Locating an Ottoman Port-City in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Izmir 1580-1780

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Locating an Ottoman Port-City in the Early Modern

Mediterranean:

Izmir 1580-1780

Mehmet Kuru

A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Department of History University of Toronto

©Mehmet Kuru, 2017

Locating an Ottoman Port-City in the Early Modern Mediterranean: Izmir 1580-1780

Mehmet Kuru

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History University of Toronto 2017

ABSTRACT

Extant historiography considers Izmir as a case of early modern “boom town.” Its transformation from a mere pier for the provisions of Istanbul into a bustling trans-regional port-city, so the standard narrative goes, was due to mercantilist penetration by English and Dutch chartered companies at a time of Ottoman economic and political crisis and social dislocation. This formulation gives little credit to the city’s regional setting as an agent of change. This dissertation, in contrast, addresses the question of Izmir’s rise from the vantage point of Western

Anatolia’s environmental outlook, hydrogeological features, and crop rotation patterns. It suggests that the city was forged not out of some in-built characteristics, but of how the inhabitants met the environmental challenges, and how this socio-environmental outlook contrasted with other regions in the long run and was articulated with economic and demographic factors. Using a composite methodology that combines environmental and economic historical approaches, and shifting the scale of observation to situate the environmental trends for sixteenth-century Izmir in a millennial perspective, this dissertation reconstructs the infrastructure of Ottoman socio-economic transformation. It rethinks the periodization and causal linkages between environment and fiscality by means of geography, and argues for

ii understanding Izmir through a continuous monetary process that amplified commercial flows on a Eurasian scale.

The first two chapters of this dissertation revisit the Little Ice Age argument concerning seventeenth-century socio-economic transformations. These chapters show the geographical limits of the argument, i.e. how the cumulative impact of regional climactic differentiation distinguished Western Anatolia, and Izmir’s hinterland in particular, allowing the development of local agricultural production and the region’s simultaneous demographic growth, distinguishing it from the rest of Anatolia.

In the following two chapters, this work draws inspiration from the way that the question of the birth of the Atlantic has been cut down to size and reoriented, inter alia, through an Indian

Ocean perspective. Here I similarly emphasize how trade flows running through Ottoman domains were inherently interlocked with Eurasian trade. I suggest that the bi-zonal Ottoman currency acted as a switch mechanism via the marginal utility of arbitrage, discontinuous in the long run but catalyzing a quintessential economic shift from the established portfolio of Eastern goods to the greater salience and integration of local products and markets. It was this shift, I argue, not a mercantilist penetration, which set the process in place. Focusing on the rise of Izmir also allows us to better understand the superstructure of Ottoman socio-economic transformation not only at the stage of Ottoman capital, but also of endemic commercial flows diffused throughout the empire.

Finally, in the fifth and the last chapter, I demonstrate how Izmir became the conduit for wider economic flows not for environmental and economic reasons alone, but also fiscal ones.

Specifically, Izmir’s covert taxation policy and taxpayers’ responses shaped its urban demographics in tandem with environmental and monetary processes. Ottoman environmental,

iii economic, and political aspects of socio-economic change were thus connected to Eurasian flows of goods and people.

Table of Contents

Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………....1

Chapter 1: Mapping People and Produce: Ecological Change and the Shift in Tax-Base in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Anatolia…………………………………………....21 1.1. Demographic Change in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia and Regional Climatic Discrepancy ……………………………………………………………………..26 1.2. A “Magnificent” Climate: Age of Rainfall……………………………………....35 1.3. Climatic Impact on Agricultural Production in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Anatolia…………………………………………………………………………..40 1.4. Transition from the “Magnificent Days” to the “Age of Crisis” ………………..53

Chapter 2: The Rise of Western Anatolia in the Midst of a Social and Climatic Crisis…….56

2.1. A Balance Sheet of Celali Era: Reversal of Fortune…………………………….59 2.2. An Oasis in the Midst of the Little Ice Age: The Rise of the Western Anatolia…68 2.3. Hydrogeological Characteristics of Western Anatolia as Determinant Factor Behind Economic Growth …………...... 72 2.4. Agricultural Production of Western Anatolia during the Little Ice Age………...78 2.5. Conclusion…………………………...... 81

Chapter 3: Monetization Process of Ottoman Markets………………………………………84

3.1. Ottoman Currency Zones and the Ottoman Monetary Policy in the Sixteenth Century…………………………………………………………………………...86 3.2. “Gresham’s Law” at Work…………………………………...... 94 3.3. The Monetary Crisis and Great Debasement in Late Sixteenth Century (1580–1589) ……………………………………………………………………..97 3.4. The Beylerbeyi Incident and the Ottoman Monetary Reform (1589-1600) ……109 3.5. Conclusion.…………..………………………………………………………....117

Chapter 4: Commercialization Process and the Long-Term Patterns of Ottoman Foreign Trade……………………………………………………………………………119

4.1. The Eurasian Monetary Integration and the Expansion of Interregional Trade..121 4.2. The Long-term Commercial Pattern of Izmir…………………………………..125 4.3. The Foreign Trade of the Ottoman Empire as a Eurasian Empire……………..138 4.4. The “Myth” of the European Mercantilist Penetration in Early Modern Mediterranean…………………………………………………………………..143 4.5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...148

Chapter 5: Taxation and Population in Izmir from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century…………………………………………………………………………151

5.1 The Demographic Evolution of Izmir according to the Travellers’ Estimates and the Ottoman Tax Registers until the End of Seventeenth Century……………..155 5.2. The Tax Burden on the Inhabitants of Early Modern Izmir……………………164 5.3. Long-term Demographic Pattern of Izmir in Early Modern Period……………177 5.4. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...187

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………...190

Appendix I: Urban Demographic Change in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia...... …...196 Appendix II: Rural Demographic Change in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia……...... 199 Appendix III: Nüzul Taxes Imposed on the Provinces of Anatolia in 1590 and 1637/38…………………………………………………………...………..…...201 Appendix IV: Revenues of Izmir Customs, Erzurum Customs and Imperıal Treasury from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century ……………………..……………..….208 Appendıx V: Index of Izmir Customs Revenues, Erzurum Customs Revenues and Imperial Treasury Revenues from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century…...221

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………230

List of Tables

Table 1.1 The Distribution of Crops Harvested in the District of Manisa according to the Tahrir registers of 1531 and 1575 ………………………………………...…….46

Table 1.2: Cotton Production in Adana according to Sixteenth-Century Tahrir Registers ...48

Table 1.3: The Tax Returns of Agricultural Produce and Their Share in Aggregate Tax Revenue for Çubuk District……………………………………………………...51

Table 2.1: A Comparison of the Taxpayer Populations of Rural Areas and the Number of Villages based on the Tahrir and Mufassal Avarız registers, 1570s-1650s ……………………………………………………………...…….. 61

Table 2.2: A Comparison of Taxes Imposed in kind (as barley) on the Provinces of Anatolia in 1590 and 1637/38 (in kile)…………………………………………..65

Table 2.3: Regional Fluctuations according to Mufassal surveys (tahrir and avarız) and Nüzul registers. …………………………………………………..………………67

Table 3.1: Annual Mukataa Revenues of Several Sixteenth-Century Mints …………….....92 Table 3.2: Monetary Composition of the Tributes of Moldavia and Wallachia in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century…………………………………………...... …104 Table 3.3: Monetary composition of the annual revenues of the Ottoman Imperial Treasury, as reported in the budgets of 1547-48, 1567-68, 1582-83, and1589- 90………..107 Table 3.4: Monetary composition of the annual revenues of the Ottoman Imperial Treasury, based on the budgets of 1589-90, 1591-92, 1592-93, and 1602-03………...…..113 Table 4.1: Gold to Silver Prices Ratios in Eurasian Markets in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries……………………………………………………………..………….123

Table 5.5: Taxpayers in Rural and Urban Parts of Izmir in the Sixteenth Century……..…157

Table 5.2: Taxpayers, Hamams, and Mosques in select western Anatolian Towns of the Late Sixteenth Century…...…………………………………………………………..158

Table 5.3: Travellers’ Estimates on the Population Size of Izmir in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries…...……………………………………………………….160

Table 5.4: Izmir’s Seventeenth-century Taxpayers, by Ethno-religious Communities, according to Cizye Registers ……………...………………………………...... 161

Table 5.5: The Number of Non-Muslim Taxpayers in Izmir After the 1691 Poll-tax reform …………………………………………………166

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Table 5.7: Tax Burden Shouldered by Rural and Urban Parts of several Ottoman Districts in the Seventeenth Century……………………………………………………..…168

Table 5.8: Non-Muslim Taxpayer Population (as nefer) in Eighteenth-century Izmir…….178

Table 5.9: Estimated Muslim and Non-Muslim Population of Eighteenth-century Izmir....183 Table 5.10: Estimated Ethnic Composition of the Population of Early Eighteenth-century Izmir………………………………………………………………………….…184 Table 5.11: Population Change in Mediterranean Port-Cities, 1600-1800…………...…..…186

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List of Maps

Map 1.1: Urban Demographic Change in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia Between 1520s/30s and 1570s/80s Based on the Tahrir Register……………….….……..29

Map 1.2: Rural Demographic Change in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia Between 1520s/30s and 1570s/80s Based on Tahrir Registers…………………………....32

Map 1.3: Geographical Distribution of Average Areal Annual Precipitation (1981-2010)………………………...……………………..32

Map 1.4: Ecologically Homogenous Areas of Anatolia………………….………………...33

Map 2.1: Change in the Taxes Imposed in kind (as barley) on Ottoman Provinces in 1590 and 1637/38, based on nüzul registers………………………………………...…66

Map 3.5: Significant Ottoman Mints in the Second Half of the Sixteenth century ………………………………………………………………...…………91

List of Figures

Figure 1.1: (A) Seventy-year Running Mean of Reconstructed May–June Precipitation for the Period AD 1097–2000. (B) Seventy-year Running Standard Deviation for the Reconstruction………………………..………………………….………………36

Figure 1.2: Comparison of Anatolian January-to-May Temperature Reconstruction and Two Hemispherical Temperature Reconstructions, 61-year Moving Average………..38

Figure 1.3: The Distribution of Crops Harvested in the Canik Province Based on the Tahrir Surveys of 1485 and 1576………………………………………………………..44

Figure 2.4: Comparison of Taxes Imposed in Kind (as Barley) on the Districts (kaza) of Saruhan, 1590-1637/38……...……………….……………………….………….70

Figure 2.5: Illustration of the Horst-Graben System…...…...………………...…...……..…..72

Figure 2.6: Map of the Gediz River Basin ………………..…………………………………73 Figure 2.7: Groundwater Head Contour Map for Baseline Flow Model………….……....…74 Figure 2.8: Tree Rings Samples from Different Sites……………………….…….…………75 Figure 4.1: Customs revenues of Izmir, Sixteenth to Eighteenth century………...………...130

Figure 4.2: Long-Term Annual Customs revenues of Izmir in Constant Akçe………..…….133

Figure 4.3: The Total Annual Values of Exports and Imports of Izmir (1775–1789) in livres tournois………………………………………………………………………....137

Figure 4.4: A Comparison of the Customs Revenues of Izmir and Erzurum in Constant Akçe…………………………………………………………………………..141

Figure 4.5: Revenues Index for Izmir Customs, Erzurum Customs, and the Imperial Budgets…………..……………………………………………………….….…145

Figure 4.6: English and French Broadcloth Exports to the Levant, 1666-1780 (in pieces of broadcloth).………………………………………………………………….….148

Figure 5.1: Non-Muslim Taxpaying Population (as nefer) in the Eighteenth-century Izmir………………………………………………………………………….…179 Figure 5.2: Annual Average Growth Rate of Non-Muslim Taxpaying Population of Eighteenth-century Izmir………………………………………………….…....180

Figure 5.3: Fluctuations in Economic Strata Among the Non-Muslim population of Izmir, based on Cizye Registers…………………………….……………………….....183 Figure 5.4: Estimated Ethnic Composition of the Population in Early Eighteenth-century Izmir…………………………………………………………………………….184 Figure 5.5: Long-term Demographic Trajectories of Mediterranean Port-cities, 1600-1800 ………………………………………………………….187

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation argues that the Ottoman model of commercial hubs is essential to our understanding of early modern Eurasian trade and that the port-city was a central element of this system. Using the example of an Ottoman port-city, Izmir, I demonstrate that specific environmental and economic factors provided a particular setting which reconfigures not only the port-city typology but the parameters of long-distance trade as well. In other words, I argue for the primacy of the “setting” that drove both the course and the nature of trade so that

Eurasian trade was a composite effect of trade flows and particular settings such as the port-city.

I employ the term “setting” here to mean both environmental and economic, or spatial and temporal features that constituted Izmir as a particular port-city within the Mediterranean trade network. It is tentatively called the “Ottoman model” not for reasons strictly territorial or typological in terms of human settlement, but for reasons of local, regional and imperial agency that catalyzed the environmental and economic patterns. My identification of such an Ottoman model was prompted by particular instances of deliberate tax-exemption implemented by the government, extended to the inhabitants who occupied this novel setting.

My primary research question is: why did Izmir, emerge as a commercial hub of

Mediterranean trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries? As I embarked on investigating this question, key observations of the data generated new sets of questions and subsequent answers that frequently related to timing. For instance, why was Izmir but not already-thriving commercial hubs such as Alexandria or Aleppo increasingly operational in early modern

Mediterranean trade, if the theories that credit the effects of a northwestern European penetration of the Mediterranean are correct? If we focus on Aleppo or Alexandria, how should we interpret the disappearance of the spice trade at the turn of the seventeenth century yet at the same time,

1 the feeding of local products into the trade circuit? Providing a monetary answer to the long- distance trade patterns, why did the economic performance of Izmir ascend while the rest of

Anatolia was turned upside down with social upheaval? Furthermore, what is the explanation behind the puzzling fact that the environment, equally salient for western and inner Anatolia, caused totally opposite effects simultaneously? So in tackling these observations that arose from investigating issues of timing, I returned to the basic question of how was Izmir different from other western Anatolian coastal town “settings” that shared similar sets of qualities. In this fashion, my primary research question was formulated following a string of questions related to temporal and ultimately spatial parameters.

A composite method following shifting scales of observations, partly born out of the research work and partly out of examining the different analytical lenses that focused on the research question, first employed as a tentative tool yet corroborated in the course of the research, proved to be essential for the study. By shifting scales of observation, I mean the composite employment of micro and macro, regional, imperial and even Eurasian scales to shed light on a common problematique. That is to say, these different elements do not simply complement each other, but test and reinforce the multifaceted body of the problematique, so that they do not provide mutually exclusive yet aggregative input, but form a kaleidoscopic structure.

In a conventional sense, this dissertation falls under the label of economic history.

However, it escapes the boundaries of the discipline strictly speaking in that the conception of economics employed herein is not simply geared to the movement of prices or commodities that forms the bulk of the literature in economic history, but comprises a more inclusive formulation dwelling on externalities such as environment or demographic mobility that is crucial for the

2 formation and the reproduction of a population. So the unifying thread in terms of methodology is the shifting scales and the common rubric is economic history that invites and organizes the environmental, economic and demographical themes.

The interlocking topics I deal with in the body of my study are evenly distributed among the themes of environment, economy and demography. On the topic of environment, traditional approaches to the influence of environment on history follow a narrow timeline for the major historical upheavals of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In contrast, I shifted the timescale to a millennial sketch that provided not simply a new outlook, but suggested new causal networks. The result was the discovery that it is not simply the Little Ice Age that affected society at this time, but a pattern of the wettest era observed in the millennium sandwiched between the two driest periods which was figured out thanks to a wider view, redefined the role of environment in the causal network. This revelation has repercussions for the historical periodization uncharted so far. In this serial configuration, the impact of the environment or geography on human societies was not simply external or static, but integral and dynamic. That is to say, humans were not merely passively affected by these factors, but were actively engaged with them, even responded and adapted vigourously to them. Furthermore, it is not simply at a macro scale that the environmental agency was analysed, but also at a micro scale, paying attention to details such as hydrogeological features and crop rotation patterns. This attention to detail paid off by revealing the interplay in regional differentiation. Hence, it illustrates the shifting scales at work overall.

Regarding the economy, I build my argument here based on recent numismatic findings that redefine the received wisdom of monetary history and establish the bi-zonal structure of monetary markets in Ottoman domains. Observing the mechanisms of the monetization process,

I interrelate it here with Eurasian commercial trends. I propose that it was not simply the replacing of trade items over time, e.g., the substitution of spices with cotton and silk, but the role of arbitrage as an agent of long-distance commerce that reset the trade routes and the social organization and mobilization of commercial operations. By the same token, the more unitary volume and traffic of long-distance trade further branched out into regional circuits of trade.

Consequently, the contention of earlier research of a mercantilist penetration of the

Mediterranean being the agent of change must be revised. I argue in its place, it is the synchronic attachment of local markets to each other at a Eurasian scale that was the major factor. Hence, it is not simply the European mercantilist agency that dominated the Ottoman markets, but the mutual interlocking markets running at multiple Eurasian sites that made up the general pattern.

This mutual integration took place only within a time interval of two decades following the

1580s and subsequently stabilized in the context of Ottoman foreign trade. By an analysis of the east-west bound integration process of Ottoman markets with the broader Eurasian markets, I deliver the Ottoman presence more fully into “global” economic history of seventeenth century.

At a different register, the micro scale permits us to observe agency “from below,” owing to the market’s response to successive calibration in debasement and recoinage policies implemented by the Ottoman government. Thus, this study traces both macro and micro registers of economic activity flowing through the hub of the port-city of Izmir.

A preliminary investigation of the tax registers revealed unexpected shifts in figures that signaled major under-registration of tax-payers, hinting at a continuous and deliberate process to keep a significant portion of the population off the record. Upon further investigation of this possibility at a micro scale, I examine the information exchange and decision-making among the local communities, since migration and flight were common tools for evading taxes. Continuing

4 my pursuit of this theory, I speculate that this intentional under-registration might be regarded as a policy decision on the part of Ottoman central authority together with a vibrant response by the local population. This argument involves the interweaving of distinct time series of different indicators; in order to corroborate the patterns, it also incorporates the estimates of contemporary travellers. Since no single time series of taxation records offers a panoramic or complete vision, a further methodological point of creating a dialectic between the multiplication and diversification of sources serves to sustain the argument. That is, only by looking at a wide range of unrelated sources does a fuller picture of hitherto unidentified yet “creative” taxation practices come into view. Therefore, I am able to suggest in this thesis that my findings reveal a deliberate exemption of the inhabitants from taxes as observed not only in Izmir, but at other similar settings across the Mediterranean such as Livorno, and in return, their emergence as the new twin hubs as amplifiers of the seventeenth-century cross-Mediterranean commercial world.

Sources and Methodology

This study involves original archival research, data compiled from disparate, published primary and secondary sources, and interpretative approaches to narrative sources. Hence, a composite methodology is employed to suit the purposes required by the multifaceted research question related to the Eurasian trade and the port-city. I encountered a series of lacunae as I undertook my research following my initial immersion in archival research. As I embarked on the archival research with the tentative aim of identifying the commercial networks in Izmir, I came to an initial conclusion that what has been derived from archival sources by other scholars before me largely ignored the local elements of the trade. Perhaps this oversight is the reason behind the fact that the explanations created from these sources produced a history that merely

5 affirmed the central role of the northwestern European metropoles and the mobile networks that underwrote the running of the trade that put them into place. However, I preferred to move in the direction of a history that regards the producers and subjects of these very documents in their own terms, own lives and actions. Consequently, my research branched out in many directions in order to stay true to the “setting” of my research question, in turn, determining the compositeness, or the multifaceted nature of the methodology itself.

My doctoral study unfolded as a dialectic of macro enquiries and micro findings. The most pertinent type of archival documentation for my research question turned out to be tax records. I meticulously combed through the bureaucratic papers relating to communication and decision-making of the central authority, such as the series of mühimmes (chief registers of important affairs), şikayet defteris (registers of complaints), and ecnebiye defteris (registers of foreigners) from the Ottoman archive, or meso-level evidence suited to the study of network forms, e.g., consular reports from various European archives, and institutional papers of the

Levant company. However, as abundant as these sources were, they did not meet the purposes of the study. Furthermore, şer’iyye sicilis (the local court records), which might have been quite fruitful for my research were unfortunately not extant for Izmir. It was instead the tax records that allowed me to create time series that tested scholarly opinion in directions that led me to environmental and monetary indicators. I noticed regional differentiations in terms of demographic patterns striking a different course from the rest of Anatolia, historical literature produced on the latter and the historiography built on it, which pushed me to revisit environmental explanations. The commercial boom I detected at the end of the sixteenth century in customs registers and the following stability, were in strong correlation with the timeline of the economic crisis. This led me to reflect on the dynamics of the crisis, and I was able to

6 identify the monetary character of the crisis and its relation to the boom. The break in the demographic pattern elicited from the tax records was reinterpreted in order to locate Izmir among contemporary towns in terms of the relative burden born by the taxpayer. This in turn led me to identify the contours of a tax-exemption process. In hindsight, it appears that I reconfigured a series of indicators by moving from one to the other or multiplying the data in layers as essential for historical reconstruction. Against the studies sufficing with reporting evidence with no comparative edge, horizontal/spatial or vertical/temporal, and sticking to the literalist rendering of the evidence in categories put at our disposal by scribes and archivists, I suppose that the comparative edge inherent in my methodology is crucial for data series, its analysis and interpretation, and the research results that I was able to elicit.

As mentioned above, having labelled my study an economic history, it nonetheless differs from an “economic history” proper or even a “social history” in terms of its compilation and use of data. For instance, purely economic historians would normally focus exclusively on the robustness of data taken from a prescribed pool of primary sources with statistical tests mostly relegating the issue of analysis to pattern coherence and leave out the social elements of the historical causality. In contrast, a completely social history would neglect the use of quantitative evidence with a strong preference for qualitative analysis. This study differs from both approaches, however, as I have borrowed the validity of the quantitative evidence from the former and the predilection for interpretative analysis from the latter. In order to forestall any criticisms levelled against the quantitative studies based on tax surveys in Ottoman history

(defterology in Ottomanist parlance), with respect to their statistical efficacy, I alternated between a vertical multiplication of the number of sources and horizontal diversification of the sort of sources that would constitute the time series or patterns. In doing so, I sought to steer my

7 findings away from the built-in biases of a single source. Thus, the operational validity of the composite evidence was not simply established within document series but across them, for what

I intended to demonstrate was to portray the general trends and their interrelations.

Even though the set of events I deemed central to my analysis were pinned to a relatively short time interval, namely the period between the late sixteenth to early seventeenth centuries, I purposely compiled and constructed extensive datasets reaching up the end of the eighteenth century, as my initial findings in shifting the time scale proved fruitful. Thus, I was able to redefine the location and causal relation of the specific economic and environmental phenomena.

Shifting and locating, in this fashion, was the main mode of operating in my research not as mere catchwords, but underlining the significance of the spatial elements. I moved from data compilation to tabulation to mapping. By the same token, I made use of numerous maps and tables not just to visualize an already acquired knowledge that could conveniently be narrated, but what simply cannot be conveyed by it, hence a substantive use of locating patterns in graphic forms. That is to say, they do not simply make up user-friendly interface but they are statements by themselves. As summed up in the title of the dissertation, the location refers not just to a geographical/physical position, but to a mental setting that is sociocultural and historical reconfiguring our historiographical notions.

Literature Survey

The focus of my research is mainly the commercial, social and climatic transformation observed in the Ottoman Empire during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

Considering the scope of the work, an extensive literature on the relevant themes is already

8 extant. Recent attempts aim to reinterpret this period not only on the scale of the Empire, but also in a Eurasian context.

The sixteenth century has been traditionally interpreted as the heyday of the Ottoman era.

The conquest of Syria and Egypt by Selim I (1512-1520) in the second decade of the century was followed by numerous successful expeditions by Süleyman I, “The Magnificent” (1520-1566), and the period of these bright military successes inevitably influenced contemporary chroniclers.

In traditional historiography, this “golden age” was generally extended up to the death of

Suleyman’s last grand vizier, Sokullu Mehmed Pasha (d. 1579), and this long period was praised not only by the chroniclers, but even by the modern scholars. The subsequent social, economic and political turbulences that took place from the 1580s onward have also been labelled as the beginning of a long, slow decline. This conceptualization, which is known as the “decline paradigm” and mainly based on a rise and fall dichotomy, began to be challenged in the last quarter of the twentieth century.1 Subsequently, many scholars have focused on the period of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in order to suggest a new contextualization for the

“post-golden age” period.2

1 For the several critics of the “decline paradigm” in different contexts; Roger Owen, “The Middle East in the Eighteenth Century: An ‘Islamic’ Society in Decline? A Critique of Gibb and Bowen’s Islamic Society and the West,” Bulletin (British Society for Middle Eastern Studies) 3, no. 2 (1976): 110–17; Jonathan Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman Decline: Military Technology Diffusion in the Ottoman Empire, Fifteenth to Eighteenth Centuries,” Journal of World History 10, no. 1 (1999): 179–201; Cemal Kafadar, “The Question of Ottoman Decline,” Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review 4, no. 1–2 (1997–8): 30–75; Rifa‘at ‘Ali Abou-El-Hajj, Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Albany: State University of New York, 1991); Douglas Howard, “Ottoman Historiography and the Literature of ‘Decline’ of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” Journal of Asian History 22, no. 1 (1988): 52–77; Donald Quataert, “Ottoman History Writing and Changing Attitudes Towards the Notion of Decline,” History Compass 1, no. 1 (2003): 1–9. 2 For a few significant examples, I. Metin Kunt, The Sultan’s Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550-1650 (New Yok: Columbia University Press, 1983), Linda T. Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660 (Leiden, New York: E.J. Brill, 1996), Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats:The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010). 9

In traditional historiography, particularly in the context of economic history, the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were viewed as the origin of a sustained economic decline. The economic and political expansion of the European powers observed during the nineteenth century was likely the main reason that modern scholars dealing with Ottoman history long took for granted this perception put forward by contemporary Ottoman intellectuals. Even if this outdated “decline” perspective has lost its influence in recent studies and the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries have started to be labelled transition or transformation periods,

Ottoman historians still refrain from reconceptualizing Ottoman commercial/economic history in the long run from the late sixteenth to the nineteenth century.

In a broader framework, the historiography of the Mediterranean followed a similar path as Ottoman historiography. In the first half of the twentieth century, monographs on the Levant

Company depicted how English merchants dominated the trade in the early modern eastern

Mediterranean.3 In mid-century, Braudel, in his seminal work on the Mediterranean, sealed the

1580’s as the time of the initial “northern invasion” of the Mediterranean.4 Numerous works and monographs reinforced this conceptualization implicitly or explicitly and tagged the 1580s as the origin of a “long-term” economic dominance of the Western powers in the Mediterranean.

Under these tropes of “decline/transition of the Ottoman Empire” or the “economic dominance” of the Western powers in the eastern Mediterranean, Izmir held a privileged position as a newborn port-city in the 1580s at the intersection of Ottoman and Mediterranean historiography. Izmir initially had a population of approximately 2,000 inhabitants in the 1570s,

3 M. Epstein, The Early History of the Levant Company (London: G. Routledge, 1908); Alfred Cecil Wood, A History of the Levant Company (London: Oxford University Press, 1935). 4 Fernand Braudel, La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II (Paris: Colin, 1949). For the critics of this conceptualization ; Molly Greene, “Beyond the Northern Invasion: The Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century,” Past and Present, no. 174 (2003): 42-71; Colin Heywood, “The English in the Mediterranean, 1600–1630: A Post-Braudelian Perspective on the “Northern Invasion”, ” in Trade and Cultural Exchange in the Early Modern Mediterranean, eds. Maria Fusaro, Colin Heywood and Mohammed-Salah Omri, (I.B.Tauris:2010), 23-44. 10 but transformed into a prominent commercial hub of the eastern Mediterranean in just a few decades, boasting tens of thousands residents.

Therefore, Izmir, as a rising port-city in the midst of the economic crisis of the Empire and the “northern mercantile invasion” of the Mediterranean, was showcased by scholars as a perfect example of the European hegemonic impact on Ottoman markets. Hence, in the only monograph devoted entirely to the rising period of this port-city, Daniel Goffman claimed that

Izmir was already set on the path of becoming a colonial port as early as the first decades of the seventeenth century.5 By the same token, in one of the earliest works on Izmir, Necmi Ülker traced the commercial activities of English and French merchants through the port of Izmir to the period 1688-1740. 6 In another monograph on early modern Izmir, Frangakis calculated the volume of import/export between Marseille and Izmir based on documentation in the French archives, and emphasized French pre-eminence in the commerce of eighteenth-century Izmir.7

The commerce of the early modern Mediterranean in general has been studied extensively. There are numerous monographs and articles on the organization of the Levant companies, which were state-sanctioned monopolies active in Mediterranean commerce, and on the activities of European “nations” in eastern Mediterranean port cities.8 Thanks to these works,

5 Daniel Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650 (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1990) 139- 146., idem, “Izmir: From Village to Colonial Port-city,” in The Ottoman City between East and West, ed. Edhem Eldem, Daniel Goffman, and Bruce Masters (New York: Cambridge University Press 1999), 79–134. 6 Necmi Ülker, “The Rise of Izmir.” Ülker also referred to Ottoman Mühimme registers, in part to display Ottoman decrees on the relationship between the European merchants and the Ottoman central authority. 7 Elena Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna in the eighteenth Century, 1700–1820 (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992). Before Goffman and Frangakis, for the first work on early modern Izmir which suggests perspective alike, see: Necmi Ülker, “The Rise of Izmir, 1688-1740” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1974). 8 For the Levant Company, see: Wood, Levant Company, M. Epstein, The Early History of The Levant Company, (London: George Rutledge & Sons, 1908), Despina Vlami, Trading with the Ottomans: The Levant Company in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015); For the commercial activities of the European merchants in Levant, see: Ralph Davis, Aleppo and Devonshire Square English Traders in the Levant in the Eighteenth Century (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1967), Edhem Eldem, French Trade in Istanbul, Bruce Masters, Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750 (New York and London: New York University Press, 1988), M. Sait Türkhan, “18. Yüzyılda Doğu Akdenizde Ticaret ve Halep” (PhD Diss., Istanbul University, 2014). 11 we know almost all the European merchants, name by name, trading under the supervision of their consuls. We also know the institutional structures of the Levant companies, the internal problems of their organizations and the diplomatic crises between the European mercantile

“nations” and the Ottoman authorities. Sephardic Jews or the Armenians of New Julfa have also been examined in order to investigate early modern mercantile networks. We know the type of goods that the companies traded on European ships in this period. The detailed biographies of consuls or the lifestyle of European communities in Ottoman ports have also been fairly well studied. However, one of the most valuable pieces of the puzzle, the total volume and long-term pattern of commerce in the early modern Eastern Mediterranean is missing. Moreover, most studies in this field are based on the European archives and focused on a specific mercantile group such as French merchants, British traders, or Dutch companies. None of them provided a satisfactory explanation of the total volume of trade running through the Ottoman ports. In this dissertation, I aim to fill this gap by addressing the long-term pattern of customs revenues of

Izmir collected from relevant registers.

The literature on social and climatic crises as observed in Europe and the Ottoman Empire has also aggregated since the middle of the twentieth century. The first half of the seventeenth century is regarded by many notable historians as a catastrophic period for Europe as well, going under the name of “crisis of the seventeenth century’. Eric Hobsbawm first coined the term “general crisis” for the European economy in the seventeenth century.9 Trevor-Roper then brought the term of

“crises” into a wider context and argued that the “crisis” was not only economic but a crisis of state. 10 Le Roy Ladurie revitalized the debate with his pioneering work, Les Paysans de

9 Eric Hobsbawm, “The General Crisis of the European Economy in the seventeenth century,” Past and Present, no. 5 (1954): 33–53. 10 Hugh Trevor-Roper, “The General Crisis of the seventeenth Century,” Past and Present, no. 16 (1959): 31–64; cf. Roland Mousnier et al. “Discussion of H.R. Trevor-Roper: ‘The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century’,” Past 12

Languedoc, which examined the agrarian society of French Mediterranean province of

Languedoc. The climate, agricultural productivity and subsistence were interlaced in discussion in this new approach.11 The contribution of Ladurie became quite visible in the monograph of

Geoffrey Parker on contemporary “crises.” Parker reserved the first part of his book for the climate and subsistence crises and the impact of the plague to provide a background for the following chapters of his work.12

Beginning from the 1980’s, this “general crisis” model gradually lost its influence and historians began to suggest new models for understanding this period from a broader perspective, not as “crises” but as a “transition,” not European, but Eurasian. At this point, Goldstone's attempt to understand the “seventeenth century crisis” as a global phenomenon was a major breakthrough.13 His argument suggests that the crises that both Western and Eastern societies experienced during this period had common origins, which can be traced to the global ecological change, in other words, in shared trends in climate. Soon after Goldstone’s contribution,

Steensgaard also emphasized that Europe and Asia shared similar conjunctures between discoveries and the Industrial Revolution. He referred to Goldstone and suggested that Persia and

Russia be incorporated into this comparative approach.14 Following this insight, climatic change became one of the integral elements of the explanations for the seventeenth century “crises”. In a more recent book, Geoffrey Parker highlighted climatic change as the fundamental cause that

and Present, no. 18 (1960): 8–42. Trevor-Roper extended his studies on this topic and published several articles. For his other articles, see: Hugh Trevor-Roper, The crisis of seventeenth century (Indiana: Liberty Fund, 2001). 11 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Les Paysans de Languedoc (Paris: Mouton, 1966). 12 Geoffrey Parker, Europe in Crisis:1598–1648 (London: Fontana, 1979). 13 Jack A. Goldstone, “East and West in the Seventeenth Century,” 103–42. 14 Niels Steensgaard, “The Seventeenth Century Crisis and the Unity of Eurasian History,” 683–97. 13 triggered the global crises along with other contemporary regional economic and political developments.15

Like contemporary Europe, the Ottoman Empire also underwent social upheavals and climatic crises during the same period. The historiography of that period was also evaluated by

Ottoman historians in connection with their Europeanist colleagues. The late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was a period of political upheaval, social unrest and economic turmoil for the Ottoman Empire and a series of large-scale rebellions known as “Celalis” swept the countryside, causing incalculable destruction in Anatolia. Interruption of interregional trade, the dramatic decline of agricultural and craft productions, as well as taxation problems were symptoms of this crisis. The large-scale depopulation of Anatolian villages and towns was another major aspect.16

If historians tend to agree that the period of rebellions had a permanent impact on the fiscal and military system for the empire, they differ on the factors that prompted these revolts.

The notion of “rural pressure” was one of the major explanations first proposed. Barkan argued that a subsistence crisis ensuing from population growth that forced peasants to abandon their holdings. In desperation, these peasants then joined brigand groups in the last decades of the sixteenth century.17 On the same track, Mustafa Akdağ suggested that the worsening economic conditions, heavy tax burden and population growth forced peasants to leave their lands and turn to brigandage.18 In consideration of this issue, Cook wondered whether it was the population increase and “rural pressure” statistically, and suggested that this situation may not have been the

15 Geoffrey Parker, Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013). 16 Oktay Özel, “The Reign of Violence: The celalis c.1550-1700” in The Ottoman World, eds. Christine Woodhead, (London and New York: Routledge, 2012): 184–202. 17 Ömer Lütfü Barkan, “Tarihi demografi çalışmaları ve Osmanlı tarihi,” Türkiyat Mecmuası 10 (1953): 1–26. This article was also translated and published in M.A. Cook, ed., Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1970). 18 Mustafa Akdağ, Celali İsyanları 1550–1603 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 1963). 14 only cause of Celali revolts. Instead, he advised historians to pay greater attention to the contemporary socio-political factors in the Empire. Supposing that the hypothesis of overpopulation was valid for the whole of Anatolia, he asked whether one could establish a direct relationship between this demographic/economic phenomenon and the Celali uprisings.

Then he suggested that the rebellion was not an automatic response to objective deprivation, but a form of social action that should be explained on another level, the Ottoman socio-political system.

The significance of Cook’s study lies in his attempt to make a shift from demographic and economic fields to the socio-political field in explaining the Celali uprisings as a breakdown of social order. 19 Where several historians emphasized the demographic increase and “rural pressure” as the main reasons behind this social turbulence, the criticisms against this viewpoint were also elaborate. This view on rural pressure was challenged by İslamoğlu who worked on northern Anatolia by using similar sources, that is, tax registers. She agreed with Cook about the growth of population, but suggested that this demographic increase did not place a burden on the shoulder of the peasants. Firstly, the arable lands were hardly insufficient for the era, even if the farm-lands (çiftliks) were fragmented. The smaller hamlets (mezraas), turned into fully-fledged villages at the end of this half century, and the forest land was also used by the villagers in the case of crop failure. Secondly, the production of barley and wheat decreased per capita, but fruits and other vegetables increased. These facts can be accepted as an indicator of the lack of crop failure as well. Thus, İslamoğlu claimed that the tendency of villagers to abandon their settlements in order to join mercenary groups or migrate to the towns was the preference of peasants attracted by increased employment opportunities.20 Apart from the “rural pressure”, the

19 Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 29. 20 İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, 151–6. 15

Celali rebellions were discussed in different contexts such as the military transformation of the

Ottoman army that took place in the late sixteenth century.

In a significant contribution to the discussion, Inalcik argued that the Celali revolts were not peasant rebellions but uprisings of irregular soldiers called levends. With the changes in military technology and the widespread use of firearms during this century, the size of the army grew from strength to strength. During the long wars against the Habsburgs and the Safavids in the last decades of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman central authority needed new soldiers/mercenaries to sustain its warfare. Being a mercenary would have been seen as an opportunity for the peasants, so they left their lands and turned to warcraft. At the end of the wars, the Ottoman army no longer needed these irregular soldiers and as a consequence, they became the main source of the Celali revolts. In other words, even if a “push” factor from villages can be detected as the consequence of rural demographic pressure, the “pull factor,” the available opportunities outside the villages, could also be equally decisive for the rural population.21

In her monograph on the Celali rebellions, rather than seeking explanations for the causes of the Celali revolts, Karen Barkey examined the relationship between the central authority and the bandits. By analyzing this relationship, Barkey aimed to explore an alternative interpretation for understanding the state-making process in the Ottoman Empire, as opposed to the European trajectory of state-centralization.22 In my research, I do not focus on the origins or process of

21 Halil Inalcik, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire 1600–1700,” Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 283–337. For other important contributions into the discussion of a “pull factor”, see: Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Tensions in the Anatolian Countryside around 1600: An Attempt at Interpretation,” in Türkische Miszellen: Robert Anhegger Festschrift - Armağanı - Mélanges, ed. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont et al. (Istanbul: Divit, 1987), 117–30; pp. 127-30; eadem, “Seeking Wisdom in China: An Attempt to Make Sense of the Celali Rebellions,” in Coping with the State: Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995), 99–121; pp. 99-101. 22 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization, (Cornell University Press, 1994) 16 these revolts or the politicies of central authority against the rebellions but rather I deal with the outcomes of these incidents in the context of Anatolia by demonstrating the regional differentiation in terms of fiscal demographic patterns.

In spite of the rich literature on the issue of social upheavals, climate change was not cited as one of the contributing factors until the work of Griswold, The Great Anatolian

Rebellion, published in 1983. In the last part of his book, he inserted climatic affairs into the discussion, though lacking documentary proof.23 This perspective was further developed by Sam

White, and the climatic impact he proposed as one of the determining factors that prompted the

Celali rebellions.24 This recent approach utilized the climatic shift and the Little Ice Age in order to locate the Ottoman case within a global history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

However, White’s framework does not differentiate between regions in terms of the consequences of these revolts or the contemporary social transformation prompted by the climatic shift that took place in Ottoman lands. In this dissertation, I carry the discussion to a different scale in terms of long-term trends, and suggest discussing the impact of Little Ice Age on Celali rebellions by including the climatic and demographic fluctuations of Anatolia observed in sixteenth century in its regional variation.

The Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation comprises five chapters, divided into three thematic section: environment, economy and demography. The first two chapters, which form section I, analyze

23 William Griswold, The Great Anatolian Rebellion 1591-1611 (Berlin: Klaus Swarz Verlag, 1983). Griswold also clarified and extended his arguments on the impact of climatic change in his later article, William Griswold, “Climatic Change: A Possible Factor in the Social Unrest of Seventeenth Century Anatolia,” in Humanist and Scholar: Essays in Honor of Andreas Tietze, eds. Heath W. Lowry and Donald Quataert (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1993), 37–57. 24 Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 17 the the social upheavals, settlement patterns and climatic shifts observed in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century Ottoman Anatolia. The following two chapters examine monetization and commercialization processes that took place in the same period. The final chapter investigates the long-term demographic patterns of Izmir and the taxation policy followed by the central authority in this port-city.

In the first chapter, entitled: “Mapping People and Produce: Ecological Change and the

Shift in Tax-Base in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Anatolia,” I gather the tax surveys (tahrir) conducted in sixteenth-century Ottoman Anatolia and map the settlement patterns and crop rotations. Based on that, I identify the regional discrepancy in demographic growth. This variation is analysed in light of recent studies on climatic history, in particular the dendrochronological [tree-ring dating] research on Anatolia. I then discuss the impact of climatic conditions on social structure and agricultural production in sixteenth-century Ottoman Anatolia.

The second chapter, “The Rise of Western Anatolia in the Midst of a Social and Climatic

Crisis”, supplements the previous one, and extends its chronology. In this second chapter, the consequences of social upheavals, namely the Celali revolts, are reviewed in terms of the transformation in settlement patterns and fluctuating tax revenue. I suggest that the economic development of western Anatolia in this period diverged from the rest of Anatolia. This economic growth is analysed by corresponding regional and geographical characteristics. The peculiar hydrogeological features of western Anatolia are highlighted as the major determinant behind this unexpected development.

In a similar way, the second theme of the transformation in economic infrastructure, is addressed through two chapters on monetization and commercialization, respectively. In the third chapter, “the Monetization Process of Ottoman Markets”, I identify the fluctuations in

Ottoman monetary markets as the trigger of the contemporary economic crisis observed in the

Ottoman Empire. I analyze the policies, such as debasements or recoinage, implemented by the

Ottoman central authority in an effort to restore monetary stability. In addition, I introduce the temporary arbitrage opportunities as the catalyst behind the expansion of foreign commerce during the last decades of the sixteenth century.

In chapter four, “Commercialization and the Long-Term Patterns of Ottoman Foreign

Trade,” I trace the long-term fluctuations of foreign commerce operating through the ports of

Izmir by analyzing the customs revenues extracted from Ottoman archival tax registers. I demonstrate that the process of commercial integration lasted approximately two decades, from the 1580s to the 1600s. Following this short period, commercial fluctuations decreased and commerce became more dependent on the conditions of Ottoman markets. Therefore, this “early incorporation” was correlated to the monetization process and the emerging arbitrage opportunities. Due to the stabilization of the Ottoman monetary markets, commercial integration lost its momentum. I also compare my findings based on the registers of Izmir with the customs revenues of Erzurum, the main hub of eastern commerce, in order to evaluate the commercial patterns between these eastern and western commercial gates. This comparison demonstrates that the commercial integration of Ottoman markets was not limited to Western markets, but is also valid for Eastern markets at the same level.

The fifth and final chapter, “Taxation and Population in Izmir from the Sixteenth to the

Eighteenth Century”, investigates the taxation policy of the early modern Ottoman government towards Izmir and the demographic patterns for the city in this period. I propose that the

Ottoman government deliberately followed a tax-exemption policy in Izmir as a means of promoting the port-city and monopolizing the commerce through a single port. Secondly, I

19 suggest that multiplying and diversifying relevant sources, by shifting the temporal and spatial frame of research with comparison of relevant registers, can be a useful historical methodology for checking a possible bias in contemporary tax registers. As a result of the diverse research conducted here and the adoption of such a method, I am able to describe the long-term demographic patterns of Izmir and locate this port-city in the early modern Mediterranean.

CHAPTER 1

Mapping People and Produce: Ecological Change and the Shift in Tax-Base in Sixteenth-

Century Ottoman Anatolia

The rise of Izmir in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was the result of interrelated ecological, economic and political circumstances prevalent in the Ottoman Empire at the time. In the first part of my analysis, I will examine the region’s environmental factors in the context of the relationship between the port-city and its hinterland. Daniel Goffman has demonstrated that during the initial phase of Izmir rise, the expansion of foreign trade through the port of Izmir was largely based on the export of local agricultural products, particularly cotton; it was only later that the transit trade of Persian silk was incorporated into the commerce operating through the ports of Izmir.25 Taking this fact into consideration, I explore regional factors that allowed for the growth of foreign commerce in western Anatolia via the port of Izmir even under the severe weather conditions of the Little Ice Age, and in the midst of the Celali rebellions. My research question reflects upon two interconnected environmental issues: the ecological transformation that Ottoman Anatolia underwent at the time, and the contemporary increase in agricultural production and in foreign commerce in Izmir’s hinterland.

Extant environmental studies examining climatic factors behind the era’s social upheavals, such as the Celali rebellions, focus mainly on the impact of the Little Ice Age during the last decade of the sixteenth century, and largely ignore the patterns of the previous period.

25 Daniel Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650 (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1990). My own archival findings on the commerce of Izmir from the Ottoman Archives also help to justify Goffman’s prediction. The first Persian silk caravans entered Izmir around 1620, and by that time, the city had already turned into an established commercial hub. The silk trade was a relatively modest contribution to the city’s commercial activity. For the details and relevant statistics, see: Chapter Four. 21

However, recent dendrochronological research—to be discussed in detail in the following sections—, has revealed that Ottoman Anatolia experienced the wettest period of the second millennium between 1518 and 1587.26 Therefore, the ecological and social transformations that occurred in the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the seventeenth century transpired also as a result of the exceptional climactic conditions of the preceding era. Following this line of enquiry, I propose that the scope of the analysis be expanded to include the early sixteenth century in order to explore the shifts in ecological conditions, fiscal population27 and agricultural production that took place during this era. This point is central to my argument, because it was the combination of these elements that paved the way for the commercial development of Izmir in the following period.

Based on an analysis of tax surveys conducted in the sixteenth century, I argue that the

Anatolia-wide demographic growth of this period—a widely accepted historical phenomenon— was characterized by sharp regional discrepancies. While the Mediterranean coastal zones witnessed limited or no change in their fiscal population, both inner and southeastern Anatolia experienced an extraordinary demographic development over half a century. By examining the long-term aridity index and contemporary climatic conditions, I conclude that the regions that experienced a marked population growth were mainly the semi-arid regions of Anatolia, whereas the Mediterranean regions remained relatively stable. On account of this temporal climatic variance, during the sixteenth century the vast inner semi-arid lands turned into well-watered areas, and new fields were opened for agricultural production. Concomitantly, the fiscal population of these regions increased markedly. However, this period of over-precipitation in

26 For details on the long-term precipitation patterns and the relevant discussion see Figure 1.1. It should also be noted that these dates do not point to an instant shift between the periods, rather they are the beginning and end of a 70-year running means, which were created in order to capture a periodical comparison. 27 I use the term “fiscal population” to define sedentary tax-payers of the Ottoman Empire and this does not include the semi-nomadic pastoral tribes or tax-exempt groups. 22 relation to the long-term averages of Anatolia had an inhibiting effect on the agricultural production of those regions under the influence of a Mediterranean climate. This impacted the local products of those regions in particular, such as grape vines and cotton.

These trajectories reversed during the last decades of the late sixteenth century, when the average precipitation index and temperature decreased gradually. The resulting lowering of cold and drought thresholds left agricultural production unsustainable in the semi-arid regions, which in turn fueled a number of Celali rebellions. While the regions of inner and southeastern Anatolia began to lose the fiscal populations that had gathered there during the sixteenth century,

Mediterranean regions did not suffer as severe disruptions. Furthermore, despite the rapid climactic shift, western Anatolia was able to witness an impressive development in terms of both its agricultural production and fiscal population, due to its unique regional hydrogeological features. The area’s shallow aquifer systems, as well as abundant ground and surface waters, enabled the region’s population to sustain agricultural production in spite of the Celali rebellions and the influence of the Little Ice Age. The cultivation of various local agricultural products such as cotton and grapes was especially amenable to this climatic shift, and production increased markedly. In this way, western Anatolia transformed into a prominent region in terms of its fiscal potential and agricultural production, made viable largely due to the waves of immigrants flooding into the region during the büyük kaçgun (great flight) that defines dislocation of population due to the Celali depredation in Anatolia in the period rougly between 1590 and

1610. These regional developments, mainly based on ecological and imperial circumstances, produced a rising agricultural surplus that allowed the port of Izmir to meet the demand of foreign merchants.

