The Internet and Ethical Values Been Much More Successful

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The Internet and Ethical Values Been Much More Successful © Dong Wenjie/Getty Images © Dong Wenjie/Getty CHAPTER 1 The Internet and Ethical Values Many decades have passed since the first communications were trans- mitted over a fledgling global network, which would later be called the internet. At the time, few would have predicted the internet’s explosive growth and persistent encroachment on our personal and professional lives. For techno-optimists, the emancipatory promise of this technical infrastructure is still unfolding. As the internet matures it has become a more personal experience, thanks to the fusion of smartphones and social networks. Retrieving the latest news, an online search with Goo- gle’s help, listening to music, watching a YouTube video, and checking one’s Newsfeed on Facebook are just some of the activities done countless times each day with the help of apps and mobile devices.1 Some sovereignties, however, have felt threatened by this decen- tralized power and information egalitarianism. As a result, they have attempted to extend their power over this anarchic network and its information flows. However, the control of networked technologies through law and regulation has often been a futile effort. Technical infrastructures that expedite the flow of information can easily become a means for obstructing or excluding information. The regime of law has had a hard time suppressing the dissemination of pornography on the internet, but software systems that filter out indecent material have 1 © Jones & Bartlett Learning LLC, an Ascend Learning Company. NOT FOR SALE OR DISTRIBUTION. 2 Chapter 1 The Internet and Ethical Values been much more successful. This reality reflects technology’s paradox- ical nature—it not only endows individuals with the capacity to more fully exercise their rights (such as free speech), but it also makes possi- ble the development of tools that can undermine those rights. Although the primary axis of discussion in this text is the eth- ical issues that surface in the ever-expanding infosphere, we must devote attention to these related matters of cyber regulation and pub- lic policy. Thus, we explore in some detail the tensions between the radical empowerment network technologies have presumably allowed and the impulse to tame these technologies through laws and other mechanisms. Because this is a text about ethics, about acting in the right way as a human person in both the real and the virtual worlds, we begin by reviewing some basic concepts that will enrich our moral assessment of these issues. Hence, in this introductory chapter our purpose is to provide a concise overview of the traditional ethical frameworks that can guide our analysis of the moral dilemmas and social problems that arise in cyberspace. We should bear in mind, however, the insight of Aristotle, who reminds us that while ethics is an applied science, every science is only as accurate as the subject matter allows. Therefore, we cannot expect mathematical certainty in ethics any more than we can find such certainty in disciplines like psychology or sociology. At the same time, ethics is a rational discipline with intelligible and objective principles that can be taught and defended.2 In addition, we also elaborate here on the two underlying assump- tions of this work: (1) the directive and architectonic role of moral ideals and principles in determining responsible behavior in cyber- space and (2) our capacity to subject networked technologies to objec- tive moral evaluation. Let us begin with the initial premise concerning the proper role of cyberethics. Cyberethics and Code An ethical norm such as the imperative to be truthful is just one exam- ple of a constraint on our behavior. In the real world, there are other constraints, including the laws of civil society or even the social pres- sures of the communities in which we live and work. There are many forces at work limiting our behavior, but where does ethics fit in? This same question can be posed about cyberspace, and to help us reflect on this question we turn to the framework of Larry Lessig. In his highly influential book, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Lessig © Jones & Bartlett Learning LLC, an Ascend Learning Company. NOT FOR SALE OR DISTRIBUTION. Cyberethics and Code 3 carefully describes the four constraints that regulate our behavior in real space: law, norms, the market, and architecture. Laws, according to Lessig, are rules imposed by the government that are enforced through ex post sanctions. There is, for example, the complicated IRS tax code, a set of rules that dictates how much taxes we owe the federal government. If we break these legal rules, we can be subjected to fines or other sanctions levied by the government. Thanks to law’s coercive pedagogy, those who get caught violating tax laws are usually quick to reform. Social norms, on the other hand, are expressions of the community. Most communities have a well-defined sense of the common