to the regulator, such as burst 31 hydraulic hoses, will be immediately reported to site supervisors, foremen, and the onsite 32 activity inspectors who will report the spill to the environmental inspector. Procedures to prevent 33 environmental contamination will be implemented immediately and include shutting down the 34 piece of equipment, stopping the source of release, collection and bagging of contaminated 35 material and soil for disposal at an approved site, prevention of released material reaching soils 36 by the use of tarps and absorbent pads. The piece of equipment will be repaired by a mechanic 37 before continuing work. The details of all spills will be documented in spill reports submitted to 38 the environmental inspector and kept on record by the Project. Please refer to Appendix B: Spill 39 Contingency Plans of the EPP (Volume 6B; Filing ID A3S2S3). Note there is an error in the 40 EPP, in the Spill Contingency Plans, Spill Scene Checklist is listed as Attachment B4. The Spill 41 Scene Checklist is under Attachment B2 as there is no Attachment B4.

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1 Site-specific ERPs will be developed for use during construction by prime contractors. These 2 ERPs will be separated but complementary to the Trans Mountain operation ERP. The 3 site-specific construction ERP will include a contact list of the construction spread managers, 4 including prime contractor, and TMEP construction and environmental management. Please 5 reference the Pipeline EPP, Section 1.2.3 for more information (Volume 6B; Filing ID A3S2S3). 6 The construction ERP contact list will be available to landowners and local stakeholders. In the 7 event that an unforeseen environmental emergency (e.g., large spill) occurs during construction, 8 for which no mitigation measures have been approved or a contingency plan developed, Trans 9 Mountain’s ERP will be followed as described in Volume 6A, Section 8.0 (Filing ID A3S2S1). 10 Trans Mountain will implement the EMPs, including the UC system as described in Volume 7, 11 Section 4.0 (Filing ID A3S4V5). Following the initial response and containment, contamination 12 will be assessed, and remediation designed and implemented in accordance to the NEB 13 Remediation Guide (NEB 2011).

48.2 Access Planning and Control 14 Yarrow (Filing ID A4Q1L3) and the GCC of BC (GC Grasslands; Filing ID A4L6I0) submitted 15 evidence regarding access control during construction. Yarrow expressed concerns regarding 16 construction activities cutting off access to farm operations such as Section 2.1.3: Disruption of 17 Irrigation System, and Section 2.1.4: Disruption of Hothouse Operations, and in Section 3.5: 18 Other Concerns, Section 3.5.1: Access, where Yarrow requests clarification on how access will 19 be maintained.

20 GC Grasslands expresses concerns that Project construction and access will disrupt access to 21 grazing, increase opportunities for invasive species, and access by all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) 22 resulting in damage to native grassland plant communities.

23 Trans Mountain and its contractors will work with landowners and land managers to acquire 24 access rights as described in Volume 2: Project Overview, Economics and General Information, 25 Section 5 (Filing ID A3S0R0) and Volume 3C: Landowner Relations,, Section 1 (Filing 26 ID A3S0V2). All temporary access roads will require approval of Trans Mountain’s inspectors 27 (refer to the Environmental Effects Assessment, Section 7.3 [Volume 5A; Filing ID A3S1Q9]). 28 During construction all measures described in the EPP (Volume 6B; Filing ID A3S2S3) will be 29 implemented for the construction footprint and includes Section 9: Access Roads for Pipelines 30 and Appendix C: Management Plans (Traffic and Access Control, Agricultural, Reclamation, and 31 Weed and Vegetation Management plans). Trans Mountain is committed to working with 32 landowners and land managers (L/O) in developing site-specific access management plans and 33 channels of communication that minimizes disruption to L/O operations and addresses L/O 34 concerns for sufficient and effective access across the construction footprint. The specific needs 35 of individual landowners are tracked and included in the landowner line list.

36 Specific to concerns of GC Grasslands, Trans Mountain is seeking approval from BC Parks to 37 use existing roads for access, specifically at the northern end of the Lac du Bois Grasslands 38 along the existing trail at McQueen Creek to Noble Lake Road. The existing roads and trails will 39 require improvements and maintenance to allow construction vehicles to access the right-of- 40 way. Any improvements made to the roads, will be reclaimed to an acceptable standard, as 41 determined by BC Parks. Trans Mountain will consult with BC Parks, their representatives, and 42 land users to develop specific plans and agreements to minimize the effects of temporary 43 access roads, minimize disruption to grazing operations, control the spread of invasive plant

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1 species, control ATV and unauthorized access, and use reclamation measures to establish 2 vegetation cover and composition to an acceptable standard.