The developments that took place in Ottoman Anatolia in the period between the early sixteenth century to the mid-seventeenth century point to an obvious back-and-forth, uneven development among regions under a certain political entity. The determinants of such uneven economic development and growth across regions have traditionally been a controversial issue among social scientists. Two main explanations have been conventionally propounded by scholars: institutions versus geography. The institutional approach,28 which focuses on cross- country, uneven developments over the long-term, does not provide us with a useful analytical framework for understanding the kind of regional fluctuations observed in the period between the early sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth centuries. This is because the central Ottoman authority did not pursue a regional policy nor adopt local institutions in these areas. These regions were governed under a common institutional structure but at the same time, oscillated in opposite courses backwards and forwards. Thus, we are led to consider the alternative explanatory approach, that is, geography.29

However, in contrast to the popular understanding of geographical determinism, I do not regard geographical characteristics as stable structures in order to underline the regional distinctions among various areas, but rather I define them as dynamic elements of socio- economic conjunctures. Analytically, I argue that geographical structures are unsteady to a certain degree and agrarian populations act quite responsively in the face of such irregularities by readjusting their routines such as crop rotation or settlement patterns, constantly keeping in tune with environmental variability. Hence, the socio-economic status of various regions that together

28 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution,” The Quaterly Journal of Economics 117, no. 4 (2002): 1231–94. 29 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: the Fates of Human Societies (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999). 24 make up a particular political entity may follow diverse trajectories over the same period. This approach promises a two-pronged analysis: comparison of the socio-economic trajectories of certain regions and the interpretation of this comparison in the light of studies on climate history.

In my analysis, I follow a chronological order, limiting my analysis in this chapter to the first phase of changes in regional fiscal populations and ecological circumstances up to the

1580s. By organizing the discussion this way, I aim to reveal the contemporary social and ecological conditions present at the start of western Anatolia’s rise. The analysis of the following period, from the 1580s to the mid-seventeenth century, is the focus of the next chapter, and serves to clearly illustrate the contrast between these periods.

In order to elaborate upon these arguments, I begin by introducing and mapping out an extensive data set compiled from contemporary tax (tahrir) registers, focusing on the regional demographic variations observed in sixteenth-century Ottoman Anatolia. As we shall see, there was an intersection between the regions that showed a high level of demographic growth during this period and the semi-arid areas of Anatolia. Next, I examine recent dendrochronological studies for evidence of the era’s climatic developments and by the same token, the relationship between demographic growth and climatic change will be interpreted. Finally, I use several case studies to consider the response of the peasantry towards these new climatic conditions.

1.1. Demographic Change in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia and Regional Climatic

Discrepancy

In the case of sixteenth-century Anatolia, tax registers are the essential sources for analyzing the socio-economic transformation of the provinces. In order to capture the variations in regional fiscal populations, I examine tahrir registers which have been previously studied by several

Ottoman historians. Such use of tahrir registers in statistical demographic studies undoubtedly has certain limitations, as various scholars have shown. 30 For example, as fiscally-oriented registers, they exclude several tax-exempt groups or villages. Secondly, the most accurate method of multiplying the recorded number of households in order to reach a figure for the total population remains a controversial issue among historians. Finally, regional survey methods in the Balkans, Anatolia and Arab lands and frontiers may have differed, making any comparisons debatable.

However, I consider these legitimate criticisms to be less applicable to the case at hand.

Firstly, it should be highlighted that the demographical statistics I employ in this chapter refer only to “fiscal population”. I do not attempt to uncover the actual population figures, but rather endeavour to discern general trends of fiscal population growth and decline observed throughout the century. My approach, therefore, is diachronic and vertical rather than synchronic and horizontal, establishing time series rather than the validity of historical data against historical reality. Thus, my priority is to maintain consistency throughout the surveys analysed.

These tahrir registers contain two main categories that are useful for demographic studies: the enumeration of heads of households (hane), and of single landless adult males

30 Bekir Kemal Ataman, “Ottoman demographic history (14th–17th centuries): Some considerations,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 35, no. 2 (1992): 187–98. Suraiya Faroqhi, Approaching Ottoman history: An introduction to the sources (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 86–95. Heath Lowry, “The Ottoman Tahrir Defterleri as a Source for Social and Economic History: Pitfalls and Limitations,” in Studies in Defterology: Ottoman Society in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries (Istanbul: İsis Press, 1992), 3–18. 26

(mücerred). Historians are largely in agreement about the “household” as a category recorded in these registers. However, the second term “mücerred” is more controversial. The tax registers, conducted at regular intervals, show significant variance in the number of mücerred listed for certain regions. In his 1972 work, Michael Cook assumes that the reason for such discrepancies is the fact that surveyors recorded unmarried adult individuals more accurately in later surveys than in earlier ones. He also suggests that immature male children were only registered as mücerred in later surveys, resulting in an increase in the mücerred figures.31 Leila Erder and

Suraiya Faroqhi agree with Cook’s second explanation, but they also argue that certain sections of non-taxpayers from the military class may have been registered as mücerred.32 In contrast,

Oktay Özel rejects all of these explanations in the absence of documented proof. Özel stresses the importance of provincial legal codes for understanding these terms, and states that there is no available evidence contradicting these codes with which we can reach an alternative explanation.33 Considering all of these conflicting hypotheses, I prefer here to consider only the number of households—that is, the main tax-payers—and exclude the mücerreds from my analysis in order to avoid a potential statistical bias due to this highly contested category. The drawback of such a choice is the omission of this category for the assessment of macro- demography, but this does not mean that one should underestimate the importance of the mücerreds in the context of social dislocation or even military transformation. However, ultimately my aim is not to arrive at a population estimate, rather I have drawn the change in the fiscal population as percentile ratios in comparative tables and maps below.

31 Michael Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia 1450–1600 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972) p 27. 32 Leila Erder and Suraiya Faroqhi, “Population Rise and Fall in Anatolia 1550–1620,” Middle Eastern Studies 15, no. 3 (1979): 322–45, p. 336. 33 Oktay Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia, 114–15. In particular, see the footnote 50. 27

Studies on the demographic structure of the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire date back to the mid-twentieth century. In his monumental work, The Mediterranean and the

Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Fernand Braudel estimated that the total population of the entire Mediterranean region doubled between the years 1500 and 1600.34 His work was welcomed with great interest by Ottoman historians, and a leading Ottoman historian and colleague of Braudel, Ömer Lütfü Barkan, began to examine the Ottoman archives as early as the

1950s to test Braudel’s predictions.35 As the first scholar of the Ottoman Empire’s demographic history to analyze this issue using the tax surveys, Barkan published his initial findings in 1953 and put forward a hypothesis of substantial demographic growth throughout Ottoman lands in the sixteenth century.36 In the years following Barkan’s work, Micheal Cook, R.C. Jennings,

Leila Erder and Suraiya Faroqhi published their own studies, which confirmed similar increasing demographic trends in several Ottoman towns over the same period.37 In the course of the 1980s and 1990s, many Ottoman historians continued to conduct research into the Ottoman fiscal registers of various regions, and these monographs enabled the mapping of the fiscal population structure of the Empire for the entire century.38 Thanks to these scholars, we now have a clear sense of the general status of fiscal population for sixteenth-century Anatolia.

34 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 1:394–410. 35 The review of the Braudel’s book by Barkan also contributed to the recognition of this work among Ottoman historians; İÜ İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 12, no. 3-4 (1951): 174–92; Türkiyat Mecmuası 10 (1953): 395–403. 36 Ömer Lütfü Barkan, “Tarihi demografi çalışmaları ve Osmanlı tarihi,” Türkiyat Mecmuası 10 (1953): 1–26. This article was also translated and published in M.A. Cook, ed., Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1970). 37 Cook, Population pressure in Rural Anatolia. Jennings, R.C. “Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon and Erzurum,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 7, no. 1 (1976): 21–57. Leila Erder, “The measurement of preindustrial population changes: The Ottoman empire from the 15th to the 17th century,” Middle Eastern Studies 11, no. 3 (1975): 284–301. Suraiya Faroqhi, “Taxation and Urban Activities in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 1, no. 1 (1979-80): 19–53. 38 Several prominent works based on tahrir registers include Feridun Emecen, XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989), Mehmet Öz, XV-XVI. Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), Huricihan İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: Agrarian Power Relations and Regional 28

However, neither demographers nor historians have noticed the discrepancies between regional demographic fluctuations.39 And while Braudel was, to a certain extent, most likely correct in claiming that there was a general demographic growth for most of the regions in

Anatolia, he overlooked regional discrepancies, as I will demonstrate in my dataset. The level of increase displays significant variations among Anatolian regions. While the Mediterranean areas indicate limited change in regional fiscal populations, the interior and northern regions of

Anatolia experienced a demographic explosion. The map below (Map 1.1) depicts demographic changes in urban centres based on the fiscal registers surveyed for the 1520s–30s and 1570s–80s.

Map 1.6: Urban Demographic Change in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia between 1520s/30s and 1570s/80s Based on the Tahrir Registers.40

Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994). A list of relevant titles can be found in the notes to the appendix. 39 R. Jennings was the only historian who pointed out the varying rate of growth for the cities under different political, economic and geographic circumstances, but he did not have a large-scale sample to reach a more general conclusion in terms of regional demographic/fiscal variation at that time. 40 For further details, consult the figures tabulated for each centre in the appendix. All the figures are compiled from the extant secondary sources. The dates of the surveys, sources, and the figures can be found in the appendix I, p 195. An online version of the map is also available via the following link; https://mehmetkuru.carto.com/viz/5082ce32- fabd-11e5-8a61-0e3ff518bd15/public_map

As shown on the map, the towns located in the Mediterranean regions of Anatolia followed a different trajectory compared to the significant increase in fiscal population apparent in inner Anatolian towns. It is notable that the percentage of population growth does not exceed

25% in any of the towns under the influence of the Mediterranean climate. In fact, in many urban centres located in Mediterranean regions such as Akhisar, Çeşme, Menemen, Aydın, Antalya or

Adana, the population was almost stagnant or displayed only a limited increase or, in some cases, even a decline. Moreover, the important commercial centres in Syria along the Mediterranean,

Tripoli and Aleppo, lost a substantial part of their inhabitants during this period.

While regions in proximity to the Mediterranean did not display a remarkable demographic development, inner and northern areas reveal an extraordinary growth over the course of approximately five decades. The demographic growth of these regions was even higher than Braudel’s estimation, and most of them showed more than a 50% increase over half a century. In certain regions, this growth rate constituted an almost 200% increase, especially in inner Anatolian towns. Thus, the demographic weight of the interior regions increased proportionally in relation to Mediterranean areas. This deviation was even more striking in terms of the rural population of Anatolia for the same period. I should note that there are still significant gaps on the map, particularly on northwestern Anatolia. Even though I gather extant literature on tahrir registers, a complete demographic map of the sixteenth-century Anatolia is not possible at this point in the the absence of studies on several districts.

Map 1.7: Rural Demographic Change in the Sixteenth-Century Anatolia Between 1520s/30s and 1570s/80s Based on the Tahrir Registers.41

In the coastal regions, while several districts were losing a certain amount of their rural taxpayers, others showed only a slight demographic rise, as depicted in Map 1.2. In contrast, the zones of inner and southwestern Anatolian followed a very different trajectory: in these regions, the level of increase in the population of taxpayers soared as high as 300%. Therefore, it is unrealistic to claim that there was a homogeneous demographic increase for Ottoman Anatolia as a whole.

This regional variation also points to a climatic differentiation between the coastal areas and inner regions. While the western and southern coasts of Anatolia are under the influence of

Mediterranean climatic conditions, the interior is characterized mostly by a continental climate.

41 For further details, consult the figures tabulated for each centre in the appendix. All the figures are compiled from the extant secondary sources. The dates of the surveys, sources, and the figures can be found in the appendix II, p 198. An online version of the map is also available via the following link, see: https://mehmetkuru.carto.com/viz/ef84ccb2-fb42-11e5-9a8c-0e98b61680bf/public_map 31

As the map below indicates, the precipitation regimes and the aridity index for the Mediterranean and interior regions of Anatolia are completely different.

Map 1.8: Geographical Distribution of Average Areal Annual Precipitation (1981-2010).42 In the map above, (Map 1.3), the geographical distribution of the annual precipitation index is depicted for three decades from 1981 to 2010. However, it should be mentioned that the average precipitation index of late twentieth-century Anatolia also intersects the average of the entire millennium.43 In the sense of geographical distribution of precipitation, the map is also consistent with the long-term averages of the regional distribution as well.44 Therefore, the evidence shows that the regions which observed extraordinary demographic growth in the sixteenth century are, the driest areas of Anatolia. Aksaray, Konya, Niğde, Karaman, and Urfa were regions that displayed the

42 Map taken from Yusuf Ulupınar et al., “2015 Yılı Alansal Yağış Değerlendirmesi” (Ankara: Meteoroloji Genel Müdürlüğü, 2016), 3, chart 3. http://www.mgm.gov.tr/FILES/arastirma/yagis-degerlendirme/2015alansal.pdf. For a detailed analysis of regional variation of climatic indices in Turkey, see: A. Deniz, H. Toros, and S. Incecik, “Spatial variations of climate indices in Turkey,” International Journal of Climatology 31, no. 3 (2011): 394–403. 43 For the relevant figure and the discussion, see Figure 1.1. 44 For long-term dendroclimatological analyses of Anatolia, see: N. Dalfes, Ü. Akkemik, N. Köse, M. Karaca, E. Kahya and Y. Ezber, Anadolu’nun İklim Tarihinin Son 500 Yılı: Dendroklimatoloji Yöntemleriyle Rökonstrüksiyonlar ve Uzay-Zaman Analizleri, TÜBİTAK, YDABAG 102Y063 nolu proje. 2006. For a summary of this project; Nesibe Köse, “Batı Anadolu’da İklim Değişikliği ve Yıllık Halka Gelişimi” (PhD diss., İstanbul University, 2007) 31-32. 32 most aggressive demographic growth in this century, whereas Izmir, Aydın, Muğla, Antalya and

Adana were relatively stable areas the populations of which fluctuated in a narrow band. Map

1.4, below, displays the different ecologically homogeneous areas of Anatolia, as determined using drought index and elevation data, and it provides a more pointed perspective on regional difference that cuts across similarities in vegetation and shared agricultural production patterns.

Map 1.9: Map of Ecologically Homogenous Areas of Anatolia. 45

As these maps indicate, there is a discernible intersection between semi-arid regions, and those areas that observed significant demographic growth in sixteenth-century Anatolia, whereas those regions with higher precipitation averages were relatively stable in regards to the fiscal population for the same period. How can this variation among Anatolian regions be interpreted?

45 Hakan Yıldız, Arife Avağ et al., “Rakım ve Kuraklık İndisi değerlerine Göre Türkiye’nin Homojen Alanlarının Belirlenmesi,” Tarla Bitkileri Merkez Araştırma Enstitüsü Dergisi 18, no. 1-2, (2009): 20. On the map, lands are shaded by 37 different colours that correspond to distinct ecologic zones. The most arid region is depicted in southeast Anatolia around the borderland of Syria and the wettest area is noted in northeastern regions, around Artvin. Other colours labelled in the legend display the various zones in between. On the other hand, it should be noted that the available ground and surface water resources are influential on agricultural crop for specific regions through the irrigation systems and accessible water resources. This map is simply based on drought index (total evapo-transpiration and precipitation regimes), and the impact of elevation. 33

This discrepancy is especially puzzling, given that during this period, mainly under the reign of

Suleyman I, there was no recorded major economic disparity between these regions. In this case, why did the semi-arid regions follow a more vigourous course of demographic development compared to those provinces under a Mediterranean climate? The high rate of increase of the fiscal population, which doubled or even tripled for certain regions, could not have been based only on natural demographic growth. Tax surveys also reveal that several semi-nomadic pastoral groups became sedentary in these regions during the period in question. For instance, in most villages of the three Middle Anatolian provinces of Bozok (Yozgat), Niğde and Kırşehir, growth was based largely on the settlement of pastoral tribes during in this period.46

So the question arises as to which dynamics were responsible for the demographic growth of settled taxpayers. What made these semi-arid regions preferable for the settlement of pastoral communities? Research conducted on different regions in Europe has argued for a direct relationship between climate change and fiscal population.47 The impact of climatic fluctuations on agriculture is a determinant of demographic and even settlement patterns in pre-industrial societies.48 Martin L. Parry’s seminal monograph convincingly demonstrates how long-term climatic change can enable the expansion of new agricultural fields into agriculturally “sensitive” lands. 49 Inspired by Parry’s approach, the following section analyzes carefully the climatic

46 Rafet Metin, “XVI. Yüzyılda Orta Anadolu’da Nüfus ve Yerleşme” (PhD diss., Gazi University, 2007), 37–58. The rate of growth in the number of settlements was enormous in these provinces. The number of villages seen on the 1530 survey was only five in Bozok, but had reached 629 in the 1574 survey. Similarly, Kırşehir had 10 villages in 1530, but this number was 752 in the following survey conducted in 1584. The number of villages increased from 275 to 455 in Niğde between 1518 and 1584. 47 Axel Michaelowa, “The Impact of Short-Term Climate Change On British and French Agriculture and Population in the First Half the Eighteenth Century,” in History and Climate; Memories of The Future, ed. P.D. Jones, A.E.J. Ogilvie, T.D. Davies and K. R. Briffa, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001) 201–17; R. Lee, “Short-Term Variation – Vital Rates, Prices and Weather,” in The Population History of England, ed. by E. Wrigley and R. Schofield (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), 356–401. 48 For a review on relationships between climatic fluctuation on European agriculture, see: Austin Bourke, “The Impact of Climatic Fluctuations on Agriculture,” in The Climate of Europe: Past, Present, and Future, ed. H. Flohn and R. Fantechi (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1984), 269–314. 49 Martin L. Parry, Climatic Change, Agriculture, and Settlement (Folkestone: Archon Books, 1978). 34 history of sixteenth-century Anatolia in order to understand possible triggers behind its demographic variations.

1.2. A “Magnificent” Climate: Age of Rainfall

The notions of climate change and the Little Ice Age have recently become an integral part of early modern historiography. They have proven particularly powerful analytically in the theorization of social movements and economic disturbances observed at the turn of the seventeenth century. This welcome addition, however, is not without its difficulties. Firstly, the restricted timeline of the research within the relevant period and the assumption that the pre- existing climatic condition constitute a stable ground zero are problematic. Secondly, regional variation is generally discounted for the sake of producing a global history.50 However, several recent publications based on tree-ring analyses have highlighted remarkable regional differences in climate conditions.51 Thankfully, recent scholarship on precipitation and temperature trends in

Anatolia presents more nuanced results, allowing us to reconstruct a more accurate climatic history for the region.52

Several studies reconstruct the precipitation index and temperature dynamics over extended periods of time in Anatolia and the Near East providing historians with valuable sets of

50 For a recent critique against the comprehensive generalization of ecologic transformation, see Astrid Meier and Tariq Tell, “The World the Bedouin Lived in: Climate, Migration and Politics in the Early Modern Arab East,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 58, no. 1-2 (2015): 21–55. 51 A. Nicault et al., “Mediterranean drought fluctuation during the last 500 years based on tree-ring data,” Climate Dynamics 31, no. 2-3 (2008): 227–45, Jürg Luterbacher et al., “Mediterranean Climate Variability Over the Last Centuries: A Review,” in Mediterranean Climate Variability, ed. P. Lionello, P. Malanotte-Rizzoli, and R. Boscolo (Amsterdam; Oxford: Elsevier, 2006), 27–148. 52 For a brief review on research of dendroclimatology in the eastern Mediterranean, see Ramzi Touchan et al., “Dendroclimatology in the Eastern Mediterranean,” Radiocarbon 56, no. 4 (2014): 61–68. Several significant studies on tree-ring dendrochronology in Turkey are available, such as: Ramzi Touchan et al., “Reconstruction of Spring-Summer Precipitation for the Eastern Mediterranean from three rings width and its connection to large scale atmospheric circulation,” Climate Dynamics 25, no. 1 (2005): 75–98; Eidem, “May-June Precipitation Reconstruction of Southwestern Anatolia, Turkey, during the last 900 years from tree rings,” Quaternary Research 68, no. 2 (2007) 196–202; Ingo Heinrich, “Winter-to-Spring temperature dynamics in Turkey derived from tree rings since AD 1125,” Climate Dynamics 41, no. 7 (2013) 1685–1701; Nesibe Köse et al., “Tree-ring reconstructions of May-June precipitation for Western Anatolia,” Quaternary Research 75, no. 3 (2011) 438–450; Nesibe Köse, “Batı Anadolu’da İklim Değişikliği ve Yıllık Halka Gelişimi” (PhD diss., İstanbul University, 2007). 35 data. In one of these reconstructions, seen in Figure 1.1, Touchan and his colleagues developed a

900-year-long precipitation index for southwestern Anatolia, which roughly covers the Konya,

Hamit and Teke regions. A 70-year moving average is also included in order to demonstrate a periodical comparison.

Figure 1.9: “(A) Seventy-year Running Mean of Reconstructed May–June Precipitation for the Period AD 1097– 2000. (B) Seventy-year Running Standard Deviation for the Reconstruction.”53

According to the findings, the 70-year period in the May-June reconstruction with the highest recorded precipitation occurring between 1518 and 1587. The periods of 1098–1168 and

1743–1812 are marked as the second and third wettest periods in the second millennium, respectively. In comparison, the periods of 1195–1264, 1434–1503, and 1591–1660 were the driest periods. This set of precipitation data depicts an interesting climatic landscape for early modern Anatolia. The reign of Suleyman the “Magnificent” also had a “magnificent” climate, with regards to its precipitation regime. In the course of the sixteenth century, Anatolia experienced its wettest 70-year period of the second millennium, sandwiched between two of the

53 Touchan et al., “May-June Precipitation,” 200. 36 three driest. Consequently, a salient shift took place in the sixteenth century in terms of climatic conditions, with consideration to the previous and following periods.

While this specific study focuses on May-June precipitation and covers only a limited area, other research and proxy data support the findings of this investigation for other seasons and for a larger region. 54 This extraordinary wet season can be defined not only by the dendrochronological findings but also by the sedimentary records of lakes in Anatolia. For instance, a high-water-lake interval with a low benthic diatom content found in Lake Çubuk confirms the high level of precipitation for the period of the sixteenth century in Anatolia.55

According to the dendrochronological proxy data, the wettest year recorded in the last

900 years was 1565, and four very humid years in a row occurred during the years 1532-1535.56

High precipitation was not the only characteristic of this period; there was also a high variability in extremely wet and dry events, whereas the lowest standard deviations were associated with the driest periods. 57 This high standard deviation in the precipitation indices indicates a high variability in consecutive years. This signifies a danger for fields located along river basins, due to the risk of flooding, and thus could negatively impact annual crop yields. It is also possible that the high level of fluctuation of the annual crop could be caused by this climatic variability.

Another significant determinant of climatic conditions, and one of the key variables for agriculture, is temperature patterns. Considering the contemporary temperature dynamics, the

54 Another work of research, based on 36 time series from 42 sites, was developed from Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Greece, presents a more comprehensive perspective for the contemporary climatic conditions of the region and reproduces similar findings, cf. Touchan et al., “Reconstruction of Spring/Summer Precipitation for the Eastern Mediterranean,” 84–7. 55 As a technical term, “benthic diatom” refers to the unicellular, marine or freshwater algae found at the lowest level of a body of water such as ocean or a lake. In the studies on climate history, this kind of algae is examined in order to trace climatic fluctuations. For the research on Çubuk Lake, see: Faruk Ocakoğlu et al., “A 2800-year multi- proxy sedimentary record of climate change from Lake Cubuk (Goynuk, Bolu, NW Anatolia),” The Holocene 26, no. 2 (2016): 205–221. The same article also mentioned that lake margin trench stratigraphy (lake margin sands over alluvial gravels) supports independently higher lake level for this period as well. 56 Touchan et al., “Reconstruction of Spring-Summer Precipitation,” 88. 57 Touchan et al., ibid., 89; Touchan et al., “May-June Precipitation Reconstruction,” 199. 37 climate reconstructions of Anatolia and the northern hemisphere shared a common long-term pattern. However, while the average temperature for the northern hemisphere had already begun to follow a decreasing trend about a hundred years earlier, in Anatolia, the decreasing trend of temperature after the warm medieval period began only in the early sixteenth century. Thus, the average temperature of Anatolia was higher than the average of the entire northern hemisphere for the sixteenth century and it did not reach a similar cold threshold up until the mid- seventeenth century. Moreover, by about the middle of the sixteenth century, the temperature of

Anatolia was the same as the mean of the second millennium temperature scores.

Figure 1.10: Comparison of Anatolian January-to-May Temperature Reconstruction and Two Hemispherical Temperature Reconstructions, 61-year Moving Average. The Black Line refers to the Temperature Reconstruction of Anatolia, Green and Brown Lines Depict the Two Distinct Research Studies on the Northern Hemispherical Construction.58 This exceptional precipitation level and moderate temperature scores most likely had an unexpectedly positive impact on the semi-arid regions of Anatolia in the sixteenth century. Those semi-arid regions—depicted as red fields in Map 1.4—, transformed into well-watered lands.

58 The figure is taken from Heinrich et al., “Winter-to-spring temperature Dynamics in Turkey,” 1694. For another study referring to hemispherical temperatures, see: Michael E. Mann, et al., “Proxy-based reconstruction of hemispheric and global surface temperature variations over the past two millennia,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 105, no. 36 (2008): 13252–7. Andreas Moberg, et. al., “Highly variable Northern Hemisphere temperatures reconstructed from low- and high-resolution proxy data,” Nature 433, no. 7026 (2005): 613–7. 38

Due to this significant climatic shift, these interior zones containing vast plains became the grain stores of the Ottoman Empire.59 In these inner lands, crop diversity was relatively limited and the main agricultural product was grain. Hence, with the explosion of settlements of taxpayers in inner and southeastern Anatolia, came the advancement of grain crops.

The impact of this ecologic and agricultural transformation on contemporary Ottoman military organization is well beyond the scope of my research. However, it should be noted that the expansion of grain fields undoubtedly enabled the feeding of a larger army, either as an element of the tımar system or as supplier food staple for military expeditions.60 Secondly, it should also be mentioned that the sustainability of agricultural production and the abundance of food underpinned by the high level of precipitation probably worked to mollify any social discord in the Anatolia region. There are records of local uprisings and clashes connected to rivalries for the throne recorded during the reign of Suleyman I, thus indicating that the Empire during his reign was not as politically stable as it is generally supposed. However, these incidents did not have a long-lasting impact nor gain momentum in Anatolia. 61 In contrast, during the following period of the driest decades of the turn of the seventeenth century uprisings and political unrest such as that of the Celali revolts had destructive and long-lasting impact.

Such extraordinary climatic conditions influenced the crop cycle as well. Peasants were quite responsive towards this climatic change, and they adapted their crop cycle according to the

59 These semi-arid regions are also in the lowest slope class of Anatolia, which mean that these are the most suitable areas for agriculture, at least as far as slope is concerned. In the Konya region, 40 % of the lands are classified as being under a 2% slope. Similarly, 26% of the lands is under a 2% slope in the mid-Euphrates region, which includes Urfa and Adıyaman. These are the largest plains of Anatolia that are suitable for agricultural production. It should be noted that the average slope of land in Turkey is about 17%. Mesut Elibüyük and Erkan Yılmaz, “Türkiye’nin Coğrafi Bölge ve Bölümlerine göre Yükselti Basamakları ve Eğim Grupları,” Coğrafi Bilimler Dergisi 8, no. 1 (2010): 27–55. 60 Lütfi Güçer, XVI –XVII. Asırlarda Osmanlıda Hububat Meselesi. The grain supply for the imperial army is discussed in following chapter using the statistics provided by Güçer, and it is noticeable that inner Anatolia was the premier grain supplier of the army in the sixteenth century, in contrast to the following century. 61For the contemporary conflicts taking part in Anatolia, see: Şerafettin Turan, Kanuni Süleyman Dönemi Taht Kavgaları (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınları, 1961); Mustafa Akdağ, Türk Halkının Dirlik ve Düzenlik Kavgası (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınları, 1975). 39 new conditions. Thus, they did not limit themselves to the production of established crops, but instead began to cultivate alternative crops to replace the former ones. The section discusses this agricultural transformation in detail through several case studies.

1.3. Climatic Impact on Agricultural Production in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman

Anatolia

The impact of these extraordinary climatic conditions can also be traced through contemporary tax registers. Tahrir surveys conducted in the sixteenth century do not only include the names of tax-payers and the size of their lands, but also the type and proportionate amount of taxes levied on their agricultural produce. The tax on agricultural production was determined in accordance with the average production of the previous three years. This practice of taking the average over time aimed to minimize discrepancies caused by the annual variability of production. Therefore, these figures cannot be accepted as representing the precise production level for a specific year, and do not capture short-term fluctuations. Nevertheless, substantial deviations can be conceived of as signs of some unusual climatic changes.62 In essence, while we do not have the annual agricultural production of the survey year—rather, an average noted was the result of negotiations between the tax surveyor and the taxpayer—, this practice may provide us with more reliable figures, especially when we consider the high variability of precipitation regimes for the period. Apart from these agricultural tax registers, incomes from the mukataas63 also provide some clues as to the epochal changes taking place in these regions.

62 Mehmet Öz, “Tahrir Defterlerindeki Sayısal Veriler,” in Osmanlılarda Bilgi ve İstatistik, ed. H. İnalcık and Ş. Pamuk (Ankara: DİE Yayınları, 2000), 17–32. 63A mukataa refers to a source of revenue estimated and entered into the registers of the finance department, each as a separate unit. See: Halil Inalcık and Donald Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, volume:1 1300-1600, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p 55. Linda Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire 1560-1660, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996) 123-24. Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1983), 2:578; Mehmet Genç, “Mukātaa,” TDV – İslâm Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2006), 31:129–32. 40

In order to provide a broad perspective on the complex relationship between climate, agriculture, and settlement in pre-modern societies, it is helpful to offer an overview of the agricultural landscape of sixteenth-century Anatolia on the micro-level. Such a synthesis of extant studies on various regions would usefully place particular emphasis on geographical conditions and particular local ecologies. Here, I highlight a few of the most prominent figures from the various regions of Anatolia in order to illustrate the drastic effects of climate change on production Anatolia-wide, as well as the reaction of farmers to the new climatic circumstances.

As will be discussed through several examples, the population patterns and production regimes followed inverse paths. It is assumed that in the case of overpopulation in the early modern world, we would see a corresponding increase in the proportion of grain being produced relative to total agricultural production. The assumption is that people would choose to produce essential nutrients in the form of grain rather than pomiculture, viticulture or cotton production.

However, the proportions of these latter products actually increased in the regions that observed the highest population growth rate during this period. Therefore, it would be difficult to claim that there was insufficient grain production to feed the people in these regions. Agricultural production such as cotton farming or viticulture, which expanded in field area, was furthermore not part of an established crop rotation practice in the overpopulated inner lands. In contrast to the above developments, we observe a loss of capacity in terms of viticulture or cotton production for the Mediterranean regions, which was the original main producing region for these products. Thus, we can see that the agricultural patterns varied from region to region and over time, in accordance with the climatic and geographic conditions of the area.

Before looking at the agricultural production case studies, in order to illustrate the drastic impact of temporal climatic shift on production, I begin by examining the devastating impact of

41 high level of precipitation, especially rainfall observed out of season, on regional salt production.

Salt production can be seen as a good historical measure of the impact of climatic shift because this industry as practised in Ottoman Anatolia, whether via salt lakes or from the Mediterranean coasts, was mainly dependant upon high levels of evaporation due to the region’s dry summers and reduced precipitation.

Two of the most significant saltworks were located in Menemen, north of Izmir at the intersection between the Gediz River and the Gulf of Izmir and in Koçhisar, alongside the Salt

Lake, Tuz Gölü, in inner Anatolia.64 Due to its relatively low cost, the technique of producing salt from sea water remained unchanged for centuries. Essentially, it involves transferring sea water to salt pans around river basins in the middle of the Anatolian winter, and waiting for the water to evaporate during the dry summer months. The deposited salt was then collected and stored by workers during the first half of September. Even today, the level of production using this method varies depending on the summer weather and early autumnal rains. A high level of unseasonal rainfall tends to lower amount of salt production.65

In the sixteenth century, the saltworks of Menemen were rented out as a mukataa, the market value of which was determined by considering the average annual income of that asset.

The revenue from this saltworks was recorded as 433,334 akçe in the 1531 survey, but dropped to 355,000 akçe in 1575.66 The nominal loss of revenue was about 17%, but when we include the effect of inflation, it represents a decline of over 25% in real value. The case of the Koçhisar saltworks is even more telling. The income from this saltworks established on the banks of the

Salt Lake was 300,000 akçe in the 1522 survey, but had fallen to almost half (as low as 170,000 akçe) in the 1582 survey. The period between these two surveys coincides with the beginning

64 These saltworks meet two thirds of Anatolia’s salt demand even in modern-day Turkey. 65 Mehmet Tıraş, “Çamaltı Tuzlası,” Eastern Geographical Review 12, no. 18 (2007), 291–300. 66 Cevat Bakkal, “Menemen Kazası XV.–XVIII. Yüzyıllar” (PhD. diss., Ege University, 1995), 264. 42 and end of the wettest period of Anatolian climate, and as a result of this shift, salt production decreased by more than half relative to the old production levels, even after accounting for inflation. Furthermore, while the revenue from this saltworks constituted over 19% of the entire tax collected in the Aksaray district for the earlier period, this portion fell to 9% by 1582.67

The variations in agricultural production between surveys also reveal how farmers adopted their crop systems to new climatic conditions. Firstly, however, it should be noted that the overwhelming majority of agricultural production was based on grains, especially wheat and barley, for every region and without exception. The rate of grain production as a percentage of all crops grown could reach a total of over 80% or even 90% for some regions. On the other hand, the preference of farmers for other types of crops reflects the influence of the climatic shift observed in the sixteenth century. The proportional flux, that is, the extraordinary increase/decrease of certain crops or withdrawal of local crops from the relevant regions, indicates the extent of this temporal climatic shift. Hence, the statistical fluctuations discussed below refer to relative turbulence, rather than to a reversal of the agricultural system for all of

Anatolia. A number of cases from various Anatolian regions underscore the agricultural evolution observed in the sixteenth century.

In understanding the impact of climatic shifts on agricultural crops, the Canik region, and the northern coasts of Anatolia, including Samsun, Ünye and Bafra, offer instructive cases to trace climatic effects on crops:

67 Doğan Yörük, XVI. Yüzyılda Aksaray Sancağı (1500-1584) (Konya: Tablet Kitabevi, 2005), 185. 43

Figure 1.11: The Distribution of Crops Harvested in the Canik Province Based on the Tahrir Surveysof 1485 and 1576.68

Comparing the proportions of crops, a substantial change in production is not observed for wheat, barley, linen and hemp, or fruits. Only the local product, rice, fell dramatically, with cultivation rates of about 15% in the late fifteenth century but only 4% a century later.69 For a time, crop preferences changed. In order to reveal the reasons behind this shift, the conditions of rice cultivation should be reviewed.

Rice is cultivated in areas around river basins with easy access to water, allowing the crop to grow in submerged fields. At the end of the summer, the water is drained and the rice is dried under the sun to minimize its water content before storage. Extreme climatic variation, especially during the late summer and early autumnal rains, negatively affects the production of rice. Considering the precipitation regime of the time, a high rate of unseasonal precipitation was most likely the reason for this regression in rice cultivation. The old rice fields were instead used for the cultivation of a new crop, millet. Millet cultivation was at a negligible level in 1485, but it

68 Öz, XV. Ve XVI. Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı, 93. 69 The the abandonment of rice cultivation was temporary, and that today the region is once again one of the centres of rice cultivation in Anatolia. İsmail Sezer and Zeki Mut, “Samsun İlinde Çeltik Tarımının Durumu ve Üretimi Artırmak için Öneriler”, Gaziosmanpaşa Üniversitesi Ziraat Fakültesi Dergisi, 21(1), (2004), 58. 44 amounted to 6% of total crop production in 1576. This plant can be cultivated in many different zones thanks to its adaptability. Millet can also withstand heavy rainfall and drought, a characteristic which might have made it favourable during the “age of rainfall,” characterized by extreme variations of weather conditions. 70 It served not only for human consumption, but formed part of livestock diet as well.

The importance of legumes in terms of crop productivity should also be underlined, as plants such as broad beans and lentils were essential cover crops, preventing soil erosion and increasing fertility.71 Furthermore, cover crops would transport away excessive moisture from soil and dry out these lands. While legumes were not seen in this region before the sixteenth century, with a few exceptions, they became a part of the agricultural system for every corner of the region by the last quarter of the sixteenth century. The introduction of legumes to the

Ottoman crop system was not limited to northern Anatolia; they were planted on a wide scale in the other provinces of Anatolia as well. Given the above-noted high standard deviation of precipitation in the wettest period of the millennium, this new practice was likely devised as a measure against possible erosion and in order to continue the fertilization of the fields.

If we turn from northern regions to the western parts of Anatolia, similar irregularities are also evident in terms of the change in established agricultural production. Manisa, as the largest inland district on the west Anatolian coast, abutted the district of Izmir to the northeast along the

Gediz River. Its agricultural data provides some significant evidence for a climatic shift. Table

70 M.V.K. Sivakumar, A.K.S. Huda, and S.M. Virmani, “Physical Environment of Sorghum and Millet-growing Areas in South Asia” in Agrometeorology of Sorghum and Millet In the Semi-Arid Tropics, Proceedings of the International Symposium, (ICRISAT Center Patancheru, India, 1982). p 63-83. In this research, it is mentioned that the mean annual rainfall varies from 550 to 1700 mm and the coefficient of variation is 32% for annual rainfall in the 169 sample locations of millet-growing lands from India. In another reference, the mean annual rainfall is 2185 mm and the coefficient of variation in annual rainfall is 66% for the 177 sample locations in Burma. These figures depict the adaptation ability of millet into variable climates. 71 İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, 195–200. İslamoğlu pays little attention to the contemporary ecological conditions and focuses instead on the usage of these cover crops as fertilizer. 45

1.1 depicts the percentage change of grains and legumes cultivated in this district for the years

1531 and 1575.

Manisa 1531 1575 Percentage Change Wheat 7,850,400 9,990,600 27% Barley 6,592,600 8,703,600 32% Oat 478,800 711,000 48% Bitter Vetch 544,500 747,000 37% Rye 288 105,000 -excessive increase- Millet 25,200 76,200 202% Chickpea 147,750 250,500 70% Broad Bean 14,250 32,250 126% Lentil 8,250 16,500 100% Table 1.6: The Distribution of Crops Harvested in the District of Manisa according to Tahrir registers of 1531 and 1575. (as kg) 72 Between these years, the rural fiscal population in the district increased by about 40%, and this demographic growth should be taken into consideration when evaluating these figures.

Taking this into account, however, the observed increase in wheat and barley production falls short of the contemporary population growth, even if we assume that these two crops constituted the overwhelming majority of all crops. It is a well-established fact that increased moisture in spring, summer and autumn can disturb the sowing and harvesting of crops, and conversely favours grain pests.73 These contingent climatic conditions might have a negative impact on the productivity of grains. However, millet crops outperformed other crops in western Anatolia during this time, as seen on the northern coasts. Legumes such as broad beans, lentils and chickpeas also followed an upward trend during this wet period. Apart from the expansion of millet and legumes, rye appeared in the crop system as a newly important grain in the province.

72 Feridun Emecen, XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası, 242. 73 Austin Bourke, “The Impact of climatic fluctuations,” 269–314; idem, “Climate and the diseases and pests of agriculture,” in The Climatic Scene, ed. M.J. Tooley and Gillian M. Sheail (London and Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 255–78. 46

Considering the rate of the average annual production of rye, it is clear this grain was not cultivated as a supplementary part of a regular grain crop, but rather as a cover crop.

Rye cereal is the most suitable member of the grain family to be used as a cover crop. It was usually planted right after the main grain harvest, acting as both a winter cereal and serving to reduce soil erosion and nitrogen leaching. Over wetter years, a winter rye cover crop increased the water retention capacity of the soil, which in itself helped to reduce the negative impacts of rainfall variability. Topsoil water content capacity may have increased as much as 10–11% with such a cover crop.74 Another distinct advantage of rye cultivation during this period was its usage as a nurse crop for legumes. Legumes grown with cereal rye are able to protect the soil and suppress weeds better than either grown alone. The combination of legumes and cereal ryes also further improved the nitrogen advantages of the cover crop system. Cereal rye captures more residual nitrogen during the fall and winter seasons, compared to legumes cultivated alone, and enables farmers to reduce their usage of fertilizer.75

If we examine the local production of the regions detailed above, we see that cotton was one of the characteristic agricultural crops of western Anatolia, the production of which did not increase during this period. Along with the fields surrounding Adana, this region was one of the most significant regions for cotton production in Ottoman Anatolia. Cotton production was in decline in the region in the mid-sixteenth century, with production declining by about 8% in spite of a 40% population increase in Manisa between the years of 1531 and 1575.76 However, cotton was an essential crop, as it was the main input material for the Ottoman textile industry.

74 Andrea D. Basche, et al., “Soil water improvements with the long-term use of a winter rye cover crop,” Agricultural Water Management, no. 172 (2016): 40–50. 75 John B. Masiunas, “Rye as a Weed Management Tool in Vegetable Cropping Systems,” in Handbook of Sustainable Weed Management, eds. Harminder P. Singh, Daizy Rani Batish, and Ravinder Kumar Kohli (New York, London, and Oxford: Food Products Press, 2006), 127–58, pp. 150–2. 76 Emecen, XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası, 251. The total production capacity was 320,015 kg in 1531 but it increased to 296,588 kg in 1575. 47

Furthermore, sailcloth and shirts for oarsmen were intensively manufactured in this region. Thus,

cotton cultivation in western Anatolia was vital for the Ottoman imperial navy as well. The

reason for the decline in the production of cotton thus could not have been triggered by a decline

in demand, considering its widespread use. In fact, as a consequence of this decline in

production, the central authorities prohibited the exportation of cotton to ensure a supply of the

valuable material for the navy.77

Adana, a crucial cotton production centre located on the southern coast of Anatolia,

followed a trajectory similar to Manisa’s during this period. As shown in table 1.2 below, cotton

cultivation decreased considerably between the 1520s and the middle of the century; in the

following decades, production resumed an upward trend, but it did not return to the level of the

early sixteenth century. The cotton crop per capita also fell significantly.

Years 1525 1530 1547 1572 Cotton Production (ton) 829 819 664 798 Table 1.7: Cotton Production in Adana according to Sixteenth-Century Tahrir Registers78

The excessive increase in May-June precipitation must have been reflected in cotton

cultivation levels. Cotton seeds are planted during the first half of May, and heavy rainfalls after

planting will spoil the seeds and negatively impact the crop. In modern times, in the case of

heavy rainfall after plantation, producers may clear the field and replant new seeds to prevent

crop failure. However, this was not a feasible solution in the sixteenth century due to the limited

availability of seeds.79

77 Zeki Arıkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İhracı Yasak Mallar (Memnu Mallar),” in Prof. Dr. Bekir Kütükoğlu’na Armağan (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1991), 279-306. 78 Yılmaz Kurt, “XV. Yüzyıl Adana Tarihi” (PhD diss., Hacettepe University, 1992), 120–1. 79 Jack R. Mauney and James McD. Stewart, Cotton Physiology, (Memphis: The Cotton Foundation Reference Book Series, 1986), 477. 48

Vineyards and viticulture are another significant element of agriculture in this region of

Anatolia. The plains of western Anatolia are the most essential areas for viticulture in the province, and the fluctuation of this agricultural product is a significant indicator of climatic impact. Grapes were used to make wine, şıra (unfermented grape juice), molasses, and raisins, and therefore formed a basic ingredient for many highly-popular consumer products in that period. Vineyards are not as dependant upon soil conditions, since grape cultivars are able to adapt to different types of soil quite easily. The plant is also fairly resistant to cold and hot weather; but it is the precipitation regime that determines the fertility of vineyards, and as such, winter rainfalls are vital. Grapevines also have deep roots, and due to this, inadequate water supplies can be compensated for by the humidity of the soil or by groundwater during dry summer months. However, irregular and extreme summer rains do have a negative effect on vineyard productivity. Vineyards require long, dry summers or else grapes can be damaged.

Extreme late spring rains can also cause fungal growth on the vines, spoiling them in the absence of agricultural pesticides.

Secondly, it should be remembered that before refrigeration, grapes were not generally stored or transported as fresh fruit, but were instead dried under the sun in September and consumed as raisins throughout the rest of the year. Consequently, excessive rainfall in

September coinciding with the grape drying process is also undesirable for vineyard cultivation.

Considering the climatic changes and the production rate of vineyards, Manisa showed a substantial decrease in grape production between 1531 and 1575. The tax revenues from grapes was 26,659 akçe in 1531, but dropped to 22,759 akçe in 1575, i.e. a nominal decrease of about

15% for the period. The prices of agricultural goods rose approximately 20% for the same era, so

49 real production decreased by nearly 30% for the gross output of the regional viticulture over the

45-year period, whereas the rural population grew by about 40% in between the two surveys.80

We should now turn towards the interior of Anatolia in order to compare and contrast these regions with the Mediterranean coastal zone. In doing so, we shall see how, despite the stagnation or decline of production in the local products of western Anatolia during this period, production of the same crops spread into the interior. The province of Rum provides us with a solid case study on this issue. This area is not one of the semi-arid regions shaded in red on the ecological map above (Map 1.4.), but was a transitory zone between the interior and coastal regions of mid-northern Anatolia, which during this era saw a high rate of demographic increase as well. In regards to crops, cotton was not one of the more heavily cultivated plants in the province of Rum in the first decades of the sixteenth century. However, by the middle of the century, its cultivation had risen in almost every district; it doubled in Katar and Niksar, tripled in Karakuş and Venk, and in Felis increased over elevenfold between 1520 and 1574.81 The proportion of cotton in the total production also increased in this period. Viticulture in northern

Anatolia followed a similar pattern in the sixteenth century. The rates of increase observed for viticulture were 66% in Cincife, 158% in Venk, 258% in Kafirni, 67% in Katar, 80% in Niksar and as high as 1357% in the Karahisar-i Demirli.82

The district of Çubuk (Ankara) provides another exemplary case for the irregularities of the wet period. In this semi-arid Anatolian region, the shares of staple grains remained almost stable between the two surveys, except for a partial decrease of barley production as per the total of tax payments. The total production of wheat was about 7,000 tonnes in the first half of the sixteenth century, surpassing 11,000 tonnes within the next five decades. Crops of barley

80 Emecen, XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası, 261. 81 İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire, 188. 82 Ibid. The leguminous plants were also included in this region into the crop system. 50 increased from about 4,000 to 6,468 tonnes. Apart from the major grains, millet, which had been cultivated in a limited amount of about 41 tonnes per year in the 1520s, virtually disappeared by the time the latter survey took place, rather unlike the case in the Mediterranean regions. On the other hand, legumes were included in the crop rotation more frequently during this period. In the former survey, there is no record of broad bean and lentil cultivation, but it is known that 31 tonnes of broad beans and 150 tonnes of lentils were planted annually from the 1570s onwards.

The total annual crop of chickpeas almost doubled from 95 to 178 tonnes over five decades.

