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HAQQANI NETWORK and CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM in AFGHANISTAN by Imtiaz Ali

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HAQQANI NETWORK and CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM in AFGHANISTAN by Imtiaz Ali VOLUME VI, ISSUE 6 MARCH 24, 2008 IN THIS ISSUE: THE HAQQANI NETWORK AND CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN By Imtiaz Ali.....................................................................................................1 INDIA’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICES STRUGGLE WITH WAR ON TERRORISM By Wilson John................................................................................................3 BRITAIN’S PRISON DILEMMA: ISSUES AND CONCERNS IN ISLAMIC RADICAL- IZATION By Raffaello Pantucci......................................................................................6 Jalaluddin Haqqani UNWELCOME GUESTS: THE TURKISH MILITARY BASES IN NORTHERN IRAQ By Gareth Jenkins...........................................................................................8 Terrorism Monitor is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation. The Haqqani Network and Cross-Border Terrorism The Terrorism Monitor is designed to be read by policy- in Afghanistan makers and other specialists yet be accessible to the general By Imtiaz Ali public. The opinions expressed within are solely those of the There has been an increase recently in alleged missile strikes inside Pakistani authors and do not necessarily territory by U.S. forces operating across the border in Afghanistan. The attacks reflect those of The Jamestown Foundation. come at a time when there is a growing call in the United States for strikes on Pakistani territory to take out al-Qaeda safe havens believed to exist in the tribal agencies along the Afghan border. NATO military commanders in Kabul have time and again expressed their dissatisfaction with the performance of Pakistani security agencies in stopping the infiltration of armed Taliban groups like the Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of this or any “Haqqani Network” from Pakistan’s tribal areas into Afghanistan. Despite the Jamestown publication is strictly fact that U.S. authorities have consistently expressed their respect for Pakistan’s prohibited by law. sovereignty, they are simultaneously growing impatient with the growing strength of the militants on the Pakistani side of the border. According to U.S. officials, the cross-border activities of these militants have a direct impact on U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Attack on Lwara Mundi For comments or questions about A March 12 missile attack targeted a home in the town of Lwara Mundi in North our publications, please send an Waziristan, killing two women and two children. Pakistan quickly registered email to [email protected], or contact us at: a protest with the Coalition forces in Afghanistan, deploring what an official 1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320 called “the killing of innocent people.” However, U.S.-led Coalition officials Washington, DC • 20036 in Kabul said that the target of the precision-guided missile was a safe house Tel: (202) 483-8888 of the Haqqani Network based in the border region of the North Waziristan Fax: (202) 483-8337 agency (Daily Nation [Lahore], March 14). Just a day after Pakistan lodged Copyright ©2008 TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TERRORISM MONITOR, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org TerrorismMonitor Volume VI Issue 6 March 24, 2008 its protest over the attack in Lwara Mundi, another has even died. However, his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, missile attack on March 16 left as many as 20 killed, alias Khalifa, has not only filled the void created by including a number of foreign fighters, when a house the absence of his veteran jihadi father, but his well- was targeted in Shahnawaz Kheil Doog village near organized group, known as the Haqqani Network, has Wana, the regional headquarters of South Waziristan. emerged as the most dangerous and challenging foe for It is believed that the missiles were fired from two U.S. the Coalition forces in Afghanistan. unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the belief that the house was being used as a training camp for terrorists The Haqqani Network is based in the Dande Darpa (Daily Post [Lahore], March 14). Though a U.S. Central Khel village near Miramshah, headquarters of the North Command spokesman would only say the missiles were Waziristan Tribal Agency. The town is about 10 miles not fired by any military aircraft—Predator UAVs are from the Afghan border. Sirajuddin, believed to be in his operated by the CIA—U.S. forces took responsibility early thirties, has a $200,000 bounty on his head. He for the earlier “precision-guided ammunition strike” on belongs to the Zadran tribe of Afghanistan, which also Lwara Mundi but made it clear that the target was the has roots on the Pakistani side of the border. Residents Haqqani Network (Daily Mail [Islamabad], March 14; in Dande Darpa Khel say that the junior Haqqani grew AFP, March 13; Reuters, March 17). A spokesman for up in this small and remote town of North Waziristan, Coalition