48.3 Reclamation and Invasive Species Management 3 The GC Grasslands expressed concerns related to restoration and invasive species 4 management as discussed below.

5 Issue/Concern: A lack of long-term commitment to restoration and invasive plant control.

6 Trans Mountain has developed a monitoring and inspection program that ensures legislative 7 requirements, environmental commitments, and permit conditions are met during the 8 construction and post-construction phases of the Project (Volume 6A, Section 4.0; Filing 9 ID A3S2S1) The programs include reporting procedures for tracking environmental performance 10 and non-compliance during construction, monitoring the success of reclamation and mitigation 11 measures; and identifying environmental issues as a result of construction for a minimum of 12 5 years post-construction (Volume 6A, Section 9.0; Filing ID A3S2S1). Trans Mountain has 13 committed (NEB Commitment Number 128; Filing ID A4K4W4) to continued consultation 14 throughout the post-construction phase of the Project, which is a minimum of 5 years after 15 construction. During the post-construction phase, outstanding issues and concerns identified by 16 regulatory agencies and government offices with an interest in the Project will be addressed.

17 Trans Mountain developed RMP, and Weed and Vegetation Management Plan (WVMP) as part 18 of the NEB Application process (Volume 6B: Pipeline EPP, Sections 7 and 14; Filing ID 19 A3S2S3). Additional surveys and consultation are in progress and based on this information the 20 Reclamation and Weed Management plans will be finalized 4 months before construction.

21 After the post-construction phase, the right-of-way and project access roads and facilities are 22 the responsibility of KMC Operations. KMC Operations works closely with regional and local 23 government and private landowners with holdings along their rights-of-way. Restoration and 24 invasive plant issues are addressed according to the procedures and techniques described in 25 the KMC Integrated Vegetation Management (IVM) Plan (KMC 2011). The vegetation 26 management plan is updated every 5 years and public consultation is conducted during each 27 plan revision (IVM Plan, Section 7.3). An objective of the public consultation process is to 28 provide the public an opportunity to identify concerns related to the management of the rights- 29 of-way, access roads, and facilities.

30 Issue/Concern: An increased risk of ongoing introduction and spread of weeds.

31 Invasive plants are often associated with access roads and highly used areas, and weeds do 32 occur along the existing access roads and in high use areas in Lac du Bois Park. Weed surveys 33 in the Lac du Bois Grasslands that were conducted in 2013 and 2014, identified four provincial 34 or regional species of concern (spotted knapweed, sulphur cinquefoil, oxeye daisy, and hoary 35 alyssum) as well as eight nuisance species (pineapple weed, great mullein, common plantain, 36 lamb’s-quarters, sheep sorrel, chicory, yellow salsify, and St. John’s wort) along access roads 37 and in adjacent areas of Lac du Bois Park. Two agronomic species (crested wheatgrass and 38 alfalfa) are also prevalent in highly used areas of the Park (Volume 5C: Vegetation Technical 39 Report; Filing ID A3S2I7).

40 Trans Mountain will manage invasive plants according to the principles outlined in the WVMP 41 (Volume 6B: Pipeline EPP, Appendix C, Section 14; Filing ID A3S2S3) and will utilize an IVM

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1 approach to carry out problem vegetation management practices. Specifically, the intent of the 2 WVMP is to prevent, reduce and manage the potential spread of provincially and regionally 3 designated weed species along the construction right-of-way as a result of construction 4 activities according to regulatory requirements. During operations, weeds are typically managed 5 to a level equivalent to that observed on adjacent lands with similar land use. In Lac du Bois, 6 Trans Mountain is working with BC Parks to reduce weed infestation levels and are discussing 7 Net Benefit/Offset options that include additional invasive species control activities in the park. 8 The WVMP includes a commitment to conduct pre-construction treatments, where warranted 9 (Volume 6B: Pipeline EPP, Section 14.1.1; Filing ID A3S2S3) and will work with BC Parks to 10 identify appropriate weed control thresholds and methods. Access planning and control is an 11 important part of the weed control program. Refer to Section 48.2 for information on the access 12 planning and control program.