Cubuk District (Ankara – Inner 1523 1571 Anatolia) Tax revenue Share Tax revenue Share Wheat 103,405 58.4% 212,184 58.7% Barley 55,958 31.6% 99,361 27.5% Bitter Vetch 10,242 5.8% 21,019 5.8% Viticulture 1,741 1.0% 9,384 2.6% Fruits 4,786 2.7% 16,136 4.5% Legumes 955 0.5% 3,205 0.9% Table 1.8: The Tax Returns of Agricultural Produce and Their Share in Aggregate Tax Revenue for Çubuk District83

Different shifts are observed in viticulture patterns. The total tax on the vineyards rose steeply from 1,741 akçe to 9,384 akçe - meaning an over fivefold increase in nominal cash value

- and its proportion as a share of overall crop production increased from 1% to 2.6% over five decades. Fruits followed a similar trajectory for this inner Anatolian district. These fluctuations were shared, more or less, by other semi-arid regions that had experienced overpopulation in the mid-sixteenth century.84 In principle, it can be expected that the expansion of grain cultivation should be higher in relation to viticulture or pomiculture in order to feed this growing population,

83 Hüseyin Çınar and Osman Gümüşçü, Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Çubuk Kazası (Ankara: Bilge, 2002), 166–76. 84İbrahim Solak, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Döneminde Anadolu’da Meyve ve Sebze Üretimi,” Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi, no. 24 (2008): 217–51. 51 but, perhaps counterintuitively, it was actually vineyards and fruit trees whose cultivation rose more sharply in these inner lands.

As another example, while the proportion of major grains such as wheat and barley rose by about 80% in Ereğli (Konya), a region which experienced one of the most pronounced demographic rises, vineyards expanded at a rate of about 120%.85 In Hısn-ı Mansur (Adıyaman), another semi-arid region located in southeast Anatolia, the total number of vines was recorded as

2,337,750 for the entire region in the first quarter of the century, and jumped to 13,445,999 in four decades.86 This suggests that viticulture had expanded almost six-fold in just a few decades in the region. Urfa, a province in southeastern Anatolia that experienced a population explosion in the sixteenth century of over 300%, also showed a similar pattern in the expansion of vineyards vis-à-vis the population growth. The total number of vines in 1518 amounted to

180,000, which increased to 389,200 in 1540 and 1,070,340 in 1566.87

These instances are just a few examples from the vast plains of Anatolia, and similar variances can be taken from other provinces as well. While in its formerly central lands of coastal Anatolia, viticulture did not expand and even retreated, the semi-arid regions displayed spectacular growth; vineyards increased over four-fold in Çankırı and Malatya, over five times in

Çorum, and as high as eight times in Harput. Pomiculture also expanded tremendously in these semi-arid regions, despite the pressures of overpopulation. 88 Not only did rural populations become involved in fruit growing, but the townsmen in parts of inner Anatolia gave up

85 Doğan Yörük, XVI. Yuzyılda Ereğli Kazası (Konya: Konya Ereğli Belediyesi, 2009), 111–22. In these regions, legumes had begun to be cultivated in the same manner. 86 Hısn-ı Mansur, Behisni, Kahta and Gerger are included into these statistics. Mehmet Taşdemir, XVI. Asırda Adıyaman (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 123–207. 87 Ahmet Nezihi Turan, XVI. Asırda Ruha (Urfa) Sancağı (Şanlıurfa: Şurkav Yayınları, 2005), 91. 88 For some large-scale compilations of statistics on vineyard and fruit production in sixteenth-century Anatolian sites, see: İbrahim Solak, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Döneminde Anadolu’da Meyve ve Sebze Üretimi,” Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi, no. 24 (2008): 217–51; Mübahat Kütükoğlu, XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda İzmir Kazasının Sosyal ve İktisadi Yapısı (İzmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2000), 156–8; eadem, XVI. Asırda Çeşme Kazasının Sosyal ve İktisadi Yapısı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010), 122–4. 52 cultivating grains and turned to pomiculture altogether.89 In a similar manner, cotton production decreased substantially in western Anatolian districts such as Menemen, Çeşme and Izmir, but improved in Hamit, Çorum, Hısn-ı Mansur, Kahta, Erzincan, Kemah, Maraş, etc.90

Overall, the agricultural system of Anatolia displays discernible irregularity during this specific period when considered in relation to long-term regional ecological characteristics. All of these data points contribute to the main argument of this chapter, namely that Ottoman

Anatolia experienced an exceptional climactic era, and that the patterns of agricultural production of the time stemmed from the unexpectedly wet climatic conditions.

1.4. Transition from the “magnificent days” to the “age of crisis”

This temporarily wet climate of the sixteenth century enabled the Ottomans to open up new arable lands in the semi-arid regions of inner and southeastern Anatolia. The extraordinary growth in fiscal populations in these regions stemmed not only from a natural population increase, but also from the sedentarization of pastoral tribes, who subsequently began to take up farming. Furthermore, the high rate of precipitation enabled a diversification of the crop cycle in these regions. Viticulture, pomiculture and cotton cultivation flourished in these inner regions and spread extensively.

However, these climatic conditions did not have a similar positive impact on Anatolia’s

Mediterranean regions. The climate conditions of the Mediterranean zones temporarily approached those of a humid sub-tropical climate, and this had a restrictive impact on the region’s established agricultural sectors, such as viticulture or cotton cultivation. The

89 Suraiya Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting, 1520-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 243. 90 Zeki Arıkan, XV-XVI. Yüzyıllarda Hamit Sancağı (İzmir: Ege Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1988); İbrahim Solak, XVI. Asırda Maraş Kazası (1526-1563) (Ankara: Akçağ, 2004); İsmet Miroğlu, Kemah Sancağı ve Erzincan Kazası (1520-1566) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1990), 176–87. 53 demography of the Mediterranean zones also remained relatively stable, in sharp contrast to the developments in inner and southeastern Anatolia.

Climate change forced a redesign of the crop cycle. In light of the high variability of precipitation, in almost every Anatolian region legumes were introduced for the first time into the standard repertoire of the agricultural system in order to abete soil erosion and improve fertility. Other crops such as rye were intermixed to improve annual yield in accordance with the unique climatic and hydrological characteristics of each region. All these indicators point to an extraordinary period in which climatic conditions triggered large-scale agricultural and demographic transformation, coinciding with the heyday of the Empire.

The main goal of this chapter was to chart the distinctive climatic conditions of sixteenth- century Anatolia as a proper contexte for the subsequent drought period and social upheavals. In conclusion, we should note that the climatic and agricultural transformations of the period were probably among the most significant factors in sustaining the continual military expeditions organized in the sixteenth century. In this period, taxes were collected in kind rather than cash, and the extraordinary growth of the fiscal population in inner and southeastern Anatolia entailed a rising supply of materiel for the imperial army. As will be discussed in the following chapter, these inner regions became the main supplier for the Ottoman Imperial army. Furthermore, the hardships of internal conflicts or local uprisings could be rapidly compensated for, thanks to the sustainability and bounty of crop production.

However, these climatic conditions were transient, and reversed at the end of the sixteenth century. The average precipitation dropped from the highest level of the millennium to one of its driest periods. A destructive drought hit the region in 1590s for five consecutive years, marking the irreversible end of this unusually wet period. Research based on tree rings suggests

54 that this drought was the region’s longest in the last 900 years. In addition, a stretch of intermittent dry periods lasted in Anatolia until the middle of the seventeenth century. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Celali revolts, which are discussed in detaile in the following chapter, also spread throughout Anatolia and disrupted the social order.

At the same time as this collapse occurred in the interior, western Anatolia was able to sustain its former agricultural production due to its idiosyncratic geological structure. Ground and surface waters enabled constant irrigation, and agricultural production was not affected by the severe climatic conditions. Furthermore, the area’s fiscal population increased extensively as a result of immigration from the inner regions of Anatolia. Local products such as grapes and cotton, which could withstand dry weather if supplied with irrigation, began to be heavily cultivated. Therefore, this climatic shift, from the wettest period to the drought era, prompted the rise of western Anatolia and the hinterlands of Izmir. Thanks to this agricultural development, western Anatolia was able to meet the demands of foreign merchants and pave the way for a commercial expansion, specifically through the port of Izmir. In the following chapter, the dynamics behind the development of western Anatolia, the peculiar hydrogeological feature of the region, will be examined in greater detail.

CHAPTER 2

The Rise of Western Anatolia in the Midst of a Social and Climatic Crisis

The era of the Celali rebellions had a lasting effect, not only on the Ottoman social order, but also on the demographic and settlement patterns of Anatolia at the turn of the seventeenth century. During this period of unrest, huge numbers of peasants abandoned their villages: some of them migrated to the relative safety of town centres; others preferred to move to more distant metropoles like Istanbul. A significant number lost their lives. 91 Social scientists tend to categorically accept depopulation as an Anatolia-wide historical phenomenon. However, this demographic fluctuation also had regional discrepancies, as will be demonstrated by examining relevant tax registers in this chapter.

As outlined in the first chapter, regional discrepancies within sixteenth-century demographic patterns such as population growth were closely linked to regional climate variation. By the same token, population fluctuations followed a similar trajectory, albeit in reverse, for the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. That is, at the same time that the inner semi-arid regions under the influence of a continental climate were losing those fiscal populations that they had accumulated in the previous period, Anatolia’s Mediterranean regions were less severely affected. Western Anatolia in particular showed a striking development in terms of its fiscal population between the late sixteenth and the mid-seventeenth century.

This period also connects to a significant climatic shift: Following the wettest period, a devastating drought took hold in Anatolia from the 1580s onwards. The drought of 1591 was especially severe and lasted five consecutive years, until 1596. The fact that it has been identified as the longest consecutive period of drought for the entire second millennium in Anatolia

91 Oktay Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order, 166-177. 56 highlights its severity. 92 The rebellions and the drought mutually reinforced the destructive powers of each other. Accordingly, the term suggested by Parry, “sensitive lands” is used to describe the first regions to be abandoned in the case of revolt or drought. In this manner, the semi-arid Anatolian sites lost their new fiscal populations and returned to the settlement levels of the 1520s during this period.93

In western Anatolia, on the other hand, agricultural production was secured and sustained in the midst of revolts and drought due to the region’s peculiar hydrogeological features. As discussed in more detail below, the geological structure of western Anatolia features a typical horst-graben system, whose water-table is relatively close to the surface and thus can be accessed using water wells only a few metres deep. Apart from these shallow aquifer systems, several rivers also enabled the irrigation of western Anatolia’s fertile alluvial plains. Thanks to these accessible water sources, the plains of western Anatolia did not suffer as much from the droughts and rebellions observed in the inner regions. Furthermore, the region became an attractive destination for peasants who had left their villages in the inner lands, and consequently a large number of immigrants flowed into western Anatolia and the regional population increased significantly. Agricultural production grew in tandem with the regional population. Local products such as cotton and grapes in particular were affected positively by the new climate.

High level of precipitation in the previous period had impacted these products negatively, but this new climatic conditions, with their corresponding decrease in precipitation, allowed these crops to thrive with the aid of irrigation.

92 Touchan et al., “Reconstructions of Spring/Summer Precipitation.” Touchan et al., “Preliminary Reconstructions.” For a discussion of how this long drought impacted revolts; see: Sam White, The Climate of Rebellion, 140-162 93 Martin L. Parry, Climatic Change, Agriculture, and Settlement. 57

In the late sixteenth century, foreign merchants began to visit the coasts of western

Anatolia in order to import agricultural products, in particular, cotton.94 The western Anatolian regions were able to meet their demand, thanks to the growth of agricultural production prompted by the unique regional geographical characteristics described above. Consequently, developments in the hinterland of Izmir such as the contemporary shift in the climatic and settlement patterns supported the commercial expansion of the port-city. The rise of western

Anatolia will be analyzed here in four steps. In the opening section, I will introduce the mufassal

(detailed) tax registers of the towns located in the hinterlands of the port of Izmir. In order to showcase the sharp contrast between regions, these registers will be compared with similar registers from various Anatolian sites that have previously been studied by Ottomanists. In an attempt to place this comparison in a wider Anatolian context, I will also compare two Anatolia- wide surveys published originally by Lütfü Güçer. In publishing these surveys, Güçer’s primary aim was to depict the grain supply systems of various sancaks to the Ottoman Imperial army during the expeditions of 1590 and 1637-38. However, I will utilize these surveys for my own purpose of illustrating regional discrepancies observed within this period, as well as the shared patterns between the detailed registers and Anatolia-wide surveys. As a second step, I will examine the hinterland of Izmir in detail in order to emphasize the significant developments of the lower basin region, while the middle and higher districts remained relatively stable. My investigation highlights the fact that the lower plain regions, which had suffered from the violent

Celali revolts to a much greater degree than the higher areas, also underwent significantly more intensive development. Following this, the hydrogeological features of the region will be revealed as the key factors for the development of these lower basins. Finally, the regional

94 For the establishment process of commercial networks of European merchants, see: Goffman, Izmir and Levantine World, 93-137. 58 improvement of agricultural production will be assessed, showing that the expansion of regional commerce in this period was mainly favored by the climatic and demographic shift.

2.1. A Balance Sheet of the Celali Era: A Reversal of Fortune

Before attending to demographic patters, let me briefly introduce the nature of the contemporary tax registers utilized in this investigation. A combination of technological innovations in the military system and its concomitant expansion, the Empire’s prolonged wars, the price revolution and, most importantly, the monetization of the Ottoman economy, together resulted in the

Ottoman fiscal administration’s chronic need for cash. This need became increasingly acute during the late sixteenth century.95 Given these fiscal challenges, the Ottoman financial system evolved to meet the Empire’s new requirement for cash by imposing new kind of taxes on the taxpayers: the cizye (the poll tax on non-Muslims), and the avarız-ı divaniye and tekalif-i örfiye

(extraordinary taxes, and imperial and customary levies).96 The survey system was also reformed in accordance with these new types of taxes.

In the classic tahrir surveys, the basic unit upon which taxes were levied was the family household (hane, lit. “house”). However, in the avarız surveys, there was a combined tax unit known as avarızhane that was composed of several actual household. There was no standard number of hane in an avarızhane, it could comprise anywhere from three to fifteen of hane/households depending on locale and the period. The number of houseolds in an avarızhane set for local depended on the average economic level—in richer areas less households per avarızhane, in pooer areas more This practice makes it difficult for historians to follow the

95 For more information about the monetization process, see the following chapter. 96 Linda Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy; Levent Küçük, Osmanlı Vergi Hukukunda Avarız Kavramı ve Avarızın İdaredeki Rolü (PhD diss., Ankara University, 2007); Süleyman Demirci, The Functioning of Ottoman Avâriz Taxation: An Aspect of the Relationship between Centre and Periphery: A Case Study of the Province of Karaman, 1621-1700 (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2009). 59 changes in fiscal population trends for various Ottoman regions, as there is no way to reach an approximate fiscal population through the icmal (summary) surveys if they do not mention the number of real households in an avarızhane. However, some mufassal (detailed) avarız registers, which include real households along with the number of avarız households, can be found in the

Ottoman archives.97 In these mufassal registers, all household heads, that is, taxpayers are listed, name by name. Even if the quantity of this kind of survey is limited compared to the number of tahrirs compiled in previous centuries, historians have utilized the mufassal registers frequently in order to trace, inter alia, the devastating impact of the Celali revolts for several regions.98

I have consulted the relevant mufassal registers of western Anatolian sites, including

Izmir, Manisa, Seferihisar and Urla, in the Ottoman archives, and have compared the figures extracted from these registers with similar data compiled by historians for various regions of seventeenth-century Anatolia. This comparison shows that while the inner and northern regions of Anatolia witnessed a drastic fall in population, western Anatolia exhibits very different settlement patterns and demographic fluctuation. Table 2.1 shows the number of villages and the real households for the rural areas of the relevant regions.

97 Oktay Özel, “17. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Demografi ve İskan Tarihi İçin Önemli Bir Kaynak: 'Mufassal' Avârız Defterleri,” in XII. Türk Tarih Kongresi, Ankara, 12–16 Eylül 1994: Kongreye Sunulan Bildiriler (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), 3:735–44. 98 Oktay Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia: Amasya 1576–1643 (Leiden: Brill, 2016); Mehmet Öz, "Population fall in the seventeenth-century Anatolia: some findings for the districts of Canik and Bozok,” Archivum Ottomanicum 22 (2004): 159–71. 60

Percentage change

1570's Mid 1600's in population

Number of villages 509 452 -11% Canik99 Rural Population 16,438 5,017 -69%

Number of villages 629 548 -13% Bozok Rural Population 18,704 4,369 -77%

Number of villages 372 262 -30% Amasya100 Rural Population 15,754 5,607 -64%

Number of villages 111 158 42% Manisa101 Rural Population 2,161 2,930 36%

Number of villages 19 +5 31 29% Seferihisar102 Rural Population 674+273 1256 32%

Number of villages 73 112+8 64% Izmir103 Rural Population 2,609 2,879+712 37%

Number of villages 159 140 - 12% Kocaeli104 Rural Population 4,324 3,595 -17%

99 For Canik and Bozok, cf. Mehmet Öz, “Population fall.” 100 For Amasya, cf. Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia. 101 For the sixteenth-century statistics of Manisa, Seferihisar and İzmir, see: cf. Emecen, XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası; Kütükoğlu, XVI. Asırda Çeşme; eadem, XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda İzmir. For the seventeenth-century survey of Manisa, see: BOA, Kamil Kepeci 2631. The survey was carried out in 1659-60. 102 Figures for seventeenth-century Seferihisar are based on BOA, MAD 15886. This survey was conducted in 1559- 60 as well. Seferihisar was a sub-district of Çeşme in the sixteenth century, and was redefined as a new district by the Ottoman government in the seventeenth century. Several villages of Hereke, another subdistrict of Çeşme, were attached to Seferihisar. They were also included, separately, in the calculations of number of villages and population for the sixteenth century. 103 For the figures for Izmir, see: BOA. D. MKF.d 27823. Urla, one of the Izmir’s subdistricts, was already surveyed in 1643 and it was not reviewed in the 1660 survey. For Urla, see: MAD 14710, 175–191. The statistics of Urla based on 1643 survey were shown separately in the second column of Izmir. 104 For Kocaeli and Karahisar-ı Sahib, Erder and Faroqhi, “Population Rise and Fall in Anatolia.” The statistics of Kocaeli and Karahisar-ı Sahib belong to the surveys of 1613–5. 61

Number of villages 408 386 -5% Karahisarı-ı Sahib Rural Population 10,396 5,972 -43%

Table 2.1: A Comparison of the Taxpayer Populations of Rural Areas and the Number of Villages based on the Tahrir and Mufassal Avarız registers between 1570s and the mid-seventeenth century.

As documented in Table 2.1, while northern/central regions experienced an enormous

loss in their fiscal populations, western Anatolia followed an opposite course during the same

period. These detailed surveys provide us with several clues about the demographic trajectory of

Ottoman Anatolia during the age of rebellion. Even if the figures above address the fluctuations

of rural population, it should be also noted that the urban population of Manisa showed an

outstanding growth as well. Considering the significant number of peasants that lived in towns,

this growth should also be factored into the equation. The town of Manisa had 1,221 households

in the tahrir survey of 1575, but the number of households reached 3,634 in the mufassal avarız

survey of 1660. The increase rate was about 197%. However, because the number of detailed

registers is limited, we are prevented from capturing a holistic demographic landscape of

contemporary Anatolia. Instead, another nüzul registers that covered almost the entirety of

Anatolia can be utilized to track the changes that took place in this region.

In order to reach a firm conclusion about the changes that took place over time in the

relative agricultural productivity of different regions, it is necessary to consider data derived

from a certain type of tax record, namely the nüzul registers. Nüzul refers to a tax collected as

part of the “extraordinary taxes and imperial and customary levies” also contained within the

avarız registers. In the sixteenth century, this extraordinary tax had been imposed on tax-payers

as payment in kind during imperial military expeditions in order to secure logistical supplies for

the army. However, by the turn of the seventeenth century and onwards, the nüzul had turned

62 into a regular annual cash tax—although, in certain circumstances, this tax could be collected also in kind. Lütfü Güçer has examined sixteenth- and seventeenth-century nüzul surveys in order to study the logistics and grain supply issues of the Ottoman army, and published two surveys dated 1590 and 1637-38, respectively. 105 In both cases, the Ottoman government organized an expedition against the Safavids and the army marched along the same route to arrive at the battlefield. To provision the army, nüzul taxes were imposed in kind as grain on the regions along the route. In fact, almost the entire Anatolian region sent its grain output to feed the military machine.

For the purpose of my research, I utilize these registers first published by Güçer in order to trace the regional variations that developed between 1590 and 1637-38. As mentioned above, an avarızhane is a single tax unit and the composition of this tax unit varied depending on the region or period. However, thanks to the nüzul registers, it is possible to review the total amount of grain sent by certain regions to the imperial army, which enables us to compare regional differentiation in terms of agricultural production.

According to the nüzul surveys, the major portion of the tax was paid in barley, with a more limited amount paid in flour. This was largely due to the fact that barley was consumed not only by people but also by livestock, and thus was an essential product for supplying the army.

Besides its logistical importance, it is easily cultivated in every corner of Anatolia, more or less independent of climatic or soil conditions. Because of its ubiquity and central role in feeding the army, I have chosen to examine the barley tax imposed upon the taxpayers as a means of evaluating fluctuations in agricultural production.106 It should be noted, however, that there are some differences between these surveys. For example, several sancaks such as Kocaeli, Aydın,

105 Lütfü Güçer, 16-17. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi. 106 The amounts of flour imposed as tax are also listed in the appendix. The overall pattern is similar for barley and flour on these tax registers. 63

Suğla, and Menteşe were only included in the second survey. Similarly, some other areas such as

Kastamonu, Bolu, Kocaeli, and Karesi were only included in the first survey. Thus, the comparison made here does not refer to the complete surveys, but rather is limited to those regions that appear in both registers. Furthermore, the kazas (districts) of each sancak are also listed on the registers, and it is evident that the list of kazas in the two registers does not match.

This discrepancy may be due to a redefinition of the borders of certain sancaks.107 In order to control for these differences, and ensure my comparison’s consistency, I have matched all districts in these two registers and listed only those that correspond in both. Therefore, the figures in Table 2.2 do not depict the total tax imposed throughout sancaks at certain surveys, but rather refer to the total amount of grain for the districts only common to the two surveys. Finally, while most of the districts paid their taxes in kind and on time, several others were late in making a payment or paid part of it in cash and these are marked as “niyamed” on the registers.108 It is obvious that there is a distinction between ability to assess the tax base and ability to collect it and my primary purpose is to trace the trends in fiscal population based on Ottoman official sources. Therefore, I have also included these niyamed districts into my compilation, with the intent of expanding the regional comparison based on official sources.109 The table [Table 2.2.] below provides a province-by-province comparison of the taxes imposed in kind by kile

(approximately 25 kg), for both expeditions in 1590 and 1637-38.

107 For instance, 21 districts of Kütahya were listed in 1590, whereas the number of districts was 26 for the second register, and there were only 18 common districts between these two registers. Therefore, I have examined just these 18 in order to reach a meaningful comparison. 108 Lütfü Güçer, 16-17. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi, 77-88. 109 The districts of niyamedgan are also mentioned in a list that can be found in the appendix. 64

1590 1637-38 Percentage Change Provinces (Sancaks) Saruhan 4,422.5 7,999.5 +81% Kütahya 8,867.5 6,403 -28% Ankara 3185 2786.25 -13% Karahisar-ı Sahib 2,423 1641 -32% Hamiteli 6,263.5 3377 -46% Teke 2,298 2,146 -7% Çankırı 3,135 1369 -56% Eskişehir 767 1,098 +43% Konya 3,075.5 1379.25 -55% Niğde 3396.5 1,630.5 -52% Aksaray 1,024 275 -73% Akşehir 1,397.5 896.25 -36% Beyşehir 2,312.5 965.25 -58% Kırşehir 1,194.5 423.75 -65% Kayseri 1,497 934 -38% Amasya 3,312.5 1,552.75 -53% Çorum 1,220.5 541.5 -56% Bozok 1,687.5 448.5 -73% Divriği 808 267 -67% Canik 1,483 670.5 -55% Sivas 6,470.5 2020.5 -69% Maraş 7,482 1947 -74% Birecik 1,484.5 342 -77% Table 2.2: The Comparison of Taxes Imposed in kind (as barley) on the Provinces of Anatolia in 1590 and 1637-38 (in kile).110

110Data extracted from Güçer, 16-17. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi, 146–85. A district- based comparison can be found in the appendix III, p 200. 65

Map 2.1: Change in the Taxes Imposed in kind (as barley) on Ottoman Provinces in 1590 and 1637-8, based on the nüzul registers.111 Before undertaking an analysis of Anatolia-wide fluctuations, however, the fiscal changes given by the available mufassal avarız surveys must be tested against the rates of taxes imposed in kind. For the districts of Amasya, Bozok, Canik and Manisa (Saruhan), the figures in the mufassal surveys and the nüzul registers do concur. The variation between the sixteenth-century tahrir registers and seventeenth-century mufassal avarız surveys can be traced through the record of the nüzul taxes collected in kind for these regions as well. The statistics derived from these different registers support each other (Table 2.3). In other words, the statistics extracted from the nüzul registers can be used to make a general assessment of the impact of the various “crises” in

Anatolia, even if they do not provide us with exact numbers.

111 For an online interactive map: https://mehmetkuru.carto.com/viz/c23460da-fb5e-11e5-824f-0ef24382571b/public_map 66

Regional Fiscal Changes According to Different Tax Registers Districts (kazas) and Provinces Change of Fiscal Population Fiscal Change on (sancaks) Between Tahrir registers and Nüzul Registers Mufassal Avarız Registers th (1570s – mid-17 century) (1590 – 1637/38) Canik -69% -55% Bozok -77% -73% Amasya -64% -53% Karahisar-ı Sahib -43% -32% Manisa +42% +80% Table 2.3. Regional Fluctuations According to Detailed Surveys (Tahrir and Mufassal Avarız) and Nüzul Registers. This table is composed of data from Table 1.4 and Table 1.5.

As for the map visualizing the statistics (Map 2.1), the most conspicuous characteristic is that the period of the Celali rebellions reversed the high rate of population growth for the inner regions, and the demographic levels receded to those of the early sixteenth century. However, the

Mediterranean regions, which had not undergone such a notable fluctuation in terms of their fiscal population in the sixteenth century, maintained a relative stability during this period.

Furthermore, western Anatolia underwent an unexpected development regarding its fiscal population during the rebellions. These rebellions gradually decreased in intensity, as they moved from inner Anatolia to its western parts, as seen on the map. Another crucial western region and part of Izmir’s hinterland, the Aydın region, cannot be assessed due to lack of data for the former period, but its grain support constituted the lion share of provision in the latter nüzul registers dated 1637-38.112 The grain contributions of Seferihisar, a new administrative district

(kaza) of the western coast, was higher than that of Konya, one of the major nodes of grain cultivation for the former period. 113 These figures indicate a demographic and fiscal shift between 1590 and 1640, from inner and eastern Anatolia to the western regions. The coastal region of western Anatolia became the most productive during this period, in marked contrast to

112Lütfü Güçer, 16-17. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi, 164-65. 113Lütfü Güçer, 16-17. Asırlarda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Hububat Meselesi, 185. 67 its limited importance in the sixteenth century. Therefore, the “Great Flight” (büyük kaçgun) does not refer to an Anatolia-wide depopulation, as historians have usually assumed, but rather points to a shift in fiscal population. While the inner regions were losing the fiscal populations that had grown in the preceding period, coastal Mediterranean areas such as Teke (Antalya) did not suffer nearly as much in terms of depopulation; significantly, western Anatolia became a shelter for those forced to leave their lands.

2.2 An Oasis in the Midst of the Little Ice Age: the Rise of Western Anatolia

How can we explain the demographic fluctuation observed in the “Age of Crises”? The first possible explanation is that the rebellions did not have much impact on western Anatolia.

However, this region, and especially Manisa, were frequently exposed to intense violence.

Numerous attacks, consisting of both small groups of 40-50 bandits and larger ones of 300-400, harassed city and countryside alike. 114 Apart from these relatively small gangs, several significant Celali revolts also broke out in the region. One of its most powerful leaders,

Kalenderoğlu, launched his first revolt in the Manisa region. He defeated Ottoman troops in the plains of the Nif River, near Manisa, and besieged the city in 1607.115 The notables of the city were forced to pay a large tribute to Kalenderoğlu in exchange for protection against the plundering of their city. It is known that he camped for a while with his fighters on the town’s outskirts before the Ottoman government granted him the title of governor of Ankara, and the rank of pasha. Another disruptive revolt was led by Yusuf Pasha, the former governor of the

Saruhan and Aydın sancaks. In 1608 he looted the villages of Saruhan with about 3-4,000

114 Akdağ, Celali İsyanları, 216–21. 115 M. Çağatay Uluçay, XVII. Asırda Saruhan’da Eşkiyalık ve Halk Hareketleri (İstanbul: Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1944), 20. 68 infantry and several thousand cavalries. 116 Under the pretext of awarding him an official appointment, he was invited to Istanbul and summarily executed there. In another case,

Cennetoğlu, a timariot, rebelled in Aydın in 1624. In the first phase of this revolt, he commanded

1,600 infantrymen and 1,000 cavalry, and seized the city of Tire. His troops moved on to

Turgutlu and finally besieged Manisa. The Ottoman government sent troops to stop him, and the countryside around the city once again was turned into a battlefield. In this case, the rebels lost the battle and Cennetoğlu was killed.117

Aside from these notable events, countless other disturbances took place in the region.

Karen Barkey devotes her entire monographic study of the Celali revolts to incidents that took place in the environs of Saruhan and Aydın, noting that 20% of the court records from this time concerned banditry and looting. Moreover, in the appendix of her book, Barkey explains why she chose Saruhan and Aydın for study:

[T]hese are two regions with no peasant rebellions (I claim the absence of peasant rebellion for all the Ottoman empire), which were instead severely affected by small-scale banditry. Movements of banditry originated in many districts of Saruhan and travelers’ reports as well as official texts document this quite vividly. Banditry in these regions remained regional, however, and did not diffuse to other areas of the empire. Occasionally, the region underwent the infiltration of more powerful and organized bandits form the east, who overwhelmed the Anatolian countryside and inflicted much damage on the area of our concern.118

Barkey makes a significant observation about the distinction between western Anatolia and the inner regions: banditry was common in contemporary western Anatolia, but rebellious groups there never reached the size of their counterparts in other parts of Anatolia. Moreover, the tax registers (both mufassal avarız and nüzul), indicate that the fiscal population actually increased despite the ongoing bandit attacks and the severe climatic conditions. But was this

116 Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, Târih-i Na‘îmâ: Ravzatü’l-Hüseyn fî Hulâsati Ahbâri’l-Hâfikayn, ed. Mehmed İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), 2:540. 117 Ibid., 913. 118 Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats, 244. 69 fiscal development valid for the entire sancak, or was there any variation in fiscal growth among districts? A close review of the evolution of Saruhan’s districts will help us to put the situation of this region into a broader context, especially in regards to the ecologic impacts on agricultural production.

Figure 2.12: The comparison of Taxes Imposed in kind (as barley) on the Districts (kaza) of Saruhan between 1590 and 1637-38. (in kile)

Figure 2.1 illustrates the degree of agricultural development for the districts of Saruhan based on the nüzul registers. As the chart shows, the fiscal capacity increased for almost every district except Demirci. Demirci is the highest district of the region in terms of its elevation, with an average altitude of over 800 metres above sea-level. Due to its location, the region was probably less harassed by Celali attacks in comparison to those towns and villages located on the plains.

Conversely, settlements in the lowlands, such as Manisa, Akhisar, and Tarhanyat

(Menemen), more than doubled their production and fiscal capacity, while Demirci displays a

70 remarkable drop. This represents yet another contrast with the situation in inner Anatolia. For instance, Özel notes that the only district with a growing population in the region around Amasya during these years was the town of Gegedra, and he suggests that the hilltop location of this town must have served as a safe haven for people fleeing Celali depredations.119 But the argument overlooks one of the main claims of this thesis, namely the significance of the impact of environmental factors on population changes (and concomitant commercial activity) in Anatolia.

The town of Demirci is particularly pertinent to my study here because it illustrates this point rather neatly. In this case, Demirci does not only sit at the highest altitude in the province, but is also located at a distance from the Mediterranean coast. Its effective climate was thus not

Mediterranean but continental. From this point of view, it resembles not the Mediterranean regions but the inner parts of Anatolia. Other smaller-sized districts, such as Borlu, Atala, Ilıca, which could not develop like Menemen or Akhisar, were not settlements on the plains, but were instead located at medium altitudes. The only exception among these towns was Gördes, which also saw growth despite being at a moderate altitude.120

To sum up, the lowlands located in river basins experienced growth in both fiscal population and agricultural productivity despite their greater vulnerability to contemporary revolts. Banditry in villages of the western coastal region caused disruption to local social order, but not wholesale migration to towns. The rebellions did not generate a great flight, and did not leave a destructive mark on the region and its agricultural capacity. Which begs the question: how did this region succeed in managing demographic and economic growth while the rest of

Anatolia suffered the dire consequences of climatic change and droughts? To answer this

119 Oktay Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia during the 16th and 17th Centuries: The ‘Demographic Crisis’ Reconsidered,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 36, no. 2 (2004): 183-205, p. 191. 120 Gördes was not an area of intensive cultivation, but rather emerged as a prominent textile manufacturing area from the 1600s onwards, selling its carpets and prayer rugs woven in Istanbul and even as far as Mecca. Ertan Gökmen, Osmanlı Dönemi Gördes Halıcılığı (Manisa: Celal Bayar Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014). 71 question, the next section addresses the impact of western Anatolia’s unique hydrogeological features on this rise in agricultural production.

2.3. Hydrogeological characteristics of western Anatolia as a determinant factor behind economic growth

Western Anatolia has idiosyncratic geological characteristics unlike other parts of Anatolia. The region presents us with a typical form of a Horst-Graben system: in this geological form, the crust is broken in different ways by tectonic forces, and the blocks thus formed move vertically in opposite directions. The plains of western Anatolia, located in the hinterlands of Izmir, form part of a horst-graben system shaped by such tectonic forces; thus, mountains are split by deep valleys, with rivers and expansive plains between them.121

Figure 2.13: An illustration of a horst-graben system.122

121 Yücel Yılmaz, "Geology of western Anatolia." Active Tectonics of northwestern Anatolia-The Marmara Poly- Project. A multi disciplinary Approach by Spacegeodesy, Geology, Hydrogeology, Geothermics and Seismology, vdf Hochschulverlag AG an der ETH, Ziirich (1997): 31-53. E. Bozkurt and H Sözbilir, “Tectonic evolution of the Gediz Graben: field evidence for an episodic, two-stage extension in western Turkey”, Geological Magazine, 141, 2004, 63–79. 122 http://geology.isu.edu/Alamo/rocks/basin_range_uplifts.php. “Horst” refers to the block pushed upward, and “graben” refers to the receding block. 72

The basins of these Graben blocks feature rivers and alluvial plains. However, the most important geological feature of the plains of Western Anatolia is groundwater rather than surface water and rivers. Graben lands have shallow aquifer systems due to this particular geological structure, making the groundwater very close to the surface. In such regions, it is possible to reach groundwater at only a few metres’ depth, easily accessible by pre-modern farmers using the techniques of the time. Hydrogeological research conducted in these fields (mapped below), also confirms the existence of a shallow water table.

Figure 2.14: Map of the Gediz River Basin

Figure 2.15: Groundwater Head Contour Map for Baseline Flow Model.123 It is important to note that the areas with accessible shallow groundwater tables (coloured in blue in Figure 2.4), were precisely the districts that experienced demographic and economic growth between 1590 and 1637-38. In the blue-coloured areas such as the fields located around

Menemen, Akhisar, Manisa and Turgutlu, farmers were able to expand agricultural production, whereas in the medium-height settlements they could produce only modest development, and in

Demirci, the highest settlement, the fiscal/agricultural capacity of the region actually contracted.

The Gediz graben formation was not the only one in the region and this hydrogeological characteristic was also shared with other basins, including the Büyük Menderes (Meander), and

Küçük Menderes (Cayster) regions, roughly covering the province of Aydın. 124 This hydrogeological feature, that is, the existence of shallow water tables, was a key factor that

123 Alper Elçi et al., “Simulation of Groundwater Flow in the Gediz River Basin,” conference paper presented at the 9th EWRA World Congress, June 2015. 124 Celalettin Şimşek, “The GIS-Integrated surfacial aquifer potential mapping and its importance for aquifer protection, Küçük Menderes basin/West Turkey” in International Congress on River Basin Management, 22-24 March 2007, Antalya, Turkey (Antalya: General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, 2007), 78–94; Hayrullah Yürekli, “Nazilli (Aydın) İlçesi Kent Merkezi ve Yakın Çevresindeki Zeminlerin Jeolojik ve Tektonik İncelenmesi” (M.A. Thesis, Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, 2012). 74 assisted in the agricultural development of the region in the middle of the Little Ice Age. These ground waters enabled the cultivation of perennial plants that had deep roots, such as fruit trees or vineyards, without further irrigation. An aquifer system close to the surface minimizes the impact of climate, and especially drought, on the development of plants.

The critical, but hitherto overlooked factor contributing to population dynamics in the region was the impact of shallow ground water systems on the growth of perennial plants. This is simply but elegantly illustrated by Harold C. Fritts, a leading scholar on the relationship between tree rings and climate. He explains the impact of shallow ground waters on perennial plants with the following figure:

Figure 2.16: “Trees growing on sites where climate seldom limits growth processes produce rings that are uniformly wide (A). The ring widths provide little or no record of variation in climate and are termed complacent. Trees

75 growing on sites where climatic factors are frequently limiting produce rings that vary in width from year to year depending upon how severely limiting climate has been to growth (B). These are termed sensitive.”125

Similarly, Hasan Çukur examined the trees on the top of Yamanlar Mountain, located in the north of Izmir, and to the samples from the valley. His findings correspond to Fritts’ graph

(Figure 2.5). That is, the trees rooted on the lower sites around Izmir were not affected by climatic change, and the tree rings displayed a uniform pattern of growth, as opposed to the samples taken from the higher elevations in western Anatolia.126

Seventeenth-century travel accounts also help to verify the amenable situation of Izmir and its surroundings. Galland, who authored a detailed account on Izmir, depicted the climate and agriculture in his travel journal.127 In describing the climatic conditions of Izmir, Galland noted that there was no rain for seven or eight months of the year. However, in another section, he emphasized the abundance of fruit trees, and also stressed that the vegetables were overwatered in Izmir and its vicinity. Not only did the shallow water table protect the trees and vineyards from the catastrophic effect of a long drought period, but furthermore, the hydrogeological structure made the construction of an irrigation system much easier.

Both Galland and the renowned Ottoman travellers Evliya Çelebi also mentioned the abundance of water wells in the countryside at the time, and that these water resources were used for irrigation.128 Le Sieur du Loir, a traveller who visited Izmir in 1639, also wrote that:

“The beauty and the fertility of the place are admirable, the vicinity of the city is covered with

125 Harold C. Fritts, Tree Rings and Climate (London: Academic Press, 1976), 17. 126 Hasan Çukur, “Ege Bölümünün Ekosistemleri” (PhD diss., Dokuz Eylül University, 1998) 81. 127 Antoine Galland, Le Voyage à Smyrne: Un Manuscrit d’Antoine Galland, 1678: Contenant Smyrne Ancienne et Modernes et des extraits du Voyage fait en Levant, ed. Frédéric Bauden. (Paris: Chandeigne, 2000). 128 Galland, Le Voyage à Smyrne, “En Turquie, on fait des rigoles et des petits canaux par tout le jardin, qui conduisent de 1'eau partout á mesure qu'on la tire avec une pousserague” 202; “Bournavali [Bornova], oú le cadi faisait done anciennement sa residence, …. Il y a de [Ia] tres bonne eau que l'on puise dans des puits fort profonds et creusés dans le roc, ce qui la rend si fraiche qu'il n'est pas besoin de neige pour la rafraichir davantage.” p 182-183. “Bouarbachi [Pınarbaşı] est renomme pour les belles eaux qu'il y a, qui sortent d'une grande source en abundance” 180. Evliyâ Çelebi, Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi, ed. Yücel Dağlı, Seyit Ali Kahraman, and Robert Dankoff (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), vol. 9 p 45. 76 plane trees and there are few whose feet are not washed with a fountain.”129 Apart from the observations of these travellers, endowment deeds (vakfiyes) detail many water wells and fountains in the agricultural fields of the city’s hinterland as well.130 Besides these irrigation opportunities, cold weather did not have as much of a negative impact here as in the inner regions. The Mediterranean climate softened the cold threshold in the plains at sea level and limited the impact of frost compared to inner Anatolia. This phenomenon was valid for the entire Mediterranean zone and Europe during this period.131

The gulf of Izmir is located right in the middle of several alluvial plains supported by shallow aquifer systems and thus plentiful water resources. The plain of Menemen is located just

20 km north of the port-city and the plain of Manisa, at 30 km distance, was the first stop for the caravans en route to Istanbul. The plain of Turgutlu was also one of the end stations for the long- distance caravans coming from Persia via Erzurum and Ankara to Izmir. The basin of Küçük

Menderes also extends to the southern part of Izmir’s outskirts. Therefore, Izmir lay at the centre of a circle composed of several different plains, which shared specific hydrogeological

“privileges” during periods of climatic disasters. This location made Izmir quite special compared to numerous Ottoman towns located on the Mediterranean coast. The following

129 “La beauté et la fertilité du lieu sont admirables; les environs de la ville sont couverts de platanes et il y en a peu dont le pied ne soit arrosé d’une fontaine.” Les voyages du sieur Du Loir, contenus en plusieur lettres écrites du Levant (Paris: Gervais Clouzier, 1654), 17. 130 For instance, in a detailed endowment deed, many olive groves located at the different parts of the countryside were defined through the names of wells or fountains around as karakuyu, alçı kuyusu, Tüylüoğlu kuyusu, dere pınar, pınarlık, Ahmet pınarı, etc..Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü, VGM 617/61-43, Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi Hulefasından eş-Şeyh Mustafa Efendi Vakfiyesi, 1055/1645. 131 Corroborating this, a study covering approximately 2,000 cities in Europe indicates that the effect of temperature varied across climate zones during the Little Ice Age, while cities in already cold climates were especially vulnerable, the cities in relatively warmer climate zones benefited from cooler temperatures. See Maria Waldinger, “The Long- term Effects of Climatic Change on Economic Growth: Evidence from the Little Ice Age, 1500–1750” Working Paper. London School of Economics (2014). Available URL: http://www.lse.ac.uk/economicHistory/seminars/EH590Workshop/EH590MT2013/Waldinger.pdf [date retrieved: 13 February 2017] 77 section elaborates on the growth of agricultural production and fiscal population in the hinterland of Izmir based on various contemporary sources.

2.4. The Agricultural production of western Anatolia during the Little Ice Age

The combination of the climatic shift and western Anatolia’s peculiar hydrogeological features had a decisive impact on regional agricultural production. Cotton, “the white gold”, was one of the plants that had benefited from this climatic shift. This plant thrives in dry weather and irrigation by aquifer systems rather than rainfall.132 Hence, it was the presence of aquifers in the hinterland of Izmir as much as it was the climatic variation from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century that stimulated the growth of cotton production there. After a long wet period during the sixteenth century, the production of local agricultural products, and especially cotton, was revived in the late sixteenth century. This reversion can be traced by looking at policies on agricultural products.

During the sixteenth century, the central authorities prohibited the export of cotton.

Various measures were taken against its smuggling from western Anatolia. However, towards the end of the sixteenth century, the export prohibition on cotton was relaxed. Faroqhi suggests two alternative explanations for this policy change: either the demand of the imperial navy diminished from about 1590 onward, or the Ottoman government was aware of the expansion of cotton production so it allowed the exportation of surplus product.133 In fact, the demand of the Ottoman navy did not decrease during the seventeenth century. On the contrary, the demand for sailcloth grew as a result of technological advances in maritime industry. Ottoman shipyards began to construct galleons to replace galleys, and this transformation in the

132 As an example, the Southern Great Plains of North America, including Texas, Oklahoma and New Mexico, are the driest parts of the continent and also largely produce cotton, thanks to a large aquifer system named the Ogallala. 133 Suraiya Faroqhi, “Ottoman cotton textiles, 1500s to 1800: the story of a success that did not last,” in The Spinning World. A Global History of Cotton Textiles, 1200-1850, edited by Prasannan Prasarathi and Giorgio Riello (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 89–103. 78 shipbuilding industry required more cotton to make sailcloth in comparison to the previous century. While the occurrence of mass purchase, such as for an expedition, or for the repair of a fleet in action, might have lessened in the absence of great sea battles, the regular annual demand actually increased steadily throughout the seventeenth century.134 A significant part of this demand was met by western Anatolia, and especially by the sancak of Saruhan.135 In the early eighteenth century, a textile manufactory was established around the shipyard in Istanbul, which began to produce items for the navy. Its manufacturing capacity was enormous in its first year: 4,123 pieces of sail cloth (13.7 tonnes/40,000 m), and this output more than tripled during some war years.136 Briefly, then, these indicators point to the second explanation of Faroqhi as the more plausible for understanding policy changes regarding cotton exportation in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The cotton production of the Empire probably expanded during this era, and Izmir was the main port-city for the exportation of this commodity.

Apart from local industries such as vineyards and cotton, new agricultural products also appeared in the region’s fields, such as tobacco. The Saruhan and Aydın regions became prominent tobacco producers over a relatively short span in the first decades of seventeenth century, causing the central authorities to attempt to restrict the over-expansion of this new plant. 137 Fruit, cotton and tobacco production expanded, without an indication of a contemporary crop failure in the region. The agricultural fields were secure enough to feed a massive population that continued to gradually increase. The urban population of Manisa

134 İdris Bostan, Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilatı: 17. Yüzyılda Tersane-i Amire (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989), 156. 135 Ibid., 161. 136 Yusuf Alperen Aydın, “XVIII. Yüzyıl Başlarında Osmanlı Donanması ve Tersane-i Amire’de Lenger ve Yelken Bezi Üretimine Başlanması,” Tarih Dergisi, no. 49 (2009) 47–57. 137 Fehmi Yılmaz, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Tütün: Sosyal, Siyasi ve Ekonomik Tahlil (1600-1883)” (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2005), 23–4. Çağatay Uluçay, “Tütün ve Kahveye Dair,” Gediz Dergisi, no. 45 (1941): 12–3. Modern Turkey is one of the most prominent tobacco producing/exporting countries and ¾ of total tobacco production was cultivated in western Anatolia. Manisa aloneproduces one third of Turkish tobacco production. Nuran Taşlıgil and Güven Şahin, “Türkiye’de Tütün (Nicotiana tabacum) Yetiştiriciliğinin Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Coğrafi Dağılımı,” Doğu Coğrafya Dergisi (Eastern Geographical Review) 18, no. 30 (2013): 71–102, pp. 80–2. 79 increased by more than two and a half fold from 1575 to 1660. From that point on, Izmir overtook Manisa and soon turned into one of the most populated cities in Anatolia, second only to Bursa. The countryside also expanded in terms of population and the number of villages.