good, which is reflected in their norms or standards of behavior. There may be no laws against marijuana smoking in a private setting with young children present, but those who try to do so will most likely be stigma- tized and ostracized by others. When we deviate from these norms, we are behaving in a way that is socially “abnormal.” The third regulative force is the market. The market regulates through the price it sets for goods and services or for labor. Unlike norms and laws, market forces are not an expression of a community and they are imposed immediately (not in ex post fashion). Unless you hand over $4 at the local Starbucks, you cannot walk away with a cup of their coffee. The final modality of regulation is known as architecture. The world consists of many physical constraints on our behavior; some of these are natural (such as the Rocky Mountains), whereas others are human constructs (such as buildings and bridges). A room without windows imposes certain constraints because no one can see outside. Once again “enforcement” is not ex post, but at the same time the constraint is imposed. Moreover, this architectural constraint is “self- enforcing”—it does not require the intermediation of an agent who makes an arrest or who chastises a member of the community. According to Lessig, “the constraints of architecture are self-executing in a way that the constraints of law, norms, and the market are not.”3 Lessig explains that in cyberspace we are subject to the same four constraints. Laws, such as those that provide copyright and patent protection, regulate behavior by proscribing certain activities and by imposing ex post sanctions for violators. It may be commonplace to download copyrighted digital music and movies from unauthorized websites, but this activity breaks the law. Markets regulate commercial and personal interactions in cyber- space in various ways. The market reacted quite favorably to Google’s targeted ads based on their users’ behavioral data and rewarded the © Jones & Bartlett Learning LLC, an Ascend Learning Company. NOT FOR SALE OR DISTRIBUTION. 4 Chapter 1 The Internet and Ethical Values company with financial success. But the market has not been so kind to some of Google’s competitors who cannot match its tracking capa- bilities. Theoretically, consumers can migrate from privacy-invasive sites to those that respect privacy rights. It should be noted that the constraints of the market are often different in cyberspace than they are in real space. For instance, pornography is much easier and less expensive to distribute in cyberspace than in real space, and this increases its available supply. The counterpart of architectural constraints in the physical world is software “code,” that is, programs and protocols that make up the application layer of the internet. They, too, constrain and control our activities. These programs are often referred to as the “architectures of cyberspace.” Code, for example, limits access to certain websites by demanding a username and password. Cookie technology enables e-commerce but compromises the consumer’s privacy. Sophisticated software has been successfully deployed to filter out unsolicited com- mercial email (or spam). Finally, there is a changing set of norms that regulate cyberspace behavior, including internet etiquette and social customs. For example, spamming and hacking were always considered “bad form” on the internet, and those who did it were chastised by other members of the internet community. Just as in real space, cyberspace communities rely on shame and social stigma to enforce cultural norms. But what role does ethics play in this neat regulatory framework? Lessig apparently includes ethical standards in the broad category he calls “norms,” but in our view cultural norms should be segregated from ethical ideals and principles. Cultural norms are nothing more than variable social action guides, completely relative and dependent on a given social or cultural environment. Their validity depends to some extent on custom, prevalent attitudes, public opinion, and myr- iad other factors. Just as customs differ from country to country, the social customs of cyberspace could be quite different from the cus- toms found in real space. Also, these customs will likely undergo some transformation over time as the internet continues to evolve. The fundamental principles of ethics, however, are metanorms with universal validity. They remain the same whether we are doing busi- ness in Venezuela or interacting in cyberspace. Like cultural norms, they are prescriptive; however, unlike these norms, they have lasting and durable value because they transcend space and time. Ethics is primarily about (or should be about) the moral principles and norms of justice that apply to all human choices. © Jones & Bartlett Learning LLC, an Ascend Learning Company. NOT FOR SALE OR DISTRIBUTION. Cyberethics and Code 5 Our assumption that ethical standards are not reducible to customs or social convention defies the popular notions of personal or cultural relativism.
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