13 Issue/Concern: Continued and extensive disturbance associated with right-of-way 14 maintenance.

15 After the post-construction phase, the right-of-way and project access roads and facilities are 16 the responsibility of KMC Operations, and are managed according to the procedures and 17 techniques described in the KMC IVM Plan (KMC 2011). The vegetation management plan is 18 updated every 5 years and public consultation is conducted during each plan revision (IVM 19 Plan, Section 7.3). An objective of the public consultation process is to provide the public an 20 opportunity to identify concerns related to the management of the rights-of-way, access roads, 21 and facilities.

22 Trans Mountain is working closely with KMC Operations and informing them of sensitive areas 23 and discussing public concerns that have been brought to our attention, and Trans Mountain will 24 continue to work with KMC Operations to identify maintenance techniques and methods 25 appropriate for Lac du Bois.

26 Issue/Concern: Project timelines that do not recognize recovery time of natural grasslands.

27 Grassland species composition can change with time (McLean and Marchand 1968) but the 28 change is seldom directional and a change in the abundance of species within the community 29 rather than a dramatic change in species is more common (Allen 1988, Bell 1988). Pipeline 30 restoration projects are limited in the number of species they can reseed or replant, but a mix of 31 early successional and late successional grassland species has proven effective for establishing 32 in disturbed soils within 5 years (Atwood 1996 and 2007). Habitat function of herbaceous and 33 graminoid communities may take longer than 5 years; however, revegetation to habitat function 34 that is equivalent to areas adjacent to the right-of-way is expected within the operational life of 35 the Project.

36 Alteration of grassland habitat in the Project area is expected to be reversible following 37 reclamation. Pipeline right-of-ways were constructed through dry, natural grasslands in the 38 South Okanagan in 1994 and 2000. A mix of native grassland species was used to revegetate 39 the sensitive grasslands in both project areas and early seral microbiotic crust species were 40 applied to disturbed soils in one location. The grasses and early seral crust species were 41 restored within project timelines (Photos 48-1 to 48-7). A mix of early and late seral native 42 grasses will be seeded at Lac du Bois. Microbiotic crust applications will not occur in the park 43 because field evaluations indicate there is very little crust in the PPC. Microbiotic crust only 44 survives in highly pristine areas that are seldom accessed and not grazed. Current conditions in

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1 the park limit microbiotic crust establishment. Microbiotic crust species will establish with time, if 2 use of the area is reduced in the future.

3 4 Photo 48-1 Native Bluebunch Wheatgrass Sheltered by a Cover Crop 5 of Fall Rye 1 year after Seeding the Oliver Indian Band 6 Lands in the South Okanagan (Atwood 2007)

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1 2 Photo 48-2 Native Bluebunch Wheatgrass 2 years After Seeding the 3 Oliver Indian Band Lands in the South Okanagan (Atwood 4 2007)

5 6 Photo 48-3 Native Bluebunch Wheatgrass 5 years after Seeding the 7 Oliver Indian Band Lands in the South Okanagan (Atwood 8 2007)

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1 2 Photo 48-4 Bluebunch Wheatgrass and Brown-eyed Susan 6 years 3 after Seeding the Vaseux Bighorn National Wildlife Area in 4 the South Okanagan (Atwood 1996)

5 6 Photo 48-5 Bluebunch Wheatgrass 6 years after Seeding the Vaseux 7 Bighorn National Wildlife Area in the South Okanagan 8 (Atwood 1996)

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1 2 Photo 48-6 Early Seral Moss (Tortula ruralis) and Cladonia Lichen 3 Species 6 years after Application on the Pipeline 4 Right-of-Way in the Vaseux Bighorn National Wildlife Area 5 in the South Okanagan (Atwood 1996)

6 7 Photo 48-7 Native Western Fescue and Native Shrubs and Trees 5 8 years after Seeding and Planting in Beaver Creek 9 Provincial Park in the West Kootenays (Atwood 2007)

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48.3.1 City of New Westminster Written Evidence (C72-5-2) – A4Q0L5 1 48.3.1.1 Section 2.4 Spread and Control of Invasive Vegetation Along Pipeline Right-of-Way 2 The pipeline threatens to create a situation where invasive species repeatedly spread into 3 disturbed areas and require frequent pesticide application over larger areas than at present, 4 increasing the exposure of biota to harmful chemicals.