This trend did not originate from an increase in the local population but was rather due to immigration from other parts of Anatolia and the Aegean islands. On the avarız survey of

Manisa, a few placenames were noted as taxpayer’s place of origin, including the island of

Lesbos and other Aegean islands.138 Indeed, an imperial decree was issued concerning the

Greek population that had migrated from the islands and settled to work in the fields of

Akhisar. 139 This migration wave was not limited to peasants, but also included Jewish manufacturers who had struggled to find raw material in Salonica, and thus moved to Manisa in the same period.140 Several semi-nomadic Turkic tribes also moved from the interior lands and brought their flocks to the well-watered western regions. While some of these pastoralists preferred to immediately settle down in whichever village had space, others were placed in certain areas as part of a settlement project on the part of the central authority in a later period. 141 These semi-nomadic groups also, on occasion, became town dwellers. Tax assessment records in the Manisa judicial registers identify some Turkic pastoral clans as tax groups residing in the city.142 These newcomers to Izmir hailed from a much wider area than the previous residents, and a significant portion of them were non-Muslims. All of these migratory waves did not lead to a crop failure or famine in the region, even though they

138 Şenol Çelik, “1659-1660 (H. 1070-1071) Tarihli Avarız Defterine Göre XVII. Yüzyıl Ortalarında Turgutlu Kazası,” Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi, no. 16 (2007): 33–66. 139 Feridun Emecen, “Akhisar,” TDV – İslâm Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1989), 2:236–7. 140 Feridun Emecen, "From Selanik to Manisa: Some Information about the Immigration of the Jewish Weavers," in The Via Egnetia under Ottoman Rule (1380-1699), ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: The University of Crete Press, 1996), 97–112. 141 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretleri İskan Teşebbüsü (1691-1696) (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1963), 68–9. 142 Joyce Hedda Matthews, “The Ottoman inheritance inventory as an exercise in conceptual reclamation (ca. 1600– 1675)” (PhD diss., State University of New York at Binghamton, 2001), 205. 80 occurred amidst frequent bandit attacks. The grain demand of this massive population was met by the output of the surrounding plains, irrigated by abundant ground and surface waters. It appears that the climatic and geological advantages of the region were able to mitigate the damage done by Celali gangs and the rapid climate change. Moreover, the region could meet the needs of its recent newcomers, and indeed was able to even export a considerable quantity of agricultural products abroad.

2.5. Conclusion

During the sixteenth century, Anatolia experienced an exceptional period in terms of the region’s climatic conditions. its semi-arid inner regions grew unsustainably in terms of their fiscal populations and agricultural production, thanks to a period of exceptional precipitation.

In the last decades of the sixteenth century, these conditions rapidly changed and the extraordinarily high rates of average rainfall decreased. The 1590s in particular marked a turning point for the socio-economic landscape of Anatolia. In the sixteenth century, tax rates for agricultural production were determined based on a three-year average, with the aim of diminishing the impact of annual fluctuations. However, the drought of the 1590s, which lasted over five years and was unprecedented in its severity, caused the collapse of the inner

Anatolian agricultural sector, and crop yields probably remained at a low level during these years. Nevertheless, the method of tax calculation meant that as production collapsed, the tax rate remained based upon a longer-term average. Thus, the tax burden on the peasantry necessarily increased, if temporarily. Simultaneously, Celali revolts expanded across Anatolia and the rebels began to confiscate the crops and especially villagers’ grain supply. It is difficult to estimate the scale of these confiscations, but in order to provide seeds for the following year, villagers had to reserve a vital threshold of at least one third of their crops. Considering the

81 years of drought, surplus was probably extremely limited during the years of rebellion, potentially making bandit attacks a real threat to seed reserves. The five-years-long drought exacerbated the destructiveness of these disturbances, eventually resulting in crop failures throughout the region. Not surprisingly, the Celali revolts had a snowball effect in inner

Anatolia, as afflicted peasants abandoned their lands, either joining the rebels or fleeing to the cities or to western regions.

In contrast, the devastation was relatively limited in the Mediterranean regions. Western

Anatolia in particular outperformed the rest of Anatolia due to its accessible shallow water table and abundant surface waters, even though the Celali rebellions posed a real threat in this region as well. In contrast to the inner regions, western Anatolia developed significantly in terms of its fiscal population and agricultural production amidst the Celali chaos. Thanks to the sustainability of agricultural production in the region, its fiscal population was not forced to leave the land or to join the rebels in large numbers. Accordingly, the area’s small-sized gangs never turned into the massive rebel armies of the kind that formed in other regions; revolts remained relatively contained and localized. Moreover, immigration into the region compensated for the devastation, enabling a period of spectacular economic growth amidst the climatic conditions of the Little Ice

Age.

This chapter aimed to explain the regional ecologic/geographic features of western

Anatolia that enabled the rise of the ports of Izmir at the turn of the seventeenth century. To that aim, I highlited the peculiarities of the region against the characteristics of other Anatolian

Mediterranean regions. This, however, does not in itself explain the pivotal economic transformation observed in the contemporaneous Ottoman Empire, which triggered the rise of foreign commerce. In order to situate the dramatic growth in European commercial interests in

Izmir, we must look beyond the region’s demographic and agricultural growth, especially in cotton, vineyards and fruit production, to consider economic and political dimensions of this process as well. In the following chapters, I explore how a major transformation in the Empire’s economic infrastructure, namely monetization, worked as the main trigger behind the Ottoman commercialization process. In addition, I look at the limits of commerce in the pre-modern world.

CHAPTER 3

The Monetization Process of Ottoman Markets

In studies of early modern Ottoman history, the process of monetization is one of the most frequently mentioned themes, acting as a catalyst for the socio-economic transformations that took place in the Empire during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. This phenomenon is generally taken for granted in studies of the period, and often left untested, whereas issues of the state’s finances, currency debasement, and high rates of inflation are more regularly pointed out as factors contributing to the era’s multifaceted economic crises. However, the dynamics between these economic issues and the policies followed by the central authority towards solving them have never been explicitly laid out. Furthermore, the monetization process marked a fundamental change in the economic infrastructure of the Empire, which deeply impacted (foreign) commerce. This relationship has also been largely neglected.

In this chapter I adopt a monetarist approach and argue that the “economic crisis” that spanned roughly the period from the 1580s to the 1600s, stemmed from a monetization which was itself prompted by the extra coinage which had begun to be transported by Europe merchants into Ottoman lands in the last quarter of the sixteenth century.143 In brief, European merchants started to transport bullion into Ottoman lands, seeking to benefit from the advantages of arbitrage that originated from the existence of different monetary zones within the Ottoman

Empire, particularly in regards to commercial activities.144 This development, once observed in

143 Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century: The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 78. 144 It was Baki Tezcan who, for the first time, drew attention to the relationship between the monetary crisis and the existence of different monetary zones in the Ottoman Empire; following his main argument, ultimately, it is the currency problem that led the Ottomans to the great debasement of 1585. As will be expounded upon in the following sections, I agree with Tezcan on the roots of the monetary issue, but recent numismatic evidence demonstrates that it was not the end but rather the beginning of the Ottoman monetary reform that ended in the first 84 the monetary markets, rapidly increased prices, and soon the Ottoman market was forced to contend with a very high rate of inflation. The implementation of monetary reforms by the

Ottoman central authorities, which included the debasing of the currency, the rearrangement of the Empire’s gold to silver ratios, as well as recoinages, resulted in the restoration of monetary stability during the first years of the seventeenth century. As a result of these reforms, the

Empire’s various monetary zones were merged, and price fluctuations came under a degree of control. I suggest that the high inflation rate and the arbitrage opportunities of the period were tilted in favour of foreign merchants, and worked against local buyers in the Ottoman markets.

Therefore, it was the economic circumstances of the time that facilitated the expansion of foreign commercial activity. These advantages for foreign merchants largely disappeared with the restoration of monetary stability, and, after two decades of growth, the commercial expansion of this period relatively stabilized, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter. Thus, in this period, the monetization and commercialization processes proceeded hand-in-hand, and the rapid development of foreign commerce was based mainly on this imperial economic transformation.

When the central authority had secured the restoration of monetary stability, the expansion of foreign commerce subsequently stabilized by the turn of the seventeenth century. As the vehicle for the supply of excess money, foreign merchants had only an indirect impact on the Ottoman commercialization process, and it is ultimately not realistic to claim that a long-lasting mercantilist penetration of the port cities of the Empire developed during this period.

While the statistical documentation and analysis of the long-term commercial patterns of

Izmir is reserved for the following chapter, here I intend to focus on the monetization process as

years of the 1600s. Therefore, my contribution aims to take Tezcan’s work a step further, in an effort to contextualize the contemporaneous monetary crisis. See: Baki Tezcan, “The Ottoman Monetary Crisis of 1585 Revisited,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 52, no. 3 (2009): 460–504.

85 the basis for this eventual commercial advancement. Primarily, following Baki Tezcan, I will review the multiple currency-zone system of the pre-1580 Empire, and the monetary policy implemented by the central authority during this period under the light of recent numismatic findings. In the following section, I will introduce “Gresham’s Law” as the main factor behind the monetary crisis. Finally, in the last two sections, a chronological sequence will be traced: firstly, the period from the initial phase of monetary crisis in 1580s to the recoinage of 1589 will be analyzed in detail, followed by a look at the period between the Beylerbeyi incident of 1589 and the debasement of 1600.

3.1. Ottoman currency zones and the Ottoman monetary policy in the sixteenth century

Until the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire comprised a single, unified monetary zone throughout the empire, from the Balkans to Anatolia. This monetary system had a bimetallic structure, composed of the gold sultani and silver akçe, along with copper coins for small transactions.145 During the first half of the sixteenth century, the territory under Ottoman control expanded rapidly, and eastern Anatolia, Syria, and Egypt were brought into the Empire. The entire coastal regions of the Levant were incorporated into Ottoman lands, and the borders of the

Empire came to stretch all the way to the Persian Gulf in the east. The Ottoman government minted Sultani gold coins in these newly conquered lands, and a unified gold standard was instituted throughout the Empire. 146 In contrast to this standardization, the former silver currencies of these newly conquered regions continued to circulate under Ottoman rule, with

145 Şevket Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 59– 74. 146 The weight and fineness of Ottoman gold coins were equal to that of the Venetian ducat. This correlation facilitated an international gold standard across the Mediterranean. 86 only minor modifications.147 Furthermore, the former, localized gold-silver ratios of these new lands remained the same under the Ottomans.148

Ottoman government followed this strategy for the recently conquered lands located on the eastern borders of the Empire. The Safavid currency, the shahi (Turkish: şahi), was accepted as a local currency for this region and in the 1530s, the Ottomans began to strike new Ottoman

şahis that were quite similar to Safavid shahis.149 During this period, a Safavid shahi contained

4.67 g. of silver, while in contrast, the new Ottoman version comprised 4.4 g. These silver coins were larger than the Ottoman akçe, so the value of the Ottoman şahi was fixed at 7 akçes.150 In the mid-1550s, however, the Safavids debased their currency several times in a row, and the weight of the Safavid shahi subsequently decreased from 4.67 g. to 2.33 g.151

At this point, the significant contribution of Tezcan needs to be addressed in order to contextualize the reason of the emergence of Ottoman Empire’s bi-zonal monetary system. As

Tezcan explained in detail, after the debasement, gold:silver prices ratio has also changed in

Safavid markets. A gold ducat was worth 13 debased Safavid shahis in Safavid markets. That is, a gold coin was valued at about 30 g. (13 x 2.33) of silver in Safavid lands, whereas the same coin was worth 41 g. in Istanbul. Consequently, silver would become more valuable in Safavid lands than in the Ottoman markets, precipitating an outflow of Ottoman silver.152 This situation created a dilemma for the Ottomans. The Ottoman central authority could follow the Safavids, and devalue the Ottoman currency in order to keep the market rates on the same footing as the

Empire’s neighbour. Otherwise, the monetary developments occured in Safavid markets might

147 New coins were re-minted in the name of the Sultan, but their designs and standards remained the same as older ones. 148 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 88–111. 149 To avoid confusion, I use Şahi for Ottoman coins and Shahi for the Safavid ones. 150 For the details of this process, see;Tezcan, The Ottoman Monetary Crisis, 472-76. 151 Rudi Matthee, Willem Floor, and Patrick Clawson, The Monetary History of Iran: From the Safavids to the Qajars (New York: Tauris 2013), 106. 152 Tezcan, The Ottoman Monetary Crisis, 477-78. 87 cause a silver drainage towards the East. Tezcan argues that under these circumstances, the

Ottoman government apparently chose to follow an alternative policy, in which they accepted the

Safavids’ gold to silver prices ratio for the “Şahi zone” in the eastern borderlands. The weight of the Ottoman şahi was slightly reduced, to 3.84 g., and a gold coin was fixed at eight silver şahis, i.e., 30.72 g. of silver, as it was worth in Safavid markets.153 As a result of this adjustment, an

Ottoman Şahi became highly overvalued against the Ottoman akçe. Though its silver content was just 3.84 g., its value was officially fixed at 7–7.5 Ottoman akçes (4.75 g.–5.1 g.). Consequently, the value of the Şahi was about 25% higher than the value of the Ottoman akçe.154

The theory of Tezcan suggests that via these means, the Ottoman central authority created a buffer zone between the Ottoman and Safavid markets. The Ottoman administrators assumed that this borderland would constitute a separate and self-sufficient market, apart from the “main lands,” of the Balkans and Anatolia.155 By making such an adjustment, it was probably hoped that the anticipated silver drainage would be avoided, and that the impact of the Persian debasement would be reduced in the Ottoman lands. Indeed, the debasements observed in the

Safavid Empire did not have a direct influence on Ottoman markets until the 1580s.

All this theory summarized above as suggested by Tezcan, was built on largely circumstantial evidence in the absence of numismatic evidence. However, new numismatic findings have corroborated this theory, contributing to the idea that a monetary adjustment was indeed carried out by the Ottoman authorities in those provinces along the Safavid

153 Tezcan, “Monetary Crisis,” 478. Tezcan stresses the lack of circumstantial evidence on the equivalence between 8 Şahis and 1 gold, but the references from the court records of Aleppo justify Tezcan’s assumption. Fatih Ilhan, “Şer’iyye Sicillerine Göre 16. Yüzyılda Halepte Fiyatlar” (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Kilis 7 Aralık Üniversitesi, 2013), 12. 154 The emergence of Ottoman şahi as an overvalued legal tender 155 Tezcan, “Monetary Crisis,” 479. 88 borderlands.156 These findings indicate that this practice was not limited to the şahi coins. The

Şahi was not the only currency circulating in this eastern zone, as the akçe and para were also in use, primarily for small transactions. As mentioned above, the Şahi had become overvalued against the Ottoman akçe, and this re-evaluation of the Şahi could have caused inflation in the eastern lands of the Empire if it were used alongside the “main” Ottoman akçe. Numismatic evidence has demonstrated that the Ottoman authorities were able to find another practical solution for this problem by adjusting the rates of akçe and para circulating within the Ottoman

Şahi currency zone in order to avoid inflation in the local markets. Recent research carried out on the large sample of Ottoman coins discovered in a hoard located in the town of Beçin in western

Anatolia near modern-day Milas, has shown that there were two distinct types of akçe in the

Ottoman lands during the latter part of the sixteenth century. The “eastern akçe” which was minted in the eastern provinces, was about 25% lighter than the “western”, “traditional” or

“main” akçe.157 Therefore, the Ottoman lands had two different akçe zones, and while the Şahi was overvalued against the western one, this was not the case in respect to the eastern akçe circulating in the local markets.

Thanks to another source, we know almost the exact date of this monetary move, which took place in the middle of the sixteenth century. In a decree sent to the head of the Aleppo provincial treasury in response to a petition, it was noted that while 100 dirhem158 of silver were used to mint 265 pieces of para in Aleppo, the same amount of silver was used to produce 337 para at the mint of Diyarbakır. Due to this discrepancy, people in possession of large amounts

156 Rahmi Hüseyin Ünal, Friedrich Krinzinger, Michael Alram, and Şule Pfeiffer-Taş, Der Münzschatz von Beçin, (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2010). For a short article on the results of this newly discovered hoard, see: Şule Pfeiffer Taş and Nikolaus Schindel, “The Beçin Coin Hoard and Ottoman Monetary History in the Late 16th/Early 17th Century,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 56, no. 4–5 (2013) 653–71. 157 Pfeiffer-Taş and Schindel, “The Beçin Coin Hoard,” 661–2. 158 An old weight unit that equals approximately 3.2 g. 89 of silver preferred to have coins minted in Diyarbakır and other lands further east rather than in

Aleppo. The petitioner from Aleppo complained about the scarcity of money in the Aleppine markets due to this practice.159 The decree written in response dated February 1554, was most likely issued directly after the debasement occurred in Safavid lands, and from this decree it becomes clear that the difference between the rate of eastern and western coins was close to 25% as well.160 Thus, we can say that this “monetary buffer zone” policy, and the division between eastern and western currencies emerged right after the Persian debasement in the 1550s.

It should also be emphasized that the mints of Aleppo (or in other words, the Aleppine monetary markets) were regulated on the same terms as those of the “western zone”.161 However, this was not a strict boundary: for instance, beginning in 1579, the minting of overvalued şahi commenced in Aleppo without the permission of the central government. This situation continued for some time, producing bountiful profits for the mint operators. 162 In general, however, we can say that according to numismatic evidence, the “eastern akçe zone” ran in a line, north to south, from Canca (Gümüşhane), to Diyarbakır, Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra.163

159 İlhan, “16. Yüzyılda Halep’te Fiyatlar,” 9-10. Archival code of this document: Halep Şeriyye Sicilleri No: 1, Belge: 3003, Tarih: 9 Rebi‟ül-evvel 961/12 Şubat 1554. 160 (100 dirhem: 337) / (100 dirhem: 265) = 0.78. 161 Ünal et al., Der Münzschatz von Beçin, 161. 162 Ibid., 75. 163 Ibid., 156–65. 90

Map 3.10: Significant Ottoman mints in the second half of the sixteenth century. Yellow icons represent mints following the western (heavier) standard, whereas red ones represent those following the eastern (lighter) standard. Baghdad and Basra are also included in the map as the centres of overvalued şahi minting.164

The shift of the mint operations can be verified by looking at the silver drainage from the

“western monetary zone” to those mints that were allowed to strike şahi coins. In the absence of regular mint records, there is no way of determining the amount of minted coins produced by the various mints in the different parts of the Empire. On the other hand, we do have the records of the annual revenues of the imperial treasury collected from mukataa of various mints for certain years, allowing us to track the changes in the minting of regional coinage.

As the most active silver mines were located in the Balkans, the main mints of the

Empire were founded close by. The sole productive silver mine in Anatolia was located in Canca.

Apart from these Balkan mints, the Canca mint and the central mint (the darphane-i amire located in Istanbul), the other mints of the Empire had only modest capacities due to the lack of

164 Based on Ünal et al., Der Münzschatz von Beçin, 125–294. Map also available at: https://drive.google.com/open?id=1C403vDjGi-LGieoPjiMIU05geIw&usp=sharing 91

nearby silver mines, and were instead established in commercial centres and cities located on

major trade routes such as Edirne, Bursa, Aleppo, Diyarbakır, Damascus, Baghdad, and Basra.

Table 3.1 shows the annual revenue of the Imperial treasury sent by the mint operators of several

different mints as the payments of mukataa for the sixteenth century, based on data from various

sources. A comparison of these mint operations indicates that there was an outflow of silver from

the “western monetary zone” towards the mints in the “eastern zone” on the Safavid border,

specifically those of Baghdad and Basra. By looking at these data, we can see that the operations

of mints decreased in the most of the Empire in the latter part of the sixteenth century, except for

the mints of Baghdad and Basra. The two mints, as the central mints where Şahi was struck,

extended their operations and the value of their mukataas increased significantly.

1510s 1520s 1530s 1540s 1550s 1560s 1570s 1580s

Year 1532 1541 1571 Kratovo Mukataa 466,000 966,666 700,000

Year 1524 1535 1544 1574 Novo Brdo Mukataa 3,454,875 2,922,216 1,814,932 722,161

Year 1536 1543 1589 Sidrekapısı Mukataa 833,333 2,525,000 1,454,371

Year 1518 1527 1542 1553 Bursa Mukataa 100,000 110,000 130,000 70,000

Year 1519 1526 1536 1550 1570 1584 Aleppo Mukataa 240,000 845,000 800,000 90,000 110,000 110,000

Year 1525 1543 1569 Damascus Mukataa 600,000 260,000 100,000

Year 1557 1575 Mosul Mukataa 45,000 55,000

Year 1518 1540 1564 Diyarbakır Mukataa 90,000 650,000 68,333

Year 1540 1566 1577 Baghdad Mukataa 310,000 221,000 758,333

Year 1552 1575 Basra Mukataa 90,000 279,916

Table 3.9: Annual Mukataa Revenues of Several Sixteenth-century Ottoman Mints.165

As the table shows, minting operations in the Balkans were in decline throughout the

entire region during the second half of the century. The relatively modest mint of Bursa followed

a similar trajectory to the northern mints.166 However, other mints located in the southeastern

parts of the Empire show remarkable fluctuations over the course of the century. It must be

emphasized that these mints were dependent on specie flow, in the absence of silver supply

extracted from local silver mines. In the first half of the sixteenth century, the mints of the

Levant, such as Aleppo and Damascus, located halfway between the Mediterranean and the

165 For the towns of Kratovo, Novo Brdo, Sidrekapısı, see: Halil Sahillioğlu, “Kuruluştan XVII.Asrın Sonlarına Kadar Osmanlı Para Tarihi Üzerine Bir Deneme” (PhD diss., Istanbul University, 1958), 258–60. For Bursa: Mustafa Akdağ, Türkiye’nin İktisadi ve İçtimai Tarihi (Ankara: Türk Tarihi Kurumu Yayınları, 1959), 2:285. For Aleppo: Enver Çakar, XVI. Yüzyılda Halep Sancağı (1516–1566) (Elazığ: Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları, 2003), 283–9. For Damascus: Muhammad Adnan Bakhit, The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century (Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1982), 243–5. For Mosul: Ahmet Gündüz, Osmanlı İdaresinde Musul (1523– 1639) (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi, 2003), 243–5. For Diyarbakır: Fatma Acun, “16. Yüzyılda Diyarbakır şehrindeki ekonomik faaliyetler,” in I. Bütün Yönleriyle Diyarbakır Sempozyumu, 27-28 Ekim 2000, Ankara, ed. Necdet Adabağ et. al. (Ankara: Diyarbakır Tanıtma Kültür ve Yardımlaşma Vakfı, 2001), 201–18; p. 217. For Baghdad: Erdinç Gülcü, “Osmanlı İdaresinde Bağdat (1534–1623)” (PhD diss., Fırat University, 1999), 427. Mehmet Kabacık, “XVI. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti’nin doğu ticareti” (PhD diss., Fırat University, 2001), 146. 166 For the Mint of Edirne, we have just two records as well; the mukataa revenues from the mint of Edirne were 100.000 akçe for 1565, and 91.500 akçe for 1601. These were not included into the table due to the relatively late date of the second record. However, it also followed a similar trend with other mint records. 93

Eastern (Safavid/Indian) markets, were quite active. 167 However, by the second half of the century they had lost a significant portion of their business, which shifted to Baghdad and Basra, the main mints of Şahi zone, due to the profitable arbitrage opportunities there. Even if this overview does not provide us with precise fluctuations over shorter periods, it can still act as valuable evidence for the acceleration of activities in the eastern mints. Furthermore, it can, to some extent, help to demonstrate the outflow of silver to the eastern borderlands of the Empire during the latter part of the sixteenth century.

The question thus becomes: why did this silver drainage, and an arbitrage difference of about 25%, not influence the Ottoman monetary markets or cause inflation until the 1580s, particularly when we take the principles of Gresham’s laws into account? The answer to this question will provide us with the key to contextualize the Ottoman monetary crisis and will demonstrate how the flow of money into the Empire by European merchants triggered inflation and, consequently, a monetary crisis. To this end, the following section explains the dynamics of

“Gresham’s Law” as the main principle behind the economic transformation of the period.

3.2. “Gresham’s Law” at work

The creation of the “eastern currency zone” was seen as a practical solution to avoid experiencing the negative effects of monetary developments such as the debasement in Safavid lands. With this policy, the Ottomans could create a buffer zone between Safavids and their eastern markets, on the one hand, and the Ottoman “core lands” on the other. During the second half of the sixteenth century, the western part of the Empire maintained a gold-silver rate of

1:11.8. This was more or less equivalent to the ratio common in European states, which in this

167 The first registers prepared right after the conquest were generally based on estimation, so the first figures of Aleppo and Diyarbakır (1518-19) could be misleading. It is possible to trace the “real” average revenue of Aleppo’s mint through the next record of 1520’s. The records of Diyarbakır presumably are a similar case. 94 period was between 1:11.5 and 1:12.168 Consequently, there was no opportunity for arbitrage between the Ottoman and western markets. The “buffer zone” of the Persian borderlands also helped prevent the flow of Ottoman silver to Persia, which had a higher gold/silver ratio. This policy operated effectively until the 1580s, after which, however, the effects of “Gresham’s

Law” began to set in.

The term “Gresham’s Law” was coined by the nineteenth-century Scottish economist

Henry Macleod, and attributed to Thomas Gresham, the royal financial agent of Queen Elizabeth

I.169 Gresham’s law, probably one of the most well-known financial axioms, states simply that

“bad money drives good money out of circulation.” The principle behind this law is that if, for example, there are multiple currencies that contain different weights of precious metal but have the same nominal value, it is expected that people would use the overvalued currencies that contain less precious metal for their market transactions. The other, undervalued coins would instead be melted down, clipped, or exported to foreign mints. Over time, overvalued coins would come to replace the others in the market, and this would subsequently cause an increase in prices.

For a demonstration of this in practice, let us assume that a sixteenth-century Ottoman tradesman had to pay a tax of 15 akçes. If this tradesman had money in different currencies exchanged at a rate fixed by the government, such as western akçe and şahi, he would prefer to pay his debt with two şahis (meaning about 8 g. of silver) and keep his akçes, which had the same nominal value (15 western akçes containing about 10 g. of silver), for himself. These akçes

168 F.P. Braudel and F. Spooner, “Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750,” in The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. IV: The Economy of Expanding Europe in the 16th and 17th Centuries, ed. E. E. Rich and C.H. Wilson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 374–486, p. 459. 169 Even if Fetter argues that there are some contradictions on the origins of this attribution to Gresham, it is widely accepted in the form suggested by Macleod. See: Frank Whitson Fetter, “Some Neglected Aspects of Gresham’s Law,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 46, no. 3 (May 1932): 480–95. 95 would then be clipped, hoarded, or sent to the mints in order to be exchanged with the overvalued legal-tender, the şahi. After a while, the “bad money” (the şahi in this example), would replace the “good money” in the markets.170 This currency competition was not only between the şahi and the akçe, but also against the value of gold. For this specific period, the official gold-silver ratio (1:11.8) was determined with reference to the silver weight of the western akçe, and if a gold coin was instead purchased with şahi, this ratio would be reduced by about 25% in favour of silver. If the quantity of “bad money” increased in circulation, gold would gradually begin to be sold at a higher rate in the free market, and, correspondingly, gold coins would eventually disappear from the market. In the Ottoman case, where a gold coin was officially worth 8 şahi (30 g. silver) and 60 western akçe (40 g. silver), if the use of the şahi scaled up extensively, the presence of gold might retreat from the market. In essence, this example describes the depreciation of the akçe and the outbreak of inflation in the Ottoman markets.

Yet, there is a missing piece to the puzzle, one which needs to be considered, namely periodic conflict. The eastern monetary currency zone emerged in the mid-sixteenth century, but as evidence has shown, prices only began to increase in its final decades. How can this discrepancy be explained? This question can be answered through a review of the monetary crisis and the impact of silver supply on the economy. As will be detailed below, if monetary supply is not sufficient in the financial markets, then the consequences that necessarily follow from the application of Gresham’s Law can be interrupted. Thus, as I will argue in the following sections, the increasing supply of money provided by western merchants in the last quarter of the

170 In the case of imperfect information about the weight of coins on the market, Gresham’s law may fail, but in the Ottoman case, the coins had a clear shape, design and weight. See: Arthur J. Roldnick, Francois R. Velde, and Warren Weber, “The Debasement Puzzle: An Essay on Medieval Monetary History,” The Journal of Economic History 56, no. 4 (December 1996): 789–808. 96 sixteenth century triggered a “price revolution,” and caused the eventual monetary crisis of the period.

3.3. The Monetary crisis and great debasement of the late sixteenth century (1580–1589)

Details of price movements in the pre-modern Ottoman world were largely unknown until the

1970s, when Barkan produced the first comprehensive study on the topic by compiling data on the prices of food and raw materials gleaned from Ottoman archives. His findings were published in an article on the “price revolution” observed in Ottoman lands during the sixteenth century.171 According to his results, the prices in both nominal (akçe) and in real (grams of silver) rose regularly during the sixteenth century. Barkan argued that this inflation was a direct effect of the impact of European trade, and he put forward this development as the turning point of an irreversible Ottoman economic decline. This well-known and heavily cited argument remained unchallenged for almost three decades, until the revisions of Pamuk in 2001.172 According to the highly detailed datasets presented by Pamuk, the price index in grams of silver remained almost identical for fifty years between 1527–28 and 1574–75, despite some fluctuations in-between.

171 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “XVI. Asrın İkinci Yarısında Türkiye’de Fiyat Hareketleri,” Belleten 34, no. 136 (1970): 557–607. Revised translation as “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: a Turning Point in the Economic History of the Near East,” trans. Justin McCarthy, International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, no. 1 (1975): 3– 28. This seminal work was preceded by several studies by the same author going back to the 1940’s, including idem, “Bazı Büyük Şehirlerde Eşya ve Yiyecek Fiyatlarının Tesbit ve Teftişi Hususlarını Tanzim Eden Kanunlar I,” Tarih Vesikaları 1, no. 5 (1942): 326–40; idem, “Bazı Büyük Şehirlerde Eşya ve Yiyecek Fiyatlarının Tesbit ve Teftişi Hususlarını Tanzim Eden Kanunlar II,” Tarih Vesikaları 2, no. 7 (1942): 15–40; idem, “Bazı Büyük Şehirlerde Eşya ve Yiyecek Fiyatlarının Tesbit ve Teftişi Hususlarını Tanzim Eden Kanunlar III,” Tarih Vesikaları 2, no. 9 (1942): 168–77. In addition to Barkan’s work, there is also the following prior to Barkan’s 1970 article: Halil Sahillioğlu, “Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1525 Yılı Sonunda İstanbul’da Fiyatlar, I,” Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, no. 1 (1968): 36–40; idem, “Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1525 Yılı Sonunda İstanbul’da Fiyatlar, II,” Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, no. 2 (1968): 54–56; idem, “Osmanlılarda Narh Müessesesi ve 1525 Yılı Sonunda İstanbul’da Fiyatlar, III,” Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi, no. 3 (1968): 50–53. 172 Şevket Pamuk, “Price Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no. 1 (2001): 69–89. 97

And while the price index increased by about 30% between 1575 and 1585, sharp inflation only began after the 1585 debasement.173

The depreciation of the Ottoman akçe was more apparent by the beginning of the 1580s.

The exchange rate of the akçe against both gold and European silver coins (gurush), decreased.

Despite the official rates of 60 akçe for a gold ducat, and 40 akçe for a European silver gurush in

1579, the actual rates were 63 akçe and 43 akçe, respectively.174 These rates reached 70 akçe for the former and 50 akçe for the latter by 1582.175 Silk prices in Bursa and wool prices in Selanik, the sectoral centres of these raw materials, also increased in scale between 1579 and 1582.176 The monetary crisis peaked in the mid-1580s, but according to Koca Sinan Pasha, the grand vizier who was in charge during the monetary reforms undertaken in 1590, the critical threshold for the

Ottoman currency was surpassed only in 1582–83.177

Considering the temporal gap of about a quarter of a century between the emergence of the overvalued şahi coin, and the depreciation of the akçe, the question remains: why did it take so long for Gresham’s Law to take effect? In order to answer this question, we shall return to the example of the taxpayer tradesman. As discussed above, if this tradesman has different

173 Ibid., 76. 174 Cemal Kafadar, “When Coins Turned into Drops of Dew and Bankers Became Robbers of Shadows” (PhD diss., McGill University, 1986), 63. 175 Ünal et al., Der Münzschatz von Beçin, 75. 176 Murat Çizakça, “Sixteenth-Seventeenth Century Inflation and The Bursa Silk Industry: A Pattern for Ottoman Industrial Decline” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1978), and an article based on the results of this research: Murat Cizakca, “Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: A Study in Ottoman Industrial Decline, 1550-1650,” The Journal of Economic History 40, no. 3 (Sep., 1980), 536. Benjamin Braude, “The rise and fall of Salonica woollens, 1500–1650: technology transfer and western competition,” Mediterranean Historical Review 6, no. 2 (1991), 216– 36, For the price increase in wool observed in the Balkans mentioned by Braude; Ljuben Berov, Dvizhenieto na tsenite na Balkanite prez XVI-XIX v. i evropeĭskata revol͡iutsi͡ia na tsenite [Movement of prices in the Balkans during the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries and the European price revolution] (Sofia: Bŭlgarska akademi͡ia na naukite, 1976), 243–4. 177 “[S]pecifically on the matter of imperial coins and other affairs, it gets delicate, with the grace of God exalted, the state of affairs that has been out of order for the [past] seven-eight years is about to be maintained and corrected under proper conditions” [“hususan sikke-i hümayun hususunda ve ahar umurda dunyanın ihtimamları olunub be- ‘inayetillahi Ta'ala yedi-sekiz yıldan beru duzeni bozulmuş olan umur ahsen-i hal ile tedaruk ve tashih olunmak üzeredur”]. The passage, from a report on monetary reform submitted by Koca Sinan Pasha to the sultan, is published in Halil Sahillioğlu, ed., Koca Sinan Paşa’nın Telhisleri (İstanbul: İslam Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi, IRCICA, 2004), 141. 98 currencies exchanged at a rate fixed by the government, he would prefer to pay his debt with the overvalued coins. Consequently, the “driving out” illustrated by this example of Gresham’s Law depends on the option’s availability to the taxpayer.178 What if the taxpayer did not have such a choice? Certain economists, who have posed similar questions regarding Gresham’s law, have answered this dilemma by stating that, “as a limitation of Gresham’s law, the condition that the aggregate of good and bad coins must be in excess of the country’s need for circulating medium.”179 Therefore, if a sufficient supply of money in the markets is lacking, “bad money” will not be able to replace “good money.” In this case, “bad money” is as good as “good money,” and it does not have a determining negative impact on monetary markets except for the gains of coin traders.

Ottoman merchants were quite aware of this arbitrage opportunity and there are signs that they began to bring their silver to the eastern mints for profit. The mint records cited above also confirm this tendency. However, the relevant references also point out that money shortages occurred due to this silver flow towards the eastern Ottoman lands.180 These references indicate that the money stock did not exceed the need of market transactions; in other words, if some amount of money flowed to the eastern borderland, money shortages appeared in relevant markets. Therefore, the sufficient supply of money in the markets was lacking for the Gresham’s law to run its course. Additionally, these overvalued coins could only be legally minted in a peripheral region away from the “core lands,” and there was no silver mine or any other kind of silver supplier in these areas able to meet this demand. The only method of circulation for these

178 Fetter, “Some Neglected Aspects,” 493. 179 David Kinley, Money: A Study of the Theory of the Medium of Exchange (New York: Macmillan, 1904), 54, quoted in Dennis O. Flynn and Don Roper, “Gresham Law and the modern theory of the demand for money,” Eastern Economic Journal 8, no. 3 (Jul., 1982): 219–35, 224. 180 Sahillioğlu, “Osmanlı Para Tarihi Üzerine,” 90, 101. 99 overvalued coins throughout the Empire was via a substantial supply of silver to the Ottoman markets.

This requirement, and the approximate date of the depreciation of the akçe, point to the two most significant developments that occurred around 1580: the start of a protracted war between the Ottomans and the Safavids (the war of 1578-90), and the growing participation of northern European merchants in Levantine trade. As a result of the conflict with Safavids, a considerable amount of cash was injected into the eastern regions through the Empire’s war expenditure, such as the payments to large contingents of troops positioned along the borderlands.

For the latter, a substantial silver influx probably commenced around 1580, initiated by

European merchants.181

Even if it is difficult to determine the principal factor influencing the supply of money in these two simultaneous developments, it is apparent that the expansion of the supply of silver to the Levantine/Persian borderlands was a turning point in Ottoman monetary history. On the other hand, as will be demonstrated in the following section, the European gurush flooded the markets after the Ottoman-Safavid wars. Therefore, the coin supply through cash payments to Ottomans troops in the borderlands affected to a certain extent in the initial phase of the monetary crisis and the main trigger was most likely the money supply operated by European merchants.

After 1580, the şahi began to circulate widely in Ottoman lands, prompting a depreciation of the akçe against both gold and the European silver coin (gurush). A contemporary chronicler, Mustafa Selaniki, considered the wide circulation of the şahi as the trigger of inflation, following the debasement of the currency. In a passage on the reign of Murad

181 Steensgaard suggests that silver started to be transported to the Levant around the mid-1570s. However, the turning point should be around 1580, which was the defining moment in the saturation of the Ottoman monetary market. Furthermore, the truce between Philip II of Spain and the Ottoman Sultan Murad III (dated 1580), was another milestone which refers a new era for the history of the Mediterranean, and this episode might have facilitated the transportation of silver into the Levant. 100

III (1574–1595), he recounts how Sultan Murad sent troops to the eastern lands for twelve years, a period during which he conquered Tabriz and built a castle there. “Because of this,” writes

Selaniki, “the state of money in silver and gold deteriorated. Silver and gold gradually gained value. Overvalued [kemayar] Şahi coins from the borderlands flowed all the way to Rumelia.” 182

He continues by describing the subsequent inflation: “For this reason, the goods of merchants began to be sold for exorbitant sums. The prices of foodstuffs and clothes increased.” Finally, he shares his observations on the debasement, writing that “While it used to be that 400 akçe were struck out of 100 dirhem of silver, as was customary, it was then authorized to mint 800 akçe, and all the salaried troops began to receive half of what they used to get in gold and gurush.”183

As Selaniki described, the Ottoman central authority first intervened in 1585 when it debased the Ottoman silver akçe. The silver content of the akçe decreased from 0.68 g. to 0.38 g., meaning that it lost 44% of its silver. Initially, the gold-silver ratio remained steady, and the debasement rate was applied to the market value of the akçe against gold. Immediately following this, a decree was issued one gold coin was to be equal to 110 akçes, the Ottoman government decided to increase the gold-silver ratio in order to avoid a silver outflow driven by Europeans trading in Ottoman lands. For this purpose, the value of gold was officially fixed at 120 akçes.184

This intervention meant an adjustment of the gold-silver ratio, and the new ratio was set at 1:13.2, higher than that of Europe. The state’s intention here was to reverse the outflow of silver with gold.

182 Mehmet İpşirli, ed., Selânikî Mustafa Efendi: Tarih-i Selânikî (971-1008/1563-1600) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), 427. “…on iki yıl ale’t-tevâlî diyâr-ı Şark’a asâkir-i zafer-şi‘ân serdârlar ile sürdi. Güzîde-i memâlikin kabza-i iktidâra getürüp, dârü’l-mülk-i Tebrîz-i aldı kal‘a yapdırdı. Ve bu sebeb ile dirhem u denânîr ahvâline ihtilâl geldi. Gitdükce sim ü zer kıymete çıkdı. Serhadd-i mansûreden Şâhî sikkesi mağşuş u müşevveş kemayâr olup, aksâ-i Rûmili’ne dek geçdi.” 183 Ibid. “…Ve bu vâsıta ile tüccâr metâ'ı girân-bahâya satılur oldı. Melbûsât u me’kûlât es'ârı artdı. Kânûn-ı kadim-i Osmânî yüz dirhem gümüşden dört yüz akça kesilür iken sekiz yük akça kesilmeğe ruhsat virildi. Ve bi’l-cümle ulûfe-horlar evvelden aldukları altunun ve guruşun nısfın alur oldılar.” 184 For the successive decrees; Sahillioğlu, “Osmanlı Para Tarihi Üzerine,” 119. 101

While the Ottoman government implemented its monetary policy in an effort to cushion the destructive impact of the monetary crisis, its actions had instead a negative effect, due to the preference of Ottoman authorities for a particular method of debasement. Rather than reducing the weight of the coin while maintaining the precious metal content, they chose to keep the total weight of the coin fixed, but lower its silver content.185 Until this debasement, the standard akçe

“was minted from clean silver without any alloys,” but afterwards, a quantity of copper replaced a certain amount of silver.186 As a result, the newly debased coins were labelled hurda [junk] in the markets, and were not accepted in transactions by the general populace. Rather than offsetting the crisis, the state’s intervention served to exacerbate it. Prices doubled, as expected, due to the official debasement, but these newly debased coins were not able to dominate the market as there was no public confidence in their value. Payments to the Janissaries were now made with debased coins, but unsurprisingly, the Janissaries had trouble using these impure coins in the markets. In a letter sent by the governor of Tırhala (Trikala) to Istanbul in September

1588, the Porte was informed that the soldiers who had received these coins were unable to purchase goods with them, because the local people refused to accept what they regarded as

"junk". In response, a command was sent to the judges of Kili, Akkerman, Sereta and Bender ordering them to inform the people that these akçes were legal tender and thus must be accepted at the market.187

185 Cf. John H. Munro, “The Technology and Economics of Coinage Debasements in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: with Special Reference to the Low Countries and England,” in Money in Pre-Industrial World: Bullion, Debasement and Coin Substitutes, ed. J. H. Munro (London: Pickering & Catto, 2012), 17. 186 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 136. 187 Ünal et al., Der Münzschatz von Beçin, 79. “Junk” – hurda refers to the counterfeit and clipped coins as well. Archival reference of order, BOA. MD. 64, 5. 102

Therefore, the old coins were still in circulation and the gold-silver rates of the pre- debasement period were still valid in the markets.188 Consequently, it was not possible to cut off the silver flow from Europe to the Levant due to the ongoing arbitrage opportunity. This unsuccessful debasement also promoted the proliferation of counterfeits as well as the clipping of old coins. Contemporary observers underlined the negative impact of defective coins on the

Ottoman economy. Selaniki remarked that the people clipped every old akçe they could find, and made five pieces out of a single coin. The sikke, that is, the Ottoman coinage, lost its respectability and fell out of use. 189 The contemporary grand vizier Koca Sinan Paşa also complained in his report submitted to the Sultan that all of these clipped and counterfeited coins may have found their way into the imperial treasury as tax payments with the help of intermediary tax collectors.190

Furthermore, gold prices continued to increase after the debasement. Although the official exchange rate of a gold coin was set to 120 akçes on the open market, actual values were around 135–150 akçes.191 In addition, the European gurush also became overvalued after the debasement vis-à-vis the official rates. Indeed, the Ottoman government was not unaware of these troubling developments. As is seen in the following decree dated 1589, Ottoman officials had, in fact, deep insights into the principles of the monetary market:

New groush are officially circulated at the rate of 80 akça, and each groush contains 9 and 1/2 dirhem of silver and a little over one dirhem of copper. If it is melted and, from the silver thus obtained, akça are struck, only 65 akça are procured. People in the market are aware of this

188 Özer Ergenç, “XVI. Yüzyılın Sonlarında Osmanlı Parası Üzerinde Yapılan İşlemlere İlişkin Bazı Bilgiler,” ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi, special issue 1978 (June 1979), 86–97. 189 İpşirli, ed., Tarih-i Selânikî, “hurda akça ki kadîmden olan akçanun her birin, halk kimse tınmayıp, terk-i siyâset olmağla beş pare eyleyüp, kat'â sikkeden nâm u nişân kalmayup ve …,” 210. 190 Sahillioğlu, ed., Koca Sinan Paşa’nın Telhisleri, 10. “Hazine-i ‘Amire ihtilâlinün ve kul tâifesinün guluv ve ‘aczinin sebebi bu idi ki bu makule ümenâ ba‘z-ı erbâb-ı devletin taht-ı himâyetlerinde sıyânet olunub hâslarundan ve şâir câize alacak yerlerden aldukları kızıl ve kırkık akçeyi ve tengeyi ümenâya virüb altuna ve guruşa tebdîl idüb ve kalb akçeleri ümenâdan Hazine-i ‘Amire’ye aldururlar imiş ‘ulûfe zamanında kula ol makule kalb akçeleri vire vire bu fesâde bâ‘is olmuşlardır.” 191 Sahillioğlu, “Osmanlı Para Tarihi Üzerine,” 224. 103

fact and of the advantage of keeping their good silver akça and using only groush in their payments. As a result of this, akça disappears from circulation. The remedy for this is that the groush be devalued to a rate of 70 akça per groush. . . . So, the gain being negligible at the new rate, no one would be interested in hoarding the new silver akça.192

These monetary crises culminated at the end of the 1580s following the unsuccessful

attempt at debasement in 1585. Gold coins were exported from the Ottoman lands in return for

European silver, which flooded the Ottoman markets in the form of overvalued Şahis and

European silver coins. As a result, the akçe was eventually driven out of circulation. One of the

most striking illustrations of the catastrophic situation of the Ottoman monetary system at the

time is the composition of coin types found in the tribute payments of Wallachia and Moldavia

on the northern frontier of the Empire. These vassal states had to send a certain quota of annual

tribute to the Ottoman imperial treasury, and the changes in the monetary composition of the

annual tribute depicts the extent of the crisis.

Monetary composition of the tribute of Moldavia

Total Ducat Florin Gurush Sultani Year tribute Akçe (Venetian (Hungarian (European Şahi Other (gold) (akçe) gold) gold) silver coin)

1565/66 1,710,000 56.8% 12.8% 6% 0.1% 23.6% - 0.7%

1568/69 1,771,750 58.6% 9.2% 2.3% 29.6% - - 0.3%

1569/70 2,360,000 61.1% 25.2% 5.0% 7.2% - - 1.5%

1571/72 2,360,000 75.2% 12.7% 3.8% - 7.3% - 1.1%

192 MAD 22148 quoted in, Halil Inalcik, “Impact of the Annales school on Ottoman Studies and New Findings,” Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 1, no. 3/4 (1978): 69–96, 95. (Inalcik’s translation). 104

1574/75 2,948,791 80.1% 7.2% 1.6% 11% - - 0.1%

1575/76 2,586,000 65.8% 22.8% 3.2% 7.7% 0.5%

1588/89 3,150,002 - - - - 63.7% 36.3% -

1591/92 1,151,682 - - - - 100% - -

Monetary composition of the tribute of Wallachia

Total Ducat Florins Gurus Sultani Year tribute Akçe (Venetian (Hungarian (European Şahi Other (gold) (akçe) gold) gold) silver coin)

1563/64 3,000,000 100% ------

1565/66 3,073,000 100% ------

1568/69 5,700,000 98.5% 1.1% 0.2% - - - %0,2

1569/70 6,000,000 98.3% - - - 1.7% - -

1588/89 7,908,880 0.05% 0.05% - - 6.1% 93.8% -

Table 3.10: Monetary Composition of the Tributes of Moldavia and Wallachia in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century. 193

In the 1570s, the annual tribute of Moldavia was paid largely in Ottoman currencies, i.e.

Ottoman gold (sultani) and silver (akçe) coins. Şahi were not included, and the share of

European coins was less than 15%. However, in the tribute of 1589, over one-third of the total

amount consisted of Şahi, and the other two-thirds were provided in European silver coins, while

the 1591/92 tribute was paid entirely in European silver coins. The numbers are even more

extraordinary for the tribute of Wallachia: while the tribute was paid almost entirely in akçe until

the 1570s, afterwards, it was sent largely in Şahi, and partially in gurush. In total, over 8.5

193 Data extracted from Mihai Maxim, “Considérations sur la circulation monétaire dans les Pays Roumains et l’Empire ottoman dans la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle,” Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes 12, no. 3 (1975): 407–15. 105 million akçes worth of tribute were sent as Şahi to Istanbul from Wallachia and Moldavia in

1589. Apart from this amount, 900,000 akçes worth of şahi were also paid as a one-time tax for the purposes of coinage correction (rüsûm-i tashih-i sikke) that year. The total amount of şahi paid as tax corresponds to an annual transfer of considerable amount of silver coins that had been previously minted in the eastern borderlands and then transported to the northern frontier.

Transporting these coins constituted an enormous undertaking in time and labour, considering that the distance between the Şahi zone and Wallachia/Moldavia is over 2,500 km in aerial distance. In fact, the actual amount of coins in transport was possibly much higher, considering the fact that a large amount remained in circulation in the market. This can be taken to mean that the şahi had turned into one of the most highly demanded “commodities” in Ottoman lands at that time.

All the references above points an increasing circulation of şahi throughout empire. The general pattern of the monetary crisis based on the circulation of şahi can be sketched out by looking at the monetary composition of the annual revenues from various records of the Ottoman treasury. In Table 2.3 below, the monetary composition of the imperial revenues is compiled from four extant budgets for the period up until the monetary reform of 1590.