forces in Afghanistan said that Pakistan was once the operational headquarters of his father’s jihadist informed after the attack, not before. The spokesman activities. It is said that he attended the now defunct made it clear that U.S. forces will respond in the future religious seminary which his father founded in the early as well if they identify a threat from across the border in 1980s in the town of Bande Darpa Khel. Though he Pakistan’s tribal belt (Daily Times [Lahore], March 14). could not be considered a religious scholar, Sirajuddin Though the Pakistani tribal region has been a center certainly sharpened his jihad skills under the guidance of concern since late 2001 when hundreds of al-Qaeda of his father. Considered to be the leader of a new fighters took refuge there, the lawless belt between generation of Taliban militants on both sides of the Pakistan and Afghanistan is now receiving attention for border and a bridge between the Pakistani and Afghan the growing activities of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban Taliban, NATO officials have recently declared him as group which has been spearheading the insurgency one of the most dangerous Taliban commanders in the against U.S.-led NATO forces in Afghanistan. ongoing insurgency in Afghanistan (Los Angeles Times, March 14). He is suspected as the mastermind behind the A Profile of the Haqqani Network deadly attack on Kabul’s only five-star hotel last January, which left eight people killed, including three foreigners The “Haqqani Network” is a group of militants led by (Daily Times, March 4). A U.S. military spokesman at Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani. Bagram Air Base described Sirajuddin’s role in a series Jalaluddin, who is said to be in his late 70s, is a noted of devastating suicide bombings: “We believe him to be Taliban commander with a bounty on his head and a much more brutal and much more interested in attacking place on the U.S. most-wanted list. Jalaluddin Haqqani and killing civilians. He has no regard for human life, is considered to be the closest aide of Taliban supreme even those of his Afghan compatriots” (AP, February leader Mullah Omar and was a noted mujahideen 21). The United States has offered a $200,000 bounty commander in the 1980s resistance against the Russian for Sirajuddin, who is expanding his operations from occupation of Afghanistan. He rose to prominence east Afghanistan into the central and southern regions. after playing a leading role in the defeat of Muhammad Najibullah’s communist forces in Khost in March Sirajuddin has evaded capture several times despite 1991. After the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 1995, attempts by Pakistani security forces to arrest him at his the senior Haqqani joined the Taliban movement and house and seminary in Miramshah in North Waziristan. rose to the top echelon of power in the regime. He In 2005 Pakistani officials raided his headquarters remained a minister during the Taliban government and in Dande Darpa Khel, the religious seminary and a top consultant to Mullah Omar. The senior Haqqani residential compound used by his network. The raiding has rarely been seen in public since the collapse of the party seized huge caches of weapons and ammunitions Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001, when he but Sirajuddin again escaped arrest (Dawn [Karachi], is believed to have crossed into Pakistan’s Waziristan September 15, 2005). Tribal Agency to evade the advance of Coalition forces. There are continuous rumors that he is seriously ill or 2 TerrorismMonitor Volume VI Issue 6 March 24, 2008 Sirajuddin is also reported to have taken credit for a Conclusion suicide-truck bombing in Khost on March 3 that killed two NATO soldiers and two Afghan civilians (Xinhua, Afghan officials as well as Coalition forces in Kabul March 13). The attack on a government building involved have cited Sirajuddin’s use of North Waziristan as a truck loaded with explosives, drums of petrol, mines operational headquarter for his alleged cross-border and gas cylinders. A Taliban videotape of the bombing terrorist activities as one example of Pakistan’s inability was released on March 20, including a statement from to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in its tribal areas. the German-born suicide bomber, Cuneyt Ciftci—also Though the Pakistan government regards these claims as known as Saad Abu Furkan—“The time has arrived to baseless, it is known that two years ago Sirajuddin issued give sacrifices to Islam. Since we lack resources to fight a circular urging militants to continue their “jihad” the enemy, we will have to turn our bodies into bombs” against the United States and the Karzai government (Newkerala.com, March 20). “till the last drop of blood.” But in the same statement he pointed out that “fighting Pakistan does not conform On the Pakistani side of the border, Sirajuddin’s influence to Taliban policy… those who [continue to wage] an has been growing as a “revered jihadist commander.” He undeclared war against Pakistan are neither our friends strongly opposed Maulvi Nazir’s campaign against Uzbek nor shall we allow them in our ranks” (Dawn, June 23, and other foreign militants waged earlier this year by the 2006).
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