5 48.3.1.2 2.4.1 Key Issues 6 There is concern over the risk of spread of invasive species related to the increase in 7 construction in the area. In particular, when noxious invasive species are present 8 (i.e., knotweed) the control of these species requires the ongoing use of pesticides like 9 glyphosates. While glyphosates are used in Metro Vancouver for control of knotweed, there is a 10 concern about the concentration/frequency and area over which pesticides are used in sensitive 11 areas. Currently knotweed is an issue around the Brunette River, and Metro Vancouver 12 manages it along the river on both New Westminster and Coquitlam sides with pesticides. 13 Pipeline construction may increase this requirement and lead to the exposure of biota to levels 14 that are toxic.

15 48.3.1.3 2.4.2 Evidence 16 When natural vegetation is cut or disturbed and soil is exposed, even temporarily, invasive plant 17 species will often invade, outcompete, and dominate the cleared area. Unintended increases in 18 access, such as people walking their dogs or riding dirt bikes along the right-of-way, can further 19 abet the spread of invasive plants. Often, invasive species form complete monocultures in 20 sensitive habitat, decreasing vegetation diversity. Many invasive plants have low habitat value 21 (i.e., food and/or shelter) for endemic/native organisms, and these native species may be 22 displaced as a result. Monocultures of invasive plants also have impacts on fish as these 23 riparian species quickly choke out water ways, deplete them of oxygen, make them impassable, 24 and shade them out. Surveys in Metro Vancouver are conducted to monitor the presence and 25 spread of invasive species, and management plans have been developed (LGL 2012). Invasive 26 species that occur in Metro Vancouver include Himalayan blackberry (Rubus armeniacus), 27 Japanese knotweed (Polygonum cuspidatum), yellow flag iris (Iris pseudacorus), purple 28 Loostrife (Lythrum salicaria), scotch broom (Cytisus scoparius), yellow laminum (Laminum 29 galeobdolon), giant hogweed (Heracleum mantegazzianum), policeman's helmet (Impatiens 30 glandulifera), orange hawkweed (Hieracium aurantiacum), English ivy (Hedera helix), daphne 31 laurel (Daphne laureola), and periwinkle (Vinca minor). Of these, Japanese Knotweed and 32 Himalayan blackberry are the most problematic in proximity to the Brunette River.

33 Clearing of native vegetation and exposure of bare soils, as required during pipeline 34 construction, increases the risk of invasive species spreading and establishing in an area. While 35 invasive species can themselves be harmful to an ecosystem, removal of invasive species can 36 also have impacts. For example, manual clearing of Japanese knotweed can result in its 37 unintentional spread due to its ability to regenerate from cut stems and roots. Hence, the 38 recommended control methods are direct stem injection and spraying with glyphosate or 39 2,4-D Amine. This herbicide, however is known to have adverse toxicological impacts on 40 amphibians (e.g., Wood & Welch 2015), reptiles (turtles) (e.g., Douros et al. 2015), mammals 41 (e.g., Kier & Kirkland 2013; Abrikwu et al. 2015), and fish (e.g., Annette et al. 2014). For 42 Himalayan Blackberry, mowing is prescribed, but this can inadvertently harm wildlife species 43 nesting within or beneath dense vegetation, which is extremely hard to meaningfully inspect for

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1 nests prior to clearing. Birds have also been shown to construct their nests lower to the ground 2 in exotic shrubs compared to native vegetation, which makes them more likely to be depredated 3 by small mammals (Borgmann & Rodewalk 2004). If invasive plants spread into a disturbed 4 area, but are controlled, those areas will generally support younger riparian forests for a long 5 period of time, yet these do not provide the same functions as mature riparian forests (May et al. 6 1997).

7 Therefore, building the pipeline, particularly near or within ecologically sensitive areas, will likely 8 lead to the spread of invasive plant species, despite mitigation methods listed by TM to prevent 9 the spread of such species. Once invasive plants spread, their control may necessitate:

10 1. the ongoing need for spraying of glyphosate at higher frequencies and greater volumes than 11 at present, which will contribute to cumulative biotoxic effects on wildlife and fish in the area; 12 and

13 2. the need for ongoing, frequent invasive biomass removal by hand or via mowing which may 14 cause a zone of wildlife avoidance due to ongoing noxious stimuli and disturbance, and may 15 lead to accidental mortality of wildlife breeding within the area cleared. Since repeated 16 exotic and invasive vegetation tends to be more common in impacted riparian corridors, and 17 since such invasion can negatively affect the functioning of the ecosystem (Hennings, 18 2001), the greatest impact will likely occur if and where the pipeline right-of-way occurs 19 within 30 m of waterways.

20 48.3.1.4 2.4.3 Suggested Mitigation 21 · Re-route the pipeline to be farther away from sensitive ecosystems.