106

Metal Years 1547-48194 1567-68195 1582-83196 1589-90197

Akçe 100,712,719 78.3% 163,311,737 72.6% 169,839,079 61.8% 195,554,155 53.1%

Akçe-i Hurda 13,298,047 3.6%

Gurush 1,797,280 0.8% 6,951,814 2.5% 104,055,358 28.3% Silver Şahi 53,636,929 19.5% 30,673,952 8.3%

Şahi Hurda 4,228,431 1.1%

Others 1,826,223 0.5%

Efrenciyye and 27,896,227 21.7% 59,944,328 26.6% 43,207,535 15.7% 15,516,962 4.2% Sultaniyye Gold Engürüsiye 858,192 0.3% 1,770,000 0.5%

Others 234,788 0.1% 1,259,282 0.3%

Total 128,608,946 100.0% 225,053,345 100.0% 274,728,337 100.0% 366,356,187 100.0%

Table 3.11: Monetary Composition of the Annual Revenues of the Ottoman Imperial Treasury, as reported in the budgets of 1547-48, 1567-68, 1582-83 and 1589-90.

In the first two annual records for the years 1547-48 and 1567-68, the respective shares of

silver and gold allow us to see the balance of monetarily “stable times.” It should be noted that

for those years over 20% of tax payments were made in gold.198 In the budget of 1547/48, the

specific currencies were not mentioned, but in the second budget, the total amount of silver coins

received by the treasury was composed almost entirely of Ottoman akçe, except for a small

194 Ömer L. Barkan, “954-955 (1547-1548) malî yılına âit bir Osmanlı bütçesi.,” İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 19 (1957-8): 219–76. 195 Ömer L. Barkan, “H. 974-975 (M. 1567-1568) malî yılına âit bir Osmanlı bütçesi,” İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası 19 (1957-8): 277–332. In the Barkan’s articles, these figures were not gathered so I sum up the revenues from relevant sections in order to create this table. 196 Halil Sahillioğlu, “III. Murad dönemine ait 1582-83 (hicrî 990) tarihli bütçe,” in Osmanlı Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Bütçeler, eds M. Genç and E. Özvar (Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006), 2:31–79. There are entries about the arrears belonged to the previous years under the title of “An bakiye-i muhasebe-i sene-i maziye”, those entries are excluded with intent to capture the instant monetary composition of the year 990/1582-83. 197 Kadir Arslanboğa, “1589-90 ile 1602-3 Mali Yıllarına Ait Osmanlı Devleti Bütçelerinin Oluşturulması ve İncelenmesi” (PhD diss., İstanbul Üniversitesi, 2012), 108–16. 198 In the budget of 1547, the holdings of the imperial treasury are also listed along with the annual revenue. In this list, 58% of the total holdings were in gold coins, suggesting that the Ottomans preferred gold for the coffers of the imperial treasury. 107 percentage (<1%) in European silver gurush. This state of affairs radically changed in the 1580s.

The share of gold coins in the treasury’s total revenue decreased to a level of about 15%, indicating that taxpayers were reluctant to pay their taxes in gold, preferring payment in silver instead.199 Another remarkable shift is evident when we look at the types of silver coin that were deposited in the treasury. The overvalued “bad” coin, the şahi, comprised about 20% of the total amount of money received by the treasury as early as 1582, three years before the great debasement. This was a serious threat to the Ottoman financial structure. The total payment accepted as Şahi was valued at over 50 million akçes. This nominal value was counted at the official rate, but the real value of this part of the revenue was 25% less. That is, due to this currency difference the loss to the imperial pocket was approximately 12-13 million akçe that year alone. The situation gradually deteriorated until the Ottoman government introduced currency debasement in 1585.

However, as discussed above, this debasement failed to restore currency stability. While data for the years prior to 1589 are currently lacking, the composition of the various currency types received by the imperial treasury during that year illustrates the ruinous impact of the monetary crisis: the proportion of gold coins fell to as low as 5%. Compared to the over-20% share of gold in the previous budgets, this percentage highlights the alarming situation confronting the Ottoman financial establishment. Furthermore, the total share of şahi and gurush in the treasury almost doubled between the years 1582-83 and 1589-90. Aside from these figures,

5% of payments were made with hurda coins, that is, clipped or counterfeit coins, and considering the fact that an official ban on the acceptance of hurda coins by the treasury was in place at that time, the rate of clipped and counterfeit coins in open circulation was probably

199 I excluded the previous year’s payments from the chart in order to reach the composition of that specific year. If they were to be included, however, the gold ratio would converge on 20%. 108 much higher. Under these circumstances, and in order to recover financial stability, the Ottoman government was forced to implement severe measures. Doğancı Mehmed Pasha, the beylerbeyi

(governor general) of Rumelia, was assigned the task of tahsis-i sikke (the correction of the coinage) in 1588.

In summary, due to a limited silver/monetary supply, the existence of different monetary zones did not negatively affect Ottoman monetary markets until the final decades of the sixteenth century. However, it was then that western merchants started to bring large amounts of silver into the Levant for their commercial activities, finding that they could also make an extra 25% profit with their silver, thanks to the arbitrage opportunity inherent in their transactions. The silver thus supplied by the westerners and circulating in the form of şahi or gurush throughout the Ottoman Empire triggered not only an increase in prices, but also a change in the composition of the imperial treasury reserves. The first solution attempted by the Ottoman government, large-scale debasement of the currency, proved unsuccessful due to the negative reaction of the populace to the debased coins. As a second move, which will be discussed in the following section, the government initiated a re-coinage of the Ottoman currency with the aim of bringing stability to the recently debased money.

3.4. The Beylerbeyi incident and Ottoman monetary reform (1589-1600)

In 1588, the Ottoman Empire was still at war with the Safavids, and as a consequence of the wartime financial conditions, the re-structuring of the currency was not feasible without additional sources of revenue. In order to generate such income, Doğancı Mehmed Pasha imposed a tax called the “rüsûm-i tashih-i sikke” (tax for coinage correction), and invited several mint wardens to Istanbul in order to improve the capacity of the central mint. 200 Though

200 Sahillioğlu, “Osmanlı Para Tarihi Üzerine,” 223–5. The Ottoman government met with a severe reaction upon the collection of this extra tax. For several examples, see: Ünal et al., Der Münzschatz von Beçin, 79. 109

Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, a contemporary chronicler and bureaucrat, claims that the total amount of revenue collected from this tax reached 100 million akçes, according to the imperial budget records the amount equalled about 32 million akçes. 201 Nevertheless, this extra revenue amounted to almost one-tenth of that year’s imperial total. Following the implementation of these measures, new akçe coins were introduced in 1589. In the budget of 1589-90, these new coins were registered as akçe-i cedid (new akçe) and the total amount of this first outlay was only about five million akçes.202

In contrast to the measures taken in 1585 when the government reduced the coin’s precious metal content, this time the operation to correct the coinage was based mainly on weight reduction. The silver content of akce was to remain stable, but the weight was reduced by half.203

Thanks to this operation, the fineness of the Ottoman silver coinage was returned back to its pre- debasement level. Essentially, then, the Ottoman government corrected the mistake made four years earlier. However, this operation was also not without its negative consequences, as it directly contributed to an unexpected political development in the form of the first bloody military uprising in Istanbul.

In what came to be known as the Beylerbeyi incident, in April 1589, some troops revolted against the government in response to receiving their salary in the new half-weight coins which include the same amount of silver indeed. They marched towards the residence of the Grand

Vizier Siyavuş Pasha, but he told them to look elsewhere, for “the case of coinage correction was assigned to Beylerbeyi Mehmed Pasha.” Upon hearing this, the rebels instead gathered in front of the house of Doğancı Mehmed Pasha. As Selaniki narrates, the mutineers challenged him thus:

201 Aslanboğa, “1589-90 ile 1602-3 Mali Yıllarına Ait Osmanlı Devleti Bütçeleri,” 131. 202 Ibid., 110. 203 Pfeiffer-Taş and Schindel, “The Beçin Coin Hoard,” 662–4. 110

Our sultan’s coins have turned into this shape. Has the house of Osman ever given such a three-month salary to the soldiers in three hundred years? Then you came, became a favourite and imposed taxes all over the country. Do you think you can correct the coinage by making such innovations?204

In response to the mutineers’ demands, the Sultan beheaded Mehmed Pasha and dismissed Siyavuş Pasha. This revolt is considered to be the earliest large-scale military uprising in the Ottoman capital, the first of many such disturbances to take place over the following century. The numismatic evidence confirms that this project of coinage reform did indeed consist only of a revision of the shape and weight of the coins, and that there was no change in the silver content. Therefore, the reason behind the unruly actions of the Janissaries was possibly psychological connected to a lasting loss of confidence in the coinage. 205 The Ottoman intellectual, Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, reflected this perception:

The imperial currency... had become so small and broken-faced... that instead of being the shining brightness of the garden and meadow of the empire and the plentiful flower-petals of the vernal park of rulership, it has now turned in appearance into drops of dew.206

In spite of the brutality of this incident, the project of monetary reform was carried forward by the subsequent grand vizier Koca Sinan Pasha from 1590 onwards.207 Sinan Pasha sent sample coins for the production of new akçe, şahi, and para to the more distant mints, and

204 İpşirli, ed., Tarih-i Selânikî, 210; “Padişahumuzun sikkesi bu sûrete girdi. Üç yüz yıldan berü âl-i Osmân selâtîni ‘asâkir-i mansûreye böyle ulufe virmiş midür? Gelüp, mukarreb olup, memlekete akçalar saldırup, bid‘at itdürmeğle sikke mi tashîh eylesen gerekdür?” For details of the incident, see Günhan Börekçi, “Factions and Favorites at the courts of Sultan Ahmed I (1603–1617)” (PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2009), 190–5. 205 Pfeiffer-Taş and Schindel, “The Beçin Coin Hoard,” 666. 206 Faris Çerçi, ed., Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali ve Künhül Ahbar’ında II. Selim, III. Murat ve III. Mehmet Devirleri (Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları 2000), 2:255. “hala bir derecede sigar ve kırkılı kırkılı bir suretle bedidar olmuşdır ki bag u rag-ı saltanatın nur-ı pür-nurı ve şah-sar-ı bahar-ı hilafetin evrak-ı şükufezarı-i mevfurı mesabesinde iken fi amanına heyet-i katarat jaleye dönmüştür…” Kafadar’s translation, “When Coins Turned into Drops,” 88. Börekçi offers another plausible explanation for the rebellion, namely court politics. The rivals of Doğancı Mehmed Pasha manipulated this project in order to eliminate him. Börekçi, “Factions and Favorites,” 190– 5. 207 Siyavuş Pasha, the grand vizier during the rebellion, was dismissed from his post by Sultan Murat III after the incident and Koca Sinan Pasha was appointed in his stead. 111 ordered them to design the relevant coins in accordance with these samples. He noted in his message that the newly minted coins would be inspected in a few months.208 He further added that the mintage of şahi was only to be allowed temporarily in order to avoid any disorder in the local markets. After this period, however, all available şahi and clipped coins were to be brought to the mint for re-coinage. Sinan Pasha was particularly careful regarding the salary payments of soldiers. He decided to pay only one third of the soldiers’ salaries in new coins, and the rest in gurush, at least initially. By avoiding the payment of salaries wholly in the new coinage, Sinan

Pasha hoped to avoid the fate of his predecessor.209

Consequently, the “corrected” new coins (those that in the words of Gelibolulu Mustafa

Ali looked like “drops of dew”), together with the policies of Koca Sinan Pasha, succeeded in restoring monetary stability in the short term. Thanks to these efforts, the gold-silver ratio in the

Ottoman lands changed from 1:11.8 to 1:13, as had been intended originally with the 1585 devaluation. Accordingly, gold became more valuable in Ottoman markets than in European markets, allowing the state to reverse the silver flow from Europe. This ushered in European merchants’ transportation into the Empire of gold instead of silver. The Ottoman Empire still had two monetary zones, with the western akçe containing 0.38 g. of silver and the eastern 0.30 g. of silver.210 The difference of real value between these two legal tenders still stood at about 25%.

However, minting of şahi was allowed just temporily according to decree mentioned above, and the decrease in the supply of silver to the more distant mints limited the production of these overvalued coins. The consequent rapid recovery of the Ottoman financial structure can be traced by looking at the different types of currency received by the imperial treasury through the extant registers.

208 Sahillioğlu, ed., “Koca Sinan Paşa Telhisleri,” 10–1. 209 Ibid., 227–8. 210 Pfeiffer-Taş and Schindel, “The Beçin Coin Hoard,” 660. 112

Years 1589-90 1591-92 1592-93 1602-03

Akçe 195,554,155 53.1% 120,625,967 48.4% 112,458,704 42.1% 108,030,604 56.7%

Akçe-i 13,298,047 3.6% Hurda

Silver Gurush 104,055,358 28.3% 77,120,201 30.9% 89,670,726 33.6% 11,055,052 5.8%

Şahi 30,673,952 8.3% 1,998 0.0%

Şahi Hurda 4,228,431 1.1% 24,050 0.0%

Others 1,826,223 0.5% 628,497 0.3% 455,950 0.2%

Efrenciyye

ve 15,516,962 4.2% 46,886,582 18.8% 64,262,234 24.1% 71,530,182 37.5%

Gold Sultaniyye

Engürüsiye 1,770,000 0.5% 3,540,000 1.4%

Others 1,259,282 0.3% 385,848 0.1% 59,304 0.0%

Total 368,182,410 100.0% 249,213,143 100.0% 266,906,918 100.0% 190,615,838 100.0%

Table 3.12: Monetary Composition of Annual Revenues of the Ottoman Imperial Treasury, based on the budgets of 1589-90, 1591-92, 1592-93 and 1602-03.211

As seen above, overvalued Şahi and hurda (clipped and counterfeit) coins, which had

previously comprised 13% of the total revenue, disappeared within two years of the monetary

reform, and this entire amount of silver was converted into gold. The share of gold coins

increased to 20% in 1591-92 and 24% in the next year. A substantial amount of this precious

metal comprised gold sent from European ports during the 1590s. Venice alone sent 551,677

ducats to the Levant in 1595. This was the peak year of ducat export from Venice, but in the four

years from 1593 to 1596, the total number of ducats imported to the Empire through Aleppo

211 Arslanboğa, “1589-90 ile 1602-3 Mali Yıllarına Ait Osmanlı Devleti Bütçeleri,” 108–16, Sadullah Yıldırım, “1000/1592-93 ve 1001/1593-94 Tarihli Ruznamçe Gelir Defterine Göre Osmanlı Devletinin Merkezi Hazine Gelirleri” (M.A. Thesis, Marmara University, 2008). 113 exceeded one million.212 The peak year is also confirmed by reports on the silk trade (2,427 bales in 1595), submitted by the Venetian consul in Aleppo.213 Steensgaard points to this decade as the most prosperous one for the Venetian-Levantine trade, and this trend continued until the early

1600s.214

Figures derived from the records of the imperial treasury for 1602-3 show that the share of gold in the treasury neared 40% at the turn of the century, while the percentage of foreign silver coins in relation to Ottoman silver coins fell to a minimum level. Furthermore, the salaries of soldiers during the war against Austria in 1602-1603 were paid in gold coins, whereas 15 years previoulsy they had been paid entirely in gurush coins.215

In the reports he submitted to the Sultan, Koca Sinan Pasha praised himself—with perhaps some exaggeration—by emphasizing the success of his monetary reform:

Was it possible to find an Ottoman coin all around the world? Is there any sign of those counterfeited/clipped coins now? And bad [coins] called şahi covered everywhere and people almost gave up their traditional usage [ref: usage of Ottoman akçe] entirely; is the disappearance of the Şahi without undue fuss a negligible service?216

Even if the Ottoman government had been able to attain full control of the şahi and had succeeded in eliminating foreign silver coins from the markets, there still would have been two monetary zones in existence. In 1590, a coinage correction similar to that which had been applied to the western akçe was applied to the şahi and the eastern akçe; the şahi was reduced

212 The exact number of ducats was 1,045,447. Braudel and Spooner, “Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750,” 448. 213 Niels Steensgaard, Carracks, caravans and companies: The structural crisis in the European-Asian trade in the early 17th century (Copenhagen: Studentlitteratur 1973), 160. 214 Ibid., 178–80. In the first decade of the seventeenth century, commerce operating through Aleppo began to decline and was never to reach the same level. Steensgaard’s focus was on the commercial actors such as the Venetians and the French in the Levant and the Portuguese in the Indian ports. Therefore, he cannot provide an explanation for this commercial decline after 1600. 215 Caroline Finkel, The Administration of Warfare: The Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary, 1593-1606 (Wien: VWGÖ, 1988) 216 Sahillioğlu, Koca Sinan Paşa Telhisleri, 203. “Ve dünya geşt olunsa sikke-i hümayunlarıyla bir osmani bulunur mı idi? Şimdi ol züyuftan bir eser var mıdır? Ve şahi nam zağel alemi kaplayub te‘amül-i nas bi’l-külliye kalkayorken hiç duyulmadan aradan gittiği az hizmet midir?” Another contemporary Ottoman writer, Şehnameci Lokman, similarly highlights the success of the monetary reform. See: Kafadar, “When Coins Turned into Drops,” 94–5. 114 from 3.8 to 2 g. of silver, and the eastern akçe was fixed at 0.28-0.30 g.217 In order to create an integrated Ottoman monetary market, these zones needed to be merged.

In order to accomplish a complete reform of the currency and finally merge the monetary zones one additional step was necessary: the re-coinage of all extant coins. This last step was applied around 1600, as foreign silver coins all but disappeared from the market. The western akçe, which contained 0.38 g. of silver, was debased by about 15%, and its silver content was reduced to 0.32 g. Later on, most likely in the early 1600s, the silver content of the eastern akçe was upgraded to the level of its western counterpart, and the Ottoman monetary market resumed the status of an integrated currency market.218 Accordingly, one gold coin still equalled 120 akçes, and, following this debasement, the Ottoman gold-silver ratio returned to its pre-reform level of 1:11.8, which approximated the ratios then current among European states. Numismatic sources also point that the reform program was in fact highly successful and the control of central authority on monetary markets increased extensively in this process.

The Beçin hoard, which substantially revised all of our knowledge on the situation of late sixteenth-century Ottoman currency, is pertinent here as well.219 This hoard, with over 48,000 samples mostly dating to the reigns of Murad III (1574–1595), Mehmed III (1595–1603) and

Ahmed I (1595–1603), demonstrates the gradual wresting of control on the part of the Ottoman central authorities over the monetary markets. In 1590s, the overvalued eastern akçe was still being transferred towards the western zone to some extent, even though this process was more

217 Ünal et al., Der Münzschatz von Beçin, 154–60. There are also several archival references about usage of light akçe (called as kara akçe) apart from numismatic evidences. Pfeiffer-Taş and Schindel, “The Beçin Coin Hoard,” 661. 218 This move must have been made in the first years of the seventeenth century. According to the samples from Mehmed III (over 30,000 coins), this merger was not practised at the initial phase of the debasement. Samples from the reign of Mehmed III confirms that two different types of akçe were struck in the eastern mints between 1600– 1603. At the beginning, eastern akçes were also similarly debased and their silver content was reduced to 0.25 grams, but later it was fixed at the rate of the western akçe. Ünal et al., Der Münzschatz von Beçin, 664. 219 The hoard was found in 2000 and the results of the numismatic study were published in 2010 in German. It was also introduced with an article in 2013. 115 limited due to the scarcity of silver supply in the eastern monetary zone. Considering the location of the hoard, which was in the western coastal region of Anatolia, the distribution of akçes belonging to the latter years of Murad III’s reign throws some light on this situation.220 One quarter of the coins from the period between 1590 and 1595 originated from eastern mints and were transported to western Anatolia; coins struck by the central mint in Istanbul made up 28% of the entire sample.221 Conversely, by looking at the origins of the sample of coins (a total of

6,716 coins) from the reign of Ahmed I (1603–1617), we can see that the coins minted in the eastern lands by this time comprised less than 3% of the entire sample. Besides this, 59% of the sample was minted in Istanbul at the central mint.222

The Ottomans’ method for countering currency depreciation in many ways matched those of other contemporary polities. Pre-modern governments frequently undertook defensive debasement or otherwise intervened in bimetallic exchange ratios in response to the undervaluation of currencies.223 In the Ottoman Empire, these measures—called tashih-i sikke

(coinage correction)—were implemented several times in the course of the first half of the seventeenth century, with reforms taking place in 1618, 1624 and 1640. Having learned the lessons of 1585, these reforms carefully avoided changing the silver content of the currency.

However, these later recoinages, without considerable debasements, did prompt some short-term inflation, and the central government therefore enforced price ceilings (narh) following the

220 On the faces of the coins, the sultan’s seal (tughra) and the name of the relevant mint where the coin was struck are visible, and this practice enabled the circulation of the coins to be traced. The hoard had a large sample with almost 4000 akçes from this period. 221 Ünal et al., Der Münzschatz von Beçin, 164–5. The significant part of the eastern coins came from Canca (13.3%), and Amid (Diyarbakır) (7.5%). 222 The hoard’s contents were finalized around 1615, making it reliable evidence for the success of the monetary reforms. 223 For specific examples of defensive debasement as applied by governments, see Munro, “Economics of Coinage Debasements in Medieval and Early Modern Europe,” 28–32, idem, “Depreciation and the Petty Coinage Problem in the Late-Medieval Economy: The Case of Flanders, 1334-1484,”' Explorations in Economic History 25, no. 4 (1988): 387–423, Debra Glassman and Angela Redish, “Currency Depreciation in Early Modern England and France,” Explorations in Economic History 25, no. 1 (1988): 75–97. 116 corrections in order to keep prices at the same level. The chart 3.1 below, reproduced from

Pamuk, depicts the long-term price movements from fifteenth to twentieth century and in the context of late-sixteenth century economic crises, prices rose in the two decades between 1580 and 1600, and peaked in 1604, after which they declined to some extent. Following this period, price movements remained within a narrow spectrum until the second half of the eighteenth century. The difference between the price indices of the 1570s and the 1760s ultimately remained very small.

Figure 3.1: Long-term Price movements in Ottoman Empire. Reproduced from Şevket Pamuk. 224

3.5. Conclusion

In conclusion, the Ottoman monetary crisis of the late sixteenth century was prompted by the expansion of the monetary supply and accelerated by the multiple-currency structure of the

224 Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 236. 117

Ottoman monetary system, ending two decades after its inception in the early years of the seventeenth century. After the failure of the great debasement of 1585, a recoinage effort was undertaken around 1590 in order to stabilize the monetary markets. This policy enabled the

Ottoman economy to purge the overvalued şahis and the foreign coins in circulation within approximately a single decade. Upon the re-attainment of stability in the supply of silver money, the Ottomans began a minor currency debasement and another recoinage process around 1600 in order to merge the currency zones and return the Empire to the standard European gold-silver ratio. This two decade-long monetary crisis left a strong impression on Ottoman economy, with substantial silver—and, later, gold—outflows, along with two significant debasements. On the other hand, this brief shock was a turning point for the monetization of the Ottoman economy.

The money demand of the Ottoman markets was sated by turning to the supply of European money, and the monetary zones of the Empire were unified by the policies implemented by the

Ottoman government. In the following period, this monetization led to a revolution in the

Ottoman taxation system, and this became a significant impetus for a comprehensive transformation of the whole of Ottoman society, from politics to the military. More pertinently to this dissertation, the late sixteenth-century monetary crisis was a period of rapid expansion for foreign commerce, as will be demonstrated in the following chapter. Foreign commerce developed in the closing decades of the century, and subsequently followed a stable trajectory dependent upon that of the Ottoman markets up until the nineteenth century.

118

CHAPTER 4

The Commercialization Process and Long-Term Patterns of Ottoman Foreign Trade

The quantitative dimensions of early modern Ottoman commerce are still largely obscure. This is despite the fact that the structure of that commerce can be roughly traced through qualitative references such as court records, travel accounts, or imperial decrees on commercial issues. The only available quantitative works are based on European archival material, which concerns the commercial operations of specific groups in the Eastern Mediterranean such as English or French merchants. As such, they do not provide us with a holistic view of foreign commercial patterns and the fluctuations observed in early modern Ottoman markets.

In this chapter, I outline the long-term commercial trajectory of Izmir, from the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth century, through a comprehensive dataset I compiled from

Ottoman archival evidence. I take the customs revenues of Izmir as indicators of overall foreign commercial activities, and analyzed them in order to understand the limits of integration between the markets of western Anatolia and Europe. Based on this analysis, I argue that the first phase of rapid commercial expansion in Izmir lasted approximately two decades, from the 1580s to the first decade of the seventeenth century, which corresponds to the monetization process discussed in Chapter Three. European merchants who visited Ottoman ports benefited from the high inflation and the arbitrage opportunities available up until the early seventeenth century. During this period, foreign mercantile groups held an advantage over local purchasers, and, as a consequence, made foreign merchants temporarily more competitive in Ottoman markets. In the first decade of the seventeenth century, monetary/price stability was to a relative extent restored, arbitrage disappeared and foreign merchants lost their competitive advantage. The next section demonstrates how, in the following period, commercial development grew dependent on the 119 expansion of Ottoman markets. As oppose to the understanding that European mercantile groups were the sole factor driving an ongoing integration process during the period between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, I underscore the presence of long-term commercial stability, or more precisely, a parallel outlook in trends regarding the fluctuation of Ottoman markets after the settling of monetary markets.

Furthermore, by comparing figures on Izmir’s commerce with customs revenues of

Erzurum, the eastern Anatolian trade hub, I will also demonstrate that the “early incorporation” was not limited to the establishment of commercial ties between the Ottoman Empire and

European markets, as the Eurocentric modernist view tends to emphasize. Through the caravan trade Ottoman markets were simultaneously connected with eastern economies, including, in particular, the Persian and Indian markets. Such connections were at least of the same degree of economic siginifance as those with European markets. Before the seventeenth century, the trade between the eastern and western markets was largely based on spice trading through the ports of the eastern Mediterranean and following the old spice routes. However, beginning in the late sixteenth century, caravans from the east began to arrive in Anatolian markets, passing through the gates of Erzurum and carrying mostly textile products, particularly Persian silks and Indian cotton. To some extent, traditional ports also lost their importance during this period. As a

Eurasian empire, the Ottoman Empire strengthened its commercial ties not only with European markets, but instead, with both eastern and western markets equally. When we look at tax revenues from the last decades of the sixteenth century, trends show parallel trajectories from this time onwards. Consequently, it is inaccurate to propose that a European mercantilist penetration into Ottoman lands was prompted by a structural change in production, or was due to a substantial decrease in transportation costs as observed in the nineteenth century. Instead, we

120 see a limited integration among Eurasian markets enabled by the monetization process during the late sixteenth century.

In order to bring the study of commercial integration between Europe and the Ottoman

Empire into a wider context, the analysis begins by discussing the Eurasian monetary integration process and the expansion of interregional trade. The following section examines the long-term commercial pattern of Izmir, based on new findings from the Ottoman archives. Next, Izmir’s customs revenues are compared with that of Erzurum, offering a more detailed understanding of the balance between western and eastern trade. Finally, in order to test the mercantilist influence on the Ottoman economy, the long-term commercial trajectories of Izmir and Erzurum are evaluated with reference to the economic growth of the Ottoman markets at the time.

4.1. Eurasian Monetary Integration and the Expansion of Interregional Trade

The most significant developments in early modern monetary markets were not confined to the

Ottomans, but took place within other spheres of influence as well. The Safavid and Mughal

Empires also had their own distinct currency zones and various types of coins. The influx of silver most likely caused similar difficulties in those markets, due to the dynamics between multiple distinct currency zones present in these empires as well. Not surprisingly, the governments of those empires took several measures and merged the currencies in use, albeit following different strategies. In the case of the Safavids, before the debasement of the mid- sixteenth century—discussed in the previous chapter—the Safavid Shahi was worth 4.67 g. of silver, whereas after the debasement, two different standards were fixed for the Shahi; the western shahi which was used on the Ottoman borders had 2.33 g. of silver, whereas the eastern shahi was fixed at 2.92 g. In the 1590s, this divergence among the currencies was fixed. Firstly,

121 upon his accession in 1588, Shah Abbas I introduced a new silver coin called the Abbasi (shahi- ye abbasi), but allowed the minting of the older type of coins for a time. Around 1595, standards for the various old-type coins were merged with the standard for Abbasi coins. Historians of the

Safavid Empire suggest that this enforcement of currency uniformity was precipitated by an increase of money in circulation. Thus, the monetary reform of Shah Abbas I established a consistent single-type currency, and consolidated the power of the central authority over the monetary markets.225

The Mughal Empire similarly undertook currency reform in the last decade of the sixteenth century. During the reign of Emperor Akbar, the territories of the empire expanded significantly, and the currencies minted by the former regimes were retained under Mughal rule.

Eventually, the Mughal government moved to standardize the different currencies and their fluctuating exchange rates with the aim of improving fiscal management. Initially, Akbar introduced a new type of coinage in 1584.226 Later, according to an imperial order of 1592, all gold and silver coins produced under previous emperors were requisitioned for recoinage. All coins, no matter their depreciation or deficiency, were accepted under their full exchange rate for free by the imperial mints.227 By the end of Akbar’s reign in 1605, all of the region’s monetary systems had been absorbed and their currencies were replaced by that of the Mughals’.228 Thus, the last decade of the sixteenth century was a period of currency standardization and/or monetary centralization for not only Ottomans, but also Safavids and Mughals.

225 Rudi Matthee, Willem Floor, and Patrick Clawson, The Monetary History of Iran, 106–8. The principles of this monetary reform held until the fall of the Safavid dynasty. 226 John S. Deyell, “The Development of Akbar's Currency System and Monetary Integration of the Conquered Kingdoms,” in The Imperial monetary system of Mughal, ed. John F. Richards (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 13–67, 35. 227 Najaf Haider, “Standardization and Empire: A Study of the Exchange Rates of Mughal Currencies,” in Mind over Matter: Essays on Mentalities in Medieval India (Chennai: Tulika, 2009), 40–53. 228 Deyell, ibid.,” 45. 122

The economic issues caused, or at least exacerbated, by the flow of silver (whether due to scarcity or abundance), such as the divergence of exchange rates or the depreciation of coins, were commonly encountered throughout the pre-modern world. For instance, in the late sixteenth century when the bimetallic ratio was 1:12 in European markets, China’s was 1:6.Consequently, substantial Chinese gold exports continued along with a massive importation of silver until 1640, when the arbitrage gains were negated due to world-wide convergence towards a bimetallic ratio of 1:14.229 Despite this trend, temporal and regional fluctuations of exchange rates never totally disappeared, so merchants always had a chance to make an arbitrage profit by trading commodity money. Nevertheless, the general trend for gold:silver ratios was towards convergence among Eurasian markets in the early modern period.230

European Years England France Ottoman Empire Persia India China average

1575 12 12 12 12 (west) - 9 (east) 9 9 6

(1590-1600): 13 1600 12 12 12 12 10 7 12

1625 14 13 13 11231 13 8

1650 14 14 14 14 13.5 14 14

1675 15 15 15 16 15 15 15

Table 4.1: Gold to Silver Prices Ratios in Eurasian Markets in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries232

229 Dennis Flynn, “Precious metals and moneys, 1200-1800,” in Handbook of Key Global Financial Markets, Institutions, and Infrastructure, ed. Gerard Caprio (Oxford: Elsevier, 2013), 1:221–34, 223. 230 For a solid China-oriented explanation of the relationship between the circulation of American silver, arbitrage opportunities and the expansion of trade, see: Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, “Arbitrage, China, and World Trade in the Early Modern Period” in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1995) 429-448. 231 This ratio, extracted from Pamuk’s compilation (see the following footnote for reference), should be viewed suspiciously. For the years before and after 1625, the gold:silver ratio was higher than 11, but 1625 was a particular case with unique circumstances.While I decided to include it, it should be seen as an exception for the monetary markets. 232 The ratios for England, France, the European average, China and India are taken from; Stephen Broadberry and Bishnupriya Gupta, “The early modern great divergence: wages, prices and economic development in Europe and 123

European financial markets began to integrate in the mid-fifteenth century, and their exchange ratios began to converge long before the emergence of maritime trade with South

Asian ports. 233 By the sixteenth century the interregional monetary structure was relatively integrated among European states. However, this ratio increased gradually throughout the eastern markets of Eurasia and the Ottoman Empire was in a crucial location in regards to this gradual transformation taking place across the continent. After the readjustment of the gold:silver ratio and the emergence of eastern and western currency zones in the mid-sixteenth century, the

Ottoman Empire turned into a transitory monetary zone. While the western regions of the empire, including the Levantine coasts and especially Aleppo were aligned with European markets—as can be seen in Table 4.1 above—the eastern regions were on the same track as the

Safavid and Mughal markets. This 25% rate difference was seen vital for the sustainability of the spice trade that flowed from India via the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea to Aleppo and

Alexandria, the traditional spice emporiums of the Levant. After the Portuguese expansion throughout the Indian Ocean in the early sixteenth century, the spice trade through the Levant was interrupted for some time, but there is a consensus among historians that these trade routes were revived by the middle decades of the century. 234 This extra 25% profit, as discussed previously, arose from the arbitrage difference, and might lead merchants to run their operations through the eastern Mediterranean entrepots from the mid-sixteenth century onwards. By the

1600s, spices virtually ceased to arrive in Ottoman lands via the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf,

Asia, 1500–1800,” Economic History Review 59, no. 1 (2006): 2–31, 23. For the gold-silver ratio of Iran, see Bert Fragner, “Social and Internal Economic Affairs,” in The Cambridge History of Iran, ed. Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart (Cambridge University Press: 1986), 6:491–567, 565. The Ottoman ratios for 1575 and 1600 are revised in accordance with the suggestions of previous chapter; all others are taken from the table; Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire, 136. 233 David Chilosi and Oliver Volckart, “Money, States, and Empire: Financial Integration and Institutional Change in Central Europe, 1400–1520,” The Journal of Economic History 71, no. 3 (2011): 762–91. 234 For a detailed survey on the historiography of the sixteenth-century spice trade, see: Salih Özbaran, Ottoman Expansion Towards the Indıan Ocean in the 16th Century (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), 285–99. 124 not only due to a Dutch monopoly on the trade, but also likely due to the disappearance of this arbitrage opportunity. However, this did not mean that the Ottoman trade route was interrupted permanently; rather, the structure of commerce was transformed by the monetization and convergence of monetary markets on a Eurasian scale.

With the arrival of northern European merchants in the Mediterranean in the last decades of the sixteenth century, Izmir connected western Anatolia to European ports. This commercial expansion, which was promoted by arbitrage and inflation, continued until the end of the sixteenth century, and stabilized in the following period. This monetary/commercial development also affected the Empire’s eastern trade to the same degree. Eastern Anatolia was connected to the Persian and Indian markets through the caravan route via Erzurum, the main gateway of the region. With the dissappearance of arbitrage opportunity, long-distance spice trade lost its driving force. With regard to this, Alexandria and Aleppo, the main entrepots for the spice trade, began to lose their relative preeminences. On the other hand, interregional trade prompted by monetization, developed rapidly and Izmir and Erzurum replaced the Alexandria and Aleppo as the gateways of cross-continental commerce. The commercial capacity of this inter-regional trade came to be dependent upon the fluctuations of the Ottoman markets after the period of monetary transition between the 1580s and the 1600s. The following sections analyze the transformation of commercial structure, and the long-term patterns of foreign trade in order to reinterpret the the commercial transformation of Ottoman Empire at Eurosian scale.

4.2. Izmir’s Long-term Commercial Pattern

With the entrance of new actors into the Mediterranean in the last decades of the 16th century the structure of long distance maritime trade has begun to change. Venice lost its leading role in the

125

Levant trade. As early as 1620s, Venetian merchants had already lost a considerable part of their share of Ottoman commerce, which came to stand at around 25%, on par with the French and substantially below the English, who by then controlled 40%.235 By the mid-eighteenth century, it was the French who took the lion share of Mediterranean commerce.236 These arguments, however, are based largely on European archival evidence. They tell us little about the total trading volume and its trajectory from the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries. This chapter, conversely, seeks to shift the focus from the activities of mercantile groups to the

Ottoman market itself and the boundaries of total foreign trade therein.237

In order to address these questions, I have compiled a comprehensive dataset on the commercial capacity of early modern Izmir. The data provided by Ottoman registers have their limitations, especially compared to European sources, as these registers were primarily drawn up for fiscal purposes, such as customs collection.238 As the auctioning of customs revenue of Izmir commenced in the second half of the sixteenth century, the only figures we have refer to the total amount of annual payment by the tax collector (mültezim) to the central treasury. Therefore, unlike European records, the available Ottoman registers do not include the categories of goods and their size, nor the names of merchants.239 At the beginning of the Cretan war, in 1645, the

235 Maria Fusaro, Political Economies of Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean: The Decline of Venice and the Rise of England 1450–1700, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 79. 236 Edhem Eldem, French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1999) and Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna. 237 There are also rare significant contributions on the issues of the role of domestic merchants. For instance, Panzac had found some evidence for the greater domestic market and its agents. Daniel Panzac, “International and Domestic Maritime Trade in the Ottoman Empire during the 18th Century,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 24, no. 2 (1992): 189–206,; For an alternative perspective against the findings of Panzac; Edhem Eldem, “Strangers in Their Own Seas? The Ottomans in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin in the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century,” Studi Settecenteschi, no. 29–30 (2010): 25–57. 238 Edhem Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2006), 3:283–335, 285–9. 239 Only a few detailed registers that include the number of ships, total quantity of goods etc., exist in the Ottoman archives for the early period, and it is not possible to establish a long-term pattern using them. Mübahat S. Kütükoğlu, “Osmanlı Gümrük Kayıtları,” The Journal of Ottoman Studies, no. 1 (1980): 220–4. Such detailed registers can be found more frequently for the later periods especially after the 1770s. Even though they provide a 126 customs revenues of Izmir were affiliated with the customs of Istanbul, and Izmir’s custom trustees (emin) were to be appointed by the customs revenue collectors of Istanbul. This organizational adjustment did not change the record-keeping style, and the total amount of annual tax sent to Istanbul continued to be registered in the same manner without any references or details. Moreover, the total amount in Izmir’s registers refers not only to the dues collected in the local port, but in nearby ones as well (known as “tevabi” [dependent ports]), such as Chios,

Çeşme, Balat, Urla, Kuşadası, and Foçateyn (new and old Foça). In addition to import and export duties, the amount shown also includes taxes levied on several local commercial products, such as mastic or salt.240 These taxes collected in various towns were bundled together into compound unit (mukataa) and farmed out together so the distribution of collected taxes among these ports cannot be calculated from the extant financial records, with a few exceptions. 241 A final limitation of the statistical series that should be mentioned is the unavoidable lack of data for certain years. There is no specific catalogue or type of standard registers that would allow us to follow customs revenues sent from Izmir in consistent fashion for the period from sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. I have compiled the data from a wide range of document types, including petitions sent from Izmir for a higher bid for the tax farm, imperial financial records, and the registers of individual tax collectors. The picture is still far from complete.

With all its limitations, the long-term series of the customs revenues of Izmir is quite reliable as a data source. First of all, the rate of dues and the customs system were consistent

great deal of sophisticated information on these issues, they are also an incomplete series and do not allow us to trace commercial fluctuations A. Mesud Küçükkalay and Numan Elibol, “Ottoman Imports in the Eighteenth Century: Smyrna (1771–72),” Middle Eastern Studies 42, no. 5 (2006): 723–40; A. Mesud Küçükkalay, “Imports to Smyrna between 1794 and 1802: New Statistics from the Ottoman Sources,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 51, no. 3 (2008): 487–512. 240 BOA. TSM 2580 0004.01 241 The only exception I came across in the Ottoman archives is BOA. IE Maliye, 640. For the analysis of this document, which shows the details of taxation for the year 1604-1607, see Daniel Goffman, Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 58. 127 throughout. There were no specific customs tariffs for various goods; rather, Ottoman customs taxation was mainly based upon an ad volerem principle.242 This meant that dues were calculated by the Ottoman agents based on the market value of the commodity and applied to the merchants in accordance with rates of 3% for Muslim Ottomans, 4% for non-Muslim Ottomans and 5% for foreigners. In the last decades of the sixteenth century, privileges (ahdnames) were granted to

European merchants by the Ottoman central authority, hence they also began to pay 3% customs tax.243 Using these statistics, an overview of the scale of foreign trade is possible.

The fluctuation of Izmir’s customs revenues, in other word updated figures, would be accepted as the clue on the reliability of these registers. The mukataa of Izmir customs was sold by auction until 1645, and the tax sum that was sent to the imperial treasury was revised with each higher bid. As a result, the value of the total customs revenues was updated frequently, as indicated below in Chart 4.1. By the beginning of the Cretan War in 1645, the customs office was affiliated with the customs of Istanbul but the total amount of tax collected continued to be updated, even if it was not as frequently as observed in the previous period. For instance, through customs revenues, it is possible to follow commercial fluctuations as a result of the long war of

1683-1699 and the great Izmir earthquake of 1688.

Finally, we should note that annual tax payments were fixed after the 1720s. In official imperial financial records, the figures were frozen for some time during the eighteenth century,244 and this is the case also for the records on Izmir’s customs revenues. However, the

242 The first document we have on specific customs tariffs applied to different commodities in the port of Izmir dates to the second half of the eighteenth century. Halil Sahillioğlu, “1763’de İzmir Limanı İhracat Gümrüğü ve Tarifesi,” Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi 2, no. 8 (1968): 53–7. 243 Halil İnalcık, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 199-200; Mübahat Kütükoğlu, “Gümrük,” TDV-İA (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1996), 14:260–8. An Ahdname was signed with France in the second half of the sixteenth century. English merchants obtained these privileges in 1580. The Dutch Republic signed a similar ahdname with the Ottomans in 1612. 244 Mehmet Genç, “18. Yüzyıla Ait Osmanlı Mali Verilerinin İktisadi Faaliyetin Göstergesi Olarak Kullanabilirliği Üzerinde Bir Çalışma,” in Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi (Ankara: Ötüken, 2010), 155–187 128 personal records of the chief of Ottoman customs provides us with the most precise statistics for the years of the mid-eighteenth century. Extrapolating from these records, a comprehensive dataset could conceivably be compiled for the period between the late sixteenth to the mid- eighteenth centuries. Finally, it has to emphasized that these figures belong to the tevabi ports of

Izmir, including Urla, Çeşme, Chios, Foçateyn etc., even if the main port was indeed that of

Izmir itself. However, this does not undermine nor compromise the conclusions based on these figures, since all the components of this mukataa were integral to regional commerce. Therefore, data that combine the customs of these ports do not mar the observations made about regional commerce; rather they underpin them.

The data series discussed below allows us to broadly follow the fluctuations of foreign trade for this the most prominent port-city of the early modern Mediterranean for an extended period of time. Before an analysis of the deflated values of nominal revenues, I would like to provide a short survey of the nominal tax revenues in order to point out the significant turning points and stress the periods of instant rise and decline. The chart below (Chart 4.1) depicts the long-term commercial trend of business conducted in Izmir based on the annual customs revenues.

129

Figure 4.1: Customs Revenues of Izmir, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century.245

The customs revenues of Izmir were recorded in the 1528 survey along with the town of

Urla, and the total annual customs income of these two modest towns was just 110,000 akçes

(80,000 akçes/Izmir + 30,000 akçes/Urla). By 1560, that amount was still only 120,000 akçes annually, and it was thus a negligible amount for the imperial treasury.246 In 1570s, the customs revenues of the ports around Izmir were unified and converted into a single mukataa. This tax unit was sold at auction for an annual payment of 323,000 akçes in 1579,247 the last year before the region’s rapid commercial development, which lasted about two decades.

245 The data of this graph and the relevant references can be found in the attached Appendix III, p 207. 246 Kütükoğlu, XVI. Asırda İzmir, 42-43. A higher bid, with an annual installment of 180,000 akçes, was proposed for these customs in 1558, but the bidder could not provide a guarantor so it was declined. 247 Ibid., 43. Chios, Izmir, Old and New Phokaia, Balat. Mukataas were farmed out for 3 years or 6 years contracts. However, in case of a higher bid within this period, the central authority could renew the sale. The bid of 1579 was probably based on the estimated total income of these ports. Considering the annual customs revenues of the ports, the average should be higher than the bid. For instance, the customs revenue of Çeşme was around 200,000 akçes for that period (Faroqhi, Towns and townsmen, 313). Thus, the combined revenue of the ports of Izmir and Çeşme should be over 300,000 akçes. Concerning the inclusion of Chios in this tax unit, the average annual income of this mukataa had to exceed that amount, but if there was no higher bid, it was probably sold at that price. 130

The annual customs revenues of Izmir exceeded two million akçes in 1583 and three million akçes in 1586. It surpassed four million in 1590 and 4.5 million by 1593. This rapid expansion did not cease until the first decade of the seventeenth century, peaking in 1604 with an annual revenue of 6.5 million. In the period following 1604, the customs revenues remained stagnant for some time. Around 1620, however, the first Persian caravans led by Armenian merchants appeared on the western shores of Anatolia.248 Persian goods, especially silk, revived the commerce of Izmir and the annual customs revenues surpassed eight million akçes during the

1620s. With the appearance of these Persian caravans, the European “nations” relocated their consulates from Chios to Izmir and commerce continued to expand in the region until the start of the Cretan War of in mid-1640s. At the beginning of the war, the customs office was affiliated with Istanbul and soon its administration was turned over to the supervision of Istanbul’s customs officer.249 Izmir was one of the crucial logistical supply ports for sustaining the war against Venice, particularly in regards to the Cretan front. Through this structural change of the management of the region’s customs revenues, the Ottoman government aimed to establish full control over the customs of Izmir during the war. The beginning of the war, which marked the disappearance of Venetian merchants from the port, also influenced the commerce of Izmir and customs revenues declined significantly for the first time in the city’s history.

In the second half of the seventeenth century, Izmir’s dynamic growth slowed, though it had already reached a substantial level. However, the situation only worsened in the last two decades of the century due to the negative effects of the long war (1683-1699), reinforced by the great earthquake of Izmir (1688) and the Venetian occupation of Chios (1694). In nominal terms, the commerce of Izmir shrank by over one quarter in a single decade from the mid-1680s to the

248 Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans, and Companies, 34–5. 249 BOA, MAD 9858, 92. 131 mid-1690s. Taking contemporary inflation into account, the real loss was much higher than even this figure. However, in time, the destruction caused by the earthquake was cleared away, Chios was reconquered in 1695, and the war against Venice came to an end in 1699. Afterwards, the commerce of Izmir recovered rapidly and, mobilizing the capacity of the region, commerce began to re-expand in the first decades of the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, a glance at the long-term commercial fluctuations reveals that Izmir never again experienced such rapid growth as it did between 1580 and 1604, even though the figures displayed only limited increases and declines in accordance with the contemporary social-political developments.

The customs revenues in nominal enable us follow strong fluctuations on commercial activities through various changeovers, but on the other hand, it could also lead us to overlook the minute details of the commercial landscape vis-à-vis the fluctuation of the price index. In order to calculate the indices of real growth, I have deflated the nominal values using the consumer price index estimated by Pamuk.250 Chart 4.2 illustrates the long-term commercial pattern in constant akçe, making the cycles more visible.

250 Şevket Pamuk, 500 years of prices and wages in Istanbul and other cities:1469-1998 (Ankara: DİE, 2000). 132

Figure 4.2: Long-term annual customs revenues of Izmir in Constant Akçe.251

After the dramatic boom of the 1580s and 1590s, the commerce in Izmir declined somewhat in the short term. Commercial expansion then restarted, and continued until the middle of the century. Strikingly, the “expansion” period of Izmir’s commerce overlaps with a period of social and political turmoil for the empire. In the first half of the century, sultans

Osman II (1618–1622) and Ibrahim I (1640–1648) were deposed and executed, and several military mutinies took place in the capital alongside the troubles of the Celali revolts in Anatolia.