22 · Commit to no clearing, access or disturbance of habitat within 30 m of a waterway.

23 · Work with the appropriate municipalities on access control plans to ensure that unintended 24 human access to the right-of-way after construction is not contributing to the ongoing spread 25 of invasive species.

26 · If glyphosate is required, commit to monitoring levels in the environment (soils, plants and 27 water) using a BACI design. Research and design an alternate way of controlling Japanese 28 knotweed in the event that glyphosate levels are becoming elevated in the environment.

48.3.2 Response 29 Issue/Concern: Management of invasive species (especially Japanese knotweed and 30 Himalayan blackberry) in proximity to the Brunette River

31 Trans Mountain will manage invasive plants according to the principles outlined in the WVMP 32 (Section 14, Appendix C, Volume 6B Pipeline Environmental Protection Plan [Filing ID 33 A3S2S3]) and will utilize an IVM approach to carry out problem vegetation management 34 practices. The WVMP includes a commitment to conduct a pre-construction weed survey (Table 35 C.14-4, Volume 6B Pipeline Environmental Protection Plan [Filing ID A3S2S3]) and a 36 commitment to conduct pre-construction treatments, where warranted (Section 14.1.1, Volume 37 6B Pipeline Environmental Protection Plan [Filing ID A3S2S3]).

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1 Trans Mountain is aware Japanese knotweed is listed as one of the world’s 100 worst invasive 2 alien species (Lowe et al. 2000) and has known impacts on native vegetation and invertebrate 3 species in riparian habitats (Gerber et al. 2008). The extensive and deep root systems and the 4 ability to reproduce from living root or stem fragments that are as small as 10 mm in length 5 (Brock 2007) make Japanese knotweed one of the most difficult invasive species to control 6 (Scott and Mars 1984).

7 Trans Mountain has consulted the Invasive Species Council of Metro Vancouver (ISCMV) 8 regarding control methods for Japanese knotweed and is aware glyphosate stem injection 9 treatments are ongoing in the Brunette River watershed. This is a common treatment in riparian 10 areas where there is no ground disturbance. Repeated (typically for 3 years) foliar applications, 11 stem injections or a combination of both methods will eradicate small patches that have not 12 developed extensive root systems (Clallam County NWCB 2007, Soll et al. 2008). Control of 13 large, well-established infestations is less successful (Dunwiddie 2007). The primary concern in 14 areas where soil will be disturbed is the transport of root and shoot fragments to uninfected 15 areas. Aboveground biomass can be cut, elevated until completely dry and then disposed of, 16 but roots are more difficult to kill. Buds on Japanese knotweed root crowns can survive for at 17 least three months after the root crowns are removed from the soil (Atwood pers. comm. 2015).

18 Himalayan blackberry is a valued cultivated plant and an aggressive and persistent perennial 19 weed that is increasingly common in disturbed coastal habitats. Although the plant’s berries are 20 prized by many local residents and some wildlife species it spreads vegetatively and by seed 21 replacing native vegetation with non-native low quality wildlife habitat (Core 1974). Controlling 22 Himalayan blackberry is usually a two-stage process that involves removing the aboveground 23 biomass and killing or removing the root crowns and major roots (Atwood 2012). A mix of 24 manual, mechanical and chemical treatments are effective.

25 Trans Mountain has engaged the ISCMV to conduct the pre-construction weed surveys on the 26 right-of-way in summer 2015 and if Japanese knotweed or Himalayan blackberry infestations 27 are recorded in the construction corridor near the Brunette River, appropriate control methods 28 will be developed in consultation with the City of New Westminster. Pre-construction 29 management actions may include: flagging infestations and identifying the infestations on 30 construction worksheets and conducting pre-construction weed treatments of infestations 31 (glyphosate stem injections, foliar herbicide applications or a combination of foliar and stem 32 injections of small patches that are a minimum of 10 m from water bodies, dry stream beds and 33 classified wetlands and 30 m from water wells and intakes [Government of B.C. 2003 and 34 2004]). During construction, methods to control the movement of soil will be implemented. After 35 construction, weed treatments will occur, as needed, according to the IVM principles in the 36 WVMP.

37 Issue/Concern: Ongoing need for spraying of glyphosate at higher frequencies and greater 38 volumes than at present, will contribute to cumulative biotoxic effects on wildlife and fish in the 39 area

40 Glyphosate and 2,4-D Amine are toxic to fish and amphibians (Wang et al. 1994, Cox 1995, 41 Howe et al. 2004, Borges et al. 2004, BC MoE 2005, Cox 2005). However the surfactants that 42 are often included in glyphosate products are 30 times more toxic to fish than glyphosate itself 43 (Cox 1995, Howe et al. 2004). Glyphosate products will kill fish and frogs at recommended 44 application rates (Cox 1995) and 2,4-D has been linked to changes in fish and amphibian sex 45 hormones and egg development (Cox 2005).

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1 The BC Integrated Pest Management Act (2003), Integrated Pest Management Regulation 2 (BC Reg. 604/2004) requires a 10 m pesticide-free zone between chemically treated areas and 3 water bodies, dry streams and classified wetlands and an additional vegetated no-treatment 4 zone that will prevent chemical drift and runoff between the area that will be treated with 5 chemicals and the water body (Section 74). Glyphosate products are the only chemical 6 herbicide that can be used within the 10 m pesticide-free zone (Section 77). Spray applications 7 can occur within 2 m of the high water mark or selective applications, such as stem injection or 8 wipe-on, can be used within 1 m of the high water mark (Government of BC 2004).

9 Trans Mountain will adhere to all provincial regulations and regional and municipal by-laws that 10 apply to pipelines pertaining to the use of pesticides. As such, Trans Mountain will not use 11 glyphosate within 1 m of open water and will not use 2,4-D Amine within 10 m of open water or 12 dry streams or within 30 m of a well or water intake (BC MoE 2005). All herbicide use near 13 water bodies will retain the regulated pesticide-free zone and a vegetated buffer that will prevent 14 drift, runoff or leaching of herbicides into the water body. Trans Mountain’s long-term objectives 15 are to reduce the use of herbicides through proactive and preventive vegetation management 16 (Volume 6B, Pipeline Environmental Protection Plan, Section 14.1.2 [Filing ID A3S2S3]). Trans 17 Mountain consults with landowners and only pest control methods that are approved by the 18 landowner are used on their property.

19 Issue/Concern: Ongoing, frequent invasive biomass removal by hand or via mowing may cause 20 a zone of wildlife avoidance due to ongoing noxious stimuli and disturbance, and may lead to 21 accidental mortality of wildlife breeding within the area cleared

22 In most cases invasive plants replace native species that wildlife depend on but there are 23 occurrences of wildlife using invasive plants for food, shelter and nesting sites (Core 1974, 24 Bossard and Rejmanek 1994). However, in general, invasive plants are considered low quality 25 habitat for wildlife.

26 As described in Section 7.2.10.9 of Volume 5A (Filing ID A3S1Q9), the Project parallels existing 27 disturbances for most of its length. These existing disturbances are likely reducing habitat use 28 by wildlife to varying degrees, independent of the Project. Considering these factors, the Project 29 is unlikely to measurably alter wildlife population distribution. Mitigation measures provided in 30 Table 7.2.10-3 in Section 7.2.10.6 of Volume 5A (Filing ID A3S1S7), including scheduling 31 clearing and construction activities outside the migratory bird breeding season where feasible 32 and conducting migratory bird nest sweeps if clearing is to occur during migratory bird breeding 33 season, reduce the potential mortality risk for nesting birds. This applies to clearing for 34 construction as well as operational activities that require vegetation clearing.

35 Suggested mitigation: Re-route the pipeline to be farther away from sensitive ecosystems.

36 Trans Mountain has designed the proposed pipeline route in consideration of sensitive 37 ecosystems and disturbance of sensitive areas will be reduced, where practical. Trans Mountain 38 has developed appropriate mitigation measures (Volume 6B, Pipeline Environmental Protection 39 Plan [Filing ID A3S2S3]) to reduce any potential adverse residual effects where avoidance of 40 sensitive ecosystems is not feasible.

41 Suggested mitigation: Commit to no clearing, access or disturbance of habitat within 30 m of a 42 waterway.

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1 Trans Mountain will reduce the amount of clearing, access and disturbance of habitat within 2 30 m of waterways as much as practical, however, cannot commit to complete avoidance of 3 these areas. Trans Mountain has developed appropriate mitigation measures (Volume 6B, 4 Pipeline Environmental Protection Plan [Filing ID A3S2S3]) to reduce any potential adverse 5 residual effects where avoidance of riparian habitat is not feasible.

6 Suggested mitigation: Work with the appropriate municipalities on access control plans to 7 ensure that unintended human access to the right-of-way after construction isn't contributing to 8 the ongoing spread of invasive species.