With respect to inter-regional trade, the safety of routes was frequently at risk. In regard to monetary issues, 1618, 1624 and 1640 saw tashih-i sikke (coinage correction) operations, which aimed, without debasement, at keeping the coinage standardized. 252 These operations also negatively influenced commerce in the short term. Despite all of these periodic political, social,

251 Data used on this graph may be found in Appendix IV, p 207. 252 Pamuk, ibid., 136. 133 and monetary developments, the commerce of Izmir continued to expand until the middle of the seventeeth century.

The 1640s signaled the peak of commercial capacity for seventeenth-century Izmir, after which long-term decline set in. These years coincided with the restoration of Ottoman social and political stability. Mehmed IV ascended the throne in 1648, beginning the second longest reign of all Ottoman sultans (1648–1687). The Köprülü family took charge of the government with the appointment of Köprülü Mehmed Pasha as grand vizier in 1656, followed by other family members as his successors. This period, known as the “Köprülü era” in Ottoman historiography, is also regarded as a time when central authority was restored. Meanwhile, the uprisings that occurred in Anatolia became decreasingly vicious, and the safety of overland trade routes was to a large extent secured. The Ottoman textile industry was also on course for recovery at this time.253 All of these developments promoted social and political stability and may have triggered the expansion of domestic trade. As a result, the products of western Anatolia, especially cotton, may have spread to other textile centres throughout Anatolia, and the flow of these raw materials and agricultural produce to foreign markets probably diminished. For instance, we know that the cotton of western Anatolia was transported as far as Tokat, and that this inland town gradually turned into a manufacturing centre of cotton textiles thanks to these cotton imports.254

In addition to these developments, the Ottoman monetary markets became fully integrated into the broader Eurasian context. Consequently, by the mid-seventeenth century, any extra profits that commercial activities accrued due to arbitrage differences significantly diminished. The monetary policies of the large Eurasian empires confirm this convergence,

253 Suraiya Faroqhi, “Declines and Revivals in Textile Production,” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume 3, The Later Ottoman Empire, 1603–1839, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi (Cambridge University Press: 2006), 356–75. 254 Mehmet Genç, “17.–19. Yüzyıllarda Sanayi ve Ticaret Merkezi Olarak Tokat,” in Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi (Ankara: Ötüken Neşriyat, 2010), 272–92, 277. 134 making it possible to trace the impact of this integration through contemporary monetary developments. After the convergence of gold to silver ratios for both local and foreign currencies, the general population became reluctant to bring their bullion or foreign coins into the mints, and, as a result, the output of Ottoman mints gradually declined. In the meantime, central authority ceased recoinage operations (tashih-i sikke) in the 1640s, and large sections of the silver mines were closed down. Consequently, the Ottoman government gave up attempts to stem the influx of foreign money, removing the arbitrage difference and allowing European coins to circulate freely in Ottoman markets.255 In the eastern markets, such as in Persia, the trend was similar. At the end of the sixteenth century, the number of Safavid mints numbered around seventy, but their number gradually dropped until it reached twenty six in the 1640s.256

As mentioned previously, in the last decades of the seventeenth century, the commercial environment of Izmir gradually worsened due to the long war with Venice (1683–1699) and the great earthquake of 1688. During the war, Izmir turned into the headquarters for expeditions launched against Venice, and the presence of a military garrison negatively impact the city’s social order. In 1695, the Venetians invaded Chios, and aso besieged Izmir itself for a time. As a result of this turmoil, Izmir’s commerce bottomed out for a while, but then recovered rapidly and returned to the level of the mid-seventeenth century in the following decade. The extant data point to a much more stable commercial life in the first half of the century. but the registers go no further than the 1750s, and the Ottoman archives are, for now, silent for the latter part of that century. Better evidence for the earlier period, as mentioned, comes from the registers of customs officers than from the records of the central government. Unless similar sources are

255 Pamuk, ibid, 142–3. 256 Rudi Matthee, Persia in Crisis: Safavid Decline and the Fall of Isfahan (London & New York: I.B Tauris, 2012), 93. 135 located for the later eitheenth century, it is not possible to demonstrate the commercial trends of the city in any precision through the Ottoman archival series.257

As noted above, the figures of customs revenues can be used to understand the fluctuations of the total value of Izmir’s commercial capacity, but they do not allow us to uncover the classifications or details of the imported/exported goods, their origins or destinations. In contrast, the European sources list the type of trading goods transported by the relevant mercantile groups through the ports of the eastern Mediterranean; for example, the records of the Levant Company focus only on the activities of British merchants, whereas the registers of Marseille allow us to comprehend the commodity flow between Marseille and other ports through to the late eighteenth century. Critically for this study, over time these sources began additionally to include not only the commercial activities for their own traders, but also the total volume of exchange for the relevant port-city, allowing us to observe the general economic landscape for the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Thus, through the archival records of Marseille, we are able to estimate the total size of Izmir’s commerce for the period

1775–1789. Even if this series cannot be articulated with reference to only the Ottoman registers, it is consistent as a separate data set for a different time period. The graph below is drawn using the statistics compiled by Elena Frangakis from the archives of Marseille, based on the total volume of trade in Izmir during the last quarter of the eighteenth century.258 These figures also confirm that the stability of Izmir’s total commercial activity lasted until the final quarter of the eighteenth century, and that there was no sudden expansion attested during this period.

257 For works based on the personal records of the customs officers, see: Saim Çağrı Kocakaplan, “İstanbul Gümrüğü (1750-1800): Teşkilat ve Ticaret” (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2014), Neşe Erim, “18. Yüzyılda Erzurum Gümrüğü” (PhD Istanbul University, 1984). 258 Frangakis-Syrett, ibid., 274. 136

Figure 4.3: The Total Annual Values of Exports and Imports of Izmir (1775–1789) in livres tournois.259

The long-term pattern of commerce for the period between the 1600s to the 1780s exhibits a crucial contrast vis-à-vis the nineteenth-century world of commerce. The total capacity of commerce increased 2.5 times between the beginning and the end of this long period, despite several interim fluctuations. 260 Thus, over approximately 180 years, the average annual commercial growth for Izmir is about 1%. This is a considerable growth rate, but it is not in the same order of magnitude as figures from the nineteenth-century, when exports from Izmir tripled in a single decade during the period between 1845-49 and 1855-59. Exports more than

259 Ibid. 260 Increased from one million to 2.5 million in constant akçe. For details, see appendix. 137 quadrupled over in the two decades after 1845.261 In other words, Izmir’s overall commercial expansion in the early modern period, spanning almost two centuries, was surpassed within a single decade of the nineteenth century. By the middle of that century, the average commercial expansion of Izmir had reached approximately 20% per annum. The commercial expansion of the city during these two periods, the early modern era and the nineteenth century, is on completely different scales.

To sum up, the data series of Izmir’s customs revenues show us that Izmir underwent an outstanding commercial expansion particularly in the two decades following 1580, prior to which the total sum of the customs revenue for the imperial treasury had remained at a negligible level. This impressive growth had relatively stabilized by the end of the period of high inflation in the early seventeenth century, an inflation that had stemmed from the fragmented Ottoman monetary structure and a monetary supply driven by arbitrage-seeking European merchants.

Overall, Izmir’s long-term commerce fluctuated along a reasonable scale compared to the massive growth that was to occure during the nineteenth century.

4.3. The Foreign Trade of the Ottoman Empire as a Eurasian Empire

It is evident that the growth of foreign trade passing through the Izmir and the tevabi ports was at a marginal level during the early modern period in comparison with the later period. This distinctive commercial characteristic of the premodern period was not limited to growth rates alone. The Empire’s commercial alignment points to a regional variation between these two disparate eras. At the end of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire strengthened its

261 Reşat Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 94 and 89. Total Ottoman exports to Western states had a 6.5% compound annual growth rate for the period between 1839 and 1854, the Ottoman imports from those states had 8.3% annual growth rate for the same period. Şevket Pamuk, ed. 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Dış Ticareti, Tarihi İstatistikler Serisi, no. 1 (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Ensititüsü, 2000), 30-31. 138 commercial ties with both the eastern and the western markets, a point often obscured by the scholarly overemphasis on the origins of European economic hegemony.

A commonplace narrative in scholarship on this period is that of the decline of the old commercial centres of the eastern Mediterranean, Aleppo and Alexandria, which began to lose their competitive advantage after the sixteenth century. The decline of these ports, once an essential component of the spice trade routes, meant that trade largely dissappeared in the post- sixteenth century era. After this juncture, the port of Izmir rose to prominence, displacing Aleppo and Alexandria as the main terminal point for the trade routes of the Levant region. In Izmir, regionally-produced goods were the main exported commodity. However, a question regarding the commerce of the eastern Mediterranean arises that is generally neglected by economic historians. That is, what happened to the eastern trade of the Ottomans during this transition period? The Julfan Armenians are mentioned frequently as the actors of a new commercial system for this latter period,262 but the extent to which the Ottoman markets were affiliated with the eastern markets is not investigated. In order to address this question, the focus should shift north from Aleppo to Erzurum, as the eastern gateway of Anatolia.

The customs office of Erzurum was established in the 1570s, and began to actively operate after the Ottoman-Safavid war ended in 1590. The customs revenue for that year was as low as 9,550 akçes, which is a negligible sum. However, within a decade, the eastern trade expanded dramatically. Even if the total commercial dues could not surpass the level of Izmir’s at that period, the growth rate was much higher for the Erzurum customs office. In the first years of the seventeenth century, the total customs income had jumped to over 2.8 million akçes. In tandem with Izmir, Erzurum’s commerce developed in the last decades of the sixteenth century

262 For the networks of Julfan Armenians, see: Sebouh Aslanian, From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 139 and its commercial activities continued intensively until the second half of the eighteenth century.263

Travellers and residents writing at the time testify to the importance and vigour of the town’s economy. Tavernier, a traveller who visited the city in 1632, defined Erzurum as one of the most significant crossroads of the Empire and mentioned that Persian silks and Indian cloths were the most prominent commercial goods traded there.264 Evliya Çelebi served for a short while as a scribe in the customs office of Erzurum in 1646 and his observations are also valuable.

He emphasized that the customs office of Erzurum was the third largest in the Empire, following that of Istanbul and Izmir. He also noted the presence of many merchants from various distant regions, such as Arabia, Persia, India, Sindh, and China.265 Halil İnalcik has also drawn attention to the market competition between Indian and British cloths in Ottoman lands.266

The numbers compiled from the customs revenues of Erzurum corroborate these observations. Erzurum’s customs revenue approximated that of Izmir’s in the 1610s, but the total income could not surpass the western ports until the second half of the century. The total value of customs income sent to the imperial treasury by Erzurum drew on par with Izmir’s in the 1660s, and they remained at a similar level until the middle of the eighteenth century. After the 1740s, eastern trade fell into a downward spiral, whereas Izmir was able to maintain a stable position.

The most striking point of this comparison is the co-movement of the commercial activities at the western and eastern entrances to Anatolia, as noted on Chart 4.4 below:

263 For details on the foundation and start-up period of the customs office in Erzurum, see: Bilgehan Pamuk, XVII. Yüzyılda bir serhad şehri: Erzurum (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006). 264 Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Les six voyages de Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Ecuyer Baron d'Aubonne, qu'il a fait en Turquie, en Perse, et aux Indes, pendant l'espace de quarante ans, & par toutes les routes que l'on peut tenir (Paris:1676) 18. 265 Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnâmesi, ed. Zekeriya Kurşun, Seyit Ali Kahraman, and Yücel Dağlı (İstanbul: YKY, 1999), 2:88–108. 266 Halil İnalcık, “The Ottoman Cotton Market and India: The Role of Labor Cost in Market Competition: The Ottoman cotton market and India,” in The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 264–306. 140

Figure 4.4: A Comparison of the Customs Revenues of Izmir and Erzurum in Constant Akçe.267

The first item of note is the strong correlation in revenue between these two customs offices. While the early modern Eurasian trade route of the Persian caravans ended in western

Anatolia, the share of the goods that reached the port of Izmir was not as large as may be supposed, considering the scale of eastern commercial activity. Some references in the detailed customs registers of Erzurum verify the limits of the east-westbound transit trade. Apart from the standard customs dues imposed upon all traded goods, merchants also had to pay ihtisab taxes

(market dues) if they sold their goods in Erzurum. In the case of transit operations such as the long-distant caravans, instead of ihtisab, a transit tax (reftiye) was levied, allowing us to calculate the proportion of trasit operations in the overall volume of trade for the port. The share of market dues in the customs revenue was over three million akçes within the total sum of eight million during the 1630s. This share decreased to some extent in the second half of the

267 The relevant statistics used to create this chart can be found in the Appendix. The statistics related to Erzurum customs which are compiled from the works of Bilgehan Pamuk and Neşe Erim are also included in the statistical table in the Appendix. 141 seventeenth century.268 For the eighteenth century, the registers provide many details regarding the structure of trade. In 1744, the market dues accounted for 50% of the entire customs revenues.269 In regards to the volume of trade, the total volume of silk brought from Persia to

Erzurum was 2,462 men (approx. 6 kg).270 A total of 1,452.5 men were sold in the city market, whereas just 1,252 men passed as transit goods through the customs of Erzurum along westbound routes,271 For the same year, 751.5 loads of cotton were transported through customs, while 2,143 loads were sold in the local market. All these goods were most likely then distributed to regional markets carried by other short-distant traders.

The limits of the impact of Persian caravans on Izmir’s trade can also be evaluated through the total customs revenues of Izmir. Persian caravans began to reach Izmir around 1620, and by that date, Izmir was already an established commercial centre. By the arrival of the first

Persian caravans, loaded mostly with silk, the rate of increase in customs revenues was only about 15%. Persian silk was hardly the only good exported from Izmir.272 Yet more evidence for the limited share of Persian goods in the commerce of Izmir can be found in the articles loaded onto the caravans for the return journey. Savary’s 1679 guide for French merchants advises that if merchants plan to sell eight to ten bales of londrinas cloth in local Ottoman markets, then they

268 Pamuk, XVII. Yüzyılda bir serhad şehri 277. 269 Ibid., 145. 270 Men is an old unit of weight equivalent to six kilograms. Cengiz Kallek “Men,” TDV-İA (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2004), 29:105–7, 106; cf. İnalcık, An Economic and Social History, xli. 271 Neşe Erim, “1720–1790 arasında Osmanlı İran Ticareti,” in V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi: Tebliğler. Marmara Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi, İstanbul, 21-25 Ağustos 1989 (Ankara: TTK 1990), 571–7, 574. As Erim suggests, some part of the silk sold in the market should be stocked in the city from the previous year. 272 Apart from silk, raw cotton, cotton yarn, woollen yarn, mohair, acorns, beeswax, leathers and carpets are some of the other numerous export goods. For the extended lists, see : Jacques Savary, Le parfait Négociant ou instruction générale pour ce qui regarde le commerce (Paris: Jean Guignard, 1679), 2:381–404. Antoine Galland, Le voyage à smyrne: un manuscrit d’Antoine Galland, 1678: contenant smyrne ancienne et modernes et des extraits du voyage fait en levant, ed. Frédéric Bauden. (Paris: Chandeigne, 2000) 152-55. 142 should include two extra bales in the bundle in order to sell them in Persia.273 The share of import goods intended for the Ottoman and Persian markets also indicates the limits of Persian influence on Izmir’s commerce. As demonstrated by the customs revenue of Erzurum, by the second quarter of the eighteenth century, eastern trade had been severely disrupted, and Persian silk was gradually replaced by other regional products in the commerce of Izmir as well. When the Persian caravans ceased totally in the second half of the eighteenth century, the ports of Izmir were hardly affected, and the loss of trade from the Persian caravans share was compensated for by other export goods.

4.4. The “Myth” of the European Mercantilist Penetration in the Early Modern

Mediterranean

The correlation between the Ottoman markets and foreign trade is another truism of Ottoman economic history that has hitherto remained unchallenged. In light of the above discussion, is it possible to sustain the notion of a European capitalist/mercantilist penetration, or a commercial hegemony forced upon the early modern Ottoman Empire by Western powers? Or was there instead a mutually-beneficial relationship between domestic markets and foreign commerce in the pre-modern Ottoman economy? Customs revenues records provide evidence for the general contour of foreign commerce in the Empire, but, in the absence of records detailing the amount of total production, it is still difficult to pinpoint the specific movements in production for specific sectors of the early modern Ottoman economy. On the other hand, we do have an opportunity to understand the long-term general trends for Ottoman markets through the figures derived from imperial budgets. In order to reveal the relationship between Ottoman markets and foreign trade, I deflated the total imperial revenues based on the available imperial budgets, and

273 Savary, Le Parfait Négociant, 2:373–4. It also detailed the differences between colours in demand for these distinct markets. 143 then compared the indices of customs revenues for Izmir and Erzurum with the imperial budgets.

This comparison shows, as seen in Chart 4.5, a strict correlation between these parameters.

144

Figure 4.5: Revenues Index for Izmir customs, Erzurum customs, and the Imperial budgets274

274 The statistics used in this graph and relevant references are found in the Appendix V, p 220. 145

Chart 4.5 looks at the evolution of customs revenues in Izmir and Erzurum, two major

Ottoman entrepots for Western and Eastern long-distance trade, against the total annual revenues of the Ottoman Empire. A striking finding deriving from the chart is that the foreign customs revenues in these two towns have moved together with the Empire’s overall revenues throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Since customs constitute only a small share of the

Ottoman imperial incomes, the correlation between the indexes cannot be taken to suggest that the rise in revenues of imperial treasury was a consequence of the rise in foreign trade volumes.

Rather, it would be more appropriate to interpret this parallel trend as an indication of the correlation between revenues from customs and the rest of the revenue items constituting the budget. These latter items consist of taxes levied on the domestic economic activities, including agricultural and manufacturing production, trade, markets, etc.

Since the impact of customs on the overall revenues is negligible due to the small share they held, the evolution of the overall revenues of the Empire can be taken to reflect the ups and downs of the domestic tax base. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that domestic tax base

(domestic output levels) is in correlation with the customs revenues (hence, the foreign trade volumes), as the index of customs is moving together with the overall revenues. Consequently, this outlook suggests that the fluctuation of foreign trade was dependent on the domestic markets. The expansion of domestic markets enabled to increase of foreign commerce simultenously, or vice versa, the period economic shrinkage of Ottoman markets caused to decrease Ottoman foreign commerce.

Data on imperial revenues are relatively rare, in comparison to the customs revenues reports, so short-term fluctuations cannot be captured for certain periods. For instance, we do not

146 have any imperial budget records for the years 1608-1643 and 1669-1691, so short-term fluctuations within these date ranges cannot be ascertained. The long-term fluctuations confirm, however, that there was a close correlation between domestic markets and foreign commerce.

This correlation in the long-term patterns undermines the claim for a mercantilist penetration into the Ottoman markets through the port of Izmir, as hypothesized by world-system theorists. Pre- modern foreign trade dependent heavily on the economic landscape of domestic markets. In the case of local economic growth, foreign commerce expanded at a similar rate, and, correspondingly, the capacity of foreign commerce was reduced during periods of economic recession.

In light of the above, how can we explain the seeming contradictions between the

European archival sources and the Ottoman registers? In fact, there is no contradiction between them. The explanation lies in the strict regional and periodic framework of eastern Mediterranean commerce. While British merchants are regarded as the main actors in Mediterranean commerce during the seventeenth century, the French took over this role in the following century. 275

Somewhat surprisingly, no-one has brought attention to the nature of this market competition. As it is depicted on the Chart 4.6. below, we have detailed registers of the exports of English broadcloth to the Levant from the mid- seventeenth century, when French merchants did not control a significant segment of the textile export market. With the turn of the century, however,

French cloth began to flow into the Levant and rapidly claimed a large share of the market.

British broadcloth gradually lost its Ottoman markets in the course of the eighteenth century.

275 For the British activities in early Modern Mediterranean; Julian S. Corbett, England in the Mediterranean: A study of the Rise and Influence of British Naval Power within the Straits, 1603-1713 (London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1904), Ralph Davis, “England and the Mediterranean, 1570–1670,” in Essays in the Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England, ed. F.J. Fisher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 117–37, idem, Aleppo and Devonshire Square: English Traders in the Levant in the Eighteenth Century (London: Macmillan 1967), Susan Skilliter, William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey, 1578-1582 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), Daniel Goffman, Britons in the Ottoman Empire, 1642-1660 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998), Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna, Edhem Eldem, French Trade in Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century. 147

There was a simple market competition between these European actors, and the total annual volume of trade doubled from the 1670s (around 20,000 pieces) to the 1750s (40,000 pieces).

These rates correspond consistently to the expansion of Izmir’s customs revenues. Thus, this comparison illustrates the fact that there is no real contradiction between these disparate sources.

As a result of the competition between them, French merchants gradually replaced the British in the eighteenth-century Levant. However, with regard to the total amount of broadcloth imported into the region, the statistics compiled from the French and the British archives are consistent with Ottoman records.

Figure 4.6: English and French Broadcloth exports to the Levant, 1666-1780 (in pieces of broadcloth)276

4.5. Conclusion

In this chapter I reinterpreted the commercial expansion of Izmir utilizing new evidence from the Ottoman archives. I put this expansion in the context of the monetization process and utilized recent analytical approaches as well as the newly-introduced numismatic evidence

276 Chart based on figures tabulated by Edhem Eldem; “Capitulations and Western Trade” in The Cambridge History of Turkey, Vol 3: The Later Ottoman Empire 1603–1839, (Cambridge University Press) p 376. 148 referenced in Chapter Three. I argued that the monetization process, lasting about two decades from 1580s onwards, was an essential period for commercial integration between the western

Anatolian and European markets. During this period, European merchants enjoyed an extra 25% arbitrage opportunity against local purchasers, and utilized this advantage in their commercial operations. Their main interest was in agricultural products during this initial period, and western

Anatolia was able to meet this demand due to its unique regional geographical characteristics in the midst of the downturn of the Little Ice Age and the simultaneous Celali uprisings. However, foreign traders lost their competitive edge when the Ottoman currency system re-stabilized in the first decade of the seventeenth century, and the extraordinary dynamism of the foreign commercial expansion of the Izmir region largely disappeared afterwards.

Furthermore, this monetary transformation was not geographically limited to Ottoman domains, but was rather a Eurasian phenomenon. The Safavid and Mughal monetary regimes were also centralized at this time, and the exchange rates among regions gradually converged.

Simultaneously, the structure of commerce shifted on the eastern borders of the Ottoman Empire as well. While the spice trade via the Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and the ports of Alexandria and

Aleppo diminished, the inter-regional commerce via the caravan routes between Persia and

Anatolia expanded. Hence, Ottoman Anatolia simultaneously strengthened commercial ties with both the eastern and the western markets in the same process.

The comparison between imperial economic indicators and the statistics derived from the customs revenues confirms that commercial growth did not greatly resemble the nineteenth- century capitalist expansion, and instead depended upon the fluctuations of the Ottoman markets.

Therefore, it is not possible to suggest an ongoing integration process led by European mercantile activities between the European economies and the Ottoman markets from the

149 sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Rather, the structure of foreign commerce was shaped by developments in the Ottoman economy, in particularthe monetary transformation.

150

CHAPTER 5

Taxation and Population in Izmir from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth

Century

The first two chapters discussed the environmental and demographic transformations of western

Anatolia as what enabled that region to meet the demand of foreign merchants in the midst of social and climatic crises. Following two chapters shift the focus to the economic infrastructure of Ottoman markets, particularly the monetization process that triggered the commercialization of the last decades of the sixteenth century, and the limits of commercialization shown through an analysis of the customs revenues of Izmir. In this final chapter, I examine the policies of the central authority towards Izmir’s commercial development. The dominant historiography holds that the Ottoman government struggled to maintain a decentralized profile for western Anatolian coastal regions and stood against the monopoly of a single port-city such as Izmir.277 In contrast,

I argue that the Ottoman authorities actively utilized the most efficient instrument available to them in order to support the commerce in this single port; that is, de facto tax exemption.

Based on data culled from the tax records of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Izmir, I argue that the majority of the inhabitants were not registered as tax-payers in the town during this period; the tax burden of Izmir was about one-eighth to one-tenth of that of other populous cities of the Empire. Whereas the main annual taxes collected from all Muslims and non-Muslims remained at modest levels from the early seventeenth to the nineteenth century, the poll tax paid by non-Muslims, cizye, was minimal until the 1691 tax reform; only afterwards non-Muslims registered strictly and systematically in cizye registers.

277 Daniel Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine world, 138-40. Gabor Agoston, “Izmir,” Encyclopedia of the Ottoman Empire, 290-93. 151

In the absence of local şer’iyye registers I was not able to locate a “smoking gun” in the archives in the form of, e.g., an imperial order regarding tax-exemption for the residents of Izmir.

Yet, I will demonstrate how the tax-exemption process can be traced through the analysis of tax registers. Thus, the privilege of a significantly lighter tax burden was granted to the town, essentially making Izmir into a de facto tax-exempt zone for its inhabitants. The central authority was keen on collecting the port’s customs revenue but surpisingly, most of the inhabitants was not registered as tax-payers most likely to favor the commercial life of the town. Consequently, a substantial migration to this town was observed and the rapid urban transformation of Izmir in its wake. Additionally, thanks to the availability of updated numbers of poll-tax payers following the 1691 tax reform, we can examine the demographic fluctuations of non-Muslim communities that settled in Izmir for the entire eighteenth century. These figures allow us to estimate the total population of the city as well. Based on these numbers, I show that the population of Izmir increased during the eighteenth century at a level of 50% over a century, an increase wholly consistent with the development of Izmir’s commercial capacity for the relevant period. It is apparent that the tax exemption policy in Izmir was successful in funnelling commercial transactions previously scattered along the coasts of western Anatolia into a single port and thus controlling the customs efficiently in order to maximize customs revenues.

Izmir was not a unique case—either in the Ottoman context or in the broader

Mediterranean world—in terms of tax exemption aimed at promoting a single city. Ottoman central authorities occasionally used this policy in various other towns and villages in order to

152 stimulate their economic development (e.g. through mining or commerce) or to increase their potential tax revenue.278

In exactly the same period, namely from the 1590s through the mid seventeenth century, the Medicis of Florence used tax-exemption similarly as an instrument to boost commercial capacity in Livorno towards foreign merchants. In 1590, the Medici made a general call to: “all you merchants of whatever nation - Easterners, Westerners, Spanish, Portuguese, Greeks,

Germans, Italians, Jews, Turks, Moors, Armenians, Persians, and [those] of other states” to relocated and move their business operations to Livorno. 279 This call also included various incentives for the immigrant merchants, including various tax exemption. The Medici exempted the Livornese from the decima property tax that was routinely imposed elsewhere in the duchy.

This exemption lasted till 1646, when the financial problems caused by the war of Castro (1641-

49) obliged the Medici to re-impose the decima on Livorno.280 In the years between 1590 and

1646, the population of the city increased from 500 to 12,000, an increase most likely related to the tax exemption, alongside numerous other economic and commercial developments observed across the Mediterranean. Consequently, Livorno and Izmir developed on par, as the poster children of a post-1580 reorganized Mediterranean commercial system.

In this chapter, beyond my main concern of ascertaining the tax-exemption policy implemented by the Ottoman central authority for Izmir, I also propose an alternative methodology to test the data culled from tax-registers, thus aiming to contribute to the defterology debates. As regards to the limits of defterology, I take into account inherent biases of

278 Fatma Acun, “Osmanlı Döneminde Anadolu Şehirlerinin Gelişmesinde Devletin Rolü: Karahisar Örneği,” Belleten 65, no. 242 (April 2001): 161–92; eadem, “Ottoman Administrative Priorities, Two Case Studies Karahisar- ı Şarki (Şebinkarahisar) and Giresun,” Archivum Ottomanicum, no. 17 (1999): 213–31. 279 Corey Tazzara, “The masterpiece of Medici: Commerce Politics and the Making of the Free Port of Livorno, 1574-1790” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2011), 3–4. 280 Stephanie Nadalo, “Constructing Pluralism in Seventeenth Century Livorno: Managing Religious Fulfillment of the Requirements (1537-1737)” (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2013), 191–2. 153 the source material that made up the figures drawn from the Ottoman tax registers. At the same time, I suggest that these sources still provide valuable figures for the studies of Ottoman socio- economic history, despite their potential inherent errors. All registration is prone to error or includes a margin of error. However, I argue that these problems can be controlled by multiplying and diversifying our sample, and by incorporating the subsequent findings into statistically grounded socio-economic studies.

Based on the methodological perspective outlined below, I first expand the regional scope of my research to include comparable registers drawn up in the seventeenth century. This allows me to test the validity of my dataset and to identify (and correct) the possible errors in the tax registers of Izmir. I also examined other contemporary evidence concerning population size in order to double-check the results, such as the number of places of worship, hamams (public baths), and population figures in available traveller narratives. Secondly, I enlarge the temporal extent of my investigation to include Izmir’s later tax registers (1691-1788). This vertical approach permits me to test the reliability of the available statistics for the period at hand. Here, the 1691 cizye reform provides crucial evidence for the bias in the tax registers: the entire non-

Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire was re-registered in 1691, following a transformed tax system. In the prior cizye system, cizye taxes were largely levied on the non-Muslim communities as a lump sum (maktu). Individuals and households were not considered distinct taxpayers, but rather the assessed tax was divided among individuals by the communal leader who delivered the lump sum to the state.281 According to the 1691 cizye reform, cizye assessed at three different level in accordance with the economic ability of the payers as high (ala),

281 For a discussion of the maktu system, see: Halil İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman Empire, 1600-1700," Archivum Ottomanicum 6 (1980): 283–337, esp. 333–4; Daniel Goffman, “The Maḳṭu‘ System and the Jewish Community of Sixteenth-Century Safed: A Study of Two Documents from the Ottoman Archives,” Osmanlı Araştırmaları / The Journal of Ottoman Studies 3 (1982): 81–90. 154 moderate (evsat) and low (edna), rather than making a distinction for their particular ethno- religious affiliation. This reform was implemented in all subsequent tax surveys. An analysis of this significant shift in the Ottoman taxation system is beyond the scope of this chapter.

However, the emergent practices resulting from this shift not only contribute to our understanding of the demographic evolution of early modern Izmir, but also allow us to reconsider the data collected from Izmir’s earlier tax registers in new light.

In the first section, I compare the population figures recorded in Izmir’s sixteenth- and seventeenth-century tax registers with traveller estimates in order to point the significant difference between the figures and the increasing number of places of worships are observed as the evidence of population growth. In following section, cizye records which was composed after

1691 tax reform, are interpreted with attempt to reveal the unregistered part of inhabitants in

Izmir. Then, the total avarız tax burden imposed on the inhabitants is compared with the tax payed by the inhabitants of other similar Ottoman centers. These lines of investigation allow me to calculate Izmir’s tax burden and to trace the limits of tax-exemption. Finally, I examine

Izmir’s long-term demographic pattern through the late-eighteenth century and these trends are analyzed to state the position of Izmir in early modern Mediterranean in terms of demographic evolution.

5.1. The Demographic Evolution of Early Modern Izmir according to Travellers’

Estimates and Ottoman Tax Registers

In the context of early modern Izmir, ascertaining long-term demographic patterns is a formidable task for any researcher. While Kütükoğlu and Goffman have already provided some

155 data extracted from tahrir surveys on the population of taxpayers for the sixteenth century,282 our knowledge for the following two centuries was for a long time based mainly on traveller accounts. 283 Numerous historians introduced varying figures based on the compilation of travellers’ estimations and there was no reference to archival sources until very recently. The first employment of tax registers in researching and providing an overview of Izmir’s demographic structure was presented by Merlijn Olnon.284 However, the time frame of Olnon’s work is limited to the second half of the seventeenth century and he consults only the cizye registers of Izmir belongs the period before 1691, poll-tax reform. Therefore, he did not notice the situation of under-registration on those registers. In this first section, I introduce the figures of tax-payers derived from sixteenth century tahrir registers by Kütükoğlu and Goffman and the population of Izmir is compared with the population of other towns around. Next, the travellers’ estimates of Izmir’s population and the figures from the tax registers of the seventeenth century

Izmir are tabulated in order to point out the significant gap in between.

According to research based on sixteenth-century taxation surveys, the total number of taxpayers almost doubled in Ottoman Anatolia during the half century between the 1520s and the

1570s. Considering the regional divergences, the rate of population increase was higher for inner lands, whereas the coastal regions were stable or developed only slightly. As a shared characteristic of this development, the growth rate of the rural regions was higher than the town centres.285 Izmir, rather unexpectedly, followed an opposite course during these same years. The total population of a kaza (an administrative unit that includes the town centre and its villages, a

282 Daniel Goffman, Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550–1650 (Seattle: University of Washington Press 1990), Mübahat Kütükoğlu, XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda İzmir Kazasının Sosyal ve İktisadi Yapısı (İzmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2000). 283 A compilation of the estimated populations suggested by travellers are in Table 5.3 below. 284 Merlijn Olnon, “Brought under the law of the land”: The History, Demography and Geography of Crossculturalism in Early Modern İzmir and the Köprülü Project of 1678 (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2013). 285 For more details on the demographic patterns of sixteenth-century Anatolia, see Chapter 1. 156 district) decreased, mainly due to a striking fall in rural population figures, although the town centre showed growth for the same period. We can suppose that, to a certain degree, a migration took place from village to town centre. Secondly, after the conquest of Chios in 1566, several

Greek families from the island may have fled to the opposite shore. But while Izmir’s progress is evident, its development could not counterbalance the loss in rural population for this period.

One third of the households in the registers across the kaza disappeared, even though the number of mücerred (adult single male) taxpayers increased.

1528 1575

Household Mücerred Nefer Household Mücerred Nefer Urban 174 63 237 n/a n/a 492 Rural 4100 1028 5128 2609 2107 4716 Table 5.13: Taxpayers in Rural and Urban Parts of Izmir in the Sixteenth Century.286

On the other hand, the commercial capacity of Izmir was still limited for this period despite its considerable growth. Izmir was far behind older nearby centres, such as Chios or

Manisa, even though it was able to surpass neighbouring coastal towns such as Çeşme or

Seferihisar. Table 5.2 below displays the fiscal population of Izmir within its region, with the number of mosques and hamams added as a separate column to justify the consistency of these statistics. Clearly the number of mosques or hamams cannot be used as accurate reflection of population size, but the figures of tax-registers and the information provided by the travellers supplement each other. The relevant observations on the number of mosques and hamams are derived from the journal of the Ottoman traveller Aşık Mehmed Çelebi, the only traveller to visit

286 Kütükoğlu, XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda İzmir, 26–30. 157 the region in the sixteenth century, or at least the only one who wrote about his visit.287 His narrative is doubly valuable as European travellers did not leave any record on this small coastal town before the seventeenth century.

1570’s surveys Observations of as total nefer288 Mehmed Çelebi Notes (household + (1585) mücerreds) Hammam Mosque In fact, there were three mosques in 289 Izmir at the time; Faik Paşa Mosque, Izmir 492 1 - 2 2 – 3 Hanbey Mosque, and Kurşunlu Mosque.290

291 Emecen identified 12 mosques in Manisa 1,801 (1,221+580) 7 - 8 10 + late sixteenth-century Manisa.

Chios292 1,470

Menemen293 930 (510+420)

A petition sent to Istanbul in 1588 Turgutlu294 459 (273+186) 1 1 requested permission to build a second hamam.295

Çeşme296 345 (221+124) Seferihisar 351 (169 +182) Table 5.2: Taxpayers, hamams and mosques in select western Anatolian towns of the late sixteenth century

287 Aşık Mehmed Çelebi, Menâzirü’l-avâlim, ed. Mahmut Ak (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), 897–901. 288 The 1575 survey of Izmir’s town centre did not distinguish between households (hane) and single male adults (mücerred), lumping them together as nefer. In order to reach a meaningful comparison, I listed the fiscal population of other towns as nefer as well. The numbers of households and mücerreds are listed parenthetically, when available. 289 Kütükoğlu, XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda İzmir, 26–30. 290 Münir Aktepe, “Osmanlı Devri İzmir Camileri Hakkında Ön Bilgi I-II,” in İzmir Yazıları (İzmir: İzmir Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2003), 12–97. 291 Feridun Emecen, XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu,1989). 292 Filiz Yaşar Keskin, “Bir Osmanlı Adasında Toplum ve Ekonomi XVI. Yüzyıldan XVIII. Yüzyıla Sakız” (PhD Diss. Hacettepe University, 2013), 39. 293 Cevat Bakkal, “Menemen Kazası XV–XVIII. Yüzyıllar” (PhD diss., Ege Üniversitesi, 1994). 294 Emecen, XVI. Asırda Manisa. 295 Feridun Emecen, “Bir Osmanlı Kasabasının kuruluşu ve yükselişi 1500-1700,” in Tarihin İçinde Manisa (Manisa: Manisa Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2006) 221–9. The number of hamams and mosques was also cited at this article. 296 Mübahat Kütükoğlu, XVI. Asırda Çeşme Kazasının Sosyal ve İktisadi Yapısı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2010). The statistics belonging to Seferihisar were also extracted from this work. 158

Mehmed Çelebi reported the number of mosques and public baths in his journal for

Manisa and Izmir, and these reports were also verified by archival sources. There were 382

Muslim taxpayers (out of a total reported population of 492) and three Friday mosques in Izmir, while in Manisa there were 1,679 (out of 1,801) Muslim taxpayers along with 12 mosques. This outlook, consistent with the registered Muslim taxpayers and mosques, allowed me to crosscheck the reliability of the registers and further illustrates how the number of mosques can be utilized as a rough indicator of population size. Apart from the number of public baths and mosques,

Mehmed Çelebi reports that the only commercial activity of Izmir was the export of grapes and figs to Istanbul. European merchants and foreign trade are not mentioned in his narrative of

Izmir, even though he did relate the presence of Venetians in Chios the same year.297

Whereas Chios was the main commercial hub of the region, holding a traditionally central position within the Mediterranean trade network, Izmir was just a modest town, whose main export was agricultural products to the Ottoman court. However, the commercial activities of Izmir developed rapidly soon after the arrival of European merchants in the Mediterranean in the 1580s. The strict prohibition imposed by the Ottomans on agricultural exports was gradually eased, and European merchants began visiting the western Anatolian ports more frequently to transport cotton, fruits, and partially grains. From the 1620s on, the trade in Persian silk also began to flow to the northern Mediterranean via the port of Izmir, with several European states establishing their permanent consulates in Izmir during the first decades of the seventeenth century, including British, French and Dutch.

The city grew dramaticly in the course of the seventeenth century. As a consequence, it became a destination in the itinerary of many European travellers to Ottoman lands. Luckily for

297 Mehmed Çelebi, Menâzirü’l-avâlim, 247. 159 us, they left valuable narratives describing the port and providing estimates about the demographic structure of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century city.

Non-Muslim Year Traveller Muslims Total Greek Jewish Armenian 30,000 (33%) 1653 D'Arvieux 60,000 (66%) 90,000 15,000 7,000 7/8,000 30,000 (33%) 1656 Tavernier 60,000 (66%) 90,000 15,000 6/7,000 8,000 25,000 (46%) 1675 Spon 30,000 (54%) 55,000 10,000 15,000 De 20,000 (40%) 1686 30,000 (60%) 50,000 Combes298 8,000 4,000 8,000 10,000 (42%) 1699 Montraye 14,000 (58%) 24,000 8,000 1,500 400 12,000 (45%) 1702 Tournefort 15,000 (55%) 27,000 10,000 1,800 200 40,000 (40%) 1714 Lucas 60,000 (60%) 100,000 20,000 8,000 26 000 (35%) 1731 Tollot 50,000 (65%) 76,000 12,000 7,000 7,000 13,000 (47%) 1733 Thompson 15,000 (53%) 28,000 10,000 2,000 600 37,000 (36%) 1776 Couffier 65,000 (64%) 102,000 21,000 10,000 6,000 50 000 33(%) 1778 Sestini 97,000 (65%) 150,000 30,000 12,000 8,000 Table 5.3: Travellers’ Estimates on the Population Size of Izmir in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries.299

298 De Combes’s unpublished Voyage du sieur de Combes au Levant, 1686 is in BNF, Ms Fr 5580 f 27v. I thank Guy Meyer for sharing this document with me. 299 With the exception of De Combes’ estimates, all data in the table is reproduced from Elena Frangakis-Syrett, “The Armenian, Greek and Jewish Communities of Smyrna in the eighteenth century (1690-1820) Demography and Economic Activities,” in Trade and Money: The Ottoman Economy in the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2007), 291–306, at 293. 160

As seen in Table 5.3, travellers’ estimates range widely, from 24,000 to 150,000 inhabitants. As a result, they cannot provide us with even a general idea of the size of Izmir’s population within reasonable limits. I have also included in the charts travellers’ assessment of the percentage of ethno-religious groups within the city’s overall population. As oppose to the significant differences among estimates on overall population, these ratios between Muslim and non-

Muslim populations remain fairly constant: the percentage of Muslims ranges from 55% to 65%, and that of non-Muslims between 45% and 35%. This is crucial in regard to the close proportions of tax-payers on the tax survey conducted in 1660 which is examined below.

When we check the tax surveys tabulated in Table 5.4 below, however, the fiscal demography of the seventeenth-century city appears radically different. Our sources include one mufassal avarız survey that lists households for both Muslim and non-Muslim taxpayers in 1660, and three cizye registers predating the poll-tax reform of 1691: one for 1640 (mufassal survey), one for 1660 (based on the avarız survey of the same year), and one for 1688 (a summary survey).

Non- Year Total Taxpayer Muslim Greek Jewish Armenian Muslim

1575 492 382 110 110 300 404 265 92 47 1640 1309 686 633 301 271 61

1660301 %52 %48 302 581 301 219 61 1688 Table 5.4: Izmir’s Seventeenth-century Taxpayers, by Ethno-religious Communities, according to Cizye Registers

300 BOA. MAD 15169. 301 BOA. D.MKF.d 27823. There is a separate cizye dated on the same year which was most likely derived from this avarız survey. It provides the same figures. For that cizye register, see: BOA MAD 14672. 302 BOA. MAD 14888. 161

The sharp difference between the travellers’ estimates and the imperial registers are evident. The numbers on the surveys signify heads of households and for the 50 years between

1640 and 1690, the size of the Armenian and Greek communities shows no significant development: over half a century’s growth was limited to a mere 14 Armenian and 36 Greek households. The Jewish community, in contrast, was more dynamic - first tripling in the two decades between 1640 and 1660 but then declining by one-fifth of over the next three decades.

The only figures we have for the taxpayer Muslim community are derived from the avarız survey of 1660. The size of the households are generally presumed to be four to five individuals, this equals a total Muslim taxpaying population size of between 5,200 and 6,500, approximately.

These figures are not close even the modest estimate of travellers.

The avarız survey of Izmir dated 1660 placed the ratio of Muslims and non-Muslims at

52% and 48%, respectively. In that survey, the members of the askeri (military class) did not appeare so it is difficult to estimate the size of the group per total population.However, as an example, askeri constituted about 15% percent in the survey of Manisa completed in the same year, 1660. 303 If we take into account the tax-exempt military class members at the stated percentage, the demographic structure of the city at least matches the estimates of travellers in terms of percentiles. However, the striking discrepancy between the traveller estimates and the registered taxpayers reported in the imperial registers still begs an explanation.

Some other evidence related to the population size reinforces the doubts on the figures derived from official tax registers. As cited above, the observation of Mehmed Çelebi suggests that there were only two or three mosques in the city in the 1585, but the European travellers who visited it a century later reckoned it had nearly 20 mosques. Tavernier recorded 15 mosques

303 BOA. KK. 2631. 162 in 1656, and Galland recorded 18 in 1676.304 By 1702 Tournefort counted 19.305 These numbers are corroborated by cityscape paintings produced by contemporary western painters. A cityscape by an anonymous Dutch painter of the 1680s feeatures 18 minarets,306 and a well-known gravure by Bruyn a decade or so later shows 19.307 Most of these mosques are also documented in vakıf

(pious endowment) registers analyzed by Münir Aktepe.308

If we accept the number of places of worships as a reliable parameter, the total population of Muslims must have increased about six or seven fold at least over a century at least. The same holds true for the non-Muslim communities. Until the last decades of the sixteenth century, there is no evidence of a local Jewish community. The first Jewish congregation was established at the end of the sixteenth century and the number of congregations increased regularly, finally reaching nine in the late seventeenth century.309 Armenians began to migrate to the city at the turn of the seventeenth century. By mid century they constructed a grand church, which was used as the main community church up until the twentieth century. The Greek community also founded two grand churches in this period, St George (1623) and St Photini (1658), taking the place of four other, more modest chapels. Considering these indicators, I suggest that a considerable proportion of inhabitants—both Muslims and non-Muslim—was not registered in the tax surveys. As a part of poll tax reform implemented in 1691, new surveys were conducted

304 John Baptiste Tavernier, The six voyages of John Baptista Tavernier, Baron of Aubonne through Turky, into Persia and the East-Indies, for the space of forty years: giving an account of the present state of those countries, viz. of the religion, government, customs, and commerce of every country, and the figures, weight, and value of the money currant all over Asia: to which is added A new description of the Seraglio, trans. by John Phillips (London: Daniel Cox, 1677), 33. Antoine Galland, Le voyage à Smyrne: un manuscript d’Antoine Galland, 1678: Contenant Smyrne ancienne et modern et des extraits du voyage fait en Levant, ed. Frederic Bauden (Paris: Chandeigne, 2000), 108. 305 Joseph Pitton de Tournefort, Relation d’un voyage du Levant (Amsterdam: Jean Có vens & Corneille Mortier, 1733), 1:196. 306 Anonymous, View of Smyrna (Izmir) and the Reception Given to Consul de Hochepied in the Council Chamber, c. 1687-1723. Collection of Rijskmuseum, SK-A-4085. 307 Corneille le Bruyn, Voyage au Levant (Paris: Guillaume Cavelier, 1714), 24–8. 308 Münir Aktepe, “İzmir Camileri.” 309 Mina Tanaç Zeren, İzmir’de Sefarad Mimarisi ve Sinegogları (İstanbul: Yalın Yayıncılık 2010) 163 throughout the empire and all non-Muslim tax-payers were recorded in accordance with the new taxation system. After the reform, non-Muslim inhabitants were recorded properly on the tax registers. In the following section, I consider those tax registers in order to shed light on the city’s unregistered population during the seventeenth century.

5.2. The Tax Burden on the Inhabitants of Early Modern Izmir

How did the proportion of unregistered inhabitants compare to the actual population of the city? This proportion cannot be ascertained without an assessment of the reform in the poll- tax legislated in 1691. This is because until this reform, taxes were collected as lump-sums by the tax-collectors. The heads of non-Muslim communities were obliged to pay a fixed tax determined by the central authority.310 The head of each recognized community collected the annual poll-taxes from his congregants and submitted it to the collector as a lump sum. The communities were free to arrange their tax-collection efforts autonomously as they saw fit, and the central authority did not intervene in this process. For instance, the community could rearrange the tax-collection allotment by taking into consideration the financial status of the members.311 The duty of the official tax-collector was simply to demand the total amount of poll- tax from the head of the community. Indeed, this practice was aimed at protecting non-Muslim community members from harassment by tax-collectors.

This system was practised until the 1691 reform, at which point it changed fundamentally. The Ottoman army had been at war with the Holy Roman Empire, Russia and

Venice since the siege of Vienna in 1683, and the financial burden of this war became difficult

310 Machiel Kiel, “Remarks on the Administration of the Poll tax in the Ottoman Balkans and Value of Poll Tax Registers for Demographic Research,” Etudes Balkaniques, no. 4 (1990): 70–104. 311 Goffman, “The Maḳṭu‘ System and the Jewish Community of Sixteenth-Century Safed;” Amnon Cohen, “On the Realities of Millet System: Jerusalem in the Sixteenth Century,” in Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society, ed. by Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (London: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 2:8–18. 164 for the Ottoman government to sustain. As an urgent solution to this financial problem, the tax system was reformed in 1691. All non-Muslim adult males above 15 years old became subject to the cizye, including clerics, whose previous privileges were abolished. As explained previously, tax-payers were now categorized in accordance with their financial status as ala, evsat, and edna rather by ethnoreligious affiliation. Importantly for our purpose here, as a stipulation of the reform, the poll-tax had to be paid individually rather than as lump-sums. Each taxpayer became responsible for paying their tax individually, and sealed papers sent from

Istanbul were delivered by the collectors to the taxpayers in order to ascertain their payments.