9 Trans Mountain will manage access to the right-of-way during pre-construction, construction, 10 and post-construction as outlined in the Traffic and Access Control Management Plan 11 [Appendix C, Section 10 of Volume 6B Pipeline Environmental Protection Plan [Filing ID 12 A3S2S3]).

13 Trans Mountain will work with applicable municipalities, resource managers, traditional land and 14 resource users, and other affected stakeholders to define locations where access control is 15 necessary, and what type(s) of access control will be implemented.

16 Trans Mountain will manage new temporary and permanent access along portions of its 17 right-of-way during the pre-construction, construction and post-construction phases of the 18 project by implementing one or more of the Environmental Protection Plan access management 19 mitigation measures. High priority access management areas are areas where increased 20 access could concentrate hunting and fishing activities at previously unattainable locations, 21 increase predation of wildlife and disturb reclamation efforts on sensitive terrain.

22 Suggested mitigation: If glyphosate is required, commit to monitoring levels in the environment 23 (soils, plants and water) using a BACI (Before-After-Control-Impact) design. Research and 24 design an alternate way of controlling Japanese knotweed in the event that glyphosate levels 25 are becoming elevated in the environment.

26 Trans Mountain is not able to commit to performing monitoring of glyphosate levels or to 27 designing alternate ways of controlling Japanese knotweed. All construction activities will be 28 inspected and monitored in accordance with the EPPs (Volume 6B Pipeline EPP [Filing ID 29 A3S2S3 and A3S2S4]; and Volume 6C Facilities EPP [Filing ID A3S2S6 and A3S2S7]). Any 30 deviations or changes to the mitigation measures set out in the EPPs will be recorded and 31 captured in the As-Built reports that are submitted to the NEB. Trans Mountain has committed to 32 a minimum 5 year PCEM plan and is willing to work towards solutions on issues or concerns 33 resulting from the construction and operation of the pipeline until they are resolved. The EPPs 34 include Contingency and Management Plans to address circumstances where environmental 35 conditions have changed, or were not originally anticipated.

48.4 Air Emissions During Construction 36 FVRD, in the affidavit of Ms. Alison Stewart, submitted evidence regarding nuisance fugitive 37 emissions, traffic and noise during construction, and responsibility for those potential effects 38 (Filing ID A4L8V6). The evidence indicated a misunderstanding around the roles of the 39 subcontractors UPI and Hatch Mott MacDonald (HMM) to Trans Mountain, neither of which are 40 construction contractors. Construction contractors will be selected at a date closer to 41 construction when the requirements for construction are closer to complete.

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1 Mitigation has been provided in the Pipeline EPP (Volume 6B; Filing ID A3S2S3), to manage 2 fugitive emissions and traffic in populated areas. If complaints arise due to fugitive emissions 3 such as noise or dust, or mobile impacts such as traffic or road use, FVRD or potentially 4 affected municipal agencies should contact Trans Mountain directly. Municipalities and regional 5 districts will not be responsible for managing different construction contractors in different areas 6 or at different times. Contact information for Trans Mountain will be provided to municipalities 7 and regional districts before construction, as discussed in the EPP. Trans Mountain and its 8 prime contractors will be responsible to implement the measures listed in the EPP and the 9 communications required to minimize impacts to residents and the public.

48.5 Summary of New Commitments 10 · Trans Mountain will work with applicable municipalities to define locations where access 11 control is necessary, and what type(s) of access control will be implemented.

12 · If Japanese knotweed infestations are recorded in the construction corridor in the City of 13 New Westminster, appropriate control methods will be developed in consultation with the 14 City.

48.6 References 15 Allen E.B. 1988. Some Trajectories of Succession in Wyoming Sagebrush Grassland: 16 Implications for Restoration. The Reconstruction of Disturbed Arid Lands. An Ecological 17 Approach. Edith B. Allen (ed). Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado. p. 89-112.

18 Atwood L. 1996. South Okanagan natural gas pipeline restoration project: 1996 vegetation 19 monitoring of the Vaseux-Bighorn National Wildlife Area. BC Gas Utility Ltd. 54pp.

20 Atwood L. 2007. Terasen Gas Inc. Southern Crossing Pipeline Project. Vegetation Monitoring 21 2001 to 2006. 18 pp.

22 Atwood, L. 2012. Albert Head 2011 Invasive Species Inventory and Management Plan. 23 Prepared for Natural Resources Canada. 37 pp.

24 Atwood, L. 2015. Personal Communication with Lynne Atwood, M.Sc., Reclamation Specialist. 25 CH2M HILL Energy Canada, Ltd. Victoria, BC. January 29, 2015.

26 BC Ministry of Environment (BC MoE). 2005. Handbook for Pesticide Applicators and 27 Dispensers. Fifth Edition. R.W. Adams, compiler and editor. Environmental Management 28 Branch. Ministry of Environment: Victoria, B.C.

29 Bell D T. 1988. Seed-related Autecology in Restoration of Mined Jarrah Forest in Western 30 Australia. The Reconstruction of Disturbed Arid Lands. An Ecological Approach. Edith B. 31 Allen (ed). Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado. p. 5-33.

32 Borges, S., C. Dzubow, G. Orrick and A. Stavola. 2,4-Dichlorophenoxyacetic Acid Analysis of 33 Risks to Endangered and Threatened Salmon and Steelhead. U.S. Environmental 34 Protection Agency. Office of Pesticides Programs. 102 pp.

35 Bossard, C. C. and M. Rejmanek. 1994. Herbivory, Growth, Seed Production, and Resprouting 36 of an Exotic Invasive Shrub Cytisus scoparius. Biological Conservation. 67(3): 193-200.

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1 Brock, J.H. 2007. Vegetative Regeneration of Japanese Knotweed. Arizona State University 2 and Western Society of Weed Science. 25 pp.

3 Clallam County Noxious Weed Control Board. 2007. Final report on the Big River knotweed 4 control project, October 2005 to June 2007. 32 pp.

5 Core, E.L. 1974. Brambles. In: Gill, John D.; Healy, William M.(eds). Shrubs and Vines for 6 Northeastern wildlife. Gen. Tech. Rep. NE-9. Broomall, PA: U.S. Department of 7 Agriculture, Forest Service:16-19. 8 Cox, C. 1995. Glyphosate Fact Sheets: Part 1 Toxicity and Part 2 Human Exposure and 9 Ecological Effects. Journal of Pesticide Reform, Vol. 15:3. Pp. 14-20.

10 Cox, C. 2005. 2,4-D Herbicide Factsheet. Journal of Pesticide Reform, Vol. 25:4. Pp. 10-15.

11 Gerber, E., C. Krebs, C. Murrell, M. Moretti, R. Rocklin and U. Schaffner. 2008. Exotic invasive 12 knotweeds (Fallopia spp.) negatively affect native plant and invertebrate assemblages in 13 European riparian habitats. Biological Conservation. Volume 141, Issue 3. Pp 646-654.

14 Government of BC. 2003. Integrated Pest Management Act. [SBS 2003] Chapter 58. Queens 15 Printer: Victoria, B.C.

16 Government of BC. 2004. Integrated Pest Management Regulation. Including amendments up 17 to B.C. Reg. 427/2008, December 18, 2008. Queens Printer: Victoria, B.C.

18 Howe, C.M., M. Berrill, B.D. Pauli, C.C. Helbing, K. Werry and N. Veldhoen. 2004. Toxicity of 19 glyphosate-based Pesticides to Four North American Frog Species. Environmental 20 Toxicology and Chemistry. Vol 23:8. Pp.1928-1938.

21 Kinder Morgan Canada (KMC). 2011. Integrated Vegetation Management Plan. 2011 to 2016. 22 87 pp.

23 Lowe S. J., M. Browne and S. Boudjelas. 2000. 100 of the World's Worst Invasive Alien 24 Species. IUCN/SSC Invasive Species Specialist Group (ISSG): Auckland, New Zealand.

25 McLean A. and L. Marchand. 1968. Grassland Ranges in the Southern Interior of British 26 Columbia. Canada Department of Agriculture. Publication 1319. 32 pp.

27 Scott, R., and R.H. Mars (1984). Impact of Japanese knotweed and methods of control. Aspects 28 of applied biology 5, Weed control and vegetation management in forestry and amenity 29 areas pp. 291-296.

30 Soll, J., D. Kreuzer, J. Dumont, I. Matthews and M. Hoeh. 2008. Sandy River riparian habitat 31 protection project report 2008. The Nature Conservancy in Oregon. 54 pp.

32 Wang, Y., C. Jaw, and Y. Chen.1994. Accumulation of 2,4-D and Glyphosate in Fish and Water 33 Hyacinth. Water Air Soil Poll. 74:397-403.

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