The classification of non-Muslims based on their financial status also helped to improve the tax-income for the imperial treasury. A contemporary chronicler, Silahdar Mehmed Ağa, provides some details on this tripartite collection system, and, in particular, notes that “[with respect to the new tax collection system] an imperial order was decreed about the tax that imposed 4 gold on the ala, 2 gold on the evsat and 1 gold on the edna non-Muslim taxpayers.”312

Another anonymous chronicler emphasized that the revenue of cizye doubled in the short term, providing 8,074 kise akçe for the year 1702, compared to less than 4,000 kise before the reform.313 This trend can be illustrated also by the cizye revenue entries in the Ottoman budgets.

Before this reform, the budgets of the imperial treasury calculate the cizye revenue at under 200 million akçes. Within a decade, it reached over 400 million.314 The anonymous chronicler who evidently procured the information through official sources cited the same figures for the increase in the cizye collection.

312 Nazire Karaçay Türkal, “Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, Zeyl-i Fezleke (1654-1695)” (PhD diss., Marmara University, 2012), 1348. 313 A kise equalled 50,000 akçes, so 4,000 kise akçe equaled 200 million akçes. Anonymous, Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi (1688-1704), ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2000), 19–20. 314 Baki Çakır, “Geleneksel Dönem (Tanzimat Öncesi) Osmanlı Bütçe Gelirleri,” in Osmanlı Maliyesi ve Kurumlar, ed. by Erol Özvar and Mehmet Genç (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2006), 184– 7. 165

Like non-Muslim taxpayers elsewhere throughout the empire, with the introduction of the new tri-bracket graduated tax collection system, Izmir’s non-Muslim residents lost their exemptions and had to re-register for the poll-tax. Much more systematic registration is evident in the post 1691 registers, allowing us to assess the previously missing taxpayers in order to estimate the total population of contemporary Izmir.

Total Non-Muslim Foreign Year Greek Jewish Armenian Population (as nefer) merchants 1688315 581 301 219 61 1,790 1691316 1,004 (incomplete) 1703317 6,450 350 Table 5.5: The Number of Non-Muslim Taxpayers in Izmir After the Tax Reform on Poll Tax in 1691.

As it is depicted on the table, the difference in taxpayer population between the pre- reform period and 1691 is enormous. In fact, the number of taxpayers increased in many regions due to the new compulsory registration of all non-Muslims above 15 (instead of only heads of households, as in the previous system). For instance, the number of Jewish taxpayers in Edirne before 1691 was 698, but jumped to 832 in the new registers that were drawn in accordance with the requirements of reform.318

However, the discrepancies in Izmir’s tax-paying population numbers recorded before and after the reform cannot be explained entirely through the shift from recording households to recording individual adult males. The new number of Armenian taxpayers was approximately 16

315 BOA MAD 14888. 316 For Armenian community, see: BOA MAD 1233. This survey seems complete and exact. The figures it provides for the Armenian tax-paying population are as follows: 120 ala (12%), 787 evsat (78%), and 97 edna (10%). For Greek community: BOA MAD 5484. This detailed register is most likely incomplete, as it does not include a complete survey of the Greek community. It counts only 33 ala (rich) out of a total of 1,790 Greek tax-payers. As it will be discussed below, this (ala) category should be around 10% within community considering the regular practices of imperial registrers. 317 BOA İE DH 1898. 318 Gürer Karagedikli, “In Search of a Jewish Community in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire: The Case of Edirne Jews (c. 1686-1750)” (M.A. Thesis, Bilkent University, 2011), 31. 166 times higher than the previous figure. As late as 1688 only 61 Armenian taxpayers were recorded as living in Izmir. Three years later, in 1691, that number became 1,004. In the case of the Greek community, only an incomplete detailed survey of 1691 is extant, but even there the number of

Greek taxpayers appears to be six times larger than in pre-reform records.

By the eighteenth-century, various types of documents in the Ottoman archives classified non-Muslim tax-payers according to economic status (ala, evsat and edna). This makes it impossible to tell the relative percentage of different ethno-religious groups among the city’s non-Muslim population. As seen in Table 5.5, non-Muslim male taxpayers in the city numbered

6,450 in the first years of the eighteenth century (excluding 350 foreign, European or Persian merchant aman holders).319 This number was more than ten times higher than in the survey of

1688. The total poll tax paid in cash also attests to this sharp rise. In the 1680s, the entire poll-tax burden for all of the non-Muslim taxpayers of Izmir, Manisa, Urla, and other nearby small settlements combined was a mere 332,530 akçe. Izmir’s proportion of this amount was likely around 150,000 akçes, considering the proportion of its taxpayers in the total (581 out of 1,274).

After the tax reform, the total poll tax amount paid by Izmirites rose by more than four million akçes, to 4,705,500 in 1723, and 5,848,600 in 1744.320 The figures based on the tax registers strongly suggest that less than one tenth of the non-Muslim inhabitants were recorded in the pre- reform seventeenth-century registers. The question then becomes: was this true only for non-

Muslims, or was tax exemption applied to both Izmir’s Muslims and non-Muslims? More generally, does this taxation practice indicate a tax evasion for Izmir, or was there a general

319 Aman were tax-exempt privileges granted by the central authority to sojourning merchants. For details on these privileges. Maurits H. van den Boogert, The capitulations and the Ottoman legal system: qadis, consuls, and beratlıs in the 18th century, (Leiden: Brill. 2005) 320 For the distribution of these1274 nefer across the region; BOA MAD 14888. For the total tax amount paid for the 1680’s, see BOA. MAD 7506, 60. The amount of prepaid part by the tax collector for the early 1700’s was 6,000 guruş (720,000 akçes). BOA İE DH 1898. For the amount for 1723, see: BOA AE Ahmed III 7318; and for the year 1744: BOA D CMH d 26774. 167

governmental problem in collecting taxes throughout the empire? The only way to answer this

question is to compare the tax-burden of Izmir with other significant Ottoman centers.

Ottoman towns can be classified considering their population. Istanbul and Cairo were

the most populaous cities which had over one hundred thousands inhabitants in the early modern

Ottoman Empire. Following them, Edirne, Bursa or Aleppo can be defined as the second rank

cities in terms of population size. During the seventeenth century, Izmir reached them thanks to a

rapid demographic growth.321 A comparison of the tax burden of cities of the same rank reveals

an extraordinary advantage for the inhabitants of Izmir.

Avarızhane in Avarızhane in Total avarızhane Urban tax units /

Metropolitan part Villages of the city in kaza total tax burden

Izmir322 328.5 1336 1,664.5 20%

Edirne323 1685 543 2,228 324 75%

Bursa325 2116.5 194 2,310.5 91%

Aleppo326 2399 347 2,746 87%

Table 5.7: Tax burden shouldered by rural and urban parts of several Ottoman metropolitan areas in the seventeenth century.

Different types of annual taxes were collected based on the number of avarızhanes rather

than individuals as the household heads. Table 5.7 shows a certain correlation between a city’s

taxable population size and its tax burden. Similar sized Ottoman towns, Edirne, Bursa and

321 Yunus Uğur, “The Historical Interaction of the City with Its Mahalles: Ottoman Edirne in late Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries” (PhD diss., Boğaziçi University, 2014), 71. 322 BOA. D.MKF. d. 27823, p 8. 323 Yunus Uğur, “Ottoman Edirne”, 163. This figure was updated in the 1686 survey; the city lost a small portion of its tax units and total number of avarızhane reduced to 1513. Therefore, the figure on the table refers to pre-1686 period. 324 Bruce McGowan, Economic life in Ottoman Europe, Taxation, Trade and the Struggle for Land 1600-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 118. According to Yunus Uğur, this figure cover both the city center (nefs-i Edirne) and the villages of the city. Yunus Uğur, “Ottoman Edirne”, 163 see footnote;364. 325 Cafer Çiftçi, “Osmanlı-Avusturya Savaşları Esnasında Bursa Halkının Avarız Türü Vergi Yükünden Örnekler (1686-1688),” The Journal of Ottoman Studies, no. 20 (2000): 247–68, 260–1. 326 Charles L. Wilkins, Forging Urban Solidarities: Ottoman Aleppo 1640-1700 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 56. 168

Aleppo had around 2,000 avarız units in the late seventeenth century as shown on the table 5.7. It is difficult to estimate actual population size based on the tax units, but it is clear that the variation was in a narrow strip considering the tax burden of these large cities.

The total tax imposed on the residents of Izmir was less than one seventh that paid by the inhabitants of Aleppo. It should also be pointed out that before 1660, this burden rested soley on

88 units, while in Aleppo in 1656 there were 3,209 units shouldering the tax.327 For the year

1655-56, the annual cash avarız tax was 325 akçe per avarız units for most of Rumelia, as compared to 300 akçe per avarız unit in Anatolia.328 In other words, the annual avarız taxes per unit were roughly the same throughout the empire. Considering the dramatic difference between

Aleppo and Izmir in the number of tax units, the total tax payment of Izmir was at a negligible level in relation to Aleppo. The comparison between Izmir and other key cities of the empire draws a similar picture on the matter of taxation. Bursa or Edirne were cities equivalent to Izmir in population size, but, contrary to it, provided a considerable contribution to the imperial treasury through cash taxes.

The last column of Table 5.7 lists the relative proportion of the total tax burden for each metropolitan area carried by its urban centre. As expected, these cities shouldered the majoirty of imposed taxes for the kaza. This rate was as high as about 90% for Bursa and Aleppo and 75%.

The tax burden of Izmir was also coherent with the “minimal” number of registered taxpayers.

Not surprisingly, the tax burden share increases depending on the population size of a city.

Unlike other similar sized cities, Izmir’s urban centre was responsible for only 20% of the total tax burden of the kaza. Significantly, prior to the 1660 survey, the number of avarızhane in the

327 For Izmir BOA. D. MKF. d, 8. In this register, it is mentioned that total number avarız unit was 88 and it increased to 328.5 by this survey [dated 1660]. Wilkins, Forging Urban Solidarities, 56. 328 Süleyman Demirci, The functioning of Ottoman avariz taxation, 147-148 169 urban centre stood at merely 88, whereas the total number for the entire kaza was 1,630. This makes the tax share of the urban centre against the district just 5% for the earlier period.329

Such a discrepancy between the tax burdens of different cities cannot be explained in the absence of carefully implemented central policy. However, in the absence of local şer’iyye registers, an imperial order concerning tax “privilege” for the residents of Izmir could not be located in the archives. Despite this inability to locate conclusive “proof,” the evidence nevertheless points to a commitment, even if covert, to a special tax scheme for Izmir. Apart from the visit of the inspector Vizier İsmail Pasha, sent from Istanbul for the survey, it is extremely unlikely that such a massive number of unregistered potential taxpayers would have escaped the gaze of the local kadıs.

On the other hand, there may still be some other possible explanations. For example, is it possible that taxing agents preferred to collect taxes for the imperial treasury independent from the figures registered in the surveys? A reference found in the registers of the finance office shows that the amount of taxes sent from Izmir to the imperial treasury was in accordance with the surveys. The figures in the copy of receipt for the year 1680 matches the survey of 1688 mentioned above.330 A second line of argument would consider whether tax collectors pressured tax-payers to increase their revenues without the knowledge of the Ottoman central authority.

This is always a possibility, but in the absence of archival evidence it is impossible to determine whether bribes were taken to avoid registration on a massive scale. However, such schemes are likely to have resulted in some legal disputes. Indeed, in one case, a petition was sent to the imperial court concerning a conflict between tax-payers and the tax collector. In this specific instance, the central authorities acknowledged that in 1643 Izmir’s total number of avarız

329 For the figures on the previous period of 1660 survey; DMKF.d 27823, 8. 330 For the amount of tax sent to imperial treasury in 1680; BOA MAD 7506, 60. 170 households had been increased slightly.331 Even though, the decision was against the tax-payers, this case suggests that the tax collection system was, in fact, closely dependent on the registers, and that the tax collector could not have requested arbitrary taxes without the approval of the central juridical system.

How then, did the officers and the taxpayers partake in the “legitimization” and the

“organization” of this practice and how was the total sum of taxes collected? We do not have a detailed narrative describing such collusion, but several sources provide clues about the practice.

For instance, the responsa332 of the rabbis of Izmir goes some way to shed light on this issue.

According to a responsum, when the Jewish community grew large enough, the members officially listed in the Ottoman tax registers were split off from the old congregation in order to establish a new one; “four-fifths of the tax unlisted congregants remained with the original congregation …. and now, some four months ago an inspector came to investigate the tax unlisted congregants and in order to dissuade him from investigating, they paid him off.”333 In this case, the tax collector of Izmir harassed the population in order to illegally take money from the community, but the Jewish congregation succeeded in keeping the newcomers unregistered.

In fact, the Jewish community was quite successful in hiding newcomers from the tax authorities.

In 1671, Rabbi Chayim Benbenishti recorded daily Jewish migration to Izmir: "They come daily

... from Manisa and from Tire and from other places and they settle in Izmir."334 In spite of this, the number of Jewish taxpayers listed in the official tax registers actually decreased between

1660 and 1688. The Jewish community of Izmir also warned the large number of newcomers

331 BOA KK 2576, 41. 332 Legal opinions pronounced by religious scholars, akin to fatwas. 333 Nechama Grunhaus, “The Taxation System of the Jewish Community of Izmir in the Seventeenth through the Nineteenth Centuries” (PhD diss., New York University, 1995), 36. 334 Ibid., 32. 171 from Manisa not to inform the local authorities in order to avoid tax levy.335 On the other hand, the Ottoman authorities were quite aware of this Jewish wave moving from Manisa to Izmir, yet evidently chose to turn a blind eye on the phenomenon, and avoid registering them upon their arrival in Izmir.336

Undoubtedly, this kind of tax evasion was not limited to the Jewish community. Greek families migrating from the Aegean islands or Morea often introduced themselves as Venetian merchants in order to avoid taxes (the ahdnames granted tax exemption to sojourning European merchants). These immigrants likely paid the consul for his consular protection and in order to avoid being listed as taxpayers. In another case, a dispute erupted between the tax collector and several old migrant families from the Greek islands, who had worked in Izmir for decades as grocers, gardeners, shoemakers, bakers, or millers. Despite their evident status as Ottoman subjects, an order sent from Istanbul favoured exempting them from paying taxes. 337 The traveller Antoine Galland, who wrote a book on 1670’s Izmir, also mentioned the inflation in the number of tax evading priest “pretenders.”338

Like the Jews and Greeks, only 47 Armenian tax-payers were listed in 1640’s Izmir, compared to a hundred local Armenian families mentioned by an Armenian traveller who visited the city three decades earlier, in 1610. His narrative is regarded as quite trustworthy; he was hosted by an Armenian family for a while and was in touch with other local Armenian families.339 These figures held even subsequently, with only 14 new taxpayers added to the 47 households in the following years up to the 1690’s. A considerable portion of the Armenian

335 Ibid. 336 “Bundan akdem nefs-i Manisa’nın hane-i avarızını tahrir eyledüğünde Yahudi taifesinden az kimesne bulunup ekseri İzmir’de sakin olmağın haliya tahrir ve defter olması…” MAD 7266, 11, quoted in, Feridun Emecen, Unutulmuş bir cemaat: Manisa Yahudileri (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık 2003), 38. 337 ASV, Bailo, 252/340, 72. ASV, Bailo, 252/342, 8. 338 Antoine Galland, La Voyage à Smyrne. A tax-exemption was granted officially to priests as the heads of their communities. 339 Hrand Andreasyan, Polonyalı Simeon Seyahatnamesi (1608-1619) (Istanbul: Everest Yayınları, 2013), 27. 172 newcomers was from Persia, and thus probably labelled as müstemen - mobile merchants who were granted tax-exemption by the central authority. In principle, müstemen status (and tax- exemption) was granted for a period of up to a year. Clearly, here and elsewhere the rule was not enforced.

We have far less evidence of the tax evasion strategies of the Muslim population, but this does not mean that they were less common. The city’s three mosques in 1585 became 20 at the end of the seventeenth century. However, as previously discussed, the increase in the number of tax-payers was far more modest. In regard to the under-registration of inhabitants, a conflict which was called as vaka-i İzmir [the incident of Izmir] in a chronicle, took place in Izmir in mid-seventeenth century.

Most official Ottoman chronicles had an Istanbulite bent and, in all but rare cases, offer little detailed information about localities beyond the capital. This incident was the only case concerning Izmir in what is a lengthy work spanning thousands of pages written by Naima,

Ottoman chronicle. 340 According to the narrative, there were complaints about the sale of grain to the “infidels” along the coast around Izmir in 1650. The Grand Vizier assigned the Pasha of

Ankara, İbrahim Pasha, to inspect the case and he came to the city with his mercenaries (levend) to seal all the stores of provisions. The expenses of accommodation for the pasha and his retinue were imposed on the local people. This was the usual practice in other parts of the empire and these expenses were termed “konak zahmeti.” In such a situation, the local taxpayers were obliged to cover the expenses of their eminent visitors. However, the problem was that the local inhabitants of Izmir did not pay annual taxes in the way that other Ottoman subjects did, and the cost of accommodation was not a negligible sum. For instance, in a similar case in 1627, when a

340 Naîmâ Mustafa Efendi, Târih-i Na‘îmâ: Ravzatü’l-Hüseyn fî Hulâsati Ahbâri’l-Hâfikayn, ed. Mehmed İpşirli (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), 3:1279. 173 pasha was accommodated in Manisa with his soldiers, a charge of five gurush was imposed on each real household to cover the expenses and the total tax collected in Manisa to cover the pasha’s accommodation costs was approximately 880,000 akçe.341 We have no information on how much tax was imposed to pay for the pasha’s accommodation in Izmir in 1650, but the case of Manisa provides us with an example of the possible tax burden. On the other hand, the total number of avarız units in Izmir in this period was just 88, with a total standard annual cash tax of approximately 1,000 (600 avarız + 400 nüzul) akçe per avarız unit.342 Consequently, the total amount of cash paid annualy by the people of Izmir was around 88,000, one-tenth of the sum collected in Manisa as “konak zahmeti.” The cost of accommodation did not pose a serious problem for Manisa, but it would have probably been unacceptable for the people of Izmir.

Naima continues that “town people gathered and visited the kadı of Izmir, Semiz

Veliyuddin Efendi, in order to say “this issue is not acceptable” and requested the removal of the pasha from the city. The kadı was unable to find a solution.”343 In fact, Kadı Semiz Veliyuddin

Efendi had just been assigned to the post of Izmir, and this was his first assignment as kadı after a long career as a professor (müderris) at various medreses.344 As the kadı could not solve the dispute, the people walked over to the mansion of the Pasha. Local levends joined the group and they besieged the mansion. The discussion escalated into a conflict and both sides experienced losses due to this clash. Finally, the pasha and the kadı petitioned the court and filed their complaints about each other. The Grand Vizier, as the patron of İbrahim Pasha, petitioned the

341 Şahin Sonyıldırım, “17. Yüzyılın İlk Yarısında Manisa” (MA Thesis, Ankara University, 2007), 38–9. In order to meet the total expense of accommodation, 10,995 gurush were collected from 2,169 households in Manisa and a gurush equaled about 80 akçe at the time. 342 Süleyman Demirci, The Functioning of Avarız, 177. 343 “şehir halkı cem olup İzmir kadısı Semiz Vali’ye gelip ‘bu ne olmaz iştir’ deyu define iltimas ettiler. Kadı dahi çaresazlıktan aciz olmakla…” Naîmâ, Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 3:1279. 344 Şeyhî Mehmed Efendi, Vekayiü’l-fudalâ, ed. Abdülkadir Özcan (İstanbul: Çağrı, 1989), 1:191; Ali Uğur, The Ottoman ʿUlemā in the mid-seventeenth Century: An Analysis of the Vaḳā’iʿü’l-Fużalā of Meḥmed Şeyḫī Ef. (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1986), 123. 174

Şeyhülislam Bahai Efendi for the dismissal of the kadı. Kadı Semiz Veliyüddin Efendi was recalled to Istanbul and in the meantime, Ibrahim Pasha left Izmir.345 This incident is a striking case on the under-registration of inhabitants of mid-sixteenth century Izmir.

Eventually, it was not so easy to hide from official eyes 80% of the population (or more) in a city of 40 to 50 thousand. Consequently, the non-Muslim section of this “hidden” population was registered immediately following the tax-reform. It is clear that the local/central authorities were quite aware of the particular circumstances in Izmir. As would be expected, the implementation of the new poll tax system was not an easy matter in the city. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the Ottoman Empire was also at war with Venice during these years of taxation reform with the occupation of Chios taking place in 1695. For this period, Izmir served as a kind of military base for the Ottoman navy, resulting in frequent social unrest in the city. In July 1688, Izmir also experienced one of the most destructive earthquakes in its history.

A fire broke out after the earthquake and aggravated the destructive impact of the disaster.

Numerous houses and hans were damaged, countless people lost their lives, and a considerable number of families fled the city. A French report mentions the death toll was as high as 16,000 to

19,000; another source cited a figure of around 15,000-16,000. Even if these numbers were exaggerated, the commercial system of the port-city was paralyzed for a time.346 One of the unexpected consequences of the disaster and its aftermath was that it was difficult to implement the tax reform in the city.

Indeed, in the wake of the earthquake non-Muslim taxpayers were reluctant to pay newly imposed taxes, resulting in several petitions by tax collectors. The central authorities, however,

345 Naîmâ, Târih-i Na‘îmâ, 3:1279. 346 Necmi Ülker, “Rise of Izmir 1688-1740” (PhD diss., Michigan University, 1974), 42–54. The houses during this period were mainly constructed with adobe or wood and even if the earthquake was so destructive, its immediate impact was not the high death toll. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the earthquake had a negative impact on the city. 175 were adamant in implementing the new regulation and demands for leniency fell on deaf ears.

Directly following the reform, a tax collector named Süleyman petitioned the court and detailed the challenge of collecting taxes under the circumstances. The taxpayers, he reported, were asking to pay the newly imposed tax using low-rate coins. In response, an imperial decree was issued, requiring that the imposed taxes be paid in imperial coins.347 Another decree was sent regarding the same problem in 1695, suggesting that the problem did not go away. This time, several non-Muslims showed berats and claimed tax exemption, but the decree ordered them to pay their taxes as stipulated.348 Two years later, in 1697, an imperial decree was sent once again concerning tax collection matters. It was strictly ordered that the cizye taxes should be collected meticulously in line with the tax registers compiled after the tax reform.349 From the early eighteenth century onwards, however, such orders concerning the implementation of the tax reform were no longer issued, suggesting that the problem was somehow resolved by that point.

While the reform applied only to the poll-tax and there were no new regulations affecting the other annual cash taxes based on the avarız system. Before 1660, Izmir’s total number of avarızhane was a mere 88, but this grew to 328.5 in that year’s survey, and remained at this level for more than four decades thereafter. Then, a new ferman sent from Istanbul requested an increase in the total avarız units, resulting in the total number of avarızhanes growing from

328.5 to 434 in 1699.350 A new survey was not conducted at this time. Instead, an avarız unit was calculated to comprise three actual household instead of four, as in the previous survey. This still

347 BOA. AE. Ahmed II 8/803 “…sim teklif edib yedlere vermeğe muhalefet etmeleriyle ehli zımmi cizyeleri eda eylediğin sikke-i hümayun ile meşkûk mucebince…” 348 BOA. İE..DH. 14/1295 “… mahruse-i mezkurede mutemekkin Rum keferesi ve Yehudi tayfalarının bazıları yedlerine bir takrib ile muaf olduk cizyeden diyü ellerine berat alub cizye malın vermeyüb…..” 349 BOA. İE. ML. 63/5922 “….1102 senesinde sadr olan hattı humayun mucibince fermanı ali sadr olduğu defterde mestur ve mukayyed bulunmağın…” 350 D. MKF. d 27823, p 2. 176 resulted in an unusually low tax-burden, which was to remain in place thoughout the eighteenth century.351

5.3. The Long-term Demographic Pattern of Izmir in the Early Modern Period

In the absence of detailed population censuses, the figures derived from the tax registers are the main source for demographic studies of premodern societies. The main problems of these sources are questions concerning their reliability and validity. As discussed in detail above, similar issues plague the tax registers of Izmir during the seventeenth century. However, the reform of the poll tax enables us to reach much more reliable figures for the non-Muslim population of the city Izmir, particularly in the eighteenth century. Another frequently encountered problem is the difficulty of creating time series due to the absence of regularly updated tax registers in order to trace periodical population changes. In this regard, we are fortunate to have five distinct data points for Izmir’s total non-Muslim taxpayer population for the period between 1703 and 1788. This time series allows us to trace population movements for every two decades on average for eighteenth-century Izmir. Apart from the total membership of the non-Muslim communities, three surveys of specific communities are available in the

Ottoman archives: a survey of the Armenian community and an incomplete one of the Greek community, both compiled right after the 1691 survey, and a survey of the Jewish community dated 1775. These allow us to assess the size of specific ethno-religious groups and their share in the total population. The combined figures for 1691-1788 derived from the surveys and other documents in the Ottoman archives are displayed in Table 5.8 below.

351 İzmir mahallat and number of avarız units were close for the years 1747; BOA. AE. Mahmud I 2718, and for the year 1775. BOA D. MKF. 30668. 177

Total Non-Muslim Foreign Year Greeks Jews Armenians Population (as nefer) merchants 1790 1691352 1,004 (incomplete) 1703353 6,450 350 1723354 7,600 1744355 8,580 1775356 9,464 2205 1788357 9,952 Table 5.8: Non-Muslim Taxpayer Population (as nefer) in Eighteenth-century Izmir

These updated numbers in the eighteenth century show demographic fluctuations, in contrast to travellers’ estimates. The general trend suggests that the population of Izmir was highly dynamic over the century, with a population growth rate of 54% between 1703 and 1788.

For this long period, the average annual rate of growth for the non-Muslim population was

0.63%. If we divide this long period into shorter segments with the aim of re-evaluating the periodical annual growth rate, we can observe an average annual population growth rate of

0.89% over the first two decades (1703-1723), the highest for the century. This rate declines in the next two decades (1723-1744) to 0.61%,then declines further over the next thirty year period from 1744 to 1775 to its lowest level of the century (0.33%), only to rise slightly to 0.39% for the next 15 years (1775-1789).

352 For Greek community; BOA MAD 5484. Considering the regulations of new taxation system, this detailed register should be incomplete. The ala Greeks has a limited proportion (33 ala out of 1,817 taxpayers) in relation to overall tax-payers of the community and this rate must be about 10% as discussed on the latter part of this section. This must be only a part of the existent survey for the Greek community. For Armenian community, BOA MAD 1233. This should be a complete and accurate survey. The shares are 116 ala/11%, 815 evsat/79%, 102 edna/10%. 353 BOA İE DH 1898. 354 BOA AE Ahmed III 7318. 355 BOA d CMH 26774. 356 BOA d CMH 26862, For the survey of Jewish community: BOA d_CMH 26863 357 BOA AE Abdülhamit I_5747 178

Figure 5.1: Non-Muslim Taxpaying Population (as nefer)of eighteenth-century Izmir

Figure 5.2: Annual Average Growth Rate of Non-Muslim Taxpaying Population of Eighteenth-century Izmir

179

Various factors are likely at play in these different periodical rates of population growth, including war and political turbulence affecting the region, social unrest around the city, and natural disasters. 358 However, for Izmir, like other premodern cities located on commercial routes, a high mortality rate due to epidemics, especially the impact of the plague, proved the main pressure on demographic growth. The plague epidemics were almost a normal part of life for the inhabitants of eighteenth-century Izmir, with plague afflicting the city for 23 years during the first half of the eighteenth century, and even more frequently in the latter part of the century, occurring 34 times over the next five decades.359 Hundreds of ships across the Mediterranean and caravans from long-distance routes visited the city every year, making it difficult to escape the old enemy in the absence of a quarantine system.

The plague was not always harsh and fatal. In the first decades of the eighteenth century, it was relatively limited in its reach and it was not powerful enough to shake the city. However, as Panzac revealed, the plague epidemics of the second half of the century proved more ruinous for the city,360 hitting it the hardest in 1739-41, 1758-60, 1762-63 and 1769-71. Mortality figures in foreign consular reports were extremely high, mentioning a daily death toll of 400-500 in July

1760, 300 cases observed per day in 1765, 300 to 400 deaths a day during the June 1784 outbreak, and 200 deaths for 1788. These figures probably refer to the peak phase of long-term epidemics, but they paint a clear picture of the impact of the plague on the population.361

Panzac suggests that these devastating plague attacks caused thousands of deaths in the city with a population loss of 20% between 1739 and 1741 and an even higher mortality of up to

358 For an overview of the enviromental and social conditions of the eighteenth century, see: Elena Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce of Smyrna in the Eighteenth Century 1700-1820 (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992), 43– 75. 359 Daniel Panzac, La peste dans l’Empire Ottoman 1700-1850 (Leuven: Editions Peeters, 1985), 198. 360 Idem, “La peste à Smyrne au XVIIIe siècle,” Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 28, no. 4 (1973): 1071– 93, 1075. 361 Ibid., 1085. 180

33% during the continuous epidemic years between 1758 and 1762. He calculates that the annual average loss due to plague epidemics across the century was about 1.1% to 1.3%, and concludes that as a result of these unrelenting attacks Izmir’s population remained stagnant.362 The rates estimated by Panzac were based on French archives but they have also been corroborated by a document I discovered in the Ottoman archives. After the epidemic year of 1724, the tax collector sent a petition regarding the cizye collection and mentioned that, due to the plague epidemic, the total sum of cizye tax collected fell below the estimate. According to his petition, a considerable number of people were dead or had fled for their lives, resulting in a 5% shortfall.363 These epidemics also shook the people of the city economically: in the same year, the status of 70 tax-payers turned from ala into edna due to the changes on their economic situation.364

The abovementioned fiscal records verify the impact of disease in the second half of the century. The growth rate bottomed out during the powerful epidemic periods, as revealed by

Panzac. However, the dynamism of the city was able to survive the disruptive impact of the plague. Panzac’s presumption of the stability of population was reasonable considering the death rates and the limits of population growth in premodern times. Keeping up a population growth performance over an approximately 1.2% mortality rate due to epidemics was challenging for an early modern city. In light of this and the persistence of plague-related mortality, Izmir’s annual

0.63% growth rate is very impressive indeed.

Another insight provided by the cizye records concerns the correlation between the trends of population growth and the economic stratification among the non-Muslim population as determined by taxation practices. The tripartite categorization of the poll-tax reform set the ratios

362 Panzac, La Peste dans l’Empire Ottoman, 363. 363 BOA, AE, Ahmed III 73/7318. 364 BOA, AE. Ahmed III 88/8794. 181 of these categories at 20% ala, 60% evsat, and 20% edna for much of the empire and 10:90:10 for some other regions.365 It was the latter distribution scale that was followed in Chios and

Izmir.366 In the first years of the eighteenth century, the ratios of cizye taxpayers accorded with this fixed distribution, but it was re-assessed during the century. While the share of the ala class remained stable at 10% for the entire century, the proportions of evsat and edna status fluctuated periodically. The share of the edna status increased slowly until the mid-century, after which it increased rapidly against the evsat group. This period coincided with the lowest annual population growth rates, presumably due to the impact of the plague. In the last quarter of the century, the share was partially retaken by the tax-payers on evsat status and this corresponded to the recovery period in terms of the rates of annual population growth. The epidemic pressure on demography cannot be the only explanation of this fluctuating trend, but this simultaneous variation is significant.

Figure 5.3: Fluctuations in Economic Strata Among the Non-Muslim Population of Izmir, based on Cizye registers

365 Marinos Sariyannis, “Notes on the Ottoman Poll-Tax reforms of the Late Seventeenth Century: The Case of Crete,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 54, no. 1 (2011): 39–61. 366 Boris Christoff Nedkoff, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Cizye (Baş vergisi),” trans. by Ş. Altundağ, Belleten 8, no. 32 (1944): 599–652, 622. 182

The figures extracted from the contemporary cizye registers make it possible to estimate the city’s approximate non-Muslim population. This is achieved by multiplying the number of nefers by three, as suggested by many scholars working on Ottoman demographic history.367 The

Muslim population of the city remains unknown, but we have several clues that allow us to roughly estimate the city’s overall Muslim population. As explained above, the extensive tax survey of 1660 converged with the view of travellers on the ratios of Muslim and non-Muslim communities. The survey of 1660 reveals a rate of 52% Muslim to 48% non-Muslim taxpayers.

This rate changes to 60:40 once we include members of the tax-exempt askeri class.368 Based on these reports, Table 5.9 provides approximate total population estimates for eighteenth-century

Izmir. For purposes of comparison, I have also included the results of the first comprensive census of the city, conducted in 1881, in the last row.369

Total Total Muslim Total Ottoman Non-Muslim Foreigners Year Non-Muslim Population Population Population (as nefer) (as Nefer) (appr.) (appr.) (appr.) 1703 6,450 19,350 29,025 48,375 350 1723 7,600 22,800 34,200 57,000 1744 8,580 25,740 38,610 64,350 1775 9,464 28,392 42,588 70,980 1788 9,952 29,856 44,784 74,640 370 1881 76,740 79,288 156,028 51,520 Table 5.9: Estimated Muslim and Non-Muslim population of Eighteenth-century Izmir

367 Bruce McGowan, “Food Supply and Taxation on the Middle Danube (1568-1579)”, Archivum Ottomanicum 1: (1969), 157-158., Mehmet Öz, XV-XVI. Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı, 63. Turan Gökçe, XVI-XVII. Yüzyıllarda Lazıkiyye (Denizli) Kazası (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 2000) 89. Mehmet Öz, “Tahrir Defterlerindeki Sayısal Veriler”, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Bilgi ve İstatistik. Eds. Halil İnalcık- Şevket Pamuk, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2000) 20-23. 368 On this and the shared view of travellers on the ethno-religious composition of the city see p:160. 369 I included the 1575 tahrir survey in the chart to illustrate the long-term demographic evolution. According to that survey, there were about 2,000 inhabitants in Izmir. Unfortunately, we have no information with which to evaluate the seventeenth-century demographic fluctuations. 370 Karpat, Ottoman Population 1830-1914, 123. 183

Table 5.10 compiles the estimated fıgures for the various ethno-religious communities, in an effort to capture the possible ethnic composition of the city around the year 1700. This compilation can only provide a rough overview of the demographic structure, not precise population data. For instance, we know the size of the Jewish taxpayer community for the year

1775. I assume that the growth rate of the entire non-Muslim population was valid equally for the Jewish community, so I calculated that amount in accordance with the rate of demographic growth for the period in between 1703 and 1775. Similarly, in the 1690s, Armenian taxpayers numbered 1,004 and I included this figure, as it forms part of my calculation. Finally, I considered the remaining non-Muslim taxpayers to be the members of Greek community due to the absence of a complete survey of that ethnic group.

Muslims Greeks Jews371 Armenians372 Total Early 1700s 29,000 11,850 4,500 3,100 48,450 Table 5.10: Estimated Ethno-Religious composition of the Population in Early Eighteenth-century Izmir

371 In 1775, Jewish taxpayers totalled 2,205 nefer. Assuming that its growth rate matched that of other non-Muslim populations between 1703 and 1775, I estimate the population figure for the early 1700 at around 1,500 nefer, or 4,500 individuals. 372 In the 1690s, Armenian tax-payers totalled 1,033 nefer, or approximately 3,100 individuals. After subtracting the Jewish and Armenian estimated population figures from the non-Muslim total I reached the figure of 12,000 for Greek taxpayers (6,450-1,500-1000 = 3,950 nefer). 184

Figure 5.4: Estimated ethnic composition of the population in early eighteenth-century Izmir

Early modern Izmir showed an extraordinary growth rate considering the limits of premodern cities. However, it was not a unique case in the early modern Mediterranean world.

The counterpart of Izmir was Livorno, promoted by the Medici as a newborn port-city in the late sixteenth century. Its pattern closely corresponds to Izmir’s. Just like Izmir, in the mid-sixteenth century Livorno was a small coastal town of only a few hundred inhabitants. The structural change of the Mediterranean commercial system and the policies followed by the Medicis in order to support Livorno with the goal of promoting it as the new port-city of the northern

Mediterranean led to the city’s outstanding commercial development. 373 Livorno’s meteoric population growth (largely thanks to migration) make it Izmir’s “twin city.” Table 5.11 and

Chart 5.4 show the population estimates of several early modern Mediterranean port cities, and underscore Livorno and Izmir’s exceptionality.374

373 Tazzara, The masterpiece of Medici; Nadalo, Constructing Pluralism in Seventeenth Century Livorno. 374 In the absence of comprehensive and reliable datasets for the southern ports of the Mediterranean, the comparison must be limited with the European port cities. [All/only] Cities of over 30,000 residents are included in the table. 185

Years 1600 1650 1700 1750 1800

Marseille 40 66 75 68 78

Genoa 71 90 80 87 90

Venice 139 120 138 149 138

Livorno 4 12 16 32 53

Catania 28 11 16 26 45

Messina 50 50 40 37 44

Napoli 281 176 216 305 427

Palermo 105 129 100 118 139

Barcelona 43 44 43 50 115

Valencia 65 52 50 80

Izmir 5 50 62 75 Table 5.11: Population Change in Mediterranean Cities, 1600-1800 (figures x1000).375

375 All figures other than for Izmir are reproduced from Jan de Vries, European Urbanization 1500-1800 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), 270–8. Considering demographic dynamism of Izmir, I assumed that it might be doubled in a quarter at least until 1600, and estimated roughly 5,000 inhabitants for Izmir in 1600. For the discussion on the rapid demographic growth of Izmir in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries see: Section 5.1. 186

Figure 5.5: Long-term demographic trajectories of Mediterranean port cities, 1600-1800.376

5.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has served two main purposes: primarily, as a general framework, I introduced the tax-exempt position of the port of Izmir in the rising process of the city. I demonstrated that the tax burden on Izmir was limited in relation to similar Ottoman cities

376 All index used in this chare are calculated through the figures from table 5.12. 187 in the seventeenth century. Therefore, Izmir did not provide only a sheltered port for the merchant ships or warehousing facilities for the traders, but it was a tax haven for all newcomers.

The central authority gathered all commercial activities into this port thanks to a blind eye tax- exempt policy, one that supported the promotion of Izmir as a prominent, new centre of the eastern Mediterranean commercial web among its potential rivals. Until the survey of 1660, the taxes collected in the avarız system remained at a negligible level. Despite a significant increase in that survey, the rate was just about one-tenth of the tax burden for the inhabitants of other

Ottoman cities. The situation was similar for the poll-tax and the majority of non-Muslims was not recorded in the registers until the 1691 reform. However, by the time of the reform, non-

Muslim taxpayers were registered and their numbers were updated in the course of the eighteenth century.

Secondly, I have suggested a methodology with which to adapt tax registers into the historical studies of the demographic structures of Ottoman cities for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to this methodological perspective, I propose to accommodate relevant tax registers together with a comparative analysis to test their reliability and validity.

This comparison should include horizontal/regional and vertical/periodical overviews in order to more accurately estimate the size of the city. Apart from the documentary analysis, various indicators such as estimates of travellers and the number of public buildings are considered an integral part of this analysis. By employing this methodology, it should be possible to evaluate the size of premodern Ottoman cities more precisely. By applying it to the study of Izmir’s population and therefore commercial growth, I have been able to trace the long-term demographic patterns of early modern Izmir. As emphasized above, however, Izmir was an exceptional case in the early modern Mediterranean in terms of its demographic dynamism

188 matched perhaps only by Livorno. Despite hardships such as the reoccurring plague epidemics, these port cities displayed an extraordinary demographic expansion in the seventeenth century and unlike the other Mediterranean port cities, were able to sustain their growth into the next century.

189

CONCLUSION

For a student of early modern global history, the emergence of Izmir offers an opportunity to locate a crucial piece of the segmented network of Eurasian commerce thus far only sketchily presented. As previous scholars have shown, the late sixteenth century signals the beginning of a new era not only in Braudel’s periodization of the Mediterranean but in profound social, economic, and political transformations of the Ottoman Empire and of Eurasian trade more broadly. The rise of Izmir as a newborn port-city in the midst of such multifaceted transformations allows us to situate the regional, imperial, and continental dimensions of this critical juncture in its environmental and economic contexts. In this dissertation, I examined three inter-related processes that turned Izmir into a prominent commercial hub of Eurasian commerce in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, namely (1) regional differentiation prompted by environmental transformation, (2) interwoven processes of monetization and commercialisation, and (3) a de facto tax-exemption policy carried out by the Ottoman government.

In the context of environmental history, this dissertation demonstrated how shifting climatic conditions, combined with geologic features, formed and transformed the socio- economic structure of Ottoman Anatolia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In broad terms, my analysis fits within the framework suggested by Horden and Purcell of approaching the Mediterranean through a micro-ecological perspective. This perspective defines micro- ecology as a locality shaped and reshaped by a set of distinctive regional geographical characteristics such as shifting climatic conditions, temporal agricultural opportunities, and their interplay with peasants’ actions in a given period. In this framework, it is the connectivity among variable micro-ecologies that constitutes the history of the Mediterranean. My analysis explored

190 the micro-ecological infrastructure of Izmir as one of the factors behind the city’s rise. Other

Ottoman port-cities—notably Salonica in the eighteenth century and Beirut in the nineteenth— displayed similarly rapid commercial development and integrated into a greater commercial system.377 Therefore, similar questions and analytical perspectives could be posed to these port cities as well, to understand their rise under particular, if comparable, conditions.

The dissertation also emphasizes the pivotal role of the monetary crisis observed in

Ottoman lands during the last decades of the sixteenth century on the making of Izmir. I argue that the monetization and commercialization processes proceeded hand-in-hand for about two decades. Thereafter, the distinct Ottoman monetary zones were unified, restoring monetary stability and at the same time slowing down commercial expansion. Even though my focus is mainly on the commercial trends of Izmir, this monetary transformation had Eurasian implications. As introduced shortly in section 4.1, similar monetary processes took place around the same time in both the Safavid and Mughal Empires. A detailed analysis of this monetization process on a Eurasian scale and its global implications are clearly beyond the scope of this project. What it does suggest, however, is that the monetization of markets triggered a global diversifying of shareholders in contemporary Eurasian commerce. For example, while the

Venetians had a large monopoly on commercial transactions throughout the Mediterranean until the 1580s, this commerce was taken up by multiple hands afterwards. Works on merchants of different ethno-religious background has shown that their involvement in interregional trade rapidly expanded at the turn of the seventeenth century. Sephardic Jews of Livorno or New

Julfan Armenians were able to strengthen their commercial ties throughout the continent during

377 Mark Mazower, Salonica, City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430-1950, (London : HarperCollins, 2004), Jens Hanssen, Fin de siècle Beirut : the Making of An Ottoman Provincial Capital (Oxford : Clarendon Press ; Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2005) 191 the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 378 Ottoman merchants also became actors in

Mediterranean commerce by the seventeenth century.379 The monetization of markets might be interpreted as one of the main factors that facilitated the growing involvement of various ethno- religious groups in the early modern commercial world.

Another vital dimension of the problem which this dissertation could only hint at is the legal ground of the “rearranged” Mediterranean commercial system. The entrance of northwestern European merchants into the Mediterranean and the appearance of various ethno- religious groups dealing with commerce led to the extant commercial system gradually evolving, with new legal requirements for the commercial system. In the extant literature, the ahdnames are mainly analyzed as the commercial privileges granted by the Ottoman government to

European merchants. However, these privileges were rather parts of a greater commercial—and juridical—transformation observed in the Mediterranean. Hence, the British Levant Company established consulates not only in Ottoman territories, but elsewhere in the Mediterranean.

Venice also granted similar privileges to the Netherlandish merchants, and the Medicis defined the rights of mercantile groups in a similar way. 380 Consequently, these legal arrangements would be analyzed as parts of Mediterranean-wide legal rearrangements in the face of diversifying and increasing mobility of goods and people in the post-1580 Mediterranean.

More broadly, Izmir holds out great promise for future research on the history of

Mediterranean mobilities. As I show, alongside Livorno, Izmir occupies a peculiar position in terms of its demographic growth. Its phenomenal population increase cannot be explained

378 Francesca Trivallato, “The Port Jews of Livorno and their Global Networks of Trade in the Early Modern Period”, Jewish Culture and History, 7:1-2, (2004). 31-48., Sebouh Aslanian, The Global Trade Networks of Armenian Merchants from New Julfa. 379 Cemal Kafadar, A Death in Venice (1575): Anatolian Muslim Merchants Trading in the Serenissima, in Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 (1986), pp. 191-217. 380 Maartje van Gelder, Trading places: the Netherlandish merchants in early modern Venice. (Leiden: Brill, 2009), Tazzara, The masterpiece of Medici; Nadalo, Constructing Pluralism in Seventeenth Century Livorno.

192 without sustained, large-scale migration to the city. Yet unlike their European counterparts, the migration patterns of early modern Ottomans are still largely unknown, save for a few case studies of underrepresented groups that migrated to Istanbul.381 Therefore, the case of Izmir may strengthen our understanding of early modern Ottoman migration patterns more broadly. So the obvious questions are; who were these immigrants and where did they come from? In my next project, I shed light on this matter partially, and analyze the migration patterns of Armenian and

Greek immigrants by using the cizye registers compiled in Izmir right after the tax reform implemented in 1691. By using these registers which include total 2794 tax-payers (1790 Greeks and 1004 Armenians) along with their origins, professions and economic status, I aim to reveal the migration paths to Izmir. My preliminary findings point that Izmir did not host only inherently mobile groups such as merchants or sailors but also a significant number of artisans, workers, and even peasants and gardeners that migrated to the town from regions of short and long distance in the latter part of seventeenth century. This case-study revisits the modernist point of view which presumes the immobility of land dependent people and lack of labor market in early modern Ottoman society.

Another question that this dissertation aims to address is the Ottoman government’s policy towards Izmir. Contrary to prevailing assumptions about the government’s purely reactive or uninformed policy, I suggest that the central authorities employed an efficient instrument, tax- exemption, in order to promote the development of this port-city. Even though I was not able to locate an imperial decree in support my contention, I demonstrate how this process worked by analyzing contemporary tax registers. That said, a missing link in this mechanism remains uninvestigated, namely the operators of this policy. Only in the nineteenth century did this

381 Mehmet Kuru, “Mobilization of Free Labor in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire: A snapshot of Izmir in 1691” (Forthcoming) in Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies. 193 significant commercial hub become a provincial administrative center ruled by Pashas. Up to that point, the kadı, as an Ottoman local official, functioned as the ultimate administrative and judicial representative in the city. In order to understand the implementation of central government policies at the local level, therefore, kadi’ background, intellectual and social profiles, and political networks are essential. In my following research on kadıs assigned to

Izmir, I explore the links between local government and Ottoman central authority and it would also help explain the constituting elements of Ottoman government as a whole.

In order to reveal intellectual, social, and political networks of kadıs, I carry out a prosopografic approach on the occupants of this post in Izmir during the period stretching from

1570s to 1720s. The contemporary biographical works on Ottoman ulema are used to uncover the general patterns of this group and this attempt enables me to unfold their family ties, the former “supervisors” of these kadıs during their training, and their mobilization through the previous and subsequent appointments. The scope of my research determined by the limits of the relevant sources encompasses the period over a hundred and fifty years between 1569 and 1723 and in these 154 years, 118 different office holders got the post of Izmir as the kadı and several ones would achieve the post more than once so the total number of assignments was 140 throughout the period. Based on prosopographic research on these office holders, I am going to show that since the last decades of the sixteenth century the post of kadı in Izmir was occupied by the members of a close clique as the shareholder of the central authority. These religious authorities could be defined as the second circle of Ottoman ulema class as they could rarely climb to the highest echelons of the Ottoman bureaucratic/administrative system. On the other hand, they had close links with the Ottoman court and administrative elites of Istanbul and these

194 networks might enable them to be the constituting element of Ottoman holistic governmental system.

To sum up, my attempt to locate Izmir in early modern Mediterranean concluded with significant findings which enabled me to revisit various themes, topics and arguments but new questions arise in meantime in order to fully understand contemporary regional, imperial and continental transformation. All the topics and questions mentioned above from the fields of environmental history to the mobility studies point crucial gears of mechanism behind the transformations observed in regional, imperial and Eurasian scales during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Further researches on these issues will help us to gain insight on the period of this critical juncture.

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APPENDIX I

Urban Demographic Change in the Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Anatolia

1520s-30s1 1570s-80's Number of Number of Percentage Town2 Household Household Change [Hane]3 [Hane] 4 Manisa 984 1221 % 24

Akhisar 594 542 % -9 al t 6 Menemen 493 510 % 3 7

Çeşme 383 390 % 2

Coas

s 8

Aydın 1891 1849 %-2 n an 9

e Denizli 1176 1228 %4

gio n

e 10 a

r Muğla 821 1006 %22 R r 11 e Antalya 872 978 %12 it 12 d Adana 1530 1571 %2 13

Me Aleppo 11226 8115 %-28 14

Tripoli 1534 1269 %-17

15 Niğde 3327 6588 %98 16 Sinop 611 626 %2 17 Trabzon 1285 2114 %64 18 Rize 217 218 - 19 Uşak 399 493 %24

20 Amasya 1414 1766 %25 21 Birecik 533 805 %51 22 Antep 1856 2969 %60

Anatolia 23 Hamit 2144 3093 %44 n 24

er Samsun 11873 21041 %77 25 th Aksaray 1090 2712 %149 r 26

Tosya 599 781 %30

d Sivrihisar 566 743 %31

n Uluborlu 516 686 %33 s a s

n Çorum 907 1234 %36

gio Harput 1064 1607 %51 re

Kütahya 1050 1588 %51 r

e Tokat 1523 2610 %71 nn

I Seydişehir 552 971 %76 Ankara 3010 5344 %78 Balikesir 834 1488 %78 Divriği 703 1345 %91 Akşehir 648 1241 %92

Kastamonu 993 1912 %93

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Bursa 6147 12828 %109 Urfa 1089 2570 %136 Konya 1150 2787 %142 Karaman 576 1423 %147 Arabgir 347 1046 %201 Sivas 1016 3074 %203 Kayseri 1801 6015 %234

1 These dates are generic periods. Surveys were conducted in different years and the specific dates of these registers are given in the relevant footnotes for each urban centre. 2 These towns would refer to just one district or the total urban population of entire province. In the cases of more than one town centre, it is mentioned in the footnotes. 3 I took the number of households in order to render comparison. Only in a few cases, all taxpayers are registered under the same category as nefer without making a distinction between mücerred or hane for the latter surveys. In these cases (Ankara, Adana, Denizli and Aksaray), I take the early registers as nefer (hane+mücerred) in order to reach a meaningful comparison and these exceptions are explained in the relevant footnotes as well. 4 Feridun Emecen, XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası, 50. Date of surveys: 1531 and 1575. 5 Feridun Emecen, “Akhisar Kasabası,” in Tarih İçinde Manisa (Manisa: Manisa Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2006), 241–2. 6 Cevat Bakkal, “Menemen Kazası XV–XVIII. Yüzyıllar” (PhD diss., Ege University, 1994), 55–77. Date of surveys: 1531 and 1575. The mahalles of the town are listed along with the number of households and mücerreds inhabited in the relevant mahalles but total number of households are not tabulated in this work so I gathered them in order to reach the total number of household in the town. 7 Kütükoğlu, XVI. Asırda Çeşme, 52–9. Date of surveys: 1529 and 1575. These statistics show the total number of households for the two town centres in the district; Çeşme and Seferihisar. 8 Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 83. The statistics extracted from Cook’s study, present the total urban hane for Kestel, Sultanhisarı and Tire. Date of surveys: Reign of Selim I (1512-1520) and 1575. There is also another survey conducted in 1529 and according to that survey, total hane is 1588 and the difference between that one and 1575 is +16%. 9 Turan Gökçe, XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Lazıkiyye (Denizli) Kazası (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), 90. Dates of surveys: 1530 and 1571. In the second survey, all taxpayers were recorded as nefer, therefore I took the number of nefer (hane+mücerred) for the first one as well. 10 Zekai Mete, “ XV. ve XVI. Yüzyıllarda Muğla ve Yöresi” (PhD diss., Istanbul University, 2004), 125–33. Dates of surveys: 1517-1583. The number shows the total hane for Muğla, Milas and Peçin. 11 Behset Karaca, XV. ve XVI. Yüzyıllarda Teke Sancağı (Isparta: Fakülte Kitabevi, 2002), 121–44. Dates of surveys: 1530 and 1568. The statistics includes Antalya, Istanos (Korkuteli) and Elmalı. 12 Yılmaz Kurt, “16. Yüzyıl Adana Tarihi” (PhD diss., Hacettepe University, 1992), 106. Three surveys were conducted in Adana in between 1525 and 1536 and I took the average of these three surveys for the first column. The date of the second survey is 1574. The numbers present the total nefer number for Adana, Ayas and Kınık as the town centres of the district. 13 Enver Çakar, XVI. Yüzyılda Haleb Sancağı (1516–1566) (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları, 2003), 140. Date of surveys: 1520 and 1584. 14 Enver Çakar, Doğu Akdeniz Sahilinde Bir Osmanlı Sancağı, Trablus (1516-1579) (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2012), 223. In the second half of the 16th century, Cebele was separated from Tripoli as a new sancak so its statistics were added into to the Tripoli for the second surveys. Dilek Aslan, “512 Numaralı Mufassal Tahrir defterine göre 1571-1572 yıllarında Cebele Sancağı” (M.A. Thesis, Fırat University, 2006). Date of surveys: 1526 and 1571. 15 Rafet Metin, “XVI. Yüzyılda Orta Anadoluda Nüfus ve Yerleşme (Bozok, Kırşehir, Niğde, Nevşehir, Keskin)” (PhD diss., Gazi University, 2007), 90–2. The dates of survey: 1518 and 1584. It is the total number of urban population for Niğde sancağı (Niğde, Bor, Ürgüp, Karahisar and Develi districts) and the statistics refer to nefer due to the unavaliability of hane numbers in the latter survey.

197

16 Mehmet Ali Ünal, Osmanlı Devrinde Sinop (Isparta: Fakülte Kitabevi, 2008), 100–1. Date of Surveys: 1530 and 1584. 17 Hanefi Bostan, XV-XVI. Asırlarda Trabzon Sancağında Sosyal ve İktisadi Hayat (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2002), 163-165 and 172-174. Date of surveys 1520 and 1583. 18 Ibid., 213. 19 Mehtap Özdeğer, 15. ve 16. Yüzyıl arşiv kaynaklarına göre Uşak kazasının sosyal ve ekonomik tarihi (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 2001), 61. Date of surveys; 1520 and 1570. 20 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia. 21 Ali Yılmaz, XVI. Yüzyılda Birecik Sancağı (İstanbul: Kitaplık Yayınları, 2009) 22 Hüseyin Özdeğer, XVI. Yüzyıl tahrir defterlerine göre Antep’in Sosyal ve Ekonomik Durumu (İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Yayınları, 1982) For Antep, the subdistricts, Nehrülcevaz and Telbaşer were not included into the rural population due to the lack of statistics at the first survey. Date of surveys: 1536 and 1574. 23 Arıkan, XV. ve XVI. Yüzyıllarda Hamit Sancağı. 47-64. Date of surveys: 1522 and 1568. 24 Öz, XV-XVI. Yüzyıllarda Canik Sancağı, 64. Date of surveys: 1520 and 1576. 25 Mehmet Akif Erdogdu, Osmanlı Yönetiminde Beyşehir Sancağı, (Istanbul, IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006) Date of surveys: 1522 and 1584. 26 Faroqhi, “Taxation and Urban Activities in Sixteenth-Century Anatolia,” 39–41. Hereafter, all statistics are taken from Faroqhi’s compilation.

198

APPENDIX II Rural Demographic Change in the Sixteenth Century Ottoman Anatolia

1520s-30s 1570s-80s Percentage Districts/Provinces Number of Number of Change Households Households 1 Manisa 1542 2161 40% 2

Menemen 1370 1444 5% s

n 3 Aydın 5747 6181 8%

gio 4

Çeşme 3308 2676 -19% re 5

İzmir 4100 2609 -36% an

e 6

Muğla 5712 5872 2% n a 7

r Antalya 8418 8178 -3% r e 8 it Tarsus 8341 12245 47% d 9 Adana 1147 779 -32%

Me 10 Aleppo 26668 30761 15% 11

Tripoli 13728 11602 -15%

12 Bozok (Yozgat) 13785 42736 210% Kırşehir 9222 24346 160% Niğde 12596 39400 212% 13 Çubuk (Ankara) 3425 8467 147%

14 s Larende (Karaman) 5322 12762 139% n 15 Rum (Tokat) 5435 9731 132% gio 16

e Burdur 12617 23125 83% R 17 n Lazikiyye (Denizli) 2699 5845 116%

er 18

Canik (Samsun) 11873 21041 77% th

r 19 Harput 5333 11332 112%

No 20

Birecik 1753 3359 92% d

n 21 422 2227 428%

a Maraş

s 22

n Amasya 9171 15754 72% 23 gio Uşak 2035 3450 70%

re 24

Antep 1639 2579 57% r e 25

Aksaray 3386 13625 302% nn I Koçhisar 39 3239 26 Zamantu (kayseri) 1802 5635 212% 27 Adıyaman 3410 10105 196% 28 Ruha sancağı 1334 5257 294% 29

Ereğli (Konya) 3342 6642 98%

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1 Emecen, XVI. Asırda Manisa Kazası, 125. 2 Bakkal, Menemen Kazası, 80–156. 3 Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 84. 4 Kütükoğlu, XVI. Asırda Çeşme, 54-66. 5 Kütükoğlu, XV. ve XVI. Asırlarda İzmir, 88. 6 Mete, XV. ve XVI. Yüzyıllarda Muğla ve Yöresi, 229. 7 Karaca, XV. ve XVI. Yüzyıllarda Teke Sancağı, 158. 8 Ali Sinan Bilgili, Osmanlı Döneminde Tarsus Sancağı ve Tarsus Türkmenleri: Sosyo-ekonomik Tarih (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 2001), 342–4. 9 Yılmaz Kurt, “16. Yüzyıl Adana Tarihi,” 98. 10 Çakar, XVI. Yüzyılda Haleb Sancağı (1516 – 1566), 153. 11 Enver Çakar, Doğu Akdeniz Sahilinde Bir Osmanlı Sancağı, Trablus (1516-1579), 245. 12 Metin, “XVI. Yüzyılda Orta Anadoluda Nüfus ve Yerleşme,” 94–108. Following sancaks (Kırşehir and Niğde) are also extracted from this work. 13 Çınar and Gümüşçü, Osmanlı’dan Cumhuriyet’e Çubuk Kazası, 103–6. 14 Osman Gümüşçü, Tarihi Coğrafya açısından bir araştırma: XVI. Yüzyıl Larende (Karaman) kazasında yerleşme ve nüfus (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2001), 153. 15 İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant, 175. 16 Arıkan, XV. ve XVI. Yüzyıllarda Hamit Sancağı, 75–6. 17 Gökçe, XVI. ve XVII. Yüzyıllarda Lazıkiyye (Denizli) Kazası, 307–12. 18 Öz, Canik Sancağı, 64. 19 Mehmet Ali Ünal, XVI. Yüzyılda Harput Sancağı: 1518-1566 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989) 20 Yılmaz, XVI. Yüzyılda Birecik Sancağı. 21 Solak, 16. Asırda Maraş Kazası (1526 – 1563), 51–117. 22 Özel, The Collapse of Rural Order in Ottoman Anatolia, 113. 23 Mehtap Özdeğer, 15. Ve 16. Yüzyıl arşiv kaynaklarına göre Uşak kazasının sosyal ve ekonomik tarihi. 24 Hüseyin Özdeğer, XVI. Yüzyıl tahrir defterlerine göre Antep’in Sosyal ve Ekonomik Durumu, 101–7. 25 Yörük, XVI. Yüzyılda Aksaray Sancağı, 76. Statistics of Koçhisar is also taken from the same work, p. 104. 26 İbrahim Solak, XVI. Yüzyılda Zamantu Kazasının Sosyal ve İktisadi Yapısı (Konya: Tablet, 2007), 212. 27 Taşdemir, XVI. Asırda Adıyaman, 50–95. (Hısn-ı Mansur, Behisti, Kahta, Gerger are included into this statistic) 28 Turan, XVI. Asirda Ruha (Urfa) Sancağı, 44. 29 Yörük, XVI. Asırda Ereğli Kazası, 74.

200

APPENDIX III

Nüzul Taxes Imposed on Provinces in 1590 and 1637-38

1590 Nüzul Survey 1637-38 Nüzul Survey Number of Number of Province District1 Flour Barley Total Flour Barley Total Avarızhane Avarızhane Saruhan Güzelhisar 225 37.5 112.5 150.0 134.00 67.00 268.00 335.00 Gördük 309 51.5 154.5 206.0 200.00 100.00 400.00 500.00 Ilıca 329 55.5 164.5 220.0 105.00 52.50 210.00 262.50 Akhisar 526 87.0 263.0 350.0 350.00 175.00 700.00 875.00 Mendehorye 161 27.0 80.5 107.0 67.00 33.50 134.00 167.50 Atala 491 81.0 245.52 327.0 177.00 88.25 354.00 442.50 Marmara 425 70.0 212.5 283.0 180.50 90.25 361.00 451.25 Kayacık 270 45.0 135.0 180.0 170.50 85.25 341.00 426.25 Gördes 525 87.5 262.5 350.0 411.50 205.75 823.00 1038.75 Manisa 1355 225.8 677.5 895.0 973.00 486.50 1946.50 2433.00 Borlu 553 92.2 276.5 365.0 155.00 77.50 310.00 387.50 Demirci3 2169 361.5 1084.5 1445.0 383.00 191.50 766.00 957.50 Tarhaniyat 987 164.5 493.5 658.0 620.00 310.00 1240.00 1550.00 Perakende 520 86.7 260.0 345.0 73.00 36.50 146.00 182.50 Total 4422.5 7999.50 Kütahya Kütahya 4442 765.0 2196.0 2961.0 945.50 472.50 1891.00 2363.50 Geyikler 234 39.0 117.0 156.0 55.50 27.75 111.00 138.75 Gököyük 1008 168.0 504.0 672.0 140.00 70.00 280.00 350.00 Küre 152 25.0 76.0 101.0 34.00 17.00 68.00 85.00 Selendi 655 109.0 327.0 436.0 69.50 34.75 139.00 173.75 Dağardı 249 41.5 124.5 166.0 120.00 60.00 240.00 300.00 Eşme 180 30.0 90.0 120.0 22.50 11.25 45.00 56.25

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Kayı 450 75.0 225.0 300.0 43.50 21.75 87.00 108.75 Şeyhlu 835 139.0 417.5 556.0 200.00 100.00 400.00 500.00 Çarşamba 714 119.0 357.0 476.0 115.00 57.50 230.00 287.50 Bozguş 2165 361.0 1082.5 1442.0 100.00 50.00 200.00 250.00 Eğrigöz 611 101.5 306.5 407.0 284.00 142.00 568.00 710.00 Kula 1455 242.5 727.5 970.0 268.50 134.25 537.00 671.25 Simav 1100 183.0 550.0 733.3 402.00 201.00 804.00 1005.00 Homa 978 163.0 489.0 652.0 67.00 33.50 134.00 168.75 Banaz 272 45.5 136.0 181.5 57.50 28.75 115.00 143.75 Honaz 516 86.0 258.0 344.0 77.00 38.50 154.00 192.50 Uşak 1768 294.0 884.0 1178.7 200.00 100.00 400.00 500.00 Total 8867.5 6403.00 Ankara Ankara 1551 258.5 775.5 1034.0 520.00 260.00 1040.00 1300.00 Yörükan 808 134.5 404.0 538.0 79.00 39.00 158.00 197.00 Çukurcak 323 54.0 161.0 215.0 17.00 8.75 35.25 43.50 Yabanabad 930 155.0 465.0 620.0 269.50 135.75 541.00 676.00 Bacı 382 63.5 191.0 254.0 44.50 22.25 89.00 111.25 Ayaş 1020 170.0 510.0 680.0 204.00 102.00 408.00 510.00 Şorba 459 76.5 229.5 306.0 146.00 73.00 292.00 365.00 Murtazabad 898 149.5 449.0 598.0 111.50 55.75 223.00 278.75 Total 3185.0 2786.25 Karahisar-ı Karamuk 198 33.0 99.0 132.0 41.50 20.75 83.00 103.75 Sahib Barcınlu 156 26.0 78.0 104.0 18.50 9.25 37.00 46.25 Sandıklu 765 126.0 380.0 506.0 180.00 90.00 360.00 450.00 Karahisar- Sahib 1592 265.0 796.0 1061.0 233.00 116.50 466.00 582.50 Sıçanlu 470 78.0 235.0 313.0 63.50 31.75 127.00 158.75 Çöleabad 300 50.0 150.0 200.0 81.50 40.75 163.00 203.75 Bolvadin 740 123.0 370.0 493.0 26.00 13.00 52.00 65.00

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Şuhut 200 33.3 100.0 133.3 120.00 60.00 240.00 300.00 Çay 230 38.3 115.0 153.3 32.50 16.25 65.00 81.25 Nevahi-i Barcınlu 200 33.3 100.0 133.3 24.00 12.00 48.00 60.00 Total 2423.0 1641.00 Hamiteli Keçiborlu 267 44.5 133.5 178.0 79.00 39.50 158.00 197.50 Gönen 335 56.0 167.5 223.3 21.00 10.50 42.00 52.50 Pavli 704 117.5 351.0 469.0 50.00 25.00 100.00 125.00 Eğridir 1512 252.0 756.0 1008.0 168.50 84.25 337.00 421.25 Yalvaç 876 146.0 438.0 584.0 92.00 46.00 184.00 230.00 Burdur 900 150.0 450.0 600.0 93.50 46.75 187.00 233.75 Avşar 520 86.5 260.0 346.0 70.00 35.00 140.00 175.00 Barla 213 35.5 106.5 142.0 23.00 11.50 46.00 57.50 Yalvaç-ı karaağaç 572 95.0 286.0 381.0 158.00 79.00 316.00 395.00 Gölhisar 800 133.0 400.0 533.0 146.00 73.00 292.00 365.00 Uluborlu 908 151.0 454.0 605.0 86.00 43.00 172.00 215.00 Kemer 270 45.0 135.0 180.0 25.50 12.75 51.00 63.75 Ağlasun 526 87.7 263.0 350.7 37.50 18.75 75.00 93.75 Irla 345 57.5 172.5 230.0 67.50 33.75 135.00 168.75 Yavıca 327 54.5 163.5 218.0 48.00 24.00 96.00 120.00 Isparta 634 105.7 317.0 422.7 100.00 50.00 200.00 250.00 Doyran 1047 174.5 523.5 698.0 64.00 32.00 128.00 160.00 Agras 508 84.7 254.0 338.7 75.00 37.50 150.00 187.50 Siroz 420 70.0 210.0 280.0 50.00 25.00 100.00 125.00 Gölhisar-ı Karaağaç 845 141.0 422.5 563.5 234.00 117.00 468.00 585.00 Total 6263.5 3377 Teke Finike 708 118.0 354.0 472.0 80.00 40.00 160.00 200.00 Elmalı 726 121.0 363.0 484.0 250.00 125.00 500.00 625.00 Kaş 782 130.3 391.0 521.0 144.00 72.00 288.00 360.00 Antalya 940 156.7 470.0 626.0 439.00 219.50 878.00 1097.50

203

Karahisar-ı teke 1180 196.7 590.0 786.0 80.00 40.00 160.00 200.00 Kalkanlu 261 43.5 130.5 174.0 80.00 40.00 160.00 200.00 Total 2298.5 2146.00 Kangiri Çankırı 1205 201.0 602.0 805.0 66.50 33.00 312.00 165.00 Kalecik 446 74.0 223.0 297.0 38.00 19.00 76.00 95.00 Karıpazarı 293 49.0 146.0 195.0 33.50 16.75 67.00 83.75 Milan 466 77.0 233.0 310.0 46.00 23.50 92.00 115.50 Koçhisar 185 31.0 92.0 123.0 49.00 24.50 98.00 122.50 Kargu 300 50.0 150.0 200.0 32.00 16.00 64.00 80.00 Kurşunlu 725 121.0 362.0 483.0 29.00 14.50 58.00 72.50 Tosya 545 91.0 272.5 363.5 179.00 89.50 358.00 447.50 Çerkeş 1272 212.0 636.0 848.0 74.00 37.00 148.00 185.00 Tohta 672 112.0 336.0 448.0 40.00 20.00 80.00 100.00 Keskin 165 27.5 82.5 110.0 8.00 4.00 16.00 20.00 Total 3135.0 1369.0 Sultanözü Seydigazi 159 26.0 80.0 106.0 50.00 25.00 100.00 125.00 Eskişehir 474 79.0 239.0 316.0 199.00 99.50 398.00 497.50 Karacaşehir 368 62.0 183.0 245.0 160.00 80.00 320.00 400.00 İnönü 300 50.0 150.0 200.0 50.00 25.00 100.00 125.00 Bilecik 230 38.3 115.0 153.3 90.00 45.00 180.00 225.00 Total 767.0 1098.00 Konya Konya 2216 369.0 1108.0 1477.0 268.50 268.50 805.50 1074.00 Belviran 911 152.0 455.0 607.0 43.25 43.25 129.75 173.00 Gafirbad 936 156.0 468.0 624.0 31.00 31.00 93.00 124.00 Aladağ 504 85.0 245.5 339.5 30.00 30.00 90.00 120.00 Larende 1598 266.0 799.0 1065.0 87.00 87.00 261.00 348.00 Total 3075.5 1379.25 Niğde Niğde 2148 357.5 1074.5 1432.0 207.75 207.75 623.25 831.00 Şamardı 316 52.5 158.0 210.0 13.25 13.25 39.75 53.00

204

Develu 620 103.0 310.0 413.0 49.00 49.00 147.00 196.00 Bor 1161 193.5 581.5 774.5 42.00 42.00 126.00 168.00 Ürgüp 796 132.5 398.0 530.0 106.50 106.50 319.50 426.00 Karahisar 713 119.0 356.5 475.0 75.50 75.50 226.50 302.00 Şücaettin 592 98.5 296.0 394.0 15.50 15.50 46.50 62.00 Anduğu 445 74.0 222.0 296.0 34.00 34.00 102.00 136.00 Total 3396.5 1630.5 Aksaray Aksaray 2050 341.7 1025.0 1366.7 91.50 91.50 274.50 366.00 Akşehir Akşehir 1168 195.0 585.0 780.0 87.00 87.00 261.00 348.00 İshaklı 675 112.5 337.5 450.0 43.00 43.00 129.00 172.00 Doğanhisarı 510 85.0 255.0 340.0 28.50 28.50 85.50 114.00 Ilgın 440 73.0 220.0 293.3 140.25 140.25 420.75 561.00 Total 1397.5 896.25 Beyşehir Beyşehir 1636 275.0 815.5 1090.0 104.00 104.00 312.00 416.00 Seydişehir 1290 215.0 645.0 860.0 104.75 104.75 314.25 419.00 Bozkır 767 127.5 384.0 511.0 54.00 162.00 54.00 216.00 Yenişehir 276 46.0 138.0 184.0 41.00 41.00 123.00 164.00 Kıreli 661 110.0 330.0 440.0 54.00 54.00 162.00 216.00 Total 2312.5 965.25 Kırşehir Kırşehir 1213 202.0 606.0 808.0 56.00 56.00 168.00 224.00 Keskün 663 110.5 331.5 442.0 40.00 40.00 120.00 160.00 Selmanlu 514 85.5 257.0 342.0 45.25 45.25 135.75 181.00 Total 1194.5 423.75 Kayseri Kayseri 2978 496.3 1489.0 1985.3 311.25 311.25 933.75 1245.00 Amasya Gedegre 1150 192.0 574.0 766.0 184.75 184.75 554.25 739.00 Amasya 2684 447.0 1342.5 1789.5 107.50 107.50 322.50 430.00 Altunabad 420 70.0 210.0 280.0 24.25 24.25 72.75 97.00 Merzifon 276 46.0 138.0 184.0 19.00 19.00 57.00 76.00 Merzifonabad 548 91.0 274.0 365.3 14.00 14.00 43.00 56.00

205

Havza 704 117.0 352.0 469.0 45.25 45.25 135.75 181.00 Gümüş 359 60.0 180.0 240.0 15.50 15.50 46.50 62.00 Zeytun 485 81.0 242.0 323.3 107.00 107.00 321.00 428.00 Total 3312.5 1552.75 Çorum Çorum 1015 169.0 507.0 676.7 46.75 46.75 140.25 187.00 Karahisar demirli 145 24.0 72.0 96.7 5.25 5.25 15.75 21.00 İskilip 1090 181.5 544.0 726.7 103.50 103.50 310.50 414.00 Katar 195 32.5 97.5 130.0 25.00 25.00 75.00 100.00 Total 1220.5 541.5 Bozok Bozok 1085 180.8 542.5 723.3 30.00 30.00 90.00 120.00 Sorkun 516 86.0 258.0 344.0 45.25 45.25 135.75 181.00 Akdağ 1180 196.7 590.0 786.7 41.75 41.75 125.25 167.00 Selmanlu 594 99.0 297.0 396.0 32.50 32.50 97.50 130.00 Total 1687.5 448.5 Divriği Divriği 1618 269.0 808.0 1078.0 89.00 89.00 267.00 356.00 Canik Meydan 185 31.0 93.0 124.0 25.00 25.00 75.00 100.00 Satılmış 831 148.5 415.5 554.0 20.00 20.00 60.00 80.00 Kavak 401 67.0 200.5 267.5 29.00 29.00 87.00 116.00 Bafra 749 125.0 374.0 490.0 70.50 70.50 211.50 282.00 Alaçam 186 31.0 93.0 124.0 25.00 25.00 75.00 100.00 Samsun 617 103.0 307.0 410.0 54.00 54.00 162.00 216.00 Total 1483.0 670.50 Sivas Sivas 1200 200.0 600.0 800.0 85.50 85.50 256.50 342.00 Sivas ili 1239 206.5 619.5 826.0 32.00 32.00 96.00 128.00 Sunisa 494 82.0 247.5 329.5 24.25 24.25 72.75 97.00 Hüseyinabad 75 12.5 37.5 50.0 4.75 4.75 14.50 19.25 Şarki pare 789 131.5 394.5 526.0 28.00 28.00 84.00 112.00 İlbeylü 411 68.5 205.5 274.0 40.00 40.00 120.00 160.00 Niksar 392 65.0 196.0 261.0 59.50 59.50 177.75 237.00

206

Etrak 260 43.0 130.5 173.5 26.50 26.50 79.50 106.00 Karayaka 139 23.0 69.0 92.0 31.00 31.00 93.00 124.00 Karakuş 70 11.5 35.0 46.5 21.00 21.00 63.00 84.00 Kelmigat 320 54.0 163.0 217.0 13.00 13.00 39.00 52.00 Zile 864 143.0 433.0 576.0 20.00 20.00 60.00 80.00 Karahisar B.Ş. 579 96.5 289.5 386.0 37.75 37.75 113.25 151.00 Turhal 683 113.0 343.0 455.0 13.25 13.25 39.75 53.00 inallimallı 400 66.5 200.0 266.0 6.00 6.00 18.00 24.00 Kazabat 1781 296.0 890.0 1187.0 61.50 61.50 184.50 246.00 Tokat 2754 459.0 1377.0 1836.0 142.50 142.50 427.50 570.00 Mecitözü 480 80.0 240.0 320.0 26.50 26.50 79.50 106.00 Total 6470.5 2020.50

Maraş Maraş 8678 1446.3 4339.0 5785.3 498.00 498.00 1494.00 1992.00 Kars 3808 634.7 1904.0 2538.7 50.00 50.00 150.00 200.00 Elbistan 2478 413.0 1239.0 1652.0 101.00 101.00 303.00 404.00 Total 7482.0 1947.00 Birecik Birecik 713 118.8 356.5 475.3 60.50 60.50 181.50 242.00 Nizip 928 154.7 464.0 618.7 33.50 33.50 100.50 134.00 Rumkale 1328 221.3 664.0 885.3 20.00 20.00 60.00 80.00 Total 2969 494.8 1484.5 1979.3 114.00 114.00 342.00 456.00

1 The districts which are defined as “niyamedgan” (the districts which did not send their taxes as kind on time) are also included into the table but they are shaded as blue. 2 There are several typos on the list prepared by Güçer; My corrections are noted in red to distinguish them from Güçer’s original figures. 3 There are two entries on the district of Demirci as ‘Demirci’ and ‘Demirci perakende’ in the survey of 1590 whereas there is a single entry to describe them allfor the latter survey. Therefore, I sum up these two entries for the survey of 1590 in order to reach a meaningful comparison

207

APPENDIX IV

Revenues of Izmir Customs, Erzurum Customs and Imperıal Treasury

from Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries

e e

Akçe

Years Years

Revenue Revenue

CPI in CPI

Constant

inConstant

Imperial Budget Imperial

Erzurum Customs Customs Erzurum

Budget Imperial in

Izmir Customs Revenue Customs Izmir

Erzurum Custom Revenu Custom Erzurum

Izmir Revenue in Revenue Constant Izmir

1579 323,029 2.16 1579 149,550 1580 2.18 1580

1581 2.22 1581 284,160,398 128,000,179

1582 2.29 1582 313,744,645 137,006,395

1583 2,270,000 2.29 1583 991,266 1584 2.36 1584

1585 3.34 1585

1586 3,070,000 3.53 1586 870,632

208

1587 3,070,000 4.45 1587 689,261

1588 3,186,000 3.09 1588 1,031,068

1589 3,603,334 4.32 1589 368,259,689 834,105 85,245,298

1590 4,103,000 3.31 1590 9,550 293,400,000 1,239,577 2,885 88,640,483

1591 4,136,000 3.08 1591 1,342,857

1592 3.39 1592 249,252,188 73,525,719

1593 4,636,667 3.88 1593 267,028,985 1,195,017 68,821,903 1594 4.14 1594

1595 5.23 1595

1596 6.24 1596

1597 6.09 1597

1598 4.85 1598

1599 4.79 1599

1600 4.45 1600

1601 4.44 1601 2,822,460 635,689

1602 4.69 1602 294,238,930 62,737,512 1603 6.98 1603

209

1604 6,589,037 6.35 1604 1,037,665

1605 6,405,210 6.28 1605 1,019,938

1606 6,177,956 6.59 1606 2,600,000 937,474 394,537

1607 5.52 1607 3,333,333 603,865

1608 6,113,581 5.52 1608 4,000,000 425,691,446 1,107,533 724,638 77,118,016

1609 4.44 1609 4,500,000 1,012,560 1610 4.10 1610

1611 6,191,369 4.12 1611 4,500,000 1,502,759 1,092,233

1612 6,413,581 4.05 1612 5,000,000 1,583,600 1,234,568

1613 6,413,581 4.16 1613 1,541,726

1614 6,419,137 4.82 1614 4,500,000 1,331,771 933,610 1615 5.26 1615

1616 5.06 1616

1617 6,469,140 3.99 1617 1,621,338 1618 4.44 1618

1619 4.63 1619

1620 7.10 1620

210

1621 7.34 1621 4,400,000 599,455 1622 7.11 1622

1623 8,073,225 6.88 1623 1,173,434

1624 8,073,225 6.33 1624 1,275,391

1625 8,073,225 4.20 1625 1,922,196 1626 4.71 1626

1627 4.49 1627

1628 4.40 1628

1629 7,906,565 4.47 1629 3,600,000 1,768,806 805,369

1630 5.18 1630 3,600,000 694,981

1631 5.51 1631 8,000,000 1,451,906

1632 5.32 1632 8,000,000 1,503,759

1633 5.36 1633 8,000,000 1,492,537

1634 5.05 1634 8,000,000 1,584,158

1635 5.31 1635 8,000,000 1,506,591

1636 6.31 1636 9,600,000 1,521,395

1637 6.36 1637 9,600,000 1,509,434

211

1638 6.05 1638 9,600,000 1,586,777 1639 5.19 1639

1640 4.45 1640

1641 4.29 1641

1642 3.79 1642

1643 4.04 1643 526,972,708 130,438,789 1644 3.95 1644

1645 11,398,222 4.19 1645 7,380,000 2,720,339 1,761,337

1646 10,000,931 4.21 1646 7,380,000 2,375,518 1,752,969

1647 10,000,931 4.78 1647 7,380,000 2,092,245 1,543,933 1648 4.80 1648

1649 4.31 1649

1650 10,000,931 4.36 1650 7,380,000 2,293,792 1,692,661

1651 4.41 1651 7,380,000 1,673,469

1652 4.58 1652 7,380,000 1,611,354

1653 4.51 1653 517,271,470 114,694,339

1654 4.54 1654 558,541,856 123,026,841

212

1655 11,500,931 4.82 1655 2,386,085 1656 6.25 1656

1657 5.69 1657

1658 5.14 1658

1659 6.01 1659

1660 7.23 1660

1661 5.83 1661 601,270,828 103,133,933

1662 12,222,233 5.15 1662 2,373,249 1663 5.05 1663

1664 4.98 1664

1665 5.28 1665

1666 5.94 1666 553,429,239 93,239,386

1667 6.34 1667 7,687,520 1,211,799

1668 6.42 1668 7,687,520 1,197,540

1669 10,000,000 6.25 1669 9,756,000 612,528,960 1,600,000 1,560,960 98,004,634

1670 6.07 1670 9,756,000 1,608,430 1671 6.65 1671

213

1672 6.18 1672 11,526,480 1,865,126

1673 13,000,000 6.66 1673 11,526,480 1,951,952 1,730,703

1674 13,000,000 7.30 1674 11,526,480 1,780,822 1,578,970

1675 13,000,000 7.79 1675 11,526,480 1,668,806 1,479,651

1676 13,000,000 7.78 1676 11,526,480 1,670,951 1,481,553

1677 13,000,000 7.57 1677 1,717,305

1678 13,000,000 8.39 1678 1,549,464

1679 13,000,000 7.66 1679 1,696,906

1680 13,000,000 7.51 1680 1,730,887

1681 13,000,000 6.80 1681 1,911,765

1682 13,000,000 7.79 1682 1,668,806

1683 13,184,584 7.09 1683 1,859,581 1684 7.44 1684

1685 8.13 1685

1686 7.68 1686

1687 7.18 1687

1688 10,184,584 7.29 1688 11,696,580 1,397,062 1,604,469

214

1689 10,184,584 7.72 1689 10,953,600 1,319,247 1,418,860

1690 10,184,584 9.55 1690 13,840,980 1,066,994 1,450,058

1691 10,184,584 8.85 1691 11,411,280 1,102,337,089 1,150,800 1,289,410 124,557,863

1692 10,184,584 7.42 1692 1,066,534,224 1,372,585 143,737,766

1693 10,184,584 7.70 1693 11,411,280 1,004,671,100 1,322,673 1,481,984 130,476,766

1694 7.70 1694 1,123,070,025 145,853,250

1695 10,184,584 7.98 1695 1,276,264

1696 9,864,584 7.22 1696 1,091,310,747 1,366,286 151,151,073

1697 9,864,584 7.50 1697 1,315,278

1698 12,824,584 7.37 1698 11,439,780 1,337,515,180 1,740,234 1,552,322 181,494,295 1699 7.94 1699

1700 6.95 1700 11,599,740 1,232,787,944 1,668,470 177,320,351

1701 5.06 1701 1,182,327,378 233,819,662

1702 12,824,584 4.99 1702 11,850,360 1,282,844,599 2,572,466 2,377,048 257,324,073

1703 14,273,684 5.30 1703 11,854,200 2,693,148 2,236,642

1704 7.46 1704 11,827,200 1,317,247,770 1,586,225 176,664,960

215

1705 12,885,424 5.58 1705 12,006,960 2,309,216 2,151,785

1706 12,448,629 5.50 1706 12,006,960 1,250,557,856 2,261,776 2,181,530 227,212,336

1707 5.60 1707 12,444,600 2,222,250

1708 5.69 1708 13,350,600 2,345,135

1709 5.52 1709 12,873,600 2,331,554

1710 15,252,572 7.34 1710 12,218,160 1,361,091,157 2,077,017 1,663,806 185,346,382

1711 6.89 1711 12,176,100 1,766,116

1712 6.43 1712 12,496,740 1,943,505

1713 7.70 1713 12,607,080 1,636,893

1714 7.44 1714 12,777,480 1,716,647

1715 6.66 1715 15,759,480 2,365,580

1716 18,200,430 7.02 1716 17,489,040 2,591,184 2,489,903

1717 6.75 1717 17,801,040 2,635,267

1718 6.91 1718 14,262,360 2,064,017

1719 7.38 1719 15,095,040 2,044,822 1720 6.95 1720

216

1721 6.57 1721

1722 6.34 1722 14,881,020 2,347,910

1723 6.67 1723 15,835,680 2,375,383

1724 7.17 1724 13,395,960 1,868,335

1725 6.90 1725 18,195,960 2,637,096

1726 6.23 1726 14,629,920 2,347,366

1727 7.53 1727 12,851,220 1,705,638

1728 8.08 1728 12,851,220 1,590,498

1729 6.20 1729 15,369,420 2,478,939

1730 7.97 1730 14,629,920 1,835,624

1731 7.36 1731 14,629,920 1,987,761

1732 7.36 1732 13,430,940 1,824,856

1733 6.74 1733 13,604,160 2,018,421

1734 6.72 1734 13,703,460 1,385,156,479 2,039,205 206,124,476

1735 7.97 1735 12,519,780 1,570,863

1736 8.12 1736 12,519,780 1,541,397

217

1737 8.92 1737 15,657,300 1,755,303

1738 8.35 1738 15,415,440 1,846,160

1739 10.96 1739 15,468,840 1,411,391

1740 10.91 1740 14,320,860 1,312,636

1741 10.65 1741 14,328,540 1,345,403

1742 19,553,640 8.89 1742 2,198,667

1743 28,597,260 8.01 1743 3,570,195

1744 27,559,440 10.39 1744 13,333,800 2,652,497 1,283,330

1745 20,404,200 7.33 1745 12,404,700 2,783,656 1,692,319

1746 21,568,140 10.09 1746 11,343,120 1,542,862,800 2,137,576 1,124,194 152,910,089

1747 21,695,460 10.91 1747 13,554,480 1,652,123,440 1,988,585 1,242,390 151,432,029

1748 23,789,460 11.18 1748 1,652,123,500 2,127,859 147,774,911

1749 20,986,500 9.89 1749 2,121,992

1750 21,430,320 10.17 1750 2,107,209

1751 23,598,420 9.23 1751 2,556,992

1752 25,229,580 7.70 1752 13,557,480 3,276,569 1,760,712

218

1753 7.88 1753

1754 10.40 1754 13,558,080 1,303,736

1755 10.47 1755 13,558,080 1,295,461

1756 12.29 1756 9,614,160 782,387

1757 12.24 1757 9,779,160 798,951

1758 10.78 1758 9,723,000 901,948

1759 11.05 1759 9,738,960 881,690

1760 10.12 1760 9,738,960 962,359

1761 12.35 1761 1,744,792,620 141,282,024 1762 9.29 1762

1763 9.62 1763

1764 9.80 1764 9,780,960 998,222

1765 9.81 1765 9,958,980 1,014,856 1766 10.99 1766

1767 12.09 1767

1768 16.02 1768 9,985,800 623,306 1769 19.12 1769

219

1770 1770

4 All sources for the customs registers of Izmir are from Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi: MAD 9858, 92; MAD 4595; D.BŞM.D 182; D.HMK.d 22013, 2; D.HMK.d 22014; MAD 6632, 8; EV.HMH.d 202, 3; D. HMK.d 22017, 4; D. HMK.d 22017, 28; D. HMK.d 22017, 48; D.HMK. D 22017, 90; MAD 9858, 7; D.BŞM.d 408, 2; MAD 9858, 6, 18; EV.HMH.d 396, 2; MAD 9858, 92, 102, 116, 126, 146, 168; MAD 18491, 4; D. HMK.d 22046; Cevdet Maliye 18/250; Cevdet Maliye 25/669; Cevdet Maliye 2653; D.BŞM.d 1170; Cevdet Maliye 7627; Cevdet Maliye 31649. Mübahat Kütükoğlu, XVI. Asırda Çeşme Kazasının Sosyal ve İktisadi Yapısı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları 2010), 188–90. Suraiya Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting 1520-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 313. 5 For the statistics of Erzurum: Bilgehan Pamuk, XVII. Yüzyılda bir serhad şehri: Erzurum (İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006), Neşe Erim, “Onsekizinci Yüzyılda Erzurum Gümrüğü” (PhD diss., İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1984). For the 18th century, the customs revenues are given in Ottoman gurush on archival documents, I converted them into akçe in order to reach a consistent comparison. 1 gurush was equal to 120 akçe for this period. 6 For the imperial budgets: Baki Çakır, “Geleneksel Dönem (Tanzimat Öncesi) Osmanlı Bütçe Gelirleri,” in Osmanlı Maliyesi: Kurumlar ve Bütçeler, ed. Mehmet Genç and Erol Özvar (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006), 167–96. For the 18th century, several figures were given in Ottoman gurush and I converted them into akçe in order to create a consistent table. 7 Şevket Pamuk, İstanbul ve Diğer Kentlerde 500 Yıllık Fiyatlar ve Ücretler: 1469-1998 (Ankara: DİE, 2000)

220

APPENDIX V

Index of Izmir Customs, Eruzurum Customs and Imperıal Revenues

AKCE AKCE

1601=1

ERZURUM INDEX INDEX ERZURUM

CONSTANT AKCE

IZMIR REVENUE IN IN REVENUE IZMIR

IZMIR INDEX 1604=1 INDEX IZMIR

ERZURUM REVENUE ERZURUM AKCE CONSTANT IN

BUDGET1602=1 INDEX

BUDGET IN CONSTANT BUDGETCONSTANT IN

1579 0.14 149,550 1580

1581 2.04 128,000,179

1582 2.18 137,006,395

1583 0.96 991,266 1584

1585

1586 0.84 870,632

1587 0.66 689,261

1588 0.99 1,031,068

1589 0.80 1.36 834,105 85,245,298

1590 1.19 1.41 1,239,577 2,885 88,640,483

1591 1.29 1,342,857

1592 1.17 73,525,719

1593 1.15 1.10 1,195,017 68,821,903 1594

221

1595

1596

1597

1598

1599

1600

1601 1.00 635,689

1602 1.00 62,737,512 1603

1604 1.00 1,037,665

1605 0.98 1,019,938

1606 0.90 0.62 937,474 394,537

1607 0.95 603,865

1608 1.07 1.14 1.23 1,107,533 724,638 77,118,016

1609 1.59 1,012,560 1610

1611 1.45 1.72 1,502,759 1,092,233

1612 1.53 1.94 1,583,600 1,234,568

1613 1.49 1,541,726

1614 1.28 1.47 1,331,771 933,610 1615

1616

1617 1.56 1,621,338 1618

222

1619

1620

1621 0.94 599,455 1622

1623 1.13 1,173,434

1624 1.23 1,275,391

1625 1.85 1,922,196 1626

1627

1628

1629 1.70 1.27 1,768,806 805,369

1630 1.09 694,981

1631 2.28 1,451,906

1632 2.37 1,503,759

1633 2.35 1,492,537

1634 2.49 1,584,158

1635 2.37 1,506,591

1636 2.39 1,521,395

1637 2.37 1,509,434

1638 2.50 1,586,777 1639

1640

1641

223

1642

1643 2.08 130,438,789 1644

1645 2.62 2.77 2,720,339 1,761,337

1646 2.29 2.76 2,375,518 1,752,969

1647 2.02 2.43 2,092,245 1,543,933 1648

1649

1650 2.21 2.66 2,293,792 1,692,661

1651 2.63 1,673,469

1652 2.53 1,611,354

1653 1.83 114,694,339

1654 1.96 123,026,841

1655 2.30 2,386,085 1656

1657

1658

1659

1660

1661 1.64 103,133,933

1662 2.29 2,373,249 1663

1664

1665

224

1666 1.49 93,239,386

1667 1.91 1,211,799

1668 1.88 1,197,540

1669 1.54 2.46 1.56 1,600,000 1,560,960 98,004,634

1670 2.53 1,608,430 1671

1672 2.93 1,865,126

1673 1.88 2.72 1,951,952 1,730,703

1674 1.72 2.48 1,780,822 1,578,970

1675 1.61 2.33 1,668,806 1,479,651

1676 1.61 2.33 1,670,951 1,481,553

1677 1.65 1,717,305

1678 1.49 1,549,464

1679 1.64 1,696,906

1680 1.67 1,730,887

1681 1.84 1,911,765

1682 1.61 1,668,806

1683 1.79 1,859,581 1684

1685

1686

1687

1688 1.35 2.52 1,397,062 1,604,469

225

1689 1.27 2.23 1,319,247 1,418,860

1690 1.03 2.28 1,066,994 1,450,058

1691 1.11 2.03 1.99 1,150,800 1,289,410 124,557,863

1692 1.32 2.29 1,372,585 143,737,766

1693 1.27 2.33 2.08 1,322,673 1,481,984 130,476,766

1694 2.32 145,853,250

1695 1.23 1,276,264

1696 1.32 2.41 1,366,286 151,151,073

1697 1.27 1,315,278

1698 1.68 1.47 2.89 1,740,234 933,610 181,494,295 1699

1700 2.62 2.83 1,668,470 177,320,351

1701 3.73 233,819,662

1702 2.48 3.74 4.10 2,572,466 2,377,048 257,324,073

1703 2.60 3.52 2,693,148 2,236,642

1704 2.50 2.82 1,586,225 176,664,960

1705 2.23 3.38 2,309,216 2,151,785

1706 2.18 3.43 3.62 2,261,776 2,181,530 227,212,336

1707 3.50 2,222,250

1708 3.69 2,345,135

1709 3.67 2,331,554

1710 2.00 2.62 2.95 2,077,017 1,663,806 185,346,382

1711 2.78 1,766,116

226

1712 3.06 1,943,505

1713 2.57 1,636,893

1714 2.70 1,716,647

1715 3.72 2,365,580

1716 2.50 3.92 2,591,184 2,489,903

1717 4.15 2,635,267

1718 3.25 2,064,017

1719 3.22 2,044,822 1720

1721

1722 3.69 2,347,910

1723 3.74 2,375,383

1724 2.94 1,868,335

1725 4.15 2,637,096

1726 3.69 2,347,366

1727 2.68 1,705,638

1728 2.50 1,590,498

1729 3.90 2,478,939

1730 2.89 1,835,624

1731 3.13 1,987,761

1732 2.87 1,824,856

1733 3.18 2,018,421

1734 3.21 3.29 2,039,205 206,124,476

227

1735 2.47 1,570,863

1736 2.42 1,541,397

1737 2.76 1,755,303

1738 2.90 1,846,160

1739 2.22 1,411,391

1740 2.06 1,312,636

1741 2.12 1,345,403

1742 2.12 2,198,667

1743 3.44 3,570,195

1744 2.56 2.02 2,652,497 1,283,330

1745 2.68 2.66 2,783,656 1,692,319

1746 2.06 1.77 2.44 2,137,576 1,124,194 152,910,089

1747 1.92 1.95 2.41 1,988,585 1,242,390 151,432,029

1748 2.05 2.36 2,127,859 147,774,911

1749 2.04 2,121,992

1750 2.03 2,107,209

1751 2.46 2,556,992

1752 3.16 2.77 3,276,569 1,760,712 1753

1754 2.05 1,303,736

1755 2.04 1,295,461

1756 1.23 782,387

1757 1.26 798,951

228

1758 1.42 901,948

1759 1.39 881,690

1760 1.51 962,359

1761 2.25 141,282,024 1762

1763

1764 1.57 998,222

1765 1.60 1,014,856 1766

1767

1768 0.98 623,306 1769

1770

229

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